Natalia V . Tomashpolskaia
AOS: History of philosophy, philosophy of language, epistemology, Wittgenstein’s philosophy, phenomenology
AOC: Austria fin-de-siècle, knowledge and belief, as-if conventions, pictorial representations and pictorial thinking, philosophy of time and memory, ethical and cultural pluralism, philosophy of mind
Dr, PhD in Philosophy (cum laude), 2024
Advanced Humanities Studies. Specialities in: History, Art, Philosophy and Ancient Sciences, University of Malaga, Spain.
Dissertation: “The Later Wittgenstein on Language and its Role in the Constitution of Reality: its Connection with the Previous Philosophical Tradition.”
MA in Philosophic Anthropology (Honors), 2014
National Research University – Higher School of Economics (NRU-HSE), Moscow, Russia.
Thesis: “Correlation between Being and Consciousness in E. Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology.”
BA in Philosophy (Bachelor of Philosophy), 2012
National Research University – Higher School of Economics (NRU-HSE), Moscow, Russia.
Thesis: “Constitution of Reality: ‘Language-games’ and ‘Lifeworld’.”
Supervisors: Tutor Chamizo Dominguez and Pedro Jose
Address: Spain, Málaga
AOC: Austria fin-de-siècle, knowledge and belief, as-if conventions, pictorial representations and pictorial thinking, philosophy of time and memory, ethical and cultural pluralism, philosophy of mind
Dr, PhD in Philosophy (cum laude), 2024
Advanced Humanities Studies. Specialities in: History, Art, Philosophy and Ancient Sciences, University of Malaga, Spain.
Dissertation: “The Later Wittgenstein on Language and its Role in the Constitution of Reality: its Connection with the Previous Philosophical Tradition.”
MA in Philosophic Anthropology (Honors), 2014
National Research University – Higher School of Economics (NRU-HSE), Moscow, Russia.
Thesis: “Correlation between Being and Consciousness in E. Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology.”
BA in Philosophy (Bachelor of Philosophy), 2012
National Research University – Higher School of Economics (NRU-HSE), Moscow, Russia.
Thesis: “Constitution of Reality: ‘Language-games’ and ‘Lifeworld’.”
Supervisors: Tutor Chamizo Dominguez and Pedro Jose
Address: Spain, Málaga
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Papers by Natalia V . Tomashpolskaia
Envisioning an Electrifying Future
Kristóf Nyíri (ed.)
Budapest 2024
Hungarian Academy of Sciences / / University of Pécs
pp. 301-308
According to Fritz Mauthner, one who is trying to articulate the inexpressible, ineffable behaves as a clown, who 'after he has climbed up to the top of an unsupported ladder, tries to pull up the ladder after himself' (Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache, vol. III, 632). We cannot go beyond the limits of our language, like a clown who cannot move away from the ladder on which he stands. Mauthner also uses a metaphor of a ladder in the other passage, 'If I wish to ascend in the critique of language, which is the most important business of thinking mankind, then I must destroy language behind me, before me, and in me step to step, then I must destroy every rung of the ladder once I step upon it' (B, I, 712). And the akin example of the ladder metaphor we meet in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. But here it has another meaning.
Analítica (3), oct. 2023-sept. 2024, ISSN – L 2805 – 1815
BERTRAND RUSSELL AND LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PERSONAL AND ACADEMIC RELATIONSHIP
BERTRAND RUSSELL Y LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, RELACIÓN PERSONAL Y ACADÉMICA, pp. 10-38
философский обзор проблемы соотношения бытия и сознания в трансцендентальной феноменологии Э. Гуссерля и способы решения данной проблемы, как в естественной установке, так и в феноменологической.
Abstract: This work is a brief historical-philosophical review of the problem
of consciousness and being correlation in phenomenology of E. Husserl and the methods of solution of this problem in natural attitude and phenomenological attitude.
Ключевые слова: феноменология, онтология, сознание, бытие,
эго, естественная установка, феноменологическая установка
Keywords: phenomenology, ontology, consciousness, being, ego, natural
standpoint, phenomenological standpoint
Husserl’s (1859-1938) doctrine of the construction of consciousness
and the epistemological doctrine of Yoga, which is presented in the
classical text “Yoga Sutras”of Maharishi Patanjali.
Ключевые слова: феноменология, интенциональность,
чистое сознание
Keywords: phenomenology, intentionality, pure consciousness
“world-picture” of Ludwig Wittgenstein and “lifeworld” of Edmund
Husserl. The aim of this work is to show that these two concepts have
much in common.
Ключевые слова: картина мира, языковая игры, форма
жизни, жизненный мир, феноменология
Keywords: world picture, language game, form of life, lifeworld,
phenomenology
Books by Natalia V . Tomashpolskaia
Envisioning an Electrifying Future
Kristóf Nyíri (ed.)
Budapest 2024
Hungarian Academy of Sciences / / University of Pécs
The present online volume contains the papers prepared for the 11th Budapest Visual Learning Conference – ENVISIONING AN ELECTRI- FYING FUTURE – held in a physical-online blended form on Nov. 13, 2024, organized by the University of Pécs (represented by Prof. Gábor Szécsi, Dean, Faculty of Cultural Sciences, Education and Re- gional Development), and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (rep- resented by Prof. Kristóf Nyíri, Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences). Nyíri and Szécsi were responsible for sending out the call for abstracts and inviting plenary speakers, Szécsi organized the physical surroundings. Nyíri’s task was to build up and continuosly update the conference website, as well as to edit the accepted submis- sions.
As we indicated in the call for submissions, the conference was planned as an interdisciplinary encounter of communication and me- dia theory, cultural sciences, sociology, psychology, philosophy, ped- agogy, history, political science, picture theory, and other disciplines. We insisted on achieving new scholarly results. Especially with AI now complementing, or intruding into, the world of the internet, what image of the future can we conceive of, what new patterns of life and in particular forms of education should we strive to create?
Envisioning an Electrifying Future
Kristóf Nyíri (ed.)
Budapest 2024
Hungarian Academy of Sciences / / University of Pécs
pp. 301-308
According to Fritz Mauthner, one who is trying to articulate the inexpressible, ineffable behaves as a clown, who 'after he has climbed up to the top of an unsupported ladder, tries to pull up the ladder after himself' (Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache, vol. III, 632). We cannot go beyond the limits of our language, like a clown who cannot move away from the ladder on which he stands. Mauthner also uses a metaphor of a ladder in the other passage, 'If I wish to ascend in the critique of language, which is the most important business of thinking mankind, then I must destroy language behind me, before me, and in me step to step, then I must destroy every rung of the ladder once I step upon it' (B, I, 712). And the akin example of the ladder metaphor we meet in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. But here it has another meaning.
Analítica (3), oct. 2023-sept. 2024, ISSN – L 2805 – 1815
BERTRAND RUSSELL AND LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PERSONAL AND ACADEMIC RELATIONSHIP
BERTRAND RUSSELL Y LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, RELACIÓN PERSONAL Y ACADÉMICA, pp. 10-38
философский обзор проблемы соотношения бытия и сознания в трансцендентальной феноменологии Э. Гуссерля и способы решения данной проблемы, как в естественной установке, так и в феноменологической.
Abstract: This work is a brief historical-philosophical review of the problem
of consciousness and being correlation in phenomenology of E. Husserl and the methods of solution of this problem in natural attitude and phenomenological attitude.
Ключевые слова: феноменология, онтология, сознание, бытие,
эго, естественная установка, феноменологическая установка
Keywords: phenomenology, ontology, consciousness, being, ego, natural
standpoint, phenomenological standpoint
Husserl’s (1859-1938) doctrine of the construction of consciousness
and the epistemological doctrine of Yoga, which is presented in the
classical text “Yoga Sutras”of Maharishi Patanjali.
Ключевые слова: феноменология, интенциональность,
чистое сознание
Keywords: phenomenology, intentionality, pure consciousness
“world-picture” of Ludwig Wittgenstein and “lifeworld” of Edmund
Husserl. The aim of this work is to show that these two concepts have
much in common.
Ключевые слова: картина мира, языковая игры, форма
жизни, жизненный мир, феноменология
Keywords: world picture, language game, form of life, lifeworld,
phenomenology
Envisioning an Electrifying Future
Kristóf Nyíri (ed.)
Budapest 2024
Hungarian Academy of Sciences / / University of Pécs
The present online volume contains the papers prepared for the 11th Budapest Visual Learning Conference – ENVISIONING AN ELECTRI- FYING FUTURE – held in a physical-online blended form on Nov. 13, 2024, organized by the University of Pécs (represented by Prof. Gábor Szécsi, Dean, Faculty of Cultural Sciences, Education and Re- gional Development), and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (rep- resented by Prof. Kristóf Nyíri, Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences). Nyíri and Szécsi were responsible for sending out the call for abstracts and inviting plenary speakers, Szécsi organized the physical surroundings. Nyíri’s task was to build up and continuosly update the conference website, as well as to edit the accepted submis- sions.
As we indicated in the call for submissions, the conference was planned as an interdisciplinary encounter of communication and me- dia theory, cultural sciences, sociology, psychology, philosophy, ped- agogy, history, political science, picture theory, and other disciplines. We insisted on achieving new scholarly results. Especially with AI now complementing, or intruding into, the world of the internet, what image of the future can we conceive of, what new patterns of life and in particular forms of education should we strive to create?
Wittgenstein and “Lifeworld” of E. Husserl]
In Gorbatov Victor (ed.), Filosofija, yazyk, kultura (volume III), Spb.: Aleteia, 2012. PP. 16-37.Abstract: The article compares two philosophical concepts: “picture of the world” of Ludwig Wittgenstein and “lifeworld” of Edmund Husserl. The aim of this work is to show similarities of these concepts.
Natalia Tomashpolskaia
“Good” and “Beautiful” ≠ “agreeable”
This paper will discuss Wittgenstein’s criticism of the disposition- al theory of values. Concerning aesthetics, Wittgenstein argued: ‘“Beautiful” ± “agreeable”‘ (MWL 2016, 346) Aesthetics is not a matter of taste. ‘The question of Aesthetics is not: Do you like it? But, if you do, why do you?’ (ibid., emphasis in the original). ‘If ever we come to: I like this; I don’t, there is an end of Aesthetics; & then comes psychology’ (ibid., 347). Tastes and conventions are not aes- thetics but a subject matter of psychology. Wittgenstein added that ‘rules of harmony’ ‘always presuppose that we shall understand that obeying these rules makes things more agreeable (ibid.). For Witt- genstein aesthetics is not and cannot be a part of psychology, he dis- tinguishes these two realms strictly. ‘I think one thing is clearer: one could sum up: Aesthetic reasons are given in the form: getting near- er to an ideal or farther from it. Whereas Psychology gives causes why people have an ideal’ (LC 2016, 355; May 22, 1933). ‘(Ethics and aesthetics are one.)’ (TLP 6.421) However, ethics is ‘the most essen- tial part of what is generally called Aesthetics’ (LE in PO 1993, 38). In LE, Wittgenstein emphasised that a ‘certain characteristic misuse of our language runs through all ethical and religious expressions’ (PO 1993, 42; italics in the original). When we use a word in the ethical, aesthetical, or religious sense, its meaning is not the same but similar to the meaning of this word used in a trivial sense. For instance, ‘all religious terms seem in this sense to be used as simi- les or allegorically’ (ibid.). In 1945 Wittgenstein explained that ‘the Sitten und Gebrauche (morals and customs) of various tribes’ is not and would not be ethical. Wittgenstein came to the statement that describing the morals, customs, habits, and cultural behaviour of nations would not be the same as studying rules and laws. Accord- ingly, ‘A rule is neither a command nor order — because there is
66
BAF+: Dispositions and Values
no one that gives the order — nor is it an empirical statement of how the majority of people behave’ (Citron 2015, 27). Moreover, for Wittgenstein, a rule is neither a command nor a sociological de- scription. The different ways in which rules are used are determined by their different grammar. ‘There are special features in regard to ethics, because in ethics there isn’t generally proof ’ (ibid., 28). Witt- genstein was speaking about the plurality of ethical systems, under- standing here by ethics, common morals and customs of a society. ‘If anyone says that something is good, he is making a judgement of value. If I decide that a certain ethical judgement is true — or that a certain system of ethics is the right one — then I am also mak- ing a judgement of value. In other words, I should be adopting that system of ethics, or making the same ethical judgement’ (ibid., 29). These ethical systems are analogous to language-games, where a person adapts a system with its statements and special rules. But no system is better than another, in this case, we cannot say that only one system must be the right one. If we want to distinguish between a right one or a wrong one, it means that we adopt ‘certain ethical criteria’ (ibid.). ‘Idea of logical criticism, or ruling out certain ethi- cal systems on the ground that they are incoherent. This would need further examination’ (ibid.). Further, Wittgenstein continued that there is a plurality of world-views, but there is not any world-view better than another. All of them are significant equally. ‘One could say ‘every view has its charm’, but that would be false. The correct thing to say is that every view is significant for the one who sees it as significant (but that does not mean, sees it other than it is). Indeed, in this sense, every view is equally significant’ (PO 1993, 135). If a person says that one ethical system is more ‘right’ than another from his or her point of view, it means only a subjective attitude, ‘that each judges as he does.’ Wittgenstein criticised both the value state- ments and the idea of reason regarding ethics. ‘If you simply take the expression of the judgement — say ‘ah’, together with a facial expression, — this might be the same for an excellent salad, a great painting or a noble action’ (Citron 2015, 30). In 1931, in his diaries, Wittgenstein wrote that an ‘ethical proposition is a personal act’, we are taught to consider something as good because other people said
67
Balkan Analytic Forum
that it is good. If it makes an impression on a person and causes ad- miration, then this ethical proposition becomes worthy for this per- son, otherwise vice versa (PPO 2003, 85). During a discussion with Schlick of the concept of ‘value’, Wittgenstein emphasised: ‘I would reply that whatever I was told, I would reject, and that not because the explanation was false but because it was an explanation’ (WWC 1979, 116; emphasis in the original); and further he continued: ‘What is ethical cannot be taught’ (WWC 1979, 117).
About ESPR
The European Society for Philosophy of Religion provides a forum for researchers employing different approaches to the philosophy of religion. For further info, please visit the website:
http://www.philosophy-of-religion.org
According to Wittgenstein, language is a vehicle of thought, however, some thoughts are inexpressible in the word-language. Through Wittgenstein’s texts, it comes out that human beings in ordinary life use pictorial language actively and conceptually. Wittgenstein considered language as ‘languages’ which are themselves systems.
‘122 “Language” is only languages, plus things I invent by analogy with existing languages. Languages are systems.’ (PG §122, 170) Hence, language is a ‘concept defined by certain systems we call “languages” and such systems as are constructed by analogy with them’ (PG, §139, 191).
There is a multifariousness of ‘languages’ (PG, §129, 179):
• word-language,
• picture-language,
• gesture-language,
• sound-language.
In PG (93) Wittgenstein explained: ‘Words are not essential to what we call “language”, and neither are samples. Word-language is only one of many possible kinds of language, and there are transitions between one kind and another.’
In the 1934-1935 Cambridge lectures (AWL 2001, 112, Lecture XIII) Wittgenstein wrote, ‘We have three systems:
(1) the system of verbal expressions,
(2) the system of pictures,
(3) the system of actions.’
All these systems have the same multiplicity (ibid.). Between these systems exist projective relations ‘leading from the words to the pictures and from the pictures to the actions’ (ibid.). However, ‘Thinking is comparable in every way to drawing pictures’ (BT 2005, 67e), but ‘what the picture tells me is itself.’ It means, ‘That is, it’s telling me something consists in its own structure, in its own forms and colours’ (PG, §121, 169; italics in the original). Therefore, picture ‘narrates something to me, it is a story’ — ‘a story tells me itself’ (PG, §121, 169). When a picture narrates it means that it tells one its own story (like a description of a genre picture), so we do not compare it with the reality outside the picture. It narrates its story using words; hence, we compare the story not with the outside reality but with ‘a combination of linguistic forms’ (ibid., 170). For a long time, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was regarded to be an example of imageless thinking, however, after the publication of all his Nachlass which contains more than 1300 pages of his own drawings and after a more detailed analysis of his texts, the situation becomes reversed. In BT (2005, 153e) Wittgenstein wrote that language has a pictorial nature and it is connected with grammar.
However, verbal language (or word-language) is the primary one. ‘I want to say over and again that primarily it is the apparatus of our language, our word-language, that we call language; and only then do we call other things language, depending on their analogy or comparability to word-language’ (BT 2005, 155e).
Wittgenstein emphasised that ‘“Talking” (whether out loud or silently) and “thinking” are not concepts of a similar kind, even though they are in closest connection’ (PI II 2009, 228e).
Wittgenstein noted an important connection between the use of verbal language, the process of thinking and pictorial images. In BT (2005, 18e) he gave an example, when we think that now it is probably three o’clock, we ‘have an image as in a toolbox of language, from which we know that we can take out the tools any time we need them.’ So, we have images of things, processes, etc., these images are linked with our language. If I think about a cat, an image of a cat may immediately appear in my mind. Such images are a part of a ‘toolbox’ of our language. However, images do not necessary accompany thinking with words. In BT (2005, 19e) Wittgenstein continued, ‘“I want to paint this spot red”, having a mental image of the colour, and “knowing” how this mental image is to be translated into reality.’
Wittgenstein distinguished not only between what could be said and shown, but also what can be written down and what not. He writes, ‘In reality one can only write down – that is, without doing something stupid & inappropriate – what arises to us in the form of writing.’ He did not clarify what this form of writing is. We may only suggest that it is a coherent, clear and concise thought. ‘Everything else seems comical & as it were like dirt.’ That is, something that needs to be wiped off.’ Then Wittgenstein added, ‘Vischer said ‘speaking is not writing’ and thinking is even less SO!’ (PPO 2003, 35). Therefore, in addition to the distinction between sayable and showable, here appear thinkable, speakable and writable.
much impressed by reading but, on the other hand, he was disappointed that Kant could not give answers to his questions about ethics. Schlick continued asking new questions about self- understanding. For example, ‘What was Robinson Crusoe’s ethics like before and after Friday came to him?’ Or before asking the main ethical question ‘How should (soll) man (der Mensch) act?’, one should answer, ‘How can (kann) man act?’ One other line that is traced throughout Schlick’s philosophy is the unity of human beings with nature. For Schlick human beings should turn to nature. Human beings are unhappy because they distanced themselves from nature. Nature is organized harmonically, to live happily in a harmony humans should return to nature as both souls and bodies. Human beings are a part of nature and their nature is good. g about human beings. According to Schlick (2006, 27) human beings are the mightier ‘thing’ in the world. He retold Sophocles’ (Antigone, V. 332/333) words about the complete unleashing (Entfesselung) of the human spirit (Geist) and sovereignty (Selbstherrlichkeit) of freedom (Freiheit). Schlick finished his habilitation thesis ‘Das Wesen der Wahrheit nach der modernen Logik’ (The Nature of Truth According to Modern Logic) at the University of Rostock, it was published in 1910. Between 1918 and 1925 Schlick worked on his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (General Theory of Knowledge), this ‘General Theory’ is perhaps the greatest work in its reasoning against Kantian possibility of synthetic a priori propositions and knowledge. This critique argues that the only truths that are self-evident to reason are propositions that are true as a matter of definition, such as the propositions of formal logic and/or mathematics. The truth of all other propositions must be evaluated regarding empirical evidence. If a proposition cannot be not a matter of definition and is not capable of being confirmed or falsified by evidence, this proposition is ‘metaphysical’, which means that it is ‘meaningless’ or ‘nonsense’. This is the basic principle upon which all members of the Vienna Circle agreed with each other. In 1932–33 Schlick wrote an article to a journal Erkenntnis, entitled ‘Positivism and Realism.’ He offered a rigorous definition of positivism as a view ‘which denies the possibility of metaphysics’ (Schlick 1979 [1932–1933], 260). He defined metaphysics as the doctrine of ‘true being,’ ‘thing in itself’ or ‘transcendental being,’ which obviously ‘presupposes that a non-true, lesser or apparent being stands opposed to it (ibid.). Also, during this time, the Vienna Circle published ‘The Scientific View of the World, The Vienna Circle as a homage to Schlick.’ Its strong anti- metaphysical stance crystallized the viewpoint of the group, this text was signed by Carnap, Hahn, and Neurath and dedicated to Schlick. This event coincided with the ‘First Conference for the Epistemology of the Exact Sciences’ in September 1929 which was organized jointly with the Berlin Society as an adjunct to the Fifth Congress of German Physicists and Mathematicians in Prague (see Uebel 2008). It is interesting to mention that one of Schlick’s good friends was Albert Einstein, a prominent physicist. In the 1930s Einstein in his non-scientific writings began to refer much more to religious and metaphysical questions than in his previous works.
Repeating nearly each day the words “God be with me”, the philosopher followed the path of Leo Tolstoy and became just as he was, “another lieutenant whom war has turned into an apostle.”
Wittgenstein had become famous as ‘the man with the Gospels’ (der mit dem Evangelium) among the soldiers during WWI (Schardt, Large 2001) and carried that book with him ‘constantly, as a talisman’ (Westergaard 2009). On 11 October 1914 he left a diary note, “I carry The Gospel in Brief by Tolstoy around with me, always, as if it were a talisman.”
2024, 18-19 January, 7th Memory, Forgetting and Creating, International Interdisciplinary Conference, InMind Support, Gdańsk, Poland, “Late Wittgenstein’s Reflections on Memory”.
Music and time perception in Husserlian phenomenology
Husserl begins his time analysis with the description of temporary objects and only then proceeds to the acts.
• The immanent object in itself with its inherent duration;
• How the differences in the immanent tone and its duration content are recognized. In other
words, the nature of reflection, although in this section, Husserl does not focus on the concept
of reflection, using the term ‘reflective immersion’;
• The phenomenon of temporally constitutive consciousness itself;
• Absolute time flow in which temporary objects are constituted with their temporal determinations
Husserl describes time perception with an example of a sound — an audio model remains central in both early and later manuscripts. When we perceive a certain melody, we hear disparate moments and fragments of the melody, the current sequence of transitions of sounds (tones) into each other. This transition into each other is the transition of the now-tone to retention, the transformation of the present into the past as a gradual fading and pushing away, retentive modification, and modification of now-points of the perceived to the past of the perceived. When the sound stops, the echo (Nachklang) remains, this echo is superimposed on the next sound, and the whole sequence of sounds consists of such an interweaving of retentions – a constant and continuous superposition of ‘echoes’ of time on each other. Denoting retention as ‘primary memory’ (primäre Erinnerung), Husserl emphasizes that the term ‘memory’ does not imply figurative memory. Due to retention, time flows as an integral stream; even speaking of a moment, we cannot pull it out of the time series without a retentive connection. Retentive modification as a change in ‘now’ point is rather a pulsating process of turning the present into the past, but the past is held in consciousness, in this sense, the past is a way of the present. Retention is not objective, not substantial. Retention is precisely the mode of manifestation of the past, the way the past exists in the present, ‘specific intentionality’. For instance, the same tone exists both in the present, as now, and in the past, as the ‘expired’ now, ‘the former’ now. Retention as a way of manifestation is also a way of awareness, a givenness of a conscious object to consciousness. In consciousness, both now and its retentive modifications exist together – the consciousness of the present is the same as the consciousness of the past, that is, the past is also, as it was, in the present. The present itself, therefore, is stretched, it turns out to be stretched (ausgedehnt), being aware of being ‘together’ with the past. The unity of consciousness, which intentionally covers the present and the past, is phenomenological data. Thus, the relationship between the now-point and the retention, the duality of duration, is a guarantee of the continuity of the flow of a temporary object.
2024, 12-14 January, Music Cognition and Understanding, University of Bucharest, Romania. “Music and Time Perception in Husserlian Phenomenology”. https://philevents.org/event/show/117825
In CV §16 Wittgenstein listed the thinkers who influenced his ideas, among them and on the first and the second place (respectively) were mentioned Boltzmann and Hertz. In this paper author argues that the ideas of H. Hertz and L. Boltzmann on the representation of reality had an extraordinary influence on the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas, not only early but also later (formation of image as a conception of thing, picture, symbol, representation; atomism, Bildtheorie, critique of naïve beliefs, anthropomorphic representation of God), It is being proposed that Boltzmann’s atomism (physical and ontological) and Boltzmann-Hertz’s concept of Bildtheorie significantly directly influenced Wittgenstein’s ideas. Atomism was fully represented in Tractatus, while the Bildtheorie is traced throughout all Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Moreover, Wittgenstein, studying Hertz’s and Boltzmann’s not only physical, but also philosophical ideas, was influenced by the understanding of the entire difference between science and philosophy and the insufficiency of science to resolve the very problems of humanity and answer the existential questions. In his lecture on aesthetic in 1939, he claimed: ‘Cf: “Physics doesn’t explain anything. It just describes cases of concomitance”’ (1967, §31). In §32 Wittgenstein wrote that we ‘are taking for granted the atomic picture of the world,’ but ‘what does this come to? We are so used to this picture that it’s as though we had all seen atoms. Every educated eight-year-old child knows that things are made of atoms. We would think it lack of education if a person didn’t think of a rod as being made of atoms.’ The point is that we take scientific postulates for granted, we believe in them. ‘My life consists in my being content to accept many things,’ added Wittgenstein in OC §342. His words in §342 echo Hertz’s explanations of the scientific statements, ‘it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted.’ According to Hertz it was that we chose and vary the propositions (Sätze) that we take as fundamental (welche wir zu Grunde legen) (1984: 4). Also, there are traced natur-philosophical parallels: it should be a ‘certain conformity between nature and our thought’ (zwischen der Natur und unserem Geiste) (ibid.; Hertz 1894: 1); Darin, und nur darin besteht auch die (prästabilierte) Harmonie zwischen Welt und Gedanken (Wittgenstein, TBT 2005: 281, pas. 381).
uAnalytiCon-2023: Integration Challenge
May 19-20, 2023
(not given)
Husserl Arbeitstage
KU Leuven
Language has a considerable significance for phenomenology, we should not exclude consideration of language in genetic phenomenology in order to consider the problem of intersubjectivity in its entirety. Through the question of language, phenomenology includes the problem of intersubjectivity and historicity of philosophical work, its actual implementation within the philosophical community. Language shapes the human intersubjective and historico-cultural world. Lifeworld becomes a product of intersubjective constitution and communication.
Through language we communicate with other people, we meet the Others, interact with other’s monads and their lifeworlds. We all constitute the common world, which, one the one hand, becomes the objective world for us, while, on the other hand, we are living in this world, we are not just observers, but actors, we all, each of human beings creates this common lifeworld interacting with the objects and with the others. This is the world of intersubjective relationships, conventions and agreements between human beings.
Wittgenstein criticised Freud’s method of interpretations. ‘This connects up with something that Freud does. Freud does something which seems to me immensely wrong. He gives what he calls an interpretation of dreams.’ (Wittgenstein, On Aesthetic, 1967 [1939], §20, p.23) Freud’s method is in establishing a relation between an event and its explanation by using a chain of associations, ‘which comes naturally under certain circumstances,’ (§20, p. 23) which leads to that and so on. Does this chain of associations truly prove the hypothetic explanation, e.g., that a dream was bawdy? Wittgenstein answers – ‘obviously not’ (§20, p.24). Though, Freud’s method has become popular, Wittgenstein suggested that it could be because ‘The connections he makes interest people immensely. They have a charm. It is charming to destroy prejudice’ (ibid.). Wittgenstein came up to an idea, that some explanations could be more attractive for people (and concrete explanations are more attractive for different categories people). It is also a deep psychological and sociological idea. As it was written above, first, and explanation should be acceptable, second, one explanation may be more attractive than other. Here could be a paradox, e.g., Wittgenstein notices, that ‘It may be the fact that the explanation is extremely repellent that drives you to adopt it.’ (§23, p. 24)
This article investigates the role of language in the constitution of reality in E. Husserl’s phenomenology and L. Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. I have discovered some resemblances and differences in their ideas and concepts on language and its role in the constitution of reality, and how their ideas complement each other in a few as- pects. We can find common features in such concepts as ‘languages-games’, ‘forms of life’, ‘picture of the world’, and the ‘community of monads’, ‘life–world’. Both philosophers are in their late periods interested in the same problems (intersubjective world, values, meanings, beliefs, culture) but from different points of view.
Husserl suggested we “Return to the things themselves!” while Wittgenstein called us “Back to solid ground!”. These philosophies represent two ways to our living world: from consciousness and from language. Wittgenstein told us that to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life. It is what we do and who we are and what gives meaning to our life. The problem of intersubjectivity and understanding of others is central for both Wittgenstein and Husserl. Wittgenstein said: I cannot understand a lion’s language because I do not know what his world is like. I do fail in understanding because I cannot get in its mind. Husserl, in Logical Investigations, considers language as something purely external in relation to meaning. This understanding of language can be called instrumental. In his analysis, Husserl seeks to study the language with a predetermined goal: to completely subordinate it to the idea of ‘pure science’ and to distinguish the language of theory from language natural. It should become a suit- able expression tool without introducing any distortion. The role of language in phenomenological work, Husserl believes, should be minimal and generally be reduced to ‘pure expression’.
I have demonstrated in my work that:
(1) the method of transcendental phenomenology demonstrates an original way of solving the problem of the dualism of consciousness and being;
(2) transcendental phenomenology provides an undeniable epistemological justification for the reality of the objective world;
(3) transcendental phenomenology shows an inextricable correlation between being and consciousness;
(4) the project of Husserlian phenomenology represents the ‘third’ way to solve the problem of dualism, which allows avoidance of the extremes of idealism and materialism.