IAEA

Topic Guide.

MUNiC
11

TOPIC A: Elimination of Rogue Nuclear Programs/ Black Market Nuclear Proliferation

HOW DOES THIS FALL UNDER THE AMBIT OF THE IAEA? The IAEA works for the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. Its key roles contribute to international peace and security, and to the World's Millennium Goals for social, economic and environmental development. Three main pillars - or areas of work - underpin the mission: Safeguards and verification Safety and Security Science and Technology In order to ensure safety and security, the IAEA must ensure that nations, organizations and agencies use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes only. Therefore the IAEA must actively engage in the elimination of rogue nuclear programs.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A ROGUE NUCLEAR PROGRAM? For the purposes of this conference any country, agency, organization or group that unlawfully possess nuclear materials (radioactive materials or materials of a fissile or fertile nature) and is not subject to IAEA safeguards or party to the NPT or the CTBT will be deemed to constitute a Rogue Nuclear Program. This definition encompasses Terrorist groups, organizations involved in the illicit trafficking

of nuclear material or technologies and nations having covert nuclear programs.

Background Since the end of the Cold War the threat of nuclear technology on the black market increased rapidly. New nuclear black markets sprung up in Moscow, Germany, and countless more European countries. Black market nuclear proliferation can be defined as any nuclear material that can be used to forge nuclear weapons and are sold or given illegally. Years later Libya sought out nuclear weapons from the Khan network. The network operated in secret for several years before being exposed by the United States, Britain, and the IAEA. The Khan network had a large supply of nuclear materials but with the help of Western countries it was shut down. Uranium and plutonium black markets are multi-million dollar industries for the smugglers and consumers. These profit the criminals and give nuclear power to states that may not have the right equipment to keep stable their nuclear reactors. Also, these states may not have strong protection for their nuclear products thus increasing the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. With nuclear black markets, the risk of non nuclear states getting nuclear weapons increases greatly and so does the risk of terrorists sabotaging them. UN Involvement The United Nations created the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty in order prevent the spread of nuclear weapons or technology and to work towards complete disarmament. A total of 189 states signed this treaty but a total of 4 states, which are believed to have nuclear weapons, have not signed. With nuclear black markets operating all around the world, it is crucial for the international community to work together to stop them. Nuclear weapons could leak from states who havent signed the NPT, or states that have low security of the nuclear load outs. The United Nations passed resolutions declaring nations to take strong action to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly by black marketers and terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.
2

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS In order for nuclear black markets to be eradicated, the source of nuclear weapons must be halted first. If all states sign and ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty then thats a big step in halting nuclear materials from its source to ensure black markets cannot get a hold of nuclear materials from countries. If black markets continue to distribute nuclear materials then countries must have full and thorough investigations on black markets that they can be involved in such as black markets taking place upon their soil. To stop the threat of black market nuclear proliferation worldwide, it would be ideal for neighboring countries to cooperate together and counter the black markets they know of. Also the spread of information is crucial to stop this issue. If nations can find a way to share information of black markets fast and effectively and act upon it, then this issue is much closer to being solved.

What can the IAEA do? Impose safeguard measures and conduct regular inspections Formulate nuclear safety plans and ensure their implementation Take whatever measures necessary to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials Negotiating and mediating situations involving Rogue Nuclear Programs Report suspicious activities involving nuclear technologies and materials to the United Nations Security Council which can then take concrete measures to address such a concern.

 Use the weight of the opinion of the international community to prevent a nation or group from engaging in non peaceful activities that involve the use of nuclear materials.

This background guide will elaborate on some of the above measures that the IAEA can take. It is left up to the delegate to formulate and suggest other alternative measures that the IAEA could take to promote non proliferation and elimination of Rogue Nuclear Programs.

Safeguards: Safeguards are activities by which the IAEA can verify that a State is living up to its international commitments not to use nuclear programmes for nuclear-weapons purposes. The global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other treaties against the spread of nuclear weapons entrust the IAEA as the nuclear inspectorate. Today, the IAEA safeguards nuclear material and activities under agreements with more than 140 States. Within the worlds nuclear non-proliferation regime, the IAEAs safeguards system functions as a confidence-building measure, an early warning mechanism, and the trigger that sets in motion other responses by the international community if and when the need arises. Over the past decade, IAEA safeguards have been strengthened in key areas. Measures aim to increase the likelihood of detecting a clandestine nuclear weapons program and to build confidence that States are abiding by their international commitments. Which verification measures are used? Safeguards are based on assessments of the correctness and completeness of a States declared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities. Verification measures include on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation. Basically, two sets of measures are carried out in accordance with the type of safeguards agreements in force with a State. 1. The first set relates to verifying State reports of declared nuclear material and
4

activities. These measures authorized under NPT-type comprehensive safeguards agreements - largely are based on nuclear material accountancy, complemented by containment and surveillance techniques, such as tamper-proof seals and cameras that the IAEA installs at facilities. 2. The second set adds measures to strengthen the IAEAs inspection capabilities. They include those incorporated in what is known as an "Additional Protocol" this is a legal document complementing comprehensive safeguards agreements. The measures enable the IAEA not only to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material but also to provide assurances as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State. IAEA Inspections which may lead to eradication of nuclear black market proliferation The IAEA carries out different types of on-site inspections and visits under comprehensive safeguards agreements. Ad hoc inspections typically are made to verify a States initial report of nuclear material or reports on changes thereto, and to verify the nuclear material involved in international transfers. Routine inspections - the type most frequently used - may be carried out according to a defined schedule or they may be of an unannounced or short-notice character. The Agencys right to carry out routine inspections under comprehensive safeguards agreements is limited to those locations within a nuclear facility, or other locations containing nuclear material, through which nuclear material is expected to flow (strategic points). Special inspections may be carried out in circumstances according to defined procedures. The IAEA may carry out such inspections if it considers that information made available by the State concerned, including explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the safeguards agreement.

 Safeguards visits may be made to declared facilities at appropriate times during the lifecycle for verifying the safeguards relevant design information. For example, such visits may be carried out during construction to determine the completeness of the declared design information; during routine facility operations and following maintenance, to confirm that no modification was made that would allow unreported activities to take place; and during a facility decommissioning, to confirm that sensitive equipment was rendered unusable. The Prevention of Illicit trafficking of nuclear materials Established in 1995, the ITDB is the IAEAs information system on incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and radioactive materials. The ITDB is a unique asset helping participating States and selected international organizations in combating illicit nuclear trafficking and strengthening nuclear security. It is also an essential component of the information platform supporting the implementation of the IAEAs Nuclear Security Plan. The ITDB facilitates the exchange of authoritative information on incidents among States. As of 1 September 2009, 107 States participate in the ITDB Programme. In some cases, non-participating Member States have provided information to the ITDB. The scope of the ITDB information is broad. It includes, but is not limited to, incidents involving illegal trade and movement of materials across borders. The scope covers incidents involving unauthorized acquisition (e.g. through theft), supply, possession, use, transfer or disposal of nuclear and other radioactive materials, whether intentionally or unintentionally, with or without crossing international borders. The scope also covers unsuccessful or thwarted acts of the above type, the loss of materials and the discovery of uncontrolled materials. It is recognized that many States lack the necessary technical capabilities to detect unauthorized movement of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Through nuclear security and technical cooperation programs, the Agency provides States, to a limited extent, with equipment for detection of smuggling of radioactive substances at borders. The IAEA also facilitates provision of such equipment through the bilateral support programs. Under the terms of the NPT, which went into effect in 1970, only five countries were allowed to have nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers at that time: the United
6

States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China agreed not to proliferate weapons technology to other countries and to work toward their own eventual nuclear disarmament. Some 190 countries ratified the treaty. But 36 years later, the world faces a problem. There are now nine nuclear weapon states, four of them outside the NPT. Several other countries that have civilian nuclear programs have the capabilities to develop military nuclear programs simply by channeling existing civilian nuclear technology. Fortunately most of the nations with civilian nuclear programs are stable democracies and have not expressed any desire to use nuclear technology for defense purposes. However the situation with the middle eastern countries and DPRK (Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea) continues to remain unresolved. The IAEA and DPRK: IAEA inspectors at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities removed safeguards equipment and left the country on 16 April 2009, following the DPRK decision to cease all cooperation with the IAEA. The international community needs the assistance and guidance of the IAEA to address this situation. The IAEA and Iran: Iran continues to argue that it has the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the generation of power in the face of looming energy crisis. Segments of the international community however continue to doubt Iran's motives and this was reflected in the recently passed resolution Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This resolution was adopted by the IAEA board of governors on the 27th of November 2009. This resolution can be found on the IAEA website and delegates are recommended and encouraged to read both it and Iran's response which can be found alongside. However, despite attempted preventive measures, the Illicit Trafficking of nuclear material continues:
7

From January 1993 to December 2008, a total of 336 incidents involving unauthorized possession and related criminal activities were confirmed to the ITDB. Incidents included in this category involve illegal possession, movement, or attempts to illegally trade in or use nuclear materials or radioactive sources. Fifteen incidents in this category involved high enriched uranium (HEU) and Plutonium. In addition, 421 reported incidents involved the theft or loss of nuclear or other radioactive materials and 724 cases involved other unauthorized activities, such as the unauthorized disposal of radioactive materials or discovery of "orphan sources". In the remaining 81 cases the reported information was not sufficient to determine the category of incident. Information reported to the ITDB shows a persistent problem with the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, thefts, losses, and other unauthorized activities. The USA has taken a lead in ensuring the nuclear materials globally are safeguarded. The two organizations listed below have also played a significant role. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR): The CTR program provides funding to help Russia secure materials that might be used in nuclear or chemical weapons as well as to dismantle weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in Russia. Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI): Expanding on the success of the CTR, the GTRI will expand nuclear weapons and material securing and dismantlement activities to states outside of the former Soviet Union. EXPECTED BLOC POSITIONS WITHIN THE COMMITTEE: Western Bloc: The Western nations have been involved greatly because they are more modern and most of the loose nukes or the blueprints for them came from their inventory. Latin Block: The Latin countries have been supportive of countering black market nuclear proliferation by the means of supporting resolutions and organizations.

Asian Bloc: Some Asian countries have had a great influence on the resolving the issue but certain Asian countries may have a greater impact on this issue than others because they have greater representation since they hold nuclear weapons. African Bloc: The African nations support the need to destroy nuclear black markets but a select few have been known to support or engage in trade with them. Middle Eastern Bloc: Some Middle Eastern states have been supportive in countering nuclear black markets by the means of capturing and decommissioning them yet others have been known to purchase these materials from these markets.

Questions to consider: Delegates are requested to keep the following things in mind while doing their research and writing position papers: What, according to your nation, constitutes a rogue nuclear program? Does your nation have a civilian or military nuclear program? If your nation has a civilian military program, do your research reactors and power plants comply with IAEA safeguards? Are they subject to routing inspections? Does your country deem the inspection of its nuclear facilities as a violation of its sovereignty? Has your nation ever been faced by the problem of nuclear terrorism and if yes, what measures were taken to avert such a threat? What, in your opinion can the IAEA do to eliminate nuclear programs?

 Does your nation believe that it is the unalienable right of every nation to have a civilian nuclear program? Has your country benefitted from an INSSP? Has your nation signed and ratified the CTBT and NPT. If not, why? Does your nation deem the threat from rogue nuclear programs to be immediate and worth addressing? If not, why? Has your country in any way assisted the IAEA in securing this threat? If yes, in what manner? What diplomatic relations does your country have with Iran and DPRK? What are your country's views on nuclear disarmament and Non- Proliferation.

Links which will help: 1. http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/index.html 2. http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/2004/03-11-4.htm 3. http://www.isisonline.org/publications/southasia/nuclear_black_market.html 4. http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/chronicle/cache/bypass/home/archive/Is sues2009/anuclearweaponsfreeworldisitachievable?pagination=true&ctnscro ll_articleContainerList=1_1&ctnlistpagination_articleContainerList=true&pr int=1 5. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1460600/UN-moves-toprevent-spread-of-WMD-black-market.html

10

Topic B: Nuclear Disasters: Prevention, Response, and the Environmental Aftermath

Introduction The threat of nuclear disaster is no longer a distant memory of the Cold War. The 1986 catastrophe at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in the Ukraine is no longer the only disaster to be ranked as the highest level nuclear disaster by the IAEAs International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale. The nuclear crisis in Japan started from the results of an approximate 8.9 magnitude Earthquake (equivalent to approximately 360 megatons of TNT, or about 26666.7 Hiroshima Little Boy bombs) on March 11, 2011, resulting in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors automatically turning themselves off. Even though they were turned off, the radioactivity in the core of the reactor still produced heat, so the reactor still required cooling. Without the cooling, the core can begin to melt, resulting from some of the fuel melting to a massive meltdown of the entire core. Their cooling system, the water pumps, required electricity. Their first power source was two power lines that ran to the nuclear conference, but it was disrupted by the earthquake. Their backup power source was the diesel generators on the site, but the tsunami that resulted from the earthquake flooded the generators, which prevented them from producing electricity. There are currently no recorded deaths, but radiation levels inside the reactors varied from below 1millisievert/hour to slightly over 1000mSv/h, dependent on the location and time. A rate of 3.13mSv/h is high enough for a non-nuclear worker to reach their annual limit in 20 minutes, with the annual limit being a measly 1mSv. For comparison, an abdominal CT scan ranges from approximately 7 to 10mSv, and an x-ray scan on the chest region is only about .02mSv. The equipment of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was badly damaged, which resulted in the meltdown of three of the six reactors. The emissions released from the Fukushima Daiichi accident were severe enough to be ranked as Level 7, which requires a major release of radioactive material with widespread health and environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures.

11

The IAEA must work within the fullest extent of its powers, as well as the incorporations of local, regional and non-governmental support to ensure future nuclear accidents do not occur, while also combating the immediate and long-term effects. To achieve this, we must closely examine the two greatest nuclear disasters in human history: Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi. 1) Chernobyl The World Nuclear Association described the cause of the Chernobyl accident best by stating that Chernobyl was the product of a lack of safety culture. The design of the reactor, incompetent operators and ignorance of proper safety procedures created the greatest nuclear accident in history. On April 25th, 1986, engineers at the Chernobyl number four reactors started an experiment to determine whether or not the cooling pump system for the core reactor could still function in the event of a power outage. Normally, this was a routine maintenance procedure. In contrast, this test lowered the control rods too rapidly, which resulted in a rapid drop in output. The engineers attempted to counteract this decline in output by removing raising the control rods. This counterbalance proved disastrous, because the engineers removed too many too quickly. The minimal requirement for control rods in the reactor core is thirty only six control rods remained. Explosions began to occur from the overheating of the reactor core. Due to the lack of building regulations that require a reinforced concrete shell, nuclear material was allowed to escape from the facility into the atmosphere. The Soviet Union (USSR) response to Chernobyl can best be described as enclosed. Initial communication with residents surrounding Chernobyl was minimal. The USSR did not issue reports until three days after the accident, or provide adequate emergency information such as Should I leave my home? For the following four years, without the approval of Soviet officials, the UN provided emergency relief. The UN provided the lack of information that the USSR ignored by assessing the nuclear safety of the region and diagnosing medical conditions. The UN also provided education to the population surrounding Chernobyl on how to protect themselves from radionuclides in the food and water. Humanitarian efforts would be greatly advanced in the 1990s. Prior to 1990, the Soviet government primarily handled the Chernobyl accident. The Soviets dealt with emergency relief at the national level while denouncing
12

international support. However, in 1990, the General Assembly, with the authorization of the Soviet Union, passed Resolution 45/190. Resolution 45/190 calls for international cooperation to address and mitigate the consequences at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Financial contributes began to increase under the monitoring of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as well as the creation 230 different research and assistance projects in the fields of health and nuclear security. International efforts continue to improve the humanitarian and security issues of Chernobyl. The UN shifted its focus on emergency relief to long-term development in 2002. Developmental organizations, such as the UNDP, UNEP, WHO, and the World Bank play an active role in the Ukraine. These organizations follow the guidelines made by the UN Chernobyl Forum, a platform established in 2003 by the IAEA that collaborates with other UN bodies and European governments to improve the socio-economic conditions of the areas affected by the Chernobyl accident. While the UN Chernobyl Forum was established by the IAEA, it must be made explicitly clear that developmental and economic assistance are not done through the IAEA. The IAEA merely advises on the nuclear security portion of contemporary Chernobyl, not the economic sector. 2) Fukushima Daiichi: What the focus of this committee should be on March 11, 2011: a magnitude 9.0 earthquake hit the east coast of Honshu, Japan. As a result of the earthquake, north-east Japan was hit by a tsunami. The tsunami flooded the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, resulting in the destruction of the electrical grid and the cooling system for the facility. With no means of temperature control, the reactors began to overheat. Reactors 1, 2 and 3 of the facility would experience a full meltdown while a fire broke out in reactor 4. The next two weeks would be spent reducing the damage of those reactors and ensuring that reactors 5 and 6 do not reach meltdown. During this time, concern is raised over hazardous levels of radioactive iodine in agriculture, milk and water. In April, the Fukushima Daiichi accident was raised from a level 5 nuclear accident to a level 7 due to the quantity of nuclear radiation released. Efforts to cool reactors 1, 2 and 3 are being continued at this current time, as well as the reduction of nuclear radiation. The levels of nuclear radiation have been reduced to such an extent that workers will not have their health immediately affected. Meanwhile, the IAEA has continued to have an active role in responding to this disaster. The IAEA has played a major role in communicating information to the
13

general public and providing nuclear expertise to Japan. The IAEA actively chronicles the developments of the nuclear facility and its radiological consequences. Additionally, the IAEA operates as an advising committee for the Fukushima Daiichi accident, rather than being on the ground with humanitarian aid. The Japanese government is handling the bulk work of humanitarian aid and nuclear security, but the UN still has a major role in handling this accident. For one, the IAEA published a report that criticized the Japanese for underestimating the impact of the tsunami, but more importantly praised the Japanese government for its exemplary response. Thus, nations must apply the wisdom of the IAEA by better preparing for natural disasters, but implement a model for response that can be based upon IAEA standards and real world examples. On the other hand, nations must determine the errors of the Soviets response to Chernobyl. Only then can nations be prepared for a nuclear disaster and its impending environmental effects.

Environmental Aftermath According to the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), there are two different types of effects of nuclear exposure: deterministic effects and stochastic effects. Deterministic effects refer to an effect that is certain to occur under given conditions. For example, if a person was exposed to a large enough dose of nuclear radiation and is currently suffering from Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS), then it can be concluded radiation exposure was the source of the illness. On the other hand, stochastic effects may or may not occur due to nuclear exposure. If a population consumes water that has had low levels of radioactive waste and suffers from varying levels of cancer within the following decade, it can be difficult to isolate the direct cause of the cancer. While deterministic effects tend to be more concrete and isolated, stochastic effects result in a wide arrange of statistics. The death tolls for Chernobyl dramatically alter depending on the source of the study, as noted by the findings of the World Nuclear Association (WNA), UNSCEAR, WHO and Greenpeace. The WNA concludes that only 28 people died as a direct result of nuclear exposure following the Chernobyl accident and UNSCEAR claims that "there is no evidence of a major public health impact attributable to radiation exposure 20 years after the
14

accident". However, a report from WHO states that a total of up to 4000 people could eventually die of radiation exposure from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Meanwhile, Greenpeace totals the deaths resulting from Chernobyl to an estimated 200,000 people. It becomes clear that the far-reaching effects of the Chernobyl accident will never be concise, but it must be noted that this is a common issue with nuclear disasters. The risk of nuclear exposure is not restrained to the immediate area surrounding a disaster. Consumption of agriculture, seafood and water can also threaten the health of entire populations. The Japanese government is currently concerned over the amount of radioactive exposure to rice, as half of the production of Japans rice is within the emission range of the Fukushima Daiichi reactor. However, it must be noted that while the emissions from nuclear accidents can affect several continents, the actual environmental affects are weaker the further they are from the source. The radiation from Chernobyl traveled from its origins in the Ukraine to Russia, Scandinavia, and Western Europe. On the other hand, there were zero cases of fatal ARS in these regions that was a direct result of the accident. Radiation levels have also throughout the world have also increased in 2011 following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, but once again the international threat is minimal. Possible solutions In order to keep the situation in control, we could have substances brought down upon the reactors to try to keep them cool in order to reduce the heat created by the radioactivity. In the case of a leak, citizens located within a close proximity could be given suits to protect them from the radioactivity, or further evacuated from the site altogether. Non-governmental organizations could also take a part in aiding the citizens of Japan near the power plant in order to further enhance their safety, possibly by providing funding for campaigns. In a worse-case scenario, the power plant reactors could be buried in order to completely annihilate the chances of further problems occurring with time. Member states must apply their knowledge of both the Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi incident in order to have an understanding of the prevention, response and long-term consequences of nuclear disasters. However, states must recognize the limitations of this individual committee.

15

The purpose of the IAEA is to act as a center for international cooperation discussion, establish standards and provide expertise, but in order to properly address nuclear disasters, nations themselves must set the proper measures. This means that nations must come together to discuss the proper means of enhancing domestic and international nuclear safety, while incorporating various NGOs and UN committees to address this topic. As noted by the crises in Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi, IAEA alone cannot prevent and solve a nuclear crisis. The IAEA has its limitations, but member states must do everything within the IAEAs power while incorporating the assistance of other international organizations to come to a resolution on this topic. Expected Bloc Positions Western Bloc: With the Western in a more stable state than its Japanese counterpart, agency experts in the boiling water reactors field are now in Japan to review the problems of the reactors to come up with a solution. Asian Bloc: As of March 11, 2011, Japan has been working to solve the crisis despite the menacing situations created by the earthquake and the tsunami. Latin Bloc: With the occurrence of the nuclear crisis in Japan, the Latin Bloc is reconsidering on whether or not to use nuclear power in their own countries due to the extreme circumstances that can be caused if a power plant were to go wrong. Middle Eastern Bloc: The Middle East has raised their prices for oil and energy due to the fact that countries are now relying more on the Middle East because Japan, one of the worlds global energy producers, is currently unable to produce much energy due to the nuclear crisis. African Bloc: The nuclear crisis in Japan is currently making Africa reconsider their nuclear energy policy due to the increased concerns about the dangers nuclear meltdown can create. Questions the delegates should answer: 1. What contributions has your country made to nuclear disaster relief? 2. What are your countries protocols for nuclear accident prevention and response?

16

3. How can your countries regulatory procedures for nuclear and emergency disasters be applied to an international level? 4. How can the IAEA improve upon their current frameworks in addressing this topic? 5. If the situation were to get too quickly out of hand, what can be done in a quick and timely manner in order to solve the problem without allowing the disaster to cause even more problems? 6. What are some possible NGOs that could give aid to Japan and the security behind the crisis? 7. How was Chernobyl solved and what lead up to that solution? 8. If your country has nuclear power plants, what are the security measures taken in your countrys power plants in order to secure it from disasters like the one in Japan? 9. How can the UN itself further secure the safety of the citizens of Japan? 10. If a policy change for nuclear energy in Japan was needed, how could it be changed, and how would it affect Japan with their position in the global energy industry? Links for further research 1. http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=43042

2. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/05/20/un-to-study-implications-of-japansnuclear-crisis/ 3. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37834&Cr=japan&Cr1

4. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-03-16/un-calls-emergencymeeting-as-japan-nuclear-crisis-deepens.html 5. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1367684/Japan-earthquaketsunami-Fukushima-nulear-plant-radiation-leak-kill-people.html
17

6. 7. 8.

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2011/amsp2011n009.html http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14913471,00.html http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidZAWYA20110317125459?pass=1

9. http://jbaynews.com/2011/03/15/nuclear-crisis-in-japan-has-affect-onsouth-africa/ 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. http://www.iaea.org/About/japan-infosheet.html http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html http://www.un.org/ha/chernobyl/history.html http://chernobyl.undp.org/english/ http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/fukushimareport01.html http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC55/Documents/gc55-14.pdf http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/index.html

18