MODERATED CAUCUS TOPICS

1) Loopholes and Failures of NPT

2) Problems in ratification of CTBT with special emphasis on Iran
3) Discussing the Definition of Fissile Materials with emphasis on NPT and FMCT
4) Ratification and successful implementation of Hague code of conduct.
5) Powers and Reach of IAEA Safeguards
6) Export Control Mechanisms.
7) Granting of NSG Licenses
8) Nuclear weapons development capabilities of Middle eastern nations
9) Discussing the role of Fissile Materials in creation of MENWFZ
10) Geographical definition of Middle East
11) Failure of the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
12) Failure in Implementation of NPT Review of 1995, 2010, 2015
13) Exploitation of MTCR by Middle Eastern Countries with special emphasis on Iran
14) Roadblock towards mutual deterrence in lieu to nuclear states with emphasis on
Pakistan
15) States which possess Undeclared Nuclear Fissile Material and Highly Enriched
Uranium in violation of NPT with emphasis on Iran
16) No first use policy of nuclear states and their consequences with emphasis on India
17) Farce of Nuclear Import for Peaceful Usage with special emphasis on China and Iran
18) Dictation of conditions by Arab States over setting up of MENWFZ with emphasis on
Saudi
19) Solutions to setting up MENWFZ

SPEECHES:-

The treaty was not designed to address non-state actors. Consequently, it fails to address threats from
terrorist organizations and nuclear black markets. This would suggest that there are issues and
violations with Articles I, II and VI of the NPT. There is a lack of provision since non-signatory states are
not required to comply with the treaty, therefore the movement or theft of nuclear weapons could be
achieved through any of the nine NWS.

One also cannot ignore the record of cheating on the part of some NPT members. While most
countries did not use their treaty membership as a vehicle for support of a covert weapons
program (see above), it is apparent that Iraq and the DPRK did. Moreover, it is clear that Iran
engaged in a broad program of concealment in violation of its safeguards obligations and that
Libya also acted in direct contravention to its safeguards commitments.

Still, the issue of cheating is not uncomplicated. As the Iraqi Survey Group reported, it was
fear of NPT and Security Council non-proliferation inspections that led the Hussein
government to abandon its nuclear program in the early 1990s.

A final complaint about the NPT and an alleged reason for its failure relates to the treaty’s
provisions—both what they include and what they do not include. There is, for example, no
enforcement provision. Article X permits withdrawal. The treaty, by custom, also permits
states to acquire enrichment and reprocessing technologies that could enable a short sprint to
the bomb.
By far the most serious concern about the NPT relates to the concept of peaceful uses and the
ability of states to acquire fuel cycle technologies and achieve a virtual nuclear weapons
capability. Many, including the Director General of the IAEA and the President of the United
States, have called for changes in fuel cycle policy. In recent developments, the IAEA reported that
Iran has assembled and delivered a nuclear reactor close to the western city of Arak. Iran claims that the
reactor is a peaceful nuclear operation, but the IAEA fears that the spent fuel from the reactor can be
reprocessed to provide enough plutonium to build a weapon.

The spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies is, in fact, a major threat to non-
proliferation and to the regime. The treaty had a similar problem with respect to Article V
and peaceful nuclear explosives (PNE’s). Though the treaty guaranteed a nation the right to
PNE’s, states parties arrived at an unwritten political consensus that this right would not be
exercised.

IAEA

Finally, even robust enforcement provisions would not enable the IAEA to act against states
outside the treaty, e.g., the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs. The UN and individual
states will continue to have to play an active role in enforcement even if the NPT had an
enforcement provision. Indeed, as all students of international organizations recognize, the
whole notion of IAEA enforcing rules independently of its member states is naï ve. The
agency is only as strong as the political will of its members, and it is those members who
already possess the responsibility for enforcement.

It was IAEA inspectors who, in the course of carrying out their safeguards responsibilities,
discovered the discrepancies in the North Korean declarations. (Indeed, North Korea has
announced that it is willing to renounce its nuclear arsenal and wants to rejoin the NPT and
submit to IAEA inspection.)

GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION OF ME

The political challenges to establishing a Middle East

NWFZ become apparent when considering a seemingly
simple and technical question: which countries should
be included in the zone?
One approach is to follow the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) definition of the Middle East
region, which comprises the 21 state-members of the
Arab League plus Iran and Israel.2 This is also the
definition used in the Draft Final Document of the 2015
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
Conference3. It differs, however, from more commonly
understood definitions of the Middle East that include
the following sixteen states: Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen.

In any case, a NWFZ in the Middle East should

obviously include Turkey, all the more so because of
Turkey's commitment to the idea of such a zone.
According to Carnegie Europe’s Sinan Ülgen, “In recent
years, Ankara has been advocating the implementation
of a regional nuclear weapons–free zone, which officials
see as part of an overall strategy to decrease tensions in
the region.”4 Meanwhile, given Turkey’s harboring of
Saudi military aircraft at its Incirlik Air Base, as well as
its involvement in Syria and elsewhere, it seems
hypocritical for the United Nations to pretend that
Turkey is not part of the Middle East when it comes to
promoting a WMDFZ in that region.
DEFENDING MYSELF
However, including Turkey in a NWFZ in the Middle
East would require the withdrawal of NATO’s tactical
nuclear weapons from Turkish territory. Under what
conditions could one envisage such a withdrawal? Ülgen
argues that it could take place only if “NATO was
operating in consensus,” meaning if Belgium, Germany,
Italy, and the Netherlands, which are also non-nuclear-
weapon states that host U.S. tactical nuclear weapons,
did the same.5That said, Ülgen also indicates that Turkey
“quietly supports maintaining the weapons on its
territory and expects other NATO countries to continue
their tactical nuclear weapon stewardship as part of the
Alliance’s burden-sharing principle.”6 Meanwhile, NATO
members have discussed the possibility of removing
nuclear weapons from Europe, but no consensus exists
for unilateral withdrawal and any reciprocal agreement
with Russia remains unlikely in the near future.

NPT REVIEW OF 2015

It became official with the closing meeting of the month-long
Ninth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT): the parties could not reach consensus agreement on a
substantive final declaration.

By all accounts, the failure of the 2015 conference to produce a

consensus outcome document with any substance can be
attributed to the discussions around the establishment of a WMD-
free zone in the Middle East, an issue linked to a resolution
adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

The controversy over the Middle East all but effectively marks the
end of the renewed effort undertaken at the previous Review
Conference to implement the 1995 resolution. The 2010 final
document had prescribed the convening of a conference on the
zone before the end of 2012 – which never happened

Still, the 2015 Review Conference feels like an opportunity

squandered. The discord that surrounds nuclear disarmament
will not dissipate, as evidenced by the 107 countries now signed
onto an Austrian-led Humanitarian Pledge pushing for “effective
measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination
of nuclear weapons.” Moreover, the continued fragmentation of
the NPT membership has negative implications for its other goals:
the further entry into force of comprehensive safeguard
agreements and additional protocols, ratification of the
amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials, and negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treaty. The NPT remains the cornerstoe of the non-proliferation
regime. But because of that, its failed Review Conference too will
have reverberations across the nuclear landscape.
NPT member states must continue the dialogue on the most pressing issues. The
2020 NPT Review Conference will coincide with the 50th anniversary of the treaty.
An often overlooked fact is that had the treaty simply been extended for 25 years
back in 1995, there would have to be another extension conference five years from
now with an unclear outcome.

2010 REVIEW

Failure to discuss FMCT even though it is advocated in 2010

Efforts to curb the spread of nuclear material and technology began only a short time
after the world was introduced to the destructive potential of atomic weaponry. In
1946 the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, authored in part by Manhattan Project physicist
J. Robert Oppenheimer, advocated for an Atomic Development Agency to regulate
fissile material and ensure that state rivalries over the technology did not occur.

There are two primary issues that divide the different drafts for an FM(C)T:
verification and pre-existing stocks. With regard to the issue of pre-existing stocks,
under the 2009 International Panel on Fissile Materials' (IPFM) draft treaty, States
Parties would be required to declare to the IAEA all fissile materials in its civilian
sector, excess for all military purposes, and for use in military reactors. Under Article
I, State Parties would agree not to produce, acquire or encourage the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Each State
Party would also agree to disable, decommission and, when feasible, dismantle its
fissile material production facilities. Article I also calls on States to declare and
submit to IAEA monitoring fissile materials in excess of their military requirements
and future excess materials resulting from future nuclear disarmament measures.
Article V of the draft treaty would establish an FM(C)T Organization to implement the
treaty objectives, ensure implementation with the IAEA, and provide a forum for the
State Parties.

In order for negotiations to begin on an FMCT, Pakistan will have to remove its
opposition vote, and a consensus to move forward with negotiations must be
reached. Pakistan has been primarily concerned that an FMCT would lock them into
a disadvantageous position relative to India’s superior nuclear stockpile.
Consequently, Islamabad would like an FMCT to include current fissile material
stockpiles, instead of just capping future production, a position shared by several
other countries.

Another contentious element is the scope of any potential fissile materials treaty.
Although most experts agree that an FMCT would most certainly ban the production of
plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, it is not likely that the treaty would include other
elements such as tritium, for example, which is used to amplify the explosive power of
nuclear weapons. Given that tritium has a radioactive half-life of 12 years, the inclusion
of it in an FMCT would, over time, limit the destructive power of nuclear weapons that
contain this element because states would be unable to replace the decaying tritium in
existing weapons. Other materials, such as depleted uranium, neptunium, natural
uranium, plutonium 240 and 242, americium, curium and californium, though not fissile,
are also used in nuclear weapons programs.
The resulting report, CD/1229, came to be known as the “Shannon Mandate” and
proposed that an ad hoc committee be convened to pursue negotiations and settle
several of the outstanding issues

How fissile material is defined is important as it has direct implications on the scope of
the treaty. But it is not only fissile material that has to be defined - production, civilian
use, and military use also need clarification.
As P5 states like Russia and the USA have opposing definitions