CHAVEZ v IAC

191 SCRA 211Grio-Aquino; November 8. 1990

NATURE
This is a petition for review on
certiorari
of the decision of the Intermediate AppellateCourt which (1) annulled the sale made by Manuela
Buenavista of her property infavor of the spouses Raquel Chavez and Gerardo Gimenez and the
subsequent sale by said spouses of the same property to Pepito Ferrer, and (2) declared that the earlier
deeds of sale signed by Manuela and her children constituted a valid partition of the land, subject to her
lifetime usufruct.
FACTS
The land in question is the paraphernal property of Petitioner Manuela Buenavista who had six (6)
children, named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and Floserpina. The first three
were the plaintiffs and the last three, with their mother,were the defendants in Civil Case
No. 1934.Presentacion Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, Manuela Buenavista,executed
a deed of sale whereby she sold her 1/6 undivided share of the land in question to her sister,
Concepcion Chavez, for P 450. Two years later, on May 2, 1960,Floserpina Chavez, with the
conformity of her mother, also sold her 1/6 undivided share of the same land to her sister,
Concepcion, for the same price of P450. Raquel,with the conformity of her mother, likewise sold her
undivided 1/6 share of the same property to Concepcion Chavez for P600. Having acquired the shares of
Presentacion,Floserpina and Raquel, Concepcion thereby became the owner of a total undivided
4/6share of the land in question with Antonio and Rosario as owners of the remaining 2/6shares.In all the
documents, there was a stipulation that the owner, Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to
her children, in equal pro-indiviso shares, her paraphernal property situated at Sitio Langas, Barrio
Calangcawan Norte, Vinzons, CamarinesNorte, with an area of 4.1163 hectares more or less under
Tax Declaration No. 9303 and assessed at P1,630.00. The owner, however, reserved for herself the
possession of the land and the enjoyment of the fruits during her lifetime.Despite the transfers or
assignments her children had executed with her conformity ten years earlier, Manuela Buenavista, signed
a "Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of the entire property in favor of her daughter, Raquel Chavez, and her
husband, Gerardo Jimenez. Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed Civil Case No.
1934 against their mother Manuela and their sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela sold the entire property
to Pepito Ferrer with right to repurchase. Ferrer was later sued as an additional defendant in Civil
Case No. 1934. Judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing the complaint, dissolving the
preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs. The
court did not award damages. Court of Appeals reversed the trial court declaring the deeds of sale in
favor of Raquel Chavezand Gerardo Jimenez and the sale in favor of defendant-appellee Pepito Ferrer as
null and void ab initio, and declaring further that the documents are evidence of a valid partition of the
land in question by and between Manuela Buenavista and her children,subject to her right of usufruct
during her lifetime. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE
WON the IAC erred in declaring valid the deeds of sale as a partition by an act
inter vivos
considering that examining the said exhibits will reveal that it is not a testament amounting to a
will
of Manuela Buenavista
HELD
NO
RATIO
Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an
act
inter vivos
or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by
the parent, as provided in Art.1080, is a case expressly authorized by law (Art. 1347, par. 2, Civil
Code). Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a partition of his
estate;either by an act

inter vivos
or by WILL. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed
in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his
estate by an act
inter vivos
, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of
a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.In numerous cases it
has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to
assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which
possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court
of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose
of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respectiveparts in
severalty. A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have
acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession inseveralty, exercising acts of ownership with
respect thereto, or otherwise recognizingthe existence of the partition.
REASONING
In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale executed by
Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez in favor of Concepcion Chavez as
evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between Manuela Buenavista and her
children as she not only gave her authority thereto but also signed the sales. The Deeds of
Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance but a contract perfected and
consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her
consent thereto. Such partition
inter vivos
, executed by the property owner herself, is valid..... As the defendants freely participated in the partition,
they are now estopped from denying and repudiating the consequences of their own voluntary acts. It is a
general principle of law that no one may be permitted to disavow and go back upon his ownacts, or to
proceed contrary thereto. (Joaquin vs. Mitsumine 34 Phil. 858.)
MANG-OY v CA
144 SCRA 33CRUZ; September 12, 1986
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
FACTS
- Old Man Tumpao had a wife and begot 3 children , the respondents in this case. Afterhis wife's death,
he married again. His second wife had 2 children she had adoptedaccodring to the practice of igorots- On
Sept 4, 1937, Old man tumpao executed a "last will and testament". According to such, Bandao Tumpao
shall be the one to carry or fulfill the Testament, and shall have the power to see and dispose of the Old
Man Tumpao's property.- The will was read to the beneficiaries who were already occupying the lands
allotted to them. On Sept 7, 1937, they had an agreement recognizing the will and Bandos appointment.
2 days later, Old Man Tumpao died.- The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to
them, apparently inobedience to the wish of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last will.- However, in
1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition of the lands of Old Man Tumpao. The latters
title was cancelled and the respondents were given anew one. It is that title which is the being questioned
by the petitioners.- The TC ruled for the petitioners. The CA reversed as it said that the will was
void since it was not probated. The agreement of partition among the supposed
beneficiaries of the will was nullified because it was a partition inter vivos and had not been approved by
the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the will was valid
HELD
1. NO
Ratio

The will is not valid since it was not probated. However, the document may besustained on the basis of
Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force atthe time the said document was executed by
Old Man Tumpao in 1937.
Reasoning
- Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act intervivos, or by win,
such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs- Article
1056 of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes a testator to partition inter vivos his property,
and distribute them among his heirs, and that this partition is not
necessarily either a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special character,
sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does not
operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs from the
respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his creditors and the
intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs- It was sufficient, therefore, that the partition should be
in writing. It does not have to be in a public document except to affect third persons (Art. 1280),
being valid between the parties who signed it in its present form.- as the trial court put it: The will alone,
would be inoperative for the simple reason that it was not probated,However, when the persons
who were named therein as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its terms
probably to save the expenses of probate. and furthermore, carried out its terms after the death of the
testator untilnow, then it must be held to be binding between them. Said agreement was not a
disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir before the death of the testator, but a nagreement to carry
out the will. It was not contested by the defendants and after the lapse of 25 years their right, if any, to
assail it has prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code. Any formal defect of the deed, was cured by
the lapse of time.- The agreement entered into by the parties did not have to be approved by
theDirector of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes because the Administrative Code of Mindanao
and Sulu was not extended to the Mountain Province. Moreover, thedocument was not a
conveyance of properties or property right.- It remains to state that the property in dispute having been
registered in 1917, the presumption is that it was acquired during the second marriage and so
cannot be claimed by the respondents as the conjugal property of their mother and Old
Man Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land as their exclusive inheritance
or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by the petitioners