1922 Encyclopædia Britannica/East Africa, Military Operations

​EAST AFRICA: MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1914–8.—The outbreak of war found all the combatants in East Africa unprepared for offensive operations. But the advantage inclined to the Germans, for they had forces on the spot sufficient for defence, which was not the case in respect to the British protectorates bordering German East Africa. The Belgian Congo was also without adequate means of defence.

Hostilities were entirely unexpected. So little was the Government of British East Africa anticipating war with its German neighbours that the bulk of the Protectorate Force, a battalion and a-half of the King's African Rifles—negro troops officered by Europeans, together with the Uganda battalion of the same force, was, in Aug. 1914, engaged against recalcitrant tribesmen in Jubaland, on the borders of Italian Somaliland, 500 m. away. In short, all the British protectorate lay open to invasion. But Lt.-Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck, commander of the forces in German East Africa—the one German soldier who earned a high reputation in the colonial campaign—knew that his opponents would be reinforced from oversea, and contemplated nothing more than an offensive-defensive. His total force, when the war began, was just under 5,000 including 260 Europeans.

The British had the advantage of the command of the sea, and the ports of German East Africa lay open to attack. So keenly did the governor of the protectorate, Dr. Heinrich Schnee, realize their helplessness that one of his first orders was to forbid any action to be taken which would lay the ports open to bombardment. As in the case of the governors of British Dominions and Colonies the governor of German East Africa was also commander-in-chief of the forces, and Dr. Schnee asserted his authority in that respect despite the protests by von Lettow. Indeed, Dr. Schnee and many of the Government officials at Dar-es-Salaam, the capital and chief port, had “little stomach for a fight,” and when on Aug. 8 two old British cruisers, the “Astraea” and “Pegasus,” steamed across from Zanzibar to Dar-es-Salaam, by the governor's orders and without the knowledge of von Lettow, negotiations for surrender of the port took place. The ships had no force to garrison the town, but the Germans signed an agreement “which forbade us to undertake any hostile act in Dar-es-Salaam, while the enemy was not so bound” (von Lettow). The same day Dr. Schnee left Dar-es-Salaam for Morogoro, a pleasant hill station with European amenities, 140 m. inland by train. The high-power wireless station at Dar-es-Salaam which communicated with Berlin was destroyed.

Despite the attitude of the governor, von Lettow determined to carry on the fight to the utmost possible limit. He had taken up his command in East Africa in Jan. 1914 convinced that “the universal war,” as he calls it, might be imminent, and that if it broke out it was his duty to combat as many of the enemy as he could and for as long as he could.

The country was highly favourable to protracted defence by a resolute and ruthless commander, such as von Lettow proved. A very large proportion of the country is covered by “bush,” that is an undergrowth sometimes more or less open, but usually dense, from which rise trees to aCharacter of the country. height of some 30 feet. This bush covers hills and valleys and even dry desert, and in the coast region develops into luxuriant jungle. Much of it is infested by the tsetse fly. Some areas are covered with dense forests, others with elephant grass growing 6 to 10 or more feet high. The valleys of almost all the rivers are swampy and fever stricken; during the rains vast areas become inundated; in the dry season, away from the rivers, water is often lacking; wild animals constitute a real danger, especially to the wounded. The climate is tropical and very unhealthy save on a few high plateaus, and in certain hill districts malaria is endemic. These conditions existed throughout German East Africa, a country nearly double the size of Germany. The “bush” was the greatest asset of the defence. As Gen. Smuts wrote (in 1918), “in the African bush, with its limited visibility, it is practically impossible to enclose an enemy determined to escape.” The method is simple when a force is so hard pushed that destruction is inevitable if resistance continues the order is given to “line for bush,” whereupon the force splits up into parties of threes and fours and vanishes into the bush. Pursuit is hopeless, and the scattered enemy, if well trained, reassembles at an appointed rendezvous. Moreover, so dense is the bush over many thousands of square miles that considerable forces may be on the march within a mile of one another, without being aware of each other's existence. These factors explain why, given sufficient armament and food, von Lettow was still in the field when the Armistice was signed in Europe, in spite of his isolation and the superior forces that after 1916 were brought against him.

Von Lettow had drawn up his plan of campaign before hostilities began, and as the best means of defence had determined to take the offensive against the enemy's most sensitive spot. This he rightly conceived to be the line of the Uganda railway (which runs from Mombasa to Victoria Nyanza). The line is parallel to and about 50 m. distant from the (then) Anglo-German frontier. It passes through the Highlands, where the British European population is concentrated with Nairobi as chief town. On the “German” side of the frontier are the Usambara hills and the Pare mountains, presenting a wall-like face to British East Africa, with few passes. But between the northern end of the Pare mountains and the towering slopes by Kilimanjaro, which rise farther north, was a distinct “gap” forming the usual passage-way between the German and British protectorates. A railway from Tanga, the port of Usambara, ran to Moshi, on the slopes of Kilimanjaro, and at the western end of the “gap.” At its eastern end, in British East Africa, is Taveta. This place was seized by the Germans on Aug. 15 and was used by them as a jumping-off ground for raids on the Uganda railway, raids which included the design of occupying Nairobi.

At the outset, or shortly afterwards, a design was also entertained by the Germans of capturing Mombasa and holding it long enough to wreck the harbours and destroy the great railway bridge from the island to the mainland. This was rendered pos- sible by the return to Dar-es-Salaam in Sept. of the cruiser “Königsberg” (it had sailed from that port shortly before the declaration of war). It was then arranged that a force should march along the coast from Tanga on Mombasa, while the “Königsberg” attacked it from the sea. On Sept. 20 the “Königsberg” appeared off Zanzibar and destroyed the “Pegasus,” which was in the roadstead undergoing repairs. Mombasa, was to be attacked on Sept. 29. But the “Königsberg” did not keep its engagement, ships of the Cape Squadron under Vice-Adml. King Hall intervening. Harried by the British, but not overtaken, the commander of the “Königsberg,” Capt. Looff, in Oct. ran his ship aground in the shallow waters of the Rufiji river, south of Dar-es-Salaam. The land force which was to coöperate with the “Königsberg” was already at Vanga, just within the British border, and it began its march of 50 m. along the coast on Sept. 20. It attacked Gazi, 25 m. from Mombasa, on Sept. 23, was repulsed and forced to retire to the frontier on Oct. 8.

Apart from raids along the coast and on the Uganda railway the Germans made a series of incursions into the frontier districts of Uganda, the Belgian Congo, Rhodesia and Nyasaland. For ​ these minor operations the Germans had the advantage of a central position, interior lines and better means of communication. The railway from Dar-es-Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika had been completed about six months before the war began, and during Aug. the small steamer “Hedwig von Wissmann,” manned and armed by German sailors from Dar-es-Salaam, sank the only hostile boat on the lake, a small Belgian vessel. Thus the Germans had command of the 400 m. of waterway on Tanganyika. On the two other lakes, Nyasa and Victoria, the British, however, early obtained command.

The operations in all theatres other than on the British East Africa frontier were regarded by both sides as subsidiary. At first the British had to consider purely defensive measures. At the outset the East Africa Protectorate Force was under the command of Lt.-Col. L. E. S. Ward. Volunteers were called for, and two regiments, one mounted, were at once formed by the white settlers in British East Africa. The King’s African Rifles were recalled from Jubaland and were in action by September. An Arab detachment was raised on the coast by Lt. (subsequently Maj.) A. J. B. Wavell (an adventurous soldier who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca), and it rendered good service until its gallant commander was killed in action Jan. 6 1916. But outside help was needed, and the Government of India consented to send a force, officially known as “Indian Expeditionary Force B.” The first regiment, the 29th Punjabis, arrived at Mombasa at the end of Aug., and with them Brig.-Gen. J. M. Stewart, who took over the command.

Plans for an offensive were now formed. It was decided that the bulk of the force from India should land at Tanga and occupy the Usambara Highlands, the most healthy and most developed region of German East Africa, and in which lived the majority of the German settlers. The landing The Tanga Episode. finished, it was intended to advance along the railway from Tanga to Moshi. At the time Tanga was attacked Gen. Stewart was to demonstrate against Taveta, and to sweep round by Longido (N. of Kilimanjaro) to Moshi. Brig.-Gen. A. E. Aitken was selected to command the Tanga expedition. India was then being heavily drained of troops for service in France, and for East Africa troops that were not all of first-class quality had to be employed. The strength of the force was about 7,000, including one British unit, the 2nd Batt. Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. The force sailed from Bombay towards the end of Oct. and the transports arrived off Tanga harbour early on Nov. 2. The attack had been expected, news of the expedition having reached the Germans through captured Indian mails, and at the end of Oct. von Lettow had arranged with the district commissioner, Auracher, that Tanga should be defended, whatever were the instructions of Dr. Schnee. On receiving a summons from the commander of H.M.S. “Fox” for unconditional surrender Herr Auracher went on board, stated that Tanga was an open and undefended place and said that he must obtain special instructions. The British, therefore, refrained from bombarding the town, and meanwhile von Lettow was hurrying down reënforcements by rail. On the evening of Nov. 2 Gen. Aitken landed one and a-half battalions at Ras Kasone, two m. east of the port. It advanced through dense jungle to the outskirts of the town, became heavily engaged and had to fall back. The British were reenforced and the fight was renewed on Nov. 3. It was indecisive, but in the evening the officer in command, Capt. Baum- stark, believing that Tanga could not be held against another attack, had collected his force four m. W. of Tanga, leaving patrols only in the town. That evening von Lettow arrived, passed through deserted Tanga, and reconnoitred the British camp at Ras Kasone. Von Lettow’s plans for the morrow were, while defending Tanga itself, which he reoccupied with two companies of Europeans, to place most of his troops in the bush along the Ras Kasone-Tanga road and attack the enemy in flank. The fight was renewed on the fourth. The British and Indian troops advanced through coconut and rubber plantations and entered Tanga town. By this time fighting was severe and general, and soon after 3 P.M. von Lettow delivered his counter-attack on the British left, which, he states, he was able to outflank by means of his two reserve companies. Supported by machine-gun fire, this outflanking force was able to push its attack home, and soon the British were in full retreat to Ras Kasone. The fight continued in the dense bush till after nightfall, the Indian and British troops eventually getting back to their camp. The next day, Nov. 5, they were reembarked, and taken to Mombasa. The attack on Tanga had been a complete failure. The casualties in Aitken’s force were, according to an India Office statement, 795, including 141 British officers and men. Sixteen machine-guns were lost. Von Lettow gives the German force engaged as " little more than 1,000." Fifteen Germans and 54 askaris were killed. The number of wounded was not stated. After this action Aitken was removed from his command, but in Dec. 1920, after a fresh investigation by the War Office, he was declared " not guilty of culpable negligence . . . and should not be held responsible for the failure."

The simultaneous attack on Longido, N. of Kilimanjaro, also failed. The Germans about 800 strong were strongly posted, and covered the only permanent water supply available. Stewart’s attacking force numbered about 1,500. After a night march of 15 m. across a waterless region, the action began on the morning of Nov. 4 and continued till 7:30 P.M. The whole movement typical of many operations in this theatre of war was tersely summed up by an officer who wrote, " We marched all night, attacked at dawn, fought all day, and then having failed to turn the Germans out, came back here as we had no water."

Following the failure at Tanga no new general offensive was undertaken by the British until the early months of 1916. The intervening period was one of preparation on both sides, with, on the part of the Germans, frequent and sometimes successful attempts to raid the UgandaPeriod of Preparation. railway, and on that of the British, defensive and retaliating raids of the same kind. Of the engagements of this period that at Jassin was the most notable. Following the failure of the German march on Mombasa, the British force on the coast advanced S., crossed the German frontier and occupied (Jan. 2 1915) the buildings of Jassin plantation, which was garrisoned by some 300 Indian troops. Von Lettow thinking that a land attack on Tanga was intended got together a force of 1,500–1,600 men, and attacked Jassin on Jan. 17. After 48 hours' fighting, the Indian troops, having expended all their ammunition and being without water, surrendered. Attempts by the King’s African Rifles (in camp 10 m. distant) to relieve them failed. But the German losses, especially in European officers, were serious, and the expenditure of ammunition made a heavy inroad on von Lettow’s small stock.

The period of preparation was spent on the British side largely in raising new troops and in the organization of transport. In April 1915 Col. M. I. Tighe, Indian army, with the local rank of Major-General, was appointed to command the troops in East Africa and to prepare for the new offensive. His force was increased by two newly raised white regiments, the 2nd Rhodesian and “Driscoll’s Scouts” (25th Batt. R. Fusiliers). While parrying the raids on the Uganda railway—which were numerous and daring, but taken as a whole, ineffective—Gen. Tighe organized occasional offensives, such as the successful attack (June 1915) on Bukoba, the German base on Victoria Nyanza for operations against western Uganda. This raid was made by Gen. J. M. Stewart, and it affords an illustration of the great distances to be covered in the East African operations. Nairobi, headquarters, was 327 m. by rail from Mombasa, the base, and 237 m. from Kisumu, railhead on Victoria Nyanza. Thence Stewart’s force had to go by steamer 240 m. before reaching Bukoba. To aid his operations Gen. Tighe began the building of a railway and pipe line across the 70 m. of desert between Voi, on the Uganda railway, and his advanced posts near Taveta.

The other theatres of operation in East Africa were much worse off for means of communication. To reach the German frontier bordering Nyasaland, Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo was a journey of from 2,000 to 3,000 m., including hundreds of miles to be covered on foot or by animal and mechanical transport. This involved the employment of vast numbers of carriers ​ in regions where local supplies of food were often non-existent. Thus in northern Rhodesia a road 400 m. long had to be cut through trackless bush, in which the areas of cultivation were infinitesimal. The Germans were better off in that, besides their two railways, they had constructed several main roads before the war, and during the war other roads and some light railways were laid down. And the German troops had not such long distances as had their opponents to cover on foot. Nor were they troubled by lack of food (at least not before 1917). The natives had been compelled to establish large food depots at all military stations, while Usambara, in or near which the bulk of von Lettow’s force was quartered for 22 months, was a land of plenty. But the necessity that they were under of guarding the coast and to a lesser extent the N.W. and S.W. frontiers, while keeping their main forces in the principal theatre about Moshi, imposed upon them a great deal of movement in a more or less N. and S. direction for which apart from the command of Lake Tanganyika few facilities existed. For instance, movement of supplies or stores by carrier from the Central railway to the Usambara railway took 12 days, and from the Central railway to Lindi in the S. not less than three weeks.

Throughout 1915 von Lettow’s chief concern was the increase and training of his forces. At the outbreak of war he had, as has been stated, just under 5,000 men (a figure which included the police as well as the troops proper). This number had been increased by Feb. 1916, when the The
German
Forces. German force was at its maximum strength, probably over 20,000. Exact figures cannot be given as the number of carriers and batmen who acted as combatants is unknown, but the rule was to arm 15% of them. Von Lettow himself says that the total numbers enrolled during the war were “about” 3,000 Europeans and 11,000 askaris (natives); the figures of casualties and captives show that the number of whites on the German side was nearer 4,000, and an official German return gave 2,217 Europeans as under arms in Aug. 1915 The Europeans included most of the German settlers in Usambara and other districts, almost all of whom were ex-soldiers and many ex-officers; a few Boer settlers; German residents at Zanzibar who had been allowed by the British to cross to the mainland; some 500 sailors from ships in harbour, including over 400 men of the Imperial navy, and a few visitors to Dares-Salaam. These last had come to attend fetes to mark the formal opening of the Dar-es-Salaam-Tanganyika railway, and among them was a retired Prussian officer, Maj.-Gen. Wahle, who rendered von Lettow good service. The German forces were organized in companies normally consisting of 200 askaris and 16 Europeans; a few of the companies were composed almost entirely of whites, two companies were mounted. The askaris were drawn from the most warlike tribes of the country, and were very well treated. Von Lettow himself was ever careful of their needs and shared their hardships on campaign. He won and retained throughout their respect and devo- tion. Besides his regular force von Lettow had in the earlier stages the help of various levies; and the anti-Moslem policy of Dr. Schnee having been reversed he also obtained the support of a number of Arabs (support which proved of little value). His movements were not, for a considerable time, hampered by disaffection among the natives; some tribes near the border of British East Africa were deported because of doubt as to their sympathies, and the converts of the British missionary societies were in general regarded as enemies and were very badly treated, many being executed. Fear of a native rising was felt among the Germans when the war broke out, but the fear proved groundless. “It was not” (writes von Lettow) “till the enemy had

penetrated the country that the natives became a real danger to us; and then it was indeed very great. The native has a fine sense of the transfer of real power from one hand to the other.” Even then, with the natives hostile, the askaris (who had with them their women and children and carriers) were faithful to their leader, and more resolute than many of the Germans.

That they obviously had the advantage inspired the German native troops with confidence, and the hard training they had between Nov. 1914 and March 1916 made them, as the event proved, very formidable opponents in the;r own country of white and Indian troops. And months before the onslaught of Gen. Smuts they had also been rearmed with modern weapons.

On Feb. 28 1915 a blockade of the whole coast of German East Africa was proclaimed, and the British Government stated that “ample steps had been taken to make the blockade thoroughly effective.” The task of the reënforced Cape squadron under Vice-Adml. King Hall in watchingBlockade Runners. 600 m. of coast line provided with many excellent natural harbours was difficult, and in fact several vessels got through. In Dec. 1914, before the blockade was proclaimed, Dar-es-Salaam was visited and the German ships which had taken refuge there sunk. In April 1915, when the Germans were in greatest need of more ammunition, the blockade was broken in a remarkable manner. The “Rubens,” an English ship of 3,000 tons seized at Hamburg, had been loaded with arms and ammunition, had eluded the blockade of the North Sea, and on April 4 (its arrival was expected) was sighted by H.M.S. “Hyacinth” four m. off Mansa Bay, N. of Tanga. The “Rubens” got into the bay, severely damaged and on fire. The crew fled ashore; the ship was boarded by bluejackets, who found her timbered up and battened down; the party was recalled and more rounds having been fired into the vessel " the admiral . . . steamed away under the impression that she would burn herself out " (Brig.-Gen. J. H. V. Crowe). Subsequently the Germans salved at leisure nearly the whole of her cargo, though a great part of the cartridges had been damaged by sea water. But there were enough Mauser ’98 rifles to rearm the force, which previously, for the most part, used the M 71 rifle. (A year later, at another critical period of the war, the Germans were again rearmed, by another blockade runner.)

The operations against the “Königsberg” also resulted in a valuable addition to von Lettow’s armament. The cruiser had remained shut up in the shallow waters of the Rufiji, but in July 1915 the light-draught monitors “Severn” and “Mersey,” sent specially from England, succeeded in setting it on fire. The cruiser was then blown up by Capt. Looff, who with his officers and crew joined von Lettow. The “Königsberg’s” armament, which included 10 4.1-in. guns, was all salved, and these 4.1-in. guns formed von Lettow’s heaviest ordnance. The Germans also recaptured with its guns the 300-ton steamer “Adjutant” (originally taken by the British at Dar-es-Salaam), which had run aground off the Rufiji in Feb. 1915. The “Adjutant” was transferred by rail to Lake Tanganyika.

Plans for the conquest of German East Africa took shape in the summer ot 1915, but their execution had to be delayed until Britain could put a sufficient force in the field. This force was not forthcoming until the close of 1915, when Gen. Botha, Prime Minister of South Africa,Plans for British and Belgian offensive. having conquered German South-West Africa, agreed to provide a force for service in East Africa. At the time Gen. Tighe had under him 10 regular infantry regiments supplied by India, including the 40th Pathans and the 129th Baluchis brought from France, a squadron of the 17th Lancers (Indians), Imperial Service troops, the 27th and 28th (Indian) Mountain Batteries, and the Calcutta Volunteer battery. Of white troops there were, besides the two regiments ​ raised by the settlers in East Africa, the 2nd Rhodesian Regiment, the 25th Batt. Royal Fusiliers and the 2nd North Lancashires (the only regular British infantry unit in East Africa). There were also the battalions of the King’s African Rifles, but at that time the value of negro troops was not sufficiently appreciated. Though they were best adapted for warfare in equatorial Africa and ultimately bore the brunt of the fighting and though von Lettow had shown the way, the raising of new native regiments was neglected at first by the British.

The plan adopted by the British in conjunction with the Belgians was for a concerted attack on three sides. The object was not only to defeat the enemy, but effectively to occupy the country, so as to render impossible the splitting up of the German forces “into guerrilla bands doubling back in all directions” (Gen. Smuts). This aim was achieved with one remarkable exception, the Wintgens-Naumann raid (see p.883, note). But when von Lettow was driven eventually into Portuguese territory the whole remaining German force became a guerrilla band, with an unlimited field for doubling and redoubling. The scheme evolved in 1915 was to strike the main blow with the force in British East Africa, whilst the Belgians were to operate in the north-west and a second British force in the south-west of the German protectorate. This second force was gathered on the Nyasa-Rho- desia borders, and Brig.-Gen. Edward Northey assumed command of it in Jan. 1916. When, in March 1916, the Portuguese entered the war, they undertook to guard the southern frontier of German East Africa. Thus the Germans had enemies on every side, and had no opportunity (which the Germans in Cameroon took) of escaping capture by retirement into neutral territory.

When Gen. Botha’s Government undertook to send forces to East Africa it had to rely upon volunteers to redeem its promise. But a force already organized and originally destined for service in Europe the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade (under Brig.-Gen. P. S. Beves) was diverted South African Reënforcements.to East Africa. A mounted brigade under Brig.-Gen. J. L. Van Deventer, and a brigade consisting of five batteries of S.A. Field Artillery, with all necessary administrative and other units, were also formed so that the South African contingent was complete and self contained. Later this contingent was increased by another infantry brigade, a second mounted brigade and the Cape Boys Battalion (under Col. Morris). All these troops except the 2nd mounted brigade had reached East Africa by Feb. 1916, before the offensive began.

When South Africa furnished this contingent the largest body of white troops which had taken the field in tropical Africa the Home Government offered the command to a South African, Gen. Smuts. Smuts was Minister of Defence in the Union Cabinet; the political situation in South Africa was uncertain and he declined the offer. Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was then selected for the post, but while at the Cape on his way out, in consequence of ill health, he resigned his appointment. Again appealed to, Gen. Smuts accepted the command and reached Mombasa on Feb. 19. He adopted, with some modifications, the plan of campaign which Gen. Tighe had originated.

Gen. Tighe had had a very difficult task, and the moral of his force, predominantly Indian, had suffered through being so long on the defensive. It altered completely with the opening of the offensive. Before the arrival of Gen. Smuts the railway across the waterless waste between Voi and Taveta had been taken to Serengati, within five m. of the German post on El Oldorobo (otherwise Salaita hill), which blocked the main approach to the Taveta gap. Skirmishing had been going on around Salaita since March 1915. The hill was without water, which was taken to the garrison from Taveta in donkey carts. " Strangely enough," wrote von Lettow, "it did not occur to the enemy to interfere with it [the transport] and thus render the mountain untenable." The first action in which the South Africans took part was an attack on Feb. 12 1916, on Salaita. Brig.-Gen. Malleson with the 1st East African and 2nd South African

Infantry Brigades, supported by artillery, assaulted the strongly entrenched German positions, approached through thorn bush. Little progress was made and the Germans, reinforced from Taveta, counter-attacked and compelled Gen. Malleson to retreat. The British casualties were 172, of which number 139 were among the South Africans. They suffered through ignorance of the new conditions. “The South African Infantry,”" wrote Gen. Smuts, " had learned some invaluable lessons in bush warfare, and also had opportunity to estimate the fighting quality of the enemy."

Gen. Tighe intended to force the enemy from the Taveta gap by a double movement. One force, undeT Gen. J. M. Stewart, was to sweep round Kilimanjaro from the north ; another, under Gen. Malleson was to attack Taveta. The forces were to join hands at Kahe, a place on_the Tanga railway S. of Moshi. Gen. Stewart, who had the ist East African Division (infantry) and Van Deventer’s mounted brigade, was at Longido, some 50 m. from Kaijado, the terminus of the Magadi branch of the Uganda railway and Stewart’s base for supplies. The chief alteration in Gen. Tighe’s plans made by Gen. Smuts was to bring back Van Deventer’s mounted brigade to the Taveta side and to use it for a turning movement which would render a frontal attack on Salaita hill unnecessary. The infantry which were to follow up Van Deventer’s movement consisted of the 2nd East African Division, of which Gen. Tighe was placed in command.

Four days after reaching Mombasa Gen. Smuts telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that he was prepared to carry out the occupation of the Kilimanjaro area at once; two days later (Feb. 25) Kitchener’s sanction for the operation was received. There was good reason for haste as the rainy season was approaching, and during the rains operations might be (and in fact proved to be) impossible. Von Lettow was well aware of the enemy’s movements, and as early as Aug. 1915 had made preparations in view of having to abandon the Kilimanjaro and Usambara regions. These preparations included the removal of all military stores. For this purpose a light railway was built south from Mombo station on the Tanga railway to Handeni (40 m.), whence a wagon road went to Kimamba on the Central (or Tanganyika) railway. Up to nearly the end of 1915 von Lettow had thought that the new British offensive might be a landing at Dar-es-Salaam or Bagamoyo; afterwards there was no doubt that it would be in the Kilimanjaro region. To meet the attack he had, he states, a force of “about 4,000 rifles” under Maj. Kraut (the British estimated that Kraut had 6,000 rifles, 16 naval and field guns and 37 machine-guns). About 1,000 rifles were concentrated to dispute any advance from Longido.

The Germans were apparently unprepared for the turning movement executed by Van Deventer’s mounted men, who got behind Taveta, and forced the enemy to evacuate Salaita hill, though on this point von Lettow asserts “our want of artillery obliged us to look on quietly while the enemy executed unskilful movements at no great distance from our front.” Van Deventer’s movement began on March 8, and on the next day his men were astride the Moshi road behind Taveta. Salaita hill was evacuated by the Germans on that day and new positions were taken up by them covering the gap between the North Pare mountains and Kilimanjaro. Von Lettow himself, with the bulk of his force, was at Himo, five m. from his front, and he was aware that behind him Gen. Stewart’s column was advancing. That column, in Gen. Smuts’s plan, was to cut off von Lettow’s retreat, and in view of the greater distance it had to cover had started from Longido on March 5. Stewart’s column met with many difficulties, and though it had no serious encounter with the Germans its progress was much slower than had been anticipated. Meanwhile the attack on the position west of Taveta was delivered on March n. The road to Himo and Kahe passed between two hills, Raeta and Latema. Maj. Kraut held both

​ hills. and the pass or nek between them; no turning movement was possible and the order was given to Gen. Malleson, commanding the 1st Brigade of the 2nd East African Division, “to clear up the position and, if possible, make good the nek.” The whole region was densely bushed. The advance began at 11:45, and the 130th Baluchis and the 3rd King’s African Rifles were sent forward to seize a spur of Latema. The defence was very strong and by 4 P.M. little progress had been made. At this hour, writes Gen. Smuts, “Gen. Malleson, who was seriously indisposed, asked to be relieved of his command.” Gen. Tighe then assumed personal direction of the operations. The 2nd Rhodesians, the 3rd King’s African Rifles, and the 130th Baluchis now attempted to gain the Latema ridge. The enemy, well hidden in the bush, and supported by accurate machine-gun fire, kept, however, possession of the ridge. Finally, the 5th and 7th South African Infantry Battalions, brought up as reinforcements and led by Lt.-Col. Byron, were sent in to make a night charge with the bayonet. Here and there small parties, which became isolated, gained the crest. Col. Byron got within 30 yds. of the main enemy position, but with 20 men only, and was forced to retire. Tighe thereupon dug in astride the road to await daylight. At 4:30 A.M. March 12 Smuts ordered Tighe to draw back his force. This operation was in progress when news came that the enemy was in full retreat. Von Lettow states that about ii P.M. on the nth a telephonic message from the Raeta position informed him that the enemy had penetrated into the position in great force and that to avoid the risk of having his communications cut he ordered the troops with him, forming his left wing, to fall back towards Kahe. When he discovered the mistake made it was too late to alter his dispositions. Maj. Kraut then evacuated the Latema-Raeta position, and the whole force retired to the Kahe position, abandoning Moshi and Kilimanjaro. Gen. Stewart’s division had not played the part expected; it was not until March 13 that it reached Bomba Jangombe, 25m. N.W. of Kahe. Here Gen. Stewart was informed by telegram that the enemy had already avoided encirclement, and his force was brought into New Moshi on the i4th. On the igth Gen. Stewart left for India. Later experience showed that the difficulties of encirclement were greater than then supposed.

Von Lettow’s new position known as the Kahe-Ruwa stretched, S. of the Moshi-Taveta road, from Kahe railway station, near which the Ruwa (Pangani) crossed the railway, eastward along the northern end of the Pare mountains, through a region of forest, bush, swamps and rivers. On March 18 he was attacked from the Latema Nek direction by a force under Brig.-Gen. S. H. Sheppard (who had commanded the 2nd East African Brigade under Gen. Stewart) and on March 20 Gen. Van Deventer was sent westward from Moshi to turn the enemy’s rear at Kahe. He reached and after some sharp fighting seized Kahe station on the 2ist, but owing to the difficulty in getting his force across the Pangani could not cut off the enemy. On the same day Sheppard fought a very determined and apparently indecisive action on the northern front a South African Brigade which was to have aided him “was so impeded in the dense bush that it was unable to exercise any influence on the fight” (Gen. Smuts). But under cover of night the German force was withdrawn to Lembeni station, 20 m. S. of Kahe. Von Lettow retired in perfect order with practically all his stores and guns, except one of the “Königsberg’s” 4.1-in. guns, which was blown up.

The fight of March 21 marked the conclusion of the Kilimanjaro operations. They had opened the door into German East Africa and had greatly inspirited the British. They had done more, for though von Lettow’s force was intact and its moral still high, its supply of ammunition had been greatly depleted. But at this critical moment another ship ran the blockade and brought the Germans most welcome supplies, including four 4.1-in. field howitzers, ammunition for the “Königsberg’s” big guns, 5,000,000 rounds of ’98 small-arms ammunition, 12 machine-guns, medical stores, provisions and clothing (for women as well as men). The ship, the “Maria,” which had come via South America, the East Indies and Madagascar, entered Sudi Bay, near Lindi, in the far south of German East Africa, in the middle of March unobserved by the British patrolling vessels. She was discovered early in April, fired into and damaged. But she completed the discharge of her cargo, and got clear away. The value of this reënforcement to von Lettow is difficult to over-estimate.

The military problem as it presented itself to Gen. Smuts and to Col. von Lettow respectively was very different. Smuts knew that the Belgians were ready to strike from the N.W. and the Nyasa-Rhodesia force from the S.W. and von Lettow was also aware of the fact. But in so large a country as German East Africa those operations were not likely for some time to affect the main forces. Von Lettow’s position was comparatively simple; he could not prevent the enemy from developing his offensive in the manner he chose, but with his superior mobility he could adapt his movements to meet his foe’s tactics.

Gen. Smuts had four possible alternatives: (1) to advance from Victoria Nyanza on Tabora, the chief town in the interior (this was ruled out as it was thought, and proved to be the case, that the Belgians could deal with Tabora); (2) follow the enemy down the Tanga railway throughAlternative Plans of Campaign: Smut’s Choice. Pare and Usambara (this was rejected as it was the enemy’s chosen ground, and where he was strongest); (3) advance direct inland from Kilimanjaro; (4) land a force at Dar-es-Salaam and advance along the Central railway. Gen. Smuts chose the third alternative; whether it was better than the fourth is questionable. An advance along the line of the Central railway had obvious advantages. The railway traversed the protectorate in an east-west direction from end to end; its occupation would have cut the German forces in two and materially helped the operations of the Belgians and Gen. Northey. Dar-es-Salaam, the ocean terminus of the railway, lay at the mercy of the British navy; it was the capital of the protectorate; its occupation would have much political as well as military importance, and would have given the British a sea base 200 m. nearer South Africa than Mombasa and reduced land communications to a much greater extent. And the shortening of the lines of communication was a vital matter. Smuts, however, decided against Dar-es-Salaam “partly because the prevalence of the S.E. monsoon at that period (April) made a landing of a large force on that coast an operation of great difficulty, and even danger, partly because a prolonged campaign on the coast immediately after the rainy season would mean the disappearance of a very large percentage of my army from malaria and other tropical ailments.”

Moreover, von Lettow by retiring along the Tanga railway had left the road into the interior “wide open and unguarded.” At that time, April 1016, it was not realized that the climate of the interior was little less deadly than that of the coast, and that whatever course was adopted a large proportion of the army especially among the white troops would be affected by malaria and other tropical ailments. Also Gen. Smuts was misinformed as to the extent and severity of the forthcoming rainy season. Of the difficulties of communication he was well aware, and slightly to lessen them the railway from Voi to Taveta was carried through the Latema gap and joined to the Tanga railway at Kahe. This railway was completed on April 25 1916. It was cut through swamps and virgin forest and thousands of men had to be employed to keep the rails from sinking in the mud. Kahe, by rail, was 210 m. from Mombasa; from Kahe the advance into the interior had to be made by other means of transport. Smuts made large use of motor lorries.

Smuts’s plan for his new campaign was, briefly, as follows: A mounted force under Van Deventer was to make a rapid advance ​ S. from Arusha (a place 40 m. W. by S. of Moshi) to Kondoa Iringa the chief strategic point in the interior of the northern part of the country thence advance to the Tanganyika railway and turn E. along that line to Morogoro. Smuts himself, with the rest of his force, after clearing as much of the Pare and Usambara regions as was necessary for his purpose, was to turn S., parallel to the coast and E. of Van Deventer’s line of advance, also converging on Morogoro. It was hoped thus to corral von Lettow and bring him- to a decisive engagement. Smuts had reorganized his forces since the March operations, and no longer had the aid of Gen. Tighe, who was given a command elsewhere and created a K.C.M.G. Smuts formed his army into three divisions, the first under Maj.-Gen. A. R. Hoskins (Inspector-General King’s African Rifles), the second under Van Deventer, the third under Maj.-Gen. Coen Brits. The first division was made up of the two East African Brigades; the two other divisions were composed of South African troops, supplemented by batteries of Indian and other artillery. On April 3 Van Deventer took the road across the Masai Steppe to Kondoa, Van Deventer’s March to Kondoa. which place he occupied after a smart engagement on April 19. En route the garrison of Lol Kissale, 17 Germans and 404 askaris with two machine-guns, had been surrounded and forced to surrender. It had been a brilliant march of some 200 m., but Van Deventer had lost hundreds of animals through horse-sickness, and though only some 80 m. from the Central railway he could advance no further. Then the rainy season set in and cut off Van Deventer for several weeks. Meanwhile von Lettow made rapid preparations to meet Van Deventer’s thrust. Three companies were brought from near Lake Kivu in the N.W. and by steamer on Lake Tanganyika to Kigoma, whence they took train to Saranda (the nearest point on the railway to Kondoa), while von Lettow himself with 15 field and two mounted companies marched from Korogwe on the Tanga railway to Kimamba on the Central railway—a distance of 125 miles. Maj. Kraut remained in charge of the force left in Usambara. The rains began while the troops were on the march, but by the beginning of May von Lettow and his force had occupied a strong position a little S. of Kondoa. A good deal of minor fighting followed but neither side made a general attack. (In May, owing chiefly to the privations caused by the rains, Van Deventer could barely muster 3,000 rifles—a number inferior to that of von Lettow.) And in June, during the period of waiting, the Belgian advance towards Tabora began to have effect on von Lettow’s own position. Gen. Smuts was also moving. His advance could not begin until May 18, the rains having turned much of the country into a lake. It took an armoured-car detachment under Lt.-Comm. Whittall, R.N., sent to reinforce Van Deventer, 35 days to cover 75 m. (in the dry season the journey took three days).

When Smuts advanced Maj. Kraut retired, skilfully, by the railway to Handeni. Equally skilful was Smuts’s advance. The main column under Gens. Sheppard and Beves marched, through the densest bush, down the left bank of the Pangani, W. of the Tanga railway; a smaller force under Gen. Hannyngton followed the railway; a third column under Lt.-Col. T. O. Fitzgerald entered the Pare mountains through a gap (the Ngulu gap) on the east. Outflanked, Kraut had no option but to retire; he had strongly fortified the railway line, but had, apparently, not believed that an advance along the fever-haunted valley of the Pangani was possible. By June 15 the conquest of Usambara was completed by the occupation of Korogwe, whence the Tanga railway descends to the coast plain. Smuts put off the occupation of the coast region, and had already with his main force turned S., and on June 19 Handeni was occupied. Gen. Smut’s Main Operations. On June 24 a determined effort was made to round up Kraut’s force, the Germans being attacked simultaneously on three sides. In this action the Kashmiris and the 25th Fusiliers (familiarly known as “the Old and Bold”) earned special distinction. The Germans fought with great determination, and when the day was lost scattered in the bush and thus escaped. They reformed in strong positions in the Nguru hills.

After this fight Gen. Smuts was compelled to halt, forming a large standing camp on the Msiha river. The force had covered about 250 m. since May 22; water was short and the transport had reached the limit of its capacity. Malaria had greatly reduced the force several units had no more than 30% of their original effectives and the troops were on half rations. The interval of enforced idleness at Msiha camp was utilized in clearing Smuts’s left flank; that is, the northern coast region. This was done by Indian and African troops under Brig.-Gen. W. F. S. Edwards (Inspector-General of Communications), with the help of the Cape squadron, now under Rear-Adml. E. F. Charlton. At this time Gen. Smuts had already reached the conclusion that white troops were not best suited for campaigning in tropical Africa (nor were the Indian troops particularly suited for the work), and that a much larger negro element was needed. By his direction the raising of new battalions of the King’s African Rifles was undertaken, but the need was urgent for immediate reinforcements by trained black soldiers. These were found in West Africa. The Gold Coast Regiment had volunteered for service soon after its return from the Cameroon campaign; its offer was accepted and it sailed in June for East Africa and was in action in July. At the end of Aug. volunteers were called for a Nigerian overseas contingent and there was a ready response, but the Nigerian Brigade could not reach East Africa till Dec.–Jan. 1916–7. Meantime a battalion of the West India Regiment and the Gambia Company had joined Smuts. The coast operations, in which the navy played a great part, were successful; Tanga was occupied on July 7, Pangani on July 23, Sadani on Aug. 1 and Bagamoyo—the terminus of the old slave road from the great lakes—on Aug. 15. The British base was removed to Tanga, a saving of 75 m. sea voyage and over 200 m. rail transport. Dar-es-Salaam was occupied on Sept. 4, but it took three months before the port could be used as the new base.

While Smuts was still at the Msiha river von Lettow had brought most of his force from Kondoa to the Nguru hills. An attempt to surprise the British camp was unsuccessful owing to “the remarkably dense bush.” When on June 24 Van Deventer, reinforced, resumed his offensive the German detachments left on his front gave way, nor was their retreat marked by the skill usually displayed by the Germans in their retirements. Van Deventer was delayed by the difficulties of transport, but by the end of July he was in possession of some 100 m. of the Central railway—from Kilimantinde to Kikombo,—and on Aug. 9 had concentrated his division for an advance E. on Morogoro. Farther W. the Belgians were beginning to close in on Tabora. Von Lettow was obliged to leave his forces in that region to their fate, but (at the end of June) he had sent reinforcements to the detachments opposing Gen. Northey’s advance from the south. His own position now appeared critical. He withdrew Maj. Kraut and most of his force S. to Kilosa, on the railway, W. of Morogoro, leaving Capt. Schulz, with a few companies, to oppose Gen. Smuts, who resumed his advance on Aug. 5. Von Lettow’s plan was to get away with as much of his stores as he could. Kraut’s force did not remain at Kilosa, but crossing the railway struck S. in the direction of Mahenge, a military station in the middle of a healthy plateau, to which plateau the detachments which were opposing Northey were falling back.

Gen. Smuts’s effort, to use his own words, “to bottle the enemy up in Morogoro” failed. Schulz, after fighting an action at Dakawa on the Wami river on Aug. 16, retired on Morogoro, leaving a broken bridge across the Wami. Smuts sent forces to outflank von Lettow, but in vain.Von Lettow Avoids Encirclement. When on Aug. 26 the British occupied Morogoro it was to find it abandoned, and partly destroyed, by the enemy. Von Lettow had gone with his force into the Uluguru mountains, which lie immediately S. of Morogoro; by a track the existence of which was unknown to the British. With von Lettow was Dr. Schnee, the governor.

Gen. Smuts had taken measures intended to prevent von Lettow getting away from Morogoro by roads leading E. and W. of the Uluguru hills; he had not anticipated a retreat into the hills themselves. Brig.-Gen. Enslin was sent with the 2nd Mounted ​ Brigade to guard the western exit from the hills. This movement von Lettow had foreseen and had posted troops to meet an advance in this direction. Meanwhile the rest of his men, with as much of the stores as could be collected, were being moved through the mountains to Kissaki. To prevent von Lettow’s escape E. of Morogoro Smuts’s main force had crossed a waterless desert 25 m. long, a move which the enemy had not expected, and it was this march which caused the hurried evacuation of Morogoro. Exhausted as were his men Smuts determined to make another effort to corner von Lettow. For some three weeks very bitter fighting continued in the Uluguru hills, in which the Germans gained several successes, but on Sept. 15 Kissaki, with considerable stores, was captured by the British. Von Lettow could neither remain in the fertile and healthy hill region nor escape W., but he was able to retreat S.E. towards the Rufiji, where he formed an extensive camp on the further side of the Megeta river, which he continued to occupy for months. In short, the limit of endurance had been reached by Gen. Smuts’s troops, further pursuit was impossible and the second rainy season was approaching. “Gen. Smuts,” writes von Lettow, “realized that his blow had failed. He sent me a letter calling upon me to surrender, by which he showed that as far as force was concerned he had reached the end of his resources.”

Von Lettow is entitled to his deduction, but by his energy and driving force Gen. Smuts had surmounted obstacles which appeared insuperable, and in conjunction with the Belgians and Northey had conquered fully two-thirds of the German protectorate, including the chief areas of European colonization and both the railway lines. This had been done in a period of seven months, and was a very considerable achievement. Civil administrations were set up in the conquered regions.

The operations of the Belgians had been carefully planned and were thoroughly successful. While such troops as were available were engaged in defending, as best they could, the Congo frontiers, a special force of a little over 10,000 The Belgian Advance to Tabora. men—all natives of the Congo—was raised and officered by Europeans. All supplies for this force, except food, had to be imported, a long and tedious process. A railway completed in Sept. 1915 from the upper Congo to Lake Tanganyika gave some help as, for example, when two small, fast and comparatively heavily armed British motor boats were taken from Cape Town to Tanganyika in sections. These boats took nearly six months to complete the journey of some 3,000 m. from the Cape to Tanganyika. Launched on the lake in Dec. 1915 they soon obtained mastery of its waters, by capturing, sinking or bottling up the enemy steamers. This achievement was of much assistance to the Belgian operations.

The organization of the new Belgian force was confided to M. Tombeur, acting Vice-Governor-General of Katanga, and an ex-officer, who in Feb. 1915 was made commander-in-chief of the Belgian Congo troops with the rank of Colonel (subsequently Major-General). All the fighting men were infantry and gunners—there were, all told, 60 machine-guns and 12 field pieces. The force was divided into a Southern Brigade (under Lt.-Col. Olsen) and a Northern Brigade (under Col. Molitor). Olsen’s brigade was stationed along the Rusizi river, between lakes Kivu and Tanganyika; Molitor’s N. of Kivu along the Congo-Uganda border. Tombeur’s headquarters were established at Kibate, just N. of Lake Kivu. Molitor’s brigade was partly stationed in British (Uganda) territory. It had the help of the Congo Carrier Corps, consisting of natives of Buganda (of whom 8,429 served in the corps), while Gen. Smuts made himself responsible for supply arrangements to Molitor’s headquarters, which were at Lutobo, 150 m. W. of Victoria Nyanza. This was a great advantage as from Mombasa to Lutobo is barely 1,000 miles.

The defence of the region had been entrusted to Maj.-Gen. Wahle, whose “western command” extended from Lake Nyasa to the Uganda frontier. Von Lettow had withdrawn part of the troops to strengthen his main force. Wahle, whose headquarters were at Tabora, was instructed not to risk a decisive action, but,

when compelled, to fall back on Mahenge. From about mid-July to the end of Oct. Wahle was cut off from his chief.

The terrain for the first part of the Belgian operations was extraordinary. North of Kivu rise the Mfumbiro mountains, a range of lofty, active volcanoes; farther N.E. extends a tangled mass of hills, for the most part heavily wooded, and numerous small lakes and rivers. On the German side was the mountainous, fertile, and thickly populated region of Ruanda—but newly conquered and still preserving its native government. A narrow passage between Lake Kivu and the Mfumbiro mountains afforded the only practicable route for the invasion of Ruanda from the N. side of the lake; from the S. side there was an easier approach. Col. Molitor’s plan was to attack from both sides of Kivu and to make a third advance from Lutobo. The campaign began on April 4 with holding attacks by Maj. Rouling at the N. end of Kivu, where the Germans, under Capt. Wintgens, held very strong positions at Kissenji along the little river Sebea. Then the two other columns were set in motion, and to avoid being trapped Wintgens had to evacuate the Sebea lines. By the middle of May the Belgians by their converging movements had “nipped off” Ruanda. They next repeated the manœuvre on a larger scale. Olsen crossed the Rusizi at the N. end of Tanganyika and pressed E. ; Molitor sent columns S.W. to join up with him and at the same time sent other columns S.E. to Victoria Nyanza, which was reached on June 27. Capt. Godovius, the German commander in Karagwe, who for nearly two years had conducted guerrilla warfare with the British Lake Detachment near the western Uganda frontier, falling back, tried to pierce the Belgian lines. His detachment sustained very heavy losses, and Godovius, severely wounded, was taken prisoner. The detachments under Wintgens, though badly mauled, escaped the Belgian cordon. By the middle of July the Belgian columns had secured the Tanganyika-Victoria Nyanza line and were ready for a further advance. Olsen’s brigade marched S. parallel to Lake Tanganyika on Kigoma—the lake terminus of the railway from Dar-es-Salaam and the port of Ujiji.

In its harbour was the “Graf von Gotzen”—launched in 1915 and the biggest boat ever seen on Tanganyika, the “Adjutant” (the vessel brought in sections from Dar-es-Salaam), and the tug “Wami.” From June onwards they had been bombed by British seaplanes manned by Belgians. Olsen’s brigade occupied Kigoma on July 28 and Ujiji on Aug. 2, the German garrison retiring by the railway to Tabora, 200 m. east. Other Belgian detachments now crossed Tanganyika S. of Ujiji, and these and Olsen’s brigade advanced on Tabora.

Molitor’s brigade, whose objective was also Tabora, had the coöperation of a British column under Brig.-Gen. Sir Charles Crewe, a South African soldier, who was on Gen. Smuts’s staff. With a force of about 1,800 men Crewe captured Mwanza, the German port on the southern shores of Victoria Nyanza, on July 14. Thereafter the Molitor brigade marched W. and Crewe’s column E. of the road leading from Mwanza to Tabora. Both forces suffered from transport difficulties, excessive heat and lack of water, and both had to fight several stiff actions. Tabora was the most important and the largest place in the interior of German East Africa. The Arabs had a large colony; there were Greek, Genoese and Indian traders and representatives of many African tribes. To lose the place would be a severe blow to the ​ Germans in Arab and African eyes, but though they fought strong delaying actions with Olsen’s brigade W. and Molitor’s brigade N. of Tabora they had no intention of holding out to the last, and in preparation for departure Gen. Wahle employed British, Indian and African prisoners in building a road towards Mahenge and established food depots along it. On Sept. 18 Wahle evacuated Tabora, leaving behind about 150 white (German) soldiers, some sick, some simply war-weary, a number of civilians (among them Frau Schnee), many prisoners of war and considerable military stores. The Belgians occupied the town the next day. Sir Charles Crewe’s column, which, it was hoped, would have reached the railway line E. of Tabora before the Germans had time to get away, only struck the line a week later. Shortly afterwards the column was broken up and Sir Charles Crewe returned to South Africa. He had, said Gen. Smuts, “rendered very useful service.” The Wintgens column in its retreat was engaged by a Belgian detachment at Sikonge, 40 m. S. of Tabora. Though Wintgens suffered serious loss he made good his escape. With this action the Belgian campaign of 1916 ended, just at the close of the dry season and at the same time that Smuts suspended his operations against von Lettow. Gen. Tombeur’s organization had been thorough and methodical, and Cols. Olsen and Molitor had proved capable commanders. The Congo Carrier Corps was disbanded and returned to Uganda.

When the Germans evacuated Tabora the operations conducted by Gen. Northey from the Nyasaland-Rhodesian border had so far developed that some of Northey’s columns were interposed between Tabora and Mahenge. Northey had taken the offensive on May 25 (1916). His fighting Northey’s Campaign force was about 5,000 strong; it was made up of King’s African Rifles (1st battalion), South African troops (infantry), Nyasa and Rhodesian volunteers, the Northern Rhodesian Police (natives under European officers), the British South African Police (Europeans) , and, later, a battalion raised from the natives of northern Rhodesia. For the supplies of this small fighting force the administrations of northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were responsible. Some idea of the effort required is seen from the fact that up to July 1917, out of a total native population of scarcely 2,000,000 in the two districts named, 395,000 were employed as carriers. Much of the supplies had to be carried, in canoe or on foot, fully 600 miles.

Northey’s forces were in two main columns: a Nyasaland column under Maj. (temporary Lt.-Col.) G. M. P. Hawthorn, and a Rhodesian column under Lt.-Col. R. E. Murray. A third column under Lt.-Col. T. A. Rodgers coöperated with Col. Murray. The advance was along the 200 m. front between lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika; there was a great deal of detached fighting, some German commanders, in von Lettow’s opinion, too easily surrendering. Bismarckburg, the German port at the S. end of Tanganyika, was occupied by Col. Murray on June 8. Northey’s main thrust was along the highroad which led from the Nyasa frontier by Neu Langenburg and Iringa to Kilosa on the Central (Tanganyika) railway the road crossing the Tabora-Mahenge route. In an action on July 24 at Malangali Northey defeated the German force which sought to bar his progress, and on Aug. 19 the British seized Lupembe, a place 100 m. W.S.W. of Mahenge. On Aug. 29 Iringa was occupied. Exactly a week earlier Van Deventer had taken Kilosa, 120 m. N.E. of Iringa. Northey could have reached Iringa much earlier, but on Gen. Smuts’s advice he “slowed down.”

When von Lettow had been forced to take to the lower Rufiji district, it was decided that a joint effort should be made by Van Deventer and Northey to deal with the enemy in the Mahenge district. But before that operation could be undertaken Van Deventer’s men were nearly spent after over six months' fighting, marching, privations and illness Northey had to meet the troops of Gen. Wahle coming from Tabora. The Germans were in three columns, an eastern under Maj. von Langenn, a centre column under Wintgens, and a western under Lt. Huebener. Wahle was with the centre column. The western column lost touch with the others, which acted in close coöperation. Northey’s columns near Iringa were much outnumbered. Although Col. Rodgers with a small body of South Africans made an effort to hold up the enemy on the night of Oct. 21 1916 the larger portion of Gen. Wahle’s troops broke through the British lines. An attack made by Maj. Kraut the same day on Mkapira, in the Lupembe region, was regarded by the British as evidence of his knowledge of Wahle’s movements; von Lettow states that this was not the case. The attack on Mkapira ended in a severe reverse to the Germans, but sharp fighting with Wintgens' column continued in the Lupembe area till the middle of Nov., by which time the Germans had occupied a chain of posts covering Mahenge, extending over 200 m., and facing Van Deventer’s and Northey’s troops. Huebener’s column was still W. of Northey’s lines, in the neighbourhood of Lake Rukwa. This was a region where there were neither British nor Belgian troops, and for weeks the British had been doubtful even of the existence of this column. It was eventually tracked down at Ilembule by Col. Hawthorn and bluffed into surrendering. It numbered 54 Europeans and 249 askaris, and the booty included a 4.1-in. howitzer (one of the guns from the “Maria”).

The combined attack by Van Deventer and Northey against the Mahenge force was at length begun, on Dec. 24. The operation failed, though one of Northey’s columns compelled the surrender of Maj. von Grawert and his detachment of 289 fighting men, including 39 Europeans. The main engagement was fought by Van Deventer’s force South African infantry and mounted men. The fight was at Muhanga, 70 m. N.W. of Mahenge. It began on Christmas Day and continued till Dec. 28. The Germans were attacked front and rear, but, as Gen. Smuts wrote, “eventually escaped through the dense bush and forest under cover of darkness and eluded pursuit.” The rains had begun and early in Jan. (1917) the operations had to be abandoned. Gen. Wahle had now under him in the Mahenge area 6,000 or more soldiers, of whom at least 1,000 were Europeans, with a large following of carriers, and he found some difficulty in feeding them all. To relieve the pressure he directed Kraut and Wintgens to take detachments S. towards the Portuguese frontier, and Kraut, crossing Northey’s lines, reached the Rovuma, where supplies were found. Wintgens had separated from him and turned N.W. (see below). All this time communications between Wahle and von Lettow were slow and irregular.

Since the abandonment of the pursuit of von Lettow at the end of Sept. (1916) Gen. Smuts had been engaged in reorganizing his army and in shortening lines of communication by making Dar-es-Salaam his base. He evacuated 2,000 to 15,000 white troops (South Africans), their British forces reorganized; Changes
in the Command. place being taken by the Nigerian Brigade (under Maj.-Gen. F. H. Cunliffe) and new battalions of the King’s African Rifles. The German ports S. of Dar-es-Salaam had been occupied by the navy in preparation for a new offensive. Of these ports the chief were Kilwa and Lindi, Kilwa being the nearest to Dar-es-Salaam. A considerable force had been concentrated at Kilwa by mid-Nov., when Gen. Hoskins took over command in that area. On Jan. 1 1917, in conjunction with Van Deventer’s and Northey’s operations in the Mahenge region, Gen. Smuts opened a new offensive against von Lettow, Hoskins coöperating from Kilwa in the rear of the Germans. Smuts tried an enveloping movement on the Mgeta river, but again, after very stout fighting, the enemy got away; they were followed up towards the Rufiji and engaged on Jan. 4 at Beho-Beho, in which fight F. C. Selous was killed at the head of his company of 25th Fusiliers. Though severely handled the Germans “again slipped past” and crossed the Rufiji at Kibambwe. The operations continued and were proceeding favourably to the British until the rains turned much of the valley of the Rufiji into a vast lake; and in that region, uncomfortably enough, von Lettow was able to maintain himself.

In the middle of these Jan. operations Gen. Smuts gave up the command. At the request of Gen. Botha he went to England to become a member of the Imperial War Cabinet. Having handed over the command in East Africa to Gen. Hoskins Smuts sailed from Dar-es-Salaam on Jan. 20 for London. Gen. Van Deventer left East Africa at the same time, returning to South Africa.

​ In consequence of the heavy rains Gen. Hoskins had to abandon operations on a large scale, though by the end of Feb. the N. bank of the Rufiji was cleared of the Germans. Some idea of the difficulties caused by the rains may be gathered from the fact that in this area “patrol work had to be carried out for some time in canoes, and the men found themselves making fast to the roofs of houses which had lately formed their quarters” (Gen. Hoskins’s despatch). Sickness among the European and South African units was so great as to necessitate their withdrawal. As many as possible were sent to South Africa to recuperate, being recalled in May, when the dry weather permitted the offensive to be resumed. Meantime Gen. Hoskins utilized the period of the rains to undertake a thorough reorganization of his forces. The training of new battalions of the King’s African Rifles was pushed on rapidly, and special attention was devoted to the improvement of communications. The difficulties of transport were very great; owing to the tsetse fly animal transport was no longer possible; both carriers and light mechanical transport, essential for a forward movement, were deficient. Gen. Hoskins by energetic measures largely overcame these difficulties.

To an extent hard to realize, the operations—of the Germans equally with the British and Belgians—depended on the number, organization and distribution of native carriers. Complete statistics are lacking, but on the British side alone, first to last, well over 500,000 carriers were employed. Dependence upon Native Carriers.Those with the main forces were recruited from British East Africa (Kenya Colony) and Uganda, in both of which countries a Compulsory Service Act was put in force in March 1917. Uganda, which also found a large number of carriers for the Belgian troops, up to the end of 1917 had furnished a total of 178,000 porters (besides 10,000 men for the King’s African Rifles). A still larger number was recruited in British East Africa; a fair number of carriers were also recruited in German East Africa itself. Gen. Northey, as already stated, obtained his carriers from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Many carriers were used in the first line, that is they took ammunition, water, etc., right up to the fighting men, and casualties in action amongst these carriers were numerous.

There was also serious wastage among the carriers from sickness and privations, especially among the men obtained from Uganda and British East Africa. This arose mainly from the difficulty in supplying them with their accustomed food. Tribes, like the majority of those in the Uganda Protectorate, whose staple food consists of bananas, sweet potatoes and beans, suffered from intestinal disease when placed on a grain diet. For example out of 3,576 carriers from Uganda employed in the coast region of British East Africa between Aug. 1914 and March 1915 only 2,050 returned. Sufficient care was not always taken by officers in charge to procure suitable rations. But these cases were exceptional, and the African Native Medical Corps, 1,000 strong, raised in 1917 (recruited mainly from the senior high-school boys in Buganda), did much to improve the health of the carriers. In 1918 the carriers in hospital numbered 7%. The West African troops had their own Carrier Corps, raised voluntarily in Nigeria, the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone. The South African troops also brought their own carriers and labour contingents, a total of 60,300 men being sent from the Cape.

Before the weather had improved sufficiently to permit the offensive to be renewed Gen. Hoskins was appointed to command a division in Palestine. Gen. Van Deventer returned from South Africa and took over the command on May 29 1917. The position of the Germans at this Position in May 1917.time was briefly this: von Lettow with his main force was at the Matunda river, with patrols and detachments pushed close to and S. of Kilwa. Maj.-Gen. Wahle had recently been transferred from Mahenge to command in the Lindi area, succeeding Capt. Looff. At Mahenge Capt. Tafel had taken over control. There were smaller German detachments between Kilwa and Lindi and near the Rovuma. There was indirect if not direct communication between all the German forces. Nowhere, as throughout the campaign, was there any continuous front. The columns under Northey contained the Mahenge force on the S. and W., and Van Deventer had at Iringa another column watching Tafel from the N.W. The rest of Van Deventer’s force was to be engaged against von Lettow. That von Lettow might in the last resort retire into Portuguese territory had been foreseen; he had in fact contemplated that course ever since in Sept. 1916 he had been forced out of the Uluguru mountains. And German columns had already raided deep into Portuguese East Africa, bringing back much loot and reports of a land flowing with milk and honey.

For his main operations Van Deventer had the choice of an advance either from Kilwa or Lindi. An advance from Lindi (which is situated on the estuary of the Lukuledi) appears to have had the prospect of the best results, as by pushing forces up the valley of the Lukuledi and joining hands with Northey’s column E. of Nyasa the escape of von Lettow into Portuguese territory might have been prevented. But Lindi harbour was poor, that at Kilwa was good, and the main body of the Germans was concentrated near it. Van Deventer’s formula was to “find the enemy and hit him hard,” and he decided to attack on the Kilwa side. The Kilwa force had been under Gen. Hannyngton, but Hannyngton was then seriously ill and Gen. Beves was in temporary command. The advance began on July 5, in the direction of Liwale, it being hoped to force von Lettow to disclose his intended line of retreat. Three columns were formed, the forces engaged including South African infantry, King’s African Rifles, the 23rd Punjabis and two mountain batteries. After some sharp fighting the Germans fell back to Narungombe, where an engagement was fought on July 19. The fighting was very severe; the Germans delivered several well-sustained counter-attacks and the issue appeared doubtful. The fight showed that “the enemy’s capacity for resistance had not in any way been weakened by the rainy season, and that the moral and training of his troops remained high” (Van Deventer).

After the fight at Narungombe the Germans, who were under Capt. von Liebermann, retreated south. Von Lettow regarded the action as an opportunity missed by von Liebermann and as further proof of the immense difficulty of carrying out successfully in the bush operations in which several columns are engaged. But Beves’s offensive was spent, and his troops suffered heavily from sickness. It was not until mid-Sept, that a new Kilwa force was ready to take the field. In the meantime preparations had been made for the advance from Lindi. In Aug. Brig.-Gen. H. de C. O’Grady, a great fighting soldier, had driven the Germans from the estuary of the Lukuledi, and provided elbow room for a further advance. He also foiled an attempt made by von Lettow in person to surprise his force.

When in Sept. Van Deventer was at length in a position to begin the main advance Gen. Beves had been transferred to the Lindi command and Gen. Hannyngton had resumed command at Kilwa. The Nigerian Brigade had been at Kilwa since Aug., and Hannyngton had also three Van Deventer’s Campaign in the South-East. new battalions from India, including the 25th cavalry. It was planned that the Kilwa force should sweep S. and the Lindi force W. so as to enclose von Lettow and prevent his breaking W. and consolidating with the Mahenge force. This period of the main advance, up to the end of ​ Nov., witnessed the hardest fighting of the whole campaign in East Africa. Relentlessly pursued by Hannyngton’s columns von Lettow was compelled to fall back to the Lukuledi valley, the chief line of retreat being towards Nyango, a place 40 m. S.W. of Lindi, towards which Beves was pressing back Wahle’s detachments. Early in Oct. Hannyngton detached the Nigerian Brigade (with which was the Gambia Company) to march to Nyango and join the Lindi force. Meanwhile other columns of the Kilwa force, including cavalry, were marching S., but further W., towards the mission stations of Lukuledi and Massasi. At those places, and at Chitwa, S. of the Lukuledi river, were most of the German supplies.

The Nigerian Brigade, after a fine march of 80 m., reached its destination on Oct. 15. On that day two columns of Beves’s force under Gen. O'Gradyand Col. Tytler respectively had driven back Wahle’s main body to Nyango and Mahiwa (the latter about two m. from Nyango). The Flight at Mahiwa. The Nigerians were to coöperate in cutting off Wahle’s retreat (preparatory to the pursuit of von Lettow), and were in action early on the isth. This was the beginning of a four days' battle, the most stubborn and most costly of the whole campaign. Von Lettow with four companies had gone to the help of Wahle, and attacks were met by counter-attacks; the Nigerians at Mahiwa being driven back and very hard pressed. Nyango the Germans abandoned on the i6th, only to take up stronger positions on a ridge two m. S. on the farther side of a river bed. These positions the British in vain assailed; they were in turn counter-attacked on the I7th and again on the i8th and compelled to fall back to the river bed, the enemy pressure continuing until after dark. Gen. Beves gave orders that the attack was to be resumed on the ipth. This order was cancelled by Gen. Van Deventer, and on the same day the command of the Lindi force was transferred to Gen. Cunliffe. On that day the Germans retired to the positions they had taken up on the 16th. The battle was over. Out of a total strength of 4,900 infantry engaged the British had 2,700 casualties, of which 528 were in the Nigerian Brigade. The 25th Fusiliers, reduced to a remnant in previous fighting, had 70 casualties out of 120 men who went into action. Von Lettow says that the German force was “some 1,500 men” and their casualties 519. This did not include all Wahle’s casualties in the retreat to Mahiwa, for on Oct. 15-8 the British captured in all 241 Europeans and 677 askaris. The total German force engaged was not fewer than 2,800. Von Lettow describes this fight as, next to Tanga, the most serious defeat suffered by the British, and says he adapted his tactics to those of Gen. Beves, who “threw his men into action regardless of loss of life and did not hesitate to try for a success . . . by repeated frontal attacks.” He (von Lettow) abandoned the idea of “an annihilating pursuit” as he learned that the enemy columns in his rear were threatening the Lukuledi mission station. He hastened to its relief and began the process of concentrating his forces to the Chiwata region. The Mahiwa-Nyango battle gave him this advantage—it was 10 days before Gen. Cunliffe was able to resume the offensive. On Oct. 24 von Lettow had a conference with Dr. Schnee, who appears to have urged that the end had come, but, writes von Lettow, “I firmly stated my opinion that . . . the war could and must be carried on.”

Meanwhile Tafel’s force had been driven from the Mahenge plateau with the help of troops furnished by the Belgians, whose coöperation had been sought. While columns of Northey’s force, under Cols. Hawthorn and Fair, pressed the enemy hard from the S. and S.W., the Belgians Mahenge cleared of the Germans. struck at Mahenge from the north. The main Belgian column, under. Maj. Batille, left the Central railway on Aug. 15, and made good progress through very difficult country. The Germans put up the usual strong rear-guard delaying actions, but when the Belgians attacked (Oct. 8) the last defence of Mahenge, Tafel ordered a general retreat. His losses had been heavy and many of his askaris deserted. Both Hawthorn and Fair were drawing near, but Tafel succeeded in outdistancing his pursuers, whose long lines of transport had reached breaking point. Tafel chose the only route open to him—that leading S.E. in the direction of von Lettow. On Nov. 16 he broke through two weak detachments of Northey’s force which gallantly endeavoured to bar his progress. A Belgian column, which had been sent round via Kilwa to Liwale, arrived only in time to engage Tafel’s rear-guard. This was the end of the Belgian effort, and their troops shortly afterwards returned to the Congo. The pursuit of Tafel was taken over by the Kilwa force and his attempt to join von Lettow was frustrated.

At this time, mid-Nov., von Lettow’s position was critical. The Lindi force had resumed its offensive on Nov. 6 and had joined hands with the Kilwa force on Nov. 12. Lettow had concentrated all his men near Chiwata, but to remain there meant certain disaster. So leaving Von Lettow escapes to Portuguese Territory. only a small body at Chiwata to put up a delaying action the place was taken by Gen. O’Grady on Nov. 14 he retreated eastward, i.e. towards the coast, along the broken edge of the Mkondi Plateau. He was pursued without pause and constantly engaged, suffering losses every day, was in a foodless region and had lost nearly all his stores. On Nov. 17 von Lettow took what he calls a fateful decision. It was to abandon all idea of fixed bases; reduce his force—half-starved and very short of ammunition, break off fighting and get away to some district where food was to be found. At a place called Nambindinga he left some hundreds of Europeans (many of whom, he states, were not unwilling to lay down their arms) and 600 askaris, and with the rest again eluded his pursuers by turning S.E. “by an unsuspected path.” While the British columns were re-forming to pick up his trail he marched rapidly S.W., having determined to cross the Rovuma near its confluence with the Lujenda, where was the Portuguese fort of Ngomano. At Nwali he shed more of his troops, and his force was now reduced to approximately 300 Europeans, 1,800 askaris and 3,000 bearers and other natives, including women and children. He marched along the Rovuma to the selected crossing place, and on the night of Nov. 25-6 he crossed the river into Portuguese territory. Gen. Wahle, Maj. Kraut and other tried leaders were with him and also Dr. Schnee. Two attempts to overtake him “failed by a few hours at both places, in spite of hard marching.” So wrote Col. G. M. Orr, commander of one of the pursuing columns.

For a day or two Tafel and von Lettow had been near one another; Tafel had reached the Rovuma but not finding von Lettow turned back. Running into an Indian patrol Tafel again tried to turn south. But his force was foodless and hopeless. On Nov. 27 a party of 37Tafel’s Surrender. Germans, 178 askaris and 1,100 followers gave themselves up to the British, and the next day, Nov. 28 1917, Tafel himself surrendered unconditionally with 19 officers, 92 other Europeans, over 1,200 askaris and some 2,200 other natives.

Not a single German combatant was left in German East Africa, and the conquest of the Protectorate was complete. At the time of his flight into Portuguese territory von Lettow states that he received a second summons to surrender. But he was no more ready to surrender to Van Deventer than he had been to Smuts; moreover, he considered his position satisfactory inasmuch as he could still contain a large enemy force.

The failure of the Portuguese to prevent von Lettow from crossing the Rovuma, or in accounting for him when he had crossed that river, was not due to lack of effort on the part of the Lisbon Government. During 1914–5 they had sent over 2,000 white troops to Mozambique, and Campaign in Portuguese East Africa. between May and July 1916 another force 4,600 strong was sent from Lisbon. Part of this force had occupied Nwali ( Oct. 1916 ), but had been forced to evacuate it a month later. In 1917 Portugal sent 8,776 more men from Lisbon, and had strengthened the posts along the Rovuma, including that at Ngomano. But the Portuguese white troops

​ lacked experience; there were not sufficient trained native soldiers and the military posts were widely scattered. Nor was any one post equal to a successful defence against the 2,000 and more veterans von Lettow had with him. Ngomano was attacked, and it surrendered after a gallant resistance in which some 200 casualties were suffered, including the commanding officer, Maj. Pinto. Its loot gave the Germans just what they lacked food, ammunition, rifles, machine-guns and clothing. The Nigerians and the 25th Cavalry being in pursuit von Lettow then marched up the Lujenda valley. He had no difficulty in keeping ahead of the enemy, and the rainy season having set in the Nigerians and 25th Cavalry were recalled in the third week in Jan. (1918) and the Germans had a short breathing space.

Gen. Van Deventer now sent home all his white and Indian troops, and the Nigerian Brigade also. Except for the Gold Coast Regiment (which was not sent back till Aug.) the 1918 operations were carried out almost entirely by natives the King’s African Rifles. There were, however, a considerable number of Europeans among the Portuguese forces, which were put under the supreme command of Van Deventer.

Given the character and extent of the country into which the Germans had entered, the known determination of von Lettow to continue the struggle and the proven difficulty of bringing him to a decisive action, “the 1918 campaign,” said Van Deventer, “had perforce to be one of virtual extermination.” Wide converging movements were undertaken. Gen. Northey sent columns from the E. and S. shores of Lake Nyasa, while the Gold Coast Regiment advanced W. from Port Amelia (a harbour midway between the Rovuma and Mozambique). This Port Amelia column was later strengthened and came under command of Brig.-Gen. Edwards. Between Feb. and the middle of May the Germans were engaged at several points from both sides, mainly in the central region between the Lujenda and Msalu rivers. Von Lettow then marched S. to the Lurio river, 200 m. from the point where he had left German territory, with no enemy in front of him except isolated Portuguese posts, from which he obtained more valuable supplies. He was pursued from the N., and an Anglo-Portuguese column started N.W. from Mozambique (to which port Gen. Edwards removed his base) to overtake him. But von Lettow, marching very quickly S., captured Ilie, and in June reached the coastal region near Quilimane (Kilimane), where he ravaged many rich prazas. In this month Gen. Northey left, having been appointed governor of British East Africa and Col. (Brig.-Gen.) Hawthorn took his place. On July 1 von Lettow attacked a mixed Portuguese and British force at Nhamacurra, 25 m. from Quilimane, and after three days’ fighting captured the place and inflicted very severe loss on the defenders. The approach of strong British columns then compelled von Lettow to retire. He marched parallel to the coast, in the Mozambique direction. He established himself at a place called Chalaua, but when in mid-Aug. British columns closed in upon it, it was to find the camp evacuated. Von Lettow had turned N.W. again, one of his ideas at this time being to raid the Blantyre district of Nyasaland. On Aug. 30 and 31 he was engaged by part of Hawthorn’s force at Lioma, E. of Lake Shirwa, and suffered severely. “It was hoped that the enemy might have been captured, but the rugged country and the thick bush made operations very difficult, and he finally broke away to the northward.”

Save that he could not replace his casualties (except to some extent by turning bearers into askaris) von Lettow held the advantage in this campaign in northern Portuguese East Africa. It was nearly as large as France, most of it was fertile, and the natives, richly rewarded with booty from captured posts, were friendly and useful. If hustled from one area there were others to which he could move. He was tied to no base and was an ideal guerilla leader. He had now, end of Aug., to decide his future course; he came to the conclusion that an attempt to invade British Nyasaland was too risky, as there the British communications were good. It was easier to go north. To reenter German East Africa would be a complete surprise to the enemy, who would imagine he was making for the Tabora region (where most of his askaris came from) and take precautions accordingly. This would give him an opportunity of turning in another direction, and keep his force in being. His casualties at Lioma had numbered 95, and he had lost stores, baggage and ammunition. By Sept. 1 his total strength had been reduced to 176 Europeans and 1,487 askaris. He suffered further loss in another encounter on Sept. 6, after which date he got clear of his pursuers. Gen. Hawthorn had sent troops by steamer up Lake Nyasa, which should have reached the N. end of the lake before von Lettow could get there; the steamers broke down, and when on Sept. 28 the Germans again reached the Rovuma they were able to overcome the weak posts stationed there. Avoiding places held in strength by the British, and keeping ahead of the columns now in hot pursuit, von Lettow passed round the N. corner of Lake Nyasa, losing many carriers by desertion Von Lettow’s Surrender. but recruiting a few askaris. He stayed at Ubena some days and then (Oct. 17) set out for Rhodesia. (At Ubena Gen. Wahle and two other Europeans, sick or wounded, were left behind.) On Nov. 1 von Lettow attacked Fife, just within the Northern Rhodesian border, hoping to capture its stores, but it was too strongly held, so the Germans turned S.W., making for Kasama, von Lettow now having some idea of penetrating into Belgian Congo. Kasama was taken on Nov. 9, but British columns were in its immediate neighbourhood and there were several patrol encounters. Necessity urged von Lettow onward. On Nov. 13 he was reconnoitring a crossing of the Chambezi (the eastern head stream of the Congo) when an English motor-cyclist arrived with a message from Gen. Van Deventer announcing the conclusion of the Armistice. Von Lettow notified his acceptance of the Armistice on Nov. 14; the formal surrender was made to Gen. Edwards at Abercorn on Nov. 23. The force which surrendered numbered 30 officers and 125 other Europeans, 1,165 askaris, and 2,891 other natives, among them 819 women, with one small field gun, 24 machine-guns and 14 Lewis guns. Those who surrendered included Dr. Schnee and Maj. Kraut.

The troops employed by the Allies in East Africa included 52,339 sent from India (among them 5,403 British) and 43,477 South African whites. Other white troops employed (East African and Nyasaland settlers, Rhodesian volunteers and the 25th Fusiliers) numbered about Troops employed by the Allies. 3,000, the African troops (King’s African Rifles, Nigerians, Gold Coast Regiment, Gambia Company, Cape Corps—1,600 strong—and West Indians) about 15,000; an approximate total of 114,000, not reckoning Belgian native troops about 12,000 in all the Portuguese and the naval force engaged. The greatest number in the field at any one time, May to Sept. 1916, was about 55,000; the lowest number, in 1918, was some 10,000, all African, save the administrative services. The total British and Indian casualties was officially returned at 17,823; of these 2,762 were among the South African Forces. These figures are exclusive of casualties among carriers and of deaths and invaliding through sickness, which among the South Africans alone exceeded 12,000.

The cost of the campaign to Great Britain, inclusive of Indian and South African expenditure and that of the local protectorates to March 1919, was officially estimated at £72,000,000.

Authorities.—British.—The despatches of Generals Smuts, Hoskins, Van Deventer, Northey, of the High Commissioner for South Africa (Lord Buxton), the Governor of Nyasaland (Sir George Smith) and of Adml. Charlton, published in the London Gazette, cover the operations, except the period up to March 1916, on the British East Africa frontier and the early naval operations, concerning which no despatches were issued. “The Times” History of the War, chaps. 155, 183, 206 and 276, covers the whole campaign. Brig.-Gen. J. H. V. Crowe, Gen. Smuts’ Campaign in East Africa (1918), has an introduction by Gen. Smuts and an account of the blockade runners. For the German treatment of prisoners, etc., see the White Paper, Cd. 8689 (1917); E. F. Spanton, In German Gaols (1917), and J. H. Briggs, In the East Africa War Zone (1918) For particular units see A. Buchanan, Three Years of War in East Africa (1919), chiefly about the 25th Fusiliers; Sir Hugh Clifford, The Gold Coast Regt. in the East African Campaign (1920) ; W. D. Downes, With the Nigerians in East Africa (1919) ; G. M Orr, “The Indian Army in East Africa,” Jnl. U.S. Inst. India (1919).

​

German.—Gen. von Lettow-Vorbeck, Reminiscences of East Africa (English trans. 1920); Dr. Ludwig Deppe, Mit Lettow-Vorbeck durch Afrika (1919); Dr. H. Schnee, Deutsch Ost-Afrika im Weltkriege (1919).

Belgian.—P. Daye, Les Conquetes africaines des Belges (1918).  (F. R. C.) 

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