Hegarty v. Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1st Cir. (1995)
Hegarty v. Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1st Cir. (1995)
Hegarty v. Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1st Cir. (1995)
3d 1367
On May 15, 1992, state and county law enforcement officers forcibly entered a
remote cabin in the Maine woods, without a warrant, and mortally wounded
plaintiff's decedent, Katherine A. Hegarty, while attempting to arrest her for
recklessly endangering the safety of four campers. Plaintiff John M. Hegarty
initiated the present action in federal district court for compensatory and
punitive damages against the defendant officers and their respective
supervisors, based on alleged violations of the Hegartys' statutory and
constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1992); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 5,
Sec. 4682 (1992). After rejecting their qualified immunity claims, the district
court determined that the defendant officers were potentially liable for punitive
damages, and the officers initiated an interlocutory appeal. Plaintiff John M.
Hegarty in turn cross-appealed from district court orders granting summary
judgment in favor of Somerset County Sheriff Spencer Havey on qualified
immunity grounds and disallowing plaintiff's section 1983 claim for
compensatory damages for loss of spousal consortium.
2* BACKGROUND1
A. The Warrantless Entry
3
During the morning of the fateful day, two vehicles, containing four campers,
entered through a gate onto woodlands owned by a paper company in Jackman,
Maine, and proceeded to their assigned campsite about one and one-half miles
past the gate and 200 yards or so beyond the Hegarty cabin. At around 9:00 that
evening, Katherine Hegarty became extremely agitated when she saw the
campers returning to their campsite for the night, and began screaming that
they had trespassed on her property. The campers assured her that the caretaker
had given them permission to use the campsite and they would be leaving the
next morning. To which Katherine responded: "Only if you make it until
morning." She then retrieved a rifle from inside the cabin and fired six rounds
from the porch in the direction of the campers, who immediately took cover
behind their trucks and boat.
During the next hour or so, Katherine reloaded her rifle several times, firing
approximately twenty-five additional rounds in the direction of the campers
before eventually yielding to their pleas for permission to depart in safety.
Leaving their other belongings behind, the campers drove their vehicles quickly
past the cabin, where they saw Katherine on the porch, rifle in hand. Although
no further shots were fired, Katherine followed the campers in her truck beyond
the entrance gate, then turned back in the direction of her cabin.
5
Upon their arrival at a truck stop located on Route 201, approximately two
miles from the woods road entrance gate, the campers immediately placed a
telephone call to the Somerset County Sheriff's Department. Their report
described a harrowing encounter with an intoxicated, distraught ("flipped out")
and armed woman who might pursue them to the truck stop and shoot at them.
Four law enforcement officers were dispatched to the truck stop--Maine State
Trooper Gary Wright and three Somerset County Sheriff's Department officers:
Patrol Sergeant Wilfred Hines, Deputy Sheriff Rene Guay, and Reserve Officer
Thomas Giroux, Jr.
After briefly interviewing the four campers, the officers decided that the
suspect had committed at least one offense by shooting at the campers. See
Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 17-A, Sec. 211 (1994) (reckless endangerment).
Moreover, from the description the campers gave of the woman, the locations
of the cabin and the campsite, and from their knowledge of the area, the
officers concluded that Katherine Hegarty was their suspect. The officers knew
that Katherine was an experienced hunter and a licensed Maine guide, with a
reputation as a "crack shot," and that she kept several powerful firearms at her
cabin. Further, the officers knew she had some history of emotional instability
(i.e., a nervous "breakdown" in 1991, requiring sedation, physical restraints and
a brief period of involuntary hospitalization), substance abuse (two arrests for
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol ("OUI") in
1991), and incidents of erratic, violent behavior directed at law enforcement
personnel--kicking and throwing punches at State Trooper Gary Wright, asking
irrational questions, and exhibiting extreme mood swings (alternately
screaming and laughing) at the time of her first OUI arrest, and an
assault/harassment against Trooper Wright at his residence shortly after the
same arrest. For these reasons, the officers concluded that they should arrest
Katherine immediately, without obtaining a warrant or informing her of their
true intentions until after she had been restrained, for fear that she would
become violent.
might be waiting for them somewhere in the vicinity, they proceeded on foot
toward her cabin, led by Trooper Wright--with a police dog--in an effort to
forewarn themselves of Katherine's presence without heralding their approach.
As they neared, at approximately 12:15 a.m., the officers observed Katherine's
truck in front of the darkened cabin and heard a radio blaring music from
inside. The clearing surrounding the cabin was plainly visible in the moonlight,
but the cabin interior was not illuminated.
8
Following a quick visual inspection of the cabin site and the interior of the
Hegarty truck, four officers approached unannounced and placed themselves
along the outer cabin walls. The fifth officer, Thomas Giroux, Jr., who was
better acquainted with Katherine Hegarty, gave a prearranged signal to the other
officers from behind a tree across the road in front of the cabin. Giroux began
calling to Katherine by name--first identifying himself and then expressing
concern for her safety--in an attempt to coax her from the cabin to speak with
him. Giroux heard no response above the blaring radio. Sergeant Hines then
pounded on the cabin door and identified himself as a deputy sheriff. He
received no response.
Meanwhile, Sergeant Crawford, who had worked his way around to the rear of
the cabin, shined a flashlight into a darkened window and saw a fully-clothed
woman lying on a bed, with a rifle astride her chest. When the woman began to
raise the rifle in his direction, Crawford dove for cover, yelling out to the other
officers that there was an armed person inside the cabin. Katherine soon asked
Crawford to identify himself. After he did so, Crawford heard Katherine leave
the bedroom and move toward the front of the cabin. The radio soon became
inaudible.
10
As Katherine walked about inside the darkened cabin, she kept asking what the
officers were doing there, and requested that they leave her property. The
officers replied that they were investigating a report of campsite burglaries in
the area, were concerned for her safety, and wanted her to come out of the
cabin so she could speak with them. Laughing intermittently during these
exchanges, Katherine ultimately rejected their requests--stating that she had
seen no one suspicious.
11
Deputy Sheriff Rene Guay--posted outside the closed window at the front of
the cabin--next saw Katherine face-to-face as she peered out the window from
a kneeling position on a nearby couch. When Guay trained his flashlight on her,
Katherine said, "I can see you." At this time, Guay observed that Katherine had
no weapon in hand nor within the vicinity illuminated by his flashlight. Guay
immediately communicated this information to Sergeant Hines and Trooper
Wright, who were posted on either side of the front door, then gave them a
signal to "go."
12
Sergeant Hines proceeded to break in the front door, but a chain lock
momentarily delayed entry. From a crouched position outside the front
window, Guay saw Katherine pick up a rifle beside the couch and begin to
raise it in the direction of Hines and Wright, who were about to break through
the front door. As she continued to raise the rifle in their direction, the officers
ordered her to drop it. Katherine paid no heed and was fatally wounded by the
officers before she could fire a shot.
14
The district court ruled, inter alia, that (1) the five officers at the scene were not
immune from suit under either section 1983 or the MCRA, because no
objectively reasonable police officer could have concluded that the
circumstances confronting these officers gave rise to an exigency sufficient to
justify forcing a warrantless entry into the Hegarty cabin for the purpose of
effecting Katherine's immediate arrest; (2) punitive damages would be
recoverable were a jury to find that the officers at the scene acted with reckless
indifference; (3) Somerset County Sheriff Spencer Havey was entitled to
qualified immunity from suit relating to any "supervisory liability," since he
had no advance notice that officer training was deficient, and since his
subsequent conduct, though "troublesome," did not constitute "gross or reckless
indifference"; and (4) compensatory damages for loss of consortium were not
recoverable absent proof that the officers' conduct had been directed at John
Hegarty rather than at his deceased spouse alone.
15
The officers promptly took interlocutory appeals from the first and second
district court rulings. See Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87,
90 (1st Cir.1994) (disallowance of qualified immunity claim is "final"
appealable order under Cohen "collateral order" doctrine). After the district
court directed that final judgment enter pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) on its
third and fourth rulings, plaintiff John Hegarty cross-appealed.
II
DISCUSSION
A. The Officers' Immunity Claims
1. Standard of Review
16
17
18
When government officials abuse their offices, "action[s] for damages may
offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees."
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 814 [102 S.Ct. at 2736]. On the other hand,
permitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial
social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and
harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.
Ibid. Our cases have accommodated these conflicting concerns by generally
providing government officials performing discretionary functions with a
qualified immunity, shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their
actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are
alleged to have violated. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 [106
S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271] (1986)....
19
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638, 107 S.Ct. at 3038.3 As this court has explained,
20
appellate
assessment of [a] qualified immunity claim is apportioned into two
analytic components. First, if the right asserted by the plaintiff was "clearly
established" at the time of its alleged violation, we are required to assume that the
right was recognized by the defendant official, see Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102
S.Ct. at 2738; Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899, 901 (1st Cir.1989); second, we
will deny the immunity claim if a reasonable official situated in the same
circumstances should have understood that the challenged conduct violated that
established right, see Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640-41, 107 S.Ct. at 3039; Rodriguez,
888 F.2d at 901.
21
22
The Hegartys correctly contend, of course, that the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibited a warrantless entry
into the Hegarty cabin to effect Katherine's arrest, except in exigent
circumstances and with probable cause. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,
749, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Buenrostro v.
Collazo, 973 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir.1992). Indeed, the constitutional rights
allegedly violated were clearly established long before this tragic incident
occurred. Accordingly, the defendant officers are deemed to have been on
notice of the relevant constitutional protections constraining their actions.
Burns, 907 F.2d at 235-36. Therefore, qualified immunity affords the defendant
officers no safe haven unless an objectively reasonable officer, similarly
situated, could have believed that the challenged police conduct did not violate
the Hegartys' constitutional rights. Id. at 236.
23
Thus, the qualified immunity inquiry does not depend on whether the
warrantless entry was constitutional, but allows as well for the inevitable reality
that "law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly
conclude that [their conduct] is [constitutional], and ... that ... those officials-like other officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful-should not be held personally liable." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. at
3039-40 (emphasis added); Burns, 907 F.2d at 237. In other words, qualified
immunity sweeps so broadly that "all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law" are protected from civil rights suits for money
damages. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 537, 116 L.Ed.2d
589 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092,
1097, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)); cf. Roy v. City of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691, 695
(1st Cir.1994) ("[T]he Supreme Court's standard of reasonableness is
comparatively generous to the police where potential danger, emergency
conditions or other exigent circumstances are present.").
24
Lastly, we assess the challenged police conduct with a view to determining its
"objective legal reasonableness," Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. at 3039
(emphasis added), which entails two pivotal features. First, the qualified
immunity inquiry takes place prior to trial, on motion for summary judgment,
see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d
411 (1985) (qualified immunity provides a shield against the burdens of
litigation, not merely a defense against liability for money damages), and
requires no factfinding, only a ruling of law strictly for resolution by the court,
see Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 752-53 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1041, 111 S.Ct. 713, 112 L.Ed.2d 702 (1991); Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920,
924 (1st Cir.1987). Thus, under the policy-driven "objective legal
reasonableness" analysis governing our inquiry, even expert testimony relating
to appropriate police procedures in the circumstances confronting the officers
may not afford certain insulation against summary judgment in the "qualified
immunity" context.
25
The "probable cause" requirement was met if the officers at the scene
collectively possessed, Burns, 907 F.2d at 236 n. 7, "reasonably trustworthy
information [sufficient] to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that
[Katherine Hegarty] had committed or was committing a [criminal] offense."
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). As
the Supreme Court has explained, "[i]n dealing with probable cause, ... as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). See also
Burns, 907 F.2d at 236 (quoting Gates ).
28
31
The defendant officers challenge the district court ruling that no competent
police officer could have formed an objectively reasonable belief that "exigent
33
Plaintiff acknowledges that the officers did not use excessive force to protect
themselves after they forcibly entered the cabin and were confronted by
Katherine, with rifle raised. Cf. Roy, 42 F.3d at 695-96. Rather, he contends
that their precipitous and ill-conceived strategy--arrived at before the officers
ever left the truck stop--deviated unreasonably from standard police tactics in
crisis situations and inexorably led to Katherine's death. Cf. United States v.
Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 43 n. 6 (1st Cir.1989) (police may not manipulate events to
create an "exigency" justifying warrantless entry).
34
cutting off any attempted escape. Thereafter, from a safer distance, other
officers could have begun the effort to coax Katherine to come outside, while
another officer returned to the police cruisers and radioed for assistance from
the Maine State Tactical Team.
35
36
37
38
Several other campsites in the vicinity of the Hegarty cabin were occupied, and
without knowing the precise motivation for Katherine's unprovoked, armed
response to the peaceable presence of the four campers earlier in the evening,
an objectively reasonable officer prudently could presume that other campers
might be at similar risk. In fact, their use of the police dog while proceeding
along the woods road toward the cabin attests to the officers' alertness to the
possibility that Katherine could be lying in wait in the woods. Deciding not to
take the risk attendant upon the delay necessarily entailed in obtaining a
warrant, the officers accordingly placed top priority on conclusively locating
their suspect at the earliest possible time so as to minimize the threat posed to
the safety of other campers. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 100, 110 S.Ct. at 1690
(exigent circumstances include the need to safeguard against threats to life or
safety of others); Almonte, 952 F.2d at 22.7
39
Quite contrary to the major premise for William McClaran's expert opinion, by
the time they arrived at the Hegarty cabin the officers had received decidedly
mixed signals concerning their suspect's location. The parked truck suggested
that Katherine might be inside the cabin, but the lack of artificial illumination
suggested otherwise. The blaring music did not conclusively disprove either
hypothesis. Nor had Katherine been seen or heard entering or moving about
inside the cabin. Thus, it was in no sense improbable that Katherine, a licensed
guide and experienced hunter, had left her vehicle and departed the cabin site
on foot.
40
Nor was the alternative police strategy posited by Mr. McClaran without its
shortcomings. Of course, had the officers chosen to cordon off the cabin from a
"safe" distance, and begun calling out to Katherine in the hope they might
negotiate her surrender--and had she responded--the "containment" phase could
have proceeded apace. On the other hand, had she simply failed to respond-either because she could not hear their calls above the blaring music, or because
she had fully expected them to investigate the campers' allegations and wanted
to keep them off guard--the officers still would be left to speculate whether she
was in the cabin.
41
Since time was of the essence, and it was imperative that they locate and
identify their suspect so as to rule out the continuing danger she could pose to
others in the vicinity, the officers then would have faced an irreconcilable
quandary. They could undertake a "containment" strategy along the lines
propounded by McClaran, which would necessitate a delay of several hours for
the Maine State Tactical Team to reach the cabin, thereby countenancing the
realistic risk that their suspect might be elsewhere at that very moment
jeopardizing the safety of others.8 Or, having heralded their arrival, the officers
Law enforcement officers quite often are required to assess just such
probabilities, and to weigh the attendant contingencies. And it is precisely such
spontaneous judgment calls--borne of necessity in rapidly evolving, lifeendangering circumstances--that the qualified immunity doctrine was designed
to insulate from judicial second-guessing in civil actions for money damages,
unless the challenged conduct was clearly incompetent or undertaken in plain
violation of established law. See Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229, 112 S.Ct. at 537;
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638, 107 S.Ct. at 3038.
43
44
45
The expert testimony on which plaintiff relies makes much of the notion that
the entire plan for approaching the outer cabin walls was ill-conceived and
uncoordinated ab initio, whereas the officers plausibly contend that they had
worked together as a team so often in the past that their basic plan and tactics
were implicitly understood. But even accepting William McClaran's
prescription as to an appropriate police procedure for use in these
circumstances, plaintiff does not explain how a differently formulated plan-devoid of the suggested deficiencies in the officers' plan--inevitably would have
averted the exigency ultimately confronting them. See supra notes 5 & 8.
Indeed, none of the consequences McClaran attributed to the alleged absence of
Second, though plaintiff argues that the officers delayed their forcible entry
until they were safest--when it "appeared" to Officer Guay that Katherine was
unarmed and beyond arm's reach from a firearm--surely this argument
exaggerates their on-the-spot sense of personal security by failing to assess the
imminence of a perceived danger in light of the totality of the circumstances.
See United States v. Veillette, 778 F.2d 899, 902 (1st Cir.1985) (exigency is
assessed by viewing "totality" of circumstances), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115,
106 S.Ct. 1970, 90 L.Ed.2d 654 (1986).
47
Katherine moved freely about the unilluminated interior of the locked cabin,
which contained deadly firearms whose exact number and location were
unknown to the officers. Cf., e.g., United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836, 841-42
(10th Cir.1986) (exigency established for warrantless entry where agents
approached aircraft with probable cause to believe it might harbor armed drug
dealers); United States v. Guarente, 810 F.Supp. 350, 352-53 (D.Me.1993)
(exigency established for warrantless entry where officers remained uncertain
about the intentions of armed suspects who might remain inside structure).
Only minutes before, Katherine had pointed her rifle at Sergeant Crawford. Cf.
O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 997 (6th Cir.1994) (qualified
immunity claim disallowed where suspect "had taken no action against the
officers" and "did not point the gun at anyone"; noting that threat to police must
be "immediate").11 Prior to their forced entry, the officers realized that the
cabin walls were "paper thin,"12 thus affording insufficient cover should
Katherine decide to fire from inside the cabin--a serious contingency that
competent officers reasonably could take into account given the violent,
irrational and unpredictable behavior recently exhibited by their barricaded
suspect, including her peculiar bouts of laughter, history of emotional instability
and demonstrated antagonism toward law enforcement personnel. In such
circumstances, competent police officers reasonably could conclude that to
announce their intention to place the barricaded suspect under arrest-dispensing with their ruse that they were there only to help her--might well
spark renewed violence.
48
cabin walls, cf. Curzi, 867 F.2d at 43, they could neither remain in their
positions indefinitely nor safely terminate the impasse by attempting to retreat
across the moonlit cabin clearing without directly exposing themselves to
potential gunfire. Thus, safe and indefinite containment--either from their
vulnerable positions against the cabin walls or from a "safer" distance--no
longer remained a practicable alternative. Cf. United States v. Wilson, 36 F.3d
205, 210 (1st Cir.1994) (upholding denial of motion to suppress evidence
because police officers should not be required to remain indefinitely outside
apartment located in building which was well-known site of prior drug sales
and police shootings); Guarente, 810 F.Supp. at 352-53 (finding it reasonable
for police to enter building in circumstances where their alternative was to
remain potential targets for any concealed armed suspect who might be inside);
cf. also United States v. Hardy, 52 F.3d 147, 149 (7th Cir.1995) (finding
exigent threat to officer safety where armed suspect, with known history of
violence and drug use, was inside locked motel room and within "easy reach" of
powerful firearm); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1044-45 (6th
Cir.1992) (finding that no unreasonably excessive force had been used against
an armed and "suicidal" person--barricaded inside apartment--who had made
threatening statements toward police officers while in intermittent close
proximity to them, and showed signs of serious mental instability); Smith, 797
F.2d at 841 (exigency established where officers had probable cause to believe
aircraft, which had landed at isolated airfield after dark, might harbor armed
drug dealers).
49
Although Somerset County Sheriff Spencer Havey did not participate in the
events of May 15, 1992, plaintiff advances two related challenges to the
summary judgment order entered in favor of Havey. First, plaintiff argues that
Havey failed to train his officers adequately or to institute written standard
operating procedures ("SOPs"), even though it was reasonably foreseeable that
these deputy sheriffs likely would encounter so-called "barricaded felon" cases
on a frequent basis in rural, wooded Somerset County. Second, even assuming
that a need for additional training and SOPs had not been foreseeable prior to
the Hegarty incident, Sheriff Havey's subsequent conduct would enable a
factfinder to infer that Havey had condoned the officers' conduct, or been
indifferent to the need for better training long before May 15, 1992. For
example, Sheriff Havey refused to discipline his officers for the fatal shooting
of Katherine Hegarty, as recommended in the Attorney General's final
investigative report. Nor did he institute additional training, as recommended
by a citizen review board convened by Havey in the wake of the tragic event.
1. Applicable Law
51
52
53
Even though the district court ruled that Havey's subsequent conduct did not
amount to deliberate indifference, it expressed serious reservations concerning
some of his conduct, see Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1166-67 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820, 110 S.Ct. 75, 107 L.Ed.2d 42 (1989)
(postincident conduct may be relevant to "deliberate indifference" inquiry);
Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 171 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 1369, 94 L.Ed.2d 686 (1987) (same), notably Havey's
failure to acknowledge the need to prescribe SOPs or to institute in-house
training for handling "barricaded felon" cases. Nevertheless, the rationale for
our decision that the individual officers at the scene acted within the bounds of
objective reasonableness, see supra Section II.A, plainly undermines most of
the district court's concerns.
55
56
Moreover, even assuming the best efforts of the most prescient supervisor, it
simply is not possible to anticipate the entire array of atypical circumstances--
upon which sensitive discretionary judgment calls must be made by the officer
in the field--for inclusion in a law enforcement agency's standard operating
procedures. For example, even indulging an impermissible measure of
hindsight, we do not believe that SOPs, however elaborate, would have enabled
the defendant officers at the scene to resolve by safer or more reliable means
whether Katherine was inside the cabin at the time the officers first arrived. So,
too, in the end, Sheriff Havey--after initiating an immediate investigation into
the officers' actions--formed the professional opinion, rightly or wrongly, that
the judgment calls made at the scene were reasonable.
57
III
CONCLUSION
58
We cannot know whether the tragic death of Katherine Hegarty would have
been averted but for the judgment calls made by the defendant officers at the
scene, nor is that the inquiry we make in a civil rights action for damages
against the individual officers. We determine only whether the discretionary
decisions made by the defendants were within the broad range of reasonable
conduct to be expected from competent police officers and their supervisors in
like circumstances. As the actions of the defendant officers and their supervisor
plainly met the latter standard, the district court order denying summary
judgment to the defendant officers must be reversed and the judgment in favor
of defendant Havey must be affirmed.
59
The judgment for defendant Havey is affirmed and the case is remanded to the
district court with instructions to vacate the judgment entered for plaintiff and
enter summary judgment for the defendant officers, and for such further
proceedings as may be appropriate and consistent with this opinion. The parties
shall bear their own costs on appeal.
The relevant facts are related in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the
party resisting summary judgment. Velez-Gomez v. SMA Life Assurance Co.,
8 F.3d 873, 874-75 (1st Cir.1993)
No appeal was taken from the district court judgment dismissing the wrongful
death, see Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 18-A, Sec. 2-804 (1994), and common-law
trespass claims
The same "qualified immunity" analysis applies to the MCRA claims. See
Jenness v. Nickerson, 637 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Me.1994)
Reserve Officer Giroux and Sergeant Crawford, who played no direct role in
the forcible entry and were responding to orders, claim entitlement to qualified
immunity by reason of their "lesser" participation. Given our holding, we need
not address their claim
We need to note the obvious as well. Even though the isolation of the Hegarty
cabin and the death of Katherine Hegarty dictate that virtually all relevant
evidence derives exclusively from the officers at the scene, see Scott v.
Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir.1994) ("the officer defendant is often the
only surviving eyewitness" in qualified immunity cases), summary judgment
nonetheless must be granted absent a genuine dispute as to a material issue. See
Jirau-Bernal, 37 F.3d at 3
The exigency created by the realistic danger the unlocated suspect posed to
other campers in the vicinity likewise substantially mitigated an aggravating
factor noted by the district court: the fact that the warrantless entry took place
at night
Once the tactical team had arrived, moreover, it would still have been necessary
to confirm--by some means--Katherine's presence in the cabin
11
Although plaintiff argues that this incident cannot serve to establish an exigent
circumstance--because Katherine may have pointed the gun at Crawford before
she recognized that he was a police officer--omniscience is not the presumed
mindset with which an objectively reasonable police officer approaches lifeendangering decisions. The correct focus must be on the significance an
objectively reasonable police officer might attach to the threatening action, in
circumstances where he--like Sergeant Crawford--could not know, with
assurance, the suspect's exact state of mind or intent. Cf., e.g., Gibson v.
Officer, P.A., 44 F.3d 274, 277-78 (5th Cir.1995) (proper focus is not upon
factual dispute as to whether suspect was intoxicated, but whether objective
facts might lead a reasonable officer so to conclude); Slattery v. Rizzo, 939
F.2d 213, 216 (4th Cir.1991) (police officer's belief that suspect was reaching
for gun was "reasonable" even though object turned out to be a bottle)
12
Their vulnerability to gunfire from within the cabin was later confirmed.
McClaran himself noted that several police bullets--fired immediately after the
forcible entry--passed through the cabin walls