Books by Giuliano Mori
Oxford-Warburg Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2024
While humanists agreed on identifying the mainrequirement of the historical genre withtruthfulnes... more While humanists agreed on identifying the mainrequirement of the historical genre withtruthfulness, they disagreed on their notions ofhistorical truth. Some authors equated historicaltruth with verisimilitude, thus harmonizing thequest for truth with other ingredients of theirhistories, such as their political utility andrhetorical aptness. Historical Truth in Fifteenth-Century Italy addresses Renaissance history,philosophy, rhetoric, and jurisprudence to shedlight on how humanists conceptualized truth and,more specifically, historical truth.
Commented critical edition of Pomponio Leto's "De historia" (BAV Stamp. Ross. 441).
The edition ... more Commented critical edition of Pomponio Leto's "De historia" (BAV Stamp. Ross. 441).
The edition of Pomponio's text is preceded by an essay on Quattrocento antiquarianism vis-à-vis humanist historiography in general.
Bologna: Il Mulino, 2017
Alla linearità della deduzione aristotelica l’epoca barocca preferisce il modello narrativo e gno... more Alla linearità della deduzione aristotelica l’epoca barocca preferisce il modello narrativo e gnoseologico della digressione, dove l’oggetto di analisi è colto con un avvicinamento progressivo e indiretto, servendosi dell’analogia o della metafora. Nel Seicento britannico, pur non mancando espressioni nel campo del romanzo, la digressione si sviluppa in un metodo generale applicabile ad ambiti diversi: una vera e propria temperie culturale di cui l’induzione baconiana è l’esempio più illustre. Se per Bacon il «metodo digressivo» serve all’analisi delle cose (le «res» contrapposte ai «verba»), Thomas Browne applica gli stessi criteri alle singole opinioni («doxa»), riscoprendo l’intrinseca unità di scienza e religione, mentre Robert Burton ordina grazie a un principio egualmente digressivo la storia delle «opinioni» (ossia la tradizione) riguardo alla nozione di malinconia. Raggiunto il suo apice nel pieno Seicento, il metodo digressivo applicato all’ordine della natura cede successivamente il passo al razionalismo illuministico e alla scienza newtoniana. Anziché essere del tutto abbandonato, però, esso diviene un elemento essenziale nella nuova concezione della mente umana. Il metodo digressivo continua così a vivere in Lawrence Sterne, originale interprete della filosofia lockiana e humiana.
Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2016
Edited volumes by Giuliano Mori
Philosophical Inquiries, 2022
Journal articles by Giuliano Mori
Philosophical Inquiries, 2022
Philosophical Inquiries, 2022
According to Aristotle, ἐπιστήμη-that is, scientia or certain knowledge-must be based upon demons... more According to Aristotle, ἐπιστήμη-that is, scientia or certain knowledge-must be based upon demonstrative arguments or syllogisms about things that cannot be otherwise, thus affording necessary conclusions. One may not disagree with such arguments: as long as scientific demonstrations are righlty understood, they force assent. Yet, Aristotle recognizes that the realm of things that can be known (and demonstrated) with absolute certainty or necessity is relatively limited-so limited that he will concede that one can have scientific knowledge of things that happen for the most part (ὡς ἐπί τὸ πολὺ), being thus, strinctly speaking, not logically necessary. These assumptions constitute perhaps one of the most consequential ideas in the history of Western thought. Especially influential was also a corollary to the definition of scientific demonstration, namely the notion that outside the realm of logical necessity and ἐπιστήμη, the argumentative reasons one may use will never be able to demonstrate, being limited to persuading. Persuasive arguments are further distinguished by Aristotle into the rhetorical, which may sway, and the dialectical, which have such an inherent argumentative rigour that they ought to persuade. An essential difference thus sets demonstrative arguments apart from the rhetorical and dialectical since only the former enjoy logical necessity. Even the relatively powerful dialectical arguments, which obey a rigorous logical structure, cannot but fall short of certainty since their premises do not fulfill the requirement of syllogistic argumentation, being merely generally admitted or probable (ἔνδοχος). This is also true for rhetorical arguments, which Aristotle sees in connection to dialectic, as a weaker form of persuasive argumentation that does not obey a logical structure. The uneven territory of argumentative persuasiveness is the subject matter of this focus. All of the cases here analyzed spring from the recognition of the impossibility to produce logically necessary demonstrations. In most cases, this awareness emerged from two very different attitudes. On the one hand, though agreeing with Aristotle's theory of demonstration, many scholars found themselves working in fields that could not afford them with the kind of premises required by Aristotelian ἐπιστήμη-for instance the fields of law, history, and philology. On the other hand, from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onwards, a growing number of philosophers rejected the Aristotelian demonstrative framework altogether, being convinced that the causal understanding that according to Aristotle underlays scientific knowledge is essentially a chimera. Most of the great paradigm shifts that characterize European culture from the early fifteenth century correlate highly with a gradual but steady decline in the general confidence about the possibility of demonstrating with logical necessity. Along with growing skeptical attitudes came, for instance, the gradual fall from favor of a philosophical genre such as the traditionally demonstrative disputatio, which was at least in part supplanted by other genres, persuasive dialogues first of all. Most importantly, the decline of demonstrative argumentations rekindled the interest in nondemonstrative strategies of proof that were originally treated by Aristotle under the heading of rhetoric and dialectic. From the early fifteenth century, these disciplines became the stronghold of humanist education, often misrepresented as a pedantic enterprise into grammatical quibbles and stylistic fastidiousness. Yet, as Coluccio Salutati argued in a 1405 letter to
Humanistica. An International Journal of Early Renaissance Studies, 2020
This article analyses the influence of Lorenzo Valla’s philosophy on his own grammatical concepti... more This article analyses the influence of Lorenzo Valla’s philosophy on his own grammatical conceptions. In particular, I argue that, in spite of the anti-normative claims of the Elegantiae, Valla’s philosophical assumptions led him to adopt normative and prescriptive stances that were harshly criticized by Bartolomeo Facio and Poggio Bracciolini. In light of an analysis of Valla’s polemics and of his grammatical works, I suggest that the contrast between anti-normative and normative traits in Valla’s grammar largely depends on whether the Elegantiae are considered from the perspective of their conception – with regard to classical Latin – or from the point of view of their reception – with regard to Humanist Latin.
Quaestio, 2020
This article analyses Valla’s historiographical stance in the light of his dialectical assumption... more This article analyses Valla’s historiographical stance in the light of his dialectical assumptions about possibility, verisimilitude, and truth. I argue that, at variance with most humanists, Valla believed that historical truth should satisfy the requirements of logical necessity, being therefore incompatible with verisimilar reconstructions of past events. However, Valla also realized that a critical method of assessment grounded in verisimilitude was indispensable to the analysis of doubtful accounts and traditions. In order to explore these matters, Valla developed a genre distinct from history proper and closer to the forensic, inquisitorial tradition. While history had to deal with necessary truths, the aim of ‘historical inquisitio’ was to draw probable conclusions from pieces of conjectural evidence. According to Valla’s dialectical principles, these conclusions were not absolutely true, but they could be considered true thanks to the notion of intellectual acumen, which allowed Valla to take a leap from the field of possibility or verisimilitude to that of truth and necessity.
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 2020
Quaestio, 2019
This article analyses Lorenzo Valla's dialectics in order to uncover an epistemological theory of... more This article analyses Lorenzo Valla's dialectics in order to uncover an epistemological theory of truth undergirding Valla's production. Based on the analysis of Valla's Retractatio totius dialecticae, I argue that Valla rejects the notion of one-sided possibility, and considers both possibility and contingency as incompatible with necessity and absolute truth. This assumption inevitably hinders inquiries in fields of knowledge that deal with inherently possible or particular data. Analysing Valla's philological works, this article shows that, in specific cases, Valla tries to overcome this obstacle thanks to the notion of intellectual acumen, a faculty that transcends the rules of logical inference and puts the inquirer in contact with truth.
Intellectual History Review, [online 2019; print 2020], 2020
This article analyzes the proselytical use of ancient theology that developed in the environment ... more This article analyzes the proselytical use of ancient theology that developed in the environment of the Jesuit China Mission in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This period is roughly coeval with the European diffusion of deistic doctrines based on a secularized interpretation of natural theology. I argue that the threat posed by the spread of such doctrines produced a significant effect on the philosophy that Jesuits developed in order to relate to Confucianism. In particular, in the late seventeenth century, Jesuits belonging to the China Mission gradually abandoned Matteo Ricci’s natural theology and espoused an approach grounded in ancient theology. The situation changed, however, after the turn of the eighteenth century. Deism continued to spread and even ancient theology came to be perceived as dangerously close the libertinism. The increasing suspicion towards ancient theology was reflected, in the China Mission, by the reception of the doctrines advanced by the so-called Figurists, a group of French Jesuits who proposed an interpretation of certain characters of the Chinese Five Classics as figurae of the Bible.
Erudition and the Republic of Letters, 2019
This article analyses Pierre-Daniel Huet's reaction to the doctrines that he believed to favour a... more This article analyses Pierre-Daniel Huet's reaction to the doctrines that he believed to favour atheism, Deism, and, generally, irreligion. Descartes and Spinoza, in particular, are guilty, according to Huet, of placing excessive confidence in the discerning power of reason and in the type of certitude it produces, which is incomparable to revealed truth and in no way superior to moral certitude that arises from authority and historical erudition. Huet counters Cartesian philosophy with sceptical fideism and opposes Spinozian exegesis by means of an innovative, although perhaps untimely, adaptation of the doctrine of ancient theology. Against the 'atheist' Spinoza and the cohort of deist thinkers, Huet intends to demonstrate that Moses is the author of the Pentateuch and the divulger of God's message to all peoples, in all times, and that, as a consequence , deist 'natural religion' is a partially corrupted version of the Mosaic doctrine.
Intersezioni, 2018
Ostentando una grande distanza critica, a sei anni dalla morte di Benedetto Croce, Mario Praz avr... more Ostentando una grande distanza critica, a sei anni dalla morte di Benedetto Croce, Mario Praz avrebbe descritto la sua relazione con il filosofo nei termini di una posizione «d'invulnerabilità, ma reciproca» 1 . Affermazione piuttosto sospetta, in particolare in relazione a Praz, la cui fortuna in Italia risentì pesantemente dell'opposizione ideologica a Croce. Nelle poche lettere, molte recensioni e moltissimi riferimenti che descrivono il rapporto tra i due non c'è, del resto, assolutamente nulla che possa far pensare all'indifferenza olimpica di chi fosse, realmente, in relazione di «reciproca invulnerabilità». Fin dall'inizio del suo rapporto con Croce, Praz assume toni che stemprano la stima con la sottile ironia e alla sicura opposizione ideologica e critica aggiungono lo squisito piacere dell'apostasia nei confronti di chi è ormai giudicato non più che un pari 2 . In realtà, la pur garbata sufficienza di Praz non fu sempre giustificata ché, almeno fino al 1925, Croce avrebbe avuto ben ragione a pensare di poter allungare la fila dei proprî clientes. È Praz stesso, infatti, a ricordare come le analisi pubblicate nei Poeti inglesi dell'Ottocento (1925) e nella Fortuna di Byron in Inghilterra (1925) fossero influen-1 M. Praz, La casa della vita, Milano, Adelphi, 1979, p. 247. Anche Croce, rispondendo alle critiche di Praz, in una delle recensioni più risentite scrive: «Io sono costretto qui a dire (togliendo ogni significato offensivo dal mio detto) che a lui non è possibile nessun contatto con me, e perciò nessun contrasto» (B. Croce, Metodo della critica, in Terze pagine sparse. Raccolte e ordinate dall'autore, Bari, Laterza, 1955, vol. I, p. 172). Affermazione sospetta, anche questa, in particolare nel contesto stizzito della recensione crociana.
Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana, 2016
British Journal of the History of Science, 2017
This article engages the much-debated role of mathematics in Bacon's philosophy and inductive met... more This article engages the much-debated role of mathematics in Bacon's philosophy and inductive method at large. The many references to mathematics in Bacon's works are considered in the context of the humanist reform of the curriculum studiorum and, in particular, through a comparison with the kinds of natural and intellectual subtlety as they are defined by many sixteenth-century authors, including Cardano, Scaliger and Montaigne. Additionally, this article gives a nuanced background to the ‘subtlety’ commonly thought to have been eschewed by Bacon and by Bacon's self-proclaimed followers in the Royal Society of London. The aim of this article is ultimately to demonstrate that Bacon did not reject the use of mathematics in natural philosophy altogether. Instead, he hoped that following the Great Instauration a kind of non-abstract mathematics could be founded: a kind of mathematics which was to serve natural philosophy by enabling men to grasp the intrinsic subtlety of nature. Rather than mathematizing nature, it was mathematics that needed to be ‘naturalized’.
Journal of the History of Ideas, Jul 2016
Intersezioni, Apr 2014
According to Bacon, for Nature to be comprehended by man, it must be put through a process of dec... more According to Bacon, for Nature to be comprehended by man, it must be put through a process of decipherment. Causal explanation, as it was conceived by the Aristotelian tradition, is therefore insufficient. Rather it must be substituted by an analogic or digressive method which could grasp the nature of things indirectly, following the threads of similitude through which all things converge to unity. This analogic method is also displayed by baroque rhetoric, which, in Bacon's case particularly, is not merely an "ars bene dicendi", but rather an "ars bene legendi" of the divine language of the book of Nature. This essay will argue that this conception of rhetoric and of analogic method represents a crucial background to the understanding of Bacon's philosophy.
Viator, 2015
This article investigates the nature of Thomas Browne’s method of scientific enquiry. It will mak... more This article investigates the nature of Thomas Browne’s method of scientific enquiry. It will make comparisons between Bacon’s experimental method and the theological and patristic traditions, with particular regard to the problem and definition of error. Browne was convinced that reason and faith, and nature and religion, were in a relation of cooperation, and shared not only the same origin but the same end, that of God and truth. In light of this, Browne’s use of mutually integrated theological and scientific sources is analyzed to shed some light on the problem of his idiosyncratic notion of experimentalism. The article ultimately attempts to demonstrate that Browne’s method for enquiry was indeed experimental because of the way he investigated theological issues through the collection of data from nature and traditional scriptural materials.
Collective volume articles by Giuliano Mori
Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences
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Books by Giuliano Mori
The edition of Pomponio's text is preceded by an essay on Quattrocento antiquarianism vis-à-vis humanist historiography in general.
Edited volumes by Giuliano Mori
Journal articles by Giuliano Mori
Collective volume articles by Giuliano Mori
The edition of Pomponio's text is preceded by an essay on Quattrocento antiquarianism vis-à-vis humanist historiography in general.
TEOLOGIE NATURALI RADICALI
DA SCOTO A LEIBNIZ
Radical Natural Theologies
From Scotus to Leibniz
3 FEBBRAIO 2020 – ORE 10-18.30
4 FEBBRAIO 2020 – ORE 10-13
Università degli Studi di Milano, via Festa del Perdono 7
AULA 113
—
3 FEBBRAIO 2020 – ORE 10-13
9.45:ACCOGLIENZA DEI PARTECIPANTI
10.00-10.50
Olivier Boulnois(École Pratique des Hautes Études, PSL),
La démonstration scotiste de la Trinité.
11.00- 11.50
Garrett Randall Smith (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn),
Nicholas Bonet on Metaphysics and Natural Theology.
12.00-12.50
Thomas Gruber (I Tatti, The Harvard University Center for Italian Renaissance Studies),
Lullian Rationalism and/or “Protophysikotheologie”? Ramon Sibiuda’s “Liber creaturarum” as “Theologia naturalis.
3 FEBBRAIO 2020 – ORE 14.30-18.30
14.30-15.20
Franco Bacchelli (Università di Bologna),
Teologie naturali nel Quattrocento.
15.30-16.20
Alberto Frigo (Università degli Studi di Milano),
Même la Trinité: Descartes, Pascal et Saint-Ange.
16.30-17.20
Édouard Mehl (Université de Strasbourg),
La puissance et son nombre, de Nicolas de Cues à Kepler.
17.30-18-30
Jean-Christophe Bardout (Université de Rennes 1),
Malebranche et sa démonstration de la Trinité.
4 FEBBRAIO 2020 – ORE 10-13
10.00-10.50
Giuliano Mori (Università degli Studi di Milano),
La teologia naturale e la compagnia di Gesù nei secoli XVI-XVII
11.00-11.50
Gualtiero Lorini (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore),
Diversa Theologiae naturalis systemata: Christian Wolff's Double Way to God.
12.00-12.50
Gabriel Meyer-Bisch (Université de Caen Normandie),
Usage et fonction du concept de Cité de Dieu dans la première philosophie de Leibniz.
Organizzazione: A. Frigo (Università degli Studi di Milano)
Programma Rita Levi Montalcini
info: alberto.frigo@unimi.it