Articles by James Horncastle
Defense & Security Analysis, 2022
Whilst scholars have examined the long-term political, social, and cultural dynamics with regards... more Whilst scholars have examined the long-term political, social, and cultural dynamics with regards to Yugoslavia’s collapse, the military has largely escaped similar scrutiny. This paper explores the League of Communists of Yugoslavia’s attempt to solve the nationalist problems of Yugoslavia through the ideology of self-management, and how the failure to do so affected the strategy of Total National Defence. The republics were able to construct their own armed forces due to Total National Defence’s devolution of powers and self-management making changes to the policy extremely difficult for the federal government and Yugoslav People’s Army.
Special Operations Journal, 2021
The study of special operations forces is one where the Anglo-American experience dominates the l... more The study of special operations forces is one where the Anglo-American experience dominates the literature. This focus on Anglo-American operations, and specifically those operations deemed successful in a conventional sense, gives a distorted view of special operations forces structures, mission profiles, and capabilities. Furthermore, the current political context is eroding the conventional operational focus of special operations. This development means special operations forces will be deployed in roles that may be inconsistent with their doctrine and training, in the process contributing particular political dynamics that reverberate back and define their role.
Ethical Water Stewardship, 2020
The 1999 Bombing of Kosovo by NATO represented a considerable shift in the manner that states wag... more The 1999 Bombing of Kosovo by NATO represented a considerable shift in the manner that states waged conventional wars. In the literature, academics represent the means employed by the parties involved as innovative developments from a warfare standpoint. The methods all militaries and paramilitaries used, however, relied extensively on principles surrounding the securitization of water. The Serbs, in their efforts to expel the Kosovar Albanians, deployed it as a tool to ethnically cleanse the province. NATO, while initially hesitant to target the electrical grid of Yugoslavia for fear that the media and others would portray the strain it would place on the civilian population in a negative light, eventually did so as the ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo accelerated. While not typically discussed in the literature, the securitization of water by all parties formed a key consideration for their policies throughout the campaign, and an important ethical question for both academics studying the issue, and practitioners as they pursued war-related activities. Finally, the weaponization of water in Kosovo helped provide impetus for the development of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which while not explicitly emphasizing water has significant implications for the ethics of water security.
War and the City , 2019
Investigates the role of urbicide in shaping the international responses to the collapse of Yugos... more Investigates the role of urbicide in shaping the international responses to the collapse of Yugoslavia, specifically that resulting from the Siege of Vukovar.
Air Force Advising and Assistance: Developing Airpower in Client States, 2018
Examines how Soviet and American military advisors managed to transform the Yugoslav Air Force in... more Examines how Soviet and American military advisors managed to transform the Yugoslav Air Force into a modern combat arm and, in so doing, obtain political benefits for their respective countries.
This paper uses the case studies of the Greek and Yugoslav resistance movements in the Second Wor... more This paper uses the case studies of the Greek and Yugoslav resistance movements in the Second World War to demonstrate that while both countries possessed the physical geographic requirement for a successful irregular warfare campaign, a broader definition of geography, encompassing political and human geography, is needed to determine why the latter movement succeeded in seizing power and the former failed. Human geography, the study of “society in relation to space and place” and political geography, the study of “spatial analys[es] of political phenomenon.” Both Yugoslavia and Greece possessed mountainous terrain that provided guerrilla organizations with the chance to coalesce. Despite this similarity of the two groups, their development was significantly different. In Yugoslavia, the left-wing resistance, under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, was able to seize power and, eventually, install a communist-centric system. In Greece, however, the returning Greek government and British forces ultimately defeated the left-wing resistance in late 1944, early 1945. Given that both forces possessed the geographical constant that many theorists and practitioners have argued was a requirement for success, the field requires a new explanation to explain why one failed and the other succeeded. In examining geography in its totality, in other words by combining the normally distinct fields of physical, political, and human geography, a more complete picture behind the success and failure of the Yugoslav and Greek resistance movements can be obtained that, while still concise, adequately captures the reason for the success and failure of both movements.
This article examines the role of the Macedonian Question in the 1944 December Uprising (Dekemvri... more This article examines the role of the Macedonian Question in the 1944 December Uprising (Dekemvriana) in Greece. While the Dekemvriana is commonly portrayed in right–left terminology in the historiography, this article argues that part of the reason for the left’s failure was their inability to manage the Macedonian ethnic component of the struggle, either within their armed forces or in their relationship with Yugoslavia. As such, this article integrates the early phases of the Greek Civil War into the broader literature on minorities in civil conflict, while simultaneously exposing some of the myths about Macedonian involvement that result from its contemporary political ramifications.
The study of special forces is dominated by accounts of British and American units. This article,... more The study of special forces is dominated by accounts of British and American units. This article, using the case study of the Yugoslav Special Forces in the 1990s and early 2000s, demonstrates how units that developed outside the Anglosphere possess not only a different military function but also distinct cultures and structures. Therefore, when analyzing units that develop outside the Anglosphere, we need to consider new analytical tools and approaches.
The Means to Kill Essays on the Interdependence of War and Technology from Ancient Rome to the Age of Drone
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Aug 14, 2013
On 25 June 1991 Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. Most outside observers assumed th... more On 25 June 1991 Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. Most outside observers assumed that the federal army, the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), would quickly reassert federal authority over Slovenia. Instead, Slovenia not only defeated the YPA, but would gain the initiative against the mechanically superior force. This article will argue that one of the principle reasons for Slovenia obtaining independence was that it benefited from the military heritage of the Yugoslav defense policy of Total National Defense (TND), whereas the YPA was largely inhibited by its legacies.
A House of Cards: The Yugoslav Concept of Total National Defence and its Critical Weakness, 2011
Conference Presentations by James Horncastle
The relationship between war and geography takes on a new meaning when irregular warfare is the p... more The relationship between war and geography takes on a new meaning when irregular warfare is the primary means of conflict. Most major texts on irregular warfare, whether describing how to conduct a successful insurgency or counter-insurgency (COIN), emphasize the importance of physical geography in obtaining a successful outcome. In fact, physical geography has, in many instances, been taken as a bona fide requirement for success in irregular warfare. It is argued that an irregular force, without an imposing geographic feature like dense woodland or mountainous terrain, will lack a secure base in its formative stages and ultimately be eliminated. Nevertheless, while physical geography is an important factor in determining the success of an irregular warfare campaign, it is not the seminal cause of success. Twentieth century history alone is full of examples of irregular warfare campaigns where the insurgents possessed physical geographic advantages, yet lost their military campaign. As a result, physical geography needs to be examined as one factor, amongst several, in order to determine the impact that it had, and continues to have, on military campaigns.
This paper compares the Greek and Yugoslav resistance movements in the Second World War and argues that while both countries possessed the physical geographic requirement for a successful irregular warfare campaign, the geographical position of both countries also helped determine the success and failures of both movements. Both Yugoslavia and Greece possessed mountainous terrain, particularly in Central Bosnia and Northern Greece, which provided guerrilla organizations with the chance to coalesce. Despite this, the development of the two groups was significantly different. While traditional interpretations of the period have attributed the reason for the divergence to politics, in that Great Britain was significantly interested in maintaining the Greek monarchy, what is often neglected, is the strategic importance it assigned to Greece due to its geographic position. Greece occupied a position that could not only guarantee control of the Aegean Sea, but also threatened British communication lines with the rest of the British Empire through the Suez Canal. As a result, where as Britain was willing to sacrifice Yugoslavia to the left-wing resistance, it was not willing to make a similar accommodation in Greece. The case studies of Greece and Yugoslavia demonstrate that geography is not strictly a matter of terrain, but occurs at the nexus of political, cultural, and strategic thought based on the values one assigns to each of the above listed factors. Acknowledging that geography actually constitutes all of these factors, and moving it beyond strict traditional physical geography definitions, helps to better assess the impact that geography has on irregular warfare campaigns.
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Articles by James Horncastle
Conference Presentations by James Horncastle
This paper compares the Greek and Yugoslav resistance movements in the Second World War and argues that while both countries possessed the physical geographic requirement for a successful irregular warfare campaign, the geographical position of both countries also helped determine the success and failures of both movements. Both Yugoslavia and Greece possessed mountainous terrain, particularly in Central Bosnia and Northern Greece, which provided guerrilla organizations with the chance to coalesce. Despite this, the development of the two groups was significantly different. While traditional interpretations of the period have attributed the reason for the divergence to politics, in that Great Britain was significantly interested in maintaining the Greek monarchy, what is often neglected, is the strategic importance it assigned to Greece due to its geographic position. Greece occupied a position that could not only guarantee control of the Aegean Sea, but also threatened British communication lines with the rest of the British Empire through the Suez Canal. As a result, where as Britain was willing to sacrifice Yugoslavia to the left-wing resistance, it was not willing to make a similar accommodation in Greece. The case studies of Greece and Yugoslavia demonstrate that geography is not strictly a matter of terrain, but occurs at the nexus of political, cultural, and strategic thought based on the values one assigns to each of the above listed factors. Acknowledging that geography actually constitutes all of these factors, and moving it beyond strict traditional physical geography definitions, helps to better assess the impact that geography has on irregular warfare campaigns.
This paper compares the Greek and Yugoslav resistance movements in the Second World War and argues that while both countries possessed the physical geographic requirement for a successful irregular warfare campaign, the geographical position of both countries also helped determine the success and failures of both movements. Both Yugoslavia and Greece possessed mountainous terrain, particularly in Central Bosnia and Northern Greece, which provided guerrilla organizations with the chance to coalesce. Despite this, the development of the two groups was significantly different. While traditional interpretations of the period have attributed the reason for the divergence to politics, in that Great Britain was significantly interested in maintaining the Greek monarchy, what is often neglected, is the strategic importance it assigned to Greece due to its geographic position. Greece occupied a position that could not only guarantee control of the Aegean Sea, but also threatened British communication lines with the rest of the British Empire through the Suez Canal. As a result, where as Britain was willing to sacrifice Yugoslavia to the left-wing resistance, it was not willing to make a similar accommodation in Greece. The case studies of Greece and Yugoslavia demonstrate that geography is not strictly a matter of terrain, but occurs at the nexus of political, cultural, and strategic thought based on the values one assigns to each of the above listed factors. Acknowledging that geography actually constitutes all of these factors, and moving it beyond strict traditional physical geography definitions, helps to better assess the impact that geography has on irregular warfare campaigns.
Editorial 1.
1. Jeffrey Rop, Greek Military Service in the Ancient Near East, 401-330 BCE (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 265, ISBN: 978-1108499507. Sabine Müller (Philipps-Universität Marburg, Germany) 2.
2. Nicholas Morton, The Crusader States and Their Neighbours: A Military History 1099-1187 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 320, ISBN: 978-0198824541. Sean McGlynn (University of Plymouth at Strode College, UK) 5.
3. Kerstin von Lingen, “Crimes against Humanity”: Eine Ideengeschichte der Zivilisierung von Kriegsgewalt 1864-1945, Krieg in der Geschichte 102 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoenigh, 2018), pp. 386, ISBN: 978-3506787750. Marcel Berni (Swiss Military Academy at ETH Zurich, Switzerland) 8.
4. Michael Geheran, Comrades Betrayed: Jewish World War I Veterans under Hitler (Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 2020), pp. 294, ISBN: 978-1501751011. Nathaniel Parker Weston (Seattle Central College, USA) 10.
5. Stephan Jaeger, The Second World War in the Twenty-First-Century Museum: From Narrative, Memory, and Experience to Experientiality (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2020), pp. 354, ISBN: 978-3110661064. Christopher Thorsten Sommer (Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg, Germany) 13.
6. Helen Fry, MI9: A History of the Secret Service for Escape and Evasion in World War Two (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020), pp. 352, ISBN: 978-0300233209. Kevin T. Hall (Ruhr-Universität-Bochum, Germany) 17.
7. Sönke Neitzel, Deutsche Krieger: Vom Kaiserreich zur Berliner Republik - eine Militärgeschichte, 2nd edition (Berlin: Propyläen 2020), pp. 816, ISBN: 978-3549076477. Frank Jacob (Nord Universitet, Norway) 19.
8. Pablo de Orellana, The Road to Vietnam: America, France, Britain, and the First Vietnam War (London: I.B. Tauris, 2020), pp. 258, ISBN: 9781784538972. Michael Holm (Boston University, USA) 25.
9. John-Mark Iyi and Hennie Strydom, eds., Boko Haram and International Law (Cham: Springer, 2018), pp. 429, ISBN: 978-3319749556. James Okolie-Osemene (Wellspring University, Benin City, Nigeria) 31.