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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KRISTIN M. PERRY, et al., No. 10-16696
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
U.S. District Court
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN Case No. 09-cv-02292 VRW
FRANCISCO,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee,
vs.
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al.,
Defendants,

DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH, et al.

Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants.

PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR-APPELLEE
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO'S
RESPONSE BRIEF

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California
The Honorable Chief District Judge Vaughn R. Walker
DENNIS J. HERRERA, State Bar #139669
City Attorney
THERESE M. STEWART, State Bar #104930
Chief Deputy City Attorney
CHRISTINE VAN AKEN, State Bar #241755
MOLLIE M. LEE, State Bar #251404
Deputy City Attorneys
City Hall, Room 234
One Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place
San Francisco, California 94102-4682
Telephone: (415) 554-4708
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................1
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .....................................................................3
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................3
I. PROPOSITION 8'S SOLE EFFECT WAS TO STRIP
CALIFORNIA'S LESBIAN AND GAY CITIZENS OF THEIR
EQUAL STATURE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION. .................................................................................3
A. Prior To Proposition 8, All Couples In California Had Equal
Substantive Rights And Equal Stature Under The Law. ............4
B. Proposition 8 Stripped Lesbian And Gay Couples Of Equal
Stature By Removing A State Constitutional Guarantee
From Them Alone But Did Not Alter Their Rights To The
Incidents Of Marriage. ................................................................6
II. PROPOSITION 8 IS PECULIARLY IRRATIONAL UNDER
CALIFORNIA LAW. ............................................................................8
A. Proposition 8 Must Be Evaluated In The Context Of
California's Other Laws And Policies. ........................................8
B. Proponents' "Responsible Procreation And Childrearing"
Rationale For Denying Marriage To Same-Sex Couples Is
Unrelated To Proposition 8's Actual Effects On California
Law. .............................................................................................9
1. California Regulates Marriage Separately From
Parentage. ........................................................................10
2. California Treats Lesbian And Gay Parents
Identically To Heterosexual Parents. ..............................11
3. California Seeks To Identify Responsible Parents For
All Children, No Matter How They Were Conceived....13
4. California Law Expresses No Preference For
Opposite-Sex Or Biological Parents. ..............................15
C. Proponents' "Proceed With Caution" Rationale Is Belied By
The Same California Law And Policies....................................17

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D. Proposition 8 Is Irrational In Light Of The Harm It Causes. ....18

III. PROPOSITION 8 WAS ENACTED TO BRAND LESBIAN
AND GAY RELATIONSHIPS AS DIFFERENT AND
INFERIOR, AN IMPERMISSIBLE STATE PURPOSE. ..................20

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett
531 U.S. 356 (2001) .............................................................................................23

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.

473 U.S. 432 (1985) ...............................................................................................8

Eisenstadt v. Baird
405 U.S. 438 (1972) ...............................................................................................9

Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query

286 U.S. 472 (1932) ...............................................................................................8

Heller v. Doe
509 U.S. 312 (1993) ...............................................................................................8

Lawrence v. Texas
539 U.S. 558 (2003) .............................................................................................23

Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens

546 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................................3

Palmore v. Sidoti
466 U.S. 429 (1984) .............................................................................................13

Plyler v. Doe
457 U.S. 202 (1982) .............................................................................................18

Reitman v. Mulkey
387 U.S. 369 (1967) .............................................................................................13

Romer v. Evans
517 U.S. 620 (1996) ...............................................................................7, 9, 20, 22

Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg

375 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................20

Sweatt v. Painter
339 U.S. 629 (1950) .............................................................................................23

U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno

413 U.S. 528 (1973) .............................................................................................22

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United States v. Virginia

518 U.S. 515 (1996) .............................................................................................23

Vance v. Bradley
440 U.S. 93 (1979) .................................................................................................8

Williams v. Vermont
472 U.S. 14 (1985) ...........................................................................................9, 22
State Cases
Carney v. Carney
24 Cal. 3d 725 (1971) ...........................................................................................15

Dawn D. v. Superior Court

17 Cal. 4th 932 (1998) ..........................................................................................16

Elisa B. v. Superior Court

117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005) ......................................................... 5, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17

Estate of Cornelious
35 Cal. 3d 461 (1984) ...........................................................................................16

Johnson v. Calvert
5 Cal. 4th 84 (1993) ..............................................................................................16

K.M. v. E.G.
117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005) ......................................................................5, 12, 14, 15

Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club

115 P.3d 1212 (Cal. 2005) ......................................................................................4

Kristine H. v. Lisa R.
117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005). ...............................................................................12, 14

Kristine M. v. David P.
37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 748 (Ct. App. 2006) .....................................................................5

Marriage Cases
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) ................................................................... 4, 5, 7, 11, 12

Marriage of Ayo
235 Cal. Rptr. 458 (Ct. App. 1987) ......................................................................14

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Marriage of Buzzanca
72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998) ...................................................................14

People v. Garcia
92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (Ct. App. 2000) ...................................................................19

People v. Sorensen
437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968) ......................................................................................14

Sharon S. v. Superior Court

73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003) ..............................................................................5, 14, 15

Stepanek v. Stepanek
14 Cal. Rptr. 793 (Ct. App. 1961) ........................................................................10

Strauss v. Horton
207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) ..........................................................................................6

Susan H. v. Jack S.
30 Cal. App. 4th 1435 (1994) ...............................................................................17
State Constitution, Statutes & Codes
Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b) ...............................................................................................4

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2632.4 ..............................................................................4

Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5 .........................................................................................3, 11

Cal. Ed. Code § 200 ...................................................................................................4

California Family Code

§ 297.5 .............................................................................................................4, 16
§§ 300-303 ..........................................................................................................10
§§ 300-310 ..........................................................................................................11
§ 2210 ..................................................................................................................11
§ 3020 ....................................................................................................................9
§ 7540 ..................................................................................................................16
§ 7541 ..................................................................................................................16
§ 7601 ..................................................................................................................16
§ 7602 ..................................................................................................................11
§ 7611 ..................................................................................................................16
§ 9000 ....................................................................................................................5
§§ 2200-2201 ......................................................................................................10

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§§ 3000-3465 ......................................................................................................11
§§ 3900-4253 ......................................................................................................11
§§ 7500-7507 ......................................................................................................11
§§ 7540-7670 ......................................................................................................11
§§ 7800-7895 ......................................................................................................11
§§ 7950-7952 ......................................................................................................11
§§ 8500-9212 ......................................................................................................11

California Government Code

§ 11135 ..................................................................................................................4
§ 12920 ..................................................................................................................4

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1365.5..........................................................................4

California Insurance Code

§ 1374.58 ...............................................................................................................4
§ 10140 ..................................................................................................................4

Cal. Lab. Code § 4600.6 ............................................................................................4

Cal. Stats. 1999, ch. 592.............................................................................................4

Cal. Welfare & Institutions Code

§ 9103 ..................................................................................................................19
§ 16013 ..................................................................................................................5

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INTRODUCTION
Excluding same-sex couples from marriage violates the equal protection and
due process clauses of the federal Constitution, as Plaintiffs argue in their separate
response brief, and the City and County of San Francisco joins fully in those
arguments. But the City, which was granted permissive intervention in this case to
present evidence and argument concerning the interests of the government with
respect to Proposition 8, respectfully submits that the record also supports
affirmance of the decision below on the grounds that Proposition 8 is not rationally
related to legitimate government interests in light of California's particular
constitutional and statutory guarantees.
Before the enactment of Proposition 8, California's Constitution provided an
equal protection, privacy, and due process guarantee to all couples that their
committed relationships would be honored as marriages by the State. In addition,
the California Constitution guaranteed full equality to its gay and lesbian citizens
in all aspects of economic, political and family life.
Against this backdrop, Proposition 8 had a peculiar effect: it removed only
the honored stature of "marriage" from same-sex couples, yet altered none of their
state constitutional rights to the traditional incidents of marriage, including the
right to form a family and raise children. Indeed, the official ballot argument in
support of Proposition 8 emphatically insisted that it removed no existing legal
rights from gay and lesbian couples other than their right to the title "marriage."
ER 1032. Describing its effect in this way may makes Proposition 8 seem like a
trifle over a name. But no observer of the campaign to enact Proposition 8—which
spent tens of millions of dollars to pass it, SER 353, and which its supporters
claimed was necessary to preserve the sanctity of marriage itself, ER 1035—would
call Proposition 8 a trifle. Indeed, in the eyes of its vocal proponents, Proposition

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8 was deadly serious, necessary to prevent "[t]he meaning and status of marriage
[from being] completely lost." SER 612.
What is the governmental purpose advanced by such a scheme, the creation
of a separate constitutional classification to remove a designation of honor but not
the substantive rights traditionally accompanying that honor? As discussed below,
the rationale that Proponents primarily advance for the classification, the
"responsible procreation" justification, does not support it, for the basic reason that
Proposition 8 had no effect on the legal regimes governing parentage and
childrearing in California. Indeed, Proposition 8 undermines state interests
embodied in laws that remain intact after its passage. The "responsible
procreation" justification is so far removed from the actual effects of Proposition 8
that it cannot plausibly serve as a rational basis for the measure.
But the interest that is in fact advanced by Proposition 8 is not hidden. The
official ballot argument in favor of Proposition 8 made plain its reason: to avoid
having anyone, and especially children, view gay relationships as "okay" or as "the
same" as heterosexual relationships. ER 1032. Proposition 8 was enacted
specifically to strip gay and lesbian families of the honor of marriage and to
remove the taint from marriage and the family that its proponents believed was
etched by inclusion of same-sex couples in this institution.
The Equal Protection Clause does not tolerate creation of a hierarchy for its
own sake. Because Proposition 8 advances no rationale other than to exclude gay
and lesbian couples from the most honored relationship classification and relegate
them to a separate designation, it denies them the equal protection of the law and
must be struck down.

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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

In addition to the issues noted by Proponents in their opening brief, the
following issue is presented:
1. Whether Proposition 8, a constitutional amendment adopted after a
plebiscite campaign that played on fears and prejudices about lesbians and gay
men, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution where its
effect is to remove the honored title "marriage" but not the incidents of marriage
from same-sex couples, and its purpose is to remove the taint that its supporters
believed the inclusion of lesbian and gay couples worked on the institution of
marriage.
ARGUMENT
I. PROPOSITION 8'S SOLE EFFECT WAS TO STRIP CALIFORNIA'S
LESBIAN AND GAY CITIZENS OF THEIR EQUAL STATURE
UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION.
"The first step in equal protection analysis is to identify the defendants'
classification of groups." Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 589 (9th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation and alteration omitted). The Court is not required to
defer to Proponents' "characterization of what classification they made." Id.
(emphasis in original). Proponents characterize the Court's inquiry as follows: "At
issue here is California's decision to reaffirm the traditional definition of marriage
as a union 'between a man and a woman.' Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5." Brief 1. This
characterization is inaccurate. With Proposition 8, California did not create ab
initio a category called marriage reserved to opposite-sex couples. Instead, it
removed the title "marriage" from one group of couples only—yet left intact the
State's constitutional guarantee to gay and lesbian couples that they had a right to
form families on the same basis as other couples. The question for equal
protection analysis, then, is whether it is rational for California to treat lesbian and

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gay couples as identical to heterosexual couples in all other respects yet deny them
the honored title "marriage."
A. Prior To Proposition 8, All Couples In California Had Equal
Substantive Rights And Equal Stature Under The Law.
Prior to Proposition 8, all couples in California—whether their members
were of opposite sexes or the same sex—had two basic guarantees: they were
guaranteed equal access to the incidents of marriage and equal stature through
access to the designation "marriage." With respect to access to the incidents of
marriage—including, as discussed below, the rights to bear and raise children—the
state Constitution still guarantees the same rights to opposite sex couples who
marry and same-sex couples who enter domestic partnerships.
California law requires the equal treatment of gay men and lesbians in public
and private life. Neither government nor private entities may discriminate against
them in education, employment, housing, public accommodations, insurance
policies, or health care service plans. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b); Cal. Ed. Code
§ 200; Cal. Gov. Code § 11135; id. §§ 12920 et seq.; Cal. Health & Safety Code
§ 1365.5; Cal. Ins. Code §§ 1374.58, 10140; Cal. Lab. Code § 4600.6(g)(2); Cal.
Stats. 1999, ch. 592; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2632.4.
This guarantee of equal treatment extends to family life. In California,
"[r]egistered domestic partners … have the same rights … and shall be subject to
the same responsibilities … as are granted to and imposed upon spouses." Cal.
Fam. Code § 297.5(a); Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 417 (Cal. 2008); Koebke v.
Bernardo Heights Country Club, 115 P.3d 1212, 1223 (Cal. 2005). Same-sex
couples also possess the right to have and raise children on the same terms as
opposite-sex couples. See Cal. Fam. Code § 297.5(d) ("The rights and obligations
of registered domestic partners with respect to a child of either of them shall be the

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same as those of spouses."). Domestic partners may adopt each other's children,
Cal. Fam. Code § 9000(g), and California law presumes that both domestic
partners are parents of a child born to either partner during the relationship. See
Kristine M. v. David P., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 748, 751 (Ct. App. 2006). Whether they
have entered into domestic partnership or not, lesbian and gay couples are
permitted to become foster parents and adopt children on the same terms as
opposite-sex couples. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 16013(a); Sharon S. v.
Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 569-70 (Cal. 2003) ("any otherwise qualified single
adult or two adults, married or not, may adopt a child"). Perhaps most
significantly, California law recognizes that same-sex couples, whether domestic
partners or not, have the capacity and inclination to procreate, and specifically
permits them to do so.1 See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal.
2005); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005); see generally Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d at 433 & n.50 (referring to "the numerous children in California … being
raised by same-sex couples").
In Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), the California Supreme Court
recognized that the laws ensuring equal treatment of lesbians and gay men are not
merely dispensations of the Legislature but are rights guaranteed by the California
Constitution. It issued three holdings. First, recognizing that "an individual's
homosexual orientation is not a constitutionally legitimate basis for withholding or
restricting the individual's legal rights," the Court interpreted the state Constitution
to provide gay individuals the same basic due process and privacy rights as all

1
When it adopted the Uniform Parentage Act's amendment governing
artificial insemination, California removed language referring to a "married
woman" thus making it possible for unmarried women, including lesbians, to have
children and create families using this process. See Marriage of Buzzanca, 72
Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 285 n.7 (Ct. App. 1998). The UPA has been extended to apply
to surrogacy as well. Id. at 284-88.

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others. Id. at 429-30. This guarantee of liberty includes "the substantive right of
two adults who share a loving relationship to join together to establish an officially
recognized family of their own—and, if the couple chooses, to raise children
within that family." Id. at 399; see also id. at 418 n.27.
Second, and independently, the Court considered the entitlement of lesbian
and gay couples to the designation "marriage." The Court held that the California
Constitution guaranteed same-sex couples the right to have their relationships
accorded the same designation as opposite-sex couples' relationships, i.e. the
stature of marriage. Id. at 434-35, 452-53.
Finally, the Court held that under the equal protection clause of the
California Constitution, "sexual orientation should be viewed as a suspect
classification" and "statutes that treat persons differently because of their sexual
orientation should be subjected to strict scrutiny." Id. at 442; see id. at 442-44.
B. Proposition 8 Stripped Lesbian And Gay Couples Of Equal
Stature By Removing A State Constitutional Guarantee From
Them Alone But Did Not Alter Their Rights To The Incidents Of
Marriage.
Contrary to Proponents' understanding, Proposition 8 did not "overrule" the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the then-existing California Constitution. Brief
9. Instead, Proposition 8 "establishe[d] a new substantive state constitutional rule
that took effect upon the voters' approval." Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 63
(Cal. 2009). In Strauss, the California Supreme Court authoritatively construed the
scope of Proposition 8's new substantive rule. It found that Proposition 8 "carv[ed]
out an exception" to the privacy and due process clauses of the California
Constitution. Id. at 75. But that exception extended only to the right of gay men
and lesbians to designate their relationships "marriage"; Proposition 8 did not
repeal the other constitutional rights of same-sex couples recognized in the

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Marriage Cases. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 75, 102. Same-sex couples thus retain
"the constitutional right to enter into an officially recognized and protected family
relationship with the person of one's choice and to raise children in that family if
the couple so chooses," id. at 102, and apart from the designation "marriage," any
classification based on sexual orientation is subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 78,
102. Interpreting Proposition 8 to effect a repeal of any rights other than to the
designation "marriage," the Court held, would amount to an implied repeal of
constitutional rights, which is disfavored. Id at 75-76. Finally, the Court held that,
because it did not expressly state that it applied retroactively, Proposition 8 did not
invalidate the approximately 18,000 marriages that same-sex couples entered into
before it passed. Id. at 119-23.
Proposition 8 is therefore singular in that it regulates only stature and not the
substance of family rights, and only for lesbians and gay men who would marry
after November 4, 2008. It is also singular in the manner in which it does this
work: by cutting away a portion of the due process, equal protection, and privacy
guarantees for a minority class of Californians only, through a popular majority
vote. As the Supreme Court noted in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996),
"[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful
consideration." Id. at 633 (quotation omitted). The peculiarity of Proposition 8 is
similar to that of Amendment 2, the Colorado constitutional amendment denying
lesbians and gay men the right to obtain statutory antidiscrimination protections
from the State or local governments, which the Supreme Court invalidated in
Romer, finding that "[i]t is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of
this sort." Id.
Just as the Supreme Court did with Amendment 2, this Court should
carefully evaluate Proposition 8's justifications in light of its singularity. But

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Proposition 8 is also similar to Amendment 2 in that the justifications its

proponents now offer for it are unrelated to its actual legal effects and should not
be credited. See id. at 635 (Amendment 2 is "so far removed from these particular
justifications that we find it impossible to credit them"). We turn now to those
justifications.
II. PROPOSITION 8 IS PECULIARLY IRRATIONAL UNDER
CALIFORNIA LAW.
Proponents urge "responsible procreation" as the justification for
Proposition 8. But the State "may not rely on a classification whose relationship to
an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational."
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). Because
Proposition 8 did not alter California's laws concerning having and rearing
children, Proponents' asserted justification is too disconnected with Proposition 8
to be credited, and this Court must look elsewhere to find the basis for
Proposition 8.
A. Proposition 8 Must Be Evaluated In The Context Of California's
Other Laws And Policies.
Even under rational basis review, the State's justification for discriminatory
government action "must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed
by the legislation," Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993), and the justification
must be one that could "reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental
decisionmaker." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979). The constitutionality
of a law is not determined "by artificial standards" with the court confining review
of legislation "within its four corners." Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472,
479-80 (1932). Rather, the court "read[s] together" the challenged law with related
enactments, id. at 480, and determines whether the state's action "taken in its
totality, is within the State's constitutional power." Id. The Supreme Court has

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thus repeatedly looked to a State's other laws to determine whether its purported
justification supplies a rational basis for a challenged law. See, e.g., Romer, 517
U.S. at 626-31 (assessing effect and purpose of challenged ballot measure in light
of Colorado's and other jurisdictions' modern antidiscrimination laws); Williams v.
Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 15, 26 (1985) (Vermont's proffered justification for sales
and use tax regime did not support the challenged law because it was contradicted
by other Vermont sales tax provisions); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 449-50
(1972) (Massachusetts's law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives could not be
justified as auxiliary to its ban on premarital sex where a conviction for distributing
contraceptives carried a sentence 20 times longer than a conviction for
fornication).
Thus, this Court must evaluate Proposition 8 in light of its effect and its
context. If the Court concludes that, in light of the constitutional protections and
statutes pertaining to gay people and gay families that Proposition 8 left untouched,
the voters could not reasonably have conceived that Proposition 8 would
accomplish the objectives Proponents assert, then the Court cannot uphold
Proposition 8 on the basis of such implausible objectives.
B. Proponents' "Responsible Procreation And Childrearing"
Rationale For Denying Marriage To Same-Sex Couples Is
Unrelated To Proposition 8's Actual Effects On California Law.
Proponents argue that Proposition 8 furthers the State's interest in
"responsible procreation and childrearing." Brief 77-93. They are correct that
society has a paramount interest in "providing status and stability to the
environment in which children are raised." Brief 78. Indeed, California's laws
concerning parent-child relationships treat as central the State's concern for the
welfare and wellbeing of children. See Cal. Fam. Code § 3020(a) ("it is the public

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policy of this state to assure that the health, safety, and welfare of children shall be
the court's primary concern in determining the best interest of children").
From there, however, Proponents' arguments and California law quickly
diverge. California law distinguishes between marriage and parenting, treats
lesbian and gay parents identically to heterosexual parents, recognizes that
irresponsible procreation and childrearing are not limited to situations where
children are conceived accidentally, and gives no preference to parents of different
genders. As a constitutional amendment, Proposition 8 could have changed any or
all of these laws. But it did not. Having left unchanged the state constitutional
provisions and laws treating same-sex parents the same as opposite-sex parents,
Proposition 8 cannot plausibly be construed as a measure designed to encourage
opposite-sex parenting over same-sex parenting.
1. California Regulates Marriage Separately From Parentage.
Proponents' procreation and childrearing rationales have as their first
premise that the law governing access to marriage is designed primarily or in
significant part to regulate parenting—the having and raising of children. That
premise is fundamentally flawed in California, where marriage does not depend on
procreation, and the parentage laws, which govern who is deemed to be the parent
of a minor child, do not distinguish between parents based on their marital status.
California does not condition marriage on either partner's ability to
procreate, Stepanek v. Stepanek, 14 Cal. Rptr. 793, 794 (Ct. App. 1961) (lack of
"fruitfulness" not ground for nullifying marriage),2 or potential fitness as a parent.
See Cal. Fam. Code §§ 300-303 (requirements for marriage), 2200-2201 (void

2
Inability to have sexual relations, if incurable, is grounds for annulment,
but inability to procreate is not. Cal. Fam Code § 2210; see also Stepanek v.
Stepanek, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 794 ("The law's test is simply the ability or inability for
copulation, not fruitfulness").

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marriages), 2210 (voidable marriages). Indeed, the California Constitution

guarantees the right to marry to couples who have no intent or ability to have or
raise children. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 430-32. Conversely, California does
not precondition its determination of parental status on marriage. "The parent and
child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of
the marital status of the parents." Cal. Fam. Code § 7602.
The laws governing access to marriage in California are in fact distinct from
the laws that regulate formation of parent-child relationships and parental rights
and responsibilities. Compare Cal. Const. art. 1, § 7.5 & Cal. Fam. Code §§ 300-
310 (marriage) with Cal. Fam. Code §§ 7540-7670 (parentage), §§ 7950-7952
(foster care), §§ 8500-9212 (adoption), §§ 7800-7895 (removal from parental
custody and control), §§ 3000-3465 (child custody), §§ 3900-4253 (obligation of
support), §§ 7500-7507 (parental rights and authority). If Proposition 8 were
intended to affect who becomes a parent and how children are raised in this state,
surely it would have revised the laws that actually address parent-child
relationships. It did not.
2. California Treats Lesbian And Gay Parents Identically To
Heterosexual Parents.
Proponents contend that "only sexual relationships between men and women
can produce children" and thus that opposite-sex relationships implicate the
government 's interest in children "in a way, and to an extent, that other types of
relationships do not." Brief at 77; see also id. at 82-83. If this were an accurate
account of California's interests, one would expect that California laws governing
parentage and parent-child relationships would distinguish in at least some respects
between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples. But they did not do so before
Proposition 8 was passed and they still do not.

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As discussed supra in Section I, even after Proposition 8 the California

Constitution guarantees same-sex couples the right to form families and to have
and raise children within them on the same basis as opposite-sex couples.
California statutes further guarantee these rights. And when same-sex couples
have children, they have the same parental rights and obligations as any other
parent. Elisa B., 117 P.3d 660; K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005); see also
Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005).
Moreover, California's parentage laws do not privilege heterosexual couples
or married couples in establishing parental rights and responsibilities. See Elisa B.,
117 P.3d at 664 (California adopted Uniform Parentage Act in part to eliminate
distinctions between children born to married and unmarried parents). Indeed, to
do so would be inconsistent with the California Constitution's protection of the
autonomy of all persons in the realm of family matters, including decisions to have
and raise children. See Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 399, 418 n.27. And it would
be inconsistent with the overarching purpose of California's parentage statutes: to
promote the welfare of all children whether they are born to a married couple or in
any other setting. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 668-69. Toward that end, California law
does favor providing children with two legal parents and stable family
relationships. Id. at 669 ("[T]he Legislature implicitly recognized the value of
having two parents, rather than one, as a source of both emotional and financial
support."); Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 696 . But to the extent the existence of a
marital relationship plays any role at all in matters relating to parenting, California
law treats the domestic partnerships of same-sex couples identically to marriage.
See supra Section I.A.
California law thus is flatly inconsistent with the idea that the State's
interests in childbearing and childrearing are somehow different with respect to

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opposite-sex and same-sex couples. It neither privileges nor burdens one type of
couple differently than the other when it comes to childbearing or parenting.
3. California Seeks To Identify Responsible Parents For All
Children, No Matter How They Were Conceived.
Proponents contend the State needs to offer marriage as an incentive to
opposite-sex couples to encourage them to have and raise children only in the
context of a marital family rather than through "casual sexual behavior" that may
unintentionally produce children. See Brief at 78, 84-86 (Proposition 8 seeks to
"channel potential procreative conduct into relationships" that "further society's
interest in responsible procreation and childrearing.").
To the extent this argument can be credited at all, it must be taken a step
further than Proponents are willing to admit: Because Proposition 8 does not
bestow an honor on opposite-sex couples but instead removes an honor from same-
sex couples, this "incentives" justification can be credited only if it is rational to
believe that opposite-sex couples will be less likely to raise children in a marital
family if the stature of marriage is also available to same-sex couples. In fact, as
discussed infra in Section III., this is the actual justification that Proposition 8's
Proponents relied on in their campaign to enact it: that the inclusion of same-sex
couples somehow sullied marriage itself and devalued it in the eyes of heterosexual
couples. Yet Proponents produced not a shred of evidence that any opposite-sex
couple in California would be less likely to marry if same-sex couples could as
well. More importantly, as Plaintiffs set out in Section IV.B of their response
brief, the state's creation of a separate relationship classification to accommodate
private biases is not a legitimate state interest. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429, 433 (1984); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1967).

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Even taken on its own terms, Proponents' justification falls short.

Irresponsible procreation and childrearing can occur whether or not a couple
conceives a child intentionally or as a result of "casual sexual behavior," and
California courts have repeatedly observed that the State's interest in identifying
two responsible parents is equally strong for all children regardless of when, why
or in what context a parent shirks his or her obligations. See People v. Sorensen,
437 P.2d 495, 499 (Cal. 1968) (ex-husband responsible for child born through
artificial insemination of his wife with his consent using another man's sperm);
Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282, 291 (child conceived through
surrogacy was the lawful child of husband and wife who divorced before her birth:
"for all practical purposes [the husband] caused [the child's] conception every bit
as much as if things had been done the old-fashioned way"); Marriage of Ayo, 235
Cal. Rptr. 458 (Ct. App. 1987) (adoptive father who subsequently divorced child's
biological mother was required to pay support, and this obligation could not be
waived by the other parent). Sadly, same-sex couples as well as opposite-sex
couples sometimes attempt to avoid their parental responsibilities, and California's
interest in providing children with two parents where possible is the same for both.
See Elisa B., 117 P.3d 660 (woman who participated in bringing children into the
world through artificial insemination of her partner with intent to raise them
together was their legal parent and could not later deny parenthood and avoid her
support obligation); see also K.M., 117 P.3d 673; Kristine H., 117 P.3d 690;
Sharon S., 73 P.3d 554.
In short, if the prestige and honor of marriage provide an incentive for
parents to raise their children together, it is equally important for that incentive to
be available to all parents who bring children into the world—whether they do so
"in the old-fashioned way" or through other methods—and to parents who adopt.

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Enacting a constitutional provision to exclude one group of parents from marriage

in no way furthers and instead undercuts the government's interest in ensuring
responsible procreation and parenting.
4. California Law Expresses No Preference For Opposite-Sex
Or Biological Parents.
Proponents finally contend that the State reserves marriage to opposite-sex
couples to encourage the raising of children by two parents of different genders,
each of whom has a "biological connection" with the child. Brief at 80-81, 89.
But—consistent with the social science that, as discussed in Section IV.B.1.a. of
Plaintiffs' response brief, refutes the idea that being raised by "biological" parents
or by opposite-sex parents is better for children—California has explicitly
disavowed these rationales and expresses no preference for households headed by
opposite-sex or biological parents.
California's parentage statutes apply in a gender-neutral manner to recognize
the parentage of two persons who jointly bring a child into the world, whether they
are a same-sex or opposite-sex couple. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 667-71 (applying
presumed father statute to find woman was presumed mother of child); K.M., 117
P.3d at 677-78 (applying paternity statute to find woman was mother of child).
The adoption statutes similarly apply without regard to sexual orientation. Sharon
S., 73 P.3d at 570. There is no suggestion in any of the California statutes or cases
governing parentage that same-sex couples are any less fit to be parents than
opposite-sex couples or any policy preference for opposite-gendered parenting.
Indeed, the California Supreme Court has specifically rejected the notion that
parents of different genders fulfill different gender roles in parenting. Carney v.
Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 736-37 (1971).

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Nor do California's laws governing parentage and childrearing reflect any

preference for biological parents over parents who beget children through means
whereby one or both are not biologically connected to the child, or over parents
who adopt. California's parentage statutes define the "parent and child
relationship" to mean "the legal relationship existing between a child and the
child's natural or adoptive parents." Cal. Fam. Code § 7601. "[N]atural parent"
does not necessarily mean biological parent; rather, it means someone other than
an adoptive parent, including persons deemed parents by operation of the
presumptions set forth in the parentage statutes. See Cal. Fam. Code § 7610;
Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 93 n.9, 95 (1993); Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 671.
Under the parentage statutes, marriage (or domestic partnership) to the natural
mother of a child results in a presumption of parenthood, which if not rebutted
within two years of the child's birth is conclusive. Cal. Fam. Code §§ 7540, 7541;
see id. § 297.5(d). This is so regardless of biological connection, because the law
embodies a determination that "integrity of the family" is considered more
important to the child's welfare than biological connection. See Estate of
Cornelious, 35 Cal. 3d 461, 464-65 (1984). Indeed, biological connection does not
even allow a putative father standing to obtain a blood test of the child in order to
challenge the husband's paternity and establish his own. Dawn D. v. Superior
Court, 17 Cal. 4th 932, 937-38 (1998).
Another statutory presumption presumes parentage by a person who
"receives the child into his [or her] home and openly holds out the child as his [or
her] natural child"—whether or not that person has a biological connection to the
child. Cal. Fam. Code § 7611(d). The presumption of paternity or maternity that
flows from establishing a stable and supportive parental relationship with a child is
not necessarily rebutted by a showing that another person is the biological father or

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mother. See, e.g., Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 667-68. Rather, California law recognizes
that a person who has lived with a child and held the child out as a son or daughter
has developed a relationship with the child that is "much more important" to the
child than biological parentage. Id. at 668. Courts apply these parentage
presumptions to protect established parent-child relationships even in the face of
competing claims by biological parents because doing so "promotes the state's
interest in the child's welfare." Susan H. v. Jack S., 30 Cal. App. 4th 1435,
1442 (1994).
Proposition 8 did not revise these presumptions to rank opposite-sex parents
or biological parents above other factors in establishing parent-child relationships.
Its failure to do so belies Proponents' post hoc rationale.
C. Proponents' "Proceed With Caution" Rationale Is Belied By The
Same California Law And Policies.
Proponents also argue that the State should proceed with caution in
modifying the definition of marriage, for fear that allowing same-sex couples to
marry will contribute to the "deinstitutionalization" of marriage, breaking the links
between marriage and childrearing. Brief at 98. Yet as discussed above,
California already treats opposite-sex and same-sex couples alike with respect to
parentage, childrearing, foster parenting, and adoption. Proponents offer no
explanation for how access to the honorific title of "marriage" may
deinstitutionalize it when access to the incidents of marriage have not. Nor, for
that matter, have they explained how denying marriage to same-sex couples who
would seek to marry after November 4, 2008 will deinstitutionalize marriage, when
leaving intact the marriages of approximately 18,000 same-sex couples who
married in California before that date has not. Moreover, to the extent Proponents
implicitly rely on the rationale that opposite-sex couples will be less likely to

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marry if same-sex couples are permitted to marry, then this rationale is an

effectuation of private biases that is illegitimate for the State to adopt. See also
Section IV.B.2. of Plaintiffs' response brief.
D. Proposition 8 Is Irrational In Light Of The Harm It Causes.
In evaluating the justification for a measure, the Supreme Court has
considered not only whether the relationship between the proffered objectives and
the challenged measure is too attenuated but also whether the law's secondary costs
are so high that it undermines the plausibility of the asserted rationale. See Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982) ("In light of [the] countervailing costs, the
discrimination contained in § 21.031 can hardly be considered rational unless it
furthers some substantial goal of the State."). The trial record in this case
demonstrated conclusively that relegating lesbian and gay couples to an inferior
relationship status has tremendous human costs, which underscore its irrationality
under California's statutory and constitutional scheme.
California's Constitution and laws in many ways recognize the equality of
lesbians and gay men. Proposition 8 contradicts this recognition by
institutionalizing a form of discrimination against lesbians and gay men, signaling
to society at large that they are different and inferior. As shown at trial, this
contradiction has tremendous costs to the State and its citizens. Gregory M. Herek,
a professor of psychology, testified that Proposition 8 inflicts a structural stigma,
or stigma expressed through institutions rather than by individuals, on lesbians and
gay men because of the way it differentiates people in same-sex relationships from
those in opposite-sex relationships. Transcript 2054:7-11. This kind of stigma
isolates gay men and lesbians from others in society, according to testimony from
psychiatric epidemiologist Ilan Meyer, and is a source of psychological injury to
them. Transcript 821:22-822:5, 832:1-18, 846:22-847:12. Moreover, according to

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Dr. Meyer, a law like Proposition 8 sends a message that gay relationships are not
to be respected, and it "encourage[s] or at least is consistent with holding
prejudicial attitudes." SER 156; see also Transcript 1276:11-13 (testimony of San
Diego Mayor and former Police Chief Jerry Sanders that "if government tolerates
discrimination against anyone for any reason, it becomes an excuse for the public
to do exactly the same thing"); People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 348 (Ct.
App. 2000) (for government to allow use of peremptory challenges to prospective
jurors based on sexual orientation would send message that gay people are
presumed unqualified to decide important questions). The net effect of
discrimination against lesbians and gay men in society, according to Dr. Meyer, is
a disproportionate incidence of mental and physical health problems, substance
abuse, depression and suicide. Transcript 870:23-872:21.
Moreover, the costs of sexual orientation discrimination are not merely
borne by the individuals who experience it daily. The trial record demonstrates
that school districts collectively lose tens of millions of dollars from absences
resulting when students are bullied because of their sexual orientation. PX810.
Students who drop out of school mean lost productivity to the state's economy.
Transcript 704:20-705:8. The health costs associated with institutional and social
stigma against gay people are likewise borne by governments, as the health care
providers of last resort. Transcript 699:16-702:7; see also Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 9103(a) (finding lesbian and gay seniors' "lifelong experiences of marginalization
place [them] at high risk for isolation, poverty, homelessness, and premature
institutionalization"). California also sees hundreds of sexual-orientation based
hate crimes every year, requiring state and local governments to spend resources
investigating and prosecuting these crimes, PX 711, and causing loss of
productivity to the state. And these measurements do not quantify the crushing

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human costs of discrimination. See, e.g., Transcript 409:13-16 (historian George

Chauncey describing, as an example of hostility affecting gay people, a 15-year-
old boy in California who was shot because he told another boy he was attracted to
the boy); Transcript 1277:17-1278:4 (Mayor Sanders describing hate crime in San
Diego where a gay man was beaten almost to death with a baseball bat); Transcript
1506:21-1514:14 (Ryan Kendall describing fellow junior high school students
taunting him with names like "faggot," "queer" and "homo"; his mother telling him
he would "burn in hell," was "disgusting" and "repulsive" and that "she wished she
had an abortion instead of a gay son"; therapist his parents sent him to telling him
being homosexual was "dirty and bad"; and how his life "fell apart" and he became
"suicidal and depressed.")
III. PROPOSITION 8 WAS ENACTED TO BRAND LESBIAN AND GAY
RELATIONSHIPS AS DIFFERENT AND INFERIOR, AN
IMPERMISSIBLE STATE PURPOSE.
Try as they may to construct a benign rationale for Proposition 8, Proponents
are unable to identify one that is even remotely plausible in light of California's
laws governing family and relationships. The relationship between access to
marriage and the constitutional and statutory provisions governing parent-child
relationships are far too attenuated to make the procreation rationale anything but
pretextual. Cf. Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 945-46 (9th Cir.
2004) (describing equal protection test for pretext in selective enforcement case).
The dearth of any plausible benign rationale, coupled with the peculiar nature of
Proposition 8 as a popular constitutional amendment that stripped away existing
constitutional rights only from a minority group, leads to the inference that
Proposition 8's true purpose was not benign. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
But inference is not necessary here, as demonstrated by the official ballot
argument in favor of Proposition 8, which assured voters that domestic partners

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would continue to have "'the same rights, protections and benefits' as married
spouses" and that Proposition 8 would not "take away" those rights. ER 1032. It
would only take away the title of "marriage." Id. But according to the ballot
argument, removing the title of "marriage" from gay and lesbian couples was
essential to "preserving marriage" itself. Thus, the title "marriage" must be
reserved for opposite-sex couples to signal that their relationships are "traditional,"
"ideal," and "an essential institution of society," in stark contrast to gay and lesbian
couples, who were marked with repeated demeaning references to "the gay
lifestyle." ER 1032-33.3 Indeed, according to the ballot argument, if lesbians and
gay men were allowed access to the title "marriage," then children would be taught
that "gay marriage is okay" and that "there is no difference between gay marriage
and traditional marriage." ER 1032 (emphasis in original). That was the harm to
be remedied: the elimination of difference between opposite-sex and same-sex
couples.
This rationale was emphasized not merely in the voter pamphlet but
throughout the Yes on 8 campaign. "[I]f we have same-sex marriage legalized, it's
… an affirmation that it's just as good. And then we're going to have this society
that eventually is going to come to believe it …." SER 552-53; see also SER 622
("Public schools will teach the fully equal status of homosexual and heterosexual
conduct based, in substantial part, on state marriage law."); SER 556 (presenting
married gay couples as equal to married heterosexual couples "is a radically anti-

3
In asserting in the ballot argument that "Proposition 8 is not an attack on
the gay lifestyle," Proponents protested too much. ER 1032 (emphasis in original).
The very characterization of gay relationships as a "lifestyle" is a stereotype that
not only calls up images of gay people as sexually deviant that were prevalent until
very recently, but would never be tolerated if used for any other minority group,
such as with reference to an African-American or Jewish lifestyle.

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human thing to say"); ER 1036 (campaign materials warning that allowing gay and
lesbian couples to marry "destroys the sanctity of marriage").4
In short, voters were told that if Proposition 8 does not pass, "[t]he meaning
and status of marriage will be completely lost" through the according of equal
stature to gay and lesbian couples. SER 612. The purpose of Proposition 8 was
made plain: it was simply to ensure that lesbian and gay couples could not taint
marriage, in its supporters' eyes, by claiming this stature.
Proposition 8 thus finds its justification not in its effects on procreation or
parentage but instead in honoring opposite-sex relationships and commensurately
dishonoring same-sex relationships—even while the California Constitution
guarantees that substantive incidents of both relationships are the same. Its
constitutionality must therefore rise or fall on whether this is a legitimate state
purpose. It is not.
Under the federal Equal Protection Clause, "[b]eneficence [cannot] be
distributed arbitrarily," Williams, 472 U.S. at 27, nor can California create a
hierarchy of relationships simply "to make [lesbians and gay men] unequal to
everyone else." Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. "'A purpose to discriminate against [a
disfavored group] cannot, in and of itself and without reference to [some
independent] considerations in the public interest, justify'" the classification. U.S.
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973) (quotation marks omitted;
alteration in original). And the extent to which this hierarchy is based on private
moral beliefs does not remove the equal protection violation but only confirms it,

4
At times, the difference between same-sex couples and opposite-sex
couples was merely asserted, as if it were self-evident. At other times, Proposition
8 campaign messages resorted to expressly moral or religious terms to justify the
same conclusion. See, e.g., SER 326-28; see also PX0168; PX 0390; PX2842 (all
available at https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/09cv2292/evidence/index.html).

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because moral disapproval is not a legitimate state interest. Lawrence v. Texas,

539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003). Nor is a purpose to discriminate cured if it is based on
something less than hatred; prejudice may be caused "by simple want of careful,
rational reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard against people
who appear to be different in some respects from ourselves." Bd. of Trustees v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Here, there can be no doubt that the "beneficence" that Proposition 8 denies
to lesbian and gay couples is no trifle. A dignitary harm is of constitutional
dimension, as the Supreme Court has recognized in other cases where parallel
institutions have been created in order to separate disfavored classes of people
from the majority. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); cf. United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) ("VMI"). Denial of access to the "reputation,"
"standing in the community" and "traditions and prestige" of the University of
Texas Law School on the basis of race could not be tolerated under the Equal
Protection Clause and was not ameliorated by access to a lesser institution. Sweatt,
339 U.S. at 634; see also VMI, 518 U.S. at 551 (separate institution was no
substitute where it lacked the "history" and "prestige" of VMI).
In this case, no one has argued that domestic partnership has the same
"reputation," "standing in the community," or "traditions and prestige" as the
institution of marriage. Indeed, the trial record demonstrates conclusively that
even with the tangible rights, benefits and obligations that state law confers on
domestic partners, same-sex couples and their children are stigmatized and harmed
by denial of the right to enter into marriage itself. See Plaintiffs' brief Section
III.D.; supra Section II.C; Transcript 1273:10-17 (San Diego Mayor Sanders
testifying that he realized his prior support for civil unions over marriage reflected
prejudice: "I was saying that one group of people did not deserve the same dignity

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and respect, did not deserve the same symbolism about marriage."); PX0186. And
the importance of the title and stature of marriage is amply demonstrated by the
$40 million that Proponents spent on a ballot measure just to "preserve" it from the
taint of gay people and their relationships. Thus, there can be no question that the
designation "marriage," which is unique in its history, traditions, meaning and
prestige, is—by itself and even apart from the tangible rights and benefits
associated with it—a right of constitutional importance.
Proposition 8 stripped the right to the honor of "marriage" only from same-
sex couples, and enshrined that inequality in the California Constitution. Yet
under California law, same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples continue to be
similarly situated in every respect that is relevant to intimate and family
relationships. Proposition 8 serves no state interest other than to demean lesbian
and gay relationships and classify them simply to make them unequal to everyone
else. It cannot be sustained under the Equal Protection Clause.
Dated: October 18, 2010 Respectfully submitted,
DENNIS J. HERRERA
City Attorney
THERESE M. STEWART,
Chief Deputy City Attorney
CHRISTINE VAN AKEN
MOLLIE M. LEE
Deputy City Attorneys

By: s/Therese M. Stewart

THERESE M. STEWART
Chief Deputy City Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KRISTIN M. PERRY, et al., No. 10-16696
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
U.S. District Court
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN Case No. 09-cv-02292 VRW
FRANCISCO,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee,
vs.
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al.,
Defendants,

DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH, et al.

Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California
The Honorable Chief District Judge Vaughn R. Walker
DENNIS J. HERRERA, State Bar #139669
City Attorney
THERESE M. STEWART, State Bar #104930
Chief Deputy City Attorney
CHRISTINE VAN AKEN, State Bar #241755
MOLLIE M. LEE, State Bar #251404
Deputy City Attorneys
City Hall, Room 234
One Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place
San Francisco, California 94102-4682
Telephone: (415) 554-4708
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH

TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 7,362 words, excluding the parts of the
brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

Dated: October 18, 2010 DENNIS J. HERRERA

City Attorney
THERESE M. STEWART,
Chief Deputy City Attorney
VINCE CHHABRIA
CHRISTINE VAN AKEN
MOLLIE M. LEE
Deputy City Attorneys

By: s/Therese M. Stewart

THERESE M. STEWART
Chief Deputy City Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 1 n:\govli1\li2010\100617\00658368.doc

CASE NO. 10-16696
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9th Circuit Case Number(s) No. 10-16696

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accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

Signature (use "s/" format) s/ Catheryn M. Daly

*********************************************************************************
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
When Not All Case Participants are Registered for the Appellate CM/ECF System
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system
on (date) .

Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the appellate
CM/ECF system.

I further certify that some of the participants in the case are not registered CM/ECF users. I
have mailed the foregoing document by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, or have dispatched it
to a third party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days to the following
non-CM/ECF participants:

Signature (use "s/" format)