Thesis Chapters by Samuel C Bellini-Leite
Abstract
Dual Process Theory has increasingly gained fame as a framework for explaining eviden... more Abstract
Dual Process Theory has increasingly gained fame as a framework for explaining evidence in reasoning and decision making tasks. This theory proposes there must be a sharp distinction in thinking to explain two clusters of correlational features. One cluster describes a fast and intuitive process (Type 1), while the other describes a slow and reflective one (Type 2), (see Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). However, as Samuels (2009) has noted, there is a problem of determining why these group of features form clusters, more than what the labels Type (or system) 1 and 2 can capture, the unity problem. We understand there might be differences in the processing architecture that grounds each type of process, thus requiring distinct cognitive frameworks for each. We argue that the predictive processing approach (as held by Hohwy, 2013 and Clark, 2016) is a more suitable framework for Type 1 processing. Such an approach proposes cognition is in the job of attempting to predict what will perturb sensory inputs next. These are not personal predictions but rather multiple sub-personal predictions that even the visual system makes at various layers at each millisecond that passes. Rather than being based on a symbolic representation of each aspect of the world, these predictions are made on the basis of statistical information updated moment by moment. This statistical content tracks previous sensory states and the causes of these previous sensory states. Kahneman (2011) has been arguing that there is a link between perception and Type 1 processing. What we hold is that such link obtains because Type 1 judgments actually are predictions stemming from higher layers of perceptual systems which work by means of predictive processing. On the other hand, we propose such architecture does not handle Type 2 processes. Rather, these seem to be based on classical symbol systems executing heuristic search as explained by Newell (1980). In conclusion, we propose a dual framework is necessary for explaining why there are two clusters of features. Such a framework would include predictive processing for explaining Type 1 processing and computations on symbolic representations for Type 2 processing.
Book Reviews by Samuel C Bellini-Leite
Resumo Resenha crítica da obra de Andy Clark: "Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action and the Em... more Resumo Resenha crítica da obra de Andy Clark: "Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action and the Embodied Mind".
Papers by Samuel C Bellini-Leite
Adaptive Behavior
State-of-the-art Large Language Models have recently exhibited extraordinary linguistic abilities... more State-of-the-art Large Language Models have recently exhibited extraordinary linguistic abilities which have surprisingly extended to reasoning. However, responses that are unreliable, false, or invented are still a frequent issue. It has been argued that scaling up strategies, as in increasing model size or hardware power, might not be enough to resolve the issue. Recent research has implemented Type 2 strategies (such as Chain-of-Thought and Tree-of-Thought), as strategies that mimic Type 2 reasoning, from Dual Process Theory, to interact with Large Language Models for improved results. The current paper reviews these strategies in light of the Predicting and Reflecting Framework for understanding Dual Process Theory and suggests what Psychology, drawing from research in executive functions, thinking disposition and creativity, can further contribute to possible implementations that address hallucination and reliability issues.
Adaptive Behavior, 2023
State-of-the-art Large Language Models have recently exhibited extraordinary linguistic abilities... more State-of-the-art Large Language Models have recently exhibited extraordinary linguistic abilities which have surprisingly extended to reasoning. However, responses that are unreliable, false, or invented are still a frequent issue. It has been argued that scaling up strategies, as in increasing model size or hardware power, might not be enough to resolve the issue. Recent research has implemented Type 2 strategies (such as Chain-of-Thought and Tree-of-Thought), as strategies that mimic Type 2 reasoning, from Dual Process Theory, to interact with Large Language Models for improved results. The current paper reviews these strategies in light of the Predicting and Reflecting Framework for understanding Dual Process Theory and suggests what Psychology, drawing from research in executive functions, thinking disposition and creativity, can further contribute to possible implementations that address hallucination and reliability issues.
Dual Process Theory has increasingly gained fame as a framework for explaining evidence in reason... more Dual Process Theory has increasingly gained fame as a framework for explaining evidence in reasoning and decision making tasks. This theory proposes there must be a sharp distinction in thinking to explain two clusters of correlational features. One cluster describes a fast and intuitive process (Type 1), while the other describes a slow andreflective one (Type 2), (see Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). However, as Samuels (2009) has noted, there is a problem of determining why these group of features form clusters, more than what the labels Type (or system) 1 and 2 can capture, the unity problem. We understand there might be differences in the processingarchitecture that grounds each type of process, thus requiring distinct cognitive frameworks for each. We argue that the predictive processing approach (as held by Hohwy, 2013 and Clark, 2016) is a more suitable framework for Type 1 processing. Such an approach proposes cognition is in the job of attempting to p...
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2021
Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality, 2020
The notion of bounded rationality is a corrective to idealized conceptions of rationality, which ... more The notion of bounded rationality is a corrective to idealized conceptions of rationality, which place unrealistic demands on rational agents and fail to explain how cognitive processes could be computationally tractable. This chapter looks at an influential group of cognitive theories, dual-process theories, and asks if they are compatible with the tenets of bounded rationality. These theories distinguish two different types of mental processing, often seen as forming distinct systems, 1 and 2. A worry for such theories is that they do not abandon the notion of ideal rationality but merely restrict it to System 2, thus failing to address the explanatory problems the notion brings with it. This was a serious problem for an influential precursor theory proposed by Jerry Fodor, but we argue that more recent versions of the dual-process approach escape it. Drawing on recent work in cognitive science, we show that System 2 processing is limited in various ways and that System 1 bears the brunt of contextual processing, thus reducing the burden on System 2. We conclude that dual-process theory need not include a commitment to ideal rationality and that it can, and should, incorporate the insights of the bounded rationality tradition.
Nos dias atuais observa-se que o perfil esperado do psicologo da saude seja pautado nao somente n... more Nos dias atuais observa-se que o perfil esperado do psicologo da saude seja pautado nao somente no atendimento clinico, e sim, em um enfoque social e humanizado. Porem, metodos sobre como prestar atendimento sob essa otica nunca foram muito explicitos. Desde a insercao do psicologo nas instituicoes de saude no seculo XX, o modelo adotado sempre foi o biomedico, com foco na eliminacao de patologias. A implementacao da Psicologia da Saude representou uma mudanca de postura perante esse modelo, vindo a adotar o modelo biopsicosocial utilizado pela OMS (Organizacao Mundial da Saude) em 1948. Com um novo entendimento da saude surge a necessidade de teorias que abarquem tal compreensao. Assim, surge a Psicologia Humanista, enfatizando o poder do homem, suas aspiracoes positivas, a utilizacao do potencial humano e a nocao de integridade da natureza humana. Apesar dessas contribuicoes, a Psicologia Humanista nao se fundou efetivamente como escola de pensamento, possivelmente porque seus pio...
Trata-se de uma resenha critica do livro Surfing Uncertainty de Andy Clark. A resenha critica apr... more Trata-se de uma resenha critica do livro Surfing Uncertainty de Andy Clark. A resenha critica apresenta o livro e avalia a empreitada de Clark em tres metas. A primeira e desenvolver e defender uma abordagem do funcionamento cerebral a partir do processamento preditivo. A segunda e demonstrar como tal abordagem pode dar conta, sob os mesmos principios de processamento, de uma alta gama de funcoes mentais como percepcao, acao, atencao, imaginacao, linguagem e raciocinio alto. A ultima e de argumentar que tal modelo e compativel ou ate mesmo enriquecedor para seus trabalhos anteriores a respeito da mente incorporada, situada e estendida.
Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 2019
The present study aimed to investigate whether or not the so-called "bouba-kiki" effect is mediat... more The present study aimed to investigate whether or not the so-called "bouba-kiki" effect is mediated by speech-specific representations. Sine-wave versions of naturally produced pseudowords were used as auditory stimuli in an implicit association task (IAT) and an explicit cross-modal matching (CMM) task to examine cross-modal shape-sound correspondences. A group of participants trained to hear the sine-wave stimuli as speech was compared to a group that heard them as non-speech sounds. Sound-shape correspondence effects were observed in both groups and tasks, indicating that speech-specific processing is not fundamental to the "bouba-kiki" phenomenon. Effects were similar across groups in the IAT, while in the CMM task the speechmode group showed a stronger effect compared with the non-speech group. This indicates that, while both tasks reflect auditoryvisual associations, only the CMM task is additionally sensitive to associations involving speech-specific representations.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2017
Dual process theory proposes clusters of features that form two dichotomous groups in cognition. ... more Dual process theory proposes clusters of features that form two dichotomous groups in cognition. One standing internal issue is defining what the reference of these two dichotomous groups could be in the mind or brain. Does dual process theory speak of two systems, types, minds, modes, kinds or just metaphors? A particular common answer is that differences in clusters of features are evidence of different underlying systems, often called system 1 and system 2. However, the suggestion to abandon the 'system' terminology is now common in the literature, but the consequences of doing so need to be addressed. This work reviews and critically discusses previous suggestions.
Journal of Cognitive Science, 2013
The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) proposed by Bernard Baars (1988) along with Daniel Dennett's (1... more The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) proposed by Bernard Baars (1988) along with Daniel Dennett's (1991) Multiple Drafts Model (MDM) of consciousness are renowned cognitive theories of consciousness bearing similarities and differences. Although Dennett displays sympathy for GWT, his own MDM does not seem to be fully compatible with it. This work discusses this compatibility, by asking if GWT suffers from Daniel Dennett's criticism of what he calls a "Cartesian Theater". We identified in Dennett 10 requirements for avoiding the Cartesian Theater. We believe that some of these requirements are violated by GWT, but not all, hence there is partial incompatibility with MDM, and it is nonsense to answer if GWT is or is not a Cartesian Theater. However, by asking such question we conclude that the issues around this discussion involve fuzzy claims about degrees of consciousness and we show how the Neuro-Astroglial Interaction Model (NAIM) is fit for solving such conceptual issues.
The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) proposed by Bernard Baars (1988) along with Daniel Dennett’s (1... more The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) proposed by Bernard Baars (1988) along with Daniel Dennett’s (1991) Multiple Drafts Model (MDM) of consciousness are renowned cognitive theories of consciousness bearing similarities and differences. Although Dennett displays sympathy for GWT, his own MDM does not seem to be fully compatible with it. This work discusses this compatibility, by asking if GWT suffers from Daniel Dennett’s criticism of what he calls a “Cartesian Theater”. We identified in Dennett 10 requirements for avoiding the Cartesian Theater. We believe that some of these requirements are violated by GWT, but not all, hence there is partial incompatibility with MDM, and it is nonsense to answer if GWT is or is not a Cartesian Theater. However, by asking such question we conclude that the issues around this discussion involve fuzzy claims about degrees of consciousness and we show how the Neuro-Astroglial Interaction Model (NAIM) is fit for solving such conceptual issues.
Mens Sana Monographs, 2013
In the last thirty years, a relatively large group of cognitive scientists have begun characteris... more In the last thirty years, a relatively large group of cognitive scientists have begun characterising the mind in terms of two distinct, relatively autonomous systems. To account for paradoxes in empirical results of studies mainly on reasoning, Dual Process Theories were developed. Such Dual Process Theories generally agree that System 1 is rapid, automatic, parallel, and heuristic-based and System 2 is slow, capacity-demanding, sequential, and related to consciousness. While System 2 can still be decently understood from a traditional cognitivist approach, I will argue that it is essential for System 1 processing to be comprehended in an Embodied Embedded approach to Cognition.
Frontiers in Psychology, 2022
Dual Process Theory is currently a popular theory for explaining why we show bounded rationality ... more Dual Process Theory is currently a popular theory for explaining why we show bounded rationality in reasoning and decision-making tasks. This theory proposes there must be a sharp distinction in thinking to explain two clusters of correlational features. One cluster describes a fast and intuitive process (Type 1), while the other describes a slow and reflective one (Type 2). A problem for this theory is identifying a common principle that binds these features together, explaining why they form a unity, the unity problem. To solve it, a hypothesis is developed combining embodied predictive processing with symbolic classical approaches. The hypothesis, simplified, states that Type 1 processes are bound together because they rely on embodied predictive processing whereas Type 2 processes form a unity because they are accomplished by symbolic classical cognition. To show that this is likely the case, the features of Dual Process Theory are discussed in relation to these frameworks.
Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality, 2020
The notion of bounded rationality is a corrective to idealized conceptions of rationality, which ... more The notion of bounded rationality is a corrective to idealized conceptions of rationality, which place unrealistic demands on rational agents and fail to explain how cognitive processes could be computationally tractable. This chapter looks at an influential group of cognitive theories, dual-process theories, and asks if they are compatible with the tenets of
bounded rationality. These theories distinguish two different types of mental processing, often seen as forming distinct systems, 1 and 2. A worry for such theories is that they do not abandon the notion of ideal rationality but merely restrict it to System 2, thus failing to address the explanatory problems the notion brings with it. This was a serious problem for an influential precursor theory proposed by Jerry Fodor, but we argue that more recent versions of the dual-process approach escape it. Drawing on recent work in cognitive science, we show that System 2 processing is limited in various ways and that System 1 bears the brunt of contextual processing, thus reducing the burden on System 2. We conclude that dual-process theory need not include a commitment to ideal rationality and that it can, and should, incorporate the insights of the bounded rationality tradition.
The present study aimed to investigate whether or not the so-called “bouba-kiki” effect is mediat... more The present study aimed to investigate whether or not the so-called “bouba-kiki” effect is mediated by speech-specific representations. Sine-wave versions of naturally produced pseudowords were used as auditory stimuli in an implicit association task (IAT) and an explicit cross-modal matching (CMM) task to examine cross-modal shape-sound correspondences. A group of participants trained to hear the sine-wave stimuli as speech was compared to a group that heard them as non-speech sounds. Sound-shape correspondence effects were observed in both groups and tasks, indicating that speech-specific processing is not fundamental to the “bouba-kiki” phenomenon. Effects were similar across groups in the IAT, while in the CMM task the speech-mode group showed a stronger effect compared with the non-speech group. This indicates that, while both tasks reflect auditory-visual associations, only the CMM task is additionally sensitive to associations involving speech-specific representations.
Cognitive Science: Recent Advances and Recurring Problems, 2017
Cognitive science has recently been facing a breakdown into various distinct approaches, such as ... more Cognitive science has recently been facing a breakdown into various distinct approaches, such as the connectionist approach, the embodied approach, the dynamical systems approach, probabilistic approaches, among others and also a relative detachment of disciplines. Much of this happened after theoretical issues related to the frame problem. This work provides an analysis of the frame problem in order to propose the revisionist strategy for cognitive science. Such a methodological strategy aims to describe a recipe for how cognitive science should proceed in dealing with the frame problem. The idea is that theoreticians should start by identifying various sub-instances of the frame problem (of which we provide a first list) to be used as guides for reformulating frameworks of cognitive science and how they relate. It is probably the case that a diverse range of approaches will be needed to deal with different sub-instances. So it might be the case that diverse general cognitive approaches will be needed for a computationally feasible account of the mind.
Dual process theory proposes clusters of features that form two dichotomous groups in cognition. ... more Dual process theory proposes clusters of features that form two dichotomous groups in cognition. One standing internal issue is defining what the reference of these two dichotomous groups could be in the mind or brain. Does dual process theory speak of two systems, types, minds, modes, kinds or just metaphors? A particular common answer is that differences in clusters of features are evidence of different underlying systems, often called system 1 and system 2. However, the suggestion to abandon the ‘system’ terminology is now common in the literature, but the consequences of doing so need to be addressed. This work reviews and critically discusses previous suggestions.
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Thesis Chapters by Samuel C Bellini-Leite
Dual Process Theory has increasingly gained fame as a framework for explaining evidence in reasoning and decision making tasks. This theory proposes there must be a sharp distinction in thinking to explain two clusters of correlational features. One cluster describes a fast and intuitive process (Type 1), while the other describes a slow and reflective one (Type 2), (see Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). However, as Samuels (2009) has noted, there is a problem of determining why these group of features form clusters, more than what the labels Type (or system) 1 and 2 can capture, the unity problem. We understand there might be differences in the processing architecture that grounds each type of process, thus requiring distinct cognitive frameworks for each. We argue that the predictive processing approach (as held by Hohwy, 2013 and Clark, 2016) is a more suitable framework for Type 1 processing. Such an approach proposes cognition is in the job of attempting to predict what will perturb sensory inputs next. These are not personal predictions but rather multiple sub-personal predictions that even the visual system makes at various layers at each millisecond that passes. Rather than being based on a symbolic representation of each aspect of the world, these predictions are made on the basis of statistical information updated moment by moment. This statistical content tracks previous sensory states and the causes of these previous sensory states. Kahneman (2011) has been arguing that there is a link between perception and Type 1 processing. What we hold is that such link obtains because Type 1 judgments actually are predictions stemming from higher layers of perceptual systems which work by means of predictive processing. On the other hand, we propose such architecture does not handle Type 2 processes. Rather, these seem to be based on classical symbol systems executing heuristic search as explained by Newell (1980). In conclusion, we propose a dual framework is necessary for explaining why there are two clusters of features. Such a framework would include predictive processing for explaining Type 1 processing and computations on symbolic representations for Type 2 processing.
Book Reviews by Samuel C Bellini-Leite
Papers by Samuel C Bellini-Leite
bounded rationality. These theories distinguish two different types of mental processing, often seen as forming distinct systems, 1 and 2. A worry for such theories is that they do not abandon the notion of ideal rationality but merely restrict it to System 2, thus failing to address the explanatory problems the notion brings with it. This was a serious problem for an influential precursor theory proposed by Jerry Fodor, but we argue that more recent versions of the dual-process approach escape it. Drawing on recent work in cognitive science, we show that System 2 processing is limited in various ways and that System 1 bears the brunt of contextual processing, thus reducing the burden on System 2. We conclude that dual-process theory need not include a commitment to ideal rationality and that it can, and should, incorporate the insights of the bounded rationality tradition.
Dual Process Theory has increasingly gained fame as a framework for explaining evidence in reasoning and decision making tasks. This theory proposes there must be a sharp distinction in thinking to explain two clusters of correlational features. One cluster describes a fast and intuitive process (Type 1), while the other describes a slow and reflective one (Type 2), (see Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). However, as Samuels (2009) has noted, there is a problem of determining why these group of features form clusters, more than what the labels Type (or system) 1 and 2 can capture, the unity problem. We understand there might be differences in the processing architecture that grounds each type of process, thus requiring distinct cognitive frameworks for each. We argue that the predictive processing approach (as held by Hohwy, 2013 and Clark, 2016) is a more suitable framework for Type 1 processing. Such an approach proposes cognition is in the job of attempting to predict what will perturb sensory inputs next. These are not personal predictions but rather multiple sub-personal predictions that even the visual system makes at various layers at each millisecond that passes. Rather than being based on a symbolic representation of each aspect of the world, these predictions are made on the basis of statistical information updated moment by moment. This statistical content tracks previous sensory states and the causes of these previous sensory states. Kahneman (2011) has been arguing that there is a link between perception and Type 1 processing. What we hold is that such link obtains because Type 1 judgments actually are predictions stemming from higher layers of perceptual systems which work by means of predictive processing. On the other hand, we propose such architecture does not handle Type 2 processes. Rather, these seem to be based on classical symbol systems executing heuristic search as explained by Newell (1980). In conclusion, we propose a dual framework is necessary for explaining why there are two clusters of features. Such a framework would include predictive processing for explaining Type 1 processing and computations on symbolic representations for Type 2 processing.
bounded rationality. These theories distinguish two different types of mental processing, often seen as forming distinct systems, 1 and 2. A worry for such theories is that they do not abandon the notion of ideal rationality but merely restrict it to System 2, thus failing to address the explanatory problems the notion brings with it. This was a serious problem for an influential precursor theory proposed by Jerry Fodor, but we argue that more recent versions of the dual-process approach escape it. Drawing on recent work in cognitive science, we show that System 2 processing is limited in various ways and that System 1 bears the brunt of contextual processing, thus reducing the burden on System 2. We conclude that dual-process theory need not include a commitment to ideal rationality and that it can, and should, incorporate the insights of the bounded rationality tradition.
Nos dias atuais observa-se que o perfil esperado do psicólogo da saúde seja pautado não somente no atendimento clínico, e sim, em um enfoque social e humanizado. Porém, métodos sobre como prestar atendimento sob essa ótica nunca foram muito explícitos. Desde a inserção do psicólogo nas instituições de saúde no século XX, o modelo adotado sempre foi o biomédico, com foco na eliminação de patologias. A implementação da Psicologia da Saúde representou uma mudança de postura perante esse modelo, vindo a adotar o modelo biopsicosocial utilizado pela OMS (Organização Mundial da Saúde) em 1948. Com um novo entendimento da saúde surge a necessidade de teorias que abarquem tal compreensão. Assim, surge a Psicologia Humanista, enfatizando o poder do homem, suas aspirações positivas, a utilização do potencial humano e a noção de integridade da natureza humana. Apesar dessas contribuições, a Psicologia Humanista não se fundou efetivamente como escola de pensamento, possivelmente porque seus pioneiros formam profissionais clínicos, os quais não enfatizaram os estudos teóricos. Já a Psicologia Positiva vem trazer métodos, técnicas e objetivos necessários para se construir uma ciência acerca do lado positivo do ser humano. Este artigo pretende rever um pouco da história da humanização na psicologia, chegando a uma introdução da aplicação do atendimento focado nas qualidades do ser humano,
baseado na Psicologia Positiva.
Compreender a mentalidade é atualmente uma das dificuldades
filosóficas e científicas mais polêmicas, com pouco consenso envolvido, e
principalmente, poucas propostas satisfatórias. Os principais problemas incluem
o de dizer como a mente pode ter poder cau sal na matéria (causação mental
veja Amaral, 2001; KIM, 1998), o problema de determinar a individualidade de
uma pessoa portadora de uma mente (problema da identidade pessoal veja
Coelho, 2020), o problema de d eterminar o conteúdo que a mente carrega
problema do conteúdo mental veja De Menezes, 2020.), e como esse
conteúdo porta um significado que faz referência ao mundo (problema do
significado e da intencionalidade veja Leclerc, 2018), dentre outros. Pode mos
dizer que todos es s es estão de certa f orma relacionados a um problema geral
conhecido como o problema mente corpo (veja Fodor, 1981). A resposta para
esse problema deve explicar a natureza da mente, e, havendo diferença em
relação ao corpo, como esses dois se relacionam.