REVIEW

Five Rules for the Evolution

of Cooperation
Martin A. Nowak

Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells,
multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation
means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But
natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism
is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct
reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple
rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.

volution is based on a fierce competition

between individuals and should therefore
reward only selfish behavior. Every gene,
every cell, and every organism should be designed to promote its own evolutionary success
at the expense of its competitors. Yet we observe cooperation on many levels of biological organization. Genes cooperate in genomes.
Chromosomes cooperate in eukaryotic cells.
Cells cooperate in multicellular organisms. There
are many examples of cooperation among animals. Humans are the champions of cooperation:
From hunter-gatherer societies to nation-states,
cooperation is the decisive organizing principle
of human society. No other life form on Earth is
engaged in the same complex games of cooperation and defection. The question of how natural
selection can lead to cooperative behavior has
fascinated evolutionary biologists for several
decades.
A cooperator is someone who pays a cost,
c, for another individual to receive a benefit,
b. A defector has no cost and does not deal
out benefits. Cost and benefit are measured in
terms of fitness. Reproduction can be genetic
or cultural. In any mixed population, defectors
have a higher average fitness than cooperators
(Fig. 1). Therefore, selection acts to increase
the relative abundance of defectors. After some
time, cooperators vanish from the population.
Remarkably, however, a population of only
cooperators has the highest average fitness,
whereas a population of only defectors has
the lowest. Thus, natural selection constantly
reduces the average fitness of the population. Fishers fundamental theorem, which
states that average fitness increases under
constant selection, does not apply here because selection is frequency-dependent: The
fitness of individuals depends on the frequency (= relative abundance) of cooperators in
the population. We see that natural selection in
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, and Department of
Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138,
USA. E-mail: martin_nowak@harvard.edu

1560

well-mixed populations needs help for establishing cooperation.

Kin Selection
When J. B. S. Haldane remarked, I will jump
into the river to save two brothers or eight
cousins, he anticipated what became later known
as Hamiltons rule (1). This ingenious idea is that
natural selection can favor cooperation if the
donor and the recipient of an altruistic act are
genetic relatives. More precisely, Hamiltons rule
states that the coefficient of relatedness, r, must
exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act:
r > c/b

(1)

Relatedness is defined as the probability of

sharing a gene. The probability that two brothers
share the same gene by descent is 1/2; the same
probability for cousins is 1/8. Hamiltons theory
became widely known as kin selection or
inclusive fitness (27). When evaluating the
fitness of the behavior induced by a certain gene,
it is important to include the behaviors effect on
kin who might carry the same gene. Therefore,
the extended phenotype of cooperative behavior is the consequence of selfish genes (8, 9).
Direct Reciprocity
It is unsatisfactory to have a theory that can explain cooperation only among relatives. We also

C
C C
C
C
C

Mutation

C C
C
C
C D

observe cooperation between unrelated individuals or even between members of different

species. Such considerations led Trivers (10) to
propose another mechanism for the evolution of
cooperation, direct reciprocity. Assume that
there are repeated encounters between the same
two individuals. In every round, each player has
a choice between cooperation and defection. If I
cooperate now, you may cooperate later. Hence,
it might pay off to cooperate. This game theoretic
framework is known as the repeated Prisoners
Dilemma.
But what is a good strategy for playing this
game? In two computer tournaments, Axelrod
(11) discovered that the winning strategy
was the simplest of all, tit-for-tat. This strategy always starts with a cooperation, then it
does whatever the other player has done in the
previous round: a cooperation for a cooperation, a defection for a defection. This simple
concept captured the fascination of all enthusiasts of the repeated Prisoners Dilemma.
Many empirical and theoretical studies were
inspired by Axelrods groundbreaking work
(1214).
But soon an Achilles heel of the world
champion was revealed: If there are erroneous
moves caused by trembling hands or fuzzy
minds, then the performance of tit-for-tat declines (15, 16). Tit-for-tat cannot correct mistakes, because an accidental defection leads to a
long sequence of retaliation. At first, tit-for-tat
was replaced by generous-tit-for-tat (17), a strategy that cooperates whenever you cooperate,
but sometimes cooperates although you have
defected [with probability 1 (c/b)]. Natural
selection can promote forgiveness.
Subsequently, tit-for-tat was replaced by
win-stay, lose-shift, which is the even simpler
idea of repeating your previous move whenever you are doing well, but changing otherwise (18). By various measures of success,
win-stay, lose-shift is more robust than either
tit-for-tat or generous-tit-for-tat (15, 18). Titfor-tat is an efficient catalyst of cooperation in a
society where nearly everybody is a defector,
but once cooperation is established, win-stay,
lose-shift is better able to maintain it.

Selection

C
C
D
C
D
D

Selection

D
D D D
D D

Declining average fitness

Fig. 1. Without any mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, natural selection favors defectors. In a
mixed population, defectors, D, have a higher payoff (= fitness) than cooperators, C. Therefore, natural
selection continuously reduces the abundance, i, of cooperators until they are extinct. The average
fitness of the population also declines under natural selection. The total population size is given by N. If
there are i cooperators and N i defectors, then the fitness of cooperators and defectors, respectively,
is given by fC = [b(i 1)/(N 1)] c and fD = bi/(N 1). The average fitness of the population is given
by f = (b c)i/N.

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The number of possible strategies for the
repeated Prisoners Dilemma is unlimited, but
a simple general rule can be shown without
any difficulty. Direct reciprocity can lead to the
evolution of cooperation only if the probability,
w, of another encounter between the same two
individuals exceeds the cost-to-benefit ratio of
the altruistic act:
w > c/b

reciprocity also leads to the evolution of morality

(30) and social norms (21, 22).
The calculations of indirect reciprocity are
complicated and only a tiny fraction of this universe has been uncovered, but again a simple
rule has emerged (19). Indirect reciprocity can
only promote cooperation if the probability, q,
of knowing someones reputation exceeds the
cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act:

(2)

Indirect Reciprocity
Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism
for the evolution of cooperation, but it leaves
out certain aspects that are particularly important for humans. Direct reciprocity relies on
repeated encounters between the same two
individuals, and both individuals must be able
to provide help, which is less costly for the
donor than it is beneficial for the recipient.
But often the interactions among humans are
asymmetric and fleeting. One person is in a
position to help another, but there is no possibility for a direct reciprocation. We help strangers
who are in need. We donate to charities that do
not donate to us. Direct reciprocity is like a barter
economy based on the immediate exchange of
goods, whereas indirect reciprocity resembles the
invention of money. The money that fuels the
engines of indirect reciprocity is reputation.
Helping someone establishes a good reputation, which will be rewarded by others. When
deciding how to act, we take into account the
possible consequences for our reputation. We
feel strongly about events that affect us directly,
but we also take a keen interest in the affairs of
others, as demonstrated by the contents of
gossip.
In the standard framework of indirect reciprocity, there are randomly chosen pairwise
encounters where the same two individuals
need not meet again. One individual acts as
donor, the other as recipient. The donor can
decide whether or not to cooperate. The interaction is observed by a subset of the population who might inform others. Reputation
allows evolution of cooperation by indirect
reciprocity (19). Natural selection favors strategies that base the decision to help on the
reputation of the recipient. Theoretical and empirical studies of indirect reciprocity show that
people who are more helpful are more likely to
receive help (2028).
Although simple forms of indirect reciprocity
can be found in animals (29), only humans seem
to engage in the full complexity of the game.
Indirect reciprocity has substantial cognitive
demands. Not only must we remember our own
interactions, we must also monitor the everchanging social network of the group. Language
is needed to gain the information and spread the
gossip associated with indirect reciprocity. Presumably, selection for indirect reciprocity and
human language has played a decisive role in
the evolution of human intelligence (28). Indirect

q > c/b

(3)

Network Reciprocity
The argument for natural selection of defection
(Fig. 1) is based on a well-mixed population,
where everybody interacts equally likely with
everybody else. This approximation is used by
all standard approaches to evolutionary game
dynamics (3134). But real populations are not
well mixed. Spatial structures or social networks imply that some individuals interact
more often than others. One approach of capturing this effect is evolutionary graph theory
(35), which allows us to study how spatial structure affects evolutionary and ecological dynamics (3639).
The individuals of a population occupy the
vertices of a graph. The edges determine who
interacts with whom. Let us consider plain
cooperators and defectors without any strategic
complexity. A cooperator pays a cost, c, for
each neighbor to receive a benefit, b. Defectors have no costs, and their neighbors receive
no benefits. In this setting, cooperators can
prevail by forming network clusters, where
they help each other. The resulting network
reciprocity is a generalization of spatial reciprocity (40).
Games on graphs are easy to study by computer simulation, but they are difficult to analyze
mathematically because of the enormous number of possible configurations that can arise.
Nonetheless, a surprisingly simple rule determines whether network reciprocity can favor
cooperation (41). The benefit-to-cost ratio must
exceed the average number of neighbors, k, per
individual:
b/c > k

(4)

Group Selection
Selection acts not only on individuals but also
on groups. A group of cooperators might be
more successful than a group of defectors. There
have been many theoretical and empirical studies
of group selection, with some controversy, and
recently there has been a renaissance of such
ideas under the heading of multilevel selection
(4250).
A simple model of group selection works as
follows (51). A population is subdivided into
groups. Cooperators help others in their own
group. Defectors do not help. Individuals reproduce proportional to their payoff. Offspring
are added to the same group. If a group reaches

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a certain size, it can split into two. In this case,

another group becomes extinct in order to constrain the total population size. Note that only
individuals reproduce, but selection emerges
on two levels. There is competition between
groups because some groups grow faster and
split more often. In particular, pure cooperator
groups grow faster than pure defector groups,
whereas in any mixed group, defectors reproduce faster than cooperators. Therefore, selection on the lower level (within groups) favors
defectors, whereas selection on the higher level
(between groups) favors cooperators. This model
is based on group fecundity selection, which
means that groups of cooperators have a higher
rate of splitting in two. We can also imagine a
model based on group viability selection,

Fig. 2. Evolutionary dynamics of cooperators

and defectors. The red and blue arrows indicate
selection favoring defectors and cooperators,
respectively. (A) Without any mechanism for the
evolution of cooperation, defectors dominate. A
mechanism for the evolution of cooperation can
allow cooperators to be the evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS), risk-dominant (RD), or advantageous (AD) in comparison with defectors. (B)
Cooperators are ESS if they can resist invasion by
defectors. (C) Cooperators are RD if the basin of
attraction of defectors is less than 1/2. (D)
Cooperators are AD if the basin of attraction of
defectors is less than 1/3. In this case, the fixation probability of a single cooperator in a finite
population of defectors is greater than the inverse of the population size (for weak selection).
(E) Some mechanisms allow cooperators to dominate defectors.

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where groups of cooperators are less likely to go
extinct.
In the mathematically convenient limit of
weak selection and rare group splitting, we obtain a simple result (51): If n is the maximum
group size and m is the number of groups, then
group selection allows evolution of cooperation,
provided that
b/c > 1 + (n/m)

(5)

Evolutionary Success
Before proceeding to a comparative analysis of
the five mechanisms, let me introduce some
Kin selection

Direct reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity

Network reciprocity

C
a
g

C
D

D
b
d

The entries denote the payoff for the row

player. Without any mechanism for the evolution
of cooperation, defectors dominate cooperators,
which means a < g and b < d. A mechanism for
the evolution of cooperation can change these
inequalities.
1) If a > g, then cooperation is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). An infinitely
large population of cooperators cannot be invaded by defectors under deterministic selection dynamics (32).
2) If a + b > g + d, then cooperators are
risk-dominant (RD). If both strategies are
ESS, then the risk-dominant strategy has the
bigger basin of attraction.
3) If a + 2b > g + 2d, then cooperators are
advantageous (AD). This concept is important
for stochastic game dynamics in finite populations. Here, the crucial quantity is the fixation probability of a strategy, defined as the
probability that the lineage arising from a
single mutant of that strategy will take over
the entire population consisting of the other
strategy. An AD strategy has a fixation probability greater than the inverse of the population size, 1/N. The condition can also be
expressed as a 1/3 rule: If the fitness of the invading strategy at a frequency of 1/3 is greater
than the fitness of the resident, then the fixation probability of the invader is greater than
1/N. This condition holds in the limit of weak
selection (52).

Cooperation is

Payoff matrix
C
D

Defectors

Fig. 3. Five mechanisms for the evolution of

cooperation. Kin selection operates when the
donor and the recipient of an altruistic act are
genetic relatives. Direct reciprocity requires repeated encounters between the same two individuals. Indirect reciprocity is based on reputation; a
helpful individual is more likely to receive help.
Network reciprocity means that clusters of cooperators outcompete defectors. Group selection is
the idea that competition is not only between
individuals but also between groups.

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Comparative Analysis
We have encountered five mechanisms for the
evolution of cooperation (Fig. 3). Although the
mathematical formalisms underlying the five
mechanisms are very different, at the center of
each theory is a simple rule. I now present a
coherent mathematical framework that allows
the derivation of all five rules. The crucial idea
is that each mechanism can be presented as a
game between two strategies given by a 2 2
payoff matrix (Table 1). From this matrix, we
can derive the relevant condition for evolution
of cooperation.
For kin selection, I use the approach of
inclusive fitness proposed by Maynard Smith
(31). The relatedness between two players is r.
Therefore, your payoff multiplied by r is added
to mine. A second method, shown in (53), leads
to a different matrix but the same result. For
direct reciprocity, the cooperators use tit-for-tat
while the defectors use always-defect. The
expected number of rounds is 1/(1 w). Two
tit-for-tat players cooperate all the time. Tit-fortat versus always-defect cooperates only in the
first move and then defects. For indirect reciprocity, the probability of knowing someones
reputation is given by q. A cooperator helps
unless the reputation of the other person indicates a defector. A defector never helps. For
network reciprocity, it can be shown that the
expected frequency of cooperators is described
by a standard replicator equation with a transformed payoff matrix (54). For group selection,
the payoff matrices of the two gameswithin

Table 1. Each mechanism can be described by a simple 2 2 payoff matrix, which specifies the
interaction between cooperators and defectors. From these matrices we can directly derive the necessary conditions for evolution of cooperation. The parameters c and b denote, respectively, the cost
for the donor and the benefit for the recipient. For network reciprocity, we use the parameter H =
[(b c)k 2c]/[(k + 1)(k 2)]. All conditions can be expressed as the benefit-to-cost ratio
exceeding a critical value. See (53) for further explanations of the underlying calculations.

Group selection

Cooperators

A mechanism for the evolution of cooperation can ensure that cooperators become
ESS, RD, or AD (Fig. 2). Some mechanisms
even allow cooperators to dominate defectors,
which means a > g and b > d.

measures of evolutionary success. Suppose a

game between two strategies, cooperators C and
defectors D, is given by the payoff matrix

ESS

RD

C (b c)(1 r )
D
b rc

br c
0

b
c

1
r

Direct
reciprocity

C (b c) /(1 w)
D
b

c
0

b
c

1
w

b
c

2 w
w

b
c

3 2w wprobability of next round

w

Indirect
reciprocity

C
D

b c
b(1 q )

c(1 q)
0

b
c

1
q

b
c

2 q
q

b
c

3 2q qsocial acquaintanceship
q

Network
reciprocity

C
D

b c
b H

H c
0

b
c

Group
selection

C (b c)(m n) (b c)m cn
D
bn
0

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b
n
1
c
m

b
c

AD

Kin
selection

b
c

b
c

1
r

b
n
1
c
m

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1
r

b
c

b
n
1
c
m

rgenetic relatedness

knumber of neighbors

ngroup size
mnumber of groups

REVIEW
and between groupscan be added up. The
details of all these arguments and their limitations are given in (53).
For kin selection, the calculation shows that
Hamiltons rule, r > c/b, is the decisive criterion
for all three measures of evolutionary success:
ESS, RD, and AD. Similarly, for network reciprocity and group selection, we obtain the
same condition for all three evaluations, namely b/c > k and b/c > 1 + (n/m), respectively.
The reason is the following: If these conditions hold, then cooperators dominate defectors. For direct and indirect reciprocity, we
find that the ESS conditions lead to w > c/b
and q > c/b, respectively. Slightly more stringent conditions must hold for cooperation to be
RD or AD.

correlation. Therefore, kin selection theory also

provides an approach to compare different mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation (69, 70).
The two fundamental principles of evolution
are mutation and natural selection. But evolution
is constructive because of cooperation. New
levels of organization evolve when the competing units on the lower level begin to cooperate.
Cooperation allows specialization and thereby
promotes biological diversity. Cooperation is the
secret behind the open-endedness of the evolutionary process. Perhaps the most remarkable
aspect of evolution is its ability to generate cooperation in a competitive world. Thus, we
might add natural cooperation as a third fundamental principle of evolution beside mutation
and natural selection.

Conclusion
Each of the five possible mechanisms for the
evolution of cooperationkin selection, direct
reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity and group selectioncan be described
by a characteristic 2 2 payoff matrix, from
which we can directly derive the fundamental
rules that specify whether cooperation can
evolve (Table 1). Each rule can be expressed
as the benefit-to-cost ratio of the altruistic act
being greater than some critical value. The
payoff matrices can be imported into standard
frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics.
For example, we can study replicator equations
for games on graphs (54), for group selection,
and for kin selection. This creates interesting
new possibilities for the theory of evolutionary
dynamics (55).
I have not discussed all potential mechanisms
for the evolution of cooperation. An interesting possibility is offered by green beard models where cooperators recognize each other via
arbitrary labels (5658). Another way to obtain
cooperation is making the game voluntary rather
than obligatory: If players can choose to cooperate, defect, or not play at all, then some level of
cooperation usually prevails in dynamic oscillations (59). Punishment is an important factor
that can promote cooperative behavior in some
situations (6064), but it is not a mechanism for
the evolution of cooperation. All evolutionary
models of punishment so far are based on underlying mechanisms such as indirect reciprocity
(65), group selection (66, 67), or network reciprocity (68). Punishment can enhance the level of
cooperation that is achieved in such models.
Kin selection has led to mathematical theories (based on the Price equation) that are
more general than just analyzing interactions
between genetic relatives (4, 5). The interacting
individuals can have any form of phenotypic

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Supporting Online Material

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SOM Text
References
10.1126/science.1133755

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Five rules for the evolution of cooperation

Supporting Online Material

Martin A. Nowak
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology,
Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Email: martin nowak@harvard.edu

The standard payoff matrix between cooperators, C, and defectors, D, is given by

C
D

b c c
b

"

(1)

The entries in the payoff matrix refer to the row player. For each interaction, a cooperator
pays a cost, c. Interacting with a cooperator leads to a benefit, b. Thus, the payoff for
C versus C is b c; the payoff for C versus D is c; the payoff for D versus C is b; the

payoff for D versus D is 0. Usually, we assume that b > c, otherwise the payoff for two
cooperators is less than the payoff for two defectors, and cooperation becomes nonsensical.
I will now discuss how to derive the five 2 2 matrices of Table 1.
1. Kin selection
A simple way to study games between relatives was proposed by Maynard Smith for

the Hawk-Dove game (S1). I will use this method to analyze the interaction between
cooperators and defectors. Consider a population where the average relatedness between
individuals is given by r, which is a number between 0 and 1. The concept of inclusive
fitness implies that the payoff received by a relative is added to my own payoff multiplied
by r. Therefore, we obtain the modified matrix

C
D

(b c)(1 + r) br c
b rc

"

(2)

For this payoff matrix, cooperators dominate defectors if b/c > 1/r. In this case, cooperators are also evolutionarily stable (ESS), risk-dominant (RD) and advantageous (AD); see
main text for the definition of ESS, RD and AD.
1

Another method to describe games among relatives was proposed by Grafen (S2)
also in the context of the Hawk Dove game. Let us assume that interactions are more
likely between relatives. Each individual has a fraction, r, of its interactions with its own
relatives, who use the same strategy, and a fraction 1 r with random individuals from

the population, who could use the same or a different strategy. Let x denote the frequency
of cooperators. The frequency of defectors is given by 1 x. The fitness of a cooperator is

FC (x) = r(b c) + (1 r)[(b c)x c(1 x)]. The fitness of a defector is FD (x) = (1 r)bx.

These linear fitness function can be described by the payoff matrix

C
D

FC (1)

FC (0)

FD (1) FD (0)

"

C
D

bc

br c

b(1 r)

"

(3)

Again we find that cooperators dominate defectors if b/c > 1/r. Therefore, both approaches give the same answer, which turns out to be Hamiltons rule (S3). Note that
the exact population genetics of sexually reproducing, diploid individuals require more
complicated calculations (S4).
2. Direct reciprocity
In order to derive a necessary condition for the evolution of cooperation in the repeated
Prisoners Dilemma, we can study the interaction between always-defect (ALLD) and titfor-tat (TFT). If TFT cannot hold itself against ALLD then no cooperative strategy can.
TFT starts with cooperation and then does whatever the opponent has done in the previous
move. We ignore erroneous moves. In this setting, TFT playing ALLD will cooperate in
the first round and defect afterwards. Therefore, the payoff for TFT versus ALLD is c.

The payoff for ALLD versus TFT is b. Only the first round leads to a payoff, while all
subsequent rounds consist of mutual defection and produce zero payoff for both players.
The payoff for ALLD versus ALLD is 0. The payoff for TFT versus TFT is (b c)/(1 w).

The parameter w denotes the probability of playing another round between the same two
players. The average number of rounds is given by 1/(1 w). Hence, we obtain the payoff
matrix

C
D

(b c)/(1 w) c
b

"

(4)

From this matrix we immediately obtain the three conditions for ESS, RD and AD that
are shown in Table 1. For cooperators (using TFT) to be ESS in comparison with ALLD,
2

we need b/c > 1/w. Slightly more stringent conditions are required for cooperators to be
RD or AD. Note that ALLD is always an ESS, and hence cooperators cannot dominate
defectors in the framework of direct reciprocity.
The calculations for exploring the interactions of larger sets of probabilistic strategies
of the repeated Prisoners Dilemma in the presence of noise (S5) are more complicated (S6,
S7). Often there are cycles between ALLD, TFT and unconditional cooperators (ALLC)
(S8). The point is that b/c > 1/w is a necessary condition for the evolution of cooperation.
This argument is related to the Folk theorem which states that certain trigger strategies
can achieve cooperation if there are enough rounds of the repeated Prisoners Dilemma
(S9, S10).

3. Indirect reciprocity
Indirect reciprocity describes the interaction between a donor and a recipient. The
donor can either cooperate or defect. The basic idea of indirect reciprocity is that cooperation increases ones own reputation, while defection reduces it. The fundamental question
is whether natural selection can lead to strategies that base their decision to cooperate (at
least to some extent) on the reputation of the recipient.
A strategy for indirect reciprocity consists of an action rule and an assessment norm.
The action rule determines whether to cooperate or to defect in a particular situation
depending on the recipients reputation (image score) and ones own. The assessment norm
determines how to evaluate an interaction between two other people as an observer. Most
analytic calculations of indirect reciprocity assume binary image scores: the reputation
of someone is either good or bad. Nobody so far has succeeded to formulate an exact
analysis for the realistic situation where the image scores are more gradual and different
people have different image scores of the same person as a consequence of private and
incomplete information.
In order to derive a necessary condition for the evolution of cooperation by indirect
reciprocity, let us study the interaction between the two basic strategies: (i) defectors
and (ii) cooperators who cooperate unless they know the reputation of the other person
to indicate a defector. The parameter q denotes the probability to know the reputation
of another person. A cooperator always helps another cooperator. A cooperator helps a
3

defector with probability 1 q. Defectors never help. Hence, we obtain the payoff matrix
C
D

bc

c(1 q)

b(1 q)

"

(5)

We have assumed that in a pairwise interaction both individuals are donor and recipient.
If only one of them is donor and the other recipient, then all entries are multiplied by 1/2,
which makes no difference. Note that the payoff matrices (4) and (5) are identical (up to
a factor) if we set w = q. Hence, indirect reciprocity leads to the same three conditions
for ESS, RD and AD as direct reciprocity with q instead of w (see Table 1).
4. Network reciprocity
Spatial games can lead to cooperation in the absence of any strategic complexity
(S11): unconditional cooperators can coexist with and sometimes outcompete unconditional defectors. This effect is called spatial reciprocity. Spatial games are usually played
on regular lattices such as square, triangular or hexagonal lattices. Network reciprocity
is a generalization of spatial reciprocity to graphs. Individuals occupy the vertices of
a graph. The edges denotes who interacts with whom. In principle, there can be two
different graphs. The interaction graph determines who plays with whom. The replacement graph determines who competes with whom for reproduction, which can be genetic
or cultural. Here we assume that the interaction and replacement graphs are identical.
Evolutionary graph theory (S12) is a general approach to study the effect of population
structure or social networks on evolutionary dynamics.
We consider a two coloring of the graph: each vertex can be either a cooperator or a
defector. A cooperator pays a cost, c, for each neighbor to receive a benefit, b. Defectors
pay no cost and distribute no benefits. According to this simple rule the payoff, P , for
each individual is evaluated. The fitness of an individual is given by 1 + P where

[0, 1] denotes the intensity of selection. Weak selection means that is much smaller

than 1. Evolutionary updating works as follows: in each time step a random individual is
chosen to die; the neighbors compete for the empty site proportional to their fitness.
We want to calculate the fixation probabilities, C , that a single cooperator starting
in a random position on the graph takes over an entire population of defectors, and D ,
that a single defector starting in a random position on the graph takes over an entire
population of cooperators. The fixation probability of a neutral mutant is 1/N where N is
4

the population size. If C > 1/N then selection favors the fixation of cooperators; in this
case cooperation is an advantageous strategy (AD).
For regular graphs, where each individual has exactly k neighbors, a calculation using
pair-approximation (S13) leads to a surprisingly simple result: if b/c > k then C > 1/N >
D for weak selection and large N . Numerical simulations show that this result is also
an excellent approximation for non-regular graphs such as random graphs and scale free
networks (S13).
The pair approximation calculation (for k 3) also leads to a deterministic differen-

tial equation which describes how the expected frequency of cooperators (and defectors)
changes over time (S14). This differential equation turns out to be a standard replicator
equation (S15,S16) with a modified payoff matrix. For the interaction between cooperators
and defectors on a graph with average degree k this modified payoff matrix is of the form

C
D

where
H=

bc

H c

bH

"

(6)

(b c)k 2c
.
(k + 1)(k 2)

It is easy to see that the payoff matrix (6) leads to the condition b/c > k for cooperators
to dominate defectors. In this case, cooperators are also ESS, RD and AD.
5. Group selection
Many models of group selection have been proposed over the years (S17-S29). It is
difficult to formulate a model which is so simple that it can be studied analytically. One
such model is the following (S30). A population is subdivided into m groups. The maximum size of a group is n. Individuals interact with others in the same group. Cooperators
pay a cost c for each other member of the group to receive a benefit b. Defectors pay
no costs and distribute no benefits. The fitness of an individual is 1 + P , where P

is the payoff and the intensity of selection. At each time step, an individual from the
entire population is chosen for reproduction proportional to fitness. The offspring is added
to the same group. If the group reaches the maximum size, it can split into two groups
with a certain probability, p. In this case, a randomly selected group dies to prevent the
population from exploding. The maximum population size is mn. With probability 1 p

the group does not divide. In this case, a random individual of that group is chosen to die.
5

For small p, the fixation probability of a single cooperator in the entire population is given
by the fixation probability of a single cooperator in a group times the fixation probability
of that group.
For the fixation probability of one cooperator in a group of n 1 defectors we obtain

C = [1/n][1 (b + cn c)/2]. For the fixation probability of one cooperator group in a

population of m 1 defector groups we obtain C = [1/m][1 + (b c)(m 1)/2]. Both

results hold for weak selection (small ). Note that the lower level selection within a group
is frequency dependent and opposes cooperators, while the higher level selection between
groups is constant and favors cooperators.
In the case of rare group splitting, the fixation probability of a single cooperator in the
entire population, is given by the product C = C C . It is easy to see that C > 1/(nm)
leads to b/c > 1 + [n/(m 2)]. If this inequality holds, then cooperators are advantageous
(and defectors disadvantageous) once both levels of selection are combined.

For a large number of groups, m % 1, we obtain the simplified condition b/c > 1+n/m.

The benefit to cost ratio of the altruistic act must exceed one plus the ratio of group size
over the number of groups. The model can also be extended to include migration, which can
be seen as noise of group selection. In this case, the relevant criterion is b/c > 1++n/m,
where is the average number of migrants accepted over the life-time of a group (S30).
Now comes a surprising move that allows us to reduce the evolutionary dynamics on
two levels of selection to a single two-person game on one level of selection. The payoff
matrix that describes the interactions within a group is given by

C
D

b c c
b

"

(7)

Between groups there is no game dynamical interaction in our model, but groups divide at
rates that are proportional to the average fitness of individuals in that group. Therefore
one can say that cooperator groups have a constant payoff b c, while defector groups have
a constant payoff 0. Hence, in a sense the following game between groups is happening

C
D

bc bc
0

"

(8)

Remember also that the fitness of a group is 1 + P where P is its payoff. We can

now multiply the first matrix by the group size, n, and the second matrix by the number
6

of groups, m, and add the two matrices. The result is

C
D

(b c)(n + m) bm c(m + n)
0

bn

"

(9)

In this simple 2 2 game, cooperators dominate defectors if b/c > 1 + (n/m). In this case,
cooperators are also ESS, RD and AD.

Interestingly, the method also gives the right answer for two arbitrary payoff matrices
describing the games on the two levels. The intuition for adding the two matrices multiplied
with the respective population size is as follows. For fixation of a new strategy in a
homogeneous population using the other strategy, first the game dynamics within one
group (of size n) have to be won and then the game dynamics between m groups have
to be won. For weak selection and large m and n, the overall fixation probability is the
same as the fixation probability in the single game using the combined matrix (9) and
population size, mn. The stochastic process on two levels can be studied by a standard
replicator equation using the combined matrix.
Finally, note that payoff matrix (9) for group selection is structurally identical to
the payoff matrix (3) for kin selection if we set r = m/(m + n) pointing to yet another
interesting relationship between kin selection and group selection (S31).
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