in Wyatt, J. , Zakkou, J. & Zeman, D. (Eds.), Perspectives on Taste; Routledge, 2022
Past research on folk aesthetics has suggested that most people are subjectivists when it comes t... more Past research on folk aesthetics has suggested that most people are subjectivists when it comes to aesthetic judgment. However, most people also make a distinction between good and bad aesthetic taste. To understand the extent to which these two observations conflict with one another, we need a better understanding of people's everyday concept of aesthetic taste. In this paper, we present the results of a study in which participants drawn from a representative sample of the US population were asked whether they usually distinguish between good and bad taste, how they define them, and whether aesthetic taste can be improved. Those who answered positively to the first question were asked to provide their definition of good and bad taste, while those who answered positively to the third question were asked to detail by what means taste can be improved. Our results suggest that most people distinguish between good and bad taste, and think taste can be improved. People's definitions of good and bad taste were varied, and were torn between very subjectivist conceptions of taste and others that lent themselves to a more objectivist interpretation. Overall, our results suggest that the tension Hume observed in conceptions of aesthetic taste is still present today.
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two methodological objections have been raised against this claim: first, that participants’ answers do not accurately reflect
what they think and, second, that the Knobe Effect can be fully explained by non-moral factors, such as the agent’s desires
or beliefs. In this article, we discuss these two methodological objections to the existence of the Knobe Effect and provide
new evidence that moral evaluations can shape intentionality judgments. First, Study 1 shows that standard measures of
intentionality do not overestimate participants’ intentionality judgments. Second, Studies 2 and 3 suggest that participants’
moral evaluations still mediate the impact of positive versus negative side-effects on judgments about intentional action, even
when taking into account a whole range of non-moral factors. Results suggest that moral evaluations play an irreducible role
in shaping our judgments about intentional action.
two methodological objections have been raised against this claim: first, that participants’ answers do not accurately reflect
what they think and, second, that the Knobe Effect can be fully explained by non-moral factors, such as the agent’s desires
or beliefs. In this article, we discuss these two methodological objections to the existence of the Knobe Effect and provide
new evidence that moral evaluations can shape intentionality judgments. First, Study 1 shows that standard measures of
intentionality do not overestimate participants’ intentionality judgments. Second, Studies 2 and 3 suggest that participants’
moral evaluations still mediate the impact of positive versus negative side-effects on judgments about intentional action, even
when taking into account a whole range of non-moral factors. Results suggest that moral evaluations play an irreducible role
in shaping our judgments about intentional action.
However, the extent to which affect influences these judgments is unclear. We conducted a metaanalysis to estimate the impact of affect. Our meta-analysis indicates that beliefs in free will are largely robust to emotional reactions.
Cependant, il n'est pas clair que le sens commun ait la conception de la liberté humain que ces scientifiques et philosophes lui prêtent. En effet, depuis quelques années, un nombre croissant d'études ont cherché à délimiter empiriquement cette notion, et leurs résultats suggèrent que notre conception commune de la liberté humaine pourrait s'avérer plus résistante et moins métaphysiquement chargée que prévue.
Je présenterai une synthèse de ces études, ainsi que de nouveaux résultats inédits, et en tirerai certaines conclusions quant aux prétendues conséquences révolutionnaires des progrès des neurosciences pour le droit.
In this paper, we return to these preliminary results and present the results of new studies investigating to which extent these results can be replicated in broader and more representative samples. We also present preliminary results on what we think should be the next step in our research program: determining what is the common-sense stance on aesthetic properties and aesthetic judgments, if it is not a realist stance. We argue that these results suggest that laypeople might actually adhere to a certain brand of relativism, but not the traditional brand of appraiser-relativism.
In this paper, we present the results of a series of experiments designed to investigate the possible differences between these two kinds of affective reactions. More precisely, we examined whether the same videos presented either as fictional or as real videos are experienced differently in terms of emotional intensity. We measured subjective emotional experience using questionnaires and physiological activity using electrocardiography, electromyography and skin conductance sensors. Results showed that films clips presented as real elicited significantly less skin conductance responses than the videos presented as fictional. Our findings support the idea that affective reactions to fictions might differ from emotional reactions to real (or supposedly real) events.
To support this claim, I will draw on three series of experiments. Drawing on a recall task, experiments 1 and 2 examine what kind of events or objects people are moved by, and compare ‘being moved’ to ‘mirth’ and ‘joy’. Then, using emotional induction through the use of videos, experiments 3 and 4 examine the bodily feelings characteristic of ‘being moved’, comparing them to the bodily feelings inspired by joy and the putative emotion of ‘elevation’. Finally, using once again emotional induction through videos, experiments 4 and 5 test for the behavioral effect of ‘being moved’, comparing its impact on prosocial behavior to the one of mirth and elevation.
To test for this hypothesis, we investigated the role of affective reactions in beliefs about moral responsibility and determinism by testing a group (n=10) of patients suffering from behavioural frontotemporal dementia. Patients suffering from bvFTD have impoverished emotional reaction. Thus, the ‘performance error model’ should predict that bvFTD patients will give less compatibilist answers.
However, we found that bvFTD patients gave answers quite similar to healthy subjects and Alzheimer patients in the control group, and were mostly compatibilist. Thus, we conclude that the ‘performance error model’ should be abandoned in favour of other available models that best fit our data.