The aim of this essay is to develop a coherence theory for the justification of evidentiary judgments in law. The main claim of the coherence theory proposed in this article is that a belief about the events being litigated is justified if and only if it is a belief that an epistemically responsible fact finder might hold by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. The article argues that this coherentist approach to evidence and legal proof has the resources to meet some of the main objections that may be addressed against attempts to analyze the justification of evidentiary judgments in law in coherentist terms. It concludes by exploring some implications of the proposed version of legal coherentism for a jurisprudence of evidence.

The aim of this study is to examine the role of perception in the most traditional theories of epistemic justification, namely, foundationalism and coherentism. First, we analyze the main characteristics of each one of these theories. We then evaluate the conceptions supported by these theories about perception – the sense-data foundationalist theory and the coherentism's causal approach. Afterwards, we present the most important obstacles and common failures of that proposals. The result of this inquiry is that both theories fail to offer an suitable model of empirical knowledge’s justification. It is essential, therefore, to have a theory that is able to overcome the limitations of traditional theories.

内容提要：本文综合评述当代认识论的现状以及主干近10 年来主要发展趋势和最新理论贡献。 它首先介绍一些必要的理论背景：盖梯尔难题，闭合原则，内在论与外在论之争 (第 2节)，然后分 6 节集中讨论、评述：(i) 温和基础主义的兴起及发展 (第 3 节) ； (ii) 对认知怀疑论的最新表述及回应 (第 4 节) ； (iii) 认知无限辨明论 (第 5 节) ；(iv) 认知语境主义的兴起，其理论贡献，以及存在的问题；(v) 德性认识论的二个模型，它们的优点,和现有的问题。最后简单讨论当代认识论面临的危机与机遇。


Abstract: This article surveys the current state of affairs and some important new developments of epistemology in the past 10 years. It first introduces some necessary theoretical background (the Gettier problem, the closure principle, and internalism vs. externalism), and then focuses on (i) the rise and development of modest forms of foundationalism, (ii) recent debates on epistemic skepticism, (iii) epistemic infinitism, (iv) epistemic contextualism and its contributions and problems, (v)  two models of virtue epistemology, its merits and existing issues. It ends with a brief review of the theoretical crisis faced with contemporary epistemology and its opportunities.

Those who criticize as well as those who nowadays defend constructivism in metaethics consider John Rawls’s constructivism to be incomplete. According to them, his ontological agnosticism makes evident this incompleteness; I question this widely accepted charge. I propose an alternative interpretation, according to which Rawls’s agnosticism is the effect of his metaethics rather than a lack of metaethics. Thanks to this interpretation, I question the originality and attractiveness of Rawls’s metaethics. My claim is that Rawls’s metaethics adequately captures the specific historical nature of political norms.

Les critiques aussi bien que les défenseurs contemporains du constructivisme métaéthique jugent incomplet le constructivisme développé par John Rawls. Ils considèrent que son agnosticisme ontologique est un signe évident de l’incomplétude de sa position métaéthique. L’ambition de cet article est de contester ce verdict généralement accepté, en produisant une interprétation alternative de l’agnosticisme ontologique de Rawls, selon laquelle cet agnosticisme est l’effet de sa position métaéthique plutôt qu’un défaut de position métaéthique. Sur cette base, je pose à nouveaux frais la question de l’originalité et de l’attractivité de la métaéthique rawlsienne. Je montre que
l’attractivité de la métaéthique rawlsienne se situe dans sa capacité à saisir l’historicité spécifique des normes de justice.

This is the first edition of Haack's internationally-acclaimed book, published by Blackwell in 1993.

readers may note with interest Putnam's observation, on the back cover, that Popper, Quine, Rorty, Goldman and the Churchlands, among others "will have to reply." See the second (2009) edition to see how that worked out!

Thesis: In this essay I intend to argue that, Ross’s view cannot overcome the objection of having the moral knowledge. To make clear all ideas and terms, I will firstly explain prima facie duties, and then I will mention about the ways of knowing (or understanding) moral values. Finally, I will explain Ross’s views and try to show that his view and his theory are not sufficient to overcome the objection about the moral knowledge.
I. The Prima Facie Duties
A. Ross’s Seven Prima Facie Duties
B. Garrend’s Addition to Ross’s List
C. Important Points of Prima Facie Duties
II. The Ways of Knowing Fundamental Moral Rules and Prima Facie Duties
A. Skepticism and Coherentism
B. Intuitionism and Common-Sense
III. Ross’s View of Knowing the Rules
A. Data of Ethics
B. Self-Evidence
IV. Conclusion

Recent critics of the coherence theory of truth (notably Ralph Walker) have alleged that the theory is incoherent, since its defence presupposes the correctness of the contrary correspondence theory of truth. Coherentists must specify the system of propositions with which true propositons cohere (the specified system). Generally, coherentists claim that the specified system is a system composed of propositions believed by a community. Critics of coherentism maintain that the coherentist's assertions about which system is the specified system must be true, not because they cohere with a system of beliefs, but because of facts about what a community believes. I argue that coherentists can admit that there are facts about what systems of beliefs communities accept, without being committed to the claim that these facts are the truth conditions of sentences about what communities accept.

It is usually accepted that deductions are non-informative and monotonic, inductions are informative and nonmonotonic, abductions create hypotheses but are epistemically irrelevant, and both deductions and inductions can’t provide new insights. In this article, I attempt to provide a more cohesive view of the subject with the following hypotheses: (1) the paradigmatic examples of deductions, such as modus ponens and hypothetical syllogism, are not inferential forms, but coherence requirements for inferences; (2) since any reasoner aims to be coherent, any inference must be deductive; (3) a coherent inference is an intuitive process where the premises should be taken as sufficient evidence for the conclusion, which on its turn should be viewed as necessary evidence for the premises in some modal range; (4) inductions, properly understood, are abductions, but there are no abductions beyond the fact that in any inference the conclusion should be regarded as necessary evidence for the premises; (5) monotonicity is not only compatible with the retraction of past inferences given new information, but it is a requirement for it; (6) this explanation of inferences holds true for discovery processes, predictions and trivial inferences.

In this article my aim is to address the issue of the public justification of political liberalism from the perspective of moral epistemology. I begin showing that a strictly political account of liberal legitimacy is hostage of tensions that are intrinsic to the justificatory framework itself. On the one hand, an adequate conception of justice should grant the required normative force thanks to the appeal to compelling justificatory arguments. On the other hand, a strictly political version of liberalism is characterized by a major focus on the actual circumstances of justice and on the acknowledgment of the fact of pluralism. Rawls main goal in Political Liberalism, for example, is to provide a full justification for a strictly political conception of liberalism starting from the “here and now” of the contemporary political societies. Rawls believes that his version of political liberalism, being neutral with regard to metaphysical and epistemological disputes, can avoid dilemmatic outcomes.
In the second part of the article, I argue, pace Rawls, that political liberalism cannot be robust vis-à-vis different theories of justification, because it is required that as theorists we take a stance regarding the epistemological framework we employ while developing a specific theory of political legitimacy. My proposal is that a moderate approach in moral epistemology expresses the best scheme available to us - as moral agents constrained by the limit of our rationality - for establishing a normatively binding, and yet realistic, procedure of justification for political institutions and practices. An epistemic moderate account can be described around four fundamental benchmarks: (1) a doxastic presupposition that highlights the fundamental deliberative role played by moral agents as they are the last authority for determining which principles are indeed compatible with their wide set of beliefs; (2) a fallibilist account of moral knowledge; (3) a coherentist theory of epistemic justification and (4) a moderate account of objectivity according to which the objectivity of the moral discourse rests on the correctness-apt deliberative procedure we produce as moral agents and that involves some correctness criteria that are publicly justified through the exchange of reasons among reasonable citizens.

This is the complete text of the Spanish translation of Haack's EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY.

[There are, unfortunately, problems with the translation,  starting with the title, which would better have been "Prueba e indagacion. For example, "consistency" is wrongly translated "firmeza" (it should be "consistencia"), and "grue" as "glauco" (it should be "verdul")]

On Epistemology there is a subject that discuss about structures of knowledge. Foundationalism and Coherentism, Foundationalism give orientation on structure which is have fondation analogy as a building that both steady and high, inside it there is basic belief that justifed the non basic belief process of conclusing the belief is based on deductive. Drawn one way (asymmetric) from basic belief to non basic belief.  While coherentism structure is a net that related with each other from one belief to other belief also give implies each other (symmetric) drawn with inductive approach. Both foundationalism and coherentism structures going to compare with method or step through description and then from the description that we get, next we identify. So on we can to compare foundationalism and coherentism. Last, from comparation result we might to contemplate and catch the strength and the weakness from each structure to obtaining the superior things on both structures. There is also foundherentism theory that might become the new problem and increasing  difficulty on structure of knowledge or become the new resolution alternative that make us successful to making peace and get out from that dichotomy.

JocBr,rrv Macrunr il i -Mark Hun;zadi et moi sommes entrés en fonction en même temps, à l,été 2004, à la Faculté de plrif"."pli" a" l'universit é Laval' Le dialogue que nous avons entretenu sur des questions de métaéthiq;, dtthiq.re normative et de phi_ losophie^politique s'est a*ré porr, ,iroi d,une valeur inesti_ mable. C'est donc avec beatrcà.rp d" plaisir q.r" 1" ""i.;. l"i l'occasion de continu"" ". dialJgr" .., commentant et en interrogeant la position que mon arî et ancien collègue défend dans le texte qui ouvre cet ouvrage. l. LA pRroRr mÉraÉrrueuE ar,r,ÉcuÉ EN FA\BUR DE LA.rusircr La réflexion de Hunyadi comprend deux parties dis_ tinctes qui me sembrent..!"r p"u riËes^entre etes. La partie la plus subsrantielle consist";" ";; réconde réflexion de nature métaéthique sur les fondements de t,etnqrr" "t t". ressources du contexte en tant que sources de normativité. Jocelyn llaclure Lautre partie, introductive, vient selon toute vraisemblance d'une impatience relative à la tendance manifestée par certains philosophes à rabattre complètement la réflexion éthique sur des questions de justice sociale. La jonction ou la suture entre ces deux parties m'apparaît assez lâche. On pourrait être d'accord avec la critique de Hunyadi du réductionnisme et en désaccord avec sa position contextualiste, ou l'inverse. Je ne suis pas convaincu par le propos de Hunyadi dans la première partie de son texte. Du simple point de vue des faits, il n'est pas difficile de montrer que la position qui . considère que l'essentiel qrue peutàire une théorie morale se résume à quelques principes élémentaires de justice > est loin d'épuiser le champ de la réflexion éthique contemporaine. Des théories perfectionnistes continuent de contester vigoureusement les théories déontologiques qui se sont gagné la faveur de plusieurs philosophesr. Même les éthiques de la vertu, considérées, il ny a pas si longtemps, comme surannées, ont fait un retour en force dans la dernière décennie2, entre autres dans le sous-champ qu'est l'éthique professionnelle. Il serait heuristiquement malheureuxlà-dessus je rejoins Hunyadique la réflexion portant par exemple sur le caractère ou les dispositions des agents disparaisse du champ de l'éthique. La position décrite par Hunyadi est dominante, il est vrai, en p b ilod op /t ic po litiq ue d'inspiration anglo-américaines. Reconnaissant le fait du pluralisme raisonnable des conceplions de la vie bonne, les libéraux soutiennent que l'État doit chercher à être neutre par rapport à ses différentes conceptions l. Plusieurs considèrent d'ailleurs, comme Hunyadi le reconnaît à la note infrapaginale 2, que le libéralisme est lui-même une doctrine perfectionniste. 2. Voir la critique des positions déontologiques et utilitaristes de G.E.M Anscombe dans 1958, " Modern Moral Philosophy ", P/ailonp/ay 35 :1-19 3. La philosophie politique est comprise, ici, comme le champ de la philosophie morale consacré aux fondements et aux finalités éthiques des nornes et des institutions publiques. Hunyadi semble faire un pas de plus en supprimant toute distinction entre l'éthique et la philosophie politique. r'" )z 11 llijliTijF,ITliil'i.l{ ,|l.'r;ii1{ùj1iiïili.i Mriiqifiiirirù1i;ùT..A,iir:i. Contmentaire,rur o lUoralr contextueLle ,

Radar systems, based on bistatic radar concept attracted a substantial attention in the recent years. Passive coherent location systems using "transmitters of opportunity" like radio or TV broadcasters, GSM base stations, satellite communication and GNSS signals proved their potential in detection and tracking moving targets over a significant area. In this paper the multistatic location system with non-cooperative transmitters is described and various aspects of signal processing and signal parameters are discussed.

Haack teaches epistemology in not-quite-the-usual way. first, her approach is historical; second, it is classical-pragmatist in tone and tenor. nonetheless she also covers most of the topics in contemporary analytic epistemology (context, virtues, etc.) as well.

Readers may be amused to see that Haack's fall semester is, as so often, interrupted by a hurricane!

Alethic functionalism, as propounded by Michael Lynch, is the view that there are different ways to be true, but that these differences nevertheless contain enough unity to forestall outright pluralism. This view has many virtues. Yet, since one could conceivably apply Lynch's "one and many" strategy to other debates, I try show to how his argumentative steps can be used to solve—not just the controversy pertaining to truth—but any controversy that surrounds a "What is X?" question.

Research Articles
Mark J. BOONE, Inferential, Coherential, and Foundational Warrant: An Eclectic Account of the Sources of Warrant
T. Ryan BYERLY, A Dispositional Internalist Evidentialist Virtue Epistemology
Tjerk GAUDERIS, On Theoretical and Practical Doxastic Attitudes
Patrizio LO PRESTI, Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Norms

Discussion Notes/Debate
Giovanni MION, Grueing Gettier

Western science and philosophy are from the beginning inextricably linked with each other. As philosophical reflection accompanies the history of science, a good number of questions have accumulated over time: Do the theories or theoretical models of science faithfully represent the reality in itself? Does science touch reality? Does science reveal the intrinsic nature of things? Is the search for truth, as correspondence with reality, the goal of science? Does science converge towards truth? Does scientific rationality depend on the existence of a scientific method, the scientific method? To all these questions Rorty's pragmatism, a philosophy on a human scale, gives convincing answers. Now, these are the most burning questions of the current philosophy of science. Therefore my aim in this paper is to show that Rorty's philosophy fit well within a reasonable epistemology of science. And this is why I also claim that Rorty's pragmatism and Van Fraassen's empiricism converge basically in a philosophical proposal that is compatible with an instrumentalist conception of science.

This article examines the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) and its role in philosophical inquiry. It begins with an overview of RE before discussing some of the subtleties involved in its interpretation, including challenges to the standard assumption that RE is a form of coherentism. It then evaluates some of the main objections to RE, in particular, the criticism that this method generates unreasonable beliefs. It concludes by considering how RE relates to recent debates about the role of intuitions in philosophy.

This essay argues that acknowledging the existence of mind-independent facts is a matter of vital importance, in that acquiescence before the layout of the world is something demanded of knowing agents from the most elementary empirical deliverance to the most abstract construct. Building on the idea that normativity requires the presence of more than one option to choose from, the essay shows how the cessation of one's life is the disjunctive alternative of any experiential episode. This much has been missed, it argues, because of a generalized failure to appreciate how even the simplest atomic contents embroil their subjects in acts of assent. Its account thus casts a new light on relativism and skepticism, revealing them to be provisional luxuries supported only by the cognitive labor of others.

For many epistemologists, and for many philosophers more broadly, it is axiomatic that rationality requires you to take the doxastic attitudes that your evidence supports. Yet there is also another current in our talk about rationality. On this usage, rationality is a matter of the right kind of coherence between one’s mental attitudes. Surprisingly little work in epistemology is explicitly devoted to answering the question of how these two currents of talk are related. But many implicitly assume that evidence-responsiveness guarantees coherence, so that the rational impermissibility of incoherence will just fall out of the putative requirement to take the attitudes that one’s evidence supports, and so that coherence requirements do not need to be theorized in their own right, apart from evidential reasons. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake, since coherence and evidence-responsiveness can in fact come into conflict. More specifically, I argue that in cases of misleading higher-order evidence, there can be a conflict between believing what one’s evidence supports and satisfying a requirement that I call “inter-level coherence”. This illustrates why coherence requirements and evidential reasons must be separated and theorized separately.

Haack shows (1) that [the numerous versions of]  foundationalism and coherentism do not exhaust the options and (2) that an intermediate theory of epistemic justification, foundherentism, is more plausible than either---combining their strengths while avoiding their weaknesses.

This piece, excerpted from  chapter 1 of  EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY, appears in a volume edited by Baroness Warnock, of women philosophers "from Anne Conway in the seventeenth century to Susan Haack in the twentieth." Haack feels ambivalent, at best, at being classified as a "woman philosopher," feeling herself to be a philosopher who happens to be a woman, but not a philosopher whose sex defines her work..

In a recent paper, Appley and Stoutenburg present two new objections to
Explanationist Evidentialism (EE): the Regress Objection and the Threshold Objection. In this paper, I develop a version of EE that is independently plausible and empirically grounded, and show that it can meet Appley and Stoutenburg's objections. Forthcoming in Synthese.

Une partie de mon propos est de se demander quel est le point de vue à partir duquel regarder la réalité du droit et avoir un critère pour définir la vérité des énoncés sur le droit. Doit-on partir d'une approche empirique, selon le modèle des sciences naturelles, avec des hypothèses destinées à être vérifiées empiriquement ou au contraire de présupposés non empiriquement observables ? On peut penser que le droit et la normativité du droit sont affaire de science. De nombreuses propositions de la science du droit partent d'hypothèses destinées à engager des recherches empiriques destinées à les vérifier. Bien que ces diverses approches aient fait l'objet de critiques sévères, elles peuvent aussi être soutenues par la défense de l'idée qu'il n'y a qu'une seule science et que la science fonctionne de cette façon et non par référence à des entités non observables sur la base de présuppositions qui ne sont jamais en mesure d'être vérifiées, même indirectement. Je voudrais insister cependant sur le fait que pour être naturaliste, c'est-à-dire pour ramener ou « réduire le droit » à des faits et à des relations causales entre des faits, il faut être « héroïque » dans le réductionnisme. Il n'est pas facile de tenir de façon cohérente une telle approche.

After arguing in the previous lecture that the Gettier paradoxes arise from a mismatch between a categorical conception of  knowledge and a gradational conception  of justification,  Haack moves to theories of epistemic justification. These slides introduce students to chapters 1-3 of her EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY.

Los límites del coherentismo en el derecho: a propósito de la tesis de Amaya Juan Vega gómez E n su libro The Tapestry of Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Coherence and its Role in Legal Argument, 1 Amalia Amaya argumenta las ventajas de adoptar una postura coherentista en el derecho. Concretamente, su tesis principal es la siguiente: Una creencia acerca de los hechos en disputa o acerca de lo que el derecho requiere se encuentra justificada si y sólo si puede ser el resultado de un razonamiento basado en una coherencia epistémicamente responsable (p. 2). Desarrollar esta tesis principal constituye gran parte del libro de Amaya, y la estrategia es común: se retoman las ventajas y críticas de una idea filosófica-en este caso la coherencia-en diferentes áreas de la filosofía para posteriormente analizar el caso del derecho. Así, a lo largo de 628 páginas tenemos un detenido y erudito análisis de, entre otros, la coherencia en la epistemología (caps. 3 y 4); en temas de razonamiento práctico (cap.

Radar systems, based on bistatic radar concept attracted a substantial attention in the recent years. Passive coherent location systems using "transmitters of opportunity" like radio or TV broadcasters, GSM base stations, satellite communication and GNSS signals proved their potential in detection and tracking moving targets over a significant area. In this paper the multistatic location system with non-cooperative transmitters is described and various aspects of signal processing and signal parameters are discussed.

In his article Gorgias on the function of language, Mourelatos famously argued that while Gorgias aims to deny the possibility of communicating truth by means of speech, nonetheless a specific account of the function of language can be drawn out: namely, a behaviouristic one. Bermudez's reading, on the contrary, attempts to show that even though it is clear that Gorgias is providing a non-representationalist account of language, nonetheless there is still room for some conception of truth, i.e. one explicable in terms of coherence. My purpose is to discuss both Mourelatos' and Bermudez's theses in order to show that neither arises necessarily from the texts.