“People aren't pissed just to be pissed. They're mad because a tiny group of crooks on Wall Street built themselves beach houses in the Hamptons through a crude fraud scheme that decimated their retirement funds, caused property values in their neighborhoods to collapse and caused over four million people to be put in foreclosure.”
― Matt Taibbi

“Liberty is the act of making the Government Fear
what you KNOW!”
― Faith Brashear

“Here are the top three warning signs [you're at risk of foreclosure]:
* You used to think nobody cared when your phone rarely rang. Then you missed a couple of house payments.
* You're glad gas prices have fallen so you can afford it if you have to move into your car.
* You're ready to say, "Let's make a deal" and trade your upside-down house for whatever's behind Door #3.”
― Kathryn Alesandrini, Cash Cow Casa: 51 Ways to Make Your House Pay YOU

“Many thrifts layered a billion dollars of brand-new loans on top of their existing, disastrous hundred million dollars of old loss-making loans, in a hope that the new would offset the old. Each new purchase of mortgage bonds (which was identical to making a loan) was like the last act of a desperate man. The strategy was wildly irresponsible, for the fundamental problem (borrowing short term and lending long term) hadn’t been remedied. The hypergrowth only meant that the next thrift crisis would be larger. But the thrift managers were not thinking that far in advance. They were simply trying to keep the door to the shop open. That explains why thrifts continued to buy mortgage bonds even as they sold their loans.”
― Michael Lewis, Liar's Poker

“This completed the curious reversal in roles that occurred in the early 1980s, when thrifts became traders and traders thrifts.”
― Michael Lewis, Liar's Poker

“The idea, in the wake of the savings-and-loans disaster, was to spread risk outward from those immediately involved in lending to mortgage borrowers and to attract investors by turning mortgages into securities that offered a wide range of yield-risk profiles. And it worked. In 1980, 67 percent of American mortgages had been held directly on the balance sheets of depository banks. By the end of the 1990s, the risks involved in America’s system of long-term, fixed interest, easy repayment mortgages were securitized and spread across a much wider segment of the financial system”
― Adam Tooze