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Fire & Explosion Protection

Dust Explosion Prevention and Protection in the Food and Pharmaceutical Industries
Materials that are common to the Food and Pharmaceutical Industries such as starch represent an extreme hazard to personnel and plant in the event of a combustible dust explosion. In a fraction of a second, pressures that exceed the design pressure of process equipment and piping are achieved, reaching over 10 bar in the case of starch. These destructive forces are generated by rapid combustion which itself results in flame propagation leading to large scale secondary dust explosions. The emphasis must be on prevention of the primary dust explosion; this paper explores the explosion pentagon which relates the required factors of dust oxygen dispersion confinement ignition and how to manage them to achieve safe plant operation. Even with prevention strategies in place, many dusts are easily ignited by virtue of their low ignition energy or the nature of the. The Food and Pharmaceutical Industries employ many specialized processes that must be conducted indoors under controlled conditions. This paper discusses design decisions that can be taken early in a project to optimize combustible dust protection with the lowest budget covering common pieces of process equipment including storage bins, silos, dust collectors, ovens and dryers, and milling systems.
Authors:
G. Brazier, BS&B Safety Systems, USA 1/10

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Dust Explosion Prevention & Protection in the Food & Pharmaceutical Industries
Geof Brazier
Director of Development, BS&B Safety Systems, 7455 East 46 th Street, Tulsa, Oklahoma, USA E-Mail: gbrazier@bsbsystems.com

Abstract
Materials that are common to the Food and Pharmaceutical Industries such as starch represent an extreme hazard to personnel and plant in the event of a combustible dust explosion. In a fraction of a second, pressures that exceed the design pressure of process equipment and piping are achieved, reaching over 10 bar in the case of starch. These destructive forces are generated by rapid combustion which itself results in flame propagation leading to large scale secondary dust explosions. The emphasis must be on prevention of the primary dust explosion; this presentation explores the explosion pentagon which relates the required factors of dust oxygen dispersion confinement ignition and how to manage them to achieve safe plant operation.

Even with prevention strategies in place, many dusts are easily ignited by virtue of their low ignition energy or the nature of the process which may include heat or mechanical action such as milling. Large scale process equipment is often outdoor and therefore practical to protect by cost effective explosion venting. The Food and Pharmaceutical Industries however employ many specialized processes that must be conducted indoors under controlled conditions. This presentation discusses design decisions that can be taken early in a project to optimize combustible dust protection with the lowest budget covering common pieces of process equipment including storage bins, silos, dust collectors, ovens and dryers, and milling systems.

Both the Food and Pharmaceutical Industries demand a level of hygiene superior to that of standard industrial processes. Explosion prevention and protection measures take account of this in their design and installation.

1 INTRODUCTION When a combustible dust explosion occurs, there will be flame and there will be pressure! Both appear and disappear rapidly with the complete combustion event typically lasting a second or so so fast that personnel are unable to respond to protect themselves or take action that might protect the process equipment and the facility in which it may be located. The flame generated by a dust explosion presents a particular hazard to personnel caught in its path. Reaching over 1000 degrees Centigrade in a fraction of a second, survival is unlikely. The pressure wave arising from a confined dust explosion will reach destructive proportions in less than 1/10 th of a second; only equipment having a high design pressure will be saved. That design pressure typically must exceed 8 bar for common

agricultural, mineral, and chemical dusts. Each dust has a Pmax value that represents the peak pressure generated in a confined combustion event.

2. PREVENTION STRATEGIES The simple solution for process designers is to construct equipment and connecting ducting with a design pressure equal or higher than Pmax. Given that most processes in the Food and Pharmaceutical Industries operate at close to atmospheric pressure, this would impose an unacceptable cost burden. Equipment such as dust collectors, silos and bucket elevators typically have a design strength of far below 1 bar; resistance of between 0.2 and 0.5 bar is most common. How shall the combustible dust risk be managed given the inability of common process equipment to survive a dust explosion?

Fig. I Primary (Initial) and Secondary Combustible Dust Explosion Events The process designer must place emphasis on prevention of combustible dust events. This may not always be possible, and in these cases, protection strategies must be employed to manage the primary event and prevent it from escalating into a more destructive secondary event (Fig. I). A valuable starting point is the explosion pentagon (Fig. II) which connects together the 5 parameters required to support a combustible dust event.

Fig. II The Dust Explosion Pentagon

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When all of these five parameters are present, a combustible dust event is going to occur. Looking at each of the five components of the dust explosion pentagon, we can see that some preventive measures can be taken under normal process operating conditions 1. Fuel; The dust itself has a Minimum Explosible Concentration (MEC) different for each material but often in the range of 10 to 100 grams per cubic meter. Sometimes a process can be controlled to remain well below this limit which means there is insufficient fuel to support the rapid combustion of a dust explosion. Most importantly, dust build up must be controlled through aggressive housekeeping to prevent the build up of hazardous quantities (see Fig. III). Effective housekeeping is the best and lowest preventive strategy to protect the a factory outside the process equipment. Inside process equipment, especially dust collectors, bucket elevators, conveyors and silos, hazardous concentrations of combustible dust should be expected.

Fig. III Example of Insufficient Housekeeping; If you can leave footprints behind or write your name in the accumulated dust, there is too much! 2. Air; With most processes in the Food and Pharmaceutical Industries using air flow to convey material and for dust collection purposes, the availability of an oxidiser to support combustion is almost always present. In a confined space, or a process that does not circulate large quantities of air, the air itself can be displaced partly or completely by an inert atmosphere such as Nitrogen in order to prevent combustion. Storage equipment and small volume process equipment (characteristic of some pharmaceutical processes) lend themselves to displacement of air by an inert atmosphere. 3. Confinement; Equipment such as dust collectors, conveyors and silos as well as the ducting used to connect these items to each other provides a confined space in which the dust hazard is present. In the event of a dust explosion, the confinement of the equipment prevents the dissipation of rapidly generated thermal expansion to the open atmosphere, allowing high pressures to build up instantaneously. Even buildings and enclosed structures are at risk from the build up of combustible dust and are easily forgotten in a risk analysis survey. 4. Dispersion; When dusty fuel and air are mixed together in a confined space, this provides a condition for perfect

combustion as soon as an ignition source is present. Avoiding dispersion of air and dust is best, however, some conveying systems and particularly all dust collection systems function by collecting dust and air together in a dynamic air flow. Where dispersed combustible dust in air is present, prevention strategies alone will be insufficient dust explosion protection is also required. 5. Ignition; Ranging from obvious sources such as flame generated by welding equipment to milli-joule level electrostatic discharge, ignition risk management requires thorough review of potential sources of energy as well as knowledge of the Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE) of the dust hazard. Some dusts, such as starch and sugar require just a few milli-joules to trigger combustion. In such cases, protection strategies will always be required. Some ignition sources can come from nature as opposed to the process equipment itself lightning strike being the strongest. Where even a light dust accumulation might arise inside a building, lighting and other electrical equipment must be rated for a dust hazard environment. Common in the Food and Pharmaceutical Industries is the use of flexible plastic hose; the action of certain dusts brushing against the side of such hose can develop thousands of volts of electrical energy if the hose itself is not electrically grounded. Both grounding and bonding of equipment is essential to limit the opportunity for energy to build up within process equipment and the building structure when combustible dusts are present. One of the most common processes in the Food and Pharmaceutical Industries is milling to reduce the particle size of raw or intermediate materials. The action of milling involves a great deal of frictional energy; the unexpected presence of rogue material such as rocks or stones from agricultural product feedstock, unwanted metal fragments (such as loose nuts, bolts, or staples) or heating to the point of generating hot particles introduces ignition sources into the product stream. These hot particles can be detected downstream of the milling system (see Fig. IV) and action taken to either introduce a water spray extinguishing system, a diverter valve, or a mechanical shut off valve that prevents the ignition source from reaching downstream equipment at which these ignition sources would complete the explosion pentagon resulting in a dust explosion.

Fig. IV Spark Detection Systems Installed Downstream Of Milling Equipment (Detectors Are The Red Colour Modules On the Right Hand Vertical Duct) Under normal process operating conditions, one or two of the explosion pentagon parameters are not usually present. This explains the absence of continual dust explosions in the Food and Pharmaceutical Industries. However,

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when managing the risk of a combustible dust event, both normal and abnormal operating conditions must be evaluated. When dust explosions occur, it is usually down to one or more abnormal events which changed the explosion pentagon.

3. PROTECTION STRATEGIES: Especially where low MIE and MEC conditions occur, and when four of the five explosion pentagon parameters routinely exist (such as in a dust collection system and its connecting duct work), protection measures as well as prevention measures must be employed. The first thought is always to seek justification of equipment protection by explosion venting. This is cost effective and as a passive safety device explosion venting requires limited attention after initial installation (although, venting is not a fit and forget solution the NFPA 69-2007 Standard from the United States is very clear in requiring periodic inspection of vent devices).

Fig. V Flame Ball Emerging From A Vented Dust Explosion While the tendency is to think of the normal operating conditions of an explosion vent where this safety device remains firmly closed, it is essential to engineer safe venting whereby the flame ball ejected by the activation of explosion vents is accounted for (see Fig. V). The flame ball exiting an explosion vent can be between about 5 meters and up to 30 meters long, depending upon the application conditions. The length and diameter can be conveniently calculated using equations from NFPAA 68-2007. Considerations with respect to safe venting include i. ii. Can personnel be present within the calculated flame path? Is there risk of a secondary explosion due to ignition of material present in the flame path?

iii. Are the products of combustion toxic or do they present other environmental concerns? iv. Does the flame path sit inside your property, or can it go into the property of a neighbour? v. If venting a piece of indoor equipment, can a duct to outside be safely applied?

vi. Is the clean up associated with a vented dust explosion acceptable? vii. Is the time delay of repair to the vented equipment acceptable? (Usually the internal forces generated in a piece of vented equipment will result in a need for repair or even replacement. Only equipment deliberately designed with a design pressure to match or exceed the expected vented dust explosion peak pressure [called Pred] can be expected to support immediate clean up and reuse. For economic reasons, most equipment is designed such that Pred equals 2/3 of the tensile

strength of the weakest part of the protected equipment which means it is going to bend and buckle under explosive force loading but not itself fly apart and become a secondary hazard.) Often the answer to one or more of these questions is a clear no and alternative measures must be considered. However, even when venting, the process engineer must have an eye on limiting the propagation of the combustible dust event from one piece of equipment to another. While an explosion vent that is correctly sized according to NFPA 68-2007 or the equivalent European Standard protects the primary equipment, the flame generated during combustion will pass into the connecting ductwork. Only very small ductwork will absorb the flame heat fast enough to arrest the further movement of flame. Ducting that is 80mm in diameter or larger must be considered at risk of supporting propagation of flame to adjacent equipment. NFPA 654-2006 gives great focus to this matter of isolation of connecting ductwork. Preventing propagation of flame can be conveniently managed by either injecting a heat absorbing suppression agent into the oncoming flame path (see Fig. VI) or by activating a mechanical barrier to cut off the air flow and therefore the flame path. Important considerations for the Food and Pharmaceutical Industries are the use of compatible

Fig.VI Chemical Isolation Applied To Dust Collector Dirty Air Inlet

materials. The chemical isolation technique of flame propagation control indicated in Fig. VI provides for either Stainless Steel or PTFE process contact materials & typically employs food grade (including Kosher) Sodium Bicarbonate as the flame suppression agent. The mechanical barrier indicated in Fig. VII uses a food grade elastomeric liner that is rapidly inflated inside its housing to close off the flow of air and flame.

Fig. VII Mechanical Isolation Barrier Pinch Valve

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4. INDOOR EQUIPMENT APPLICATIONS: The Food and Pharmaceutical Industries typically install process equipment indoors for hygiene reasons. This can make the practice of direct explosion venting to atmosphere difficult. Sometimes a duct can be used to connect an explosion vent mounted on a piece of process equipment to a safe outdoor location, but the length of that duct is limited by the application parameters (calculations for permissible duct length are conducted according to NFPA 682007). Ducts that are over 3 meters long are unrealistic for most applications & these ducts should be straight to avoid delay in reaching open atmospheric conditions all ducts result in an increased value for Pmax. Indoor equipment usually requires alternative means of protection. Given the requirement of using food grade materials, two techniques are most practical: i. Explosion Suppression By detecting the commencement of a combustible dust explosion, a suppression agent is rapidly injected into the protected process equipment to prevent the development of full combustion (Fig. VIII). The agent extinguishes the flame at the earliest opportunity, preventing the full combustion process from developing which simplifies clean up and prevents dangerous pressure levels from being reached. Food grade Sodium Bicarbonate agent is the most common.

Fig. VIII Injection Of Suppression Agent Into Process Equipment ii. Flameless Venting The technique of flameless venting combines an explosion vent with a flame arresting element to absorb the heat of combustion and act as a flame barrier (see Fig. IX). For indoor use, a device which absorbs both flame and particulates is essential this is a requirement for NFPA68-2007 compliant devices. By absorbing both flame and dust, such a flameless venting device may be employed in the proximity of personnel. Simpler devices that do not meet the requirements of NFPA 68-2007 absorb flame only and will emit both burned and unburned dust as well as hot embers. Devices with only flame absorption capability are not intended to be used in proximity to personnel.

Fig. IX Flameless Venting Device; NFPA-68-2007 Compliant Design

5.

BUILDING PROTECTION

For reasons of hygiene, the Food and Pharmaceutical Industries operate many processes indoors. While good housekeeping practices are essential to reduce the risk of a combustible dust event, protection of buildings and structures is often required. This can be a challenge because large vent areas are required. One novel approach is to combine the function of windows in allowing ambient light into a facility with explosion venting. The facility pictured in Fig. X includes a number of windows designed to release as explosion vents (examples marked by a star).

Fig. X Building Protection By Venting

6.

CONCLUSIONS:

The unique requirements for hygiene in both the Food and Pharmaceutical Industries and the risks from toxic release of certain Pharmaceutical products require that techniques beyond simple explosion venting be deployed for the protection of both personnel and equipment. Where the explosion pentagon analysis approach identifies four or more dust explosion parameters to be even occasionally present, protection as well as prevention measures are required. Once the primary protection method is decided for each piece of equipment, its isolation to prevent propagation to a much larger secondary event is required (see Fig. XI). Developing a combustible dust

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prevention and protection plan when a Food or Pharmaceutical Industry facility is being designed and constructed always results in the most cost effective approach.

Fig. XI Potential Consequences When A Primary Event Propagates To A Series Of Secondary Events

References: a. b. c. d. NFPA Standard 68-2007, National Fire Protection Association, USA NFPA Standard 654-2006, National Fire Protection Association, USA OSHA Combustible Dust Fact Sheet, March 2008; Occupational Safety & Health Administration, USA OSHA and Combustible Dust presentation; Carter & Reason, Indiana Occupational Safety & Health Administration, USA