Japanese occupation of West Sumatra
West Coast Province of Sumatra スマトラ西海岸州 (Japanese) | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1942–1945 | |||||||||||
| Motto: 八紘一宇 (Hakkō Ichiu) ("Eight Crown Cords, One Roof") | |||||||||||
| Anthem: 君が代 (Kimigayo) ("His Imperial Majesty's Reign") | |||||||||||
 West Coast Sumatra (dark red) within the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies (red) | |||||||||||
| Status | Province under military occupation by the Empire of Japan | ||||||||||
| Capital and largest city | Padang[1] 1°00′S 100°30′E / 1.000°S 100.500°E | ||||||||||
| Common languages |
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| Emperor | |||||||||||
• 1942–1945 | Hirohito | ||||||||||
| Army Commander (Gunshireikan) | |||||||||||
• 1942 | Tomoyuki Yamashita | ||||||||||
• 1942‒1943 | Yaheita Saito | ||||||||||
• 1943‒1945 | Moritake Tanabe | ||||||||||
| Governor (Shūchōkan) | |||||||||||
• 1942‒1944 | Yano Kenzo | ||||||||||
• 1944‒1945 | Hattori Naoaki | ||||||||||
| Legislature | Shū Sangi-kai | ||||||||||
| Kerukunan Minangkabau | |||||||||||
| Historical era | World War II | ||||||||||
• Pacific War begins | 8 December 1941a | ||||||||||
| 14 February 1942 | |||||||||||
| 8 March 1942 | |||||||||||
• Japanese troops land on Padang | 17 March 1942 | ||||||||||
• Japanese Civil Administration set up | 9 August 1942 | ||||||||||
• Disestablished | 17 August 1945 | ||||||||||
| 10 October 1945 | |||||||||||
| Currency | Netherlands Indian roepiah | ||||||||||
| Time zone | UTC+9 (TST) | ||||||||||
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| Today part of | Indonesia | ||||||||||
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The Japanese occupation of West Sumatra, officially known as Sumatora Nishi Kaigan Shū (Japanese: スマトラ西海岸州, Hepburn: Sumatora Nishikaigan-shū, lit. 'West Coast Province of Sumatra'),[2][3] started from 1942 until 1945 when the region was controlled by the Empire of Japan. The occupation was notable and recognized as one of the rare instances where a civilian government was established, rather than being governed by someone associated with the Japanese Imperial Army. The Japanese entered Padang on 17 March 1942 and within ten days all important cities in the West Sumatra region were occupied without resistance from the Dutch. The Japanese occupation of the region ended on 17 August 1945 with the proclamation of Indonesian independence by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta.
In the early days of the Japanese occupation, events in Padang were heavily influenced by Sukarno.[4] In October 1943, Japan ordered the establishment of the Giyūgun to help with defence. Led by Chatib Sulaiman, the Giyūgun was the only army unit formed by the Japanese in West Sumatra. This voluntary army would later become the backbone of Indonesia's armed forces after independence.
Japanese arrival
[edit]Prelude
[edit]
In December 1941, the Japanese 14th Army, under the command of Admiral Kondo, successfully defeated U.S. military forces on Luzon Island, facilitating the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Concurrently, the Imperial Japanese Navy, in cooperation with the Japanese 25th Army for intelligence sharing, sank the British battleships Prince of Wales and Repulse in Singaporean waters on December 10, 1941.[5] The defeat of the British naval forces significantly weakened British defenses and morale in the region, enabling Japanese forces to advance on British-controlled Malaya with relative ease, with much of the British Pacific Fleet unreinforced until March 1942 and withdrawn to Ceylon and scattered across the Dutch East Indies.[6] Following these operations, the 16th Army, led by Lieutenant General Hitoshi Imamura, and the 25th Army, under the command of General Yamashita Tomoyuki, began their sights to take control of Indonesia.[5] From its intelligence reports, the Netherlands was well aware of Japan's intention to expand its influence to Indonesia. Therefore, the Dutch tried to organize a limited militia, including education such as the Military Academy in Breda and the formation of Vaandrigs.[7] Sumatra itself hosted the second-largest concentration of Dutch East Indies troops, following Java. The island's defense was overseen by Major General Roelof T. Overakker, who served as the commander of the Sumatra High Command.[8] Approximately 4,500 KNIL (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) soldiers, including both garrison and militia forces, were stationed on the island.[9]
The Sumatra High Command was organized into four Territorial Commands: North Sumatra, West Sumatra-Tapanuli, Riau, and South Sumatra.[8] The Territorial Command of West Sumatra and Tapanuli, led by Lieutenant Colonel John H.M. Blogg,[10] managed the defense of the western region of Sumatra. The Dutch stationed one infantry company each in Padang, Emmahaven (Teluk Bayur), Fort de Kock (Bukittinggi), and Sibolga. Additionally, Padangsidempuan and Tarutung were defended by three infantry sections each. Two infantry companies, supported by a militia company, were assigned to protect Pekanbaru. Key strategic assets defended by these troops included the harbors at Emmahaven and Sibolga, as well as the airfields in Pekanbaru and Padang. To reinforce these defenses, a 75mm cannon battery was stationed to guard Emmahaven harbor, and an airborne machine gun section was deployed to protect the Pekanbaru airfield. Beyond regular troops, the Dutch deployed a Landstorm company to safeguard critical infrastructure in western Sumatra. A Stadswacht company was tasked with guarding Padang, while Bukittinggi, Sawahlunto, and Sibolga each had a section of similar units for defense. Additionally, a mobile first aid detachment operated under this command to support military efforts.[9] With so, Dutch Foreign Minister, Eelco van Kleffens, came to Batavia under the Dutch government-in-exile at the beginning of 1942 and told that the Dutch East Indies, with the help of the people, was ready to face the Japanese. The Dutch however did not foresee the lack of support from the local population.[7] According to a report gathered by spies operating under the F-Kikan banner, the formation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy intensified tensions in the Pacific. In response, the Dutch government introduced a series of wartime legislative measures to mobilize the Indonesian population for defense by May 10th, 1940. However, these measures inadvertently fueled widespread resentment among the local populace.[11]
In January 1942, there were notably two Japanese flying boat attacks on the city of Padang. The first attack was carried out by a flying boat by dropping only one bomb in front of Padang station, near the railroad workshops. This was the first bombing to ever occur in West Sumatra. The second attack in January was also launched by seven Japanese flying boats over the port of Emmahaven. After a few circles over the city of Padang, the flying boats dropped bombs on ships at anchor in the docks and warehouses were also targeted. As a result, about three large ships were sunk, parts of the warehouses and wharves were burned, and the bridge for loading coal onto ships was damaged.[12]
By February 1942, as part of their preparations for war, the Dutch organized various auxiliary and militia units to support the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL). These included the Stadswacht, Landswacht, and Luchtbeschermingsdienst (LBD), alongside other militia preparations.[12][13] The Stadswacht was responsible for localized protection in larger towns, focusing on maintaining order and guarding critical areas. Similarly, the Landwacht was established on estates, consisting of estate personnel tasked with defending their properties and, if required, assisting neighboring estates. Additionally, other auxiliary and conscript units were formed, such as the Landstorm, a militia comprising Europeans over the age of 32.[13] However such preparations were insufficient when the Japanese arrived.[12]
Invasion
[edit]
In 14 February 1942, the Japanese began its invasion of Sumatra by deploying paratroop units in Palembang.[12] According to Audrey Kahin, the Japanese intended to preempt Dutch plans to damage oil installations near Palembang. From Palembang, the Japanese army soon spread across southern and northern Sumatra swiftly. By mid-March, larger numbers of troops landed on the northern and eastern coasts of Sumatra, moving rapidly southwards.[14]
On 23 February, reports indicated that a Japanese motorized column of approximately 48 trucks had reached Lahat, while another column of 23 trucks and 7 tanks was advancing westward, possibly toward Bengkulu. In response, the West Sumatra and Tapanuli Territorial Commands prepared to counter the Japanese advance northward. Meanwhile, the KNIL commander in Jambi initiated the withdrawal of scattered troops from Muaratebo, while maintaining defensive positions at Sarolangun.[15]
By 26 February, the Sarolangun Detachment was forced to retreat following Japanese action in Bangko. While awaiting reinforcements, the detachment was tasked with delaying the Japanese advance around Muarabango, mobilizing six squads, some drawn from the Mang Detachment. Dutch forces destroyed the bridge over the Bungo River, using its 100-meter width as a defensive barrier.[15] However, on 28 February, Japanese forces successfully encircled the western flank of the Dutch defenses. Despite reinforcements being dispatched from Jambi, they arrived too late, and the KNIL troops were ultimately repelled from Muarabungo, retreating to Muaratebo. To protect retreating forces from Central Sumatra, the KNIL Command established a defensive perimeter on the west bank of the Batanghari River, setting up positions around Musang Island on 1 March.[15] Troops from Jambi were placed under the command of Major C.F. Hazenberg, who had arrived at Sungai Dareh that day with the main body of his column. Major Hazenberg organized his forces at Padangpanjang on 27 February, comprising a staff unit, a medical section, and three infantry companies (one still in the process of formation).[16] These units navigated harsh weather and challenging terrain to reach Sungai Dareh.[17] After assuming command, Major Hazenberg was assigned to conduct guerrilla warfare in the Lubuklinggau area. His objectives included resisting Japanese advances from Jambi and attempting to recapture the Palembang airfield.[18] However, with only two companies totaling approximately 350 men, Hazenberg's forces were too dispersed and under-equipped to effectively contain the superior Japanese forces advancing north from Lahat. Hazenberg's initial plan involved mobilizing two companies to attack Japanese positions at Muaratebo and deploying another company through Kotobaru to confront Japanese troops at Muarabungo. A reserve force from Jambi was stationed at Kotobaru, while a company guarded mining boats on the Batanghari River near Musang Island.[18] Heavy rains caused the Batanghari River to overflow, temporarily delaying Japanese advances and allowing Dutch reinforcements from Padangpanjang to organize relief efforts.[17][18]
Between 3 and 7 March, fierce battles ensued as Japanese forces attempted to cross the Batanghari River. Dutch intelligence reported significant Japanese casualties, reducing their regiment to around 200 men. Encouraged by these reports, Hazenberg planned a counteroffensive on the night of 8–9 March, secretly assembling local boats and preparing provisions and ammunition. However, on 8 March, news arrived of General Hein ter Poorten's surrender in Java. Hazenberg immediately received orders to suspend all offensive operations. As a result, the planned counterattack was canceled, and all KNIL units in Sumatra were placed on a defensive footing.[17][18]
Dutch last stand
[edit]Through the Agreement of Kalijati on 8 March 1942, the Dutch ceded the Indonesian colonies to Japan. After the occupation began, the Japanese divided Indonesia into three military administration areas. The Sumatra region was under the 25th Army Military Government Department (Rikugun) in Singapore led by General Tomoyuki Yamashita. However, for nine days after receiving the Dutch surrender, Japan had not yet reached West Sumatra, leaving a power vacuum in the region and what remained of Dutch authority in complete disarray.[19] Many high-ranking Dutch officials had fled to safety on allied ships or evac planes, abandoning those who remained behind and creating mass panic. Most of the Dutch residents who stayed in West Sumatra lived in small houses or military pensions, while only a few Dutch military police patrolled the area.[20]
Even after the official capitulation of the Dutch East Indies, rogue elements of the KNIL army of Sumatra disavowed this order. Led by then Governor of Sumatra and former resident of Sumatra's West Coast, Adriaan Isaac Spits, he declared the Dutch army in Sumatra would continue to fight "to the last drop of blood."[21] He and rebelling KNIL generals later formed the Dutch Territorial Command in Sumatra. At that time, the Territorial Command of Central Sumatra, including West Sumatra and North Sumatra, was then led by Major General Roelof T. Overakker,[8] taking over Lt. Col. John Blogg's military jurisdiction over West Coast Sumatra.[10] Prior to the Agreement of Kalijati, Major General Overakker had suspected that incoming radio reports indicated that the fighting in Java was not going well. His suspicions were heightened on 7 March when attempts to contact the KNIL headquarters in Bandung were met with radio silence. Repeated unsuccessful communication attempts prompted Overakker to implement emergency measures in what's left of the Dutch East Indies in Sumatra. These included regrouping the remaining Sumatran and Allied forces in Sumatra at Tanah Alas, in an effort to consolidate their positions.[22] The Dutch planned to build defenses in the mountainous areas of Aceh, in the districts of Takengon, Tanah Luos, and Tanah Alas.[8] The Dutch Territorial Command in Sumatra then enacted a scorched earth policy across West Sumatra to slow down the Japanese advance, much to the suffering of the locals.[19]
The Japanese army's advance from the north through Lubuk Sikaping encountered little to no resistance from the remnants of the Dutch East Indies army. Only the advance from the east met some resistance, but it to was also negligible. As the Dutch forces retreated, they attempted to sabotage their own infrastructure and resources to prevent them from falling into Japanese hands.[8] Initially, the Dutch Territorial Command called on the local population in West Sumatra to destroy key infrastructure that could potentially be used by the Japanese upon their arrival. However, this request was rejected by the people, as they were unwilling to damage their own region. Realizing that the Dutch were without local support, the Dutch forces grew increasingly panicked. Compounded by the approach of the Japanese army, and the realization that they could not rely on assistance from the local population, leaving them in a precarious situation, as if confronting two adversaries—an external military threat and the increasing internal discontent from the people of West Sumatra.[23] The Dutch army retreated by first damaging the Pulau-Musang Bridge in the Teluk Kepayang Pulau Indah, Jambi area. Before surrendering power, the Dutch had dumped all their supplies of oil, gasoline, and various alcoholic beverages into the river (flood canal) near Sawahan in Padang, which resulted in fires along the river, reaching the Jati area and the villages of Terandam and Ranah. These fires fortunately did not cause significant damage. A similar act of sabotage occurred near Bukittinggi in Gadut, where the Dutch set fire to their fuel supplies, filling the air with thick black smoke. In other towns such as Batusangkar, Payakumbuh, and Solok, the Dutch burned gasoline and kerosene stored in depots owned by the Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij (BPM). However, through the initiative of Indonesian employees working at the depots, a large part of the kerosene stored in cans was also saved and distributed to the people. Likewise, groups of people were able to salvage a large number of abandoned drums containing gasoline and lubricating oil, so that they could be used for public transport, which had been in short supply.[8]
Political prisoners of Kutacane
[edit]
As the Dutch troops began to withdraw from West Sumatra and Tapanuli, they maintained the appearance of a force still willing to resist the Japanese advance. The rugged terrain of West Sumatra, with its mountainous landscape, valleys, and canyons, was initially planned by the Dutch as a potential last line of defense. If push came to shove, then West Sumatra would be burned to the ground, leaving the enemy with nothing but rubble. The people of Minangkabau, with few fully knowing the impending Japanese invasion, sense that something was awry among the Dutch and felt that disaster might happen. Aware of the losses that the scorched earth tactic could cause, many were strongly against it. Even former Indonesian East Indies officials who worked in the Dutch local government voiced disapproval.[24] Demonstrations were planned to happen on 12 March on Padang Panjang against the scorched policy. Led by Chatib Suleiman, Leon Salim, and several supporters, they established the Komite Penegak Merah Putih (Committee to Uphold the Red and White) and planned to raise the Indonesian flag at Padang Panjang due to its perceived symbolism.[23] They intend to demand the Dutch to hand over power to the Indonesians before the Japanese army enters West Sumatra, so they will be the ones to negotiate with the Japanese occupation army.[19] They were later arrested after word spread about the planned protests and were subsequently taken by the Dutch to the mountains of West Sumatra where the Dutch intended to make a final stand against the Japanese.[4] Historian Martamin believed that by bringing high-ranking political prisoners such as Chatib Sulaiman, the Dutch hoped to secure their safety from local discontent during their retreat to the mountains. At that time, Chatib Sulaiman had significant influence over the people of West Sumatra, especially among the Pemuda. The Dutch were also aware of efforts centered in Padang Panjang aimed at local resistance, but due to Chatib Sulaiman's involvement, they were able to retreat safely. The Dutch retreat to Kutacane, carried out in haste and panic, severely damaged their dignity and what's left of the reputation hold within the governance of the Dutch Territorial Command in the eyes of the people.[25] Later pressure from the Japanese, mainly from bombing campaigns, led the Dutch to instead change locations to Setan Mountain in Atceh.[4] Initially sentenced to death, the political prisoners were released on 28 March 1942 following the Japanese occupation of Kutacane, which occurred without resistance.[26] The surrender of KNIL (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) Major-General Roelof T. Overakker, along with approximately 2,000 men, at Kutacane—west of Kabanjahe in Northern Sumatra—facilitated the Japanese takeover and ended Dutch rule over Sumatra.[27] They all went back to West Sumatra once they got permission from the occupying Japanese. Previously, Sukarno had convinced Japanese occupational forces to send several of their men to scout and find Chatib Suleiman and his group who were kidnaped by the Dutch. They later arrived in Padang Panjang and then escorted to Bukittinggi on 2 April 1942.[26]
The suppression of political movements and the elimination of native party influences, which had long served as platforms for the people in Sumatra, accelerated the buckling of Dutch rule in West Sumatra. This repression, combined with the oppressive policies of the Dutch, led to widespread resentment among the population. As a result, the arrival of the Japanese army in West Sumatra was initially welcomed as an act of retribution against the longstanding oppression and pressures endured under Dutch colonial rule.[28] The Japanese entry into West Sumatra almost coincided with their movements in other parts of Sumatra. Japanese army soldiers entered Padang City on 17 March 1942. Within days, all of West Sumatra was under their control and the Dutch military commander in Sumatra surrendered unconditionally to the Japanese.[14]
Administration
[edit]
To academic Audrey Kahin, one of the focuses of the Japanese occupation army during the first year of occupation was to get the government apparatus in Sumatra functioning so that they could make efficient use of its vital resources, particularly the oil fields near Palembang and the rubber plantations in East Sumatra.[29][14] Within the broader Japanese framework, West Sumatra was not initially a priority in terms of economic interests, but it held significant strategic importance. Initially, it was a major route through which the Japanese expected to infiltrate their agents into Sumatra.[30] However, since mid-1943, Sumatra's strategic importance increased as the Japanese predicted that Allied counterattacks against the west coast of Sumatra and surrounding islands would be launched via the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.[31] The Japanese revived the Dutch system of government and reappointed most of the former Indonesian officials who had been in the previous bureaucracy.[29][14] The Japanese divided Sumatra into 10 shū (identical to the administrative regions of the Dutch residencies and the former province system of Japan), each headed by a shūchōkan.[32]
Sumatra in the occupation government structure was initially under the control of the Singapore-based 25th Army. However, the 25th Army Command concluded that it was not possible to govern Sumatra from its headquarters in Singapore, especially in terms of protecting the area around vital installations. In subsequent developments, the direction of the war since the beginning of 1943 was unfavorable for the Japanese. On various Pacific fronts, the Japanese army began to be pushed back and the initiative for the attack lay with the Allies. This circumstance had forced the Japanese Army Command for the “Southern Area” to shift its main focus of policy from consolidating power in the newly occupied areas to a defensive strategy against possible Allied counterattacks.[33][34] After a feud between Yaheita Saito and Shigenori Kuroda, Chief of Staff of the Southern Army, over the issue of relocating the 25th Army to Sumatra,[35] the headquarters of the 25th Army was moved from Singapore to Bukittinggi in Sumatra in May 1943. Consequently, Sumatra, which had previously been attached to Malaya, was made a self-governing unit.[19] Recognizing Sumatra's potential to support the Japanese economy and military in the face of Allied forces, the Japanese separated Sumatra from Malaya on 1 May 1943.[36] The 25th army took direct control of the city, later renaming it from Stadsgemeente Fort de Kock to Bukittinggi-Si Yaku Sho (or simply Shiyakusho, lit. 'Municipal office; council; city hall') and expanded the city limits for their needs.[36] The city area Padang, was expanded to include the entire Padang onderdistrict, thus Marapalam and Ulak Karang are included in the City of Padang City plus Seberang Padang, Teluk Bajur, Bukit Air Manis, and Gunung Pengilun with a population of 78,000 people.[37] The city was selected as the headquarters of the 25th Army due to its strategic and isolated location. Its hilly topography, flanked by towering mountains and valleys, most notably Sianok Canyon, offered natural defense advantages, making it an ideal base for military operations during the Japanese occupation.[38]
Modeled after the system of governance in Syonan-to (then Japanese occupied Singapore), the Sumatran government also consisted of two main components, the military command (Gunsireibu) and the civil administration (Gunseikanbu).[39][40] In mid-1943, the Commander of the 25th Army, Tomoyuki Yamashita, succeeded in establishing the Gunseikanbu, the central military government staff as the executive organ of government in Sumatra. This central military government staff was headed by a Gunseikan who was directly held by the Commander of the 25th Army.[41] As part of the military government, the Gunseikanbu was intended to support the activities of the military and military police (Kempei).[39] In carrying out his administration, the gunseikan formed ten departments headed by a Sumo Bucho (Chief of General Affairs). The ten departments were the Department of the Interior, the Department of Police, the Department of Justice, the Department of Industry, the Department of Finance, the Department of Public Works, the Department of Transport, the Department of Information, the Transfer and Shipping Department, and the Department of Meteorology. These ten directors were overseen by the Director of the Interior who acted as the Deputy Gunseikan. Meanwhile, each Shū (州) government had three departments, namely the Department of the Interior, the Police Department, and the Social Welfare Department.[41] From the three departments, the Shu was equipped with four sections, namely: General Affairs, Industry, Finance, and Police.[39] Two primary sections were actively involved in managing key aspects of the Japanese occupation's economic administration in the region. These responsibilities included the internal circulation of goods and foodstuffs, the distribution of imported products from Japan, the handling of goods for export, adjustments to budget and revenue management, the establishment of price standards for certain commodities, and the implementation of labor management standards. These operations were closely monitored by branches of the Military Government Headquarters (Gunseikanbu) in each province, which supervised and ensured adherence to Japanese administrative policies. With the Gunseikanbu's approval, the shūchōkan may establish several ad hoc organisations to assist the province and directly supervise the Police Affairs Department (Keimubu) independent of the control of the Kempeitai and the police department of each region. Due to its decentralized structure, governors and lower-level institutions, particularly in East Sumatra, West Sumatra, and South Sumatra, were granted the autonomy to address the specific needs of their respective regions. While these regions were required to achieve economic self-sufficiency and meet their own food needs, these efforts often fell short. Food shortages frequently occurred in certain areas, and basic necessities such as soap, paper, matches, and other essential goods had to be imported to compensate for local deficiencies.[42]
The West Coast Sumatra Province was formed in August 1942 under the name Sumatora Nishi Kaigan Shū to replace the residency system to the Shū (州) system. The province has its capital in Padang. Former Toyama Prefecture Governor Yano Kenzo served as the first shūchōkan.[43] As tasked for being the civilian leader for the West Coast Sumatra Province, Yano Kenzo arrived in Padang on 9 August 1942 along with 68 civil servants.[44] Starting from the Japanese occupation, Padang Gemeente was governed by a Padang Shichō directly to the shūchōkan of West Sumatra.[45] The division of West Coast Sumatra's administrative units was almost entirely based on the division made by the Dutch in 1935, consisting of 5 afdeelingen, 19 onderafdeelingen, 20 districts, 49 onderdistricts, and at least 430 nagari. Historian Gusti Asnan noted that a slight difference from the division of administrative units by the Japanese was the exclusion of Fuku Bun Bangkinang and the inclusion of the Kampar Regency in Rio Shū (Riau Province). In running the wheels of government in West Coast Sumatra, the Japanese did not make many changes to the government structure, except for changes in nomenclature into Japanese. The Afdeeling, headed by an assistant resident, was changed into a bunshū (分周), headed by a bunshūchō (分周長). Bunshū were further divided into the onderafdeeling headed by a controller was changed to a fuku bunshū headed by a fuku bunshūchō or Kantokukan.[44][46] The Kantokukan was a low-ranking Japanese official, but had a relatively important position as he was the liaison officer between the Japanese official layer and the bumiputera officials.[46]
The district headed by a demang was changed to a gun (郡) headed by a gunchō. Onderdistricts headed by assistant demangs were transformed into fukugun headed by a fuku gunchō.[44] Except for important positions in the administration, the Japanese still used native officials who had previously been in the Dutch East Indies administration[47] on condition that they did not infringe on Japanese authority.[48] This was because the Japanese who first came were soldiers who did not understand the organization and intricacies of civil governance.[49] Japanese reports in 1942 indicate that the government apparatus for West Sumatra who were later sent had never arrived to Indonesia due to the ship being hit and sunk by Allied torpedoes.[50][51] The highest native official headed the gun and its subordinate structure, the fukugun (副郡).[46] The smallest government unit, the nagari, was termed son and the head of the nagari was called sonchō or son (村).[44]
Native policy
[edit]
Prior to the arrival of Japanese bureaucrats, the Japanese military leaders inherited the administrative structure left behind by the Dutch and were also tasked with maintaining order. Due to a shortage of manpower, the Japanese authorities relied heavily on native workers.[52][53] The Japanese made sure that cooperation with the natives in Sumatra was vital for the war effort, given the resources Sumatra holds. And so, the Japanese sought cooperation among the native elite, both from civil servants (known as the pamong praja) and prominent leaders in the guise of independence, rousing support from the locals.[54] The Japanese utilized the three main components of West Sumatran society—adat (traditional customary) leaders, nationalists, and religious groups—as effectively as possible. Each group was assigned distinct roles based on their sociological backgrounds and societal influence. The adat group was tasked with organizing government administration, nationalists were assigned the responsibility of conducting propaganda, and religious groups were charged with mobilizing the people's support by framing Japan's war efforts as a "holy war" to expel Dutch rule. While Japanese officials agreed to employ West Sumatran natives in local governance, the military leaders were hesitant to fully trust them.[52] Japan's attitude towards the leaders of West Sumatra society was described by H.J. Benda in Document No. 47, dated April 27, 1942. The occupation government recognized the importance of acknowledging sources of political power in West Sumatra. Nationalist figures from the region had to be embraced, and political leaders, as well as other influential figures within the community, were co-opted to help achieve the goal of “Japanizing” the people of West Sumatra. Through prominent local leaders like Moh. Syafei, Chatib Sulaiman, and others, the Japanese sought to erase Western influence and instill a deep hatred for anything associated with Western culture. Slogans created by the Japanese, such as "Inggeris dilinggis" (the British will be crushed), "Amerika diseterika" (America will be ironed out), and "Belanda kurang-ajar" (the Dutch are insolent), were used as propaganda tools to foster anti-Western sentiment among the people of West Sumatra.[55][56] The Pamong praja were useful for keeping the administrative system running, which basically followed the pattern from the Dutch colonial period. In reality, however, the policies of the military leaders in Sumatra were largely constrained by the principles governing the administration of the occupied "southern territories", which dictated that the native pribumi population should be "guided in such a way as to engender confidence in imperial power, and premature encouragement of native independence movements should be prevented".[54][57]
The 25th Army in Sumatra was significantly more reluctant than the 16th Army in Java to grant Indonesians any substantial role in civilian or military administration.[58] Consequently, local involvement was initially limited to the lowest administrative level, the Nagari (village). At this level, the Japanese retained many Dutch colonial administrators and avoided replacing the existing Nagari heads with new figures. For other administrative positions, however, a strict selection process was conducted.[52] Thus in the first months of the Japanese occupation, Colonel Fujiyama and his Assistant (aide and secretary), Lieutenant Ichitaro Wakamatsu, who were responsible for forming the ranks of the government in West Sumatra, relied on a committee composed of Japanese military officers and under the advice of a local official, M. Arief Dt. Majo Urang, in appointing new officials. Previously, after the 1927 Rebellion, Achmad Arief Dt. Madjo Orang was appointed assistant demang for adat affairs, then became demang for adat affairs in 1940.[59] Both Colonel Fujiyama and Ichitaro Wakamatsu, were actively involved, traveling extensively throughout West Sumatra to oversee and participate in the recruitment and administrative setup.[52] As a result of the selection process, around 21 people were chosen to be gunchō and 47 people to be fuku gunchō. In addition, several educated West Sumatrans were also given strategic positions at the West Sumatran level, such as Sutan Mohammad Rasjid, who was appointed as a prosecutor at the High Court in Padang, and several others who were employed in the shūchōkan and bunshūchō offices. The segregation and assignment of different tasks to the three main groups of Sumatran society meant that the differences between them became clearer. All three elements of the community continued to try to establish their presence in society and did their best to collaborate and win over the Japanese authorities in the hope that they would become the ‘golden children’ of the occupying army. The division of labour and the pressure of work that they went through continued until the Japanese were defeated. The indigenous people remained the dominant layer of society in the administration of government (especially at the Nagari level), the nationalists became the bureaucrats at higher levels (especially at the West Sumatra level) and the religious people remained the main pillar for mass mobilisation through the establishment of various educational institutions and Islamic organisations.[60]
After initially investing in the local leadership, the Japanese attempted to align themselves with the leaders of the people. However, once it became clear that these leaders were vigilant and resistant to manipulation, the Japanese reverted to utilizing the existing Dutch colonial apparatus. This administration was coerced through force, often subjected to physical punishment such as tempeleng (harsh slaps) and repeated usage of derogatory terms to enforce Japanese orders against the local population.[61] During the era of the Shū Sangi-kai (Prefectural Council), the Japanese acknowledged the influence of local leaders, who could potentially obstruct their efforts. To manage this, they established the Shū Sangi-kai, a council devoid of autonomous authority. Its role was merely advisory, answering questions from the shūchōkan on how best to support the Japanese war effort. The council’s recommendations were publicized by the Senden-han (Propaganda Division) and followed by enforced mobilization of resources and labor from the people. The members of the Shū Sangi-kai, operating under the constant threat of the feared Kempeitai (Japanese military police), could do little but attempt to mitigate the harsh impacts of Japanese actions on the people.[62] As Japan's position in the war deteriorated, their efforts to unify and mobilize the populace became increasingly desperate. After the Center of the People's Power (Putera) organization in Java, led by Sukarno, was transformed into the Hōkōkai (Badan Kebaktian Rakyat or People's Loyalty Organization), a similar one-party system was implemented in Sumatra. This was in line with the dissolution of all political parties and popular movements upon the Japanese arrival. In West Sumatra, the Hokokai included prominent figures from various societal groups. However, before it could fully establish itself, Japan's defeat was sealed with the dropping of the atomic bombs, leading to Japan’s unarmed surrender and the abrupt end of its occupation.[62]
Direct control over Information
[edit]
Prior to the Japanese arrival, Padang had several active dailies: Persamaan, the only national daily in West Sumatra; Sinar Sumatera; the Malay/Chinese Dagblad Radio; and Sumatra Bode, the only Dutch-language newspaper in the region. However, Sinar Sumatera and Sumatra Bode disbanded just days before Japanese forces entered Padang, leaving only Persamaan and Dagblad Radio, both of which faced significant challenges. Cut off from global news, they could no longer rely on the Dutch news agency Aneta, which had ceased operations, nor did the Japanese Dōmei Tsushin agency have a branch in the area.[63] Controlled by various difficulties and shortcomings, the national daily Persamaan, with Marah Nurdin as its director, struggled steadfastly and tenaciously to survive.[64] The Japanese soon took issue with the remaining publications, particularly Persamaan, which had published a report about local men who collaborated with the Japanese secret service, openly wearing an “F” on their sleeves to signify their allegiance. These individuals were known to exploit their positions, often seizing property and even robbing village treasuries, with one robbing a Wali Nagari's safe,[65] under the guise of loyalty to Japan. As editor-in-chief, Mulkan was accused of defaming the Japanese army, leading to an immediate ban on both remaining newspapers until they were reviewed by authorities. This marked the first censorship imposed by the new Japanese administration.[64][65]
However, the Japanese went further, merging Persamaan and Dagblad Radio into a single publication called Padang Nippo, which served as Japan’s voice in the region. The editorial team comprised a mix of staff from both previous dailies, with Marah Nurdin and Lie Oen Sam serving as editors-in-chief, alongside Suska, Mulkan, and Oel Tin Djin as representatives. This structure was short-lived, as subsequent arrivals of Majid Usman, an Indonesian educated in Japan, along with Chatib Salim and Nasrun AS, led to further changes. Marah Nurdin, Suska, and Oei Tin Djin were replaced by Majid Usman and Chatib Salim. In addition to Padang Nippo, the Japanese established the Kita Sumatora Shinbun.[65] The English edition of the Dōmei Tsushin news agency remained the sole source of news during this period, further consolidating Japanese control over information in the region.[64] In Bukittinggi, the Japanese constructed the largest radio transmitter on the island of Sumatra, intending to use it as a way to serve as a propaganda tool to raise the spirits of the people and garner support for the Japanese war effort.[36]
Reception
[edit]Role of the F-Kikan
[edit]The role of the F-Kikan, the infiltration force deployed in Sumatra prior to the Japanese landings, is believed to have been substantial in creating a positive sentiment among the locals in Sumatra. Prior to the invasion, Japanese spies under the F-Kikan, had previously exercised influence over the Minangkabau people. Some of the Japanese who had settled in West Sumatra since the 1920s acted as Japanese intelligence "sent to pave the way for their occupation."[30] The organization recruited at least 10 Sumatrans—five of whom were from West Sumatra—to assist the Japanese in entering Sumatra, with a particular focus on West Sumatra. Additionally, the strategy of engaging religious groups played an influential role. Several religious leaders were approached by the Japanese, with some even invited to visit Japan or participate in various meetings and ceremonies hosted by the Japanese government. According to historian Gusti Asnan, given the deeply religious nature of West Sumatran society, the respect shown by the Japanese toward religious leaders and Islam helped to foster positive sentiments toward Japan, either consciously or unconsciously.[39] Operating covertly, F-Kikan elements in Central Sumatra achieved significant success in spreading pro-Japanese propaganda. Their efforts quickly emboldened widespread support and sentiment among the Minangkabau and Batak peoples.[66]
Initial landing
[edit]At early morning, led by Colonel Fujiyama, the first Japanese soldiers silently entered the city of Padang on 17 March 1942, and ten days later the Dutch military commander in Sumatra surrendered unconditionally.[19] The Japanese military in collaboration with the F-Kikan in Sumatra was then sent to Sumatra to propagandize the victory of the Japanese forces in the war, their intention to "liberate the people", and their hope for cooperation in preventing the destruction of oil-related facilities and infrastructure by the Dutch and Indies authorities. These efforts were particularly successful in Atceh, Northern Sumatra, and West Coast Sumatra, where uprisings and actions to prevent the destruction of facilities by local residents were seen in various areas in time for the Japanese military advance.[67]
When the locals of Padang ventured out early morning, well-armed Japanese troops were seen on the streets of Padang, occupying strategic locations. Some were on foot, while others were on bicycles. Initially, there was no display of fear; many even greeted the soldiers with gratitude. Shortly thereafter, the city saw an influx of people from neighboring areas who wanted to observe the newly arrived Japanese troops.[68] The arrival of the Japanese army in Padang was initially hailed by the people, who chanted "Merdeka! Banzai! Long live Japan!"[69][70] The people had been convinced that the Japanese were coming to liberate the nation from the rule of Western Imperialism.[70] The Japanese invoked the slogan of Asia for Asians as a liberator of Asia from imperialism.[71][28] However, the situation soon changed, and tensions increased as the soldiers began to arrest people and confiscate bicycles. Anyone who attempted to resist was met with physical force. Consequently, people started hiding possessions that might attract a soldiers' attention.[68] Watching how the soldiers act, many began to have the courage to rob the contents of Dutch and Chinese houses in remote isolated events. This later spiraled uncontrollably into forming a "bumi angkat" movement across the region, with many justifying their act as revenge.[68] Dutch residences were ransacked and looted, and violence, including murder, became inevitable. The Chinese community, which had been seen as favored by the Dutch, became another target for the people's wrath. In every city in West Sumatra, the Chinese quarters, which were both residential and commercial hubs, were attacked, as few Dutch remained in the area. Chinese shops were looted and destroyed, and in some cases, killings occurred. The term "Cina Mengamuk" emerged during this time, as the Chinese community retaliated in an attempt to defend themselves against the attacks.[72]
The Japanese tried to regain control of the situation left by the ungoverned power vacuum left by the Dutch in Padang, with days later public executions were announced in the beaches of Kasiek-Angek in Padang. The one of the first to be publicly executed was a person named Bambang Ateh. He first dug his own grave and sat on his knees against the sea to be shot from behind. This event later stopped the many robberies and the "Bumi angkat" movement altogether. Along the coastline of Padang Beach there are still unmarked burial sites.[68]
Rise of Sukarno
[edit]
Initially exiled to Bengkulu for his disruptive political activities, Sukarno was marched, bussed, and trucked to Padang with the intention of transporting him to Australia to be kept as a prisoner. When word spread about the impending Japanese landings in Padang, the Dutch abandoned Sukarno to save themselves.[73] Dutch resistance eventually collapsed across West Sumatra as reports of Japanese landings arrived not only in Padang, West Sumatra, but also across the East Indies archipelago. After the Dutch failed to take Sukarno to Australia, he was stuck in West Sumatra for a period of three to five months, from February 1942 to July 1942.[74] Hizbul Wathan members, an Islamic scouts association associated with Muhammadiyah at the time based out of Ganting, went to retrieve Sukarno and bring him to Padang by cart,[75][76] later being held under the protection of the local Japanese garrisons stationed in the cities and villages of Sumatra mistaking him for a local town figure.[77] Initially, the Japanese had files on Sukarno and decided that his return to Java was necessary to stabilize Indonesia.[78] This decision was explicitly made and arranged by the Japanese 16th Army Headquarters after receiving numerous letters from Indonesian youths and student groups requesting the Army to find Sukarno and allow him to return to Java. However, during the first months of occupation, the Military Administration in Djakarta had no clue about his whereabouts, prolonging his stay in West Sumatra.[77] In an attempt to locate Sukarno, the commander of the Japanese army in the city of Padang, Major Itoh, asked a liaison named Jahja Djalil to deliver Captain Sakaguchi to Sukarno.[78] Jahja Djalil had previously established contacts with the Japanese Consulate in Batavia on behalf of the Harian Persamaan newspaper in Padang as tensions rose in the Pacific.[79]
From word of mouth[80] and to spies,[81] it was later found that, in Padang, Sukarno and his first wife, Inggit Garnasih, stayed at a halfway house owned by Dr. Waworuntu, a veterinarian and friend of Sukarno. It was from this house that Sukarno resumed his activities as a leader of the struggle. To the locals, He was seen as being always available, not only for political or matters of the homeland but also for simple gatherings, often accepting meal invitations from the public. Free and unrestricted from the confines of Dutch oversight, Sukarno's popularity continued to grow, as his speeches inspired people and strengthened their resolve to face the challenges ahead. During his travels, he was frequently accompanied by Sutan Usman Karim, also known as Suska, who at times served as his chauffeur in Padang and at other times acted as his spokesperson.[78][80] During this time Sukarno had been careful to conceal his identity and made efforts to maintain a low profile. When Sukarno became aware of the Japanese arrival in Padang, he was already wide awake at 4 a.m. Hearing a loud rumble of tracks and marching passing by Wawarontu's house, he initially mistook the sound for thunder. Unable to sleep, he and Waworuntu took a walk through the streets, where they witnessed cheering crowds and widespread looting by Indonesians as the Japanese had forced shops to open early. When Waworuntu asked Sukarno if he saw the arriving Japanese as liberators, Sukarno firmly rejected the notion, describing the Japanese actions as mere "performance" and labeling them as fascists as Sukarno had understood of their brutality across occupied Asia. To this point, conversing with Waworuntu, Sukarno was thoughtful on how he should approach the Japanese and the threat of Japan on the Indonesian people, debating which course of action should be taken had the opportunity arrives.[82] The historic house was destroyed in 2023 to make way for a restaurant.[83]
A day after the arrival of the Japanese, Captain Sakaguchi, speaking in French,[81] was the first to introduce himself at the meeting with Sukarno presenting his official identification card as a member of the Sendenbu (宣伝部, Propaganda Department). He was accompanied on this visit to Sukarno by Jahja Djalil as his translator.[79] In response to Sukarno's inquiry about the purpose of his visit, Captain Sakaguchi stated, “It is nothing. I know that I need to make your acquaintance, and that is why I have come. That is all. I did not come to give orders to you. Meeting the famous Mr. Sukarno is my first duty. We know everything about you. We know you are the leader of Indonesia and an influential person. It is our honor to give you the respect you deserve.”[79][81] Three days after the meeting, Captain Sakaguchi had "requested" Sukarno to visit the 25th Army's temporary headquarters in Bukittinggi. Not in a position to reject the request, Sukarno obliged and traveled to Bukittinggi by train. Word of his presence spread unintentionally from one train car to another and quickly beyond. At each station along the route to Bukittinggi, he was greeted with a hero's welcome necessitating for Sukarno to make a short speech to the crowd as a way to not mob the train. Observing his popularity, specifically noticed by Captain Sakaguchi, the Japanese occupational army began to realize the potential value of having Sukarno as an asset to their cause.[69][84]
In Bukittinggi, a second delegation were represented by Colonel Fujiyama of the Imperial Army for Sumatra[85] and commander of the F-Kikan movement in Sumatra, a military intelligence operation that infiltrated Sumatra before the fall of the Netherlands.[69][67] Sukarno arrived to Colonel Fujiyama's mansion, a residence formerly owned by a wealthy dutchman, located atop the Sianok Canyon.[84] During the two hour meeting,[69] Colonel Fujiyama had assured Sukarno that Japan would not interfere with Indonesia's national interests, recognizing the diverse religious and cultural makeup of the Indonesian people. His main objective was to restore peace and manage the government in the region efficiently. In return, Fujiyama promised formal and active political cooperation.[86] Under severe psychological pressure,[69] Sukarno, in response against his will, agreed to collaborate with Japan, stating his intention to carry out propaganda aligned with Indonesia's goals while also working towards the nation's independence.[86] And so along the course of the occupation in Indonesia, Sukarno showed a cooperative attitude towards the Japanese.[87] However, the leaders and figureheads of the National Party of Indonesia (PNI) were divided during a meeting at the Bumiputra office in Bukittinggi. Some supported cooperation with the Japanese, while others refused to do so. Anwar Sutan Saidi, the head of the pro-independence bank, Bank National, and various trade organizations, chose to avoid the political track that were of the result of Japanese collaboration and instead focus on the economic track. His aim was to raise funds and procure weapons to support the struggle for independence. Tamimi Usman led a group of people who followed Sutan Syahrir's non-cooperative way and mobilised underground activities. The group led by Chatib Sulaiman followed the path of struggle for independence of Indonesia rather than collaborating with the Japanese to gain it.[88][89]
Period of 'cosiness'
[edit]
In the first days of their arrival, the Japanese leaders in charge of West Sumatra carried out accommodative politics towards the inhabitants of West Sumatra. Kahin coined the time lasting from May to August 1942 as the period of ‘cosiness’. This attitude was manifested, among other things, in granting permission to raise the red and white flag, sing the Indonesian song and allow the establishment of the People's Committee organization.[90] This is in conjunction with how Sukarno managed to persuade most independence movement leaders to cooperate with Japan. Intending to create an independence committee, Sukarno decided to stay in Padang in February 1942 for 15 days.[91] In his speech in Padang, Sukarno urged the people not to resist the Japanese army because the forces were not equal. According to Sukarno, the Indonesian people must use Japan to achieve their goal of realising Indonesian independence. Through his cooperative attitude, Sukarno managed to prevent the Japanese army's harsh actions against the people of West Sumatra.[92] As a result, during the initial phase of the Japanese occupation, the Indonesian people were afforded a brief period of freedom to express their nationalist aspirations, which had long been suppressed. This window often manifested through acts of "Sympathie" and "promised cooperation" with the oncoming Japanese army.[93] When the Japanese army prohibited the raising of flags other than the Japanese flag, Sukarno once asked Captain Sakaguci to cancel the order to lower the red and white flag. His request was rejected.[69] On this issue, Sakaguchi warned, "Perhaps, Mr Soekarno, you should not delay this too much." Sukarno followed otherwise and before carrying out this very heavy instruction, Sukarno went to the mosque to pray.[79] Sukarno personally feared that without his reasoning, the flag ban would lead to an unprepared native uprising would lead to significant repercussions against the Indonesian people, especially against the well-prepared Japanese military forces.[84] He then ordered the people to lower the flag "until the time comes when we can fly Sang Dwi-warna freely from all forms of foreign domination."[89]
Sukarno and Hatta saw co-operation with Japan as the best way to achieve the goal of Indonesian independence, "sailing in one ship with the Japanese while carrying our own merchandise."[89] The flag issue prohibition comes when Indonesians in Bukittinggi had been flying the Indonesian flag side by side with the Japanese flag in their perceived 'liberation'. When the occupying 25th Army ordered the Indonesian flag to be taken down, Anwar Sutan Saidi had protested and he was put in prison on 3 April 1942,[95] later suspecting that he had pro-Dutch ties.[96] Sukarno had to personally intervene for Anwar's release once he learned of Anwar's capture and subsequent tortures by the Kempeitai.[97] By then Sukarno and West Sumatran leaders formed the People's Committee,[98] as a temporary government to maintain calm in the region as Japanese troops consolidated their power.[99] Meanwhile, Leon Salim, Chatib Suleiman, and Mohammad Nasroen united all existing youth organisations into the Pemuda Nippon Raya organization. However, this organisation did not last long as the Japanese peeked the idea behind its establishment and labeled it as a nationalist organization in disguise. Leon Salim was arrested by the Japanese on 14 November 1942 on suspicion of pretending to help them, but was released after a week.[94] After the Pemuda Nippon Raya gaffe, political parties and national organizations were declared banned. The Taman Siswa School program, which had long been recognized as an educational institution rooted in Indonesian nationalism and culture, was forced to change its name to the Taman Nippon Raya (Garden of Greater Japan). All meetings, publications, and listening to foreign radio broadcasts were prohibited, and even non-political organizations were banned by the Japanese. Violating any of these regulations could lead to brutal consequences, including torture by the Japanese military police, the Kempetai,[100] then led by Sergeants Aiboshi and Kawaguchi, who were known to be harsh in their inspections.[101]
Sukarno for Madjid
[edit]
Sukarno's presence was not long in West Coast Sumatra. Initially, General Hitoshi Imamura, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese 16th occupation army with headquarters in Djakarta, had ordered the top Indonesian leaders to form a civilian governing board. However, many hesitated without the guidance of Sukarno. In light of his founding and captive in Sumatra, Imamura sent a letter to Colonel Fujiyama stating, "The bulk of the occupied forces, as well as the governing head of these forces, are in Java. The real administrative task is here, and civilian affairs are not progressing well." The letter concluded his writing as for the immediate release of Sukarno as a military order.[103] The 25th Army had hardly any close relationship with the 16th Army in Java, let alone the Imperial Japanese Navy in Eastern Indonesia, attributed to the historical interservice rivalry between the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Consequently, this contributed to Sukarno's extended stay in West Sumatra, as well as the 25th Army's reluctance to relinquish control over Malaya during Yaheita Saito's tenure.[35] Prior to Sukarno's relocation to Java, Colonel Fujiyama and his assistant, Ichitaro Wakamatsu, facilitated Sukarno's safe return to Djakarta while also arranging for the repatriation of Madjid Usman, a journalist from Padang, to West Sumatra as a gesture of reciprocation for the support Sukarno received during his stay in West Sumatra.[89] This exchange was made possible only after long negotiations which resulted to an agreement that was reached between the 16th Army, which governed Java, and the 25th Army, which held authority over Sumatra. The arrangement essentially involved a reciprocal exchange: Sukarno, who had been stranded in Minangkabau, for Madjid, who was in Java. Madjid's stature as an Indonesian figure was initially seen by the Japanese as comparable to that of Sukarno.[104][105] Once found and pressured by the 16th army by June 1942, Sukarno left by land to Palembang where he took a plane and went to Tanjung Priok in Java to lead the Indonesian independence struggle.[63][69]
Abdoel Madjid Usman had formerly been a close Japanese sympathizer and have known to have connections within the Japanese Embassy in Batavia and the Japanese government since the 1930's. At the time, he was known to have been the first Indonesian student to study in Japan, arriving in Kobe on 7 January 1933 to intending to study at an Imperial University,[106][107] specifically the Tokyo Imperial University. However due to restrictions only allowing admissions to those passing high school, he had been accepted to Meiji University.[108] He and his friend, Mahjuddin Gaus, would later establish the Serikat Indonesia and became a member of multiple Pro-Japanese Pan-Asian organizations, representing Indonesia. There, he kindled connections with Japanese officials.[107] After studying in Tokyo, he went back to the Dutch East Indies to work in a newspaper company as a redactor and teacher in Padang. He then married and became accustomed to life in Padang. He was later arrested and transported to Java after the Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst (PID) determined his sympathies toward Japan. After the Battle of Java, he was later released by the Japanese. After waiting for months in Java barred from returning to Padang, Madjid was to be transported to Sumatra after an agreement between the 16th and 25th Army.[109] After arriving in Padang, Madjid was met by Lieutenant Ichitaro Wakamatsu as the Hukukang (adjutant) of Acting Governor Colonel Fujiyama, and Lieutenant Utsumi of the Padang City Keibitai (Garnizun) who later became the Head of Sendenhan (propaganda) Ito Butai Section. They offered Madjid to help in the administration of West Sumatra, to which he refused and opted to instead be in an advisory position to the Shūchōkan. Understanding his sympathies to Japan but not wanting to be labeled as a collaborator, the Japanese accepted his position as advisor and translator for the Shūchōkan. He was also placed as a redacteur for the Padang Nippo, then as the last Burgemeester of padang. After threatening on becoming a simple rice farmer to shūchōkan, Yano Kenzo, he would later become a founding member of the Centre for Research on Minangkabau Society and the Kerukunan Minangkabau.[102]
Under Yano Kenzo's governorship
[edit]
The civil administration of West Sumatra only became effective after the arrival of Yano Kenzo to West Sumatra on 9 August 1942 as 'Governor of West Coast Sumatra',[43] along with 68 other bureaucrats and administrators from the Japanese mainland who filled the positions in the Bunshū and fuku bunshū.[44] Before serving in West Sumatra, Yano had served as Governor of Toyama Prefecture.[43] Yano Kenzo became the only civilian leader in the Japanese-occupied areas of the Dutch East Indies, a notable exception as most of the occupied territories in the archipelago were governed by local military commanders of the Japanese Imperial Army.[110] Gusti Asnan noted that Yano played a major role in realising good cooperation between the people of West Sumatra and the Japanese.[90] Yano opposed many policies of the 25th Army Command, but maintained friendly relations with 25th Army Commander Moritake Tanabe in Bukittinggi.[111] Tanabe assumed that the population of Sumatra, due to its heterogeneous nature, would not be able to establish local organizations in the same way as the 16th Army had facilitated in Java, where the majority of the population was ethnically Javanese. This assumption was based on the notion that the ethnic diversity of Sumatra would hinder the formation of unified, local groups, in contrast to the more homogeneous society in Java, thus upholding the military government's administration in the early years of the occupation.[112] Tanabe also had reservations about the increasing role of the Indonesian nationalist movement on Java, but responding to the "Koiso Promise" granting increased autonomy and eventual independence to Indonesia, which included all of the former Dutch East Indies, he established the Sumatra Central Advisory Council and trained locals for administrative leadership roles,[113] granting political concessions to Sumatra by allowing it to form a Chūō Sangiin.[112] However, he attempted to distance himself from local politics by as much as possible,[113] leaving much leniency to the administration of West Coast Sumatra outside of Bukittinggi to the civilian government headed by Yano Kenzo in Padang, which acts as an administrative city for development and public works affairs in the province.[114]
Yano Kenzo's sympathy for the local people's aspirations for independence and his disappointment with government policies, that did not match his views, were expressed in an article he wrote later in 1967.[111] As a civilian leader, Yano Kenzo instead approached the Minangkabau people through culture and multiculturalism, rather than through force or authority much like his equivalent peers across occupied Asia. He had an interest in nature, society, and the customs of Minangkabau, which socially adhered to the matrilineal tradition.[43] His fascination on the Minangkabau people led him on studying the culture and writing a book in February 1944.[115] According to Gusti Asnan, his political views, which were influenced by his keen interest in Minangkabau, became the basis for his idea to initiate the establishment of several civic, social, and cultural organisations in West Sumatra.[90] As a result, he had personally established and allowed cultural-research platforms and religious organisations in West Sumatra as a way for the Japanese and locals (such like the Penghulu class)[90] to learn more about the country's traditions and history,[43] such as the Nine-member Customary Institution (Lembaga Adat Sembilan Anggota)[90] and the Centre for Research on Minangkabau Society (Balai Penyelidikan Masyarakat Minangkabau) for the adat, and the Minangkabau Higher Islamic Council (Majelis Islam Tinggi; MIT) for Muslim leaders of Minangkabau.[116] Minangkabau scholars, such as Rusad Datuk Perpatih Baringek, were invited to participate in cultural research organizations established by the Japanese authorities. For Yano Kenzo, this initiative served as a means to bring together the diverse components of West Sumatran society—including adat leaders, Islamic groups, the intelligentsia, nationalists, and even socialists—closer to the Japanese administration, with himself acting as a bridge between them. To facilitate this, Yano, alongside Colonel Fujiyama and Ichitaro Wakamatsu, organized routine discussions held at the shūchōkan's residence, regular engagement with these societal groups.[117]
... The Minangkabau of Sumatra, under my jurisdiction ..., seem to be the most intelligent and economically advanced of all the tribes; and their political awareness is admirable. So, it is not surprising that they have a strong desire to end 350 years of Dutch oppression, and achieve full independence. Convinced that the Japanese occupation army would help them achieve their long-term dream, they co-operated. However, after two years of occupation, nothing changed.
For persisting in his stance against the exploitative nature of the economic policies pursued by the Japanese authorities, Yano Kenzo resigned as governor in March 1944. Officially leaving in April 1944,[1] he was then replaced by Hattori Naoaki. The new governor, described as a "careful and cautious person," had previously served as the head of education in Sumatra.[119] Yano argued that the Japanese occupying forces were well aware of Indonesia's abundant resources and were determined to maintain their hold on the country, even if it meant giving up the Philippines and Burma.[118]
During his tenure as Governor of West Coast Sumatra, Yano established the Kerukunan Minangkabau (Gui Gan) as a consultation body between himself and Minangkabau leaders.[43] The Kerukunan Minangkabau was established by Yano on 1 October 1942. Kerukunan Minangkabau met regularly at the governor's residence. Represented from each district, subdistrict, head of nagari, head of adat, scholars, youth, and the intelligentsia, its members consisted of 10 to 20 people. Its members were representatives of ulama, politicians, traditional leaders (including datuks), and academics who acted as an informal advisory board to the shūchōkan. Gusti Asnan referred to Kerukunan Minangkabau as the early House of Representatives (DPR). When the 25th Army Command issued an order for the establishment of a regional representative councils (Japanese: 州参議会, romanized: Shū Sangi-kai) in each shū on 8 November 1943 for the Central Advisory Council, the civilian government of West Sumatra continued the existing Kerukunan Minangkabau as a Shū Sangi-kai and Muhammad Sjafei was appointed chairman, supported by the 25th Army[120][121][122] The primary distinction in its new form as a Shū Sangi-kai was its formal integration into the government apparatus and the expansion of membership, which now included 20 to 30 members, with the Japanese carefully balancing the representation of pergerakan (popular movements, both political and religious) with that of the pamong praja (civil administration) and keradjaan (traditional rulers).[123] Within the council, Yano Kenzo allowed and even insisted on sending criticism of any policy enacted by the local Japanese government for insight in governance, unheard-of within occupied Asia.[116][124][125] Some prominent figures of West Sumatra who became its members were Chatib Sulaiman, Dt. Majo Urang, Syekh Jamil Jambek, Fachruddin H.S. Dt. Majoindo and Darwis Dt. Majolelo.[126][125] Meeting twice a year, the Shū Sangi-kai also answers a list of politically innocuous questions by the shūchōkan.[127]
Support from Minangkabau ulamas
[edit]
The occupation government adopted a different attitude toward Islamic groups compared to its approach to nationalist movements. Islam, practiced by almost the entire population of West Sumatra, held significant influence over the society. Recognizing that much of the resistance against Dutch rule in West Sumatra had been led by these religious groups, such like during the Padri War, the Japanese saw Islam as a useful tool to embed their influence within the West Sumatran community.[72] Due to this tolerance and in response to the transfer of power to the Japanese army, the Minangkabau ulama group initiated the establishment of the Minangkabau Higher Islamic Council (MIT). The MIT was established under the leadership of Syekh Jamil Jambek, with Haji Mansur Daut and Datuk Panglimo Kayo serving as secretaries.[128] Japan's lenient attitude toward the faith, religious practices, and traditions of the West Sumatran people was driven by the hope that they could use these elements as tools to further their own agenda—specifically, the Japanization of West Sumatra through local beliefs and religion.[129] Ahmad Husein noted that this assembly was established as a forum where the scholars deliberated on the politics of the Japanese government. Meanwhile, according to Datuk Palimo Kayo, the MIT was born thanks to the awareness of reformist ulama figures about how dangerous Japanese rule was.[130] Established in 1942, the organisation elected Sulaiman Ar-Rasuli as chairman. With the aim of gathering all the forces of struggle of the Minangkabau Muslims, the MIT Minangkabau received the support of the entire Minangkabau people. This institution brought together the ‘two groups’ of Islam in West Sumatra, namely Muhammadiyah and Perti.[90] Despite their cooperation within the framework of the shūchōkan, the leaders of these Islamic organizations were united in their resistance to Japanese political strategies.[128]
To gain acceptance from the people, the Japanese tried to approach the ulama group and give them a place in policy-making. The Japanese designed the formation of the Masyumi organisation at the centre. Religious Affairs Offices were established in each prefecture called Shu Muka. The clerics were given a special training programme called Kiyai Koshokai to prepare them to become Japanese propaganda tools. The "Principles Concerning Military Government in the Occupied Territories" (Senryochi Gunsei Jisshi Yoko) issued by the Japanese authorities on 14 March 1942 stated, "that religions should be respected as far as possible in order to keep the minds of the people stable... Muslims, should be given special attention in order to make use of them in order to grip the minds of the people".[132] The occupation government adopted a tolerant stance toward Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Perti, and others. They sought cooperation from Islamic scholars (ulama), allowing them to continue their activities. Religious schools, including Muhammadiyah and Perti schools, were permitted to continue their educational efforts. The many madrasahs and suraus (Islamic study centers), which were dependent on their religious leaders for survival, were also allowed to carry on their educational and religious practices.[133] Minangkabau clerics took advantage of the offer of cooperation with Japan to gather the strength of the Minangkabau Muslim struggle against the colonisers. The Japanese gave the Minangkabau MIT a place in policy-making, including appointing Mahmud Yunus to represent the Minangkabau MIT as a resident advisor.[134] In addition, several members of the assembly were invited to attend the Greater East Asia Islamic Congress in Singapore.[135]
... The Dutch do not allow us to be soldiers for them, but the Japanese do. Entering the Giyu Gun will be useful for us to fight them.
Despite encouraging the people to help the Japanese, the Minangkabau ulama at the same time fostered the growth of Indonesian nationalism. They encouraged young men to attend military training organised by the Japanese. Together with traditional leaders, they were involved in the recruitment process of prospective Giyūgun officers to minimise the influence of Japanese propaganda and replace it with the spirit of nationalism. Historian Gusti Asnan noted that their involvement in the selection of officers was to select candidates who were over 25 years old to 30 years old and insert the spirit of love for the country in the Giyūgun march. "They wanted the candidates to be mature enough to avoid the negative influence of the Japanese military upbringing."[137][138][139] UIN Imam Bonjol academic, Irhash A. Shamad, stated that the pseudo-support given by Minangkabau scholars during Japanese rule had blinded the Japanese in seeing what was behind the support. Community leaders together endeavoured to achieve Indonesian independence. According to Irhash, fighting openly against the Japanese at that time was a wrong calculation, so the scholars motivated the people to fight quietly "while taking refuge behind the support for the Greater East Asia War echoed by Japan."[138]
Mobilization of the population
[edit]Formation of the Giyūgun
[edit]
Within a year of the occupation, the Japanese shifted the focus of their policy from consolidating power and controlling the occupied areas in Southeast Asia to preparing to defend the region from Allied attack.[140] Sumatra with its rich oil fields in Palembang and North Sumatra was particularly important in this regard. Strategically, Sumatra was also considered important due to its geographical position facing the Indian Ocean, especially the northern part of Sumatra's West Coast being the most vulnerable area from the two allied attacks of India and Ceylon. To implement these objectives, it was necessary to guarantee security and order from physical force, violence, and political conciliation.[54] Admiral Nakamura, a high-ranking officer of the Imperial Japanese Navy, once remarked, "Retreat from Sumatra means losing the entire East Indies."[141] From mid-1943, the Japanese strategic plan anticipated an Allied counter-attack from Ceylon through the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Consequently, the defense of Sumatra centered around the west coast, particularly the northwest coast, and on the islands of Nias and Sabang.[142] Sumatra was then divided into four main military operational areas, each supported by its respective local garrison. However, the territorial responsibilities and functions of the Japanese military institutions underwent significant changes throughout the occupation. The 4th Division (Osaka) was stationed in Padang to counter potential attacks from the west and to serve as a reserve force for northern Sumatra. Additionally, the 25th Brigade in Tapanuli stationed a third of its troops on Nias Island and deployed a sizeable force to the Mentawai Islands. Even so, the Japanese 25th Army had sought to mobilise the population's power for the Japanese cause.[142][143]
In November 1943, the 25th Army Headquarters planned out on how the Voluntary Army of the Southern Area Land Army Command would work. The plan calls for the formation in four separate areas (later one more area was added), with each four Giyūguns formed independently under different leadership. This reflected the relatively high degree of regional autonomy that characterised the Japanese occupation of Sumatra.[144] At first the 25th army tried to use the paying system (under the Heiho project)[42] to supplement its armed forces.[145] The Heiho members were recruited through local pamong praja (civil administration) channels and were provided with a fixed wage or salary, creating the perception that they were "cheap mercenaries."[145][146] Many Heiho themselves felt like second-class citizens due to the unfair treatment they received.[145] The Japanese military had the authority to deploy them to battlefields anywhere, including Morotai, Burma (Myanmar), Malaya, Siam, and other regions. Some Heiho enlisted in West Sumatra were sent to the Morotai front, where they faced fierce Allied attacks.[146] For Japan, the Heiho held both military and economic value, as thousands were deployed not only to battlefields but also to perform grueling physical labor on heavy infrastructure projects in Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines.[145] In Minangkabau, young men showed little interest in joining the Heiho, resulting in low enlistment numbers. To compensate, candidates were brought in from neighboring regions such as Tapanuli to fill the ranks. The Heiho became infamous for the immense suffering they endured on various battlefields, often deployed under harsh conditions and facing significant dangers with little support.[146] A significant number of Heiho never returned home after the war. Many lost their lives in combat or succumbed to the extreme conditions of projects such as the construction of the Thailand-Burma railway, which became infamous for its harsh conditions and high death toll.[145] Eventually, experiences of Heiho recruits became a grim symbol of the hardship faced by the Minangkabau intending to join into Japan's wartime efforts.[146] By May 1943, the system failed to bring results;[147] with General Masazumi Inada, the architect of the a native army across the Southern area, once concluded that the Heiho units could not solve problems, even tended to jeopardise Japan's defense.[145] Chatib Sulaiman then proposed to Yano Kenzo over the formation of a native army in West Sumatra instead as a way to supplement the strength of the Japanese army given the chance.[111] Meetings within the Kerukunan Minangkabau and Yano Kenzo lasted days with members specifically choosing words that could convince Governor Yano of this idea.[148] After rounds of meeting, this led governor Yano Kenzo to believe that it was the ideals of independence, not money, that drove the natives to fight and so suggested the idea to Tanabe in Bukittinggi.[147] Similarly, General Tanabe formerly met with General Inada regarding the shortcomings of the Heiho units in August 1943. During this discussion, Inada proposed the creation of a similar native formation to address the issues observed.[149] After the Army Command based in Saigon, Vietnam issued an order to form a Kyōdo Bōei Giyūgun on 8 September 1943, the 25th Army Commander, Tanabe, gave full authority to the Governor of West Sumatra to implement the formation of a native army.[140] And so in September 1943, the joint establishment of the Giyūgun in Malaya and Sumatra had official legality granted by the Imperial General Headquarters and the Southern Army Staff Headquarters. The Southern Army Staff, under the direction of Colonel Kaizaki, prepared in September 1943 an ‘Outline for the Organisation of the Native Armies’.[149]
An accomplished Yano Kenzo then convened a session of the Kerukunan Minangkabau on 27 September 1943 to address Tanabe's reply. In the meeting, he declared, "The time has come for the Indonesian nation to rise up to defend its homeland. The license to establish a voluntary army has been authorized... so that the defense of the island of Sumatra will be further strengthened."[150] Following the meeting, a committee was formed to organize the establishment of the Giyūgun (Volunteer Army) in Padang. In the same meeting however, Yano Kenzo disagreed on naming the formation after an Indonesian name, specifically forbidding the name Pembela Tanah Air (PETA) unlike its counterpart in Java. It is thought that this was due the 25th Army's reluctance to give or surrender any type of authority of Sumatra to any other parties, especially those from the 16th Army.[109] Thus the Giyūgun (Indonesian: Laskar Rakjat, Japanese: 義勇軍, lit. 'Volunteer Army') was established in Sumatra.[147] The reasons on why there are two names for the formation, Laskar Rakyat (People's Army) and Giyūgun (Volunteer Army), was due to the difficulty of translating the words from Indonesian with terminologies that works specifically in Japanese. Additionally, Yano Kenzo's believed that the Japanese would be unlikely to relinquish control over Sumatra and that a process of Japanization would eventually be established in the region as time progresses.[151] To Lebra's analysis, Japan did not plan to recognize independence until late in the war, a stance only announced in July 1945, was reflected in terminology. In Malaya and Sumatra, the Japanese employed the term giyūgun (voluntary army) rather than doku-ritsugun (independence army), the latter used for the Burmese Independence Army.[152] The details of the committee’s composition were later reported by the Kita Sumatora Shinbun on Monday, 2 October 1943.[150] Later, the Giyūgun Kensetsu Honbu engaged in propaganda for the Giyūgun through newspapers, radio, films, and mass meetings. The association also assisted in the recruitment of cadres.[153][62] Soon after, an association called Giyūgun Kensetsu Honbu (Headquarters for the Establishment of the Giyūgun) was formalized in Padang on 5 October 1943 with Chatib Suleiman, a nationalist figure, as its chairman.[153][62][150] Given the opportunity, Yano Kenzo used this mass recruitment campaign to help and promote the propagation of the ideals of Indonesian independence in West Sulawesi.[147]
A significant gathering in the announcement of the Giyūgun took place on 10 October 1943 in the courtyard of the shūchōkan's residence in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. The event, attended by thousands, included notable figures such as Chatib Sulaiman and Mahmud Junius, alongside Japanese officials like the Butai-tyo (company commanders). Prominent Islamic clerics, including the Chairman of the Higher Islamic Council (MIT) Inyiak Sheikh Sulaiman ar-Rasuli (Candung), Sheikh Mohammad Djamil Djambek, and Engku Sutan Mangkuto from Muhammadiyah, also participated. During the event, propaganda was openly disseminated to encourage participation in the Giyūgun. Yano Kenzo delivered a speech emphasizing the dual use of spiritual and martial commitment, stating, "If you gentlemen's hold the Qur'an in your right hand, then hold this sword in your left hand [while raising a katana]. The sword in your left hand is to be wielded to vanquish the enemy."[154] Yano Kenzo's speech and prose had at one point significantly influenced Sheik Djamil Djambek's style of speechmaking and later Khutbahs' on the topic of the Giyūgun.[155] During an event on 12 October 1943, Djambek adopted a similarly impassioned style to encourage participation in the Giyūgun. Speaking with emotion, he brandished a drawn karih from his sarung and expressed, "My heart is heavy with sorrow because I am old and no longer strong enough to stand firmly. Yet, I firmly believe that the youth, descendants of our nation's heroes, will not neglect their duty to defend and protect their homeland, as enjoined by their religion."[154]
Giyūgun Padang
[edit]On 14 October 1943, Chatib Sulaiman led and pioneered the formation of a committee for the formation of the Giyūgun called Giyūgun Koenkai.[156][62] To support this effort, Chatib Sulaiman traveled extensively around West Sumatra, recruiting prospective Giyūgun officers, and frequently shuttling between Padang and Bukittinggi.[157] This committee under Japanese supervision screened prospective volunteer officers to be formed.[140] In accordance with the structure of Tungku Tigo Sajarangan as a traditional Minangkabau leadership institution, the responsibility of recruiting prospective Giyūgun officers was handed over to three prominent leaders of West Sumatran society, namely Ahmad Datuk Simaradjo, from the ninik mamak element; Chatib Sulaiman, from the cerdik pandai element; and Hadji Mahmud Junus, from the alim ulama element.[158] Together, they convinced the officers that the military training provided by the Japanese was aimed at achieving the ideals of Indonesian independence.[159][160] Young men in Minangkabau were encouraged to become Giyūgun troops to receive military training from the Japanese. With the encouragement of traditional and religious leaders, many young men registered to become Giyūgun. Among those listed were Dahlan Djambek, Ismail Lengah, Syarif Usman, Dahlan Ibrahim, Syofyan Nur, Syofyan Ibrahim. A. Talib, Nurmatias, Sayuti Amin, Alwi St. Marajo, Syefei Ali, Mahyuddin Tonek, Burhanuddin, Munir Latief, and many others. From here there were around 20,000 who applied for the Giyūgun, but only 1,000 rations were available.[161] Great encouragement for the development of the Giyūgun was given by Yano at a large meeting on 20 November 1943 in at the shūchōkan's residence in Bukittinggi, involving the participation of heads of nagari (village-level administrative units) and the penghulu class, considered the most influential layer of Minangkabau society. The Japanese battalion commander (Butai-tyo) had emphasized West Sumatra's potential manpower, stating: "Here in Minangkabau, there are about 20,000 people by calculation. If each penghulu sends one agile and intelligent youth to the laskar, there would be 20,000 warriors to defend the homeland." The gathering included thousands of penghulu delegates from Luhak Nan Tigo—the three core regions of traditional Minangkabau—and 460 recorded nagari leaders. Several prominent ninik-mamak figures, including the head of Nagari Balingka, the chief of Barulak Nagari, Datuk Paduko Batuah, and Datuk Singo Mangkuto (a leader of the Indonesian Islamic Union Party), were invited to speak.[162] With so, Yano was able to influence the penghulu, who had been able to recruit at least another 20,000 soldiers from each member of his descendants.[163] The meeting culminated in a resolution affirming the ninik-mamak’s (customary elders) support and agreement to take responsibility for the formation of the Giyugun at the village leves.[162] The call of the penghulu was well received by his people group.[163]
During the initial round of enlistment, many individuals applied to join the Giyugun training center in Padang. However, the number of applicants accepted was strictly limited. For the officer candidate category, no more than 50 individuals were admitted. The qualifications for officer candidates were particularly stringent. In addition to meeting health requirements and educational standards, candidates were also assessed based on the social status of their parents. Connections to or networks within the system were considered an important factor in the selection process. The selected officer candidates were later promoted to the rank of company commander. The next category comprised candidates for non-commissioned officers (NCOs), with a larger intake than the officer candidates. For the first cohort, eight han (classes or sections) were formed, each consisting of 60 participants. These candidates were trained to serve as section or squad commanders. The selection process for participants was conducted by a joint committee of Japanese and Indonesian staff under the Giyūgun Kensetsu Honbu. In addition to requirements concerning social status, education, and health, candidates were generally expected to be between 25 and 30 years old. However, in practice, the age requirement was not strictly enforced. Chatib Sulaiman had hoped that the first cohort of Giyūgun officers would be able to critically and skeptically engage with Japanese values. He believed this approach would prevent Japanese ideologies from unduly influencing the overall mindset of the Giyūgun trainees. Following the selection process, only 34 cadets graduated as officers. For the non-commissioned officer training program, approximately 250 to 300 participants were admitted.[164] The Giyūgun units established in Sumatra, Malaya, Indochina, and Kalimantan were primarily tasked with supplementary roles, including coastal defense and guard duties. These units addressed personnel shortages in these capacities and were intended to counter or delay any potential Allied offensives in Sumatra. However, they were not designed as combat-ready military units. Instead, the voluntary army was structured to perform auxiliary and complementary functions in coastal defense. Further evidence of this distinction is the minimal involvement of graduates from Nakano Gakkō, the Japanese military intelligence training school, in the training of the Sumatran and Malayan Giyūgun. This reflects the limited emphasis on political warfare objectives within these units, as such objectives were only sporadically relevant.[152] Sumatra's significance to Japan stemmed from its strategic location, military importance, and critical resources, particularly oil. Consequently, no Tokomu Kikan or Nakano Gakkō graduate groups were deployed to the island. Japanese policy for Sumatra emphasized long-term ownership and that includes keeping the population in check.[165]
The Giyūgun Koenkai became the only military force established by the Japanese in West Sumatra.[166] The Giyūgun force was initially formed in Padang and the coastal areas, trained by the 37th Infantry Regiment of the 4th Osaka Division in 1943.[167] The Giyūgun Section (Giyū-han) led by Major Akiyama was formed within the division staff office and there the basic outline was made. Later in January 1945 when the 4th Division was transferred to Thailand, the 25th Combined Brigade was transferred from Tapanuli and stationed in the Padang area. With this change, the Giyūgun was placed under the command of this newest Japanese garrison. Afterwards, the name of the Giyūgun Kensetsu Honbu was changed to Giyūgun Koenkai (Giyūgun Support Association) and other nationalist figures such as Muhammad Sjafei and Suska also joined. With the help of this organisation, qualified young men were selected as potential cadres.[62] Finally, training began in Padang in February 1944.[168] Training included marching, Judo, Kendo, Japanese language, and Seishin lectures. According to Lebra, the propaganda emphasis was on fighting for one's country and co-operating with Japan in the Greater East Asian neighbourhood.[169] The training of candidates began in two batches at Bukit Ambacang in Bukittinggi.[170]
During Dutch rule, the Minangkabau people had very few skills and experience in the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL). This was partly due to the Minangkabau culture of not having many military careers.[167] Even so, the people of Sumatra, outside of Aceh, have historically had very little military tradition or culture.[171] Another reason was partly due to the Dutch's perceived strong Indonesian nationalism sentiments present within the Minangkabau culture, thus not allowing the Minangkabau people to KNIL.[167] The absence of a strong military tradition outside of Aceh significantly influenced the character and career of the officers who graduated from Giyūgun Sumatora. These officers were known for their puritanical approach, emphasizing professionalism and prioritizing the national Indonesian character-military values over the traditional Javanese priyayi military culture. This distinction set them apart as a new set of officers focused on national rather than regional or aristocratic military ideals.[172] According to Audrev Kahin, only one of those recruited as Giyūgun cadres, Ismael Lengah, had received formal Dutch military training as a member of the Stadswacht, the city guard established in Padang in the last months of Dutch rule.[167] Therefore, Giyūgun training provided an important missing element if any realistic opportunity for West Sumatrans to oppose a repeat of the strong Dutch takeover of their previous hold on the area.[167]
After three months of training, in May 1944, the cadres were sent to their place of appointment and began organising the company by recruiting local soldiers. At the time of the Japanese surrender, four infantry companies (in Talu, Pariaman, Painan, and Padang), a machine gun company (in Emmahaven), a mortar company (in Padang), and a howitzer platoon (in Lubuk Kilangan) were organised in the West Coast Residency under the auspices of the 4th Division. Since a company consisted of about 200-250 soldiers, the number of soldiers at the end of the war was estimated at 1,500‒2,000. Yano Kenzo wrote that the number of qualified applicants was very high, while the quota prepared by the army was only about a thousand. Each Company had several platoons and was stationed in different places, though the majority was stationed in Padang as the Japanese army initially prioritized coastal defense. Led under the 4th Division, its main base led by Captain Sasaki and later on by Major Akiyama.[147]
Giyūgun Bukittinggi-Si Yaku Sho
[edit]
The 25th Army initially did not deem it necessary to establish a dedicated military training center in Bukittinggi. To the 25th army, the purpose of establishing the Giyūgun (Volunteer Army) was to address Japan's immediate military defense needs, particularly to strengthen the defense lines in coastal areas. Padang, as the main and most strategically significant city on the west coast of Sumatra, served as the primary stronghold against a potential Allied invasion from the Indian Ocean, which was expected to target the Japanese occupation's central command in inland Bukittinggi. Secondly, Japanese forces already stationed in Bukittinggi were considered sufficient to manage any immediate military tasks in the area. Consequently, the Japanese military government prioritized increasing the number of coastguard personnel in Padang and other coastal regions over establishing a training facility in Bukittinggi.[173] But as the war situation became increasingly unfavourable for Japan, it became necessary to strengthen defences around the 25th Army Headquarters by building fortifications in the mountainous interior. Thus another a separate Giyūgun group was organised in the Bukitinggi area.[174] Under the direct supervision of the 25th Army Headquarters in October 1944, the Giyūgun's formation was about a year later than the other Sumatran Giyūguns. Cadre training began in October 1944 with 200‒300 cadets at Bukit Ambacang, on the outskirts of Bukitinggi. After the training, 35 cadets were appointed as non-commissioned officers. All cadets were then divided and organised into 8 companies in the internal area of West Sumatra. The Bukittinggi Giyūgun troops were strategically stationed across several locations. Gulai Bancah, Baso, Padang Panjang, Koto Baru, and Batusangkar, with each site primarily hosting infantry corps. Baso also housed an engineering corps, while Padang Panjang served as the base for the communication corps. Additionally, there was also another artillery company and an engineering company. All companies were placed under command of the Bukittinggi Defence Garrison (Bukittinggi Bo'eitai) under the 25th Army with Colonel Harada as commander. The 35 non-commissioned officers were then recalled and received higher training. Eight were promoted to second lieutenant (shōi), three to high non-commissioned officer (Jun'i), and the rest to sergeant major (sōchō).[174]
Auxillaries and officer education
[edit]
By then, Japanese propaganda intensified in 1944. The various groups were united in the Hōkōkai, led by Muhammad Syafii and Khatib Sulaiman from the nationalist or educated movement; Datuk Parpatih Baringek and Datu Majo Uang from the tradition group; and Djamil Djambek and Sutan Mansur from the religious group.[163] The Giyūgun Koenkai (later supported by the Giyūgun Koenbu), an association of Giyūgun supporters, was formed as a liaison between civilian and military leaders.[158][62] The organisation has its headquarters in Jalan Belantung, Padang, and established branches in all districts, sub-districts and nagari.[177] Haha No Kai, the women's wing of the Giyūgun led by Rasuna Said and Ratna Sari, was established to prepare supplies for fellow officers.[178][62] The women's activities included collecting donations of rice from the community, from the savings of a handful of rice to be cooked each day.[170]
By the time of the proclamation of independence, the Giyūgun had organised two drills for its officers.[135] The first batch included Ismael Lengah, Dahlan Djambek, Sjarief Usman, Dahlan Ibrahim, A. Talib, Sjofjan Ibrahim, Munir Latif, Kasim Datuk Malilit Alam, Nurmatias, and Ahmad Hussein. The second batch included Kemal Mustafa, Sjoeib, and Zaidin Bakri. In 1945, 11 Giyūgun second lieutenants and three young lieutenants were appointed in Bukittinggi and four second lieutenants in Padangpanjang. At the same time, 20 officer candidates were appointed with the rank of sergeant-major (sōchō). These Giyūgun units were then organised into companies and allocated along the coast of West Sumatra, from Muko-Muko to Tiku.[170] As the first professional military organization in Sumatra, the Giyūgun adhered to certain qualitative standards typical of professional military institutions, shaped heavily by Japanese influences. Two key variables, control and skills, defined these standards. Training, overseen by Japanese instructors, operated on two levels of organizational control. First, internal control where officer candidates were trained to maintain harmony within the officer corps, both as a professional and social group. Second, external control enforced discipline based on rank and authority, marking a hierarchical structure. Skills, particularly proficiency, were prioritized above all else. While traditional attributes of a professional soldier, such as courage and discipline, were valued, the Japanese occupation government added an additional criterion; the ability to lead society. This focus on societal leadership extended the role of soldiers beyond the battlefield and into civic and societal influence. This framework laid the foundation for the concept of a career ladder in the modern Indonesian military tradition.[179]
Apart from the Giyūgun officer education, the Japanese army in West Sumatra also educated 11 candidates from the Chūgakkō (lit. 'Middle school') in Padang. Among them were Hasnan Habib and Munafri Munaf. For village security guards, Bogodan, as well as assistance personnel for the police, Keibuho, were also trained.[180] One notable former Keibuho member was Kaharuddin Datuk Rangkayo Basa, who later became the first governor of West Sumatra in an independent Indonesia in 1958.[181] During the Japanese occupation, he rose to the rank of Keishi (district chief of police) after undergoing training in Syonan-to (Singapore), funded by first governor of West Sumatra, Yano Kenzo.[182] Taking account to auxiliaries and other formations, Brig. General Saafroedin Bahar estimates the total number approved for training was projected to be 5,000 people.[180]
Allied attacks and rebellions
[edit]
On 24 August 1944, Japanese planners did correctly assessed an Allied attack originating from Ceylon under the initiation of Operation Banquet. However, the attack took the form of minor bombing raids rather than an impending amphibious landing as Japanese planners expected. Commanded by Rear Admiral Clement Moody, the operation included bombing raids over Japanese positions in and around Padang, targeting the Padang airfield, the Indaroeng cement works, and the harbor facilities and shipping at Emmahaven.[183][184][185] The second Allied attack on the Emmahaven took place in March 1945 at 06:30. This attack on Emmahaven lasted about 20 minutes, bombing and shelling ships that were docked and loading coal. As a result, three large and small ships were sunk and many “coolies” who were working to load coal became victims. On the Japanese side, several Kaigun (navy) men were killed. During the Allied attacks on Indarung, Tabing airfield and Emmahaven, Giyūgun units participated for the first time in these Allied attacks, without suffering any casualties. Air Bangis also experienced cannon fire from Allied warships, mostly aimed at the hills and the boats and sloops at anchor. These Allied gunfire did not meet with the slightest resistance on the part of the Japanese soldiers as they were mainly manning and preparing positions inland for a possible Allied landing, which did not happen. The Allied warships departed after sinking the boats, barriers, and lifeboats.[186] In reality, the Allies had largely avoided the Dutch East Indies and opted to focus on the Central Pacific and the South-West Pacific, as previously agreed from the Casablanca Conference.[187][188]
Another incident incident involved a company of Giyūgun soldiers stationed in Mukomuko, where Dahlan Ibrahim, a prominent independence figure, once served as the Vice Commander. Dahlan Ibrahim had been responsible for forming Giyūgun companies since his stationing in Painan, eventually being based in Mukomuko until the Japanese surrender. The Mukomuko Giyūgun Company received a report from the Seinendan, a pemuda paramilitary organization, about a suspicious light seen at sea. Upon investigation, it was discovered that an Allied submarine had dropped off some men in a carriage boat. The Giyūgun soldiers immediately fired upon the boat. After the submarine disappeared, the body of an Australian soldier who had apparently been dropped off as a spy in Mukomuko was found.[186] This event was likely from the actions of Korps Insulinde, where the battalion organized infiltration and intelligence gathering operations in occupied Sumatra.[189][190]
By the closing stages of World War II, economic hardship imposed by the 25th Army and widespread pressure felt by the people of Sumatra led to growing disillusionment and discontent toward the Japanese occupying forces. This unrest prompted some to take up arms against the occupying forces. In South Sumatra, Giyūgun officers held secret meetings in Lahat in December 1944 and January 1945, planning to launch an armed rebellion at an opportune moment across the province, and later spreading. However, the plan was thwarted when the Japanese army discovered the plot. In July 1945, Giyūgun members in Pematang Siantar, led by 1st Lieutenant Hopman Sitompul Siantar, openly defied orders from Japanese officers and trainers, intending to continue and escalate the resistance into an armed rebellion. This effort, however, was swiftly suppressed when Sitompul was arrested by the Kempetai and detained in Bukittinggi. Meanwhile, in Bukittinggi itself, various youth groups and nationalist factions began rallying to form an anti-Japanese resistance movement. Seeking independence, these groups operated both covertly and openly, as public sentiment turned increasingly against the Japanese, particularly with the realization that the Allies were gaining the upper hand in the war and dissatisfaction with the direct rule of the 25th Army over the region.[191]
Increasing control
[edit]As tensions in the Pacific War escalated, Japan increased its control over the population. Japan's initial ‘friendliness’ towards the local people began to reverse. Moreover, the financial needs for the war against the Allies increased, while the source of income did not increase. Therefore, the policy of exploiting people's labour for the benefit of Japan began to appear. People were forced to work in factories. Cruel tortures against dissenters by the Kempetai were seen everywhere. The freedom of the people's leaders was restricted, and organisations and associations were only allowed to carry out service-oriented activities for the benefit of Japan.[49] It is through these harsh acts done by the Japanese occupation government led to tensions between the Japanese military authorities based in Bukittinggi and Governor Yano Kenzo who headed the West Coast Sumatra provincial civilian government in Padang[1]
In an effort to meet the need for labour, the Japanese authorities imposed compulsory rōmusha labour on the population for various Japanese purposes, such as building roads, railways, bridges, fortifications, and protection tunnels. In addition, civil servants, merchants, school children, and residents who did not participate in forced labour were subjected to Kinrohoshi, voluntary work to collect river stones, sand, and gravel and transport them to the necessary places.[192] Japanese bunkers and protection tunnels were found in Padang and Bukittinggi. The Muaro-Pekanbaru railway line was the result of forced labour involving approximately 6,600 prisoners of war[193] and 30,000 rōmusha workers. Through education, the Japanese made fundamental changes in West Sumatra. Schools were mobilised for Japanese interests and Japanization policies were implemented. Indonesian was made the language of instruction in schools to introduce Japanese culture and at the same time, students at various levels were taught Japanese.[194] Students were also trained in Taisō (a type of Japanese morning exercise), Japanese-style mutual aid, and even military training. These activities were actually carried out more than studying. The youth were trained militarily for the Keibōdan (police auxiliaries), Seinendan (village security guards), Heihō (Greater East Asia soldiers), Rōmusha (Greater East Asia builder soldiers), and the Giyūgun.[195] Meanwhile, the educated classes, especially teachers, civil servants, and students were made into "new Japanese." Seikeirei (bowing to the emperor's palace in Tokyo) and Mukto (commemorating the spirits of Japanese heroes) are performed at certain times. These activities are usually done after hearing the speeches of the shūchōkan or Japanese officials. Keirei (standing salute) is mandatory whenever passing Japanese dignitaries, even in cars.[135][192] The Gregorian calendar is replaced by the Japanese imperial year, which is 660 years apart, while the time signature is adjusted to Japanese standard time, which is about 2.5 hours apart from Tokyo time.[135][192]
Economic turmoil
[edit]
As Japan's military power began to decline sharply from the first half of 1944, the impact on the local population in occupied territories in Sumatra became increasingly severe. One of the most significant factors exacerbating the situation was the Japanese military authorities' decision to increase the money supply without any backing by real assets. This policy led to severe inflation, drastically reducing the purchasing power of the local population.[196] Tanabe, a military man, often sought Yano Kenzo's opinion because he himself was “dissatisfied with the military reports and policies issued by the Military Government Headquarters." In addition to "being very interested in policies concerning the indigenous people.”[197] The potential devastation wrought by this monetary policy struck Governor Yano who strongly protested against its impact on the local people, arguing:
Anyone can find on the first page of the country's financial books that the prices of goods will rise in line with the increased supply of war currency. A doubling of the amount of money has caused the price of goods to triple.
Mounting economic pressure erratically made by the Japanese military led to Yano Kenzo, reign in protest.[1] Despite Yano's protests, economic pressures continued to mount as Japan's military setbacks worsened in the following months. The Japanese military government intensified its demands on the Sumatran people, requiring local officials to supply foodstuffs and other materials at increasingly higher fixed rations. Additionally, they were tasked with finding men to work as "coolies" on Japanese defense construction projects.[119] Obtaining household necessities became harder due to the war effort's demands. All staple foods were prioritized for the Japanese forces engaged in the Pacific war, forcing most of the people's agricultural products to be surrendered for war purposes. Granulated sugar became a rare commodity as it had to be imported from Java, and the locals had to resort to using 'Lawang' sugar, a type of local red sugar cane that had been ground into a powder. Salt was also scarce, with the briquetted salt made in Madura becoming hard to find, leading people to make their own salt. Basic hygiene products were difficult to obtain, and many people had to use substitutes like rice straw ash or kenikir fruit for soap. Kerosene, essential for lighting, was in very short supply, prompting the widespread use of coconut oil lamps or burning rubber as an alternative. Matches were also hard to come by, so people resorted to using fire hatches, striking a hard stone with iron to create sparks and light fires.[199]
Transportation was another significant issue. Bicycles were often used with dead tires, and cars or buses no longer used petrol but instead relied on oil made from rubber, which emitted a foul smell. The shortage of clothing was particularly acute, especially in the later years of the war. Urban dwellers, who typically had more old clothes, could somewhat cope, but villagers, especially farmers who could only afford to make or buy new clothes once a year, suffered greatly. Many villagers were too ashamed to go out, and if they had to, they wore makeshift body coverings made of tarok bark or burlap. The price of cloth skyrocketed, with just a few pieces of batik cloth being valuable enough to exchange for a paddy field.[199] Although there was some cloth, much of it was stored in Japanese warehouses in preparation for the war, exacerbating the shortages.[200] The difficulties in transportation also affected trade between regions. Moving goods was challenging due to the lack of transport equipment and the damaged infrastructure, including railways. Trade required special licenses, particularly for goods transported to Java. The condition of the railway tracks was so poor that it led to two significant accidents in West Sumatra during the war: one at Pakan Raba'a near Padang Panjang in 1944 and another in Lembah Anai.[201]
Women under the occupation
[edit]
During the Japanese occupation, many West Sumatran women were victims of Japanese army violence, especially sexual exploitation. Acts of violence against women have occurred since the first days of the Japanese army's arrival. The rules of values that respect women were violated by acts such as coercion, kidnapping, and rape, to forcibly making comfort women or Jugun ianfu. Japan could no longer bring in comfort women from their own country so instead, Japan made a policy to force women to serve as comforters for the needs of its soldiers in the brothels they set up. A government policy issued in 1938 said that every battalion needed to have a brothel, so that Japanese soldiers could concentrate on the war.[204]
Overcoming this form of coercion was attempted by local leaders. In 1942, while in Padang, Sukarno discussed with several ulama and gave permission to practice prostitution for Japanese soldiers.[205] "Solely as an emergency measure, in order to protect our girls, I intend to make use of the prostitutes in this area. In this way, foreigners can satisfy their desires and the girls should not be disturbed, "explained Sukarno.[206][207][208][209] The granting of this permit is marked by the existence of brothels in several places in West Sumatra such as Padang, Bukittinggi, and Payakumbuh. Generally, sex workers come from non-West Sumatran women, most of them come from women who were brought by the Dutch to work and their lives were neglected.[204] Sukarno acknowledged that it was his administrative act as the de-jure leader of the Indonesian people. He congratulated himself on "simultaneously enhancing the women's income, sating the lust of the invaders, and thereby protecting virtuous Minangkabau maidens."[210][211]
Sukarno's granting of licenses to brothels was originally intended to stop the Japanese army from harassing West Sumatran women. The beginning of this program was to gather 120 prostitutes as "volunteers" to be penned in a special camp for service to Japanese soldiers.[210] However, the number of women permitted to operate in Japanese camps was insufficient to serve the thousands of soldiers. "To get the comfort women provided, Japanese soldiers had to buy queue tickets. Even for one woman, there were up to four or six people queuing in one night," testified one Kaigun Heiho with the rank of corporal. With these tickets, Japanese soldiers were organized while waiting their turn to be with the women they desired. The stark inequality in the number of women available caused dissatisfaction among many Japanese soldiers, prompting them to coerce many West Sumatran women. To obtain women, the Japanese resorted to coercion, abduction, rape, and persuasion. They did not hesitate to take women even if they were married, regardless of whether they were sitting with their husbands at the time.[204]
Plans for Sumatra
[edit]In the early months of the Japanese occupation, the repressive nature of the administration in Sumatra likely stemmed from initial plans to integrate Malaya and Sumatra directly into the Japanese Empire. These territories were seen as pivotal,[212] with Sumatra in particular regarded as "the center of industrial development in the Southern area" and part of "the nuclear zone of the Empire's plans for the Southern area." As such, they were subjected to strict control, with efforts to foster a close relationship of mutual interdependence between the two territories and measures aimed at their full integration into the Japanese imperial structure.[141][213][50][214] The Japanese occupation of Sumatra provided a distinct strategic perspective compared to Java. Sumatra was administratively combined with Malaya under the authority of the 25th Army rather than being placed with Java under the 16th Army. One key reason for this arrangement was Japan's objective to prevent the concept of "Indonesia" from being recognized as a single political entity. While initially driven by strategic considerations, this belief was later reinforced by political demands requiring Japan to reject the use of the term and concept of Indonesia.[165] In the later years of the occupation, the reluctance to grant any real power to Sumatrans was further reinforced by Japanese fears that the Allies might use Sumatra as the spearhead for a counter-offensive against Japan.[122] From a strategic viewpoint, the primary threat of invasion in Southeast Asia came from the west, via the Straits of Malacca. Thus the strategic importance of the strait justified merging Sumatra with Malaya administratively, rather than aligning it with Java. While Sumatra lacked rice production and export-oriented industries, its oil resources were critical for sustaining Japan's military and industrial operations. In contrast, Java's surplus rice production and large labor force were utilized to support Japanese campaigns in Central Asia. These considerations underscored the Japanese rationale for managing Sumatra and Java as separate administrative entities, with Sumatra grouped together with Malaya. Additionally, Java's larger population and stronger nationalist movements necessitated greater emphasis on political warfare; contrasted with Sumatra, which received less political engagement.[165]
After April 1943, when Sumatra was administratively separated from Malaya, there was some reconsideration of Japanese policy in light of the worsening war situation. However, the 25th Army, which now held sole authority over Sumatra, remained steadfastly opposed to making any significant concessions toward independence. Any limited steps taken in this direction were done reluctantly and only under pressure from Tokyo or their counterparts in Java, who faced greater challenges and had adopted a more pragmatic approach to engaging with Indonesian nationalist aspirations. Consequently, until 1945, there was little indication of any plans for eventual independence, and the Japanese actively suppressed nationalist movements on the island to maintain their control.[122][123]
After 1944
[edit]
After the fall of the Tōjō Cabinet, Madjid Usman, who was in Kōfu under house arrest at the time, was invited by members of the Taisei-Yokusankai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) to Tokyo, including prominent journalists such as Akira Asano, Rintaro Takeda, Uio Tomisawa, and other notable Japanese figures. On 8 May 1945, they offered him the position of leading an "Interim Indonesian Government" centered in Sumatra given his pro-Japanese background and as an alternative to Sukarno. This proposal was framed under the context of the 'Koiso Promise' made by then-Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso, which hinted at granting independence to Indonesia. However, Madjid refused the offer, viewing it as a move to turn Indonesia into a pro-Japanese puppet state and a belligerent in the war. To Madjid, this arrangement was no different from Ba Maw's Burma or Puyi's Manchukuo, both of which were nominally independent but effectively under Japanese control.[215] In conjunction, when Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso promised independence for Indonesia, including all of the former Dutch East Indies, through the 'Koiso Declaration' on 7 September 1944, the 25th Army Command in Bukittinggi strongly opposed the inclusion of Sumatra within the promised Indonesian territory.[119] The 25th Army had tried to hold on to the territory until the end of the Japanese occupation, with one by a temporary measure by preparing a Sumatra-wide Chūō Sangiin (Central Advisory Council) intended to mirror that of the 16th Army's Chūō Sangiin in Java, chaired by Sukarno.[216] The Sumatran Chūō Sangiin held its first and only session in May 1945, chaired by Mohammad Sjafei and Chatib Suleiman as its secretary.[217][121] The council's potential role in shaping Sumatra's future was effectively curtailed, not only by the restrictions imposed by the 25th Army Command but also by the region's historical developments in preceding years. According to historian Audrey Kahin, a significant factor contributing to the declination of Sumatra's self-determination plan nudged by the 25th Army since the beginning of the Japanese occupation was the minimal contact between provinces (Shū) and that it was only at the shū level that indigenous organizations can sincerely began to emerge.[216] Communications and the ability to organize between residencies were also curtailed, as all Japanese-sponsored organizations in Sumatra were strictly confined to the residency level, limiting their scope and influence. Additionally, prewar nonpolitical organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Taman Siswa found it nearly impossible to establish contact or coordinate activities beyond this level. Following Tokyo's demand, the 25th Army reluctantly conceded to allowing the Indonesian national flag to be flown, the national song to be sung, and any Indonesian-esque symbols only to be used under propaganda purposes. Previously, both of such act had been banned since Sukarno's time in Sumatra. Despite these concessions, the 25th Army continued to insist that Sumatra should follow a separate path from Java.[218]
On 25 July 1945, the Japanese 25th Army begrudgingly allowed the establishment of the BPUPK (Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work) in Sumatra, chaired by Mohammad Sjafei, who also served as the head of the Sumatra Central Advisory Council.[219] The BPUPK in Sumatra was a model copy of the 16th Army's BPUPK in Java though without mention of Independence. Previously, the 25th Army had rejected calls from the 16th Army to send delegates for the establishment of the BPUPK in Java. Similarly, General Shimura repeatedly denied Sukarno permission to visit Sumatra ever again, fearing that such a visit could embolden the independence movement in Sumatra and "lead it to deviate from the carefully controlled path prescribed by Japanese authorities."[220] At the end of the war, significant distrust emerged between the 25th Army in Bukittinggi and both the 7th Area Army and the 16th Army to the point of inter-army sabotage, notably on the creation selected members of the BPUPK in Djakarta. One instance was the 25th Army's obstruction of Mohammad Sjafei's departure to attend the PPKI conference in Djakarta.[62] Another instance involved the selection of delegates, which had been decided in Syonan-to or Djakarta without reference to the 25th Army. Japanese planners in Syonan-to and Djakarta harbored reservations about the leadership made by the uncompromising 25th Army, viewing it as "overly distinctively Sumatran" in identity or "too closely tied to the Gunseikan (military government authorities)" in administration.[221] For the 25th army's BPUPK, the secretary of the committee was Djamaluddin Adinegoro. In addition to the chairman and secretary, the committee comprised 22 members, including prominent figures such as A.K. Gani, Teuku Hasan, Hamka, and the Sultan of Asahan. Although the committee never convened formally, it issued a statement expressing its resolve to support the Japanese Empire. The chairman and secretary had planned a tour around Sumatra to deliver speeches promoting this agenda. They began their journey on 26 July, but their efforts were abruptly halted by Japan's surrender, bringing an end to the initiative.[222][223][224][225]
Plans of relocating the Emperor
[edit]There were plans during the latter stages of World War II that the Imperial General Headquarters would relocate to Sumatra if Tokyo were to come under attack by allied forces.[226] This idea came from multiple reports in 1945 when Tokyo was heavily bombed by allied forces on the 9‒10th of March.[152] Reports indicated a detailed emergency plan devised by General Akira Muto to secure the Emperor's family by relocating them to Sumatra. Muto is said to have approached Satō Morio to conduct a review and provide recommendations for a suitable location in Sumatra as potential refuges for the Emperor and his family.[226][152] Additionally, some high ranking members of the Imperial Japanese Army privately contemplated retiring in Sumatra after the war's conclusion.[227] To Siti Aminah Usman, this rumor is said to have been supported by the visits by Marquis Yoshichika Tokugawa to West Sumatra. Once working with the Japanese occupation government, Siti was once assigned to escort the Marquis on his travels across West Sumatra in 1943. His first visit included stops at Nagari Gurun, Pagaruyung, and Batusangkar, before he eventually stayed in Bukittinggi. On his second visit, he traveled to the Diniyyah Putri College in Padang Panjang, where he was warmly received by Rangkayo Rahmah El-Yunusiyah. The leadership of the occupation government refrained from questioning the Marquis's intentions regarding his visits to what seemed to be random treks and visits to small villages (kampongs) and remote areas across Sumatra. However, it was widely suspected that his mission involved surveying locations that could potentially serve as a suitable refuge for the Imperial family, should such a need arise.[102]
Surrender
[edit]
On August 15, 1945, many people in West Sumatra were unaware of Japan's surrender. However, those who were observant noticed a change in the demeanor and behavior of the Japanese. The typically rigid and determined Japanese soldiers appeared melancholic and withdrawn. In the Giyūgun units, the atmosphere had also changed; Weapons had been collected on August 10 in Padang, under the pretext of exchanging them for new ones, coinciding with a break in training due to fasting, were never retrieved back.[228] They were later disbanded irregularly on August 16, 1945, and in some units even later, without any formal ceremony or explanation. Members of the Giyūgun were simply told that the war was over, but there was no declaration of defeat or surrender, leaving many confused and uncertain about the situation. The Giyūgun members were then sent back to their villages, traveling on foot or by carriage, with the Giyūgun members in worn-out and tattered clothing.[228] An account by Abdul Halim (Aleng), a 2nd Lieutenant of the Bukittinggi Giyūgun and former teacher of the HIS Muhammadiyah, was once summoned to the company office in Bukittinggi on August 15. Upon requesting permission to return to his village to see his seriously ill grandmother in Matur, his company commander, 1st Lieutenant Okura, surprisingly granted him leave and even allowed him to rest in the village for an extended period. He then shared this unexpected gesture with his colleagues in Bukittinggi, to which puzzled many Giyūgun members who had not yet grasped the reason behind the sudden change in their commanders' attitudes.[229] One of the first Indonesians who have heard of the surrender was Jahja Djalil, aprominent activist, courier, and reporter in the region. He was informed by Kurihara, a Japanese journalist working for Kita Sumatora Shinbun in Padang, that the war had ended.[230]
By mid-August, the attitude of the Japanese in the region had shifted noticeably. They began to approach Indonesians more amiably, but this change was met with skepticism due to the previous harshness and brutality of the Japanese. During a regular meeting at the Japanese Governor's home, Sutan Mohammad Rasjid and other officials from the High Prosecutor's Office, including Dr Liem Gim Tjiang, Idroes, and Ismail Karim, were informed by the Governor, Hattori Naoaki, that Japan had laid down its arms and was seeking peace. In Muko-Muko, Northern Bengkulu, Dahlan Ibrahim, the Deputy Commander of the local Giyūgun Company, received news of the war's end on 20 August 1945. On 22 August 1945, at 10:00 AM, all Giyūgun troops and companies in Bukittinggi and the surrounding areas were officially disbanded. The Giyūgun Koenbu was also disbanded after members notice its operations was without any signs of Japanese supervision or oversight.[228]
Echoes of the Proclamation
[edit]
The first news about the Indonesian proclamation of independence came from Indonesian employees working at the Post, Telegraaf, en Telefoondienst (PTT) offices in Padang and Bukittinggi.[228] According to Jahja Djalil, the first person in West Sumatra to hear about the proclamation of Indonesian independence was his brother-in-law, Aladin, an employee of PTT Padang. Early on the morning of August 18, 1945, Aladin received the news and wrote the proclamation on a telegram paper, which he passed to Jahja Djalil and Arifin Aliep. The two then traveled to Bukittinggi, where they approached a letterzetter (typesetter) at the inactive office of the Padang Nippo. In secrecy, they managed to print 20 copies of the proclamation, ensuring its dissemination in the region.[231] As soon as the traders and educated classes of West Sumatra received news from Aladin, an employee of PTT Padang, that Sukarno and Hatta had proclaimed Indonesia's independence on 17 August 1945 in Djakarta, word began to spread rapidly by word of mouth. Although at that time there was no direct contact with the leaders in Djakarta to clarify, the Indonesian youths (Pemuda) felt responsible for spreading the supposed news of the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence. Indonesian youths began printing pamphlets in secrecy and began to widely distribute it in Padang and several other cities in West Sumatra, and thus the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence became widely known to the public in a relatively short time.[232] Immediately, Jahja Djalil and his colleagues went to see Abdullah Halim. Abdullah was of the opinion that the news of the proclamation should be disseminated immediately and that the views of some of the scholars in Padang should be examined.[229] Many of those contacted were cautious of it being possibly false information, but Sutan Mohammad Rasjid and Dr Athos Ausri gave strong encouragement.[232]
With regard to the Proclamation of Independence, Jahja Djalil sought clarification with Yano Kenzo on the same day. The former Japanese governor resting in Padang confirmed the existence of the Proclamation of Independence but emphasized that it was now a matter for the Indonesian people, not Japan.[232] When asked for his opinion on leadership in the newly independent West Sumatra, Yano expressed his support for Indonesian independence but noted that Japan had changed—now operating under the authority of the Allied powers. If questioned about the proclamation by the Allies, Yano assured Jahja that he would turn a blind eye and feign ignorance regarding the matter, effectively allowing the Indonesian efforts to proceed without interference.[233] Yano then recommended Mohammad Sjafei for the position of Resident, citing Sjafei's roles as Chairman of the Chūō Sangiin of Sumatra and Chairman of the Shū Sangi-kai of West Sumatra. Yano expressed that he did not see anyone else more suitable for the role. He ordered that his opinion be conveyed to Moehammad Sjafei himself as his final order.[232] Initially, Moehammad Sjafei was hesitant to accept the responsibility of leadership in West Sumatra, requiring persistent persuasion from figures like Ismael Lengah, Jahja Djalil, Arifin Aliep, Kaharani Sini, Abdul Aziz, Sulaiman, B.M. Tahar, Djalaloeddin Hasan, Ustad Roesdi, and Sjarif Said. Despite their efforts, Sjafei continued to refuse. Jahja Djalil then relayed this information to Yano Kenzo, who responded with laughter, revealing that he had already spoken directly with Moehammad Sjafei.[233] Following this conversation and reassurances by Sjafei's friends, he would eventually agreed to take up the position.[234] In a separate conversation, Jahja Djalil inquired with Yano Kenzo about the possibility of Yano resuming the governorship in an independent Indonesia. Yano dismissed the idea, explaining that a new residency had already been established and that he would not be returning to office in the foreseeable future.[233][232]
Official signing
[edit]British troops landed in Padang on 10 October 1945, led by Major General Henry M. Chambers of the 26th Indian Infantry Division and accompanied by none other than Major General Adriaan Isaac Spits, as the Dutch representative.[235] On 21 October, these Allied officers accepted the surrender of all Japanese military forces in Sumatra, signed by Lieutenant General Moritake Tanabe, commander of the 25th Army, and Vice Admiral Sueto Hirose,[236] who orchestrated the Japanese invasion of Batan Island in the Philippines and stayed in West Sumatra.[237]
Aftermath
[edit]Japanese post-war uncertainty
[edit]
Before Japanese troops, who had been disarmed by the Allies in West Sumatra, were dispatched to Pekanbaru for their eventual return to Japan, they were initially gathered in Baso and Cubadak near Payakumbuh. Many of these soldiers seemed hesitant to return home, preferring to assess the situation before making a decision. Their reluctance to leave stemmed from various personal reasons, and some even expressed a desire to settle down in Indonesia. As the situation unfolded, a number of Japanese soldiers approached members of the People's Security Army (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat or TKR) and sought to integrate into local life. Some found employment in workshops, while others became advisors at training grounds. There were also reports of officers committing suicide (Harakiri) due to the shame of their defeat. A subset of these Japanese soldiers decided not to return to Japan and were willing to assist in Indonesia's struggle for independence. They were distributed among various agencies in need, including large workshops focused on repairing weapons. Workers from Sawahlunto also participated in these efforts, repairing and manufacturing equipment under the guidance of the Japanese who had chosen to stay.[238]
However, not all Japanese soldiers who remained were sincere in their intentions. Some were involved in sabotage or acts of treason. Some even refused to surrender. As suspicions grew, the Commander of Division IX, Colonel Ismael Lengah, ordered the arrest of approximately 127 Japanese soldiers. The operation was carried out by the Commander of the Army Police (PT) Division, Major Syafe'i, who gathered the suspects for examination in the Payakumbuh area.[238]
Japanese influence
[edit]
According to Akira Oki, the legalisation of Indonesian as the language of instruction in schools affected the development of the Indonesian language and led to a sense of unity among the people.[240] The education provided by the Japanese accelerated the maturation of Indonesia's independence efforts, something that the Japanese authorities in West Sumatra did not realise. In the political field, the Japanese had bequeathed the form of the representative institution Kerukunan Minangkabau, which brought together traditional and religious leaders as advisors to the resident.[125] Although they had no official authority in the government, they could colour the policies of the Japanese rulers in West Sumatra,[118] and secretly instil national ideals in the people.[241] In the military field, the Japanese provided military training through the Giyūgun volunteer army. The first batch of Giyūgun officers would later play a role in the establishment of the Indonesian armed forces after independence and most of them gained strategic places in the military hierarchy during the revolutionary period.[242]
Audrey Kahin notes that co-operation between adat and religious leaders during the Japanese occupation of West Sumatra formed a link in the chain of territorial relations and a foundation for mutual understanding, something that was particularly valuable in the years after independence.[159]
See also
[edit]
- Invasion of Sumatra
- Muarakalaban–Muaro–Pekanbaru railway
- Japanese colonial empire
- Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies
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- ^ Rohwer, Hümmelchen & Weis 2005, p. 359.
- ^ a b Husein 1991, pp. 38‒39.
- ^ Middleton, Drew (24 January 1943). "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy at Ten-day Conference Held in Casablanca; Giraud and De Gaulle, Present, Agree on Aims". The New York Times.
- ^ Morton 1962, p. 381.
- ^ "[DEF] SC#208 waar de pinda's senang zijn". Oorlog en Defensie (OOR) - forum.fok.nl (in Dutch). 17 May 2011. Retrieved 2024-12-07.
- ^ "Van Indiëgangers naar Korps 'Insulinde'". Prinses Irene Brigade. 2015-03-10. Retrieved 2024-12-07 – via Archive.org.
- ^ Lubis 2005, pp. 147–148.
- ^ a b c Asnan 2003, pp. 116.
- ^ "Sumatra-spoorweg". Japanese Krijgsgevangen (in Dutch). Retrieved 31 January 2022.
- ^ Asoka, Andi (2005). Sawahlunto, dulu, kini, dan esok: menyongsong kota wisata tambang yang berbudaya (in Indonesian). Pusat Studi Humaniora (PSH), Unand kerja sama dengan Kantor Pariwisata, Seni, dan Budaya, Kota Sawahlunto, Sumatera Barat. ISBN 978-979-3723-50-1.
- ^ Martamin 1977, pp. 104.
- ^ "Nanpo sukusen ni tomonau senryochi gyosei no gaiyo" [The outline of Military Administration in Sumatra]. 福音局資料 [Book Bureau Data] (in Japanese). Tokyo: Fukuinkyoku. 1946. P.14. Appendix 3.
- ^ Kenzo Yano (10 April 1967). 最後の会議 [The Last Conference]. Sekido hyo. p. 82.
- ^ Kenzo Yano (10 April 1967). "最後の会議" [The Last Conference]. Sekido Hyo: 82.
- ^ a b Husein 1991, pp. 71.
- ^ Husein 1991, pp. 71‒72.
- ^ Husein 1991, pp. 72.
- ^ Raditya, Iswara. "Rahmah El Yunusiyah Memperjuangkan Kesetaraan Muslimah". tirto.id (in Indonesian). Archived from the original on 16 February 2021. Retrieved 13 July 2022.
- ^ "Rahmah el Yunusiyyah Pejuang Pendidikan Kaum Wanita". Jejak Islam untuk Bangsa. 24 January 2020. Archived from the original on 16 May 2022. Retrieved 13 July 2022.
- ^ a b c Zubir 2006, pp. 103–116.
- ^ Sukarno 2010, pp. 110.
- ^ VIVA.co.id & 10 Desember 2015.
- ^ Merdeka.com & 10 Juni 2012.
- ^ Tirto.id & 15 Januari 2017.
- ^ Tirto.id & 18 Juli 2017.
- ^ a b Friend 2009, pp. 27.
- ^ Penders, Christian Lambert Maria (1974). The Life and Times of Sukarno (illustrated ed.). Sidgwick & Jackson. p. 64. ISBN 0283484144.
This impression is reinforced by Sukarno's own glowing reports26 of how he was successful in regulating rice supplies in Padang and in procuring prostitutes for the Japanese soldiers , activities which cannot exactly be described as ...
- ^ Kanahele 1967, pp. 57, Chapter IV.
- ^ Kanahele 1967, pp. 38–39, Chapter IV.
- ^ Mook 2010, pp. 43.
- ^ Usman & Chaniago 2017, pp. 216‒217.
- ^ a b Kahin 2005, pp. 152.
- ^ Ricklefs 2008, p. 339.
- ^ Reid 1971, pp. 24–25.
- ^ Tan Malaka 2020.
- ^ Reid 1971, pp. 25.
- ^ Reid 1971, pp. 30.
- ^ Kahin 1952, p. 121-122.
- ^ Kusuma 2004, p. 1.
- ^ Reid 1971, pp. 28–29, 45.
- ^ Reid, Anthony (2004-01-01). An Indonesian Frontier: Acehnese and Other Histories of Sumatra. BRILL. doi:10.1163/9789004486553_018. ISBN 978-90-04-48655-3. S2CID 243462963.
- ^ a b Zed 2005, pp. 13.
- ^ Lebra 1988, pp. 144.
- ^ a b c d Husein 1991, pp. 79–80.
- ^ a b Halim, Abdul (1997). Riwayat Hidup Letnan Kolonel TNI Purnawirawan Abdul Halim. Jakarta.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - ^ Husein 1991, pp. 77.
- ^ Idris 2001, pp. 82.
- ^ a b c d e Husein 1991, pp. 82.
- ^ a b c Idris 2001, pp. 82‒83.
- ^ Husein 1991, pp. 82, 91–92.
- ^ "Chronologisch Overzicht: Hoofdstuk SVI, August-December 1945". (Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis, Staff van de Bevelhebber der Landstrijdkrachten). E.L.F. Couvreur. Den Hag: 29.
- ^ "Operations 'Dulcie' and 'Parakeet' re-occupation of Pedang and Medan Sept-Dec 1945: naval report". WO 203/5393. War Office. 1946 [01/01/1946-31/12/1946]. Retrieved 2024-08-31 – via www.nas.gov.sg.
- ^ Dull, Paul S (1978). A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Naval Institute Press. p. 30. ISBN 1299324614.
- ^ a b Husein 1991, pp. 475‒476.
- ^ Rachmawati, Ira (2014-12-03). "Menelusuri Sejarah Suram Lobang Jepang di Bukittinggi". KOMPAS.com. Archived from the original on 2023-01-17. Retrieved 2024-12-19.
- ^ Oki, A. (1907). Social Change in the West Sumatran Village: 1908–1945. p. 239.
- ^ Kahin 2005, pp. 154.
- ^ Asnan 2003, pp. 83.
Bibliography
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- Kurasawa, Aiko (1993). Mobilisasi dan Kontrol: Studi Tentang Perubahan Sosial di Pedesaan Jawa, 1942–1945. Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia.
- Shamad, Irhash A. (2007). Islam dan Praksis Kultural Masyarakat Minangkabau. Jakarta: Tintamas Indonesia.
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{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Kahin, Audrey (1979). Zed., Mestika (ed.). Perjuangan Kemerdekaan, Sumatera Barat dalam Revolusi Nasional Indonesia 1945-1950. Ithaca, New York: Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia (MSI).
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- Benda, Harry Jindrich (1965). Japanese military administration in Indonesia: selected documents. New Haven]: Yale University Southeast Studies. LCCN 65026388. OCLC 306368. OL 14321437M.
- Usman, Salmyah Madjid; Chaniago, Hasril, eds. (1 September 2017). Memoar Siti Aminah Madjid usman-Hiroko Osada : kisah hidup dan perjuangan seorang putri bangsawan Jepang untuk kemerdekaan Indonesia (in Indonesian). Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia. ISBN 9789794619049.
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- Fujiwara Iwaichi (1 October 1966). Ｆ機関 [F-Kikan or F-Agency] (in Japanese). 原書房. Retrieved 2024-10-11 – via 昭和館デジタルアーカイブ.
- Hata, Ikuhiko, ed. (2001). Nihon kanryōsei sōgō jiten, 1868–2000: tsuketari shuyō kigyō no toppu ichiran. Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai. ISBN 978-4-13-030121-3.
- Mansoer, M.D.; Imran, Amrin; Safwan, Mardanas; Idris, Asmaniar Z.; Buchari, Sidi I. (1970). Sedjarah Minangkabau (in Indonesian). Jakarta: Bhratara.
- Asnan, Gusti (2007). Memikir ulang regionalisme: Sumatera Barat tahun 1950-an (in Indonesian). Yayasan Obor Indonesia. ISBN 978-979-461-640-6.
- Dull, Paul S. (2007). A battle history of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941 - 1945) (1. print. in paperback ed.). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Pr. ISBN 978-1-59114-219-5.
- Nederlands-Indië Contra Japan (in Dutch). Vol. 6: De Strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra. The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij. 1959.
- Salim, Leon (1986). Prisoners at Kota Cane. Translation series / Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University. ISBN 978-0-87763-032-6.
- Iskandar, Mohammad (1998). Peranan desa dalam perjuangan kemerdekaan di Sumatera Barat, 1945–1950 (PDF) ([Ed. 1.]. ed.). Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan RI.
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{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Tan Malaka (2020). From Jail to Jail. Translated by Helen Jarvis. Ohio University Press. ISBN 9780896804043.
- Kahin, George McTurnan (1952). Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Kusuma, A.B (2004). Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 : memuat salinan dokumen otentik badan oentoek menyelidiki oesaha2 persiapan kemerdekaan [The Birth of the 1945 Constitution: including copies of the authentic documents of the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence] (in Indonesian). Depok, Indonesia: Badan Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia. ISBN 979-8972-28-7.
- Ricklefs, M.C. (2008) [1981]. A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1300 (4th ed.). London: MacMillan. ISBN 978-0-230-54685-1.
- Mook, H. van (2010-10-18). The Netherlands, Indies and Japan: Their Relations 1940-1941. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-92519-1.
- Nino Oktorino (2019). Seri Nusantara Membara: Invasi ke Sumatra (in Indonesian). Elex Media Komputindo. p. 145. ISBN 978-602-04-8798-4.
- Rhodes, Anthony (1976). Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion in World War II. Chelsea House Publishers. ISBN 978-0-87754-029-8.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Friend, Theodore (2003). Indonesian Destinies. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 27. ISBN 0-674-01834-6.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Friend, Theodore (1988). The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan Against the West in Java and Luzon 1942–1945. Princeton University Press. pp. 82–84. ISBN 0-691-05524-6.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Adams, Cindy Heller (2011). Bung Karno: penyambung lidah rakyat Indonesia (in Indonesian). Kerja sama Yayasan Bung Karno [dengan] Penerbit Media Pressindo. ISBN 978-979-9110-32-9.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Aqsha, Darul (2005). K. H. Mas Mansur, 1896-1946. Erlangga. ISBN 979-781-145-X.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Idris, Soewardi (2001). Pejuang kemerdekaan Sumbar-Riau: pengalaman tak terlupakan (in Indonesian). Yayasan Pembangunan Pejuang 1945 Sumatra Tengah.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Muljana, Prof Dr Slamet (2008-01-01). Kesadaran Nasional ; Dari Kolonialisme Sampai Kemerdekaan (Jilid 2) (in Indonesian). Lkis Pelangi Aksara. ISBN 978-979-1283-57-1.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Moehamad, Djoeir; Yusra, Abrar (1997). Memoar seorang sosialis (in Indonesian). Yayasan Obor Indonesia. ISBN 978-979-461-273-6.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Saidi, Anwar St; Saidi, Anwar Sutan (1967). Tugu pemuda Sumatera: (dilapangan Dipo-Padang) perintis djalannja sedjarah menudju Indonesia Raya (in Indonesian). Tenunan Padang Asli. pp. 22‒24.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Surjomihardjo, Abdurrachman (1990). PDRI, Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia: dikaji ulang (in Indonesian). Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia. ISBN 978-979-8177-00-2.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Jasmi, Khairul (2018). 121 wartawan hebat dari ranah Minang & sejumlah jubir rumah bagonjong (in Indonesian). Panitia Pelaksana Daerah Hari Pers Nasional 2018, Biro Humas Setda Provinsi Sumatera Barat. ISBN 978-602-51382-0-1.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Post, Peter (2010). The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War. Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-16866 4.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Yano Kenzo (1944). ミナムカバウ族 [Minangkabau People] (in Japanese). 矢野兼三.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Daya, Burhanuddin (1990). Gerakan pembaharuan pemikiran Islam (in Indonesian). Tiara Wacana Yogya. p. 332. ISBN 978-979-8120-13-8.
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Cited journals and reports
[edit]- Siti Fatimah (2011). "Kepemimpinan Tradisional Masyarakat Minangkabau pada Masa Pendudukan Jepang". Tingkap. 8 (1).
- Nakamura, Mitsuo (1970). "General Imamura and the Early Period of Japanese Occupation". Indonesia (10): 1–26. doi:10.2307/3350632. hdl:1813/53491. ISSN 0019-7289. JSTOR 3350632.
- Siti Fatimah (1993). Sistim Kepemimpinan Tradisional Masyarakat Minangkabau pada Masa Jepang (Report). Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan Padang.
{{cite report}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Yurita, Fetra; Ibrahim, Bedriati; Bunari (1 February 2015). "Sejarah "Lubang Japang" sebagai Tempat Perlindungan dari Sekutu di Bukittinggi Tahun 1942-1945" (PDF). Jom Fkip Unri. Fakultas Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan, University of Riau.
- Kyoichi Tachikawa (5 March 2016). "南方軍政における民心安定策" [Measures to Stabilize Popular Sentiment in the Military Regime of the South] (PDF). National Institute for Defence Studies. 5.
- Kahin, Audrey (1974). "Some Preliminary Observations on West Sumatra during the Revolution". Indonesia (18): 77–117. doi:10.2307/3350695. hdl:1813/53591. ISSN 0019-7289. JSTOR 3350695.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Reid, Anthony (October 1971). "The Birth of the Republic in Sumatra". Indonesia (12). Cornell University Press: 21–46. doi:10.2307/3350656. ISSN 0019-7289. JSTOR 3350656.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - "客珍らか洋南" [Guests from the south]. Kobe Shinbun (8 January 1933 ed.).
- "DPRD Provinsi Sumatera Barat Dari Masa Ke Masa" (PDF). Government of West Sumatra. 2021-07-01.
- Kosim, Muhammad (2015-01-01). "Syekh Sulaiman Al-Rasuli Tokoh Pendidikan Islam Bercorak Kultural". Turāst: Jurnal Penelitian & Pengabdian UIN Imam Bonjol. 3 (1).
Cited websites
[edit]- Hendra, Jose (7 June 2016). "Lima Bulan Sukarno di Padang". Historia. Retrieved 9 June 2016.
- "Sila Ketuhanan dari Ulama Padang Japang". Historia. 1 June 2016. Retrieved 9 June 2016.
- "Syekh Abbas Abdullah". Darul Funun. 5 November 2015. Retrieved 9 June 2016.
- "Kisah Soekarno Sediakan Pelacur untuk Tentara Jepang". Merdeka.com. 10 June 2012. Retrieved 9 June 2016.
- "Siasat Bung Karno Hadapi Tentara Jepang". VIVA.co.id. 10 December 2015. Retrieved 9 June 2016.
- "Sukarno & Para Pekerja Seks di Masa Pergerakan Indonesia". Tirto.id. 18 July 2017. Retrieved 9 June 2016.
- "Jugun Ianfu, Budak Wanita di Masa Penjajahan Jepang". Tirto.id. 15 January 2017. Retrieved 9 June 2016.
- Culture and Tourism Ministry of Padang. "Masjid Raya Gantiang" [Gantiang Grand Mosque] (in Indonesian). Archived from the original on 4 November 2013. Retrieved 30 May 2012.
- L, Klemen (1999–2000). "Allied Merchant Ship Losses in the Pacific and Southeast Asia". Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942. Archived from the original on 2021-04-12. Retrieved 2024-08-16.
- Orllanda, Merlina Agustina (2020-05-09). "Gua Jepang Panorama Di Bukittinggi Sebagai Warisan Dari Masa Pendudukan Jepang 1942–1945". Balai Pelestarian Cagar Budaya Sumatera Barat. Retrieved 2024-06-29.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Chaniago, Halbert (2023-02-22). "Rumah singgah Sukarno di Padang dirobohkan: Saksi hangatnya hubungan Sukarno dan masyarakat Minang di awal perjuangan kemerdekaan 'telah lenyap'". BBC News Indonesia (in Indonesian). Retrieved 2024-09-06.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Chaniago, Hasril (2021-05-25). "Abdoel Madjid Usman, Wartawan dan Pejuang Kemerdekaan Didikan Jepang". Sumbarsatu.
{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Riadi, Fajar (2023-03-17). "Indonesia and Japan in War: Same Bed, Different Dreams". premium.historia.id. Retrieved 2024-11-10.
- Diskominfo (1 January 2016). "Sejarah Kota Padang". Padang.go.id. Ministry of Communications and Informatics.
External links
[edit]
Media related to Japanese occupation of West Sumatra at Wikimedia Commons
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