This article discusses the processes of: (1) transition; and (2) learning agency development in early childhood educational settings and proposes a framework for understanding interactions between these two processes. The paper presents findings from a single case study which provides evidence of the relevance of acknowledging young children’s voices in research concerning them and in educational practices. The research was carried out in a State school in Santiago, Chile, and aims to contribute to related work carried out in Chile as well as internationally. The main research questions were: ‘What issues in relation to transition do Chilean young children highlight as important when interviewed using photographs?’ and ‘To what extent do young children demonstrate the development of their sense of learning agency when interviewed using photographs?’ The study adopts a bio-ecological perspective and follows a multiple level and multiple methods design. This article reports the preliminary findings of two photograph interviews carried out with one girl aged between 5½ and 6½ years (the first in Kindergarten and the second in First Grade). The analysis considers the information
revealed during these photograph interviews, and reports the important issues for this girl’s transition process and its relation with her development of learning agency. Finally, the discussion highlights the relevance of these issues and their relation to the context in which the data was gathered as well as the contribution of this study to research in the transition and learning agency field.

Il semble que nous puissions dire que nous sommes conscients de choses variées, comme des objets (une table, une pomme, une voiture), des personnes (des proches, des inconnus, Pierre ou Marie), des qualités (des couleurs, des sons, des formes) ou encore des événements (des pommes qui tombent, des personnes qui se rencontrent ou des formes qui changent). Mais nous avons également tendance à considérer que nous sommes conscients de nous-mêmes : qu’est-ce à dire ? Parfois, nous entendons par là que nous sommes conscients des traits de caractère propres à la personne que nous sommes, ou bien des qualités de ce corps que nous considérons comme le nôtre. D’autres fois, nous comprenons par conscience de soi celle que nous avons du fait que nous existons, que nous avons une histoire et sommes doués d’une identité plus ou moins forte (car nous pouvons avoir changé ou être amené à changer, comme en témoigne la variation de notre caractère ou de notre aspect physique par exemple). D’autres fois encore, la conscience de soi désigne la conscience que nous avons de ce qui se produit en nous : des sensations, des émotions, des idées qui surviennent de manière plus ou moins volontaires, à l’occasion de situations variées.

Le fait que nous puissions attribuer ainsi plusieurs acceptions à la notion de conscience de soi renvoie au paradoxe selon lequel d’un côté, la conscience de soi est une expérience intime que nous faisons quotidiennement et souvent sans grande difficulté (à de rares exceptions près, sur lesquelles nous reviendrons) ; de l’autre, nous avons du mal à déterminer ce qu’il faut entendre par conscience de soi : quelles sont les différents sens de cette notion ? quelle est la spécificité de la conscience de soi, par rapport à d’autres formes de conscience ? quel est, au juste, l’objet de la conscience de soi ? Comment une telle expérience est-elle possible et en quoi consiste-t-elle ?

Les réponses à ces questions sont loin de faire l’objet d’un consensus, tant chez les philosophes qu’au sein de la communauté scientifique — notamment celle des chercheurs en sciences cognitives. Cet article se propose de présenter, dans cet ordre, chacune de ces questions ainsi que les principales thèses, classiques et contemporaines, qui nourrissent les discussions particulièrement animées au sujet de la conscience de soi.

This paper first identifies and then provides a novel analysis of an important feature of anorexia nervosa (AN) that has gone unrecognized in the philosophy of psychiatry literature. This feature is the discrepancy between first-personal experiences of anorexic food restriction and the clinical descriptions of these same behaviors at the level of agentive awareness. In order to reconcile these two depictions of anorexic actions, I develop a positive account of the sense of agency in AN that accommodates current empirical findings while also providing valuable insight into how it is that anorexics can sincerely report feeling fully in control over their food restriction.

In this paper I am analyzing the suggestion of neurophenomenology, which states that problems with mistaken attribution of thoughts in schizophrenics are not caused by malfunctions on the higher-order conceptual level, nor on the “middle-way” level of efferent signals losing their way. Neurophenomenologists suggested that the problems lies on the neurological level and is connected with failures of the anticipatory aspect of working memory (WM), reflected in the pre-reflective structure of phenomenal experience. I begin with a brief general introduction of the sense of agency (SoA), then I shortly present the neurophenomenological account of SoA, show how this model postulates the connection of SoA and WM, and close this part with a couple of critical remarks. After describing the problem of SoA for thoughts I argue for the terminological change of inserted thoughts into autochthonous thoughts. Finally, I outline the neurophenomenological proposition of the possible interrelations between WM and SoA. I claim that only after combining different domains like executive functions, contextual factors, emotions, affectivity and SoA, can we account for SoA disturbances as being connected to WM disorders.

The aim of our paper is to show that there is a sense of body that is enactive in nature and that enables to capture the most primitive sense of self. We will argue that the body is primarily given to us as source or power for action, i.e., as the variety of motor potentialities that define the horizon of the world in which we live, by populating it with things at hand to which we can be directed and with other bodies we can interact with. We will show that this sense of body as bodily self is, on the one hand, antecedent the distinction between sense of agency and sense of ownership, and, on the other, it enables and refines such distinction, providing a conceptual framework for the coherent interpretation of a variety of behavioral and neuropsychological data. We will conclude by positing that the basic experiences we entertain of our selves as bodily selves are from the very beginning driven by our interactions with other bodies as they are underpinned by the mirror mechanism.

We argue that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance
to the cognitive sciences, and that it can also learn from the empirical research
conducted in those sciences. We discuss the project of naturalizing phenomenology
and how this can be best accomplished. We provide several examples of how
phenomenology and the cognitive sciences can integrate their research. Specifically,
we consider issues related to embodied cognition and intersubjectivity. We provide
a detailed analysis of issues related to time-consciousness, with reference to
understanding schizophrenia and the loss of the sense of agency. We offer a positive
proposal to address these issues based on a neurobiological dynamic-systems
model.

The author describes the sense of agency as examined in the neurophenomenological system, which is a recently developed methodology that draws extensively from the tradition of phenomenology and cognitive studies. The thesis investigates the phenomenological roots of the system, traces its stages of development, touches upon the neurobiological correlates of it and discusses the latest achievements. Finally, some critique of neurophenomenology together with a brief survey of rivalry approaches to the problem of sense of agency is presented and the future possible ways of development is reflected upon.

L'idée d'un sens agent 1 -qu'Averroès ne nomme jamais ainsi -apparaît exclusivement dans le Grand Commentaire du De anima, lorsque le Cordouan commente De an. II, 5, 417b22-29 (com. 60) 2 . Aristote souligne dans ce passage une différence entre l'acte de sensation (τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι 1 On parle ici de ce que la tradition scolastique nommera le sensus agens, à savoir, dans l'ordre du sensible, l'équivalent de ce qu'est l'intellect agent dans l'ordre de l'intelligible. Assurément, toutefois, l'idée que le sens soit « agent », et non purement passif, pourrait s'entendre autrement : on pense (notamment) au développement fondamental de De an. II, 5, 417b2-16 sur l'équivocité du « pâtir » sensoriel, qui montre que la réception de la forme dans le sens équivaut à un déploiement de son être, à un accroissement, un « progrès » (une additio, dit l'arabo-latin, qui traduit ziyāda, l'épidosis grecque) de la puissance vers ellemême, et donc, quodam modo, à une activité -sur la « passivité » du sens et de l'intellect chez Averroès, voir M. GEOFFROY : "Passio", "transmutatio", "receptio" : Averroès sur l'analogie de l'intellect et du sens dans le(s) commentaire(s) au De anima d'Aristote, in : J. HA-MESSE/O. WEIJERS (éds.) : Écriture et Réécriture des textes philosophiques médiévaux. Volume d'hommage offert à Colette Sirat. Turnhout : Brepols 2006, 137-184. Par ailleurs, le sens peut être considéré comme « actif » en tant qu'il agit au dehors : Aristote en parle à propos de la vue en De insom., 2, 429b26 sq. ; et Averroès aussi, bien qu'autrement : cf. par exemple son Colliget, III, 38, in : Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis.

Electrical Muscle Stimulation (EMS) ooers rich opportunities for interaction. By varying stimulation parameters (amplitudes, pulse widths and frequencies), EMS can be used to either trigger muscle contractions, and so convey object aaordances or guide user movements, or provide rich haptic feedback. However, the way users' experience changes with these parameters, and EMS in general, is poorly understood. Using a phenomenologically inspired interview technique, the explicitation interview, we study een users' experience of EMS across 48 combinations of stimulation parameters. We synthesize the descriptions of EMS and relate stimulation parameters to categories of experience, such as 'temperature', 'motion', and 'sensitivity'. From the interviews, we explore more general topics in body-based interfaces, including the experience of control, metaphors for having your body actuated, and the relation between EMS parameters and perceived depth and location of sensations. ese ndings provide a vocabulary of EMS experience, and an insight into the relationship between speciic parameters and associated sensations. In turn, this can help designers consider the user experience of EMS when developing interfaces.

Recent significant research in a number of disciplines centers on the concept of the sense of agency. Because many of these studies cut across disciplinary lines there is good reason to seek a clear consensus on what 'sense of agency'means. In this paper I indicate some complexities that this consensus might have to deal with. I also highlight an important phenomenological distinction that needs to be considered in any discussion of the sense of agency, regardless of how it gets defined.

Several recently developed philosophical approaches to the self promise to enhance the exchange of ideas between the philosophy of the mind and the other cognitive sciences. This review examines two important concepts of self: the ‘minimal self’, a self devoid of temporal extension, and the ‘narrative self’, which involves personal identity and continuity across time. The notion of a minimal self is first clarified by drawing a distinction between the sense of self-agency and the sense of self-ownership for actions.
This distinction is then explored within the neurological domain with specific reference to schizophrenia, in which the sense of self-agency may be disrupted. The convergence between the philosophical debate and empirical study is extended in a discussion of more primitive aspects of self and how these relate to neonatal experience and robotics. The second concept of self, the narrative self, is discussed in the light of Gazzaniga’s left-hemisphere ‘interpreter’ and episodic memory. Extensions of the idea of a narrative self that are consistent with neurological models are then considered. The review illustrates how the philosophical approach can inform cognitive science and suggests
that a two-way collaboration may lead to a more fully developed account of the self.

"The thesis vindicates the common-sense intuition that touch is more objective than the other senses.  The reason why it is so, it is argued, is that touch is the only sense essential of the experience of physical effort, and that this experience constitutes our only acquaintance with the mind-independence of the physical world.
The thesis is divided in tree parts.
Part I argues that sensory modalities are individuated by they proper objects, realistically construed.
Part II argues that the proper objects of touch are pressures and tensions, defined as pairs of real an antagonist forces.
Part III argues that experiences of pressures are an essential part of the experience of physical effort and that the experience of physical effort (which amounts to the experience of resistance to our will), constitutes our only immediate access to the mind-independence of the physical world."

Article based on paper presented as part of Panel 24: ‘Looting, Refusing, Negating, Embodying’ ‘Critical Refusals’ Fourth Biennal Conference of the International Herbert Marcuse Society, University of Pennsylvania, 27-29th October 2011

http://www.pdcnet.org/radphilrev/content/radphilrev_2013_0016_0001_0375_0385

http://web.asc.upenn.edu/news/Critical_Refusals_Conference.pdf

O presente artigo tem por objetivo analisar a função que a narrativa assume na produção de significado resultante do contato entre jogadores e mundo no Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game (MMORPG) World of Warcraft (WoW). Estabelecendo uma articulação entre a teoria dramatúrgica, desenvolvida por Erving Goffman, que afirma que as ações humanas são dependentes do contexto interacional, o objetivo da pesquisa é vislumbrar de que forma a narrativa associada ao mundo age na produção de scripts comportamentais, e de que forma tais scripts dialogam com um suposto comportamento operacional, resultante do efeito de ilusão experimentado pelo jogador.

In this study, the researcher used an action research methodology to investigate the selfinitiated creative processes and artifacts of his fourth and fifth grade students over the course of one school year in an attempt to shed light on the pedagogical effects of an elementary classroom that allows its students significant creative agency. The majority of the literature on the self-initiated creativity of children examines the work of primary grade students in an art room setting, revealing a gap in the literature and the need for a study regarding self-initiated creative processes and products made by children in an intermediate general classroom setting. The research site was a democratically based, child-centered classroom in a private day school where students were encouraged to share in the development of the conceptual, curricular, and physical aspects of the learning environment. The self-initiated creative activities of the children provided a unique lens through which the r...

Edited version of published paper presented at 'Is Black and Red Dead?' Conference, Centre for the Study of Social and Global and Justice (CSSGJ) University of Nottingham, 7-8 September, 2009

https://socialhistoryportal.org/news/articles/110943

... Free Will: a historical and philosophical introduction jej autor, Ilham Dilman, przenikają karty najstarszych dzieł literatury greckiej [Dilman, 1999]. ... świadomej woli: „plany działania nie wydają się wymuszać zachowa-nia w tym sensie, iż jeśli pojawi się dany plan, dochodzi do ...

We habitually think of our Self as a conscious agent operating largely in terms of how we consciously experience those operations. However, psychological and neuroscientific findings suggest that mental operations that seem to be initiated by the conscious Self are largely preconscious or unconscious.  In this paper I examine how these aspects of the Self and its operations combine in the exercise of free will—and suggest that the conscious wishes, choices and decisions that we normally associate with “conscious free will” result from preconscious processes that provide a form of “preconscious free will”.  The conscious experiences associated with other so-called “conscious processing” in complex tasks such as speech perception and production, reading and thinking, also result from preconscious processing—which  requires a more nuanced analysis of how conscious experiences relate to the processes with which they are most closely associated. We need to distinguish processes that are conscious a) in the sense that we are conscious of them, b) in the sense that they result in a conscious experience, and c) in the sense that consciousness plays a causal role in those processes.  We also examine how consciousness enables real-ization: it is only when one experiences something for oneself that it becomes subjectively real. Together, these findings suggest that Self has a deeper architecture.  Although the real-ized aspects of the Self are the consciously experienced aspects, these are just the visible “tip” of a far more complex, embedding preconscious/unconscious ground.

Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “thought insertion” might supply a counterexample to the Cartesian principle according to which one can always recognize one’s own thoughts as one’s own. Animated by a general distrust of a priori demonstrations, Gallagher is convinced that pitting clinical cases against philosophical arguments is a worthwhile endeavor. There is no doubt that, if true, a falsification of the immunity to error through misidentification would entail drastic revisions in how we conceive the boundary between self and other. However, I argue that (1) the idea of unearthing an exception to the Cartesian thesis is, on further reflection, not a realistic prospect and that (2) this casts doubt on the attempt to conjoin first-person phenomenology and third-person cognitive science in the service of philosophical debates.

There are few concepts as relevant as that of intentional action in shaping our sense of self and the interaction with the environment. At the same time, few concepts are so elusive. Indeed, both conceptual and neuroscientific accounts of intentional agency have proven to be problematic. On the one hand, most conceptual views struggle in defining how agents can adequately exert control over their actions. On the other hand, neuroscience settles for definitions by exclusion whereby key features of human intentional actions, including goal-directness, remain underspecified. This paper reviews the existing literature and sketches how this gap might be filled. In particular, we defend a gradualist notion of intentional behavior, which revolves around the following key features: autonomy, flexibility in the integration of causal vectors, and control.

Changes in the sense of agency are defining feature of hypnosis. The Sense of Agency Rating Scale (SOARS) is a 10-item questionnaire, administered after a hypnosis session to assess alteration in the sense of agency. In the present study, a Hungarian version of the measure (SOARS-HU) is presented. The SOARS-HU and the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) were administered to 197 subjects following hypnotizability screening with the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form A (HGSHS:A). Confirmatory factor analysis and correlations with hypnotizability demonstrate the reliability and validity of the SOARS-HU. Changes in the Involuntariness and Effortlessness sub-scales of the SOARS-HU were associated with alterations in subjective conscious experience, as measured by the PCI. These changes in subjective experience remained significant after controlling for HGSHS:A scores. These results indicate that changes in the sense of agency during hypnosis are associated with alterations of consciousness that are independent of hypnotizability.

The sense of agency refers to the feeling that we are in control of our actions and, through them, of events in the outside world. Much research has focused on the importance of retrospectively matching predicted and actual action outcomes for a strong sense of agency. Yet, recent studies have revealed that a metacognitive signal about the fluency of action selection can prospectively inform our sense of agency. Fluent, or easy, action selection leads to a stronger sense of agency over action outcomes than dysfluent, or difficult, selection. Since these studies used subliminal priming to manipulate action selection, it remained unclear whether supraliminal stimuli affecting action selection would have similar effects. We used supraliminal flankers to manipulate action selection in response to a central target. Experiment 1 revealed that conflict in action selection, induced by incongruent flankers and targets, led to reduced agency ratings over an outcome that followed the participant's response, relative to neutral and congruent flanking conditions. Experiment 2 replicated this result, and extended it to free choice between alternative actions. Finally, Experiment 3 varied the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between flankers and target. Action selection performance varied with SOA. Agency ratings were always lower in incongruent than congruent trials, and this effect did not vary across SOAs. Sense of agency is influenced by a signal that tracks conflict in action selection, regardless of the visibility of stimuli inducing conflict, and even when the timing of the stimuli means that the conflict may not affect performance.

Apa Itu Creative Design Agency Surabaya | Di era milenial saat ini segala sesuatu usaha jika mau berhasil harus ada nama merek yang terkenal. Menggunakan creative design agency mampu meningkatkan merek kamu sehingga menciptakan benak di dalam konsumen yang kuat.

Branding merupakan aktivitas yang butuh skill khusus. Hal ini membutuhkan effort khusus pula untuk bisa membuat hal-hal yang membuat branding itu meningkat seperti desain logo, konsistensi membuat konten di sosial media, beriklan dll. Sebagai creative design agency yang bekerja dengan kreativitas.

Kami juga melakukan proses yang melibatkan pemikiran strategis jangka panjang. Ada beberapa strategi khusus untuk bisa menciptakan brand yang berhasil.

Mulai dari penelitian tentang brand itu sendiri, merencanakan visi brand, menganalisa citra yang ingin dibentuk, dan branding yang ingin dibentuk sosial media.

The sense of agency is a central aspect of human self-consciousness and refers to the experience of oneself as the agent of one's own actions. Several different cognitive theories on the sense of agency have been proposed implying divergent empirical approaches and results, especially with respect to neural correlates. A multifactorial and multilevel model of the sense of agency may provide the most constructive framework for integrating divergent theories and findings, meeting the complex nature of this intriguing phenomenon.

In this arts-based, action research study, I examine the self-initiated creative processes and artifacts of fourth and fifth graders who I taught during the 2012-2013 school year. The purpose of the study is to reflect on the effectiveness of my pedagogical strategies intended to empower students’ creative agency. The research site was a democratically based, child-centered classroom where students were encouraged to share in the development of the conceptual, curricular, and physical aspects of the learning environment. Empowering students to become critical agents by fostering choice and autonomy lead to arts-based approaches of inquiry and spontaneous creative learning experiences.

At the core of the sense of agency for self-produced action is the sense that I, and not some other agent, am producing and directing those actions. While there is an ever-expanding body of empirical research investigating the sense of agency for bodily action, there has, to date, been little empirical investigation of the sense of agency for thought. The present study uses the novel Mind-to-Mind paradigm, in which the agentive source of a target thought is ambiguous, to measure misattributions of agency. Seventy-two percent of participants made at least one misattribution of agency during a 5-min trial. Misattributions were significantly more frequent when the target thought was an arousing negative thought as compared to a neutral control. The findings establish a novel protocol for measuring the sense of agency for thought, and suggest that both contextual factors and emotional experience play a role in its generation.

Difficulties in self–other processing lie at the core of schizophrenia and pose a problem for patients’ daily social functioning. In the present selective review, we provide a framework for understanding self–other integration and distinction, and impairments herein in schizophrenia. For this purpose, we discuss classic motor prediction models in relation to mirror neuron functioning, theory of mind, mimicry, self-awareness, and self-agency phenomena. Importantly, we also discuss the role of more recent cognitive expectation models in these phenomena, and argue that these cognitive models form an essential contribution to our understanding of self–other integration and distinction. In doing so, we bring together different lines of research and connect findings from social psychology, affective neuropsychology, and psychiatry to further our understanding of when and how people integrate versus distinguish self and other, and how this goes wrong in schizophrenia patients.