Social Equilibrium
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Cited by:
- Canning, David, 1992.
"Average behavior in learning models,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 442-472, August.
- Canning, D., 1990. "Average Behaviour In Learning Models," Papers 156, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
- D. Canning, 2010. "Average Behavior in Learning Models," Levine's Working Paper Archive 490, David K. Levine.
- Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
- Anthonisen, Niels, 1997. "On the Convergence of Beliefs within Populations in Games with Learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 169-184, September.
- Oechssler, Jorg, 1997.
"Decentralization and the coordination problem,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 119-135, January.
- Joerg Oechssler, 1994. "Decentralization and the Coordination Problem," Game Theory and Information 9403004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Itzhak Gilboa & Dov Samet, 1991. "Absorbent Stable Sets," Discussion Papers 935, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Joshua M. Epstein, 2000. "Learning to Be Thoughtless: Social Norms and Individual Computation," Working Papers 00-03-022, Santa Fe Institute.
- Lawrence E. Blume, 1995. "Evolutionary Equilibrium with Forward-Looking Players," Game Theory and Information 9509001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ellison, Glenn, 1997.
"Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 180-210, May.
- Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia," Levine's Working Paper Archive 413, David K. Levine.
- P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
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Keywords
game theory ; learning ; economic equilibrium;All these keywords.
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