Academia.eduAcademia.edu

Construing Objective Coherentism in Aristotle's Categories

AI-generated Abstract

This paper explores the influence of Aristotle's work "The Categories" on the philosophical doctrine of objective coherentism, analyzing the comparative modalism present in both Aristotle's concepts and the contemporary interpretations by figures like David K. Lewis. It critiques Lewis's multi-conditional framework and discusses the role of contraries in Aristotle’s philosophy, proposing that these elements serve as fundamental definitions in both systems, ultimately positing that Aristotle’s modal definitions can inform and improve categorical systems.

CONSTRUING OBJECTIVE COHERENTISM IN ARISTOTLE’S CATEGORIES DRAFT ABSTRACT: I explore the connection between Aristotle’s category theory and my own theory of categories, including the similarities and differences between Aristotelian assumptions and those of categorical deduction. ------------------------------------------------------------ I will defend the view that Aristotle uses a modal system. I will also source a variety of examples in defense of the idea that his Categories can yield positive iterations. Over the years, modality has had a number of definitions, including conditionalism and truth versus falsehood “The modal value of a statement is the way, or ‘mode,’ in which it is true or false.” (Oxford Companion to Philosophy, p. 581 on modality).. My fundamental thesis is that Aristotle’s Categories is subject to translation in its own terms. Specifically, the modality of Aristotle is fertile ground for new ideas about categories (See for example, Avi Sion’s Future Knowledge, p. 27 and Coppedge, p. 46 - 49). Modalism is best known today as part of the intellectual school called modal realism, an idea defended by David K. Lewis and others. Because of the limits on this paper, I will not describe modal realism in great detail. Suffice to say it relies on Aristotle’s work, but has suggestions of typological ideas.. The fair use of categories, conditionals, or in other words, modes, has inevitably come into looser and looser potential usages, while also sustaining a variety of pretensions to technicalism. I summarize this trend as a general willingness to use conditionals in a modern, generic sense. Generic does not mean that categories are not technical, only that any technical aspect is subject to considerable potential criticism. In keeping with my thesis, objective coherentism is a movement which may be attributed to Rescher, Sion, and recently, myself, and offers some advantages over Aristotle: (1) A coherent framework, (2) The use of polar opposites, (3) A method of categorical deduction not introduced by Aristotle, and (4) A valid means of circular argumentation. My defense will not only include a proof of the influence of Aristotle, but also the defense of these specific improvements. Aristotle’s influence is widespread. He is not only the inventor of the categorical syllogism, but is also sometimes known as ‘the first scientist,’ in addition to being the first philosopher to call himself by this name. The manifestations of Aristotle’s work in today’s world are sometimes very large or complicated constructs, such as the periodic table of the elements, the institution of botany, or the Committee of Arts and Sciences. Therefore, any claim to Aristotle’s special significance in the modern world begs the question of just what kind of profound new influence is being outlined. In the specific case of a new concept of deductive method, it would be reasonable to show obscure evidence which is convincing, rather than generalized popular evidence which is unconvincing. Indeed, if a new method of deduction were popularly in evidence, one would suspect that any new terminology would already be in use. However, I found, that this was not the case. Evidently, the new usage was avoided for one of two reasons: (1) Deference to the authority of traditional methods, or (2) The absence of any new method. That critique is foundational for my argument. There are three prominent sources for the evidence of Aristotle’s influence upon the translation known as objective coherentism. Ordered by direct influence, they are (1) Avi Sion, an intellectual who uses the term categorical deduction but does not define it clearly, (2) Aristotle himself, in his work called The Categories, and (3) David K. Lewis, a recent contemporary philosopher. I will choose to consider the least convincing evidence first. Lewis expresses an affinity with a variety of values for conditionals in his work, Counterfactuals, saying that, because of certain conditions upon his concept of metaphysics, Our four formal constraints in the definition of a centered system of spheres are justified because, if they were not met, the spheres could not very well be regarded as carrying information about comparative similarity of worlds. This may seem obscure, but Lewis seems to be saying that modality is not a matter of mere ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood,’ but rather multiple conditionalism. Elsewhere in the same work Lewis describes what he calls counterfactual truth conditions, which, because they also constitute a kind of exclusive list applied to a system, are directly comparable to Aristotle’s concept of The Categories. Only one of Lewis’ counterfactual conditionals is falsity in the traditional sense. As it appears in Aristotle, however, multiple conditionalism is not a very exceptional development. It might constitute at best, the reversal of a plebumization. For in the Categories, he always describes contraries without describing their quantity. “can receive contraries” is always repeated without stating the number of contraries (Categories, Part 5 4a15, 4a30, 4b5, 4b15). (Contraries are Aristotle’s only form of conditionalism, since all conditionals have opposites). Thus it appears that four versus two conditionals might be an acceptable choice for Aristotle, even if it appears incidental. The fact that Aristotle was more conservative about the number of categories than is Lewis in his many worlds theory, figures in the conclusion that categorical systems can be improved. Now, in what ways does Aristotle appear to be a modalist? Aristotle says simultaneously that “It is…characteristic of substances not to have a contrary” (Categories Part 5, 3b 25) and that “a substance, one and the same in number, can receive contraries.” (Categories Part 5, 4a 15). I obsess with contraries because in my view, these are Aristotle’s concept of a definens. For example, Aristotle earlier introduces the concept of differentiae, before continuing with the idea of contraries. Aristotle also states that “All the things that come to be naturally are either contraries or from contraries” (Physics, Part 5, 188 b25, italics mine). Aristotle’s substance is not defined to be contrary, and yet it is defined by contraries---in other words, its definition consists of opposites, or potential opposites. This is very similar to my own category theory in which contraries serve as exclusive definitions. It is also similar to the definition of modality as containing what is ‘true’ and ‘false.’ Thus, it may be concluded that Aristotle was a modalist. In what ways does Aristotle’s use of the term contrary differ from my use of the term ‘opposite’? For one thing, Aristotle says that “none of the things said without combination---such as ‘man’, ‘white’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’ --- is either true or false” (Categories Part 4, 2a10). Aristotle’s concept of entities is also different, as I will mention later. I can abbreviate Aristotle’s view of contarieties by paraphrasing that substances are not definitions, that is, as Aristotle says, they do not contain in themselves, contraries. This is most clear where he says: Primary substances are subjects for all other things [that is, non-substances], and all other things are predicated of them or are in them, and it is for this reason they are called substances most of all” (Categories Part 5, 2b15). Evidently, what Aristotle means by modality is a quantitative relation, whereas in my own theories, relations are always by qualities. When I use the term opposite, I mean a mode of quality, whereas what Aristotle means when he says contrary is a category of substance. With some insight, the two definitions are interchangeable. Contrariness is not the only theme common between Aristotle and recent theories. In my own work I use the word ‘entity’ to describe things as various as causes, agents, and governments, something that is directly comparable to Aristotle‘s substances, although his theory of secondary substances does not do much to clarify their reality. Although in objective coherentism entities are explained as exceptions to the rule, Aristotle uses substances to stand for something while offering no such explanation. However, the sense in which the substances are compounded to equal truths and beliefs in Aristotle suggests a kind of evaluative framework in which it is somehow determined in what way the substances are real. This is very similar to my own view. The concept of entity serves as a segue for the concept of coherentism. Coherentism in my view is the ability to define truths in terms of ratios of the universal. Although Aristotle does not use this concept (one important reason for the difference), it is clear that his ten categories were meant as an exhaustive list: in this way, it anticipates the concept of exclusive categories introduced in my own work, The Dimensional Philosopher’s Toolkit (2013). and that of Avi Sion. Future Logic (1990). In other important ways, The Categories is not at all coherent. In fact, Aristotle cites that the only way of forming truth statements is by combining multiple substances. Also, it is easy to see how ten exclusive categories is potentially non-universal, if a given thing is not ever one and not ever all of them. This is closer to the contemporary correspondence theory, which has been the largest contender to coherency The major difference between the theories is that coherency focuses on abstract systems, whereas correspondence aims at corroboration.. However, a simple difference between Aristotle and recent work is not enough to support the existence of a new system. Remember, I set out to prove that there are four fundamental improvements upon Aristotle in objective coherentism: (1) A coherent framework, (2) The use of polar opposites, (3) A method of categorical deduction not introduced by Aristotle, and (4) A valid means of circular argumentation. We have already seen that in some ways Aristotle is closer to correspondence theory, whereas in other ways, such as his use of an exhaustive list, his use of contraries, and his invention of the categorical syllogism, he has some similarity to coherentism as I have been propounding it. Those three aspects are directly analogous, although not identical, to the first three aspects in objective coherentism. The fourth item is somewhat incidental, but serves as an example of a major notable difference between the two bodies of theory. In objective coherentism, coherency is as I said, the use of ratios of the universal. Aristotle’s use of PQR or if P then Q, by contrast, is not an explicit statement of universalism. It does not use universal as an imbedded property as I do in the categorical deduction, nor does it specifically exclude universalism in any statement. And, so far as that goes, the use of the term universal in species of statements does not help, since it has already been stated that Aristotle admits of combinations, while also rejecting the quality of single substances. Aristotle did not include ‘universal’ as one of his Categories, or not explicitly He does in some places state that substances are universals, but he does not mean this exclusively of the substance, and this is an important difference.. So it can be concluded that there is something new in the idea of a universal coherency. Earlier I defended the differentiation of Aristotle’s use of the term ‘contraries’ from my use of the term ‘opposites.’ Here I establish the real difference, that is, the difference in utility. Not Utiltarian utility, but rather systematic or logical utility, a more general use. My use of polar opposites is a granted form of absolute exclusion, for the following reasons, and it has already been noted that Aristotle did not use exclusive methods: (1) An opposite of some type is the only way to achieve a property of quality, because if the property of quality does not have an opposite, conceptually this means that it is absolutely neutral. Irrational elements can typically be excluded, because they have no rational function, but factually these elements may have opposites themselves, and thus, may according to the method also be rational. (2) Neutral terms must have a property of quality to have any nature at all. E.g. I assume that things which are absolutely neutral but which are understood, are merely ventilations of the properties interpreted of them, rather than being real entities in themselves. (3) Opposites embody an absolute extension of the entire conceptual space which could ever explain the assumed subject of a potential comparison. (4) An assumed subject, when it is complete, is a relatively absolute. That is, its function in language could not be improved without real improvement. It is not a matter of semantics. ---- Seeing that that proof is sufficient, I will see it as defended that coherency is possible, via opposites, unlike in Aristotle ---. Next I will defend the validity of the new method of deduction, called categorical deduction. As mentioned earlier, the term categorical deduction---which uses this coherent method---was not in wide usage until very recently. In categorical deduction, opposites are always put diagonally across from one another in a diagrammatic method. In my own work, this feature was inspired by the Cartesian coordinate system, which was not invented until 1637. This is the same as saying that in a four quadrant diagram, that A is the opposite of C, and B is the opposite of D. How is a conclusion reached? The method is A:B::C:D or A:D::C:B. First I will distinguish the method from a number of similar-sounding methods, including Aristotle’s syllogism. Categorical deductions are dissimilar from categorical syllogisms, because exclusion is not mechanical, but rather pre-established. The analogy to Venn diagrams less direct, but perhaps more profound in the case of categorical deduction. My method is also different from Kant’s categorical imperatives, because categorical imperatives are always moral claims, and require additional thought for their principle. Categorical deductions, on the other hand, apply to many linguistic contexts, and are easily computable. For the following reasons, my method is also different from analogy: (1) Analogy compares opposites to opposites, whereas categorical deduction compares opposites to non-opposites, and (2) Categorical deduction always uses polar opposites, whereas analogy often uses related expressions which are not always opposites, and (3) Categorical deduction is used to create whole, coherent statements of truth, whereas analogies are understood to be highly specific. So it can be seen clearly that categorical deduction is a new type of method. But we have yet to prove that it improves on Aristotle. And there is also the interesting claim that circular reasoning may sometimes be valid. How does categorical deduction improve on the categorical syllogism? For the following reasons: (1) It is coherent, (2) It is exponential, (3) It is pithy, and (4) It is a non-causal form of inference. Similar to Anaximander’s concept of Apeiron, only not a tautology, that is, if opposites are to be believed. If all four of these points could be proven, there would be a very strong basis for the claim that Aristotle’s work has been improved. First of all, Aristotle’s syllogisms make no claim to amounting to a complete system, in any length of time. Aristotle’s attempt at exclusivity was his only means of circumventing this. In other words, as has been shown in more recent theories, Aristotle’s method is notoriously non-exclusive, and therefore, in my view, non-universal. There is therefore an advantageousness to adopting the word ‘category’ in place of substances, as I do in my own work. Secondly, categorical deductions have a relatively unique property, of compounding along a contingent axis, because opposites are always contingent to one another, so that any given set of opposites can be combined with any given other set of opposites. There is thus a vast and desirable inflation in the value of a categorical system, when such a system does calculations. That was another feature not present in Aristotle. In Aristotle, the thinker has to do the grunt work. It is not computational. Categorical deduction also provides the advantage of abbreviating vast tracts of information, by using exclusive qualities in place of unknown quantities. Thus, much of the problem with abstraction is eliminated. Lastly, a more difficult defense is the claim that categorical deduction involves a non-causal form of inference. This is important because it is also a coherent form of inference. In Aristotle, hypothetical syllogisms are the major form which is causal. However, other forms become compounded with hypothesis when time is involved. E.g. ‘Only cats meow, Something meowed, The thing that meowed was a cat’ becomes ‘Only systems think, Something thought, What thought was a system.’ ‘System’ becomes a dangler which depends on its own realization, which cannot occur. By contrast, in a categorical deduction, all information is revealed as output. Consequently it is a non-causal form of inference. Now the final problem which I have left for last, is what are the ways in which categorical deduction is a valid form of circular reasoning? And the answer is already clear, for the method cannot be modified in any way, as it is a rule of the system that it is graphically, although not chronologically, recursive (circular). If it is graphically recursive it does not have the same problem of temporal circularity that exists in linear arguments. Instead, whoever uses the argument is free to construct it from multiple angles. That may be unsatisfactory, but of course, if the method works, it works. And if the method is proven, it is proven. When it comes to relativity and absoluteness, Aristotle provides a concept that “It is because of what the facts are, or are not, that a statement is said to be either true or false, not by its being able to receive contraries” (Categories Part 5, 4b5-10). His method is thus specifically oriented towards truth statements but (perhaps ironically), not accepting of opposites. Although he says that “a substance does not admit of more or less” (Categories Part 5, 4a5), it is clear from some of his other statements e.g. “none of the things said without combination … is either true or false” (Categories Part 4, 2a10) that what Aristotle means by absoluteness always refers to the world, totality, or in other words, Platonic justice. This aspect has potential to blur what may otherwise be what I call a pure conceptual tool. Avi Sion says: “No Copernican revolution is conceivable in the field of logic: It would not merely be anti-Aristotelian, but anti-rational” (Laws of Thought p. 144) So, even in recent years, there has not been much willingness to modify the system protracted by Aristotle. Works Cited Aristotle. “Categories.” Cited in Ancient Philosophy. Cohen et al. eds. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2011. --------------. “Physics.” Cited in Ancient Philosophy. Cohen et al. eds. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2011. Coppedge, Nathan. The Dimensional Philosopher’s Toolkit. Bloomington: Authorhouse, 2013. Costello, Robert B. “Parse [etymology]” The American Heritage College Dictionary. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993. P. 995 Honderich, Ted, ed. “modality.” The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford U, 1995. P. 581 Lewis, David K. Counterfactuals. Malden: Blackwell, 1973. Sion, Avi. Future Knowledge. Electronic: Lulu, 1990. P. 27 -----. Laws of Thought. Electronic: Lulu, 2008. P. 144 Nathan Coppedge, SCSU, Aristotle Paper 11/08/2013, p.
pFad - Phonifier reborn

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.

Note: This service is not intended for secure transactions such as banking, social media, email, or purchasing. Use at your own risk. We assume no liability whatsoever for broken pages.


Alternative Proxies:

Alternative Proxy

pFad Proxy

pFad v3 Proxy

pFad v4 Proxy