The Sociology of Social Change Piotr Sztompka IB BLACKWELL Oxford UK & Cambridge UsContents List of figures List of tables Preface Acknowledgements PART I CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES 1 Fundamental concepts in the study of change The organic metaphor: the classic approach to social change ‘The system model; engendering the concept of social change Clusters of changes: raising the complexity of dynamic concepts The alternative model: the dynamic social field Varieties of social processes: a typology Vicissitudes of the idea of progress Brief intellectual history Progress defined The mechanism of progress The demise of the idea of progress An alternative concept of progress The temporal dimension of society: social time ‘Time as the dimension of social life Time as the aspect of social change Time reckoning Time in consciousness and in culture The functions of social time Major theoretical traditions in the study of time Modalities of historical tradition The processual nature of society The concept of tradition The emergence and change of traditionviii Contents The functions of tradition 64 Traditionalism and anti-traditionalism 66 5 Modernity and beyond roo} Modernity defined 69 Aspects of modernity 71 Modern personality 7 Disenchantment with modernity 78 Beyond modernity 81 6 The globalization of buman Society 86 From isolation to globalization 86 Classical accounts of globalization 88 Recent focus: globalization of culture 91 Images of the globalized world and the ideologies of globalism 95 PART II THREE GRAND VISIONS OF HISTORY 7 7 Classical evolutionism 99 The first metaphor: organism and growth 99 The founders of sociological evolutionism 101 The common core of evolutionist theory 107 Weaknesses of classical evolutionism 109 8 Neo-evolutionism 113 The rebirth of evolutionism 113 Neo-evolutionism in cultural anthropology 114 Neo-evolutionism in sociology 118 Neo-functionalism and the debate about differentiation 123 The turn towards biological evolutionism 125 9 Theories of modernization, old and new 129 The last embodiments of evolutionism 129 The concept of modernization 131 The mechanisms of modernization 133 The critique of the idea of modernization 135 Neo-modernization and neo-convergence theory 136 10 Theories of historical cycles 142 The logic of cyclical theories 142 Forerunners of the cyclical image 144 Historiosophies of the rise and fall of civilizations 145 Sociological theories of cyclical change 149 11 Historical materialism 155 Evolutionist and Hegelian roots 155 The Marxian image of history: three-level reconstruction 157Contents ix The action-individual level: the theory of ‘species being’ The socio-structural level: the theory of classes The world-historical level: the theory of socio-economic formation Multidimensional theory of history-making PART III THE ALTERNATIVE VISION: MAKING HISTORY 12 Against developmentalism: the modern critique The refutation of ‘historicism’: Karl R. Popper The misleading metaphor of growth: Robert Nisbet ‘Pernicious postulates’: Charles Tilly ‘Unthinking’ the nineteenth century: Immanuel Wallerstein 13 History as a human product: the evolving theory of agency In search of agency Modern theories of agency The agential coefficient 14 The new historical sociology: concreteness and contingency The ascent of historical sociology The new historism The historical coefficient 15 Social becoming: the essence of historical change Levels of social reality ‘The middle level: agency and praxis Environments: nature and consciousness Enter time and history ‘The becoming of social becoming PART IV ASPECTS OF SOCIAL BECOMING 16 Ideas as historical forces Intangibles in history The spirit of capitalism The Protestant ethos Innovational personality Achievement motivation The predicament of the ‘socialist mentality’ 17 Normative emergence: evasions and innovations The normative core of social structure Institutionalized evasions of rules Normative innovations 18 Great individuals as agents of change History as a human product 162 169 171 173 179 181 181 184 186 188 191 191 193 200 202 202 205 210 213 213 215 219 224 230 233 235 235 236 237 240 242 243, 250 250 251 255, 259 259x Contents Competing theories Becoming a hero Being a hero Affecting history 19 Social movements as forces of change Social movements among agents of change Social movements defined Social movements and modernity Types of social movements Internal dynamics of social movements External dynamics of social movements The state of social movement theories 20 Revolutions: the peak of social change Revolution as a form of change The idea of revolution: a glimpse of its history The modern concept of revolution The course of revolution The models of revolution Major theories of revolution Defined ignorance in the study of revolutions Bibliography Index 263 267 a7 272 274 274 275 279 281 285 292 296 301 301 302 303 306 308 309 318 322 34311 12 13 14 15 1.6 17 8.1 8.2 11.1 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 17.1 20.1 20.2 20.3 List of figures Unilinear process or consistent course Multilinear process or branching alternative courses Step-functions or quantum leaps Cyclical process Spiral process Stagnation Random process Steward's image of the social system (source: Kaplan and Manners 1972: 47) Lenski’s evolutionist scheme (source: Lenski 1966: 92) Socio-economic formation Dimensions and levels of a social process Agency and praxis in operation The flow of historical process Various time spans of social self-transformation Sequential stages in the diffusion of innovations Aspirational deprivation (source: Gurr 1970: 51) Decremental deprivation (source: Gurr 1970: 47) Progressive deprivation (source: Gurr 1970: 53) 14 15 15 16 7 18 18 117 120 172 218 219 226 227 256 312 313 3135.1 5.2 71 722i 73 10.1 15.1 16.1 19.1 List of tables Weber's opposition of two types of societies Parsons’s ‘pattern-variables’ Military versus industrial society Mechanical versus organic solidarity Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft Sorokin’s periodization of history Individual and social agency Authoritarian versus innovational personality The typology of change 72 74 103, 105 106 153 214 240 275Preface The study of social change is at the very core of sociology. Perhaps all soci- ology is about change. ‘Change is such an evident feature of social reality that any social-scientific theory, whatever its conceptual starting point, must sooner or later address it’ (Haferkamp and Smelser 1992a: 1). This has been true from the origins of sociology. The subject was born in the nineteenth century as an attempt to comprehend the fundamental tran- sition from traditional to modern society, the rise of the urban, industrial, capitalist order. Now, at the close of the twentieth century, we are in the midst of an equally radical transition — from triumphant modemity, gradually spanning the whole globe, to new emerging forms of social life, still nebulous enough to warrant the vague label of ‘post-modernity’. The need to under- stand ongoing social change is again acutely perceived by ordinary people and sociologists alike. It was already clear in the 1970s that ‘the most striking feature of contemporary life is the revolutionary pace of social change. Never before have things changed so fast for so much of mankind. Everything is affected: art, science, religion, morality, education, politics, the economy, family life, even the inner aspects of our lives — nothing has escaped’ (Lenski and Lenski 1974: 3), It is even more obvious as we move closer to the end of the twentieth century. As it has been put by an insightful observer of the contemporary scene, We live today in an era of stunning social change, marked by transformations radically discrepant from those of previous periods. The collapse of Soviet-style socialism, the waning of the bi-polar global distribution of power, the formation of intensified global communication systems, the apparent world-wide triumph of capitalism at a time at which global divisions are becoming acute and eco- logical problems looming more and more large — all these and other issues confront social science and have to be confronted by social science. (Giddens 1991: x0) The purpose of this book is to take stock of the basic intellectual tools for the analysis, interpretation and understanding of social change, particularly on a macro-sociological or historical scale. Such tools can be searched for in three distinct domains. (1) In common sense, where people have certainly entertained loose ideas, notions and images about social change from thexiv Preface moment they began to think about their own lives, (2) In social and political philosophy, which raised common-sense reflection to the level of an autono- mous, specialized, rational pursuit producing complex categories, visions and doctrines. (3) In the social sciences proper, history, economics, political science, social anthropology, sociology, which began to apply methodical, critical, fact-oriented scrutiny to the changing social reality, attaining more rigorous and empirically founded concepts, models and theories. We shall be exclusively concerned with scientific approaches to social change, and even more re- strictively, mostly with those proposed within the discipline of sociology. Hence the title The Sociology of Social Change. For almost two centuries sociology has amassed a considerable wealth of concepts, models and theories dealing with social change, all that time socio- logical approaches to social change have themselves been changing, What parts of that rich heritage should be included in our proposed systematic inventory? Should we focus exclusively on the most recent or most fashionable trends, forgetting all that went before? The answer is an emphatic No. One Of the most precious pieces of sociological wisdom is the principle of historism It says that in order to understand any contemporary phenomenon, we must look back to its origins and the processes that brought it about. The same applies to the realm of ideas; it is impossible to understand contemporary views on social change without recognizing which earlier conceptions they intend to elaborate, and which earlier theories they stand against. We shall follow this principle. But that does not mean that our goal is an exercise in detailed intellectual genealogy, tracing links, colligations and sequences of all the theories of change that have been proposed since the birth of sociology. It is not a project in the history of ideas, but in systematic sociologal analysis. Hence, with the benefit of hindsight we can afford to be selective, ignoring those conceptions or even whole ‘schools’ which have proved to be sterile, leading up blind alleys of intellectual development. Instead we shall focus only on those which are still alive and influential. We shall also be systematic rather than chronological in the exposition; less concerned with dating than with logic. And we shall adopt the perspective of a contemporary observer of social change, seeking enlightenment whatever its source and ready to try ideas of every sort from the rich and varied sociological heritage. As befits a book addressed (although not exclusively) to students, I shall try to be as detached and non-partisan as possible, giving fairly what is due to each of the theories presented. But of course I have beliefs of my own: for example I happen to believe that there is a clear direction in the changes of the theories of change, which evolve away from mechanistic developmental schemes claiming inevitability, necessity and irreversibility for social processes, and towards an emphasis on human agency, the contingency of events and openness of the future. The logic of this intellectual evolution is reflected in the dramaturgy of the book, which starts with classical developmental ap- proaches and leads up to the exposition of the ‘theory of social becoming’,Preface xv as both the outcome of earlier theoretical debates and arguably a more ad- equate approach to current social change. Thus in the course of the exposition I shall try to be ‘cold’ and objective, but at the conclusion my cards will be put on the table. There is no way to hide it: this is a book with a message and a bias. The author's own point of view will not be kept secret, but rather unravelled openly for scrutiny and critical debate. For the most part, the book will try to present, elucidate and explicate sociological theories about change. The argument will remain mostly at the level of conceptions and visions. Concrete historical facts will be invoked only in so far as they provide illustrations of specific concepts, models and theories of social change. Hence the reader will be able to learn only indi- rectly about contemporary or past societies, to find out the facts and data Our purpose is not to relate what is or was happening, where the social world is moving and how, but rather to provide the lenses through which one can see for oneself, sharper and farther. Or to put it less metaphorically, we wish to supply the language, thought-patterns, moulds for imagination nec- essary for informed, critical thinking about social change. Is this goal defensible on practical grounds? What is the use of conceptual and theoretical knowledge of the kind we propose? Here we have to sum- mon another important sociological insight, the principle of reflexivity, which claims that in human society knowledge has direct and immediate practical consequences. What people think about social change is crucially important in moving them to action, and hence it crucially influences the very course and prospects of social change. In this sense, enriching theoretical knowl- edge about change is by the same token practically relevant for producing change. Ideas about change become a resource for introducing change. The ticher such resources are, the wider the variety of available concepts, models and theories, the deeper and more critical their mastery, the more informed and self-aware human actions become, both the everyday actions of common people, and the change-oriented programmes of task-groups, organizations, social movements, governments and other collective actors. The scope and depth of sociological imagination is an important factor in shaping society's fate. The premises indicated above dictate to some extent the internal construc- tion and logic of the book. Part I will be devoted to the explication of fundamental concepts which, independently of their origins, make up the standard and widely accepted pool of ideas indispensable for the study of change, such as social change itself, social process, development, historical cycle etc. We shall also discuss concepts which are more contested, such as social progress, social time, historical tradition, modernity and globalization. Part II will be devoted to three grand visions of human history which have left the strongest impress on both societal and sociological imagination, pro- viding competing frameworks for the conception and intepretation of social change by ordinary people and sociologists alike. These visions are evolu- tionism, cyclical theories and historical materialism. They will be discussedxvi Preface both in their orthodox, extreme form, and in later more open versions. It will be shown that, despite numerous critiques, such visions retain a strong in- fluence on contemporary thinking, provide archetypes for common sense and are revived in ever new formulations in sociological discourse. In the Jong run, however, sociological theory seems to be moving away from grand historical schemes towards more concrete accounts of timed and localized social changes, produced by identifiable actors, individual or collective. This tendency is analysed in part III, which traces the new theoretical movement against developmentalism and towards the brand of theorizing which I pro- pose to label ‘the theory of social becoming’ (Sztompka 1991b). This is rooted in two influential theoretical trends: theories of agency and historical sociology. These, it is claimed, provide the fourth, alternative approach to social change, gradually superseding the three traditional visions and providing the most adequate tool for interpreting the transformations of contemporary society. In the framework of this approach, the field is open for the study of specific, concrete mechanisms of change, as well as the role of various agencies in fostering change. Those processes which are already well recognized in so- ciological literature are discussed in part IV, with particular emphasis on the role of intangibles — ideas and norms — as the substance of change, the role of eminent individuals and social movements as agents of change, and the essence of social revolutions as peak manifestations of change.Acknowledgements The ideas presented in this book have been tested throughout the years on my students, both at the Jagiellonian University at Cracow and at the Univer- sity of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). I have learned much from them, as T hope they also have from me; but it was through chance that my lectures have been brought together in one volume. The history of books, like history in general, is highly contingent. I recall one sunny afternoon at UCLA and the lunch we shared with Simon Prosser, the editor at Blackwell's. It was right then, as a result of his editorial magic combined with the spell of the place, that the plan to write this book suddenly appeared both obvious and inevit- able, ‘The bulk of the work was done in the stimulating scholarly environment and personally gratifying milieu of the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (SCASSS) at Uppsala in the spring of 1992. My gratitude goes to all other fellows present at that time in the Collegium, as well as to its directors and staff, and particularly to my friends, and formidable competi- tors in the great game of Jes boules, Jeff Alexander and Bj6rn Wittrock.Part I Concepts and Categories1 Fundamental concepts in the study of change ‘The organic metaphor: the classic approach to social change It was at the very birth of sociology that a distinction was conceived which has haunted sociological thinking up to our days and proved to be as mis- leading as it has been persistent. This was a sort of ‘original sin’ of our dis- cipline, and the responsibility rests squarely with the father of sociology, ‘Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who divided his system of theory into two separate parts: ‘social statics’ and ‘social dynamics’. Underlying the distinetion was an implicit metaphor made fully explicit some time later by Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), the analogy between a society and a biological organ- ism. Social statics was conceived as the study of the anatomy of human society, the composite parts and their arrangement, just like the anatomy of the body (with its organs, skeleton and tissues), whereas social dynamics was assumed to focus on physiology, the processes running inside society, just like bodily functions (respiration, metabolism, circulation of the blood), and producing as their ultimate result the development of society, again comparable to organic growth (from the embryo to maturity). The implication was that there existed something like a steady state of society, which could be per- ceived and analysed prior to, or independently of, its motion. Herbert Spencer kept to the same image but altered the terminology. He is the author of another distinction which for more than a century was at the core of sociological language: ‘structures’ as opposed to ‘functions’. The former indicated the internal build-up, shape or form of societal wholes, the latter the modes of their operation or transformation. The same implication, that it was possible to conceive of society as some kind of hard entity or tangible object apart from its operations, or in other words that it was feasible to distil structures from functioning, was confirmed and reinforced. The methodological legacy of those early ideas was the opposition of two types of procedure, which in the early Comtean formulation was desribed as the search for laws of coexistence (why certain social phenomena invariably appear together) versus the laws of succession (why certain social phenom- ena invariably precede or follow others). The idea, under various labels, found its way into most textbooks of sociological research: ‘synchronic (or cross-sectional) study’ was defined as looking at society in a timeless, static4 Concepts and Categories perspective, and ‘diachronic (or sequential) study’, as recognizing the flow of time and focusing on ongoing social changes. The modern study of change (diachronic research) has been strongly in- fluenced by such views. It has inherited the classic organic metaphor and related distinctions not directly, from Comte, Spencer and other nineteenth- century masters, but via the influential school of twentieth-century sociology known as system theory, functional theory, or structural-functionalism (cf Sztompka 1974). The system model of society elaborated within that school brought together and generalized all ideas typical for organicism. The whole conceptual apparatus commonly applied to the analysis of change derives primarily from the system model, even when scholars dealing with change do not recognize that, or distance themselves from the systemic and structural- functional theories. It is only recently that the ‘system model’ has been chal- lenged by an alternative image of society, the processual, or morphogenetic approach, and that the concepts applied to social change have been modified accordingly. The system model: engendering the concept of social change The idea of a system denotes a complex whole, consisting of multiple ele- ments bound together by various interrelations and separated from the en- vironment by a boundary. Organisms are clearly cases of systems, but so are molecules, buildings, planets, galaxies, Such a generalized notion may be applied to human society at various levels of complexity. At the macro-level, the whole global society (humanity) may be conceived as a system; at the mezzo-level, nation-states and regional political or military alliances could also be seen as systems; at the micro-level, local communities, associations, firms, families or friendship circles may be treated as small systems. Further. more, qualitatively distinct segments of society like economy, politics and culture may also be grasped in systemic terms. Thus in the hands of system theorists, ¢.g. Talcott Parsons (1902-79), the notion is not only generalized but found universally applicable. Social change, accordingly, is conceived as the change occurring within, or embracing the social system. More precisely, it is the difference between various states of the same system succeeding each other in time. If we speak of change, we have in mind something that comes into being after some time; that is to say, we are dealing with a difference between what can be observed before that point in time and what we see after that point in time. In order to be able to state differences, the unit of analysis must preserve a minimum of identity ~ in spite of change over time. (Strasser and Randall 1981: 16) Thus the basic concept of social change involves three ideas: (1) difference, (@) at different temporal moments, (3) between states of the same system. AFundamental concepts in the study of change 5 good example of the standard type of definition runs like this: ‘By social change I mean any nonrecurrent alteration of a social system considered as a whole’ (Hawley 1978: 787). Depending on what is seen as changing — what aspects, fragments, dimen- sions of the system are involved in change — various kinds of change may be distinguished. This is because the overall state of the system is not simple, one-dimensional, but rather emerges as the combined, aggregated result of the state of various components such as: 1 the ultimate elements (e.g. the number and variety of human individuals and their actions) 2. interrelations among elements (e.g. social bonds, loyalties, dependencies, linkages between individuals, interactions, exchanges between actions) 3. the functions of elements in the system as a whole (e.g. the occupa- tional roles played by the individuals, or the necessity of certain actions for the preservation of social order) 4 the boundary (e.g. criteria of inclusion, conditions for acceptance of individuals in the group, recruitment principles in associations, gate- keeping arrangements in organizations etc.) 5. the subsystems (e.g. the number and variety of distinguishable special- ized segments, sections, subdivisions) 6 the environment (e.g. natural conditions, or the ambience of other societies, geo-political location). It is only through their complex interplay that the overall characteristics of the system emerge: equilibrium or disequilibrium, consensus or dissensus, har- mony or strife, co-operation or conflict, peace or war, prosperity or crisis etc. When dissected into its primary components and dimensions the system model implies the following possible changes: 1 change in composition (e.g, migration from one group to another, re- cruitment to a group, depopulation due to famine, demobilization of a social movement, dispersion of a group) 2 change in structure (e.g. appearance of inequalities, crystallization of power, emergence of friendship-ties, establishing co-operative or com- petitive relationships) 3. change of functions (e.g. specialization and differentiation of jobs, decay of economic role of the family, assumption of an indoctrinating role by schools or universities) 4 change of boundaries (e.g. merging of groups, relaxing admission criteria and democratization of membership, conquest and incorporation of one group by another) 5 change in the relations of subsystems (e.g, ascendancy of political regime over economic organization, control of the family and the whole private sphere by totalitarian government)6 Concepts and Categories 6 change in the environment (e.g. ecological deterioration, earthquake, appearance of the Black Death or HIV virus, obliteration of the bipolar international system). Sometimes changes are only partial, restricted in scope, without major reper- cussions for other aspects of the system. The system as a whole remains intact, no overall change of its state occurs, in spite of piecemeal changes going on inside. For example, the strenth of a democratic political system lies in its ability to meet challenges, alleviate grievances and defuse conflicts by partial reforms without jeopardizing the stability and continuity of the state as a whole. This kind of adaptive modification is an illustration of changes in the system, But on other occasions change may embrace all (or at least the core) aspects of the system, producing overall mutation and making us treat the new system as fundamentally different from the old one. This is well illus. trated by all major social revolutions. This kind of radical transformation deserves to be called a change of the system. The borderline between these two cases is somewhat fluid. Changes in often accumulate and finally touch the core of the system, turning into changes of, Quite often in social systems we observe specific thresholds, beyond which the extensiveness, intensive. ness and momentum of fragmentary, piecemeal changes transform the whole identity of the system and lead not only to ‘quantitative’ but truly ‘qualitative’ novelty (Granovetter 1978). As all tyrants and dictators learn sooner or later, keeping the lid on public discontent is feasible only up to a certain point, and the slow erosion of their power inevitably opens the door for democracy. If we look at the sample of definitions of social change to be found in standard textbooks of sociology, we shall see that various authors place the emphasis on different kinds of change, but for most of them structural change in relationships, organization and links among societal components appears to be crucial: ‘Social change is the transformation in the organization of society and in patterns of thought and behavior over time’ (Macionis 1987: 638). ‘Social change is a modification or transformation in the way society is organized’ (Persell 1987: 586). Social change refers to ‘variations over time in the relationships among individuals, groups, organizations, cultures, and societies’ (Ritzer et al. 1987. 560). ‘Social changes are the alterations of behavior patterns, social relation- ships, institutions, and social structure over time’ (Farley 1990: 626). Perhaps the reason for emphasizing structural change is that, more often than other types, it leads to changes of rather than merely changes in, society. Social structure makes up a sort of skeleton on which society and its operations are founded. When it changes, all else is apt to change as well. As we noticed before, the notion of a system may be applied at variousFundamental concepts in the study of change 7 levels of societal complexity: macro, mezzo and micro. Accordingly, social change may also be conceived as occurring at the macro-level of international systems, nations, states; at the mezzo-level of corporations, political parties, religious movements, large associations; or at the micro-level of families, communities, occupational groups, cliques, friendship circles. Then the central question becomes how the changes running at those various levels interre- late. On the one hand, sociologists ask what are the macro-effects of micro- events (e.g. how changes in consumer behaviour produce growing inflation, or how shifts in everyday habits transform civilizations and cultures), and on the other hand they ask what are the micro-effects of macro-events (e.g. how revolution changes family life, or how economic crisis influences friendship patterns). ‘Social change is mediated through individual actors. Hence theo- ries of structural change must show how macrovariables affect individual mo- tives and choices and how these choices in turn change the macrovariables’ (Hernes 1976: 514). Chisters of changes: raising the complexity of dynamic concepts ‘The concept of social change comprehends the ultimate, smallest ‘atoms’ of social dynamics, single shifts in the state of the system or any of its aspects. But single changes are rarely isolated, they are normally linked with others, and sociology has devised more complex concepts to deal with typical forms of such linkages. The most important is the idea of a ‘social process’ describing the sequence of interrelated changes. A classical definition is given by Pitirim Sorokin (1889- 1968): ‘By process is meant any kind of movement, or modification, or transformation, or alteration, or “evolution”, in brief any change, of a given logical subject in the course of time, whether it be a change in its place in space or a modification of its quantitative or qualitative aspects’ (1937: vol. 1: 153). More precisely the concept denotes: (1) the plurality of changes, (2) referring to the same system (occurring within it, or transforming it as a whole), (3) causally related to each other (in the sense that one change is a causal condition, or at least a partial causal condition, and not merely an accompanying or preceding factor, of the other), and (4) the changes follow each other in a temporal sequence (succeeding each other along the stretch of time). Examples of processes, going from the macro-level toward the micro- level, would include: industrialization, urbanization, globalization, secular- ization, democratization, escalation of war, mobilization of a social movement, liquidation of a firm, dissolution of a voluntary association, crystallization of a friendship circle, crisis in the family. Again, the crucial theoretical issue is the linkage between microprocesses and macroprocesses. Among social processes two specific forms have been singled out by so- ciologists, and for many decades became the focus of their attention. One is8 Concepts and Categories ‘social development’, which describes the process of unfolding of some po- tentiality inherent in the system. More precisely, the concept signifies a process with three additional characteristics: (1) it is directional, i.e. no state of the system repeats itself at any stage; (2) the state of the system at any later moment represents a higher level of some selected property (eg. there is growing differentiation of structure, or higher economic output, or the advance of technologies, or enlarged population), or at each later moment the state of the system comes closer to some indicated overall state (e.g. the society approaches the condition of social equality, universal prosperity or democratic representation); and (3) this is stimulated by the immanent (internal, en- dogenous, auto-dynamic) propensities of the system (e.g. expansion of hu- man population with accompanying growth in density, the resolution of internal contradictions by establishing qualitatively new forms of social life, channelling human inborn creativeness towards significant organizational innovations). The notion of development carries some strong assumptions: the inevitability, necessity and irreversibility of the process it describes. It easily degenerates into a fatalistic and mechanistic view of change, as running independently of human actions, somewhat above human heads, towards a predetermined, ultimate finale. We shall soon discuss the large group of theories for which the idea of development has become central, and which can be put together under the label of developmentalism. They include all varieties of evolutionism (from Comte to Parsons) and historical materialism (from Marx to Althusser), Another form of a social process particularly stressed by sociologists is the ‘social cycle’. Here the process is no longer directional, but not haphazard either. It is characterized by two traits: (1) it follows a circular pattern: each state of the system at any given moment is apt to reappear at some moment in the future, and itself is a replica of what had already occurred at some moment in the past; and (2) this repetition is due to some immanent tendency of the system, which by its very nature unfolds in such a specific undulating, or oscillating way. Thus in the short run there are changes, but in the long run there is no change, as the system returns to its initial state. We shall have occasion to present an influential group of theories which interpret human history in terms of social cycles: the cyclical theories of change (from Spengler to Sorokin). One more concept, perhaps the most debatable, but also most influential in the whole history of human thought (and not only in the history of sociology) is the idea of ‘social progress’. It adds axiological, valuational dimension to the more objective and neutral category of social development. Hence it takes us away from strictly scientific, neutral accounts into the normative, prescriptive domain. In principle, by ‘progress’ we mean: (1) a directional process which (2) steadily brings the system closer to the preferred, beneficial state (or, in other words, to the implementation of certain values selected on ethical grounds, such as happiness, freedom, prosperity, justice, dignity, knowledge etc.), or to the achievement of an ideal society described comprehensively, in its overall shape by numerous social utopias. Most often the idea of progressFundamental concepts in the study of change 9 defines how, according to a given author or the Weltanschauung he/she represents, society should look. This clearly falls outside the realm of science, which restricts its interest to what is, rather than what ought to be. But sometimes the idea of progress attains a categorical, descriptive flavour: it carries a claim that, as a matter of empirical fact, some values are necessarily realized in human history, and that in general society inevitably changes for the better (whatever is defined as better by a given author). Such a claim, expressing historiosophical optimism, may already be subjected to test, even though, regrettably, it rarely passes. We shall have much more to say about social progress in chapter 2, about the idea’s triumphs, its recent demise and a possible way to salvage it. The alternative model: the dynamic social field It is only recently that sociology has put into doubt the validity of organic- systemic models of society, and the very dichotomy of social statics and social dynamics. Two intellectual trends seem to gain in importance: (1) the emphasis on the pervasive dynamic qualities of social reality, i.e. perceiving society in motion (‘processual image’), and (2) the avoidance of treating society (group, organization) as an object, i. de-reifying social reality (field image’). The first intimations that the opposition of statics and dynamics may be spurious, and that no changeless objects, entities, structures or wholes can be conceived at all, came from the natural sciences. As Alfred N. Whitehead put it; ‘Change is inherent in the very nature of things’ (1925: 179). Such a purely dynamic or processual perspective soon turned into the dominant approach, the tendency of modern science to treat events rather than things, processes rather than states, as the ultimate components of reality. For sociology it meant that society should be conceived not as a steady state but as a process; not as a rigid quasi-object, but as a continuous, unend- ing stream of events. It was recognized that a society (group, community, organization, nation-state) may be said to exist only in so far, and only as long, as something happens inside it, some actions are taken, some changes occur, some processes continue to operate. Ontologically speaking, society asa steady state does not and cannot exist. All social reality is pure dynamics, a flow of changes of various speed, intensity, rhythm and tempo. It is not by accident that we often speak of ‘social life’, perhaps a more fitting metaphor than the old image of a hide-bound, reified super-organism. Because life is nothing else but movement, motion and change, when those stop, there is no more life, but an entirely different condition — nothingness, or as we call it, death. The methodological consequence of such a dynamic view of social life is the rejection of the validity of purely synchronic studies and the affirmation of a diachronic (historical) perspective. As the leading twentieth-century his- torian puts it: ‘A study of human affairs in movement is certainly more fruitful,10 Concepts and Categories because more realistic, than any attempt to study them in an imaginary con- dition of rest’ (Toynbee 1963: 81). The image of the object undergoing change is modified accordingly. Society (group, organization etc.) is no longer viewed as a rigid, ‘hard’ system, but rather as a ‘soft’ field of relationships. Social reality is inter-individual (inter- personal) reality, what exists between or among human individuals, a net- work of ties, bonds, dependencies, exchanges, loyalties. In other words, it is a specific social tissue or social fabric binding people together. Such an inter- individual field is constantly in motion; it expands and contracts (e.g. when individuals join or leave), strengthens and weakens (when the quality of their relationships changes, e.g. from acquaintance to friendship), coalesces and disintegrates (e.g. when leadership appears or dissolves), intermeshes or separates itself from other segments of the field (e.g. when coalitions or federations appear or secessions occur), There are specific bundles, knots of social relationships which we have learned to single out as crucially important for our life, and we are apt to treat them in reified language: they are what we call groups, communities, organizations, institutions, nation-states. This is an illusion that they have an object-like existence. What really exists are constant processes of grouping and regrouping, rather than stable entities called groups; there are processes of organizing and reorganizing, rather than stable organizations; there are processes of ‘structuration’ (Giddens 1985) rather than structures; forming rather than forms; fluctuating ‘figurations’ (Elias 1978) rather than rigid patterns. When such a perspective is taken, the smallest, fundamental unit of socio- logical analysis appears to be an ‘event’. An event is understood here as any momentary state of the social field (or any segment thereof). Take as an example family dinner. It is 2 moment when certain family members are gathered together at home, seated at a table, involved in talking and eating, In precise terms, it is an event. Moments earlier the members of the family were dispersed, involved in different clusters of relationships: one at the office, another at school, another in the kitchen, another at the cinema, another riding in the car; moments later they will be dispersed again: looking at TV, returning to work for an important after-hours job, driving to a night disco. What distinguishes this particular bundle of relationships as a family, and preserves its continuity and identity over time, in spite of constant changes is: (1) psychological identifications: self-definitions, feelings, attachments, loyalties; (2) the likelihood of periodical contractions of relationships: getting together at home, or at least getting in touch from time to time by mail, on the phone; (3) the particular quality of relationships: their intimacy, diffuseness, disinterestedness, spontaneity. The notion of the inter-individual field may be specified. We propose the following fourfold typology CINIO scheme’, cf. Sztompka 1991b: 124-6) to distinguish four dimensions or aspects of the field: ideal, normative, interactional and opportunity. So far, to simplify matters, we have said that social relationships link human individuals, But what is it that they in fact linkFundamental concepts in the study of change 11 and how? Either the ideas, thoughts, beliefs held by the individuals, which may be similar or different; or the rules guiding their conduct, which may support or contradict each other; or their actual actions, which may be friendly or hostile, co-operative or competitive; or their interests, which may coincide or stand in conflict. There are four kinds of tissue or fabric which emerge in society and bind it together, depending on the kind of entities linked by the networks of relationships: the tissues (1) of ideas, (2) of rules, (3) of actions and (4) of interests. The interlinked networks of ideas (beliefs, convictions, definitions) make up the ideal dimension of the field, its ‘social awareness’. The interlinked networks of rules (norms, values, prescriptions, ideals) make up the normative dimension of the field, its ‘social institutions’, Both the ideal and normative dimensions add to what has been traditionally referred to as culture. Then the interlinked networks of actions make up the interactional dimension of the field, its ‘social organization’. The interlinked networks of interests (life-chances, opportunities, access to resources) make up the op- portunity dimension of the field, its ‘social hierarchies’. Both the interactional and opportunity dimension add to what may be called the societal fabric in the strict sense. To underline the multidimensionality of the field we shall henceforth use the term ‘socio-cultural field’. ‘At each of the four levels, the socio-cultural field is undergoing perpetual change. We observe (1) the constant articulation, legitimation or reformula- tion of ideas, the appearance and disappearance of ideologies, creeds, doc- trines and theories; (2) the constant institutionalization, reaffirmation or rejection of norms, values, or rules, the emergence and dissolution of ethical codes, legal systems; (3) the constant elaboration, differentiation and reshaping of interactive channels, organizational links, or group ties, the emergence or dissolution of groups, circles and personal networks; (4) the constant crys- tallization, petrification and redistribution of opportunities, interests, life- chances, the rise and fall, extension and levelling of societal hierarchies. The true complexity of social life occurring in the socio-cultural field will be grasped if we realize two points. First, that the processes at the four levels do not run independently of each other. Just the reverse: they are interrelated by various cross-dimensional links, for example, the link studied by the so- ciology of knowledge between the opportunity and ideal dimensions (how life-situations determine beliefs), or the link examined by the sociology of deviance between the normative and interactional dimensions (how norms influence or fail to influence actions). Second, we must realize that the socio- cultural field operates at various levels of complexity: macro, mezzo and micro. It is a notion applicable across all scales of social phenomena. The socio-cultural field of a particular sort manifests itself in families, but also — qualitatively differently - in corporations, political parties, armies, ethnic communities, nation-states, and even the whole global society. Those various manifestations are not isolated; on the contrary, they are interrelated in a most complex manner. The crystallizations and fluctuations of the socio- cultural field, embodied in the social events of the global, regional, local and12 Concepts and Categories even most personal sort, significantly co-determine one another. The prob- lem of macro-effects of micro-events, and the opposite problem of micto- effects of macro-events require thorough and extensive study. Within the model of a fluid socio-cultural field, produced as an alternative vision to the reified social system, the basic concepts of social dynamics introduced earlier retain their validity, but with slightly modified meaning, Thus: (1) social change will mean differences between the states of the social field over time; (2) social process, a sequence of social events (consecutive, different states of the social field); (3) social development, differentiation, expansion, crystallization, articulation of the social field in its various dimen- sions, resulting from internal, immanent propensities; and (4) social progress, any such developments, provided they are conceived as beneficial relative to some axiological viewpoint. The main difference from the system model is the conceptualization of changes and processes as truly continuous and never discrete, fragmented or broken. Between two points in time, however close, the movement does not stop. However we narrow down the scale, limiting the time distance between two ‘snapshots’ of society, this distance is always filled out with changes. The changes flow incessantly, and any two states of the socio-cultural field, whether temporally almost identical or remote, are certainly different, One is reminded of the famous ancient metaphor of the river, into which one cannot step twice, as it will no longer be the same river (Heraclitus 1979). It is only by convention that we conceptually freeze some states important for our prac- tical needs, treating them as single events, and speak of change or process as the sequence of such frozen, ‘discrete’ points. Varieties of social processes: a typology We do not claim exclusive validity for either the systemic or the field model. After all, models are cognitive instruments, and as such must be judged by their effectivenss, fruitfulness and heuristic power. The systemic model has proved extremely influential and underlies most of the theories of social change which are still around. The field model emerges in an attempt to grasp the dynamic nature of society more adequately, but requires a great deal of further conceptual elaboration and empirical corroboration. For the time being it seems wise to take an eclectic stand and to derive our basic conceptual apparatus for the study of social change from both sources. Each throws some light on the extreme variety of dynamic phenomena. Raymond Boudon has a point: ‘It is hopeless to try to reduce social change to one unique model’ (1981: 133). To get our bearings in the complex domain of social change, we need to introduce a typology of social processes. It will be based on four major criteria: (1) the form or shape that the process takes; (2) the outcomes or results of the process; (3) the awareness of social processes in the population; @ the moving force behind the process. We shall also briefly consider (5)Fundamental concepts in the study of change 13 the level of social reality where the process operates, and (6) the temporal scope of the process. The form of social processes To take the first criterion, if we look at the processes from the distant, external perspective, various forms and shapes can be recognized. Thus, the processes may be directional or non-directional. The directional processes are irreversible and often cummulative. Each consecutive stage is different from any earlier stage and incorporates effects of the earlier stage, while each earlier stage provides prerequisites for the later stage. The idea of irreversibility empha- sizes that in human life there are deeds which cannot be un-done, thoughts which cannot be un-thought, feelings which cannot be un-felt, experiences which cannot be un-experienced (Adam 1990: 169). Once they occur, they leave ineradicable traces and inescapably influence the further stages of the process; be it personal career, acquisition of knowledge, falling in love, or surviving war. As examples of directional processes we may indicate the socialization of a child, expansion of a city, technological development of industry, population growth. In this wide sense both individual biography and social history are mostly directional. But not necessarily in the narrower sense, when specific subtypes of di- rectional processes are taken into account. Some of them may be teleological (or in other words, finalistic), persistently approaching a certain goal or end- state from various starting-points, as if pulled towards it. Examples are pro- vided by so-called theories of convergence, which show how various societies, of utterly diverse traditions, eventually reach similar civilizational or techno- logical achievements, be it in machine production, democratic rule, automo- bile transportation, telecommunications etc. Other examples of such processes abound in structural-functional literature, which emphasizes the finalistic tendency of the social system to reach a state of equilibrium by means of internal mechanisms which compensate for any disturbances. But there are also directional processes of a different shape. They are developmental, persistently working out, unfolding certain inherent potentialities as if endlessly pushed from within. For example, constant technological expansion is often represented as driven by inherent human innovativeness or creativeness, or territorial conquests as motivated by an inherent acquisitive drive. If the end- state is valued positively, the process is treated as progressive (e.g. elimination of disease and increasing longevity). If it moves away from the positively valued, preferred end-state, we shall call it regressive (e.g. ecological de- struction, commercialization of the arts). Directional processes may be gradual, incremental or, as we sometimes say, linear. When they follow one single trajectory, or pass through simi- lar sequences of necessary stages, they are called unilinear. For example most social evolutionists believe that all human cultures have to go through the same set of stages, some sooner, some later. Those which started earlier or14 Concepts and Categories State-variable Time Figure 1.1 Unilinear process or consistent course: (a) ascending (progressive; (b) descending (regressive). proceeded quicker show the more backward or slow ones how their own future will look; those which are still backward demonstrate to those more advanced how their own past inevitably looked. The unilinear process may be represented as in figure 1.1. On the other hand, when the processes follow a number of alternative trajectories, skip some stages, substitute others, or add stages not typically found, they are called multilinear. For example when historians describe the origins of capitalism, they indicate various scenarios of the same process in different parts of the world: western, eastern and other patterns. When stu- dents of modemization examine Third World countries, they single out various routes they take towards industrial-urban civilization. The schematic repre- sentation of the multilinear process can be drawn as in figure 1.2. The opposites of linear processess are those which proceed by means of qualitative leaps or breakthroughs after prolonged periods of quantitative growth, passing specific thresholds (Granovetter 1978) or effecting certain ‘step-functions’. These are non-linear processes. For example, as viewed by Marxists, the sequence of so-called socio-economic formations moves through revolutionary epochs — sudden, fundamental, radical transformations of a whole society after long periods of accumulating contradictions, conflicts, strains and tensions. Such processes can be represented as in figure 1.3. Non-directional (or fluid) processes may be of two types. Some are purely random, chaotic with no pattern discernible. For example, consider flows ofFundamental concepts in the study of change 15 cable & State-variable & & Time Figure 1.2 Multilinear process or branching alternative courses. State-variable ) (a) $e Time Figure 1.3. Step-functions or quantum leaps: (a) ascending (progressive); (b) descending (regressive).16 Concepts and Categories State-variable Time Figure 1.4 Cyclical process: (a) regular (equal phases); (b) accelerating (shorter phases); (€) decelerating (longer phases). excitement in revolutionary crowds, or processes of mobilization and demo- bilization in social movements, or in children’s games. Other processes are oscillatory, following discernible patterns of repetition or at least similarity, when consecutive stages are either identical with, or at least qualitatively resemble, earlier ones. When virtual recurrence is observable, we consider the process as circular, or as a closed cycle. For example, think of the typical working day of a secretary, or the seasonal labour of a farmer, or in a longer time-perspective the routines of a scholar starting to write his/her next book. On the macro-scale, the economic cycles of expansion and recession, boom and stagnation, bull and bear markets, often follow this pattern. The graphic representation will resemble a sinusoid, as in figure 1.4 When the resemblance is observed, but at a different level of complexity, we consider the process as following the pattern of a spiral, or as an open cycle, for example, the advance of a student through consecutive levels of school or university, with enrolment, terms, breaks, examinations, but each time at a higher educational level; or, on a different scale, economic cycles, but in conditions of overall growth (proverbially two steps forward, one step back); or in the largest time span, the tendency which Amold’ Toynbee ascribes to all human history: the gradual perfecting of religion and in gene- ral the spiritual life of mankind, through numerous cycles of challenge and response, growth and decay (Toynbee 1934-61); or Karl Marx's vision of the progressive emancipation of humanity through the ‘vale of tears’, via consecutive cycles of deepening exploitation, alienation, poverty, and their surmounting by revolution (Marx and Engels 1985). If the level achieved afterFundamental concepts in the study of change 17 @ ) State-variable Time Figure 1.5 Spiral process: (a) ascending (progressive); (b) descending (regressive). each cycle is higher, as in our examples, we may speak of a developmental (or even progressive) cycle. If on the other hand the level achieved after each reversal is lower on some relevant scale, we shall refer to the process as a regressive cycle, as in figure 1.5. One limiting case, when the flow of time does not coincide with any changes in the state of the system is known as stagnation (figure 1.6). Another limiting case, when the changes do not follow any recognizable pattern, may be called a random process (figure 1.7). The end-results of social processes ‘The second important consideration and next criterion of our typology has to do with the outcomes produced by the processes. Some processes result in the emergence of completely new social conditions, states of society, social structures etc. These are truly creative and produce fundamental novelty. The term ‘morphogenesis’ (Buckley 1967: 8-66) may be applied to all processes of this sort. Examples abound: the mobilization of social movements; the establishment of new groups, associations, organizations, parties; the found- ing of new towns; enacting the constitution of a new state; the spread of a new fashion or lifestyle; the development of a new technological invention, with all its far-reaching consequences. Morphogenetic processes are to be found at the origins of all the civilizational, technological, cultural and social achievements of humankind, from early primitive society up to the modern industrial stage.18 Concepts and Categories a @ Ss State-variable (b) 82 _ SEE Time Figure 1.6 Stagnation: (a) at a higher level; (b) at a lower level. State-variable Time Figure 1.7 Random process.Fundamental concepts in the study of change 19 ‘These must be distinguished from the processes of mere transmutation, which produce less radical results without fundamental novelty. Among these, some do not produce any novelty at all, others result merely in modifying, re- forming, reshaping existing social arrangements. ‘The former, known as ‘simple reproduction’ (or else as compensatory, adaptive, homeostatic, equilibrating or sustaining processes) result in upholding received conditions, preserving the status quo, safeguarding the persistence and continuation of society in an entirely unchanged shape. They are in the focus of attention of the structural- functional school, which is primarily concemed with the prerequisites of stability, social order, harmony, consensus and equilibrium (Parsons 1964). No wonder functionalists have extensively studied a number of simple repro- ductive processes. One example is socialization, which transmits the cultural heritage of society (values, norms, beliefs, knowledge etc.) from one genera- tion to the next. Others are social control, which eliminates the threat to the stable operation of society brought about by deviance; adaptation and adjust- ment, which allow stable continuity of social structures in spite of environ- mental change; unequal distribution of privileges and benefits among social positions, safeguarding smooth recruitment to pre-existent statuses and roles, as in the so-called ‘functional theory of stratification’ (Davis and Moore 1945). Finally there are constraining and sanctioning systems of etiquette, rules of deference and demeanour etc. as the means for reaffirming traditional status hierarchies. Whereas simple reproduction keeps everything unchanged, ‘extended reproduction’ signifies a quantitative enrichment without basic qualitative modification. This occurs, for example, with demographic growth, the spread of suburbs, raising the production of automobiles in a given plant, increasing the recruitment of students to a university, the accumulation of capital by savings. The opposite, quantitative impoverishment, again without qualitative change, may be called ‘contracted reproduction’, as with the spending of financial reserves without any savings, so-called ‘negative growth’ of popu- lation, the unbridled exploitation of natural resources. When, apart from quantitative modifications, basic qualitative change oc- curs we no longer speak of reproduction but rather of ‘transformation’. It is not always easy to determine where the borderline is, and which change may count as qualitative. As a rule of thumb, one may require a change of structures, with important modification in the network of relationships obtaining in the social system or the social-cultural field, and/or a change of functions, with important modification in the mode of operation of the system or field. Such changes may be conceived as touching the core of social reality, as their repercussions are usually to be felt in all aspects of social life, transforming its overall quality. For example structural changes occur with the appearance of a leadership and power hierarchy in a group, the bureaucratization of a social movement, the replacement of autocratic rule by democratic govern- ment, the levelling of social inequalities by tax reform. Examples of functional change can be seen with the introduction of self-management at an enterprise20 Concepts and Categories with the employee council assuming decision-making prerogatives, the adoption of a direct political role by the Church, the shifting of educational functions from the family to schools. ‘Transformation’ is a synonym for what we earlier called ‘changes of’, whereas ‘reproduction’ indicates at most ‘changes in’ Processes in social consciousness In all changes occurring in the human world an important consideration is the awareness of change by the people involved, and particularly the aware- ness of the results that processes bring about (cf. Sztompka 1984b). Introduc- ing the subjective factor into our typology we may distinguish three additional types of changes. Obviously these distinctions cut across earlier ones and may be treated as subcategories of either morphogenesis or reproduction or transformation. 1 The processes may be recognized, anticipated and intended. Paraphras- ing the usage proposed by Robert K. Merton (1968: 73) we shall call them ‘manifest’. For example, the reform of traffic laws lowers the number of accidents; legalizing currency exchange eliminates the black market; the pri- vatization of retail trade raises the supply of consumer goods. 2 The processes may be unrecognized, unanticipated and unintended. Again, following Merton’s lead we shall call them ‘latent’. In these cases the change itself and its outcome appear as surprising, and depending on the circumstances may be welcome or the opposite. As an instance, for a long time people were generally unaware of the environmental damage produced by industrialization. So-called ecological consciousness is a relatively recent phenomenon 3 People may recognize the process, anticipate its course and intend specific effects, but may be entirely wrong on all counts. The process runs against their expectations and produces results different from, or even en- tirely opposite to, those intended. Applying the term adopted by Merton and Kendall (1944), we shall refer to such a case as a ‘boomerang process’. For example, a propaganda campaign may actually strengthen the attitudes it attacks, by mobilizing the defence and provoking a negative reaction; fiscal reform intended to curb inflation may produce recession and higher inflation; or rates of profit may fall as the result of greater competitiveness pushed by the desire to raise profits The seat of causality The next major criterion differentiating between types of social processes has to do with the moving force behind them, the causal factors putting them in motion. The main issue is where such forces or factors originate, whether in the realm undergoing change or outside it. In the former case we speak of