Talk:Hamas/Archive 28

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Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 6 September 2024

First paragraph, Gaza is described as 'Israeli-occupied', however Israel has not occupied Gaza since its complete withdrawal from the area in 2005. Suggest to remove 'Israeli-occupied' for complete accuracy of historic events. 147.161.167.20 (talk) 11:02, 6 September 2024 (UTC)

Not done, Gaza is considered occupied by the international community regardless of the withdrawal. Selfstudier (talk) 12:12, 6 September 2024 (UTC)

As noted above, there's at least a significant minority which subscribes to the view that the occupation ended in 2005, e.g. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]. So this seems like opinion territory, and opinions are normally attributed or qualified, not stated as facts in WP:WIKIVOICE. — xDanielx ^T/_C\^R 14:59, 6 September 2024 (UTC)

Is it a strong enough minority, though, to give due weight as though both are simply opinions? To me, the international consensus has a heavy bearing on what we say. Yr Enw (talk) 16:14, 6 September 2024 (UTC)

This is exceeding tiresome, we have #Gaza was not occupied above, one of several occasions this issue has been raised on this page (and other pages), generally by non EC editors, I will copy Nableezy response here:

Gaza continuing to be occupied is the majority position, with the UN, ICRC and most academics agreeing that Gaza has remained occupied as Israel continued to exercise effective military control over the territory. See for example: The ICRC considers Gaza to remain occupied territory on the basis that Israel still exercises effective control over the Strip, notably through key elements of authority over the strip, including over its borders (airspace, sea and land – at the exception of the border with Egypt)., RULAC: Following the implementation of the 2005 Disengagement Plan, Israeli armed forces were no longer present in the territory of the Gaza Strip. For this reason, some reject Israel’s classification as an occupying power.
However, international practice and the majority of scholarly opinions have long considered that, even after its withdrawal in 2005, Israel has continued to occupy the Gaza Strip by virtue of the control exercised over its airspace and territorial waters, land crossings at the borders, the supply of civilian infrastructure, and the exercise of key governmental functions such as the management of the Palestinian population registry. ... This view has been supported in relation to the Gaza Strip by several reports and declarations by relevant international bodies, such as the UN, the ICC and the ICRC.) Scholarly opinion is more split than it is for the WB/EJ, but the majority view is that Gaza has continued to be occupied despite the disengagement. The ICJ ruling also included In light of the above, the Court is of the view that Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel’s obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.

The situation is known as "functional occupation" and to make clear that it is a majority view, here's the NYT "Despite Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, by most legal definitions, it still occupies the territory, since it controls Gaza’s airspace, its coastline, all the land borders except with Egypt, the vast majority of goods allowed to enter and the Gazans allowed to leave." Selfstudier (talk) 16:58, 6 September 2024 (UTC)

WP:WIKIVOICE tells us to avoid stating opinions as facts. An opinion being prevalent doesn't turn it into a fact (though prevalence affects other matters like WP:BALANCE). We're clearly still in opinion territory, given that the characterization in question is a matter of controversy among experts.

Contrary to some sloppy media reports, the ICJ did not and never has reached a finding on whether Gaza is occupied. At best the recent opinion suggests that occupation status is non-binary, and Gaza lies somewhere on the continuum. However, their language is also consistent with the idea of residual obligations following an occupation which ended in 2005.

See Yuji Iwasawa's separate opinion: while the Court makes clear that Israel continues to be bound by certain obligations under the law of occupation, it does not take a position as to whether Gaza remained “occupied” within the meaning of the law of occupation after 2005. Marko Milanovic also has a nice analysis. — xDanielx ^T/_C\^R 05:28, 7 September 2024 (UTC)

The opinion of a single judge does not alter what the court has found. Both your links point to Marko Milanovic articles, one of which is dated from 2009 and therefore dated in this context because then the court had not made any finding on the matter (same applies to the other opinions you linked earlier) while the other 2024 article actually supports what I have said:

"For more background on the functional approach in particular, see the work of Aeyal Gross, who originated the term, and see also this post explaining how the ICRC adopted and mainstreamed it; see also the proceedings of a 2012 expert meeting on occupation convened by the ICRC, and see also the ICRC new Common Article 2 commentary, reiterating its position." <- This is the mainstream view and the court has endorsed it. This is what the ICJ said in its opinion:

"In terms of its territorial scope, question (a) refers to "the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967", which encompasses the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. The Court notes that the various United Nations organs and bodies frequently make specific reference to the different parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court also does so in the present Advisory Opinion, as appropriate. However, the Court recalls that, from a legal standpoint, the Occupied Palestinian Territory constitutes a single territorial unit, the unity, contiguity and integrity of which is to be preserved and respected. Thus, all references in this Opinion to the Occupied Palestinian Territory are references to this single territorial unit." and

"Based on the information before it, the Court considers that Israel remained capable of exercising, and continued to exercise, certain key elements of authority over the Gaza Strip, including control of the land, sea and air borders, restrictions on movement of people and goods, collection of import and export taxes, and military control over the buffer zone, despite the withdrawal of its military presence in 2005. This is even more so since 7 October 2023. In light of the above, the Court is of the view that Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel’s obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip."

The only thing left up in the air is the degree to which Gaza is occupied and not the fact of it. Quite happy to take this to RFC if needed but on a more relevant page. Selfstudier (talk) 08:47, 7 September 2024 (UTC)

I fixed the link. Again Milanovic's analysis explains how the opinion you're quoting can be interpreted as referring to residual obligations, and Judge Iwasawa himself wrote that the Court ... does not take a position as to whether Gaza remained “occupied” ... after 2005.

Even if we were to interpret the court's broad language as saying that occupation is non-binary and Gaza is somewhere on the continuum, that doesn't support the content in question, which is outright statements that Gaza is occupied with no such nuance.

If ICJ judges were in agreement that Gaza is occupied, it would have been easy to state that plainly. (It wouldn't even require unanimity, just a simple majority.) That's not what happened here.

I don't think ICJ findings of fact would override opinions of other experts anyway, but hypothetically if we were to treat the ICJ as an arbiter of truth, it wouldn't back up the content in question. — xDanielx ^T/_C\^R 14:39, 7 September 2024 (UTC)

You are just repeating yourself, functional = residual, either way, the degree has not been defined, but they are in relation to the laws of occupation and so occupation is a fact and only the degree is not specified, viz " the Court is of the view that Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel’s obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip." and it is a simple matter to produce a raft of experts supporting the ICJ, since the ICJ is only reflecting the mainstream view of the same experts (and not endorsing the views of the minority of experts). Selfstudier (talk) 14:52, 7 September 2024 (UTC)

functional ≠ residual, the residual interpretation would be that there is no longer an occupation (functional or otherwise), yet certain obligations continue after the end of the occupation.

It's a simple matter to produce a raft of experts for either side of the controversy (maybe not of the same size, but that doesn't matter for WP:WIKIVOICE), though it wouldn't be clear which side is "supporting the ICJ" given that the ICJ has never taken a clear position on the matter. — xDanielx ^T/_C\^R 15:33, 7 September 2024 (UTC)

The ICJ has taken a clear position, quoted above. If it were otherwise, the RS would be saying Gaza is NOT occupied and none of them are saying that. Even your own cite to Markovic says, right upfront, "the Court has held that the law of occupation, at least to some extent, continues to apply in Gaza." and that is the position and that position was the mainstream expert view before the ruling as well as now, after it. Selfstudier (talk) 16:47, 7 September 2024 (UTC)

As the rest of Markovic's analysis explains, the law of occupation can apply in ways that do not imply Gaza is presently under occupation (even in some partial, non-binary sense). The ICJ has taken a position of sorts, but it's not a finding that Gaza is occupied or is not occupied. It's fine to document the ICJ's actual nuanced position somewhere (probably not the second sentence of this article), but Israeli-occupied isn't that. — xDanielx ^T/_C\^R 21:08, 7 September 2024 (UTC)

ICJ's position is not nuanced at all. Some excerpts from their latest report published on July 19:

• Palestinian territory occupied since 1967 encompassing the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip — The “Occupied Palestinian Territory” constituting, from legal standpoint, a single territorial unit
• legal consequences arising, respectively, from Israel’s policies and practices and from its continued presence as an occupying Power in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
• the Court considers that Israel remained capable of exercising, and continued to exercise, certain key elements of authority over the Gaza Strip, including control of the land, sea and air borders, restrictions on movement of people and goods, collection of import and export taxes, and military control over the buffer zone, despite the withdrawal of its military presence in 2005
• the Court is of the view that Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel’s obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip
• legal consequences arising from Israel’s “prolonged occupation” of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In this regard, the Court notes that Israel’s occupation has lasted for more than 57 years [...] the Court must turn to the relationship between Israel, as the occupying Power, and the protected population of the occupied territory, which is governed by the law of occupation

etc etc. - Ïvana (talk) 02:11, 9 September 2024 (UTC)

It's not clear what you're implying - is it that the court has found Gaza to be occupied post-2005? That would be directly contradicted by Judge Iwasawa himself. — xDanielx ^T/_C\^R 21:40, 9 September 2024 (UTC)

I'm not "implying" anything, I'm outright saying that the ICJ's position is explicit: Gaza is considered to be under occupation by Israel, both historically and currently. Judge Iwasawa's individual perspective doesn't change the court's official stance. - Ïvana (talk) 21:54, 9 September 2024 (UTC)

Judge Iwasawa did not dissent from the advisory opinion (only Sebutinde did), nor did he vote against any of the dispositif. He was explicitly clarifying the position of the Court, not himself. There's a very clear contradiction between Judge Iwasawa's statement and your assertion that the ICJ's position is explicit: Gaza is considered to be under occupation by Israel. — xDanielx ^T/_C\^R 22:15, 9 September 2024 (UTC)

According to Article 57 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion. Separate opinions are personal views expressed by individual judges and are intended to provide insights into their perspectives. They do not alter the conclusions of the majority judgment, which reflects the official stance of the Court. In this case, the Court concludes that Gaza is occupied by Israel. The separate opinion of the judge does not change this official conclusion. - Ïvana (talk) 01:04, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Iwasawa's statement that the Court ... does not take a position as to whether Gaza remained “occupied” is quite explicitly about the court's opinion, not his own. Separate opinions serve many purposes; this one (at least the relevant part of it) was about clarifying the court's opinion. — xDanielx ^T/_C\^R 02:31, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Not to sound repetitive but, again, separate opinions are intended to reflect individual judges perspectives and provide additional insights into their reasoning. They do not alter or clarify the Court's official conclusions. If the ICJ wanted to add a clarification, amend, or comment, it would do so through an official procedural mechanism rather than via a separate opinion of an individual judge. The official conclusion remains that Gaza is considered to be under Israeli occupation based on the degree of control Israel exercises. - Ïvana (talk) 04:02, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

I think it's clear that Iwasawa was explaining what he understood to be the court position, since he refers to the Court explicitly. If there are other experts who explicitly disagree with Iwasawa (and Markovic), maybe there can be an argument that he misunderstood the court's opinion, but otherwise I would assume that a judge who participated in drafting the opinion is more qualified to interpret it than you or I. — xDanielx ^T/_C\^R 15:39, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

We're not debating Judge Iwasawa's qualifications. The crux of the issue is whether his individual, separate opinion impacts the Court's official findings. It does not. Separate opinions are meant to offer additional insights and personal viewpoints but do not alter the conclusions reached by the majority. The ICJ's advisory opinion, as reflected in the majority judgment, concludes that Gaza remains under Israeli occupation. This conclusion was reported by the BBC, The Guardian, Jacobin, OHCHR, etc etc. I don't have anything else to add without reiterating points I've already covered. - Ïvana (talk) 16:46, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

I just don't see how the Court ... does not take a position as to whether Gaza remained “occupied” can be interpreted as a personal viewpoint. It's explicitly a statement about the Court's opinion. Journalists' attempts to summarize the opinion don't seem useful when we have expert analysis. — xDanielx ^T/_C\^R 18:19, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Obiter dicta and ratio decidendi are two different things, we had a similar discussion about this in Gaza genocide case, a single judge opinion/dissent does not change the court's majority verdict, the only thing of relevance here and that is also reflected in the RS. Selfstudier (talk) 18:25, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

There's no real dissent in Iwasawa's separate opinion (he voted for the entire dispositif, notwithstanding his complaints about its focus), and certainly not in the statement that the Court ... does not take a position as to whether Gaza remained “occupied”. There's simply no way to read this statement as anything but a clarification of the court's opinion. — xDanielx ^T/_C\^R 18:44, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Reading Iwasawa directly as opposed to Markovic interpretation of what he said, it seems pretty clear that he is merely distinguishing between "functional occupation" and "occupation", a nice legal point for lawyers to argue about going forward but that's about it. Selfstudier (talk) 18:41, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) said Israel should stop settlement activity in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem and end its "illegal" occupation of those areas and the Gaza Strip as soon as possible

Even Gaza has long been occupied, the court found, despite Israel’s 2005 disengagement, because Israel maintained authority over various aspects of life in Gaza that could be exercised when it wished

Within this framework, the ICJ clarified that its definition of "occupied Palestinian territory" included Gaza, the West Bank, and east Jerusalem Selfstudier (talk) 18:22, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Why look to journalists' attempts at summarizing the decision, when have expert analyses like Markovic's which are much more precise and detailed? — xDanielx ^T/_C\^R 18:46, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

I think that the ICJ ruling in general and judge Iwasawa's opinion in particular are primary sources and we need experts' interpretations here. Markovic is definitely an expert. Random newspaper articles should have less weight that experts' opinions. It would be a good idea to find more experts like Markovic to make sure we reflect the consensus. Alaexis_¿question? 19:56, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

I agree with Alaexis on this one. However, I also agree with xDanielx that it's at least heavily disputed as to whether 2005 withdrawal ended the occupation of Gaza. Some say it did. Some do not, but we should reflect that disagreement, not ignore the minority, non-fringe POV. Andre🚐 20:07, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

As I said, no problem with an RFC on this one, just not on this page, since it is incidental to the article topic. I will also want to address the other finding, that said occupation is as well, illegal.

At Gaza strip, for instance, the infobox there has:

Regarded as an occupied territory even prior to 2023 due to the Gaza blockade

This is before the ICJ findings, obviously and reflects what I said already, the prior mainstream view and that mainstream view is what has now been endorsed by the ICJ. Selfstudier (talk) 22:29, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip would seem like a suitable place for an RFC unless someone has a better idea. Selfstudier (talk) 22:37, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Agree we can have an RfC. I certainly have scholarly sources that say the view that Israel occupies Gaza is the majority opinion.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 01:04, 24 September 2024 (UTC)

References

Israeli-Blockaded

Please change “Israeli-Occupied Gaza Strip” to “Israeli-Blockaded Gaza Strip”. From this Talk section, it is clear “Israeli-Occupied” is a controversial qualifier and has been argued a non-neutral POV. While it seems odd to include any qualifier at all in front of “Gaza Strip” on this page as Hamas does not have the qualifier “terrorist group” to maintain POV neutrality, I think this is at least a more accurate and less controversial qualifier. 71.179.129.209 (talk) 23:32, 21 September 2024 (UTC)

Will not do, until there is some consensus. Best you post this to Talk:Gaza Strip or Talk:Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 01:06, 24 September 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 26 September 2024

Hamas is widely recognized as a terrorist organization by many countries. Abishek456 (talk) 20:12, 26 September 2024 (UTC)

 Already done already mentioned in multiple places in the article

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 30 September 2024

Please replace the current image in the main infobox with File:Emblem of Hamas.svg as that version is more official. The existing image is more of an interpretation of the emblem, and it does not accurately reflect the official design. Bambobee (talk) 00:54, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

 Done The emblem has been reverted. –LDM2003 ^{talk to me!} 09:44, 2 October 2024 (UTC)

References

1988 Charter

Shouldn't the [never-revoked] 1988 Charter be properly introduced in the lead (and not just in relation to the 2017 charter)? Removed here. BobFromBrockley (talk) 10:58, 3 October 2024 (UTC) Pinging Makeandtoss - was it the word "genocidal" (which I thought summarised body, but could easily be dropped)? BobFromBrockley (talk) 14:21, 3 October 2024 (UTC)

The lede is already bloated. Elaborating on the 1988 charter this much would be undue. Describing "genocidal" in WP voice is POV. Use of "however" is editorial. It was not a constructive addition. Makeandtoss (talk) 10:49, 4 October 2024 (UTC)

The "however" preserves the same meaning as the "while" in the current version, so if the "however" is editorialising then the current version is. We can easily include the 1988 Charter (the subject of about 30 mentions of the body) without too many extra words, and remove the word genocidal. I'll have another go, addressing your concerns. BobFromBrockley (talk) 15:38, 4 October 2024 (UTC)

My attempt instantly reverted by Onceinawhile. I thought this addressed the concerns raised; can you explain how it is unbalanced? BobFromBrockley (talk) 16:53, 4 October 2024 (UTC)

Your proposed wording and emphasis reads like an attempt to make the article read as if antisemitism is their driving force, and make their ideology sound like that of ISIS. That is a misrepresentation of the sources. Onceinawhile (talk) 18:31, 4 October 2024 (UTC)

Agree with @Makeandtoss and @Onceinawhile that the edits are unnecessary and violate NPOV. The current version already introduces and discusses the charter and its nature, and there is no need to alter its positioning to emphasize a certain point of view. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 20:43, 4 October 2024 (UTC)

@Alaexis: Please engage in the talk page discussion before reverting. Makeandtoss (talk) 07:51, 5 October 2024 (UTC)

Bringing Alaric’s’ edit summary here: “the charter is an important topic covered at length in the article and in RS about Hamas”. Also noting that Makeandtoss and Onceinawhile did not engage in the talk page before reverting my edits, but that onus is on me/Alaexis to secure consensus for change from the stable version so it’s current correct to revert to that for now at least. BobFromBrockley (talk) 08:10, 5 October 2024 (UTC)

As you rightfully said , the WP:ONUS is on the inserter of the material. Makeandtoss (talk) 08:52, 5 October 2024 (UTC)

I don’t see how it violates NPOV. There’s nothing I added that wasn’t already there in a different place in the lead. Can you say which bits of the wording are not NPOV? BobFromBrockley (talk) 08:04, 5 October 2024 (UTC)

The current version has NPOV issues.

“ While the 1988 Hamas charter was widely described as antisemitic, Hamas's 2017 charter removed the antisemitic language and said Hamas's struggle was with Zionists, not Jews. ”

The two cited scholarly sources do not call the 2018 document a charter which would imply that it superseded the 1988 charter.

As to the 1988 charter, its antisemitism is notable but so are calls for jihad against Jews and for the creation of an Islamic state. It's not clear why we should mention only one aspect of it. Alaexis_¿question? 08:36, 5 October 2024 (UTC)

Again, the lede is already bloated, and it should serve as a summary of the Hamas group, not of the 1988 charter. Makeandtoss (talk) 08:55, 5 October 2024 (UTC)

The difference between the two version is 79 bytes, so it’s not really about bloating. It’s about whether the 1988 charter should be buried or given due prominence. BobFromBrockley (talk) 09:10, 5 October 2024 (UTC)

Its not buried. But rather Hamas' positions on a Palestinian state should take more prominence than allegations of antisemitism. The vast majority of scholars (not affiliated with IDF) see Palestinian nationalism and resistance as central Hamas ideologies, where antisemitism is at best a secondary ideology.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 03:54, 10 October 2024 (UTC)

Joana Cook and Shiraz Maher discuss the political development of Hamas in their The Rule is for None But Allah and are explicit about the relationship between the charter and the document (p. 144) It should be noted that this 'Guiding Principles' document did not replace the Charter, but was rather an updated communication of the group's strategy. Alaexis_¿question? 08:45, 5 October 2024 (UTC)

Joana Cook and Shiraz Maher discuss the political development They are the editors, Nina Musgrave is the author. A fuller quote would be:

"Hamas's more balanced approach to Israel was the pointed argument that the group was not opposed to Jewish people, but rather to the 'Zionist project': 'Hamas does not wage a struggle against the Jews because they are Jewish but wages a struggle against the Zionists who occupy Palestine.' While Hamas had made this point on several occasions, this was the first time it had made such a distinction between Jewish people and the State of Israel in a policy document. In this regard, Hamas was attempting to moderate its stance, cognisant of the maximalist tone of its 1988 Charter. It should be noted that this 'Guiding Principles' document did not replace the Charter, but was rather an updated communication of the group's strategy."

The charter(s) ("seen by some to be a new Charter" - Musgrave) should be discussed mainly via their wikilinks rather than trying to focus only on one of them. Selfstudier (talk) 09:09, 5 October 2024 (UTC)

If it's seen by some we shouldn't say in in Wikivoice. We already mention the supposed change of the approach in the lede. The charter surely deserves at least one sentence there as well. Alaexis_¿question? 13:38, 5 October 2024 (UTC)

If you think 2017 Hamas charter is the wrong title, RM it. Selfstudier (talk) 13:43, 5 October 2024 (UTC)

Wikipedia is not a RS. Alaexis_¿question? 18:18, 5 October 2024 (UTC)

True but the title is notable. Selfstudier (talk) 18:32, 5 October 2024 (UTC)

@Alaexis this is an ongoing discussion, please don't unilaterally make controversial edits while this is still an open topic of conversation. We should try to WP:AVOIDEDITWAR here and make a decision via discussion, first. There are plenty of RS in the 2017 article that @Selfstudier as well as in this article that refer to this as a charter. Smallangryplanet (talk) 08:40, 7 October 2024 (UTC)

Likewise there are plenty of RS that don't call it a charter. If you believe that "charter" is a universally accepted name to be used in wikivoice then the onus is on you to prove it. Alaexis_¿question? 18:30, 7 October 2024 (UTC)

Again, that an article with this title exists, suggests that it is a commonname for the document. Then the ONUS is on you to show that it isn't, I suggested an RM above. Selfstudier (talk) 18:34, 7 October 2024 (UTC)

WP:UGC explicitly lists Wikipedia as an example of a source with user-generated content which is therefore not considered a RS. Alaexis_¿question? 20:42, 7 October 2024 (UTC)

I think it kind of doesn't matter whether the new document is a charter or replaces the charter. all that matters is do RS talk about the 1988 one still, a lot, which I think they do, right? Andre🚐 20:54, 7 October 2024 (UTC)

They do, often together with the new (whatever we want to call it). Selfstudier (talk) 21:34, 7 October 2024 (UTC)

@Alaexis It is WP:COMMON to refer to it as a charter, as backed by extensive RS and the fact that the page name itself refers to it as such. More importantly it is long-standing consensus to have it referred to as such, and since you are the one seeking to challenge that consensus, you need to find consensus for your position first before making edits in violation of that consensus.

I have noticed that you have a habit of engaging in this kind of behavior. It is highly disruptive and undermines good faith editing while leading to edit warring, which I remind you is a violation of Wiki rules. Kindly stop doing so. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 21:50, 7 October 2024 (UTC)

I suggest you refrain from personal attacks. If you believe that "charter" is a universally accepted name to be used in wikivoice then the onus is on you to prove it. Alaexis_¿question? 08:45, 8 October 2024 (UTC)

You have that backwards and no-one has said "universally" either, that's a strawman, there is an article with title saying that it is an aka. That's what you need to challenge and your recent edit at the page doesn't do it. Selfstudier (talk) 08:51, 8 October 2024 (UTC)

Moving on from the topic of whether "Charter" is the right word, can one of the reverters explain why they considered my recent edit (see revert here) POV/unbalanced? BobFromBrockley (talk) 13:53, 8 October 2024 (UTC)

• The current formulation in the lead is based on a lot of discussions last year and a couple of RfCs (all in the archives). Lets respect the longstanding version, until there is consensus.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 03:51, 10 October 2024 (UTC)

Mandates killing of Jews

The article currently says "The 1988 Hamas charter "mandate(s) the killing of Jews"." The fact that its in quote implies the text comes from the Charter. But instead it comes from an op-ed in CNN.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 20:30, 10 August 2024 (UTC)

I removed it as it is pretty much repeated by the following line AlexBobCharles (talk) 12:40, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

Also changed section name to "Allegations of Antisemitism". AlexBobCharles (talk) 12:41, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

Well, it's a reasonable interpretation of Article 7 of the charter. If there are RS offering an alternative explanation we can add that too. Alaexis_¿question? 20:17, 11 August 2024 (UTC)

@Alaexis removed "Allegations" from the title , it should be "Allegations" as it isn't an undisputed fact and the section itself cites Hamas's disagreement. AlexBobCharles (talk) 13:53, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

The 1988 charter was widely described as antisemitic, there are references in the section. Is there anyone who disputes that? Of course Hamas would deny that, that's not a RS for our purposes. Alaexis_¿question? 19:53, 12 August 2024 (UTC)

There's a difference between being antisemitic and mandating the killing of Jews. Besides one hadith (which has pre-existed Hamas by >1,000 years) I don't see anything that can be construed as killing Jews.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 01:03, 24 September 2024 (UTC)

That's a big "except," the 1988 Hamas charter explicitly quotes said quotation which does include killing of Jews, not to mention other references to a struggle against Jews. Andre🚐 01:08, 24 September 2024 (UTC)

But just to clarify, there is absolutely nothing other a single hadith (which pre-exists Hamas and comes from Sahih Muslim) that can be construed as killing of Jews, right? If so, we really should be much more specific.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 01:01, 11 October 2024 (UTC)

There's another sentence besides that which says, For our struggle against the Jews is extremely wide-ranging and grave, so much so that it will need all the loyal efforts we can wield, to be followed by further steps and reinforced by successive battalions from the multifarious Arab and Islamic world, until the enemies are defeated and Allah's victory prevails. I mean you can try to say they're not talking about killing but defeating enemies on a battlefield with battalion I think reasonably does suggest that. There is also another sentence about killing, I will assault and kill, assault and kill, assault and kill, not to mention, a number of references to jihad fighters. Andre🚐 01:10, 11 October 2024 (UTC)

If Israel surrenders , there will be no need to kill Jew's in Hamas POV. "Mandates killing of X" more implies that they have a specific problem with X than they are fighting their current enemies AlexBobCharles (talk) 02:47, 11 October 2024 (UTC)

"Mandate" might not be the best word. Maybe a better way to describe it would be "advocates" the killing of Jews. Andre🚐 02:50, 11 October 2024 (UTC)

Clarify tag

@Ïvana, I'm not sure I understand what needs to be clarified here. The stated request reason is "This is too vague: how does that sound, what exactly did they call (say or write)? This (presumed) paraphrasing is not enough, and needs a date."

This is what the WP article says

That’s not to say that Sinwar and other Hamas leaders did not occasionally call for Israel’s annihilation. In a 2022 speech, Sinwar warned Israelis that Hamas would one day “march through your walls to uproot your regime.

This is our text

In the early 2020s, Hamas leaders occasionally still called for the annihilation of the state of Israel.

Do you propose adding Sinwar's quote and other quotes by Hamas members calling for the destruction of Israel? The article already has plenty of those so I think a general statement works better. Alaexis_¿question? 18:37, 10 October 2024 (UTC)

I agree, the clarify tag is unnecessary. Andre🚐 18:46, 10 October 2024 (UTC)

This is being discussed above. But its best to just write : "Sinwar said, in 2022, that Hamas would “march through your walls to uproot your regime." Let the readers make their interpretation. Btw, we also wouldn't do this for Benjamin Netanyahu. We wouldn't put in wikivoice that he has called for genocide, even though plenty of RS say he has. Instead we'd say "Netanyahu said A. B, C and D interpreted that statement as calling for genocide."VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 00:59, 11 October 2024 (UTC)

There's no RS as far as I know that says that statement. If it did, we could add to that article. Andre🚐 01:04, 11 October 2024 (UTC)

Sorry, I didn't realise the discussion above moved beyond the "reports" issue. I'll respond there. Alaexis_¿question? 10:46, 11 October 2024 (UTC)