Talk:Free will/Archive 24

This is an archive of past discussions about Free will. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

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Archive 22

Coherence and quality maintenance

The collateral damage to all this is that the article gets less and less coherent. Adding well-cited distinctions here and there without properly integrating the change into the rest of the article inevitably results in overall deterioration over time. We have a deep and serious quality maintenance problem here that goes beyond the behaviour of a single editor.

Why should any competent person invest time in this article when we have no mechanism in place to protect the article from well-meaning local improvements that ruin its overall coherence? Vesal (talk) 11:50, 6 May 2015 (UTC)

This article is a paradigm case of a type of topic that Wikipedia handles poorly. Along with a number of other philosophical topics, free will has the property that there is no mainstream. The diversity of views is so great that it is impossible even to state the problem without falling into controversy. When a topic is so lacking in unity, the only way to get unity in an article is for it to be imposed by an author -- an author who has a broad knowledge of the topic and is committed to neutrality. But unity of that sort is never very robust -- it is always vulnerable to disruption by editors who favor framing the article in a different way.

That isn't certain to happen. Consciousness has the same basic problem as free will: there is no mainstream. When I set out to rework that article a few years ago, I expected the same thing to happen as has happened here -- that the unity would be disrupted by editors who didn't accept the validity of the framework. That hasn't yet happened, but it is really just pure luck. Active defense against that sort of thing is very difficult. Looie496 (talk) 13:26, 6 May 2015 (UTC)

Both of you have identified a serious problem. On this talk page, Snowded has proposed his idea of a solution, namely to restrict all contributions to summaries of what he calls 'third-party sources'. That is unfortunate terminology because there are no 'third-party sources' for subjects like this. What he might mean by this is a restriction to compendia of invited review articles: he likes the Oxford Handbooks and the Oxford Companions, and dislikes the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy although I see no essential differences between these sources. It is possible that such limitations can produce something close to what single authorship could produce, but it has several difficulties. One is that there are many such articles written from diverse viewpoints, so unanimity will not result. Another is that restricting sources requires criteria for their selection, and there is no WP policy to separate these secondary sources from others or to rank them. Another problem is that it would make WP derivative and outdated, and the compendia themselves would be a better source of information.

My approach, detested by many editors, is to take the view that the topic be presented with careful attention to secondary sources of all varieties, and to depend upon WP policies like WP:SECONDARY to select sources, and WP:NPOV and WP:UNDUE to maintain balance. Over time more sources and more balance would evolve. Unfortunately, this process requires that contributors try to present sourced opinion, and most WP editors are unwilling to engage in presenting sourced opinion, greatly preferring their own. Of course, personal opinions are easily expressed, and require none of the labor involved in finding and summarizing sources. When sources are found that happen to diverge from personal views, battle ensues, not over sources, but opinions.

If this policy-based approach were enforceable, the WP article would include eventually a pretty complete and balanced presentation, and would become stable over time because additions would all be source-based, and probably would occur only when a new or previously unreported source came to light. It is possible that the resulting article would be disorganized, but some editors would attempt to structure the material from time to time, and if the environment were source-based, discussion of structure would be constructive.

The main problem in improving quality and coherence at the moment, as I see it, is that the purpose of presenting sourced opinion is not made paramount by contributors, and interpersonal struggles supplant presentation of sourced opinion. Brews ohare (talk) 14:10, 6 May 2015 (UTC)

Perhaps it can be anticipated that I see my attempted contributions to this article as following the policy-based strategy I have outlined. I find opposition to my efforts rarely if ever consists of analysis of sources or suggestions for adding sources. Instead the policy-based presentation of sources is attacked as violation of WP:SYN with no identification of how or what constitutes the violation. The opposition is simply a visceral reaction to the policy-based presentation of sources itself, as a strategy, regardless of the content it produces. There is a distrusting suspicion that the selection of sources inevitably is indiscriminate, and despite WP:UNDUE this approach introduces fringe views into an article. Brews ohare (talk) 14:26, 6 May 2015 (UTC)

It is entirely possible that there are expert philosophers engaged on WP, and they have expertise in subjects like free will. So far as I can see, Snowded and Damian see themselves in this way. However, experts are not viewed on WP as founts of wisdom whose pronouncements are to be accepted from on high. The role of experts, as I see it, is to use their extensive knowledge of sources to provide authoritative sourced content backed up by citations. They could help a lot to organize article structure. That role for experts seems not to be part of self-professed experts' thinking on WP. Brews ohare (talk) 15:28, 6 May 2015 (UTC)

The problem with your sourced opinion approach is that it results in a rambling mess. The proper way would be to read a lot of material, meaning full-length works, so that we can have a fair and proportionate representation of the significant views on this topic. This requires actual expertise to pull off. I'm not an expert myself, but I have read enough full-length treatments of this topic to recognize which editors know the literature. Vesal (talk) 16:01, 6 May 2015 (UTC)

Vesal, rambling can be a problem, and Free will exemplifies it, although I cannot be held responsible for its present long and disorganized form. You identify an approach to better organization based upon expertise to obtain a "fair and proportionate representation of the significant views", surely an indisputable goal.

However, I have a very clear understanding of experts, and they vary one to another, from those much interested in the goal you identify to those interested only in their latest interest, or in hearing themselves talk. And, of course, depending upon your own judgment as to just who is expert and who is not is far from satisfactory, just as is the acceptance of individual editor's personal assertions of expert standing.

So some less utopian approach is what we are faced with. I think an improvement right off the bat would be a rigid insistence upon the presentation of sourced opinion and avoidance of all other forms of talk page blather, particularly unsupported accusations of violating WP:OR or WP:SYN. What do you think about that? Brews ohare (talk) 16:31, 6 May 2015 (UTC)

There is a pretty obvious solution. Revert it to its featured article status version and then agree changes on the talk page. Get Brews to agree a 1rr restriction with the need to agree changes on the talk page if reverted. Further agree that a no is a no on the talk page. Further, that reinstating disputed edits because he does not think the talk page response is adequate is not acceptable. That restriction could be taken to ANI if not voluntary. The reality is that Brews does not accept the general interpretation here of synthesis, ignores policy on civility and misstates opposing opinions. All three are exhibited in this section. I doubt that will change but a 1rr restriction would nullify it as a problem)----Snowded ^TALK 16:51, 6 May 2015 (UTC)

The featured article goes back to 2004. That sounds like a big rollback. Of course, Snowded and I don't see eye to eye on process. His idea of how changes should proceed is that he has no need to justify his actions or follow policy. His belief is that discussion of sources is pointless unless they are 'third-party' sources (that is ones he has chosen). So that is a problem. Brews ohare (talk) 18:25, 6 May 2015 (UTC)

Misrepresentation and personal attack Brew, try and avoid both ----Snowded ^TALK 21:33, 6 May 2015 (UTC)

Enactivism

The WP article Enactivism is badly written and impenetrable. There is a better article that mentions it in SEP. By coincidence my PhD thesis (1986, sadly now lost by the library) was on this subject. I am not sure it is notable enough to include in the article, or at least it would take much original research. Peter Damian (talk) 15:15, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

Hutto is not impenetrable. Brews ohare (talk) 15:25, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

"The server encountered an error and could not complete your request".Peter Damian (talk) 15:51, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin (2013). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. MIT Press. p. 6. ISBN 9780262018548. Google book link Amazon 'look inside' link

Proposals

Once again this discussion gets hijacked by Brews spamming. However, on Looie’s claim that “there is no mainstream”, I disagree. It is true that there is no settled opinion in philosophy, even for two thousand year old questions, but most philosophers agree on what the main theories are (e.g. compatibilism/incompatibilism, and what the main sub-theories of those are, and so on). You can test this by sampling any reliable tertiary sources (four of which have been mentioned above) and while there are differences, there won’t be a million miles of difference.

Another suggestion is to develop a set of guidelines on what a flagship philosophy article should look like. Is it merely a set of links to the sub articles? Does it contain mini essays which summarise or even replicate the contents of sub articles? Does it diverge from them entirely? Etc.

Another problem raised (by User:Pfhorrest above) is definitions. Typically philosophers try to resolve problems by defining terms. E.g. define ‘determinism’ and ‘free will’ in a way that they don’t conflict. Hence competing philosophical theories tend to compete via the definitions. But this is a nightmare for a encyclopedia which is compelled to open with a single definition. This would be worth discussion. Must rush. Suppertime. Peter Damian (talk) 18:35, 6 May 2015 (UTC)

There is an interesting discussion which starts with the 2004 featured article and asks what is missing from it? Philosophy is not a field that changes every few months so I doubt if its much ----Snowded ^TALK 21:35, 6 May 2015 (UTC)

Couple brief comments on skimming this.

I agree that a useful role for experts here is in organization and structure, and that's the role I've mostly tried to play (not to call myself an "expert" exactly, since I don't work in the field, but I do have a degree in it at least). Which is largely why I'm not delving into quibbling about what exactly different sources say. I'm mostly concerned with structure of the article (and the lede, which is supposed to summarize and outline that structure) preserving room for neutral consideration of all the different viewpoints and sub-topics that need discussing in the body of the article. I really don't have the time or interest to work on the nitty gritty of the main body of the article.

About rolling back, I think going all the way back to 2004 would be a bit much. I've been watching this article since 2010, and for the most part it has been very stable since then, when I helped to resolve a major ongoing dispute that was happening at the time. Since then there was one big conflict with an extremely tendentious and biased one-note editor attacking just this article (User:Syamsu), who got permanently banned from the whole encyclopedia and basically had no effect on the article as a whole; and then there's this ongoing conflict with Brews that has stretched out over a couple years now and not produced much substantial change to the article either. (For comparison, this is the version of the article from March 2010 where I first introduced the wording of the lede that has stood more or less the same ever since, and this is the version of the article from August 2012 just prior to Brews' first edit here.) All the other changes besides those two have been a series of very minor improvements, and other than those two big conflicts, the article has been very stable. I don't think we need to roll all the way back to six years before it reached that stable state (back to elven years ago!), especially considering it wasn't delisted from FA status until just three years ago. --Pfhorrest (talk) 21:44, 6 May 2015 (UTC)

OK so your call on the last GA version? Very open to other ideas, but we need a restart of some type ----Snowded ^TALK 05:26, 7 May 2015 (UTC)

The problem with the article is not its Introduction, which is OK as is, as Pfhorrest has pointed out. There are some problems with the section Free will#In Western philosophy.

For reasons I cannot understand, there is massive resistance to straightening out the distinction between nomological determinism and physical determinism. Other than that, this section is not too bad either.

"Other than that, this section is not too bad either". You are talking about the section whose opening paragraph opens "The underlying issue is ...". You see no problem with that? Peter Damian (talk) 18:03, 7 May 2015 (UTC)

Damian, as stated immediately above, and linked, the section referred to is Free will#In Western philosophy. Brews ohare (talk) 19:11, 7 May 2015 (UTC)

Some reorganization of the content of the subsections 1.1-1.3 could shorten up this discussion and make it more readable. My guess is that there is no-one here who has any intention of doing that. Pfhorrest has bowed out already, calling this the "nitty-gritty". Snowded and Damian have exhibited no interest in this kind of extensive writing throughout their time on WP.

So where is all this furor leading? Removal of tons of work accumulated from myriad (now largely absent) contributors will serve to emasculate the article, but it is not going to improve it. There is no-one going to do the work. Brews ohare (talk) 10:40, 7 May 2015 (UTC)

If I am wrong about this lack of crusading writers, let some of these critics actually propose specific changes to specific wording on this page. Brews ohare (talk) 11:27, 7 May 2015 (UTC)

If it's any help, I have looked at the article's history and the key contributions and I think reverting to the 2004 might be a little drastic. On the other hand, the introduction needs some work (see my comments above) and it's terribly bloated. What we really need is a consensus on what a flagship philosophy article looks like.

On Brews claim that I haven't done any work, or that there is no one to do the work, I have been here since 2003 and I wrote some of the original philosophy articles. I am also a published writer on academic philosophy. I am happy to put in some work or help with the discussion here, but we need a plan first, and I am not seeing a plan. Piecemeal additions and piecemeal reverts is no way to do it. Peter Damian (talk) 17:57, 7 May 2015 (UTC)

Damian, so far, you have suggested several approaches to reorganization. (1) Develop guidelines for a flagship philosophy article; (2) Sample tertiary sources and try to develop a summary compatible with their commonality; (3) Try to solve the problem of beginning the article when multiple definitions are in use.

Pfhorrest approached this last item via the idea of constraints. It works pretty well, and I don't think the lede needs work. If you don't like that approach you could say why and what you would replace it with. Instead, I'd focus on the subsection Free will#In Western philosophy. In this context, your second item is something you could begin to fill in: quote the sources and present a trial balloon for assessment. Your first point requires an outline of specific topics. The existing article is constructed around headers and sub-headers that could provide a beginning framework for possible changes leading to a better outline. Damian, do any of things indicate how you plan to help out? If so or if not, what are you going to do next? Brews ohare (talk) 19:03, 7 May 2015 (UTC)

Brews. other editors may disagree but I am now pretty convinced that progress on this (or other articles) is not possible unless and until you reconcile yourself to the majority view on synthesis, cease personal attacks and agree to change the way you interact. Now if you are prepared to do that we can try something ----Snowded ^TALK 19:28, 7 May 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: What connects this iteration of your customary lecture to what Damian plans to do ? Brews ohare (talk) 19:34, 7 May 2015 (UTC)

This is a bit tangential to the topic of this section but FWIW I don't think we should have a "In Western Philosophy" section at all. Not that everything in that section should be deleted, but that the structure of the "philosophy" section needs to guide the structure of the entire article. Rather than different academic disciplines, the top-level sections should be different conceptions of what free will is; basically, the subsections of the philosophy section as it is now. Within each of those should go both the philosophical discussion of why that concept of free will is the correct one, and then all philosophical arguments / scientific research / religious doctrine / etc about whether or not anyone has free will in that sense. (Scientific research and religious doctrine won't usually delve into definitional questions, but it will still take some definition or another for granted). This avoids the pervasive definitional problems by basically splitting the article into many "sub-articles" (but not ones I think should actually be separate articles), one about each sense of free will. --Pfhorrest (talk) 23:52, 7 May 2015 (UTC)

I put in a header that fits Damian's and Pfhorrest's thoughts about structure. The present article has main headers 'In Western philosophy', 'In science' and 'In Eastern philosophy' . Pfhorrest has suggested they have enough in common that they could all be brought together and the main headers become those of the subsection headers under what is now 'In Western philosophy' . That might work, but it might not. My suggestion is that the subsection 'In Western philosophy' be put into good shape first, and when that happens it should be clear whether the other two main sections can be brought in.

My concern is that the traditional framing of the topic as compatibility or not with a variety of definitions of what compatibility means and what determinism means is so verbally oriented that it will tend to suck up most of this section, and result in undue weight given to arguments over semantics. There are many Western philosophers that are not natural fits to a dominantly semantic division. Calling a bunch of them 'compatibilists', for example, does not illuminate these positions, which have important differences.

So just to proceed in small bites and not have the whole article to digest at one gulp, maybe this one section would prove manageable. Brews ohare (talk) 00:25, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

On point (2) above, about sampling (reliable) tertiary sources I have made a start here, starting with the sub heading "difficulties of definition". A number of articles simply avoid the subject of definition altogether. It should be obvious from this why I am uncomfortable with the use of the term 'constraint' in the definition, as this term, also 'compulsion', 'impediment', 'coercion' etc is traditionally associated with compatibilism.
On developing a structure of the article, I suggest agreeing on a method of division. A good method of division is such that the divided portions neither overlap, nor leave any remainder. One way would be to divide determinism into (1) causal determinism (which Brews calls 'nomological determinism' – I prefer the former as avoiding long and difficult words that would put off the ordinary reader); (2) epistemic determinism, which would include 'theological determinism', and (3) logical determinism.
On Brews's dogged insistence that we must further subdivide causal determinism into physical and non-physical, this division merely reflects an old strategy of limiting the scope of determinism to exclude human choices. See e.g. here. "Everything else in the world is made of matter and thus is material or physical. Material things are governed by particular laws and so are determined to particular activities. If human beings were wholly material, then their actions would also be determined and they would not act freely. But because the capacities that bring about action are immaterial in nature, and hence, not governed by physical laws, actions that come about as a result of those capacities will be uncoerced, at least under ordinary circumstances. According to medieval accounts of freedom, then, freedom is incompatible with causal determinism (although medieval philosophers would not express the point in these terms)." [1] So the distinction Brews is proposing is simply a variety of incompatibilism, and should be treated as such.

Peter Damian (talk) 11:05, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

Kudos for discussing a source. It explains a view dividing events in the universe into two groups - one where causal determinism apples and one where it does not. To adopt your conclusion that this is an incompatibilist position is incorrect however, unless one assumes the second set is empty. If you adopt an enactivist position however, you object to the division into two groups as a false framework. See the links to Hutto "Radicalizing Enactivism" above explaining the impossibility of dividing a tightly coupled system into separate parts. Nagel and others also say the division is false because, in their view, although the laws of nature apply to all events, causal determinism does not apply to a more accurate view of these laws ("The View from Nowhere", for example). Nagel supports a greater role for conscious action, and Griffith (linked above) points out those that think evolution requires this capacity. From these viewpoints, the compatibilist-incompatibilist framework is a Procrustean bed.

I am using an iPad to edit so repeating these links is awkward. But if you can't find them I'll track them down for you later. Brews ohare (talk) 14:21, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

"To adopt your conclusion that this is an incompatibilist position is incorrect however, unless one assumes the second set is empty. " That is clearly not my position. Peter Damian (talk) 14:41, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

To make my position clear, causal determinism is always inconsistent with the strong form of free will (i.e. origination). However if we restrict the types of event to which determinism applies, then then the inconsistency simply does not apply. By analogy, hot is always inconsistent with cold. But that does not mean that bodies cannot be hot, so long as the cold fails to reach them. Likewise, if there are types of event that determinism does not affect, then they are not determined. It's very simple really.Peter Damian (talk) 14:48, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

"If you adopt an enactivist position however, you object to the division into two groups as a false framework." Why is the division a 'false framework'? Either freewill and determinism, however defined, are consistent, or not. Tertium non datur. This is a matter of logic. P or not-P. Peter Damian (talk) 15:06, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

Your links don't work for me. I am assuming they are to Chapter 4 of James Fieser's unpublished book Great Issues in Philosophy? His definition of determinism "a person never has the ability to have done otherwise." is not as general as the ordinary definition: "a theory or doctrine that acts of the will, occurrences in nature, or social or psychological phenomena are causally determined by preceding events or natural laws."

I would say that one can make the problem simple by setting up the universe to be simple, for example choosing a very restrictive view of what free will means and adopting a view of determinism that contradicts that definition. However, there are millennia of discussion about "ability to do otherwise" and "alternative possibilities" that are mostly about choosing the "best" definitions, which mostly amounts to trying to encapsulate the intuitive sense of free will in an objectivist language.

Your comment on Hutto misses his point, which is that various definitions of freewill and determinism are not descriptors with any meaning in the present context. It is like describing a Picasso with quantum theory. You may capture the physics, but the painting has nothing to do with that. Brews ohare (talk) 15:19, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

See my definition below. "Free will is the ability to choose between different possible courses of action." As I mention, the definition of 'possibility' remains open in order to capture the difference between the two main positions. The definition is perfectly clear. Peter Damian (talk) 15:54, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

Your italicized sentence appears to originate in Colleen McClusky's article on "Medieval Theories of Free Will" in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which is off-line at the moment. Brews ohare (talk) 15:58, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

Yes. To be clear, the sentence is "But because the capacities that bring about action are immaterial in nature, and hence, not governed by physical laws, actions that come about as a result of those capacities will be uncoerced, at least under ordinary circumstances."Peter Damian (talk) 16:00, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

"The definition is perfectly clear". It also may be irrelevant in the context of human decision making and enacting, if we follow Hutto, Nagel and Griffith. Brews ohare (talk) 16:08, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

The definition is clearly relevant to the subject of free will, since it is a definition of free will. If what you are talking about is irrelevant (as you claim), then it shouldn't be in the article. Peter Damian (talk) 16:14, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

You misunderstand - the topic of free will encompasses many dimensions, and you have selected some of these where your description has meaning. But some other approaches are orthogonal to this formulation. You know the old quote: "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy." - Hamlet (1.5.167-8), Hamlet to Horatio Brews ohare (talk) 16:19, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

I have selected the two definitions that are commonly found in reliable tertiary sources. Do you agree with that approach or not? Peter Damian (talk) 16:23, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

I do not. The idea that 'free will' is a topic limited by some or another restrictive definition may be appealing because it puts the subject in a verbal box, but the subject is wider than this. That is the reason that it has preoccupied mankind for millennia: it escapes easy encapsulation. Hutto, Nagel, Nordhoff, Schrodinger, etc etc do not accept what might be labeled the 'definitional' approach. The example I provided is that quantum mechanics does not provide a meaningful description of a Picasso painting. You can describe the painting in these terms, but so what? Brews ohare (talk) 16:33, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

To be very clear, do you disagree with the approach of looking at reliable tertiary sources? This is really important. Peter Damian (talk) 16:39, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

I think you are aiming at selecting a few WP:SECONDARY sources to place on a pedestal as so-called "tertiary" sources, and thereby to restrict the discussion of free will to exclude Hutto, Nagel, Nahmias, Nordhoff, Schrodinger, and possibly the 'moral responsibility' concerns of William James and Immanuel Kant from the discussion? Brews ohare (talk) 16:46, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

Not really. I will take that answer as a 'no', and as you see from my comment on user:Snowded's talk page, I now throw all my support behind a ban from all philosophy-related topics. I believe you mean well, but there are competence issues that are driving away other editors, and this disruption really has to stop. Sorry. Peter Damian (talk) 16:52, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

You can allay my suspicions by identifying the sources you wish to make the last word, and explaining just how you wish to handle the other authors I have mentioned. The easy road to escape these considerations by labeling me as an amateur or incompetent is beneath you. Brews ohare (talk) 16:56, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

For example, how would you handle these sources? How would you handle William James? How would you handle Hutto? How would you handle Nagel? Brews ohare (talk) 17:07, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

I am really sorry. I have given my best shot at trying to engage with you, but as I say, there are basic competency issues. Peter Damian (talk) 17:16, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

Damian: I am sorry too. If this is your "best shot" at dealing with these linked sources, you have competency issues of your own. Brews ohare (talk) 17:44, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

A different approach to reorganization

The leading paragraphs before the first subsection are supposed to introduce the body of the article. Because that body is ill-defined at the moment, I propose to leave the introduction alone until the rest of the article is better organized. Although there are several main sections at the moment, and perhaps they will be absorbed later, as a simplified beginning I propose to look at the section Free will#In Western philosophy.

Here again there is an introductory section that should summarize what follows in this subsection. But to start, let's look at the table of contents for this subsection:

1.1 Incompatibilism

1.2 Compatibilism

1.3 Other views

The "other views" section is a sort of miscellaneous:

1.3.1 Two-stage models: although it begins as a discussion of the decision process, this topic is quickly abandoned to become a discussion of whether an indeterminism limited sufficiently to prevent randomness still can allow alternative possibilities. This discussion is confused and presents a number of authors in so fragmented a manner that one has no idea of what they actually said.

1.3.2 Free will as an illusion: A juxtaposition of snippets of contrary opinions making no attempt to relate them to each other.

1.3.3 Free will as "moral imagination": Raises the separation of "freedom of thought" and "freedom of action" focusing upon Steiner's Philosophy of Freedom. I am left with no idea of what Steiner thought, and the "thought" + "action" formulation is a very simplistic version of what psychologists think goes on in a decision process.

1.3.4 Free will as a pragmatically useful concept: A misrepresentation of William James thinking

1.3.5 Catholic teachings: Says in many words that Catholic teaching is on both sides of the compatibilist-incompatibilist debate. The conclusion could be made a sentence somewhere else, so the real question is how much documentation is appropriate.

1.3.6 Free will and views of causality: The idea of what is causality is pretty central to determinism. This section belongs in a subsection on the entire subject of determinism.

My immediate reaction is that this entire subsection should be deleted and its contents placed in other subsections. Any comments? Brews ohare (talk) 19:12, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

I also dislike that "other views" section and would like to see its contents resorted into their proper places.

However as I comment in the section above, I'm hesitant to have all forms of compatibilism lumped together like that, as they are each a different view on what free will is that should be presented on par with the incompatibilist view on that question.

I think it might be good to label the broken-out compatibilist subsections with the word "compatibilism" though. Perhaps "Classical Compatibilism" for the not-imprisoned-or-in-chains view of Hobbes, Hume, etc, and "Modern Compatibilism" for the views of contemporaries like Frankfurt.

I'm honestly not sure what to do with the kind of so-called "compatibilists" who seem to essentially have an incompatibilist conception of what free will is, but say that since for this or that reason you can't in practice predict what people are going to do even if it is technically determined, people still have free will. That seems like it technically has to be classified as compatibilism since it's saying people can have free will despite being determined, but it seems to share the same conception of free will as incompatibilists, unlike both the hume/hobbes and frankfurt types of compatibilist. --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:10, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Maybe it would be better after all to not label those sections as incompatibilist and variations of compatibilist, but to label the "incompatibilist" section as being about free will as lack of determination; the hard-to-categorize group above then follows naturally as free will being lack of predictability; the classical compatibilists see free will as lack of coercion or restraint; the modern compatibilists as lack of psychological compulsion; other views can then naturally be fit in as "free will as freedom of the will from _____". Could probably use some rewording to tighten it up a bit though but you get the structural idea there. --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:13, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Reliance on tertiary sources

I think you have to answer Peter's earlier question in the affirmative before it makes sense to engage in any discussion about structure or content. To remind you: "To be very clear, do you disagree with the approach of looking at reliable tertiary sources?" ----Snowded ^TALK 19:20, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

Just so we are all on the same page, I propose this definition of 'tertiary source approach'. This will be used when the article is of such a level of generality that secondary sources (which potentially cover all matters of detail) are no longer a reliable guide to what should be included. So (1) we agree on a set of reliable tertiary sources, e.g. Oxford Companion, Routledge, SEP etc. We then look at the main areas or headings covered by each source. We reject headings not covered by most sources, then include the rest. Thus if source 1 covers ABC, source 2 covers BCD, source 3 covers ABCDE, we include ABCD for sure, but think about rejecting E, because only 1 of the three covers it. We also think about giving priority to B and C, because all 3 sources cover them. Snowded, is that your understanding of the proposal? Peter Damian (talk) 19:49, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

What is reasoning behind accepting only topics common to all the "tertiary" sources? Why not include all the headers? That would make the WP article more inclusive And more useful. And what article titles contained in the accepted "tertiary" sources are acceptable? All related articles from the selected sources, or only those with certain titles? For example, I suppose 'Free will' is acceptable. How about 'Compatibilism', 'Moral responsibility', 'Neurophilosophy'? Brews ohare (talk) 23:50, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

All the headings could be included, I agree. But for a general 'flagship' article we have a duty to our readers to cover the subject reasonably succinctly. There is no need to include every detail and every subdetail. Otherwise we might as well write all the sub-articles first and then transclude the lot into one single article. The current article is rather like that - the section on theological determinism is nearly as long as the article on the same subject. A flagship article should explain all the general issues, and the division, very clearly but quickly, leaving the reader the free will to choose whether to click on the link to the sub-article. The current article adopts a compulsionist approach. Peter Damian (talk) 05:45, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

And even more than that, the current article actually omits topics that are of central importance, particularly the connection between free will and moral responsibility, which is so important that it really deserves a paragraph of the lead. Looie496 (talk) 14:15, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

I agree, and we could even define free will as that which we can take praise for, and must take blame for. “if anyone says the stone sins because it falls down through its own weight, he is not perhaps more stupid than the stone but he is certainly considered mad” says Augustine. Saruman is certainly not stupid. His desire for knowledge and order leads to his downfall, and he rejects the chance of redemption when it is offered.Peter Damian (talk) 14:34, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Suggested granularity

There is a discussion above on division, on which I am in broad agreement with user:Pfhorrest. The other question is granularity. How much should be pushed into the sub-articles, how much should be included in the main article? My view is that most people are unlikely to read the whole of the current article (certainly I couldn't be bothered), and of those that do, the sub-articles might be a better choice. Our duty to our readers is an article that is not excessively long, but which summarises the main views clearly and in a way that is accessible to the intended readership, and hopefully interests them enough for them to follow the links to more detailed treatments. Certainly there should be no detail in the main article that is omitted by the sub-articles. Thoughts? Peter Damian (talk) 07:10, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Following your path of limiting the article to just enough guidance to be able to select a more extensive article, I'd suggest only the lede be retained without subsections. The present lede is fine, but a paragraph on moral responsibility should be added, as Looie and many sources suggest, and another on neurophilosophy. I really see no problem with the present approach using constraints at the outset-it's simple and comprehensive. Brews ohare (talk) 14:36, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Galen Strawson says "According to compatibilists, freedom is compatible with determinism because freedom is essentially just a matter of not being constrained or hindered in certain ways when one acts or chooses." [2]. Also, it is odd to talk about being constrained by determinism. Determinism is a theory about how the universe works. How can we be constrained by a theory? Constraints are things like bars, ropes, barriers of all kinds. Peter Damian (talk) 14:59, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Although shortening up Free will like this simplifies writing this article, it necessitates re-examination of all the linked articles to insure they carry the weight. Brews ohare (talk) 14:54, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

I did not suggest restricting it to the introduction. The article should be divided in the way that user:pfhorrest suggests above, then dramatically trimmed, with anything not already in the sub-article being moved to sub-articles. Also, this would have a significant impact on how other flagship articles are handled, and should not be done without extensive consultation outside this narrow little page. Peter Damian (talk) 14:59, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

That's right. I suggested shortening it this way. Damian, your notion of a constraint is very narrow, and quoting Strawson on how compatibilists handle constraints does not mean compatibilism is implied by the notion. You have a way of confusing discussion of hypotheses with facts. The various hypotheses of types of determinism, if they were fact, would constrain 'free will', if it were a fact. Brews ohare (talk) 15:05, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Are you saying that if nomological determinism were a fact, then it would constrain free will, if it were a fact?Peter Damian (talk) 15:20, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

As you know. there are various versions of nomological determinism. One is (approximately) that all future events are determined by antecedent events. If this hypothesis were in fact true and a human choice was classified as an 'event', then choice would be an illusion, the ultimate constraint upon any realization of free will, limiting it to such a degree that it would be impossible. Brews ohare (talk) 15:45, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

I see Peter Damian (talk) 15:51, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Do you think perhaps you need to check your understanding of compatibilism? Peter Damian (talk) 16:20, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Suggested division

Following my remarks above, here is a suggested division.

Begin with a definition: Free will is the ability to choose between different possible courses of action. This is consistent with with both compatibilism and incompatibilism, depending on the definition of 'possible'. If it is defined modally, as the contradictory of impossible', then free will is inconsistent with determinism. If it is defined as freedom from external constraint or compulsion, then it is consistent. There is no consensus among philosophers about which definition is correct. [Reference sources like Strawson etc]
There are three [generally accepted] kinds of determinism, namely causal, epistemic and logical.
We then divide into three parts corresponding to causal, epistemic and logical
- For Causal determinism, the two main positions are compatibilism and incompatibilism. Explain in more detail the compatibilist notion of 'possibility'.
  - Explain incompatibilism, and make a further division into hard determinism and (metaphysical) libertarianism. Further divide libertarianism by the way that the scope of determinism is restricted. For example, medieval Aristotelians believed that while non-rational beings (stones, plants, animals) are governed by natural laws, humans are mostly not. This would be the place for the distinction that Brews wants to make. Discuss the problems with this view, such as psychological, biological causation etc.
  - Explain compatibilism (which is simply the contradictory of incompatibilism). Discuss the problems of this view, mainly as not agreeing with our intuitive or 'originalist' conception of free will.
- Epistemic determinism is not well covered, but try here. See also Augustine's discussion of the problem here.
- Logical determinism is also not well covered in the present article, but there is this elsewhere on Wikipedia.

I think the points on 'Eastern philosophy' could mostly be incorporated into epistemic determinism, but I haven't looked closely. Peter Damian (talk) 15:03, 8 May 2015 (UTC)

I don't think it's a good idea for the top-level structure of the article to be framed around determinism because that biases the entire article in favor of incompatibilism, as compatibilism is not at all concerned with the truth or falsity of any kind of determinism. I also don't think it's even a great idea to structure the article at the top into "incompatibilism and compatibilism", because there are so many different kinds of compatibilism, each with its own different conception of what free will is. If we take a completely unbiased stance on the definitional question, then incompatibilism is equivalent to one of many answers to that question: it's the position that free will is a will that is free from determinism. Every different compatibilist notion of free will posits a different thing that free will is a will free of.

Since incompatibilism is so damn popular I think it deserves due weight with top billing (so the first section should be about the incompatibilist conception of free will), but that's it. The structure of the article absolutely must not assume incompatibilism by framing the entire issue of free will as free will vs determinism. Everything that is to do with determinism and its relation to free will should go in the incompatibilist subsection. Then on an equal structural level, but further down in order, should be separate sections for each different compatibilist conception of free will. --Pfhorrest (talk) 04:57, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

OK I see the problem of organising an article called free will around different kinds of determinism. So the division would be between the two main conceptions of free will, the first of which is modal and is essentially incompatibilist, the second which is essentially compatibilist. Begin with incompatibilism, then compatibilism. That could work. Peter Damian (talk) 05:40, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

I think that's still a little weighted in bias toward incompatibilism, but it might be acceptable as a compromise because of the historical weight given incompatibilism. What I would most like to see though is a top-level division into every different conception of what free will is; all but one of them (free will as non-determination) historically get lumped together as "compatibilism", but many are as different from each other as each is from incompatibilism. All they have in common is the rejection of the conception of free will as non-determination. Certainly we need to mention the terms "incompatibilism" and "compatibilism", but I think that could best be done in the prose of the incompatibilist section (and perhaps in the lede as now), rather than in the structure of the article: at the start of the first section on free will as lack of determination, mention that that position is called incompatibilism; then after discussion of that topic as you've outlined, mention in closing that there are many other different views that are lumped together the umbrella of "compatibilism", segueing directly into the next section, the first kind of compatibilism we consider.

I would probably make that next section the Dennett style of compatibilism holding free will as unpredictability, because of the similarity between determinism and predictability.

Then the classical compatibilist view of Hobbes and Hume, the "not a prisoner and in chains" kind of view equating freedom of will to what we'd nowadays call freedom of action instead.

Then the modern compatibilist view of Frankfurt et al, holding free will as a kind of reflexive evaluative process that is actually effective on one's actions.

Maybe there are other views that need to be featured in there too, though if there's too little to say about them maybe they can get lumped together into one section overviewing them. (But much of what's in that "other views" section now is clearly miscategorized; two-stage models are a form of libertarianism as they require a nondeterministic process somewhere in the causal chain; free will as an illusion is just hard determinism, I don't even know how that got separated there; etc). --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:20, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Ah, but you say " I also don't think it's even a great idea to structure the article at the top into "incompatibilism and compatibilism", because there are so many different kinds of compatibilism". But if you agree that the different kinds of compatibilism are truly different kinds, then surely you do accept the division? I am a bit puzzled by this. Peter Damian (talk) 05:55, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

I'm not completely sure that I follow your point here, but I think your asking at how I'm using "compatibilism" like it's a unified thing and yet also arguing to have the different kinds of it treated as each on par with incompatibilism?

If so, the resolution is that I'm accepting and using the historical terminology that lumps together every view besides the free-will-means-non-determination one into a single category, because that's how the literature talks about it just due to the course the discourse has taken over the centuries; while at the same time arguing that that's not really the most neutral way to present the material. In a perfect world I think we wouldn't have the word "compatibilism", but since we do I use it. For an analogy: we probably shouldn't need words like "colored" or "ethnic" to refer to non-white people, since non-whites are made of many ethnicities as different from each other as they are from whites; but historically the white/nonwhite division is there, so we have that linguistic framework anyway. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:20, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

OK I understand. The schoolmen distinguished between 'univocal' and 'equivocal' ways of dividing. If univocal, then the more general term has the same meaning across the different specific types. If equivocal, then you are really dealing with different types of things that happen to be called by the same name. So the question is whether the different things called 'compatibilism' are really the same type of thing or not (except as they are all indifferent to determinism). Peter Damian (talk) 06:34, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

I do however strongly agree with your substructure of incompatibilism and even more strongly that that is the place that the kind of thing Brews is concerned with goes. --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:02, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

OK we agree here. Peter Damian (talk) 05:30, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

On the other hand I even more strongly object to relegating compatibilism to an "unintuitive" ghetto. In even an introductory philosophy discussion group with students first exploring these concepts, you will find people arguing from their intuition that the supposed conflict posited between determinism and free will is false. To suggest that incompatibilism is somehow more common sense than compatibilism biases the article terribly. --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:02, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

I don't strongly disagree here either. Do you not see a slight tension though between your view that incompatibilism is 'so damn popular', and your claim here? Peter Damian (talk) 05:30, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

I do see that apparent tension, but to my mind the situation is somewhat analogous to theism and atheism (the analogues being incompatibilism and compatibilism). No doubt theism is an extremely popular opinion, and an article covering something like general worldviews or such might want to open with a discussion of it for that reason; but it goes quite a bit further still to suggest that everyone is naturally a theist until they read about the possibility of atheism and de-train their mind to unlearn their theistic intuitions. It's one thing to acknowledge that something is a popular opinion; it's another to suggest that it's the default, innate, intuitive, or common sense opinion. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:20, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

My reading of authors like Hutto, Evans, Nagel, and some others from the monistic enactivist and evolutionary perspectives is that the compatibilist-incompatibilist division of the discussion of free will entirely miscasts the subject. For them, free will vs determinism is another example of treating mind as representations of reality in the brain used to determine actions upon the world. They don't accept this model. Brews ohare (talk) 15:27, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Hence it is neither the case that FW is compatible with D, nor not the case that FW is compatible with D. See Principle of excluded middle. Peter Damian (talk) 15:30, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Or it is the case that one or both terms have no application, only a construction of the imagination, as with GH Hardy's conception of 'pure' mathematics. Nagel would accept the intuition of free will as part of consciousness which he thinks is a force in evolution, and would discount physical determinism as a partial truth applicable to a limited domain of experience. Brews ohare (talk) 15:51, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

I would be surprised if either Hardy or Nagel denied excluded middle. Peter Damian (talk) 16:05, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

This is not a matter of logic, but a discussion of hypotheses. A theory defines certain concepts that define its 'rules of engagement' and each theory has its unique vocabulary. As an example, you can argue that parallel lines never cross. And that is true in some, but not all geometries. Nagel has his version of free will and determinism and I'd say the two are compatible. I am unsure whether Hutto has any use for free will, but he probably has a concept of determinism similar to Nagel's. However, it doesn't cast any light upon either author's theory to label them compatibilists or incompatibilists because an understanding of their approaches does not hinge upon this point. It is an irrelevancy. Brews ohare (talk) 16:26, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Last time I checked, excluded middle was a part of logic. Either "Free will is compatible with determinism" or "It is not the case that free will is compatible with determinism" is true. That is what excluded middle says. Peter Damian (talk) 16:33, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

You are also deeply confused about the Parallel postulate. Parallel lines are defined as lines that do not cross. Peter Damian (talk) 16:44, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Damian: You misunderstand. For example, a search of Hutto's book doesn't turn up the term 'free will'. Assuming he does not use the term and it is not part of his model, you cannot say 'free will' must be compatible with or incompatible with determinism in his view, because his view does not incorporate the concept. You could define 'free will' in terms of his concepts according to your preferences, but the fact he doesn't use it means it is not a useful concept in his estimation. Brews ohare (talk) 16:49, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

In contrast, Nagel does use the term free will, but he does not define it in terms of determinism. Brews ohare (talk) 17:14, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Damian: you are misinformed about parallel lines: your definition applies to Euclidean geometry, only one of many. In some other geometries, there are no parallel lines satisfying this definition. Brews ohare (talk) 16:49, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

You need to look up the definition of parallel. Of course it is true that two straight lines forming the same angles where crossed by any third line, may ~~not~~ meet, i.e. may not be parallel, unless we assume the parallel postulate. But parallel lines by definition are those that do not meet. You are deeply wrong on so many things. Parallels, excluded middle, you name it. Peter Damian (talk) 17:18, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Damian, you are so eager to be right that you continue to miss the point: there are theories (Hutto, Nagel etc) that do not use one or another of the terms 'free will' or 'determinism' and do not define the two in terms of one another. Hence, dividing the article free will in two parts only according to 'compatibilist' or 'incompatibilist' automatically misconstrues or distorts these authors' positions, which basically have nothing to do with this division. Brews ohare (talk) 17:34, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

It is not so much I want to be right, as to use language with exactness and precision, which I learned as part of my apprenticeship as a philosopher. As Snowded says, you would be better off at a community college, although they may want to charge extra. Peter Damian (talk) 17:41, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Well, when you are baffled and cannot address an issue, resort to personalities, eh? Brews ohare (talk) 18:33, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Philosophy on Wikipedia

As Peter King said “Philosophy I'm a philosopher; why don't I edit the article on my subject? Because it's hopeless. I've tried at various times, and each time have given up in depressed disgust. Philosophy seems to attract aggressive zealots who know a little (often a very little), who lack understanding of key concepts, terms, etc., and who attempt to take over the article (and its Talk page) with rambling, ground-shifting, often barely comprehensible rants against those who disagree with them. Life's too short. I just tell my students and anyone else I know not to read the Wikipedia article except for a laugh. It's one of those areas where the ochlocratic nature of Wikipedia really comes a cropper.” Peter Damian (talk) 18:02, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

This plea for privilege based upon expertise is contrary to the spirit of WP. Unlike contributing to a technical journal where one expects well-versed reviewers, here one must rely upon backing up argument with accessible sources, and cannot expect your reputation to relax the need for justification. The problem Damian and Snowded have is their unwillingness to present sources to support their actions, and an inability to explain anything themselves, making explanation using sources even more critical. Brews ohare (talk) 21:55, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Theological compatibilism

There are also some gaps in the coverage of theological compatibilism, both in this article and in Theological determinism. Anselm (The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice, [3]) and the many schoolmen who followed him, such as Richard of Middleton, argue that there are two types of necessity, namely antecedent and subsequent. The second does not involve any compulsion (coactionem) or restraint (prohibitionem). Haec necessitas nec cogit nec prohibet aliquid esse aut non esse.

See also my point above about the definition of free will, namely that if it is "the ability to choose between different possible courses of action" then possibility, taken in the right sense, does not have to conflict with impossibility.

A lot of work needs to be done on Theological determinism. Given the dire situation here, it might be easier for me to work on that.

See also what Anselm says about predestination. I have highlighted the corresponding English and Latin words.

Latin

English

Patet igitur ex iis quae dicta sunt, si bene considerentur, quia nec praedestinatio excludit liberum arbitrium, nec liberum arbitrium adversatur praedestinationi. Siquidem omnia illa, quibus supra monstravimus liberum arbitrium praescientiae non repugnare, pariter ostendunt illud praedestinationi concordare. Non ergo rationabiliter quotiens aliquid contingit operante spontanea voluntate -- velut cum homo homini facit iniuriam, unde ab illo occiditur -- quidam clamant dicentes: 'Sic praescitum et praedestinatum erat a deo, et ideo necessitate factum est, nec aliter fieri potuit'. Quippe nec qui alium iniuria irritavit nec qui se vindicavit, hoc fecit necessitate, sed sola voluntate; quia si non sponte voluisset, neuter quod fecit fecisset.

Therefore, if these statements which have been made are examined closely, it is evident from them that predestination does not exclude free choice and that free choice is not opposed to predestination. For, indeed, all the considerations by which I have shown above that free choice is not incompatible with foreknowledge show as well that it is compatible with predestination. Therefore, whenever something happens by the agency of free will (e.g., when one man wrongs another man and as a result is killed by this other), it is unreasonable for certain people to give vent loudly to the words: “Thus it was foreknown and predestined by God; and, hence, it was done by necessity and could not have been done otherwise.” Indeed, neither the man who provoked the other by a wrong nor the other who avenged himself did this by necessity. Rather, [each acted] voluntarily, because if each had not freely willed to, neither one would have done what he did.

Peter Damian (talk) 08:50, 10 May 2015 (UTC)

For all of the time taken up by the editors here on this article in good faith I must say I agree with User:Snowded and would hope that a peaceful conclusion would be achieved. LoveMonkey 23:38, 10 May 2015 (UTC)

On divisions of 'free will' based upon 'causal determinism'

It has been proposed that the article Free will be divided into three parts corresponding to three different types of determinism: causal, epistemic and logical. Aside from this division being simplistic, a further difficulty is the proposed division of the subsection Causal determinism into two parts: Compatibilism and Incompatibilism, according as to their definitions of 'free will' being compatible with causal determinism or incompatible.

This structure needs a few clarifications. One is the role for 'causal determinism'. According to The Oxford Handbook of Free Will "“causal determinism” [can be defined as the doctrine that] “every event has a cause that is an event that takes place at some antecedent time or times”.

This notion is not entertained by science today, and of course any statement about every event is beyond verification, in principle. A modern definition is provided by Ernest Nagel and applies to theories, not to "every event":

"a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."1

—Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, p. 285

A paraphrase of this definition is:

"a theory is deterministic if and only if a set of sentences specifying the state of the world at one time, together with lawlike sentences characterizing the state of the world drawn from the theory, deductively entail sentences characterizing that state of the world at any other time".2

—John T. Roberts, Determinism: The Philosophy of Science, p. 199

Of course, scientific theories are legion, and no-one believes any one theory applies to everything, although that goal retains a certain attraction. Nagel's definition is compatible with theories that are statistical in nature like statistical mechanics and quantum field theory as well as classical theories that are sometimes interpreted using Laplace's demon. This definition renders moot some common debates in philosophy over the role played in defining determinism by infinitely precise measurements of initial conditions, and the role of indeterminacy in quantum theory.

So one debate is whether this is the definition that should be used here, and how its adoption affects the presentation of a (large) portion of the philosophical literature.

A second debate is whether adoption of this definition allows a meaningful division of 'free will' into only the compatibilist or incompatibilist camps. If this division is based upon the attitude toward causal determinism as defined above, the division seems very black and white (free will under this view of determinism is a "metaphysical fancy"). If it is based upon Nagel's definition of determinism, it becomes a more interesting debate (both sides have something to say), and one open to some developments in modern philosophy, such as neurophilosophy.

Certainly some versions of free will fall under these two classifications. However, enactivist views do not because they avoid one or the other (or both) of the terms 'casual determinism' or 'free will'. One might ask whether, if they don't talk about free will, how they can be part of an article about free will? The answer is that a discussion of whether we need the concept of 'free will' is germane to the article Free will.

Another set of views that do not fit into the twofold division are those of Thomas Nagel and Nahmias who see consciousness as an unrecognized component of evolution. One might say these theories are 'compatibilist' (although the absence of a theory like Ernest Nagel proposes renders this opinion conjectural), but does that description add anything meaningful to understanding this position?

I think some more thought is needed here. Comments? Brews ohare (talk) 18:25, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

This appears to be an interpretation issue. Brews ohare appears to feel their interpretation of the sources leads to their POV. However none of the sources spell out say explicitly what Brews ohare is interpreting them to say look at the Thomas Nagel link it makes no such statement it merely mentions Nagel and freewill. LoveMonkey 23:54, 10 May 2015 (UTC)

LoveMonkey: I have cited the sources to say what "causal determinism" is and what Ernest Nagel has proposed as a definition of a "deterministic theory". I also have identified Sobel as a source that thinks adopting "causal determinism" is not an interesting position. I've suggested Nagel's definition is more interesting - I am interested in how other editors view this situation. Brews ohare (talk) 01:08, 11 May 2015 (UTC)

I posted about Thomas Nagel. LoveMonkey 13:39, 11 May 2015 (UTC)

Clean up

I will try and tidy the article up slowly and gently and with consensus-seeking. I moved the section on Catholic teaching, which is far too granular, to Free will in theology (cut, paste, trim near-duplicate material. I don't know what to do with the entire section 2 'in science'. What is a section on science doing in a philosophy article? Let's begin with Free_will#Determinism_and_emergent_behavior. I think this subsection could be trimmed entirely. Speculative and not the locus of the subject. Peter Damian (talk) 19:32, 13 May 2015 (UTC)

I agree that the "Determinism and emergent behavior" section should go, but I don't think the whole "In science" section is out of place, though perhaps mistitled and poorly structured. For one thing, given that incompatibilists think that the question of determinism has essential relevance, a brief discussion of what physics has to say about it is germane. Also a discussion of the experimental work by Libet, Wegner, etc, is relevant, because many people take their findings to disprove the existence of free will. And a discussion of surveys of what ordinary people actually believe about free will is relevant, although that section can probably be cut in half. The "Prospection" section I think can go; it is UNDUE here.

As I've said before, though, I think the highest priority for this article should be to add a discussion of the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. Looie496 (talk) 14:01, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

Followup -- I've gone ahead and removed the section in question. Anybody who feels this needs further discussion is free to revert. Looie496 (talk) 14:15, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

Thank you. I agree that the most important thing to add to the article is a discussion of the relationship between free will and moral responsibility, given that most of Western theology is precisely about how to reconcile God's foreknowledge and pre-ordination with the fact that sinners who make the wrong choice face eternal damnation. But this is a really difficult discussion to do well, and so it is not high priority (I am aiming to complete something in about a year's time. Peter Damian (talk) 17:16, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

I'm thinking about something more basic -- a paragraph or two to point out that one of the reasons free will seems like such an important issue is a feeling many people have that it is wrong to punish a person for an action that was not freely willed. Looie496 (talk) 20:15, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

That could be done. Peter Damian (talk) 21:45, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

PS is there nothing salvageable from what you deleted, that could go into a sub-article ? Peter Damian (talk) 17:18, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

In terms of its implications for free will, the removed material is largely OR as far as I can tell. I might be wrong. Looie496 (talk) 20:15, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

I have deleted 'Prospection' per above, although added a link in 'see also'. I also deleted the two-stage nonsense, per this. Article not deleted yet, but it seems clear it is part of a larger walled garden. Peter Damian (talk) 17:23, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

Thank you both for your involvement here. My participation will probably still be very sparse comments here and there for a while, as I have major life problems keeping me from fully engaging, but now that it's no longer an intractable battleground here I might let this page stay on my watchlist again.

In regards to the discussion above, I agree per my earlier comments that the "in science" section doesn't belong here per se, but I disagree that science in general is inappropriate for this article, or that the article is essentially about philosophical issues only. There are not-infrequent scientific results purporting to shed light on something or other about free will, and I think that those belong here. However they need to be structured to make clear what philosophical assumptions those scientific endeavors are making, especially what their operational definition of "free will" is, and then should be organized into the appropriate section of the article concerning free will of that sort. As Looie mentions, scientific findings about the (in)deterministic nature of the universe would be quite relevant to the debate within incompatibilism (i.e. between libertarians and hard determinists); psychological and neurological research purporting to shed light on free will probably belongs somewhere in the section about contemporary compatibilism as it usually concerns the (non)existence of self-regulatory feedback loops akin to the reflexive volitions Frankfurt et al concern themselves with; and so on.

(And also as I've said before, I also think that the "In eastern philosophy" section, and basically the entirety of the article, should eventually be integrated into what is currently titled "In western philosophy", which should then be the general structure of the article. But I do like Peter Damian's idea to first fix up "In western philosophy", then integrate the rest of the materials into it and only then break the subsections out and remove that header entirely.)

I also agree that the importance of moral responsibility to the issue needs to be built up, however I don't feel like it would be structurally best to just have a separate section on free will and moral responsibility. Rather I think it should be included in the introductory or overview material as a (if not the) major motivating factor behind debate on the topic in the first place, and it should continue to be included pervasively throughout the rest of the article as relevant.

On sort of both of those topics, the kind of general surveys on what people think about free will that Looie mentions above is probably best-integrated into some sort of introductory of overview material as well, rather than its own section. (Although, some things like the psychological effects of belief in free will might possibly belong in a subsection about a contemporary-compatibilist sense of free will.) --Pfhorrest (talk) 23:26, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

I'd agree with Pfhorrest on the relevance of including science here. The issue is what is referenced. If you look at some of the Dawkins acolytes who argue that there is no free will because parts of the brain light up after we have moved our hand in a response to a stimulus, then you can see some of the impact. Against that we have another scientific/philosophical position which says that position is dependent on a Cartesian concept of consciousness and that the moving of a hand is an autonomic response, while moral decisions are a novelty respective response; the former case the brain lights up to check it got it right that time rather than to direct. Then we can layer on top of that De Landa's realist account of Assemblage theory and its impact on moral decisions and life gets interesting. Juarrero and others have a different take based on insights from Complex Adaptive Systems theory and the related phenomenon of Strange Attractors (in part my field of study which is moving to an academic context). It also comes back to Philosophy of Religion as you can see some of this foreshadowed in Rahner's . Now the problem with all of that is that its all recent and not yet in the third party sources to any great extent. Kane in the introduction to the second edition of the Oxford Handbook of Free Will sections the debate into eight parts: Theology, Physics, Morality, Libertarian, Hard Determinism/Incomatibilism & Neuroscience. That might give us a sourced structure.

Incidentally if anyone is going to be at the Philosophy & Music OR the Book Festival at Hay and wants to meet up email me, it might even be worth a meet up if others are there----Snowded ^TALK 04:19, 16 May 2015 (UTC)

I agree with Pfhorrest that the article needs to be re-structured to make clear what philosophical assumptions those scientific endeavors are making. It's not as though there is compatibilism, not-compatibilism and science, as though excluded middle had failed. All the scientific points should support one or the other - typically they support not-compatibilism. Peter Damian (talk) 06:03, 16 May 2015 (UTC)

The basic problem is that free will, more than any other philosophical topic with the possible exception of the "self", is plagued by loose reasoning. The folk concept of free will, as Dennett has repeatedly pointed out, is a farrago of nonsense. It is easy to see that the folk concept is incompatible with any sort of causation whatsoever, not just determinism. Much of the scientific work is motivated by the folk concept and shares its incoherence; nevertheless it is too influential to be ignored. Our task, perhaps unfortunately, is to cover all this stuff in a way that will be perceived by readers as neutral. If we try to make clear the philosophical assumptions underlying the scientific work, it will turn into a mess, because the blunt fact is that there are no clear assumptions. The same problem arises for quite a number of philosophical treatments. We can't be in the position of imposing clarity on treatments that are intrinsically unclear. Looie496 (talk) 13:36, 16 May 2015 (UTC)

Do you have a quote from Dennett about the 'folk concept'? (Not a rhetorical question, I don't have any of Dennett's work). Peter Damian (talk) 16:37, 17 May 2015 (UTC)

See http://weskaggs.net/?p=1452 on my personal web site, which includes a lengthy quote from Dennett. Incidentally Dennett's first book (Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting) was about this topic, so he's been working on it for quite a while. Looie496 (talk) 13:44, 19 May 2015 (UTC)

We have Simon Blackburn and Rupert Sheldrake sharing a platform? Intriguing. [ec] I will take a look at Kane but don't quite see why 'Theology' is split out in that way. See my quote from Anselm above, which is clearly a variety of compatibilism, even down to the language used (if we accept the translation from the Latin). Also, the Western tradition is directly connected with morality (=~sin). You cannot blame a stone for falling to the ground, says Augustine, but you would blame a man for choosing evil, ergo etc. As Looie says, this is deeply connected with our very idea of free will. Free choice is by definition a choice you would be praised or blamed for. Peter Damian (talk) 06:05, 16 May 2015 (UTC)

And a few sessions with Mary Midgley who is always a delight - its a good ten days. I settle in every year for the duration. In Kane its the first section, but only one essay in it by Hasker. The other sections are more substantial ----Snowded ^TALK 06:08, 16 May 2015 (UTC)

"Other views"

Still in pruning mode, Section 1.3, consisting of 4 subsections, looks like another quote factory. Any ideas? Peter Damian (talk)

This is where the rubber hits the road. It is probably a good idea to have something about views that don't fit cleanly into either the compatibilist or incompatibilist camps, but doing a good job means having deep enough knowledge to achieve synthesis without OR. The current version doesn't synthesize enough. I certainly wouldn't be able to do better, though. Looie496 (talk) 13:48, 19 May 2015 (UTC)