Hossein Dabbagh
Hossein Dabbagh is an Assistant Professor in Applied Ethics at Northeastern University London. He is also a Philosophy Tutor at Oxford’s Department of Continuing Education.
Before joining NCH at Northeastern University London, he worked at Oxford Blavatnik School of Government, University of Lucerne and Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies. He was also an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Research Assistant at the Institute of Ismaili Studies, Aga Khan Centre, and Honorary Research Fellow at the UCL Institute of Education.
Hossein studied for his PhD in moral philosophy at the University of Reading and Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. For his PhD, he focused on moral epistemology and empirical moral psychology. In his thesis “Mind, Epistemology and Neuroethics: A Defence of Epistemological Intuitionism”, he defended an intuitionist epistemology from criticism drawn from empirical moral psychology under the supervision of Philip Stratton-Lake, Brad Hooker and Regina Rini.
His areas of specialisation are moral philosophy, social-political philosophy, philosophy of language, practical ethics (neuroethics, biomedical ethics, AI ethics), public policy and Islamic political theology.
As a holder of Exceptional Talent Endorsement from The British Academy, Hossein engages with a wider range of value systems and is interested in “decolonising” philosophy. He examines ideas beyond the Western canon, including Persian and Islamic philosophy.
Supervisors: Prof. Brad Hooker, Prof. Philip Stratton-Lake, and Dr Regina Rini
Before joining NCH at Northeastern University London, he worked at Oxford Blavatnik School of Government, University of Lucerne and Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies. He was also an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Research Assistant at the Institute of Ismaili Studies, Aga Khan Centre, and Honorary Research Fellow at the UCL Institute of Education.
Hossein studied for his PhD in moral philosophy at the University of Reading and Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. For his PhD, he focused on moral epistemology and empirical moral psychology. In his thesis “Mind, Epistemology and Neuroethics: A Defence of Epistemological Intuitionism”, he defended an intuitionist epistemology from criticism drawn from empirical moral psychology under the supervision of Philip Stratton-Lake, Brad Hooker and Regina Rini.
His areas of specialisation are moral philosophy, social-political philosophy, philosophy of language, practical ethics (neuroethics, biomedical ethics, AI ethics), public policy and Islamic political theology.
As a holder of Exceptional Talent Endorsement from The British Academy, Hossein engages with a wider range of value systems and is interested in “decolonising” philosophy. He examines ideas beyond the Western canon, including Persian and Islamic philosophy.
Supervisors: Prof. Brad Hooker, Prof. Philip Stratton-Lake, and Dr Regina Rini
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Papers by Hossein Dabbagh
https://aeon.co/essays/secularism-in-iran-is-not-just-a-form-of-western-imperialism
از میان برداشتن ساختارهای ناعادلانه ای که ظلم را در جامعه تشدید و تقویت می کند اهمیت اخلاقی ویژه ای دارد. وجود ساختارهای ناعادلانه در دراز مدت می تواند به دوام یک نظام سیاسی فاسد دامن بزند. علاوه بر این، ناعدالتی ساختاری اعتماد شهروندان به یکدیگر را خدشه دار و جامعه را از هم گسیخته می کند. ساختارهای ناعادلانه با رفتار و اعمال یکایک شهروندان تشدید و بازتولید می شود؛ از این رو، همه شهروندان برای از میان برداشتن ناعدالتی¬ها مسئول هستند و وظیفه همگانی آنان حساس بودن به قوانین و سیاست هایی است که چنین ناعدالتی هایی را موجب می شود. در یک جامعه دینی با ساختاری ناعادلانه، شهروندان دیندار مسئولیت سنگین تری دارند چون علی الاغلب به نحو تصادفی نفع بیشتری از ساختارهای ناعادلانه برده اند. اما دست یافتن به ساختارهای عادلانه بدون فرض و وجود آزادی پایدار نمی ماند. عمده بی عدالتی ها که ریشه در سرکوب و سلطه دارد با فقدان آزادی شروع می شود.
Our argument from blameworthiness can be formulated as follows:
(1) If a moral agent performs an action X for which he can justly be blamed, then he will be responsible and he ought not to perform X (the concept of blameworthiness entails responsibility).
(2) If a moral agent is responsible and he ought not to perform X, then there is a reason for him not to perform X (responsibility entails having reason).
(3) There are a set of actions, S, that moral agents can be justly blamed for performing.
(4) So moral agents are responsible for performing an action in S (from 1 and 3).
(5) So there are reasons for moral agents not to perform an action in S (from 2 and 4).
By falsifying the negation of premise (3), we show that (3) is true. To falsify that it is not the case that there are actions for which moral agents can be justly blamed, we presented an example of an extremely immoral, imprudent, and pain-seeking agent who forms abnormal desires and acts against moral, prudent, and hedonic norms as much as possible. Since there are not any desires for such norms in his psychology, and his actions are based on these desires, he is not regarded as rational by most people and social institutions such as psychiatric clinics and courts. In addition, it would be irrational to hold that he is rational in his having immoral, imprudent, and pain-seeking desires and acting accordingly because it is a rational, prevalent, conventional practice to believe so and any theory which denies its rationality should provide convincing reasons.
https://aeon.co/essays/secularism-in-iran-is-not-just-a-form-of-western-imperialism
از میان برداشتن ساختارهای ناعادلانه ای که ظلم را در جامعه تشدید و تقویت می کند اهمیت اخلاقی ویژه ای دارد. وجود ساختارهای ناعادلانه در دراز مدت می تواند به دوام یک نظام سیاسی فاسد دامن بزند. علاوه بر این، ناعدالتی ساختاری اعتماد شهروندان به یکدیگر را خدشه دار و جامعه را از هم گسیخته می کند. ساختارهای ناعادلانه با رفتار و اعمال یکایک شهروندان تشدید و بازتولید می شود؛ از این رو، همه شهروندان برای از میان برداشتن ناعدالتی¬ها مسئول هستند و وظیفه همگانی آنان حساس بودن به قوانین و سیاست هایی است که چنین ناعدالتی هایی را موجب می شود. در یک جامعه دینی با ساختاری ناعادلانه، شهروندان دیندار مسئولیت سنگین تری دارند چون علی الاغلب به نحو تصادفی نفع بیشتری از ساختارهای ناعادلانه برده اند. اما دست یافتن به ساختارهای عادلانه بدون فرض و وجود آزادی پایدار نمی ماند. عمده بی عدالتی ها که ریشه در سرکوب و سلطه دارد با فقدان آزادی شروع می شود.
Our argument from blameworthiness can be formulated as follows:
(1) If a moral agent performs an action X for which he can justly be blamed, then he will be responsible and he ought not to perform X (the concept of blameworthiness entails responsibility).
(2) If a moral agent is responsible and he ought not to perform X, then there is a reason for him not to perform X (responsibility entails having reason).
(3) There are a set of actions, S, that moral agents can be justly blamed for performing.
(4) So moral agents are responsible for performing an action in S (from 1 and 3).
(5) So there are reasons for moral agents not to perform an action in S (from 2 and 4).
By falsifying the negation of premise (3), we show that (3) is true. To falsify that it is not the case that there are actions for which moral agents can be justly blamed, we presented an example of an extremely immoral, imprudent, and pain-seeking agent who forms abnormal desires and acts against moral, prudent, and hedonic norms as much as possible. Since there are not any desires for such norms in his psychology, and his actions are based on these desires, he is not regarded as rational by most people and social institutions such as psychiatric clinics and courts. In addition, it would be irrational to hold that he is rational in his having immoral, imprudent, and pain-seeking desires and acting accordingly because it is a rational, prevalent, conventional practice to believe so and any theory which denies its rationality should provide convincing reasons.
اینکه تئوری های علمی چگونه به تور می افتند و توجیه و تبیین آنها به چه نحو است، از مسائل جدی فلسفه علم محسوب می شود. در این میان برخی از فیلسوفان علم همچون کارل پوپر بر مقام داوری انگشت تاکید می نهند و از شان توجیه تئوری ها دفاع می کنند و برخی دیگر مقام گردآوری را پیش می کشند و از چگونگی پیدایی تئوری ها سخن می گویند؛ اولی بحثی معرفت شناختی را در میان می نهد و دومی نگاهی جامعه شناختی را در دل دارد.
کتاب پیش رو، آزمایشگاه ذهن، نوشته جیمز براون، فیلسوف علم کانادایی معاصر، را می توان در دسته دوم قرار داد. وی اکنون استاد فلسفه علم در دانشگاه تورنتو است. از دیگر آثار او می توان به فلسفه ریاضی، امر عقلانی و امر اجتماعی و چه کسی در علم قانون گذاری می کند؟
مترجمان این اثر را عمدتاً دانشجویان فلسفه دانشگاه بهشتی تشکیل می دهند. سبب آنجاست که همگی آنها از دانشجویان مرحوم علوی نیا بودند و به توصیه او چنین کرده اند. فصل نخست کتاب را زرین مناجاتی، دانشجوی دکتری اخلاق زیست محیطی به دست گرفت. فصل دوم، سوم و چهارم را به ترتیب محمد ایزدی، حنیف امین بیدختی و حسین دباغ دانش آموختگان فلسفه غرب ترجمه کردند. عاقبت، فصل پنجم را ایمان آقابابایی، دانش آموخته فلسفه علم و فصل ششم را ابراهیم باسط دانش اموخته فیزیک و فلسفه انجام دادند.