The Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2014

In this new work, Michael Slote seeks to defend the view that perfection, whether of virtue or of personal happiness, is impossible. In the process of arguing for this conclusion, Slote discusses much that is of interest -including some suggestions for ways of categorising virtues and goods, and some possible ways forward for care ethics.

Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology, 2009

Sandel's book argues against genetic enhancement as an illegitimate expression of a drive to human mastery and a rejection of the proper appreciation of the gift of life. His view combines bad theology with bad virtue ethics, and exemplifies the problem of status quo bias in ethics.

This is a book review of Michael Hyde's "Perfection: Coming to Terms with Being Human."

National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 2017

With the advance of CRISPR technology, parents will be tempted to create superior offspring who are healthier, smarter, and stronger. In addition to the fact that many of these procedures are considered immoral for Catholics, they could change human nature in radical and possibly disastrous ways. This article focuses on the question of human perfectionism. First, by considering the relationship between human nature and technology, it analyzes whether such advances can improve human nature in addition to curing diseases. Next, it looks at the moral and spiritual dimensions of perfection by analyzing the cardinal virtues. It argues that seeking perfection in the physical sense alone may not be prudent or wise and may produce greater injustices and weaken the human spirit in the long run. Understanding our true calling to perfection can help us resist the temptation of hubris to enhance the human race through technology. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly

Human Affairs, 2009

This article tries to rescue the perfectionist approach to moral theory from the pragmatic tradition and inspiration. Based on the philosophy of Dewey and taking into account authors like H. Putnam or S. Cavell, it tries to defend the idea that pragmatism allows us to understand moral perfectionism in a new way. In that way, perfectionism is bound to a certain interpretation of practical rationality, and a new understanding of moral objectivity and human subjectivity. Finally, moral perfectionism is not a theory that aims to solve all moral dilemmas but provides an understanding of how to face up to the problems of ordinary moral life.

The present article provides a synthetic description of the history of the idea of human perfection in modern philosophy. The description is aimed at capturing main currents in this history, which have been divided in the article into the 'anti-perfectionist', and the 'pro-perfectionist'. The former currents include: (1) the reappearance of the pessimistic picture of human nature underlying skepticism with regard to the feasibility of the idea of human moral perfection; (2) the fall of the classical picture of the world leading to the rejection of the idea of human teleological/metaphysical perfection and to skepticism with regard to the possibility of the justification of the idea of human moral perfection; (3) the discovery of the incompatibility and incommensurability of moral values leading to doubts regarding the coherence of the very idea of human moral perfection. The latter currents include: (1) the new ('Romantic') way of understanding human moral perfection based on the idea of radical freedom; (2) the appearance of the belief in the perfectibility of human beings, i.e., their unlimited capacity to perfect their moral, intellectual and physical abilities. The article also traces the complex relations between these currents.

Papers invoking a revival of the virtues are by now quite common. What seems completely missing, however, is a perspective which puts virtue ethics in context with other important theories which bring conceptions of the good back to the ethical (and political) discussion, such as natural law theory and perfectionism. In this paper I argue for a common core that runs through virtue ethics, (a certain) liberal perfectionism and natural law theory: the claim is that we can find much more similarity and shared ethical views than what is usually assumed between liberalism and natural law theory, if we go beyond ‘rights talk’ and focus on the virtues. Against this claim we hypothesize and discuss two general problems: (1) what virtue ethics should we consider in the large variety on offer? (2) why not taking seriously also theories, such as objective list theories and new natural law theory, which also propose alternative conceptions of the good? Our conclusions are inclined to favour an inclusive (perfectionist) view of human flourishing as excellences of character (or virtues) which may sound acceptable for liberal and natural law theorists. CONTENTS 1. Virtue Ethics and Its Legacy. 2. Liberal ‘Rights Talk’. 3. Different Brands of Perfectionism. 4. Objective List Theories. 4.1 Sher’s Argument for Objective List Theory. 5. Traces of a Different Perfectionism. 5.1 Agency Goods Perfectionism. 5.2 The Place of Virtues in Agency Goods Perfectionism. 6. The Idea of Nature. 7. Virtues in Natural Law Theory. 7.1 New Natural Law Fundamental Goods. 8. Conclusions. ABOUT THE AUTHOR First degree in Law at the University of Bari, Master degree of Law at New York University, Ph.d. in Political Philosophy at Sussex University (thesis on liberal perfectionism). Visiting scholar at Oxford and Harvard University. Working on liberal theories of justice, virtue ethics and perfectionism, with a recent bent toward natural law theory and its relationships with liberalism. Currently teaching 'Philosophy of Law' and 'Ethics and the Law' as associate professor at the University of Bari.

Journal of Aesthetic Education, 2014

Whatever ethical stance one takes in the debate regarding the ethics of human enhancement, one or more reference points are required to assess its morality. Some have suggested looking at the bioethical notions of safety, justice, and/or autonomy to find such reference points. Others, arguing that those notions are limited with respect to assessing the morality of human enhancement, have turned to human nature, human authenticity, or human dignity as reference points, thereby introducing some perfectionist assumptions into the debate. In this article, we ask which perfectionist assumptions should be used in this debate. After a critique of views that are problematic, we take a positive approach, suggesting some perfectionist elements that can lend guidance to the practice of human enhancement, based on the work of Martha Nussbaum's Capability Approach. We suggest that the central capabilities can be used to define the human aspect of human enhancement and thereby allow a moral evaluation of enhancement interventions. These central capabilities can be maximized harmoniously to postulate what an ideal human would look like. Ultimately, the aim of this article is twofold. First, it seeks to make explicit the perfectionist assumptions found in the debate and eliminate those that are problematic. Second, the paper clarifies an element that is often neglected in the debate about human enhancement, the view of the ideal human towards which human enhancement should strive. Here, we suggest that some central capabilities that are essential for an ideal human being can be maximized harmoniously and can therefore serve as possible reference points to guide human enhancement.

Perfectionism is the view that developing the human essence is good. In this paper, I defend perfectionism against some recent formulations of classic objections. The first objection is that perfectionism counterintuitively undervalues the relevance of (1) pleasure and (2) preferences. Daniel Haybron and Dale Dorsey present compelling counterexamples, but I argue that certain construals of perfectionism can successfully capture pleasure and preference, or, considered differently, they aren’t worth capturing. The second objection is a sophisticated version of the “wrong properties” objection posed by Dale Dorsey, wherein the intuitively plausibility of the perfectionist ideal is threatened by a lack of theoretical pressure to accept putative wrong properties cases. I argue this objection is unsuccessful because it fails to distinguish between general claims and substantive views. However, when pushed further, the objection leads to a serious worry, what I call the Deep Problem: perfectionism fails to offer a satisfying foundational justification for why developing the human essence is valuable. Some perfectionists, such as Thomas Hurka, have views that avoid the Deep Problem, where others, such as George Sher, attempt to answer it. I argue these approaches are unsatisfying. The lack of immediate intuitions directed toward the general perfectionist claim place a special burden on perfectionism to provide a justificatory foundation in contrast to competing axiologies. In response to the Deep Problem I consider a new and surprising direction for perfectionism. This new direction suggests perfectionism must appeal to additional values to ground its own value, suggesting a close relationship between perfectionism and value-theoretic pluralism.