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Three views on economic power

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  • Alexandre Chirat
  • Ulysse Lojkine

Abstract

We investigate the concept of economic power in the three main paradigms of economic thinking in the 20th century: neoclassical, marxist and institutionalist. We propose a reconstruction, based on a new taxonomy, of the various forms of power conceptualized by each of them. In particular, we claim that the neoclassical paradigm contains a consistent although often implicit theory of power. We then show that many controversies between these paradigms were debates on power and that some shifts in mainstream economics in the 1970s and 1980s are a reaction to the criticisms leveled against the neoclassical conceptualization of power.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexandre Chirat & Ulysse Lojkine, 2024. "Three views on economic power," EconomiX Working Papers 2024-31, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2024-31
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Power – Markets – Consumer sovereignty – History of economics;

    JEL classification:

    • B20 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - General
    • B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
    • L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General

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