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2022, NatureCulture
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6 pages
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AI-generated Abstract
This email exchange reflects on the impact of Covid-19 on democratic institutions, especially in Hungary under Viktor Orbán's regime. The authors discuss the evolving nature of political practices amidst crises, emphasizing the need for new forms of political engagement and the importance of recognizing both hope and despair in today's world. They question how to meaningfully address systemic issues while navigating the ongoing challenges posed by the pandemic and populist politics.
Intersections, 2021
Gábor Scheiring has written an extremely thoughtful and provocative book on the death of Hungarian democracy, introducing many new aspects. Rarely do we find such a wellthought-out, scrupulous, and well-structured work about Hungarian politics, in which the theoretical and empirical parts build on each other in supporting the key statements of the book. In line with the dominant position of political science in Hungary and internationally, the author considers the Orbán regime to be a competitive or elective dictatorship, and consequently places it among hybrid regimes (cf. Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2005; 2015). This book, however, is not so much about the nature of the already fully fledged Orbán regime (see, for example, Scheiring & Szombati, 2020) than about the reasons behind its emergence. The author claims that the primary reason for the historic failure of the fragile Hungarian democracy, emerging in the wake of the change of the regime, is market fundamentalism, which came to dominate Eastern Europe after 1989 (cf. Soros, 1998). Its principles and key concepts, including privatization, deregulation, shock therapy, financial and trade liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization and market society were accepted by the Hungarian parties. Thus, the electorate belonging to social groups below the middle-class were unable to find a political alternative in the 1990s, which would have credibly represented the principle of equality in addition to freedom. Eventually, these voters, having lost their patience, lined up alongside the right-wing and far-right forces operating on the exclusionary notion of 'nation'. Scheiring points out that for significant groups of voters, the shift essentially implied the replacement of the concept of 'class' with the concept of 'nation', without a change in the substance of their basic attitudes initially. Workers, who in the early 2000s were not yet receptive to ethnicist ideology (cf. Szalai, 2004), had mostly espoused it by the end of the decade. The 2010 political turn put an end to the era of liberal democracy and voters gave a green light to the rise of an illiberal, competitive dictatorship (initially labelled as a majoritarian democracy). Because Scheiring sometimes calls the period of 1990-2010 a democracy and other times he dubs it as a 'simulated democracy', it is not always clear exactly what he means. In my opinion, the author describes an elite-driven, institution-centred democracy, which re-and boki mained one-sided over the years because active social participation could not gain strength. Consequently, many identified the concept of democracy with the multi-party system only. In contrast with such democratic deficit, however, the concept of simulation presupposes intentionality on the part of political actors, and it would be an exaggeration to extend it to the entirety of the above-mentioned twenty years. My impression is that it is more likely that that the co-emergence of capitalism and democracy was a process laden with serious contradictions. The fact that democracies survived in capitalist systems only does not imply that a newly established capitalism automatically leads to democracy. Nor is it certain that the nascent market economy will automatically consolidate a semi-peripheral democracy which had no historical antecedents, and which emerged as result of an international domino effect. The term 'simulated democracy' is more fitting for the period starting from 2010, when the regime-in a manner that Prime Minister Orbán himself called a 'peacock dance'elevated the double speech to the rank of official politics (on the Orbán regime see Magyar & Vásárhelyi, 2017; Kovács & Trencsényi, 2020). The defining moments of the period included the unilateral constitutional process (2011), the fourth amendment of the Fundamental Law, which shattered the rule of law (2013), free but unclean elections, and the proclamation of 'illiberal democracy' (2014). The exaggeration and propagandistic reinterpretation of the dangers posed by the wave of refugees (2015) and a referendum serving the interests of the ruling party (2016) fit into this list as well. As illiberal democracy, despite its misleading name, is not a democracy but a hybrid regime (cf. Bozóki & Hegedűs, 2018a), by adopting it the Hungarian Prime Minister declared his break with the Westernstyle democratic system that has existed in Hungary since the change of regime. A typical communication strategy of a hybrid regime is double talk, which has appeared in both the domestic and international politics of political leaders in power. After Fidesz's victory in the 2018 'semi-free' elections, peacock dancing was less and less needed, although electoral autocracy persisted until the adoption of the 2020 emergency law (Scheppele, 2020). According to Scheiring, the key social factor behind the emergence of the Orbán regime was the parallel revolt of the working class and the national bourgeoisie against growing inequality and insecurity engendered by the neoliberal competition state. I believe the author is right in that for a considerable part of the working class it was indeed a revolt: the fact that beside Fidesz, the far-right Jobbik also became visibly stronger, attests to that. What began was not some 'rubbing shoulders with' the future authority, but a search for new, radical political agents who defined themselves in opposition to the policies of the left-liberal coalition government. In the case of national capitalists, however, this opposition was by no means so sharp, nor was changing sides. In their case, it was not so much a rebellion or ideological identification, but rather a flexible adaptation to the new political environment created by Fidesz, which by 2010 had risen to power. Those Hungarian capitalists who were unable to compete with multinational companies that paid higher wages, created better working conditions, and even tolerated the operation of trade unions sought and found favour in the protectionist nation-state in exchange for their political loyalty. This is evidenced by the fact that 'right-wing capitalists', as Scheiring calls them, almost unanimously opted for Fidesz, rather than Jobbik, from the two right-wing parties available to them. Of the rising ineecion. ea eopean jonal of ocie and poliic, 7(1): 161-176.
2021
The Hungarian government’s crisis management fits well the illiberal logic of the current regime. It was characterised by the strong leadership of Prime Minister (PM) Viktor Orban who personally controlled the first wave of the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. His unquestionable leadership was further reinforced by a controversial law that provoked intense internal and international criticism. These criticisms were used by the pro-government camp to present the government and PM struggling to preserve the safety of a Hungarian people while under constant attack from liberal and global enemies of the regime. During the crisis, similar discursive strategies were used as is usual in Hungarian politics: the threat of immigration, the decline of the Western world and the European Union (EU), the adversarial role of George Soros, the Hungarian opposition, the media and the international liberal mainstream and the effectiveness of nation-states were recurring topics during the crisis. ...
This publication is a comprehensive overview of developments, events and trends in Hungary in 2017, and an outlook on what topics we expect to dominate Hungarian politics in 2018, the year of parliamentary elections. It focuses on five broad areas. In the first section we review the year from the perspective of the Hungarian government, with a special emphasis on the issues and policies behind the stable lead of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party. In the second section we look at the opposition parties, their state and prospects. The third section focuses on foreign affairs, in particular the Orbán government's relations with key European partners, and Hungary’s place in the Russo-American matrix. In the fourth section, we take a detailed look at how Fidesz's policies have shaped the economy. Finally, some key developments of the Hungarian society – changes in the media landscape, new laws targeting the CEU and NGOs – are discussed. All of the sections conclude with a brief analysis of the issues which may come to the fore in 2018.
2021
One can ask why and how Hungary’s Viktor Orban extends his dominance on the universities by passing a law that radically alters the structure of the universities and how they are run. You may not be in great shock after hearing the recent events in the country due to what has been happening for quite some time; that is, this university reform contradicts European values as the other previous acts of the Hungarian leader. However, I would like to mention that this illiberal turn, labeled by the Freedom House, from one of the member states of the European Union, which has increased its succession, especially since the outbreak of the pandemic, is actually a situation that needs to be questioned.
Ethnologia Europaea , 2020
The 2016 election victory of Donald Trump and the UK referendum on 23 June 2016 to leave the European Union (Brexit) both signal tremendous alterations in global politics. What really connects these international changes to the steady popularity of Viktor Orbán in Hungary? This article describes how a newly emerging and growing transnational political process known as illiberal democracy has influenced Hungary and other states since the late 1990s. By utilizing fieldwork materials from the mid-to late-2010s, it is asserted that both the process of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump have boosted not only the legitimacy of extreme right but contributed to the solidification of illiberalism in Hungary.
Frontiers in Political Science, 2023
Hungary has become the leader of democratic backsliding within Europe, with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán turning into the staunchest critic of the EU, despite a consistent support for the European project among the wider public and Hungary being a net benefiter of EU membership. Using a systematic analysis of all speeches, statements and interviews of the PM for his three consecutive governments 2010–2022, I claim the radicalization of this Eurosceptic discourse is a direct consequence of a continuous populist performance of crisis that demands the creation of images of friends and foes to unite and mobilize people. Orbán relies on discursive processes of othering to construct to his liking both “the good people” and its enemies, who are to be blamed for the crises. Anybody can become an enemy in the various crises that follow each other. At the same time, discursive conceptions of Europe vs. the EU remain in the center of the discourse to establish Hungary's European belonging as well as opposition to EU for policies that allegedly people reject. While the economic crisis pits an economic “us” against the former socialist political elite, foreign capital, and the EU and IMF that are all blamed for Hungary's near-bankruptcy situation. The refugee crisis redefines both “us” and “others”, the “self” is distinguished using ethno-linguistic criteria and identitarian Christianity to signal the cultural distance from the Muslim migrant “other” as well as multicultural EU. The pandemic crisis is performed only to further exacerbate the conflict between the illiberal “self” and the liberal “others”, where supranational EU, promoting multiculturalism, gender ideology or neoliberal policies not only threatens the very existence of traditional-national lifestyles but endangers the people themselves. With each crisis performed, newer and newer conflict lines between various “European self's” and “threatening EU” are identified, each adding to the radicalization of Orbán's discourse. The demonization of the EU and the pretext of saving Europe using these false discursive constructs enables Orbán strengthen his grip of power and drift to authoritarianism.
Edition Politik, 2021
This essay is a sketch of antisemitism in Europe. Sometimes it is easier to understand problems from a distance, as it were. History shows that Anti-Semitism was a consistent feature of European history from as early as 1000 A.D. The long standing historical behaviors clearly indicate strong cultural unconscious emotional-instinctual undercurrents in European culture and consciousness. Any objective view of American history and culture reveals a very parallel situation with blacks.
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2011 Conference Record of the Forty Fifth Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers (ASILOMAR), 2011
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