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Akhbari

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Akhbarism (Arabic: الأخبارية, romanizedal-ʾAkhbāriyya) is a minority Sect of Twelver Shia Islam. The term is usually used in contrast to the majority branch of Twelver Shia – the Usuli. Like the Usulis, they follow the Quran and Hadith, but unlike them, Akhbari rejects the use of reasoning by trained Islamic jurisprudents (faqih) to derive verdicts in Islamic law,[1] maintaining it is forbidden (haram) to follow the legal rulings of anyone but one of the "Fourteen Infallibles" of Twelver Islam.[2]

The term Akhbari comes from khabara'at, news or reports, while Usuli comes from Uṣūl al-fiqh, principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Akhbaris, unlike Usulis, do not accept Usul al-fiqh -- i.e. the attempt to draw up a coherent set of legal principles based on rulings made by the Imams prior to the Occultation (ghayba) of the last Imam, "married with other sources of revelation (such as the Quran)".[3] Akhbari also do not follow/imitate (taqleed) the teaching of a mujtahid, specifically a marja‘ (model for imitation) who practice a modern form of ijtihad (independent legal reasoning). Instead, Akhbaris imitate the Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi, (the Twelfth Akhbari of Shia, who is believed by Shia to be in the Occultation), on the grounds that the Imam is infallible and the marja‘ -- however learned in jurisprudence -- are not.[2] Knowledge of the religious rulings or Islamic jurisprudence used by Akhbaris is passed down by dead or living Muhaddith who have narrated the rulings hadith of The Fourteen Infallibles without interpreting them. Interpretation of the Quran, and complete in-depth gnostic knowledge (al-rāsikhūn fi al-ʿilm Arabic: الراسخون فی العلم) of revelation from the Imams is also passed down.

As of the twenty-first century, Akhbari form a tiny minority within Shia Islam, with Usulis making up the mainstream majority. Akhbarism started as a movement with the writings of Muhammad Amin al-Astarabadi (d. 1627) and achieved its greatest influence in the late Safavid (1501-1736) and early post-Safavid era. However, shortly thereafter Muhammad Baqir Behbahani (d. 1792), along with other Usuli mujtahids, crushed the Akhbari movement.[4] Today it is found primarily in the Basra area of southern Iraq (where they form the majority in many districts) although no longer in the city. They are also found in the island nation of Bahrain, Hyderabad, India, Tanzania and different cities of Pakistan[5] (Karachi, Sehwan, Hyderabad, Lahore, Faisalabad, Chakwaal, and Gojar Khan)[6] with reportedly "only a handful of Shi'i ulama" remaining Akhbari "to the present day."[7]

Background

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The gist of Akhbari ideology is that nothing but the aḥadīth of the Infallible can serve as authoritative evidence in Islam. Akhbaris consider themselves to be bounded by the "Hadith of the two weighty things" (Hadith ath-Thaqalayn), i.e. reported instructions by the Islamic prophet Muhammad to his followers to follow only two sources of divine guidance after his death — the Quran and his progeny, the Ahl al-Bayt, (which Twelvers consider to be the Twelve Imams). Therefore, even for new events occurring during the Major Occultation, Akhbaris continue to follow the traditions of Ahlul Bayt, as per the saying of Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi where he said "As for the new events, which will occur (during my occultation) turn to the narrators of our traditions, because they are my proof to you, while I am the proof of Allah to them"[8] Akhbari reject fatāwa based on ijtihad, they also reject the permissibility of writing exegesis of the Qur'an without quoting the narrations of the infallible Ahlu l-Bayt. Akhbari quote the Hadith ath-Thaqalayn and several authentic traditions of the Twelve Imāms to prohibit the practice of exegesis. Akhbaris do not believe in generalization of Hadith, they say Hadith is either right or wrong;[9] further they believe that Hadiths compiled in The Four Books of Shias are reliable.

It is reported that Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi acknowledged the Kitab al-Kafi (which is one of The Four Books of Shias) and said "al-Kafi is sufficient for our Shia (followers)".[10] (In contrast, Usulis doubt the credibility of this saying as it is not found in the Kitab al-Kafi.)[10]

Akhbaris also differ from Usulis in their rejection of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists, arguing that preachers of religion have no role in politics, clerics should advise political leaders but not govern themselves. Akhbaris believe in the separation of religion and state in absence of Twelfth Imam, they say that only an infallible ruling Imam has a right to combine religion and state; and which will be accomplished only after the arrival of awaited Shia Imam.

Usūlism evolved on the basis of Usul al-fiqh (the hypothetical concepts and perceptions of some scholars) centuries after the major occultation. Among the earliest Shī‘a ulamā' such as Muhammad ibn Ya'qub al-Kulayni and Ibn Babawaiyya, the most important activity was transmission of a ḥadīth.[11]

At this time, the Shī‘a distinguished themselves from the Sunni in the category of law, which employed such methods as qiyas "analogical reasoning" and exegesis". However, the Shī‘a developed law directly from the traditions of the Imāms.[11]

Initially during the Buyid period, the Twelver ulamā' considered that since the Imām had gone into Occultation and his Nā'ib al-Khass was no longer present, all the functions invested in the Imām had lapsed. The principal functions of the Imām had been:

  1. Leading the Holy War (jihad)
  2. Division of the booty (qismat al-fay)
  3. Leading the Friday Prayer (salat al-juma)
  4. Putting judicial decisions into effect (tanfidh al-ahkam)
  5. Imposing legal penalties (iqamat al-hudud)
  6. Receiving the religious taxes of zakāt and khums.[12]

However, it soon became apparent that the situation caused by the lapse of functions of the Hidden Imām was extremely impractical and left the Twelver Shī‘a community at a great disadvantage, with no leadership, no organization and no financial structure.[12]

Contrary to Usulis, Akhbaris believe in the perpetuity of Sharia from only the infalibles, so the right to interpret the Quran is only to 14 infallibles who have complete in-depth gnostic knowledge (al-rāsikhūn fi al-ʿilm Arabic: الراسخون فی العلم). Whereas the former belief in the development of jurisprudence with time 'Uṣūl al-fiqh',[13] Akhbaris seek religious rulings or Islamic jurisprudence from a dead or living Muhaddith, who has narrated or narrated the rulings hadith of The Fourteen Infallibles without interpreting them. Furthermore, Akhbaris say that The Fourteen Infallibles (which include the Shia Imāms) never permitted Ijtehad.[14][15]

History

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Akhbaris contend that, over the course of the history of Twelver Shi'ism since the Occultation, Usuli ulama have progressively usurped more and more of the functions of the Hidden Imam. They believe there have been five transgressions or stages of usurpation.

First transgression

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As early as the 5th century AH / 11th century CE, more than 150 years after the Occultation of the 12th Imām, Shaykhu t-Ta'ifa reinterpreted the doctrine to allow delegation of the Imām's judicial authority to those who had studied fiqh. Although he implies in his writings that this function should only be undertaken by the ulama if there is no one else to do it.

Shaykhu t-Taifa considered the ulamā' the best agents of the donor to distribute religious taxes since they knew to whom it should be distributed. Nevertheless, individuals were free to do this themselves if they wished. He allowed fuqahā' to organize Friday prayers in absence of the Imām or his special representative.

The prominent Shī‘a scholars who rejected this thesis were:

  1. `Alam al-Huda (who was from among the Shaykhu t-Taifa's group)
  2. Ibn Idris
  3. Allamah al-Hilli[12]

Second transgression

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By the 13th century, Muhaqqiq al-Hilli was able to advance these concepts further, by extending the judicial role of the ulama to iqamat al-hudud -- the imposition of penalties by ulama themselves. In his writings it is possible to see the evolution in his thinking whereby the fuqahā' develop from the deputies of the donor for the distribution of religious taxes in his early writings to being the deputies of the Hidden Imām for collection and distribution of the taxes in his later works.[16] In effect, transgressing the limits set by Shaykhu t-Taifa (two centuries earlier) in his first transgression.

Third transgression

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Muhaqqiq al-Karkhi (About 300 years after the second transgression) was the first to suggest, arguing from the hadith of ‘Umar ibn Hanzala, that the ulama were the Nā'ib al-'Amm (general representative) of the Hidden Imām. But he restricted his application of this argument to the assumption of the duty of leading Friday prayers.[16]

Fourth transgression

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It was Shahīd ath-Thānī (Zayn al-Din al-Juba'i al'Amili) who took the concept of Nā'ib al-'Amm to its logical conclusion in the religious sphere and applied it to all of the religious functions and prerogatives of the Hidden Imām. Thus the judicial authority of the ulamā' now became a direct reflection of the authority of the Imām himself. It was now obligatory to pay the religious taxes directly to the ulamā' as the trustees of the Imām for distribution and the donor who distributed these himself was considered to obtain no reward. This is in direct contradiction to limits set by prior transgressions.[16]

Furthermore, Shahīd ath-Thānī extended the range of those eligible to receive money from zakāt to include religious students and the ulamā' themselves, who thus became the recipients of the money as trustees of students. Even in the field of defensive jihād, Shahīd ath-Thānī identified a role for the ulamā', (but not in offensive jihād where he agreed with Akhbari that the role of Hidden Imām had lapsed pending his return).[16]

Although the aforementioned scholars were not mujtahids in their full capacity, they introduced innovative concepts into Shī‘a theology which later formed the basis of the exegetical school. Their innovations were not accepted by prominent Shī‘a scholars of their time and thus, remained mostly theoretical.

The traditional Shī‘a doctrine was, by its nature, fatal to the leadership of any regime except that of Imām al-Mahdi since they believed that an Islamic state can be established only under the leadership of an infallible Imām. Thus, the Shī‘a had little role to play in supporting the decisions of the state, in contrast with the Sunni tendency of offering their full support to the Ottoman Empire.

This caused a great deal of paranoia to the states where the Shī‘a were in majority. By the end of Safavid era the situation had become intense due to the rise of imperialism on a global scale. It was necessary to develop an alternate ideology for the survival of Iranian state. This is when a group of ulamā' were encouraged to squeeze out the possibility of extending the state's control over the Shia majority; by whatever means necessary.

The revival of Akhbārism, or "neo-Akhbārism" as it became known, was under the dean of Karbala scholarship, Yusuf Al Bahrani (1695–1772), who led an intellectual assault on Usuli thought in the mid-18th century. An Akhbari critique of Usulism had emerged in Bahrain at the beginning of the 18th century, partly spurred by the weaknesses of the Usuli sponsoring the Safavid empire.[17] By succeeding to the role of dean of Karbala as one of the pre-eminent scholars of the age, al-Bahrani's extended this Bahrain-based debate to the rest of the Shī‘a world.

Al-Bahrani's neo-Akhbarism accepted only two sources for Imami jurisprudence, the Qur'an and the oral reports from the Imams. He did not, however, go so far as to say that no verse in the Qur'an could be understood without the interpretation of the Imams, a position held by the Safavid-era Akhbari Astarabadi which Shaykh Yusuf denounced as extremist. He rejected the Usuli principles of consensus (ijma`) and independent reasoning (`aql, ijtihad). Indeed, he questioned rationalist approaches to religion in general, quoting with approval a condemnation of reading philosophy and theosophy. But Shaykh Yusuf accepted the validity of Friday prayers in the Occultation and did not completely reject Usuli positions on other issues. His Bahrani neo-Akhbarism sought to be an intermediate path between extremist Usulism and extremist Akhbarism.[18]

Ayatollah Behbahani

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Under al-Bahrani, Usuli scholarship was considered impure but Bahrani was not politically influential. It was Muhammad Baqir ibn Muhammad Akmal al-Wahid Behbahani who challenged and defeated the Akhbaris and eventually became the most politically influential cleric in Karbala in 1772. Bihbahani's theology was not welcomed by the Akhbaris. Although this controversy had begun as a minor disagreement on a few points, it eventually grew into a bitter, vituperative dispute culminating in Behbahani's declaration that the Akhbaris were infidels (Kuffar).[7] However, the dispute remained purely intellectual.

At first there was a large population of Akhbari activists at the shrine cities of Iraq but it was Bihbahani who, at the end of the 18th century, reversed this and completely routed the Akhbaris at Karbala and Najaf. South Iraq, Bahrain and a few cities in Iran such as Kirman remained Akhbari strongholds for a few more decades but eventually the Usuli triumph was complete and only a handful of Shī‘a ulamā' remained Akhbari to the present day.[7]

After the theological coup brought about by al-Wahid Bihbahani by military methods, the Usuli school became instrumental to the Iranian regime.

Fifth transgression

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During the first Russo-Persian War (1804–1813), Fath Ali Shah's son and heir, Abbas Mirza, who was conducting the campaign, turned to the new ulama and obtained from Shaykh Ja'far Kashif al-Ghita' and other eminent clerics in Najaf and Isfahan a declaration of jihad against the Russians, thus implicitly recognizing their authority to issue such a declaration – one of the functions of the Hidden Imām. Kashif al-Ghita used the opportunity to extract from the state acknowledgment of the ulama's right to collect the religious taxes of Khums."[19]

This followed the pattern of other transgressions by overthrowing the limits of its prior (fourth) transgression.

Iranian Revolution

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Following the Iranian Revolution, the Usuli school has gained popularity among previously Akhbari communities.[6] Usuli clerical power reached its natural conclusion with control and domination of the state as promulgated through Vilayat al-Faqih under the authority of the Supreme Leader.

Rejection of the Mujtahids

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Akhbaris reject mujtahids. They practice this based on the last letter Imām Mahdi wrote to ‘Alī ibn Muhammad, fourth trusted follower of the Lesser Occultation. In the letter, Imām Zaman said:

If someone claims himself as deputy of Imam during occultation he is a liar, ousted from Allah’s religion, calumniating Allah; he himself has gone astray and is leading others into error too. He will always be in loss. Be Curse unto him of mine, of Allah, of Allah’s Rasool (SW) and of his Progeny (AS) for every moment, and in all circumstances.[20]

Akhbaris claim that only the Imāms may be described as āyat Allahs (Ayatollahs, "signs of God") based on the Hadith-e-Tariq,[21] and that no one else has the right to ascribe this divinely appointed title to themselves. For example, the Hadith-i Tariq says:

O Tariq, Imam (as) is the Kalama-t-Allāh [Word of God], Waj'ha-t-Allah [Face of God], Hijaba-t-Allah [Veil of God], Nūru-Allah [Light of God], Āya-t-Allah [Sign of God]

Historically it was only in the early 19th century that ordinary mujtahids began to describe themselves as 'Ayatollahs.'[dubiousdiscuss]

Prominent Akhbari scholars

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See also

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References

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  1. ^ "Akhbari". akhbari.com.
  2. ^ a b "Welcome to Akhbari.com". akhbari.org.
  3. ^ Gleave, Scripturalist Islam, 2007: p.xvi
  4. ^ Momen, Moojan (1985), An introduction to Shi'i Islam : the history and doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism (Athna Ashri "اثناء عشری"), Oxford: G. Ronald, p. 222, ISBN 978-0-85398-201-2
  5. ^ "Online Shia Islamic Articles, Books, Khutbat, Calendar 2013, Duas". hubeali.com.
  6. ^ a b Nasr, Vali (2006), The Shia revival : how conflicts within Islam will shape the future, New York: Norton, p. 69, ISBN 978-0-393-06211-3
  7. ^ a b c Momen, Moojan (1985), An introduction to Shi'i Islam : the history and doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism, Oxford: G. Ronald, p. 127, ISBN 978-0-85398-201-2
  8. ^ Bahar al-Anwar Vol. 53, p. 181
  9. ^ Kohlberg, E. "AḴBĀRĪYA". Encyclopædia Iranica. Retrieved 24 April 2016.
  10. ^ a b "Belief of Shi'a in the Completeness of Qur'an | A Shi'ite Encyclopedia | Books on Islam and Muslims". Al-Islam.org. 2013-11-12. Retrieved 2013-12-31.
  11. ^ a b Momen, Moojan (1985), An introduction to Shi'i Islam : the history and doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism, Oxford: G. Ronald, p. 185, ISBN 978-0-85398-201-2
  12. ^ a b c Momen, Moojan (1985), An introduction to Shi'i Islam : the history and doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism, Oxford: G. Ronald, p. 189, ISBN 978-0-85398-201-2
  13. ^ "The Stages of Development of Shi'a Jurisprudence". Al-Islam.org. 2016-08-15.
  14. ^ "Our Misfortune Regarding Ijtihad Against the Texts | Books on Islam and Muslims". Al-Islam.org. 2012-10-15. Retrieved 2013-12-31.
  15. ^ "History of Khalifa Umar bin al-Khattab – Testament and Assessment of Umar – Section 16 – Islamic History". alim.org. Archived from the original on 2020-11-24. Retrieved 2017-06-16.
  16. ^ a b c d Moojan Momen, An introduction to Shi'i Islam, p.190
  17. ^ Cole, Juan Ricardo (2002), Sacred space and holy war : the politics, culture and history of Shi'ite Islam, IB Tauris, pp. 58–78, ISBN 978-1-86064-736-9
  18. ^ Cole, Juan Ricardo (2002), Sacred space and holy war : the politics, culture and history of Shi'ite Islam, IB Tauris, pp. 53–54, ISBN 978-1-86064-736-9
  19. ^ Momen, Moojan (1985), An introduction to Shi'i Islam : the history and doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism, Oxford: G. Ronald, p. 191, ISBN 978-0-85398-201-2
  20. ^ Bihar al-Anwar, Allamah Majlisi
  21. ^ Hadith-e-Tariq

Bibliography

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