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NASA/TM-1998-206557

The X-33 Extended Flight Test Range

Dale A. Mackall
Dryden Flight Research Center
Edwards, California

Robert Sakahara
Air Force Flight Test Center
Edwards, California

Steven E. Kremer
Goddard Space Flight Center
Wallops Island, Virginia

October 1998
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NASA/TM-1998-206557

The X-33 Extended Flight Test Range

Dale A. Mackall
Dryden Flight Research Center
Edwards, California

Robert Sakahara
Air Force Flight Test Center
Edwards, California

Steven E. Kremer
Goddard Space Flight Center
Wallops Island, Virginia

National Aeronautics and


Space Administration

Dryden Flight Research Center


Edwards, California 93523-0273

October 1998
NOTICE
Use of trade names or names of manufacturers in this document does not constitute an official endorsement
of such products or manufacturers, either expressed or implied, by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.

Available from the following:

NASA Center for AeroSpace Information (CASI) National Technical Information Service (NTIS)
7121 Standard Drive 5285 Port Royal Road
Hanover, MD 21076-1320 Springfield, VA 22161-2171
(301) 621-0390 (703) 487-4650
THE X-33 EXTENDED FLIGHT TEST RANGE

Dale A. Mackall
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Dryden Flight Research Center
Edwards, California

Robert Sakahara
Air Force Flight Test Center
Edwards Air Force Base,
Edwards, California

Steven E. Kremer
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Goddard Space Flight Center
Wallops Flight Facility
Wallops Island, Virginia

ABSTRACT

Development of an extended test range, with range instrumentation providing continuous vehicle
communications, is required to flight-test the X-33, a scaled version of a reusable launch vehicle. The
extended test range provides vehicle communications coverage from California to landing at Montana or
Utah. This paper provides an overview of the approaches used to meet X-33 program requirements,
including using multiple ground stations, and methods to reduce problems caused by reentry plasma radio
frequency blackout. The advances used to develop the extended test range show other hypersonic and
access-to-space programs can benefit from the development of the extended test range.

KEY WORDS

X-33, Reusable Launch Vehicle, Extended test range, Radio frequency communications, Reentry plasma
blackout.
NOMENCLATURE

AFB Air Force Base


AFFTC Air Force Flight Test Center
CFD computational fluid dynamics
DET2 Detachment 2, deployables of the Space and Missiles Systems Center
DGSA Dynamic Ground Station Analysis
DoD Department of Defense
ExTRA Extended Test Range Alliance
FTS flight termination system
GPS/INS global positioning system/inertial navigation system
MOF Mobile Operations Facility
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
RIR Range Instrumentation Radar
TTR Tonopah Test Range
UHF ultrahigh frequency
U. S. United States
UTTR Utah Test and Training Range
WFF Wallops Flight Facility

INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 1996, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) signed a cooperative
agreement, number NCC8-115, with Lockheed Martin Skunk Works (Palmdale, California) to develop
and flight-test the autonomous X-33 vehicle, a scaled version of the next-generation single-stage-to-orbit
reusable launch vehicle. This cooperative agreement approach gives Lockheed Martin primary responsi-
bility for the X-33 program. When additional government help was required, Lockheed Martin
“subcontracted” to NASA centers and the United States (U. S.) Department of Defense (DoD) for
specific work. Through this mechanism, NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (Edwards, California)
became responsible for the extended test range.

This paper describes the management approach to accomplishing the X-33 objectives, mainly the
formation of the Extended Test Range Alliance (ExTRA), a unique team of government and industry
personnel and range assets established to resolve design issues and accomplish the X-33 extended test
range and support other programs as required. Extended test range requirements, derived from range
safety and the X-33 program, are also detailed.

The range safety requirements were the most challenging to define and meet. The X-33 vehicle is an
autonomous vehicle that launches like a rocket, reenters the atmosphere, and lands horizontally like an

2
aircraft. Historically, rockets have been launched over the oceans to allow failed rockets to be destroyed
using explosive devices. The X-33 vehicle will fly over scarcely populated areas and use remote lakebeds
for emergency landings.

Numerous range requirements come from the X-33 program for interface definitions with the vehicle
communication subsystems and the need for multiple ground stations to provide continuous coverage of
the flight. Another area that can affect communications coverage, the reentry plasma shield that causes a
“blackout” of radio frequency signals such as range safety commands, will also be discussed. A coopera-
tive team of experts from across the country has analyzed and modeled the blackout problem.

ESTABLISHING THE EXTENDED TEST RANGE ALLIANCE

The X-33 vehicle behaves like a vertical launch vehicle for the first few minutes of flight, then becomes a
reentry vehicle, and finally lands like an aircraft. Developing a team with expertise in all three areas was
essential. Soon after the X-33 cooperative agreement was signed, NASA Dryden began gathering the
expertise to accomplish the extended test range effort, including using other agencies and contractors. A
recent agreement to share capabilities between the U. S. Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) at
Edwards Air Force Base (AFB) (California) and NASA Dryden led to the use of AFFTC range engineers.
The AFFTC engineers have considerable expertise in telemetry systems, range safety systems, and data
communications. With this agreement, the ExTRA first began.

Unfortunately, the ExTRA still lacked launch vehicle and reentry expertise. To cover the launch vehicle
arena, the team identified and assigned a chief engineer from the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
(Greenbelt, Maryland) Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) (Wallops Island, Virginia). The WFF is experi-
enced in launch support of suborbital sounding rockets and orbital launch vehicles, and NASA Goddard
is providing support of reentry analysis and data communication network services. The ExTRA team
(fig. 1) was now ready to build the X-33 extended flight test range in order to perform the range tracking
and command and telemetry data acquisition for the X-33 program.

Lead organization

Lockheed Martin X-33


Flight Assurance and
X-33 System Integration

Lead range NASA


organization and Dryden Flight Air Force Extended range
flight research Research Center Flight Test Center experience
experience

Reentry plasma NASA NASA Orbital and


analysis and ground Goddard Space Wallops suborbit launch
communication Flight Center Flight Facility experience
networks
980231

Figure 1. The extended test range alliance for the X-33 program.

3
X-33 EXTENDED TEST RANGE REQUIREMENTS

The X-33 range requirements originate from numerous program documents and government organiza-
tions, such as the Range Commanders Council. Figure 2 shows the flow of program requirements that
determined the range requirements. These documents cover topics such as range safety, ground support
system automation and information, vehicle-to-ground radio frequency interfaces, vehicle flight test
plans, operational television plans, operational intercom plans, meteorological plans, site operations
plans, flight assurance plans, “launch commit” criteria, flight rules, and more (refs. 1–3).

Range safety Flight assurance


(AFFTC/NASA) (Lockheed Martin)

Vehicle and ground Range Range Commanders


system specifications requirements Council standards

980232

Figure 2. Requirements flow down.

The X-33 vehicle presents unique tracking requirements because of the need to continuously track the
vehicle from California to Montana through the atmospheric reentry flight profile (fig. 3). The vehicle
will reach a maximum altitude of 300,000 ft and fly at speeds approaching Mach 15. In order to provide
the ground tracking coverage, the range team identified sites at the AFFTC, the U. S. Army Dugway
Proving Grounds at the U. S. Air Force Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR) (Utah), Mountain Home
AFB (Idaho), and Malmstrom AFB (Montana). As is evident by the number of sites, a diverse range net-
work is being implemented to successfully meet the program requirements.

The primary high-level requirement that the range is to meet comes from Lockheed Martin proprietary
documents: “The X-33 operations and support shall provide the capability to uplink commands and
receive downlink telemetry data during vehicle test and flight operations.”* To ensure the requirement is
met, the range is implementing a system that will provide complete command uplink and telemetry cov-
erage from launch through wheel stop for all test and flight operations. Range systems will be placed at
strategic locations throughout the flightpath of the vehicle to allow overlapping coverage with a maxi-
mum range of 235 nmi for each site. The range system will include a communications link from the range
operations center (detailed by Karla Shy and Cynthia Norman in the report “The X-33 Range Operations
Control Center”) at NASA Dryden to all launch, overflight, and landing sites for uplink commands and
downlink telemetry data.

Several high-level requirements originate from the AFFTC Range Safety Requirements Document,
(ref. 1):

…all reasonable precautions shall be taken to minimize these risks with respect to life,
health, and property.
*Lockheed Martin Skunk Works, “X-33 Systems Requirements Document,” 604D007 (Revision), Sept. 1996.

4
All range critical systems shall be designed to ensure that no single point of failure,
including software, will deny the capability to monitor and terminate, or result in the
inadvertent termination, of the X-33 vehicle.

The overall tracking systems shall be robust, highly fault tolerant, allow for catastrophic
failure in a single system without loss of tracking data, and provide for graceful degrada-
tion of the system under multiple component failures.

Malmstrom AFB
coverage

Mountain Home AFB


coverage

NASA Dryden/
Edwards AFB
coverage

Michael Army Air Field


coverage: initial landings
and overflight

980233

Figure 3. Range coverage circles.

The extended range has arranged for the use of numerous mobile and fixed systems from other ranges
throughout the country. Table 1 shows the systems to be used in flights to the Dugway Proving Grounds.
Systems, antenna type, and antenna diameter that will provide coverage at the launch site and during
downrange flight and landing are given. Table 2 shows the same information for flights to Malmstrom
AFB and describes overflight sites. These systems have proven reliability, and the flight termination
systems (FTSes)are fully redundant. The range systems chosen are currently used to support NASA,
DoD, and commercial suborbital and orbital programs.

5
Table 1. Ground systems and sites for Dugway Proving Grounds flights.

System Coverage
Edwards AFB UTTR
Transponder test set (LSC) WFF system (L)
Radar
NASA Dryden RIR no. 1; 16 ft (FC)
AFFTC 8 ft (LSC) NASA Dryden 30 ft (L)
Telemetry
NASA Dryden triplex; 23 ft (FC) MOF no. 1; 6 ft (L)
Omni antenna (LSC) NASA Dryden 30 ft (L)
Uplink
NASA Dryden triplex; 23 ft (FC) MOF no. 1; 6 ft (L)
FTS NASA Dryden directional antenna; 15 ft (FC) WFF FTS no. 1 (L)

Key: FC Flight coverage


L Landing
LSC Launch site coverage

Table 2. Ground systems and sites for Malmstrom AFB flights.

System Coverage
Mountain
Edwards AFB UTTR Home AFB Malmstrom AFB
Transponder test set (LSC) UTTR TPQ-39 (O) TTR mobile WFF system (L)
(O)
Radar
NASA Dryden RIR
no. 1; 16 ft (FC)
AFFTC 8 ft (LSC) NASA Dryden DET2; 23 ft WFF 18 ft (L)
Telemetry 30 ft (O) (O)
NASA Dryden triplex; MOF no. 1; 6 ft (L)
23 ft (FC)
Omni antenna (LSC) NASA Dryden DET2; 23 ft WFF 10 ft (L)
Uplink 30 ft (O) (O)
NASA Dryden triplex; MOF no. 1; 6 ft (L)
23 ft (FC)
FTS NASA Dryden directional UTTR system (O) WFF FTS WFF FTS no. 1 (L)
antenna; 15 ft (FC) no. 2 (O)
Key: FC Flight coverage
L Landing
LSC Launch site coverage
O Overflight

6
The range has implemented a fully independent communications path for the two sources of tracking data
used by the range safety officer. The two sources are the global positioning system/inertial navigation
system (GPS/INS) data and radar tracking data. A range safety officer will be at each tracking site to pro-
vide local assessment of vehicle safety in the event of a range-wide communications failure. The range
systems will also be positioned to allow for spatial diversity to facilitate an additional means of redun-
dancy throughout the range. Completely redundant systems will be used at launch and landing sites to
meet the single-system catastrophic failure requirement. The sites will also include redundant power
sources that allow for instantaneous switchover and graceful degradation, as required.

Continuous Coverage and Public Safety


An experimental flight test vehicle flying over populated land areas is an important range safety concern.
Maximizing the flight vehicle tracking coverage is an important aspect of minimizing flight safety risks.
Public safety is the top priority for the X-33 program, and the range systems are designed with this task in
mind. Steps taken to minimize the risk to public safety include redundant ground hardware subsystems
within each tracking and command system, completely redundant tracking and command antennas at the
launch and landing tracking sites, and geographically located tracking sites that allow for ideal overlap of
coverage with other sites (fig. 3).

Independent Data Communication Paths


In addition to having overlapping coverage and redundant tracking systems, the range data communica-
tions network was designed to allow for independent paths of critical vehicle position data. These critical
vehicle position data are being generated by two sources: the ground radar systems tracking the X-33
vehicle; and the GPS/INS data that are embedded in the telemetry downlink. These two sources of vehi-
cle position data are independently routed to the range safety officers throughout the range. The report
“Extended Range Communications Support for the X-33” by Brian Eslinger and Reynaldo Garza
describes the redundant data communications network in detail.

Approach and Results of the Reentry Plasma Blackout Analysis


Because of a lack of new reentry vehicle designs, little work had been performed on evaluating reentry
plasma blackout of radio frequencies since the early days of the Space Shuttle program. Fortunately,
NASA Goddard and the NASA Langley Research Center (Hampton, Virginia) had personnel able to per-
form such analysis. Because communications with the X-33 vehicle for monitoring and control are essen-
tial to the success of the flight test program, understanding the level of attenuation and the associated
time period for loss of signal is critical.

The approach to the plasma analysis was to first look at Space Shuttle flight data and use the data as a
truth model against the analysis techniques. Figure 4 shows an overview of the approach used. First, old
Shuttle computational fluid dynamics (CFD) data were recovered, and the resultant CFD data were used
in the NASA Goddard and NASA Langley attenuation calculations. The results of the models were then
compared to the small amount of Space Shuttle flight data available from the tracking ground stations.
Initial NASA Goddard analysis resulted in lower attenuation levels than flight and was adjusted to match.
The NASA Langley analysis techniques generally resulted in larger attenuation levels than flight. These
data established a “bracket of results” defining best- and worst-case conditions for the attenuation levels.

7
The results of the two different analysis methods were most evident in the L-band case. The NASA
Langley results indicated a maximum attenuation of 114 dB; NASA Goddard results indicated a value of
10 dB. Range safety requires that worst-case results be used when making program decisions.

Vehicle shape,
flight conditions, Shuttle comparison
Shuttle CFD Shuttle attenuation
atmosphere, etc. to flight data

Vehicle shape,
flight conditions, X-33 dynamic ground
X-33 CFD X-33 attenuation
atmosphere, etc. station analysis

Blackout times
980234

Figure 4. Approach to X-33 plasma analysis.

Both analysis methods provide an attenuation level perpendicular to the vehicle antenna. Because the
communication signal vector is usually at an acute angle and continuously changing, a model that
includes angular dependencies is required. Using ray tracing methods through the plasma field, NASA
Goddard developed an algorithm to calculate attenuation as a function of altitude and communication
vector angles. Figure 5 shows a command signal penetrating the dense plasma at the vehicle nose, having
a high attenuation level, and a signal penetrating through a thinner plasma region at the rear of the vehi-
cle. The NASA Goddard and NASA Langley normal attenuation values were adjusted using the function
for the communication vector angles.

Launch site
communication
vector

Shock wave

Downrange
site communication
vector

980235

Figure 5. Communication vectors and plasma.

Both plasma models were integrated into an existing Dynamic Ground Station Analysis (DGSA)
program developed at NASA Goddard. The program previously included all attenuation factors affecting
vehicle communication, except plasma. Some of the factors included were frequency, polarization, path
loss (distance), transmitter and receiver characteristics, and physical location of the ground stations. The
DGSA program uses vehicle trajectory and attitude data, and provides signal attenuation for all frequen-
cies and from all ground stations. The blackout time period was then calculated for each signal path.

8
Figure 6 shows the blackout time period for the NASA Goddard and NASA Langley attenuation values.
The range safety signal in the ultrahigh frequency (UHF) frequency band is completely lost for 74 sec in
both cases. The command uplink signal in the L-band range is completely attenuated for 30 sec, but only
when using the NASA Langley attenuation model. A program decision was made to use the L-band com-
munication to provide flight termination capability, thereby shortening the command blackout time from
the UHF FTS (see the discussion below). The telemetry S-band signal is completely attenuated at all
ground stations for 6 sec when using the NASA Langley values.

UHF FTS blackout L-band command


– Best case: 74 sec – Best case: no blackout Malmstrom AFB
– Worst case: 74 sec – Worst case: plasma coverage
– Blackout: 30 sec

Mountain Home AFB


coverage

NASA Dryden/
Edwards AFB
coverage

Michael Army Air


Field coverage

980236

Figure 6. Blackout time periods.

Independent L-Band Flight Termination Capability


As described earlier, when the X-33 vehicle reenters Earth atmosphere, the vehicle will encounter
extreme plasma heating conditions. During these periods of extreme heating, radio frequency attenuation
levels will increase dramatically. To minimize the time period of radio frequency blackout, high-gain

9
antennas are required. The current flight profiles define the maximum blackout period to be over the
Dugway Proving Grounds and the Mountain Home AFB tracking sites. Placing systems with higher gain
antennas at these locations will minimize the radio frequency blackout period. In addition, because of the
drastic blackout occurring at UHF frequencies for flight termination, the program proposed a design that
would allow the L-band command uplink path to the vehicle to be used as a range safety flight termina-
tion medium.

X-33 EXTENDED TEST RANGE ADVANCES

Historically, NASA Dryden and the DoD have used flight corridors from California to Utah for missile
testing, and in the 1960’s, the X-15 vehicle flew from Northern Utah to Edwards AFB. Yet, the X-33
program poses new challenges because of the vehicle and range safety requirements of an autonomous
vehicle. Continuous coverage of the vehicle from launch to landing requires the use of multiple range
sites. This concept is not new, but the manner of implementation will ensure that the data are reliably
transmitted and received by the customer.

The telemetry stream downlinked from the vehicle will be received by multiple telemetry antennas to
ensure the continuous coverage. These multiple streams will be processed by a programmable telemetry
processor to automatically select the best telemetry source. Darryl Burkes discusses the approach taken to
ensure that the correct stream is chosen in the report, “X-33 Telemetry Best Source Selection, Processing,
Display, and Simulation Model Comparison.”

Advances in analysis methods were required to determine placement of antenna systems in locations that
would ensure required coverage of the vehicle during flight. A software package from NASA Goddard,
the DGSA software, was improved using the comprehensive plasma model to provide information. Given
the vehicle trajectory and the location of antenna systems, link margins can be calculated to ensure cover-
age. Ashley Sharma discusses DGSA and the range simulation in the report, “X-33 Integrated Test
Facility, Extended Range Simulation.”

Another advance is the use of various NASA and DoD mobile and fixed range systems. Telemetry, radar,
uplink, flight termination, and differential GPSes from different organizations were evaluated to deter-
mine if the systems could meet X-33 requirements. In addition to meeting technical requirements, system
availability and cost were also factors used in selecting the systems. Because these systems have different
missions and use different data formats, their integration is challenging. The challenge was met by having
an integration period allowing identification of potential problems at Edwards AFB before deploying the
systems to remote sites.

CONCLUSION

The range requirements to safely perform flight test of the X-33 vehicle over the western United States
have been presented. The formation of a unique alliance of national experts to meet the challenges of the
X-33 range include United States Department of Defense and NASA personnel and assets. The technical
challenges of the X-33 range were accomplished using advanced communication and range system
designs, as well as complex plasma blackout analysis methods, previously undeveloped.

10
REFERENCES

1. Air Force Flight Test Center and NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, “X-33 Range Safety
Requirements Document,” Feb. 1998.

2. Range Commanders Council, Telemetry Group, “Telemetry Standards,” IRIG Standard 106-93,
Jan. 1993.

3. Range Commanders Council, Range Safety Group, “Flight Termination Systems Commonality
Standard,” Standard 319-92, Aug. 1992.

11
Form Approved
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188
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maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington,
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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
October 1998 Technical Memorandum
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS

The X-33 Extended Flight Test Range

6. AUTHOR(S)
WU 242-33-02-00-23-00-TA9

Dale A. Mackall, Robert Sakahara, and Steven E. Kremer

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION


REPORT NUMBER
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center
P.O. Box 273 H-2261
Edwards, California 93523-0273

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING


AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

National Aeronautics and Space Administration


Washington, DC 20546-0001 NASA/TM-1998-206557

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES


Presented at the 39th International Telemetry Conference, San Diego, California, October 26–29, 1998. Dale
Mackall, NASA Dryden, Edwards, California; Robert Sakahara, Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards,
California; Steven Kremer, NASA Goddard, Wallops Island, Virginia.
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

Unclassified—Unlimited
Subject Category 17

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

Development of an extended test range, with range instrumentation providing continuous vehicle
communications, is required to flight-test the X-33, a scaled version of a reusable launch vehicle. The extended
test range provides vehicle communications coverage from California to landing at Montana or Utah. This
paper provides an overview of the approaches used to meet X-33 program requirements, including using
multiple ground stations, and methods to reduce problems caused by reentry plasma radio frequency blackout.
The advances used to develop the extended test range show other hypersonic and access-to-space programs can
benefit from the development of the extended test range.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES

Extended test range, Radio frequency communications, Reentry plasma blackout, 17


Reusable Launch Vehicle, X-33 16. PRICE CODE
A03
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified Unlimited
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18
298-102

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