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Eurasianism and its Implications for Azerbaijan

2010, Eurasianism and its Implications for Azerbaijan

"Eurasianism as theory and practice is an increasingly important component of Russian modern political discourse. Not surprisingly, Azerbaijanis have been both attracted and repelled by aspects of this ideology and its potential application in the post-Soviet space. Given the diversity of ideas and programs that exist under the rubric “Eurasian,” of course, it is impossible to predict with precision the consequences of the strengthening of Eurasian trends in Russia for Azerbaijan, but given the attention this set of ideas is receiving in Russia, Azerbaijanis cannot afford to ignore it". (c)

AZERBAIJAN IN THE WORLD ADA Biweekly Newsletter Vol. 3, No. 11 June 1, 2010 adabiweekly@ada.edu.az In this issue: -- Adel Mohammad Adaileh, “Azerbaijani-Jordanian Relations Have Deep Roots” -- Paul Goble, “Another Turn of the Caucasus Kaleidoscope: Turkish-Russian Rapprochement and the Karabakh Conflict” -- Farhad Aliyev, “Eurasianism and Its Implications for Azerbaijan” -- A Chronology of Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy -- Note to Readers ***** AZERBAIJANI-JORDANIAN RELATIONS HAVE DEEP ROOTS H.E. Mr. Adel Mohammad Adaileh Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Relations between Azerbaijan and Jordan are based on a centuries-long shared history and culture, and they have developed in recent years because of the active dialogue between our two governments. Both Baku and Amman work together both bilaterally and in multilateral forums, and both are committed to the further strengthening of such ties in the future. In the years after Azerbaijan regained its independence, our late king Al Husain bin Talal developed and maintained excellent relations with Azerbaijan’s president at the time Heydar Aliyev. And in the last decade, Husain’s successor, Abdullah II has visited Azerbaijan three times, while President Ilham Aliyev has come to Jordan twice, high-level visits that have ensured that relations continue to grow. 1 That commitment was reflected in the opening of the Azerbaijani embassy in Amman and of the Jordanian embassy in Azerbaijan, institutions that over the last four years have allowed our two countries to cooperate in areas like agriculture, energy, cultural affairs, investments, media, aviation and transport. And in the last two years, trade between our countries has grown by 43 percent and now amounts to approximately 10 million US dollars. At present, Jordan’s chief exports to Azerbaijan are pharmaceuticals. In the security area, cooperation between our two countries has expanded as well. Azerbaijan’s defense industry ministry and Jordan’s King Abdullah II, Design and Development Bureau “KADDB” have signed two contracts calling for the production of military equipment in Baku by a Jordanian corporation. And several other joint projects in this sector are in the offing. For example, Azerbaijan’s defense industry ministry took part in SOFEX 2010 in Amman early in May and exhibited 55 different kinds of defense industry production to governments and corporations around the world. As someone who has worked in diplomacy for many years, I am often asked what qualities an individual needs to be successful in that area. I think you must make every effort to understand the world around you, be tolerant of humanity, and develop a healthy respect for the views, cultures, values and beliefs of others. You must learn other languages, the key to other cultures. And you need to learn how to use informal networks to communicate with others, all skills Jordanian diplomats here in Baku practice every day. ***** ANOTHER TURN OF THE CAUCASUS KALEIDOSCOPE: TURKISH-RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT AND THE KARABAKH CONFLICT Paul Goble Publications Advisor Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy When Armenia and Turkey signed the protocols calling for the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two longtime enemies and the opening of the border between them, many in Baku and the rest of the world assumed that this shift in the diplomatic game would prevent any rapid resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Karabakh and the other occupied territories. But it rapidly became clear that there was a long and difficult path between the signing of these accords and their adoption and that the initial judgments about their consequences for Karabakh were overstated or at least premature. Now, when a rapprochement is taking place between the Russian Federation and Turkey and when Moscow appears to be taking an even harder line than before in support of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan given its sharp criticism of the Armenian-organized “parliamentary elections” in Karabakh, many in Baku and the rest of the world have assumed that this move will force Armenia to accept the renewed Madrid Principles and withdraw from the occupied territories in short order. 2 Given Armenia’s historical dependence on Russia and given the current collapse of its effort to reach an accord with Turkey and thus have an alternative bridge to the world, such predictions about the consequences of the Russian-Turkish rapprochement for the Karabakh conflict certainly appear plausible, more plausible in fact than the earlier ones concerning the impact of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement. Finding itself increasingly isolated if it does not agree to withdraw and recognizing that it will gain both renewed support from Russia and the opening of the Turkish border if it does, Armenia would seem to have compelling reasons to take precisely that step or at least move more rapidly in that direction than it has in the past. But there are at least three reasons why such a reading may be too optimistic, reasons that those who want a settlement need to recognize in order to design more effective policies. First, the loss of Russian backing, if indeed that is a fair reading of what is happening, may lead Armenia to adopt an even harder line against any agreement. That counter-intuitive conclusion reflects what some have called the Masada Complex that has informed Armenian behavior in Karabakh and the other occupied territories over the last two decades. Believing that it is better to fight and even die than to retreat any further—the message of the great novel of the Armenian experience, Franz Werfel’s The 40 Days of Musa Dagh—at least some Armenians will say that they must rely even more on themselves than before and prepare for a final battle, even if it is one that they may even expect to lose. Such apocalypticism—even if it is manifested only in part—could have the effect of making the current talks even more difficult, with Armenians believing that they may be able to torpedo the Russian-Turkish rapprochement or draw in the Iranians or some other outside power in ways that will work to their own advantage. At the very least, those in Yerevan who feel themselves now without serious allies are more likely rather than less to listen to and rely upon the Armenian diaspora, a group that is more radically anti-Turkish than is Armenia itself and one whose influence had been on the wane as a result of Yerevan’s rapprochement with Ankara. That could point to a new effort reflecting the combined efforts of Armenia and the diaspora to seek international condemnation for the events of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire. Second, the Turkish-Russian rapprochement is certain to have a major impact on the role of outside powers in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, but it is unlikely by itself to change the positions of the two countries most directly involved, Azerbaijan and Armenia. What does that mean? In simplest terms, it suggests that both Russia and Turkey are likely to see a change in the Minsk Group, with Turkey added as a cochair, or the development of alternative venues in which the other co-chairs, France and especially the United States, will have a lesser voice. The drive to include Turkey as a co-chair is picking up steam with more and more commentators in Moscow saying that would be a good step and with Armenian opposition to such a move apparently less of an obstacle than it was before. But any such change by the very nature of diplomacy would slow things down rather than speed them up, given that a reconstituted Minsk Group would inevitably have to go through a series of meetings so as to coordinate things with the new member. And because of that likelihood, it could even be the case that Armenia would view the inclusion of Turkey as a useful delaying action until something else turns up. 3 But the desire of Turkey to play a bigger role in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict and that of Russia to play a predominant one in which outside powers, particularly the United States but indeed all, including even Turkey, could combine to lead to a search for a new venue for discussing the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict. Many in Baku and other capitals are unhappy that the Minsk Group has not made more progress toward the resolution of the conflict, and many are beginning to focus on the fact that the US pushed for the creation of that group in the OSCE because it was the only international organization in which all the countries of the region were members except Iran. And consequently, there is a new willingness to explore alternatives to the Minsk Group, possibly involving an entirely different cast of characters. It is unlikely, of course, that the Minsk Group will simply disappear. In the world of diplomacy, organizations frequently live on long after they have been effectively supplanted by others. (The last meeting of the League of Nations, for example, did not take place until AFTER World War II, a conflict the League had been set up to prevent). But if other groups do emerge, that will slow negotiations down still further as new players emerge and as each side takes the measure of the other. Consequently, moving away from the Minsk Group, something ever more governments appear ready to do, may have very different consequences than some of them appear to recognize. And third—and this is far and away the most important factor—Russia and Turkey have both broader and very different interests in the Caucasus than just resolving the Karabakh conflict. On the one hand, that means that each of them will seek to maximize those interests even if it does not promote the rapid resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. While both oppose any use of military power to end the impasse—such a restarting of open hostilities could threaten their interests— neither appears likely to be willing to sacrifice its wider interests in order to achieve an Armenian-Azerbaijani peace. Indeed, only if such an accord promotes their interests are they likely to push it very hard. And on the other, the differences in their positions on many issues—Russia wants to restore its influence across what Moscow still calls “the near abroad,” the former Soviet space, and Turkey wants to expand its influence in the same region—means that there are distinct limits to the rapprochement of these two powers, limits that could undermine the accord they seem to have reached in much the same way that the underlying differences between Armenia and Turkey have prevented the adoption of the two protocols Yerevan and Ankara have signed. Given all this, it is almost certainly wise to avoid becoming too optimistic or too apocalyptic in one’s predictions about the future of the South Caucasus on the basis of a single turn of the Caucasus kaleidoscope. It almost certainly will turn again, possibly bringing all the pieces into alignment for an agreement but equally possibly throwing them into disorder in such a way that no accord will be possible anytime soon. ***** EURASIANISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AZERBAIJAN Farhad Aliyev, PhD 4 Eurasianism as theory and practice is an increasingly important component of Russian modern political discourse. Not surprisingly, Azerbaijanis have been both attracted and repelled by aspects of this ideology and its potential application in the post-Soviet space. Given the diversity of ideas and programs that exist under the rubric “Eurasian,” of course, it is impossible to predict with precision the consequences of the strengthening of Eurasian trends in Russia for Azerbaijan, but given the attention this set of ideas is receiving in Russia, Azerbaijanis cannot afford to ignore it. That situation is further complicated by the fact that many in Moscow invoke Eurasian ideas to justify a neo-imperialist policy. Given that Azerbaijan is a segment of the South Caucasus sub-region, it thus lies within a zone of discontinuity from the point of view of both Eurasians and their opponents. That is, the country can be seen as properly part of Eurasia or as just outside it. Nevertheless, today Azerbaijan is increasingly discussed by adherents of integration in post-Soviet area as a part of Eurasia, especially after the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war. In addition, when analyzing the situation of Azerbaijan relative to Russia, one must not ignore the historical background, that is, the experience of continuing coexistence and the social and cultural ties between the countries even now. All this allows to a well-known degree some certainty in speaking about the attachment of Azerbaijan more to the Eurasian geopolitical space with all its cultural-civilizational consequences than to the European or any other, including Turkic space with which it is more often grouped. [1] From this, we can conclude that Azerbaijan, being in the zone of interests and the immediate influence of Russia cannot fail to be considered as a segment of the Eurasian geopolitical space. An official acceptance of Eurasianism by the Russian government would increase the integrative trends on the post-Soviet space with all ensuring consequences. That does not point to an instantaneous loss of sovereignty by Azerbaijan or other former Soviet republics. Instead, it could mean in its most probable first step the inclusion of Azerbaijan into “a single Eurasian economic space,” which would take the form of a broadened “Tariff Union.” In a more distant perspective, it is possible to imagine that this would lead to a common currency area and even other deeper and stronger forms of integration. Eurasianism as an integrative doctrine is the fruit of the intellectual efforts of Russian investigators and consequently cannot fail to be at the center of discussions of Russia as it seeks to be the focus of all integration processes in Eurasia. (Without going into details, one should nonetheless note that the Eurasia about which the classical figures of the doctrine wrote nearly a century ago corresponds with the borders of the former USSR. Thus, the current post-Soviet space is itself the Eurasia of the Eurasians, as distinguished from the generally accepted definition of geographers). One must also keep in mind that as an addition to the key aspects of the doctrine of Eurasianism familiar to most, there is the Eurasian concept of “place of development,” the region, in the broadest sense of the word, which includes landscape, climatic conditions, and the ethnos as the bearer of culture. Such an addition is of course justified at least in many cases because the historical coexistence of various ethnic groups has left a unique impression on each of them to a large extent without any regard to the desire of particular individuals or groups 5 within them. Thus, for Eurasians, Eurasia is a unique place of development, and Azerbaijan, as a part of the South Caucasus, is a constituent element of that place. Consequently, it cannot fail to be drawn into integration processes in the framework of the latter. If Russia becomes internally strong, something it is not today, then it can be a center of attraction for the states surrounding it, and Moscow will thus try to draw into its orbit “the peripheral ones” from the point of view of the Eurasian “center.” There are thus at least two possible scenarios for the future: Eurasianism (or ‘Eurasianism like doctrine’) becomes some kind of the state ideology of Russia and leads Moscow to pursue those integrative projects or Eurasianism remains a trend of thought but does not determine the direction of Russian policy in the post-Soviet area. Theoretically, the strengthening of Eurasian attitudes in Russia and the internal strengthening of the country will almost inevitably influence the course of events on the entire post-Soviet space as a whole and on Azerbaijan in particular because it is obvious that the influence of the West under such a conjunction of circumstances will be reduced or at the very least will be contested by a “Eurasian” Russia which will do everything it can to eliminate Western influence in the Russian neighborhood. According to Marlene Laruelle (2007, p. 13), “Eurasianism can play an important role in the future” because it already today competes with communism as a political force, especially if one takes into consideration that even the classics of the doctrine often positioned Eurasianism as communism without Marxism. Consequently, many researchers now say that Eurasianism is in a position to fulfil the ideological vacuum in this region. Besides, the majority of experts stress that the contemporary neoEurasian movement, headed by Alexander Dugin, is supported at least at the declarative level by the government and that suggests that the power structures in Russia have decided to bet on Eurasian ideas at least in the long term. In this connection, the author of these lines would like to note the following: It is impossible to reject the possibility of the implementation of certain ideas of Eurasianism in the future, especially as a means of cultural self-defense against the dominance of the West even if it is acknowledged that these ideas will be transformed in the course of that interaction. However, it is important to recognize that the perspectives of the implementation of the Eurasian doctrine on the postSoviet space will in the first instance depend on their vitality and elevation to the state level in Russia, a trend that is already in evidence as has been suggested here. Geographically and historically, the territory of contemporary Russia has long been and is today a place of competition for the construction and demise of broader state formations, the last two of which were the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. One would not want to fall into the trap of geographic determination, but it is difficult not to agree that even today’s globalized world of high technologies and science exists in a geographic continuum, the impact of which makes itself felt on present geopolitical subjects almost as a Procrustean bed surviving from the past. Note [1] On September 29, 2009 the first session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Turkic Language countries took place in Baku and resulted in the Baku Declaration. On October 2-3, 2009 in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, the ninth summit of 6 the heads of the Turkic Language countries occurred. The only Turkic language country which did not participate in the work of that summit was Uzbekistan. Reference Laruelle, Marlene. “The Orient in Russian Thought at the Turn of the Century”, in Shlapentokh, Dmitry, ed. (2007) Russia Between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism (Leiden-Boston). ***** A CHRONOLOGY OF AZERBAIJAN’S FOREIGN POLICY I. Key Government Statements on Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy President Ilham Aliyev says that “the military potential which exists today in Azerbaijan allows us at any moment to successfully and in a short time fulfil any task” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211477.html). Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that the conclusive stage of the resolution of the Karabakh conflict is beginning and that while no exact date can yet be given, “the Azerbaijani flag will again fly over Khankandi.” He adds that “it is necessary to conduct elections with the participation of both communities who must define the future status [of Nagorno-Karabakh] within the framework of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211287.html). The draft Military Doctrine of Azerbaijan identifies Armenia as “an aggressor,” Milli Majlis deputy Zahid Oruj says (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211902.html). II. Key Statements by Others about Azerbaijan Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan says that Turkey “cannot laugh when Karabakh is crying bitter tears” and that Ankara remains committed to resolving all conflicts in its region on the basis of its policy of having no problems with its neighbors (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211711.html). The Russian foreign ministry says that “Moscow supports the principle of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and does not recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state.” Consequently, it rejects as illegitimate the May 23 voting there (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210723.html). III. A Chronology of Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy 31 May President Ilham Aliyev receives Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the Chinese Central Bank (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211980.html). 7 Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives Michael Link, a member of the German Bundestag (http://www.day.az/news/politics/212006.html). Defense Minister Col. Gen. Safar Abiyev receives Celeste Wallander, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211883.html). Deputy Foreign Minister Vagif Sadykhov meets in London with British parliamentarians and the British Foreign Office to discuss strengthening bilateral ties (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211975.html). The draft Military Doctrine of Azerbaijan identifies Armenia as “an aggressor,” Milli Majlis deputy Zahid Oruj says (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211902.html). Azerbaijani and Russian parliamentarians meet in Moscow for a session of the Inter-Parliamentary Commission on Cooperation between the two legislatures (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211936.html). Aydin Mirzazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that “the main thing that Armenia is to take on itself is the obligation to liberate the occupied territories” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210583.html). Svetlana Orlova, vice speaker of the Russian Federation Council, says that the five Duma deputies who worked as election monitors in Karabakh and were then declared persona non grata by Azerbaijan had gone to the occupied territories on their own rather than as part of an official Russian government delegation (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211996.html). 29 May Vahdat Sultan-zade, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Ashgabat, says that Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are studying the possibilities for cooperation in the energy sector (http://www.day.az/news/economy/211675.html). Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan says that Turkey “cannot laugh when Karabakh is crying bitter tears” and that Ankara remains committed to resolving all conflicts in its region on the basis of its policy of having no problems with its neighbors (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211711.html). 28 May Azerbaijan marks the Day of the Republic in honor of the foundation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in 1918 (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211476.html). 27 May President Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva lead the nation in a ceremony on the eve of the Day of the Republic. In his remarks, the President says that “the military potential which exists today in Azerbaijan allows us at any moment to successfully and in a short time fulfil any task” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211477.html). 8 Economic Development Minister Shahin Mustafayev receives Fu Ziying, China’s Vice Minister of Commerce (http://www.day.az/news/economy/211533.html). The political parties represented in the Milli Majlis issue an appeal to the parliaments of the world not to accept the voting in Nagorno-Karabakh as legitimate (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211398.html). Gultakin Hajibayli, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that unless Yerevan accepts the renewed Madrid Principles and negotiates in good faith toward an agreement, “Armenia will continue the process of political and economic suicide” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211355.html). Ziyafat Askarov, the deputy head of the Milli Majlis, leads an Azerbaijani delegation to the spring session of the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO that is taking place in Latvia (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211346.html). The Romanian foreign ministry says that Bucharest does not recognize the “parliamentary elections” organized in Nagorno-Karabakh on May 23 as legitimate (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211305.html). The governors of seven US states send greetings to Baku on the occasion of the Day of the Republic (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211373.html). 26 May The Azerbaijani government sends to the Milli Majlis a draft military doctrine that the deputies are to consider in the near future (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211151.html). Defense Minister Col. Gen. Safar Abiyev makes a working visit to Moscow at the invitation of his Russian counterpart Anatoly Serdukov (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211133.html). Namik Aliyev, Azerbaijani ambassador to Tbilisi, meets with Zurab Kharatishvili, the president of the Central Electoral Commission of Georgia (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211171.html). Asef Hajiyev, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that “it had been made clear to Armenia that it must end the occupation of Azerbaijani territories” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211139.html). Turkish President Abdulla Gul says that “the current status quo in the Caucasus contradicts the interests of everyone” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211129.html). Turkish President Abdulla Gul says that “the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway is a step to the rebirth of the Silk Road” (http://www.day.az/news/economy/211163.html). The Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe says that the voting conducted in Nagorno-Karabakh on May 23 “is not recognized by the international community” as legitimate (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211208.html). 9 The Organization of the Islamic Conference calls on the international community to denounce the voting held in occupied Nagorno-Karabakh on May 23 (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211157.html). The Norwegian foreign ministry sends a note to its Azerbaijani counterpart saying that Oslo views the recent “vote” in Nagorno-Karabakh as “fictional” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211283.html). The Iranian foreign ministry says that reports that Tehran sent observers to the “so-called ‘parliamentary elections’” in Nagorno-Karabakh are untrue (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211143.html). The Netherlands does not recognize the voting in Nagorno-Karabakh as legitimate and expresses its support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211136.html). The French foreign ministry says that the May 23 voting in Nagorno-Karabakh “cannot in any circumstances define the future status” of that part of Azerbaijan (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211110.html). President Barak Obama nominates Matthew Bryza to be the US ambassador to Azerbaijan. Bryza’s candidacy must be confirmed by the US Senate (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211112.html). 25 May President Ilham Aliyev named Mammad Ahmadzade Azerbaijani ambassador to Argentina (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211089.html). Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives Belgian Senator Anne-Marie Lizin (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211084.html). Deputy Foreign Minister Vagif Sadykhov speaks on Azerbaijani foreign policy to the Oxford Union Society (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210739.html). Ali Ahmadov, the deputy chairman of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party, says that the lack of resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict “creates the conditions for conducting illegal ‘elections’ by the separatists” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210991.html). Maud de Boer-Buquicchio, the deputy secretary general of the Council of Europe, says that “the Council of Europe stands for the most rapid resolution possible of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/211009.html). Štefan Füle, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, says that “the elections conducted in the countries of ‘the Eastern Partnership’ are an indicator for cooperation with the European Union” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210928.html). In other comments, he says that the EU intends to expand its cooperation with Azerbaijan (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210931.html). Kanat Saudbayev, Kazakhstan foreign minister and chairman-in-office of the OSCE, says that the May 23 voting in Nagorno-Karabakh “must not influence the outcome 10 of the process of resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210949.html). Arnold Schwarzenegger, governor of the US state of California, sends greetings to Azerbaijan on the occasion of Republic Day (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210910.html). 24 May President Ilham Aliyev welcomes to Baku the participants of the 7th Conference of Council of Europe states devoted to gender equality (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210880.html). President Ilham Aliyev receives UN Deputy Secretary General Dr. Asha-Rose Migiro (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210904.html). President Ilham Aliyev receives Maud de Boer-Buquicchio, the deputy secretary general of the Council of Europe (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210851.html). President Ilham Aliyev receives Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210906.html). President Ilham Aliyev receives Walter Kälin, the representative of the UN Secretary General on the human rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs) (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210871.html). President Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva receive Dr. Asha-Rose Migiro, UN Deputy Secretary General (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210785.html). First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva receives Maud de Boer-Buquicchio, the deputy secretary general of the Council of Europe (www.day.az/news/politics/210734.html). First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva tells a Council of Europe conference on gender equality being held in Baku that “gender and equality are among the most important bases of any democratic society” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210902.html). Ali Hasanov, head of the political department of the Presidential Administration, says that “by means of the illegal ‘elections’ in Nagorno-Karabakh, the separatist regime hopes to prolong its existence” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210721.html). The Foreign Ministry issues a declaration saying that the voting in occupied Nagorno-Karabakh on May 23 was illegal (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210855.html). The Foreign Ministry dismisses as an emotional outburst Armenian Foreign Minister Edvard Nalbandyan’s assertion that the people of the “so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” have the right to define their future without regard to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210896.html). 11 Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that “if the co-chairs [of the OSCE Minsk Group] force Armenia to accept the renewed Madrid Principles, this will open broad opportunities.” He adds that “we expect an answer from the president of Armenia and the minister of foreign affairs” who up to now have not said “yes” or “no” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210876.html). Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov signs two intergovernmental accords with his Egyptian counterpart Ahmed Aboul Gheit, and Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy rector Hafiz Pashayev signs a cooperation accord with Egyptian ambassador to Azerbaijan Sabir Mansour (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210836.html). Gudrat Gurbanov, the head of the State Maritime Administration of Azerbaijan, takes part in the London meeting of the Committee on Maritime Security (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210845.html). Emin Eyubov, Azerbaijani ambassador in Brussels, says that recent events have shown that the Armenian lobby is not capable of winning what it wants (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210865.html). Ogtay Asadov, the speaker of the Milli Majlis, receives Dagestani President Magomedsalam Magomedov (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210769.html). Ziyafat Askarov, the first vice speaker of the Milli Majlis, says that “the Parliamentary Assembly of the Turkic Language Countries will become the basis for the still greater strengthening of the political, economic, and cultural ties among the member countries of this organization” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210762.html). Aydin Mirzazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that “the military path of the resolution of the Karabakh problem is on the order of the day” given Armenian intransigence (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210584.html). Ban Ki-moon, UN secretary general, says that the United Nations does not recognize as legitimate the voting held in Nagorno-Karabakh on May 23 (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210898.html). The co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group issue a statement saying that “the carrying out of so-called ‘parliamentary elections’ in Nagorno-Karabakh must not mean a premature designation of the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh in the context of the peaceful resolution of the conflict” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210843.html). Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit says that “good coordination of actions exists between Baku and Cairo” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210699.html). Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski says that “Poland sees in the countries taking part in the Eastern Partnership future neighbors of the European Union” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210794.html). The Russian foreign ministry says that “Moscow supports the principle of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and does not recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an 12 independent state.” Consequently, it rejects as illegitimate the May 23 voting there (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210723.html). 23 May Ali Huseynov and Elman Zeynalov, two Milli Majlis deputies, attend an international conference in Sofia on “The Eastern Policy of the European Union—New Possibilities, New Obligations” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210652.html). 22 May Polad Bulbuloglu, Azerbaijani ambassador to Moscow, says that President Ilham Aliyev “has declared many times that Azerbaijan wants to resolve [the Karabakh conflict] by peaceful means. But every nation, every people, every state is obliged to defend its citizens, to defend and preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, we consider that if the peace negotiations do not yield results, then Azerbaijan will be free in its choice as to how to resolve this long-standing conflict” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210595.html). Ganira Pashayeva, a Milli Majlis deputy, while taking part in the World Summit of Women, meets on the sidelines of that Beijing conference with the first lady of Tanzania, the vice president of Vietnam, the foreign affairs minister of Lichtenstein, the foreign trade minister of Jamaica, the labor minister of Kazakhstan, the labor minister of Albania, the higher education minister of Oman, the family affairs minister of Malawi, the state secretary for education and sport of Slovenia, the deputy regional development minister of Bulgaria, and the deputy minister of women’s education of Saudi Arabia (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210568.html). Fazil Mustafa, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that “it is not excluded that the formula for the end to the occupation of Azerbaijani territories according to the 2+3+2 formula really lies on the negotiating table” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210159.html). 21 May The Foreign Ministry distributes a statement saying that Azerbaijan welcomes the adoption by the European Parliament on May 20 of a resolution calling for a more active European role in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210450.html). Elnur Aslanov, the head of the political analysis department of the Presidential Administration, says that “Baku is ready for dialogue despite the complicated situation in the South Caucasus” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210310.html). Ali Hasanov, the head of the political department of the presidential Administration, says that relations between Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation are developing “intensively” in the transportation sector (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210468.html). The Azerbaijan defense ministry announces that Baku is conducting negotiations with 27 countries on military-technical cooperation and security (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210460.html). 13 The Azerbaijan defense ministry says that “if a second Karabakh war begins, then it will conclude with the defeat of the opponent Armenia, and we declare this confident in our arms and the preparation of our soldiers” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210446.html). Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, says that the EU “does not recognize the constitutional and legal frameworks in which ‘the parliamentary elections’ in Nagorno-Karabakh are to take place in Nagorno-Karabakh” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210477.html). The Azerbaijani community of Crimea protests the adoption of a resolution by the Uzhgorod city council on “the Armenian genocide” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210409.html). 20 May Agshin Mehtiyev, Azerbaijan’s permanent representative to the United Nations, sends a letter to the UN General Assembly and the Security Council that says the vote planned for May 23 violates UN resolutions and international law (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210179.html). Ganira Pashayeva, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that “unlike other countries who are members of the OSCE Minsk Group, Turkey always observes its obligations” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210226.html). Ganira Pashayeva, a Milli Majlis deputy, tells the World Forum of Women in Beijing that “among the million IDPs as a result of Armenian aggression, there are thousands of women” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210209.html). The foreign ministers of the Organization of Islamic Countries recognize the Khojaly tragedy as a crime against humanity (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210215.html). The Turkish Foreign Ministry condemns plans to hold “parliamentary elections” in Nagorno-Karabakh as a violation of Azerbaijani sovereignty and international law (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210182.html). Pierre Lellouche, French Minister of State for European Affairs, says that “France as a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group supports the efforts of Azerbaijan and Armenia toward the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210220.html). Dennis Sammut, the head of LINKS, says that “the coalition government of Great Britain will not change [London’s] policy toward Azerbaijan” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210186.html). 19 May Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, during the OIC ministerial in Dushanbe, meets with Tajikistan President Imomali Rahmon as well as with the foreign ministers of other OIC countries (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210000.html). 14 The Foreign Ministry says that anyone who participates as an observer in the “socalled” elections in separatist Nagorno-Karabakh will be considered a persona non grata by Azerbaijan (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210030.html). The ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party sends a letter to the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group calling on them to denounce plans to hold elections in the Armenianoccupied portion of Azerbaijan (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210093.html). Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu calls for the intensification of talks on Nagorno-Karabakh (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210036.html). The foreign ministers of the member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference adopt during their 37th session three resolutions which identify Armenia as the aggressor in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (http://www.day.az/news/politics/210035.html). Burkhan Kuzu, chairman of the constitutional commission of Turkey’s Grand National Assembly, says that “if Russia refuses to help official Yerevan, a catastrophe awaits Armenia” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209539.html). Vacheslav Baburin, a professor at Moscow State University, says that “it would be useful for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict if Turkey were to become a cochair of the OSCE Minsk Group” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209823.html). 18 May Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, while attending the 37th session of the Council of the Foreign Ministers of OIC countries, calls on Muslim governments to support holding a summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Baku in 2013 (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209889.html). Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov says that he “hopes” that the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs “will be able to convince Armenia to accept the renewed Madrid Principles” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209697.html). Agshin Mekhdiyev, Azerbaijan’s permanent representative to the United Nations, meets with Joshua Sears, director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209902.html). Labor and Social Security Minister Fuzuli Alakbarov signs a new cooperation protocol with his Turkish counterpart Omer Dinjer (http://www.day.az/news/economy/209698.html). Shahin Aliyev, head of the department of legal affairs of the Presidential Administration, says that “elections in Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be carried out without the permission of the government of Azerbaijan and the Central Electoral Commission of the country” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209757.html). OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu says that “the Organization of the Islamic Conference supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209765.html). 15 The Organization of the Islamic Conference announces plans to open in Baku the Eurasian Regional Center of the foreign ministerial forum (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209788.html). Bilge Cankorel, the head of the Baku office of the OSCE, says that “the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe supports the efforts of Azerbaijan directed at improving the electoral milieu” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209767.html). 17 May President Ilham Aliyev tells visiting Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that “always, at decisive moments in the negotiations, the Armenian side takes steps which break them up” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209570.html). First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva receives Emine Erdogan, the wife of the prime minister of Turkey (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209599.html). Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives his Chinese counterpart Yáng Jiéchí (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209628.html). Bahar Muradova, Milli Majlis vice speaker, says that “Ankara must act in a coordinated fashion with Baku” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209620.html). Nazim Mammadov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that “everyone knows under the dictate of which state Armenia acts” and that according to the existing schema, Turkey will open its borders with Armenia after the de-occupation of two districts” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209473.html). Asim Mollazade, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that “official Yerevan has always occupied itself only with the imitation of negotiations” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209196.html). Anar Mammadkhanov, a Milli Majlis deputy, says that “for the Armenian diaspora, achieving recognition for the mythical ‘Armenian genocide’ is much more important than dealing with the problems of Armenia” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209285.html). Jon Ramberg, Norway’s ambassador to Baku, says that “the entrance of Azerbaijan into the World Trade Organization can attract additional investment in the development of the non-petroleum sector of the economy” (http://www.day.az/news/economy/209586.html). Representative Solomon Ortiz, the co-chairman of the Azerbaijan Working Group in the US House of Representatives, sends his greetings to Baku on the occasion of Republic Day (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209605.html). 16 May President Ilham Aliyev receives Jordanian King Abdullah II during the latter’s official visit to Azerbaijan and tells him that “we conduct negotiations in a constructive manner and from this point of view expect an analogous approach from the Armenian side” (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209378.html). 16 Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and his Jordanian counterpart Nasser Judeh sign two bilateral cooperation accords (http://www.day.az/news/politics/209427.html). Note to Readers The editors of “Azerbaijan in the World” hope that you find it useful and encourage you to submit your comments and articles via email (adabiweekly@ada.edu.az). The materials it contains reflect the personal views of their authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 17
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