There is a familiar teleological picture of epistemic normativity on which it is grounded in the goal or good of belief, which is taken in turn to be the acquisition of truth and the avoidance of error. This traditional picture has faced numerous challenges, but one of the most interesting of these is an argument that rests on the nearly universally accepted view that this truth goal, as it is known, is at heart two distinct goals that are in tension with one another. This paper will look more closely at the standard way of understanding the truth goal, drawing out both its explicit and implicit features. My aim will be to show that the standard way of understanding the truth goal is deeply mistaken, to propose and defend an alternative model, and to show how this alternative model restores the unity of the goal and its potential to ground and explain the normative dimensions of belief.

This paper focuses on the possibility of akrasia – a phenomenon of human agency which involves "recognizing what is better for one and yet doing what is worse" (Brickhouse, 1). I examine two accounts of akrasia and argue for one of them. One: intellectualism comes in two degrees, both of which base human agency on reason (or thinking) and believe akrasia to be impossible. Strong intellectualists face difficulties in demonstrating the impossibility; thus I focus on weak intellectualists – such as Gottfried Leibniz – and show that akrasia is only apparent but actually impossible; i.e. it merely seems like one recognizes the better yet does the worse. What actually occurs is that the intellect is hijacked by an intense feeling, compelling the individual to perceive an actual evil as an apparent good. Two: voluntarism by Philip Melanchthon is a form of anti-intellectualism which claims that feeling determines human agency and that one cannot control his or her feelings. Under this view, recognizing the better but doing the worse (akrasia) is both possible and relatively common because the thought that something is not actually good cannot alter the feeling that it is good. I argue against Melanchthon and show that thinking alters and gives rise to feelings. Thus, one can have a degree of self-control over feelings by strengthening the bond between the intellect (thinking) and the will (striving) by doing what I call the Leibnizian exercise.

Metaphilosophy, 2019

We philosophers of science have before us an important new task that we need urgently to take up. It is to convince the scientific community to adopt and implement a new philosophy of science that does better justice to the deeply problematic basic intellectual aims of science than that which we have at present. Problematic aims evolve with evolving knowledge, that part of philosophy of science concerned with aims and methods thus becoming an integral part of science itself. The outcome of putting this new philosophy into scientific practice would be a new kind of science, both more intellectually rigorous, and one that does better justice to the best interests of humanity.

1997

Minimalism about truth has received considerable attention of late. We think that much of the discussion suffers from a pair of deficiencies. First, there has been a failure to discriminate different varieties and dimensions of minimalism about truth. Second, some serious and fundamental problems for the most popular varieties of minimalism about truth have not yet received sufficient attention. This paper aims to remedy those deficiencies. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, we distinguish six main varieties of minimalism about truth. In the second section, we identify four dimensions along which views about truth can be more or less minimal, thus clarifying the range of relevant notions of “minimality”. In the third section, we critically discuss four minimalist theses.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2007

forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy

Note: an early version of this paper circulated under the title 'Truthiness'. Please cite this version instead.

2018 is an anniversary year for not only the fiftieth anniversary of Pope Paul VI’s Humanae Viate but also the twentieth-fifth anniversary (August 6) of St. John Paul II’s Veritatis Splendor and the twentieth anniversary (September 14) of Fides et Ratio. John Paul himself stresses the link between these two encyclicals. This article is concerned with John Paul II’s contribution to addressing the question regarding the necessary metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions that are demanded by the prior basic affirmations of Catholic faith and thought, presuppositions making it possible to show that the truth-attaining capacity of the human mind is such that it can achieve an “intake of the real.” Following John Paul II’s lead, my article focuses on the theme of truth itself, its nature, what truth is and why it matters, on the relations between not only truth and the epistemic justification of truth claims, but also how both truth that is asserted, propositional truth, and “accepted with intellectual assent,” on the one hand, and lived truth, or existential truth, which is practiced, and hence “a truth to be lived out,” on the other.

CEHM Fundación Carlos Slim, 2024

Rodrigo Martínez Baracs, “Tenochtitlan en las crónicas españolas”, en el ciclo 700 años de la fundación de Mexico Tenochtitlan, Centro de Estudios de Historia de México, Fundación Carlos Slim, martes 10 de septiembre de 2024, a las cinco de la tarde.

2022

article was written for an Australian Left-wing platform. Following extensive discussions about its publication and the editing of certain contents, initial approval was granted. However, it was subsequently removed on grounds of purported anti-Iranian revolutionary sentiments. I republish it almost unchanged.

2016

A investigação e o castigo às violações aos dos direitos humanos das ditaduras nos países da América Latina se tornaram uma questão inevitável para o fortalecimento e a consolidação das democracias da região. No presente trabalho, observaremos os principais eventos no processo de justiça transicional em Uruguai desde a redemocratização até os dias de hoje. Analisaremos os principais eventos observando a participação dos (e em) tribunais no processo de luta pela memoria, verdade e justiça. Examinaremos também a posição sobre a revisão do passado violento em cada um dos governos no período selecionado 1985-2016. O estudo tenta colaborar no debate atual sobre os processos de revisão do passado violento na nossa região, desde a perspectiva da justiça transicional, salientando a trajetória dos tribunais e a posição dos governos no poder com relação à impunidade.