The Vaisheshika Darshana

The Vaisheshika Darshana
Translation and Commentary by John Wells

Copyright 2009
Chapter One Exposition 3
Chapter One
Exposition
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(1.1.1) atha now ata therefore dharmam dharma vykhysyma we shall

explain (This subject-verb construction does not seem authentic.) 1.1 (1.1.2) yata
through which abhyudaya-nireyasa-siddhi elevation, rising having no
better, unsurpassed good accomplishment sa that dharma dharma, duty,
destiny 1.2 (1.1.3) tat-vacant (abl. because) (of) that exposition -mnyasya
(gen. of) encompassing brought to mind, remembered, contemplated, (referring
to Veda) prmyam having the authority 1.3 (1.1.4) dharma-viea-prastt
(abl.) dharma this particular, this very engendered by dravya-gua-karma-
smnya-viea-samavynm (gen.) physical essential constituents action
universal particular inherent pada-arthnm (gen. of) word(s) meanings,
what is meant sdharmya-vaidharmybhym (inst. by way of, in terms of)
consistency inconsistency tattva-jnt (abl. comes through) "essentialness",
essence understanding nireyasam unsurpassed good
Now, therefore, we shall explain Dharma
1.1 Dharma is that through which there is the accomplishment of rising to
the unsurpassed good. 1.2 Because it is an exposition of that, it (this teaching)
has the authority of Veda. 1.3 Engendered by this very dharma, the
unsurpassed good comes through understanding of the essence, in terms of
consistency (with the dharma) vs. inconsistency (with the dharma), of what is
meant by the words "physical", "essential constituents", "action",
"universal", "particular", and "inherent".
2 The Vaisheshika Darshana
In the first sutra the author declares that whatever tends toward liberation
qualifies as dharma or duty. He does not mean to say that the only actions that can
possibly lead to liberation are those considered to be dharma by religious law or
convention, like working according to one's born station in life and participating in
religious activities. In these first sutras he states that dharma is rather an
understanding, and he says in sutra 1.2 that whatever is a true expression of the
inner understanding that leads to the highest good for a person can be considered
an expression of Veda.
In sutra 1.3 he says that this is higher learning, unsurpassed in merit, and in this
sutra the use of the words derived from "dharma" (from dh), following so closely
to its use in 1.1, is not just a coincidence. The thing that is consistent with dharma
(sdharmya) and that which is not consistent with it (vaidharmya) are two opposite
and yet complementary views of reality, and for the sake of the essential
understanding that leads to the highest good, which is liberation, the first is to be
affirmed and the second diminished or abandoned, though in life the second is
inevitable. The affirming and abandoning is also taught in the Yoga as abhysa-
vairgya (YD 1.7), and in the Sankhya as abhysa and tyga (SD 13.13), or
anvaya-vyatireka (SD 24.12). The words in quotes are the six words with which
the Vaisheshika system is traditionally identified (SD 19.2).
Physicals, Essential Constituents, and Action
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1.4 (1.1.5) pthiv earth pas waters (pl. of ap) (This will be translated in the
singular for simplicity.) tejas fire, light vyu air kam the ether kla time
dik (di) dimension tm individual self mana mind iti thus dravyi physical
things 1.5 (1.1.6) rpa-rasa-gandha-spar form taste smell feel
sakhy countings, reckonings parimni measurings pthaktvam
individuality sayoga-vibhgau conjunction disjunction paratva-aparatve
priority posteriority buddhaya discernings sukha-dukhe happiness
suffering icch-dveau desire aversion prayatn endeavors (The dual dvandva
compounds here (perhaps accusative), besides representing dichotomies ("vs."),
have a strong locative relationship with the transitive participles in the plural, so
the word "regarding" has been supplied.) ca and, along with gu essential
constituents (like fibers of threads of strings of ropes, etc.) 1.6 (1.1.7) utkepaam
up-casting avakepaam down-casting kucanam expansion prasraam
contraction gamanam going iti thus karmi actions
1.4 The physical things are: earth, water, fire, air, the ether; time and
dimension; individual self and mind. 1.5 Their essential constituents are:
form, taste, smell, feel; countings; measurings; individuality; discernings
regarding priority vs. posteriority (and) conjunction vs. disjunction, along
with endeavors regarding happiness vs. suffering (and) desire vs. aversion. 1.6
The actions are: up-casting vs. down-casting, expansion vs. contraction, going.
The existence of physical matter and of time and space, is commonly
acknowledged, as is the existence of the many individual people in this world who
perceive and think with their minds. This author, however, describes a creative
perception that is not commonly acknowledged, where the building blocks of the
physical things are known only by the perceiver. The source of this inner
perception and creation, his true identity, is something called "mahat" (great). It is
intelligent (cit), which is discussed in 1.10-18, and it is often identified with the
ether because that is the foundation of its physical or "real" (sat 1.16) aspect. The
ether is an abstract concept of an ethereal all-pervading medium, like space but not
a vacuum. It is not an independent physical substance, but rather the ambient
substance of his consciousness, in which the glimmer of his dimensional reality
first becomes perceptible. It is also associated with primal sound (see 2.10-18, a
parallel to 1.10-18). In this scheme the gross physical world arises from subtle
sensations and tendencies called essential constituents (gu), as a string is made
of its constituent threads. The subtlest of them is feel or "touch" (spara), which
refers to all the various tactile sensations, inside and out, but there is an even more
subtle level of feeling, called "bliss" (nanda) in the Sankhya. It is an aspect of
mahat that is associated with positive emotion and it may pervade the sensations of
feel, sight, taste, and smell, in that order. From this foundation are created,
cumulatively, the elements of "air" (breath), "fire" (light or heat radiation),
"water", and "earth" (organic substance), in that order. Hearing and sound (speech)
are always treated separately, but their intimate connection with bliss and with feel
(breath) is obvious.
Those sensations are associated with the body, but there is also an expansion of
the microcosm of the body into the environment through the tendencies to measure
reaching out or withdrawing in a radial way, grounding or rising in an axial way,
and rotating right or left in an angular waywhich tendencies define physical
dimension. Then there is the tendency to count, by holding the old, then changing
or progressing, then acknowledging the new (which then becomes the old), and
repeating. Those three elements are the aspects of the three guas of Sankhya:
tamas, rajas, and sattva. From this new foundation of the sensations combined with
the tendencies of measuring and counting, time is defined. Thus one constructs the
knowledge of being an individual physical person, mindful of a pre-existing world
of objects, advancing through a continuum of dimension and time.
In this scheme there is a serial aspect where the essential constituents are
discerned and ordered according to priority vs. posteriority, as well as a non-serial
aspect where they are discerned in various relationships of conjunction vs.
disjunction with each other (see also SD 10.3). For example, from bliss, through
the conjunction of a felt synaesthetic greenness and pinkness with a felt splendor
of visual form, a blending of color, moisture, and fragrance, the caution of thorns,
etc., a rose bush is created; from the assessment of its dimensions and orientation
in space, to the counted oscillation of its branches in the breeze, to its being the
rose bush that the perceiver as an individual would claim to know in that place and
time. All this is the subjective aspect of the dualism of Yoga philosophy, and from
here on we will refer to the perceiver as the yogin.
The "actions" (karmas) given here are all in relation to bodily impulses rather
than activity in the external environment, because that activity is only a gross and
relatively unimportant representation of its internal counterpart. Up-casting and
down-casting represent the axial spectrum of falling or being cast down by the
force of heaviness (gravity) vs. rising or casting oneself up in opposition to it.
Expansion and contraction are represented in the body by respiration, heartbeat,
peristalsis, etc., and by grasping and letting go. "Going" is creating karma in a
forward direction, like an archer (see 5.7-9). These three aspects of action might
also be seen to represent the constructs of axial and radial (spherical) dimensions
and possibly even axial rotation (which is reflected in some Sanskrit verb roots
like ac, ac, and vt, which mean "to go" or "to turn").
Subjectivism Is Consistent with Dharma
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1.7 (1.1.8) sat real anityam non-constant dravyavat (vati like, as) physical
kryam effect kraam cause smnya-vieavat (vati like, as) universal
particular iti dravya-gua-karmam (gen. of, for) the physical essential
constituents action aviea not different, common 1.8 (1.1.9) dravya-guayo
(loc. regarding, in) the physical essential constituents sajti-rambhaka-tvam
instance originator being sdharmyam consistency (1.1.10-13 is commentary.
See Appendix.) 1.9 (1.1.14) krya-virodhi effect incompatible karma action
(1.1.15-31 is commentary. See Appendix.)
1.7 What is common for the physical, the essential constituents, and action
is this: they are cause (and) they are effect, as the universal and particular
are; they are non-constant and they are real, as the physical is. 1.8 The
consistency with the dharma (of understanding) in regard to the physical and
the essential constituents is their being (understood as) instance and
originator (respectively), 1.9 (whereas) action is incompatible with effect.
The word "universal" refers to a class of things. "Dog" is a universal whereas
"shih tzu" is a particular sub-class, and "our dog Joey" is a particular instance of
both. In the subjectivivist aspect of Yoga philosophy, the cause of any particular
thing is in the essential constituents (guas), and these, whether it is the dog's look
and smell, his furry feel, or his noisy bark, are made of the yogin's consciousness.
In Sankhya and Yoga, the "guas" are sattva, rajas, and tamas, but here the author
uses the word to indicate the essential constituents, emerging from the bright sattva
via intellect. They are colored by rajas and darkened by tamas (see SD 3.7). Sattva
is the bright, vital human consciousness in its aspect of truth, purity, and goodness.
Tamas, which is resistance to change, has a stronger influence in the sensory
physicals, so they may be easier to understand as effects of consciousness, because
they seem to persist. Rajas, which is the need to change, is more associated with
action, but action quickly slips into the tamas of memory, so for example the
tendency to cast up ultimately manifests as the memory of having risen, the
tendency to go manifests as the memory of having changed location, and so on.
In the declaration that action is inconsistent with effect we see the first
indication of the divergence from the traditional doctrine of karma as a law of
cause and effect, which will be discussed in the Sankhya and the Yoga. Thus, in
this section he has explained the first three principles of Vaisheshika named in
sutra 1.3: the physical, the essential constituents, and action.
Intellect as the Foundation
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Of the Universal and the Particular

1.10 (1.2.1) kraa-abhvt (abl. coming from) cause absence krya-
abhva effect absence 1.11 (1.2.2) na not tu but krya-abhvt (abl. from)
effect absence kraa-abhva cause absence 1.12 (1.2.3) smnya-viea
universal particular iti called buddhi-apekam intellect consideration
1.10 Absence of effect comes from absence of cause, 1.11 but not absence of
cause from absence of effect. 1.12 What is called (here) "universal and
particular" is a consideration of intellect,
The author offers a unique definition of the word "universal", as a reality that
exists independently as consciousness, even in the absence of any particulars. It is
a foundation where there is no suffering but only self awareness, intellect, and
native contentmentsat, cit, and ananda. Here he expands on the universal and
particular mentioned in 1.3. They are not only a "consideration" of intellect but the
effect of it, because mahat, as intellect, is the cause of all things. His status as the
progenitor is confirmed by very similar statements in VD 4.1-4 and SD 3.13-17.
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Of the Physical, the Essential Constituents, and Action
1.13 (1.2.4) bhva existing anuvtte (gen. of) the following eva just so
hetu-tvt (abl. because) basis for knowing its being smnyam universal eva
just so 1.14 (1.2.5) dravyatvam physicalness guatvam essential constituent-ness
karmatvam actionness ca and smnyni universals viea particular
ca and 1.15 (1.2.6) anyatra (loc.) other than antyebhya (abl. w/anyatra; apart
from) the last or lowest ones vieebhya (abl.) particulars
1.13 that universal (intellect) existing just so because of its being the
basis for the knowing of what follows, just so. 1.14 Physical-ness, essential
constituent-ness, and action-ness are universals, and they are particular, 1.15
(that is,) apart from the lowest particulars,
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1.16 (1.2.7) sat real, true, actual iti called yata from which comes dravya-
gua-karmasu (loc. regarding, involving) the physical essential constituents
action s that sat-t real-ness (Here, in this highly context-dependent writing, the
reflexive sense and the contrast are clear, so the conjunction and the pronoun are
supplied .) 1.17 (1.2.8) dravya-gua-karmabhya (abl. from) physical essential
constituents action artha-antaram thing separate sat-t beingness (1.2.9-16 is
commentary. See Appendix.) 1.18 (1.2.17) sat_iti "actual" liga-a-viet (abl.
because) indicator non-particular viea-liga-abhvt (abl. because) particular
mark absence ca and eka singular bhva the existing
1.16 (but) its (intellect's) realness is that from which comes what is
called "real" (in sutra 1.7), involving the physical, the essential constituents,
and action. 1.17 Its realness is a separate thing from the physical, the essential
constituents, and action. 1.18 That existing (of intellect 1.13) is singular,
because it is not particular as an indicator of anything called "real", and
because of the absence of any particular indication (of it). (See 1.11)
The physical, the essential constituents, and action, all three, are particulars in
that they are particular aspects of intellect. Existence requires the superintendence
of intellect: recognizing, acknowledging, and deliberating. This discriminating
function creates reality through the instrumentality of the three principlesthe
physical, the essential constituents, and actionin combination. Intellect is an
aspect of the principle called "mahat" (great), and it is separate from those three
"real" principles because it can recognize itself independently of them. As opposed
to the multiplicity of creation involving those three, existence or realness itself is
one (ekam). Even an affirmation of belief in plurality, and in fact the entire
objective dimension of the Yoga duality, occurs in the present moment on the part
of a single believer, and from the subjectivist point of view, that is the extent of its
reality. Thus, in this section he has explained the fourth and fifth principles of
Vaisheshika named in sutra 1.3, the universal and the particular. The sixth
principle, the inherent, will be discussed in Chapter Eight.
Chapter Two
Physicals, Essential Constituents, and Indicators
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2.1 (2.1.1) rpa-rasa-gandha sparavat (fem. sing.) form-taste-smell

having feel pthiv earth 2.2 (2.1.2) rpa-rasa sparavatya (fem. pl.) form-
taste having feel pas (pl. of "ap" fem.) waters [drav fluid snigdh viscous]
(See Appendix.) 2.3 (2.1.3) tejas fire rpa sparavat form having feel
2.1 Earth is what has feel with form, taste, and smell. 2.2 Waters have feel
with form and taste; 2.3 Fire has feel with form.
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2.4 (2.1.4) sparavn having feel vyu air (2.1.5-13 is commentary. See
Appendix.) 2.5 (2.1.14) vyo (abl. from) air vyu-sammrcchanam
(sammrchana MW) air congealing, solidification nntva-ligam variety
indication (2.1.15-19 is commentary. See Appendix.) 2.6 (2.1.20) nikramaam
going forth, egress praveanam entering, coming in iti thus, such kasya of the
ether ligam indication (2.1.21-31 is commentary. See Appendix.)
2.4 Air (breath) has (only) feel. 2.5 The indication in the variety (of
applications 2.1-3) of it (feel) is the solidification of air from (etherial) air. 2.6
Going outward and coming inward; such is the indication of the ether.
In these two groups of sutras the author defines the familiar four physical
elements in terms of their essential constituents. When seen from the subjectivist
point of view it is easier to make sense of them than from the traditional "object
first" point of view. (For that we have the periodic table.) The most subtle one,
called "air", is made only of feel, including none of the other essential constituents.
It is rough or smooth, hot or cold, pleasurable or uncomfortable, etc., including all
the tactile sensations whether external or internal. Air, as pra, meaning breath or
life itself, is also the principle of flowing and it represents the inner fluid life
streams. The second, fire or light (tejas), is what we might think of today as the
Chapter Two Physicals, Essential Constituents, and Indicators 9
perception of electromagnetic radiation, including all forms of heat and light. It
represents the visible object-world that seems to spread out before the yogin,
identifiable by feel and sight, but not taste or smell. In the same way, water is
made of feel, sight, and taste, without smell. Finally, there is "earth" or organic
substance. The living earth is a comprehensive food construct, nourishing every
life form and reusing all its waste in the process, so it has a living aspect, a
decaying aspect, and a food aspect. We know that earth means food (see also SD
11.9) in this teaching because, as the author has said, it is made not of tiny
particles of preexisting matter, but of feel, sight, taste, and smell. The religious
association of pthiv (earth) with the cow as the source of milk, is very consistent
with this definition. From mahat as the ether comes word or sound, and from
mahat as bliss comes feel. The priority of the feel/breath complex among the four
is confirmed in VD 3.12, in SD 20.11, and in YD 7.11. Even modern Yoga
teaching focuses on this complex. From feel comes breath and from breath life.
Feel becomes heat and from heat arises color, light, and form. With taste, form
becomes devoid of heat, color, and definition, becoming cold, clear water. Earth
takes form as water conjoins with breath or air (see 5.12-13), becoming the smelly
organism. The smells associated with earth are the decay of dead things, the
bouquet of living ones, and the aroma of food.
The qualities in all the sensory essential constituents are varied. The quality of
feel in internal sensations is different from that in touching external objects, and
those are both different from the sensation of drinking water, and again from that
of eating food. Just as feel differs thus in air, light, water, and earth, the quality of
visible form differs in light, water, and earth; that is, in the colorless shapeless
water vs. the color, brightness, and shapes of the physical objects in one's
environment, and in seeing the living aspect of organic substance vs. its decaying
and food aspects. Similarly, the quality of taste is different in the various mineral
and salt flavors associated with water, than it is in the flavor of food; and finally
the quality of smell is different in the diverse living, decaying, and food aspects of
organic things. In the objective view these are all qualities or "attributes"
possessed by preexisting objects that are made by an indifferent Prakti (nature),
and experienced only passively by the individual, but in the subjectivist wing of
the Yoga duality they are qualities of consciousness, which is the creative and
intelligent potential force possessed solely by the one conscious self, and the
making of it is done by and for that self.
The outward manifestation from the abstract sense of feel to the actual feel of
food, for example, is its "solidification" (2.5), and from there, combined with the
other sensations involved, its progression into actual solid food. Only the one
example of solidification is given in sutra 2.5, but it applies to all the other sensory
essential constituents as well. Thus, indications are given for the first five
physicals, i.e., the four sensory ones and in 2.6 the ether.
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(2.2.1-5 is commentary. See Appendix.) 2.7 (2.2.6) aparasmin (loc. in respect
to, than) later aparam later yugapat simultaneous ciram lasting a long time
kipram lasting a short time iti thus, such kla-ligni time indicators (2.2.7-9
is commentary. See Appendix.) 2.8 (2.2.10) ita (itas) from here idam this iti
(quotes) yata from there tat that diyam having dimension ligam indicator
(2.2.11-13 is commentary. See Appendix.) 2.9 (2.2.14) ditya-sayogt (abl.
known by) suns conjoining bhta-prvt previously past bhaviyata about to
be bhtt past ca and prc east (2.2.15-25 is commentary. See Appendix.)
2.7 Later than later vs. simultaneous, long-term vs. short-term; such are
the indications of time. 2.8 "This from here", "that from there" is the
indication of what has dimension. 2.9 East is known by the conjoining of the
(twelve) suns, previously past, about to be, and just past.
The tendency to count or reckon is a source of the sense of time, as its essential
constituent, but the indicators of it are things like memory and immediacy and
their corresponding concepts of long-term and short-term time frames. The
tendency to measure or size-up is a source of the sense of dimension, but its
indicators are a perception of coming from there to here, and going from here to
there: outward or inward in a radial way like a sphere (defining the ether), up and
down in an axial way, or right and left in a rotational angular way. The "here" is
the point of observation, and that observation is only possible in terms of these
same concepts as represented in the body of the observerin the upright axis of
the human back with its associated sense of rising versus resting; in the forward-
directed nature of vision, speech, locomotion, and productive action with their
associated sense of near and far; and in the rotational flexibility of the body with
Chapter Two Physicals, Essential Constituents, and Indicators 11
its associated sense of right and left. If the observer were reduced to a
dimensionless point, the only "observation" possible would be self-awareness.
Dimension is closely associated with time. (A hypothetical sense-deprived
thoughts-only experience, without any sense of objects moving in space or the
passage of the day, would not qualify as a sense of time.) The east-west dimension
the author refers to is the path of the apparent progression of the sun, moon, and
constellations, which define days, lunar months, and years. The so-called "present"
is a present-moment memory construct of a "just now" past, whereas the previous
past is a construct much further removed. The "about to be" future is almost as
certain as the present, but of course the extended future is not. Thus "indications"
are given for the fourth and fifth physicals in the list: dimension and time.
Speech or Sound
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2.10 (2.2.26) sata (gen. of) existent liga-abhvt (abl. because) indicator
absence (2.2.27-28 is commentary. See Appendix.) 2.11 (2.2.29) na not ca also,
thus asiddham unestablished, unproved vikrt (abl. because) modification 2.12
(2.2.30) abhivyaktau (loc. in) manifesting dot (abl. arising from) degradation
2.10 (Just) because there may be the absence of an indication of something
existent, 2.11 it is not thus unproved, because that (indication) is a
modification 2.12 arising from the degradation in its becoming manifest.
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2.13 (2.2.31) sayogt (abl. from) conjoining vibhgt (abl. known from)
disjoining ca and abdt (abl. known from) sound, speech ca and also abda-
nipatti sound, speech manifestation (2.2.32 is commentary. See Appendix.)
2.14 (2.2.33) dvayo (gen. of) those two tu but, yet pravttyo (gen. of)
development abhvt (abl.) absent 2.15 (2.2.34) pratham-abdt (abl. from)
primary word
2.13 The manifestation of speech (sound) is known from conjoining and
from disjoining, and it is also known from the speech 2.14 that is yet absent
the development of those two (conjoining and disjoining), 2.15 (that is) from
primal speech (sound),
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2.16 (2.2.35) sampratipatti-bhvt (abl. known from) general agreement
existence ca and 2.17 (2.2.36) sadigdh uncertainties sati it happens that
bahutve (loc. where there is) multiplicity 2.18 (2.2.37) sakhy-abhva
reckoning non-existence smnyata (tasil resulting from) the universal form
2.16 and it is known from the existence of general agreement, 2.17 (but)
where there is a multiplicity (of speech sounds) (see YD 7.2-3) it happens that
there are uncertainties, 2.18 (whereas) there is no such reckoning (agreement
or uncertainty) resulting from that universal (primal) form.
These last nine sutras treat the essential speech-sound (and hearing) as separate
from the other four senses, and its indication as separate from the other "object"
indications. It is the primal universal from which arises the speech of
communication, but it is known even in the absence of such an indication (see also
6.4-9). This dualist description is similar to those of mahat and the individual in
Chapter Four. Sound bridges a certain gap in the physicals, as it is bound to the
ether (2.6), which might be considered as a center, with the gross elements on one
side and dimension and time, etc., on the other (2.7-9).
Chapter Three
The Separate Thing
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In Relation to the Indicator Body
3.1 (3.1.1) prasiddh (pl.) established, commonly acknowledged indriya-
arth (pl.) senses objects 3.2 (3.1.2) indriya-artha-aprasiddhi sense
object without common acknowledgment indriya-arthebhya (abl. from)
senses objects artha-antarasya (gen. of) thing separate hetu basis for
knowing 3.3 (3.1.3) sa that, something an-apadea without semblance
3.1 Those objects of the senses (2.1-18) are commonly acknowledged, 3.2
(but) there is a basis for knowing of a separate thing from the objects of the
senses, that is without the common acknowledgment of the objects of the
senses, 3.3 something without the semblance,
Chapter Three The Separate Thing 13
The word "apadea" means indicating or pointing to something as a reason,
especially a fictitious reason or pretext. Pointing to a physical manifestation as the
only reason or proof that something exists is a pretext, because the manifestation is
only a semblance of the real thing. On the other hand, t he word "hetu" means a
reason for knowing something or a motive for doing something; either way it is a
basis for the knowing or doing. He says there is a basis for knowing that is
separate from the ordinary common knowledge of those mere physical things.
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3.4 (3.1.4) kraa-ajnt (abl. adverbial) cause without understanding
(3.1.5) kryeu (loc. regarding) effects jnt (abl. from) understanding (3.1.6)
ajnt (abl. from) lack of understanding ca moreover 3.5 (3.1.7) anyat
something else, something different eva indeed hetu reason, basis for knowing
iti just mentioned anapadea without semblance 3.6 (3.1.8) artha-antaram
thing other hi because, for artha-antarasya (gen. of) thing other an-apadea
without semblance (Antara here means the one and the other. see 3.2.)
3.4 which (semblance), moreover, comes from a (certain) lack of
understanding that arises from understanding regarding effects without
understanding the cause, 3.5 (but) the "hetu" (basis for knowing) just
mentioned (see 3.2), without any semblance, is indeed something different, 3.6
for it is a separate thing (see 1.17) that is without the semblance of the other
thing (the commonly acknowledged)
In the case of common knowledge there is no understanding of the principle
that the subtle cause of objects is in consciousness itself. There is only
comprehension of the objects or effects without realizing their true cause. He says
this is non-understanding in general, or a lack of the understanding required for the
"unsurpassed good". It is important here to keep in mind the teaching that there is
no multiplicity of people understanding these things, some with and some without
realization of the true cause, because both forms are in one person.
| 4l l 4l 4| interpolation El -
Bl 7
94B4l 9lB 4 \

3.7 (3.1.9) sayogi joined together, conjoined samavyi going together,
inherent eka-artha-samavyi one-thing, same-thing inherent virodhi
inconsistent, contrary, excluded (see asanika SD 5.1) ca and (3.1.10-17 is
commentary. See Appendix.) 3.8 (3.1.18) tma-indriya-artha-sanikart (abl.
from) individual sense object yat which nipadyate it is brought forth tat that
anyat something different 3.9 (3.1.19) pravtti-nivtt (dual) proceeding
ceasing ca indeed pratyac-tmani (loc. absolute) inward individual de (loc.
abs.) known paratra (loc. abs.) something other ligam indicator
3.7 which (semblance) is the conjoined, the inherent, the inherent in one
thing, and the excluded. 3.8 It is something different, brought forth from the
drawing in together of the individual, his senses, and their objects. 3.9 It is the
indicator (the body 9.14-15), indeed the one proceeding and ceasing (living
and dying), in a place other than what is known inward of the individual.
The conjoined or joined-together is a class or a particular thing. The inherent
are the attributes or qualities of either a class or a particular thing. The inherent in
one thing is the set of attributes that define a particular thing, sufficient to describe
one thing and to exclude all others. The "excluded" refers to any qualities that are
cut away in the process of defining either a class or a particular thing. This
functioning of intellect is the source of the objects under examination, which is
explained further with an example in sutras 9.14-15.
In Relation to Mind
El B lB l4|l4 B| \
interpolation
97lllWlBlll
9lllBB | l4BB|lE-
l4ll ] =l 97llB| \lB
3.10 (3.2.1) tma-indriya-artha-sanikare (loc. regarding) individual
senses object (These are three. See 4.2.1.) drawing in together jnasya (gen.
of) understanding bhva presence abhva absence ca and, versus manasa
(gen. of) mind ligam indication (3.2.2 is commentary. See Appendix.) 3.11 (3.2.3)
prayatna-ayaugapadyt (abl. because) urges non-simultaneousness jna-
ayaugapadyt (abl. because) understanding non-simultaneousness ca and ekam
one only 3.12 (3.2.4) pra-apna nimea-unmea jvana-manogati (f.) in-
breath out-breath closing the eyes, falling asleep (see nimi MW) opening the
eyes life, living heart's course, wish, desire indriya-antara-vikr powers
other changes sukha-dukha icch-dvea prayatn happiness suffering
desire aversion powers of endeavoring ca and, in addition to tmana (gen.
of) the individual ligni indications (3.2.5-9 is commentary. See Appendix.)
3.10 The indication of mind is the absence vs. presence of understanding
(mentioned in 3.4) regarding the drawing in together of the objects, the senses,
and the individual. 3.11 There is only the one (mind), because one's urge to act
does not happen conjointly (with others), and because one's understanding
does not happen conjointly (with others). 3.12 The indications of the
individual are the desire for life involving the filling breath and the emptying
breath, closing the eyes and opening the eyes, and the (similar) changes in the
other (two) powers, as well as endeavors regarding happiness vs. suffering
and desire vs. aversion.
Here, after nine sutras of preparatory material, he finally gives the indications
of the remaining two physicals: mind and individual. The absence vs. presence of
understanding, entertained by the mind, is the dualism of semblance vs. separate
thing (3.1-9). The word "understanding" (jna) is equivalent to discerning
(buddhi) in sutra 1.5, and "endeavors" (prayatna) is also from the same sutra. They
represent the jnendriyas and the karmendriyas respectively, which together
constitute mind. The word "ekam" means that there is only one mind, as opposed
to the many lower physicals, because the only discerning or endeavoring that are
ever known happen there alone. The word "yaugapadya" comes from "yugapad",
which means literally happening conjointly or "simultaneous", but for the yogin,
thought, perception, and the urge to act are only known directly in the one mind.
There is no simultaneous community of perception and action, like a flock of birds
or a school of fish.
The sense of being an individual person with a unique identity involves things
like name, time, place, family, and occupation. It is also the level of awareness
where one decides to do, what would be best for one's overall happiness, but the
body associated with this personal identity emerges from subtler sources. The
filling and emptying breaths are "expanding and contracting" actions in the body,
also associated with air and the power of feel, while the "opening and closing of
the eyes", alternately rising into wakefulness and falling asleep, are up-casting and
down-casting actions. This also indicates the power of seeing, which is forward-
directed like the action of "going". "The changes in the other powers" refers to the
similar periodic tendencies of the remaining two sensory powers, associated with
taste and smell. Those four involve the powers of knowing (jna-indriyas), not
only in enjoying but in protecting one's life through aversion: knowing the urgency
of hypoxia, excessive heat or cold, a spoiled smell or a bitter poisonous taste in
food, knowing danger when you see it, etc. The drive for life is also manifested
through desire, in the powers of doing (karma-indriyas): the urges toward going,
doing, saying, sex, and the consumption and passage of food and water.
4| B \ 4 ~l-
4 9lB l4l4ll4ll 9
In Relation to the Individual
3.13 (3.2.10) yadi if dam known anvakam (indeclinable) following, after,
secondary aham I am devadatta aham I am yajadatta iti "i.e.", quotes 3.14
(3.2.11) de_tmani_lige (loc. absolute; given that, granted) known
individual indicator eka_eva only the one dhatvt (abl. arising from)
solidity pratyakavat (vati just like) perception pratyaya belief, assurance
(3.2.12-13 is commentary. See Appendix.) 3.15 (3.2.14) aham I, I am iti called
pratyac-tmani (loc. located there) inward, behind the individual bhvt (abl.
known by) its presence paratra the other place abhvt (abl. adverbial) in the
absence of artha-antara-pratyaka thing, entity other, different, separate
perception (3.2.15-18 is commentary. See Appendix.)
3.13 If it is commonly known, it is secondary, i.e., that "I am Devadatta" or
"I am Yajadatta". 3.14 Given that there is an indicator of the individual that
is commonly known, still there is only the one (individual) (see
Br.Ar.Upanishad 1.4.1). That belief (that "I am Devadatta" etc.) arises from the
solidity (of the indicator body), having perception of it (the objects, senses, etc.
mentioned in 3.10-11), 3.15 (but) inward of this individual called "I", there is
perception of the separate thing, known through its presence (even) in the
absence of what is in the other place (the "I").
The inner self (pratyak tman) is something separate from "tman" or the "I"
self that is known as the individual, or the personal identity known by name. That
separate entity is equivalent to the Sankhya's "separate principle", mahat (see SD
16.13, 19.11). In the other place stand all those things that are associated with the
personal identity called "I", including the senses, the urges and so on.
]lBB4 ll
4l| BlBl ll=l

3.16 (3.2.19) sukha-dukha-jna-nipatti a-viet (abl. known from)
happiness suffering understanding emergence absence of difference,
variety, particularity aiktmyam that there is only one individual 3.17 (3.2.20)
vyavasthta (tasil abl. sense; inferred from) various life circumstances nn
multiplicity 3.18 (3.2.21) stra-smarthyt (abl. from) teaching strength ca
and
3.16 That there is only one individual (soul) is known from the absence of
particularity (other particular individuals) when it comes to the emergence of
understanding of happiness and suffering, 3.17 (whereas) (the notion of) a
multiplicity of them (individuals) is inferred from various life circumstances,
3.18 and from the strength of teaching.
Understanding of happiness and suffering is known directly and immediately
only by the one knower, the yogin. It is not caused by circumstances but rather
emerges as a construct in his individual awareness, whereas the notion that other
people know and feel, as true as it may be in its own way, is only inferred from
observing outward signs, such as speech, action, or physical appearance. The
intelligence of the physical human organism, based on its physical powers of
observation, memory, reasoning, and life-supporting preferences, exists just as
surely as artificial intelligence now exists; but all that, right down to the finest
detail, is a construct that is separate from one's own immediate great self-
awareness. Seeing the variety in things like life circumstance, status, and health, in
oneself and others, creates the belief in a multiplicity of other souls sustaining
consequences of their actions, but the seeing of the people hardly qualifies as proof
of the souls. This relationship between happiness vs. suffering and the notion of
individual souls is further explained in 9.10-14. The individual is the culmination
of all the essential constituents in conjunction, but in the next chapter a singular
higher form will be described, one who is the container of the individual. He is
separate, but being comprehensive he must include the lower plurality as well.
Chapter Four
The Great One and the Individual
l47
l \
ll4ll l4interpolation
He Is Both Singular and Plural
4.1 (4.1.1) sat existent a-kraa-vat no cause having nityam (ind.)
constantly, eternally 4.2 (4.1.2) tasya its kryam effect ligam indicator 4.3
(4.1.3) kraa-bhvt (abl. from) cause presence krya-bhva effect
presence (4.1.4-5 is commentary. See Appendix.)
4.1 There is something eternally existent which has no cause. 4.2 Its
indicator is its effect. (see SD 3.14-15) 4.3 The presence of the effect arises
from the presence of its cause.
B 4l
l|= ~ interpolation
B 4ll
4 l |= interpolation
4.4 (4.1.6) mahati (loc. regarding, of) the great aneka-dravya-vat-tvt (abl.
from) (of his) non-singular physical having, possessed of being rpt (abl.
from) own form ca and upalabdhi comprehension 4.5 (4.1.7a) sati real api
actually dravya-tve (loc. in) physical state mahat-tve (loc. absolute) great
being (The second part of 4.1.7 was a separate, non-authentic sutra.) 4.6 (4.1.8)
aneka-dravya-samavyt (abl. known from) non-singleness, plurality physical
inherent rpa-viet (abl. known from) form its own distinct ca and rpa
form upalabdhi comprehension (4.1.9 is commentary. See Appendix.)
4.4 Comprehension of this great one (mahat) comes both from his
(singular) form and from the non-singular (plurality) being possessed of the
physical, 4.5 his greatness being actually real in its physical state. 4.6
Comprehension of his form is known from the inherence in the physical of
that plurality and from his own distinct form.
This great one is certainly the mahat that is further developed in the Sankhya,
where he is also called "the first" (meaning the prior one), "equal to prakti" (the
prime originator), the "one of authority" (SD 3.13-14), etc., and in the Yoga, he is
called "bodiless", meaning prior to the body elements (YD 7.17).
Chapter Four The Great One and the Individual 19
ll4ll l llB * |4ll ~l~
4lll l l l interpolation
4.7 (4.1.10) tasya of that abhvt (abl. to be inferred from) absence
avyabhicra no contradiction 4.8 (4.1.11) sakhy countings parimni
measurings pthaktvam singularity sayoga-vibhgau conjoining disjoining
paratva-aparatve priority posteriority karma action ca and (This must be the
end of the original sutra.) 4.9 rpi-dravya-samavyt (abl. from) having form
in the physical inherence ckui instances of sight, sightings (4.1.12)
arpiu (loc. in respect of) those things not possessed of form ackui no
sightings (4.1.13 is commentary. See Appendix.)
4.7 There is no contradiction of that (distinct form) to be inferred from the
absence of that (plurality), 4.8 (namely) countings, measurings, individuality,
conjoining vs. disjoining, priority vs. posteriority, and action, 4.9 (for
example) instances of the faculty of sight coming (only) from the inherence in
physical things of having form, (there being) no instances of sight in the case
of those that have no form.
The singular cannot be counted, measured, separated, conjoined, or prioritized,
but it exists nonetheless. A similar point was made in 2.10-11 and the Sankhya
deals with the same idea in SD 20.6, where there is the only instance of the word
"physical" (dravya) in that work. Sight (ckus) here is an example representing all
four powers of sense, and the example is meant to refute the idea that activity in
those senses can only exist when there is already something there to be sensed.
B ll 44 l E4
interpolation
|94 4 l 4 |B|B
The Womb-born and the Non-womb-born Individual

4.10 (4.2.1) tat puna then again pthiv-di-krya-dravyam earth the rest
effect physical trividham threefold arira-indriya-viaya-sajakam body
powers of sense sphere of objects named, agreed on (4.2.2-3 is commentary.
See Appendix.) 4.11 (4.2.4) au-sayoga atom(s) conjunction tu but, after all
apratiiddha no objection, not disallowed 4.12 (4.2.5) tatra in which case
arram body dvividham twofold yonijam womb-born ayonijam non-womb-
born ca and (Surely the author understands the rule against such a contradiction.)
4.10 Then again, there is the threefold, commonly agreed (named) as the
body, the powers, and the sphere of objects, which is physical as an effect
consisting of earth and the rest; 4.11 after all, conjunction of atoms is not
disallowed, 4.12 in which case it is twofold: a body that is womb-born, and not
womb-born,
Even though in the liberating view the threefold is an effect of the essential
constituents, this should not be seen as a logical contradiction to the living view
where bodies, sense organs, and other objects are made of atoms, but rather as a
complement. This chapter clearly outlines the dualism.
B 4 ~l
4 l lll4l
4.13 (4.2.6) aniyata-di-dea-prvakatvt (abl. known by) undefined
dimension realm previousness 4.14 (4.2.7) dharma-viet (abl. known by)
role particular ca and 4.15 (4.2.8) samkhy-bhvt (abl. known by) name
existence ca and
4.13 known by its previousness in a realm of dimension that is
undefined, 4.14 and by its particular dharma, 4.15 and by the existence of its
name.
The gross physical body that is made up of atoms has a name and a role in life
but there is another form that does not. It is the source body that exists in an inner
realm of consciousness where the powers of reckoning, measuring, individuation,
sense, and urge are not yet evolved into the outer manifest forms with which they
will co-exist. Like the knowledge, the body is twofold, the inner and the outer.
This is a strong statement of the dualism.
ll ~l
|Bl 4 \l
4.16 (4.2.9) sajy (abl. f. inferred from) having a name ditvt (abl.
inferred from) beginningness 4.17 (4.2.10) santi they exist ayonij non-womb-
borns 4.18 (4.2.11) Veda-ligt (abl. from) ca and also
4.16 From their beginningness (birth) (and) from having a name (see 3.13)
it is inferred 4.17 that (other) non-womb-borns (individuals) exist; 4.18 and it
is also (learned) from the Veda-liga.
Chapter Five Action 21
The plural "non-womb-borns" says it all. Like the final sutras in Chapter Three,
this group gives reasons for the opposing belief in other individuals. There is a
parallel here to the passages in the Sankhya (see SD 19.17-18 and all of Chapter
Twenty) about naming (4.15) plant and animal bodies, and their being known from
a branch of the Veda dealing with gross worldly things and their relationships, the
Veda-liga, namely the law texts (smti), which are really the last scriptures that
would ever be considered guides to liberation.
Chapter Five
Action (in Conjoining with the Self)
|97ll l |l l
ll ll | interpolation
Up-casting
5.1 (5.1.1) tma-sayoga-prayatnbhym (abl. dual; from) individual self
conjoining urge, endeavor haste (loc. in) hand karma action 5.2 (5.1.2) tath
from there hasta-sayogt hand joining together ca and musale (loc. in) pestle
karma action 5.3 (5.1.3) abhighta-je musala-adau karmai (loc. abs.
given, granted) striking, pounding produced by pestle etc. action
vyatirekt (abl. because) difference akraam without cause hasta-sayoga
hand conjoining (5.1.4-6 is commentary. See Appendix.)
5.1 Action in the hand comes from endeavor and a conjoining with the
individual self, 5.2 and from there, action in a pestle (for example) from
conjoining with the hand, 5.3 (but, even) given that there is action in the
pestle, etc. (the mortar, the grain, etc.) produced by the pounding, (still) that
conjoining with the hand is without such a cause, because there is a
difference.
In this chapter, conjunction (conjoining) is explained in terms of the actions of
an individual and in terms of actions in regard to physical elements. Some more
subtle aspects of conjunction and disjunction will be described in the next chapter.
The motivation, the urge, and the immediate impulse that arise within a person to
set any action into play are known by the one person and no one else, existing on
the other side of the boundary that sets it apart from gross physical actions. The
author gives the example of the physical hands lifting the pestle, and when it is
dropped, the husks being split from the grain within the mortar, along with the
physical causality that connects those events. It has already been said that the
primal action "karma" of 1.6 is inconsistent with this kind of effect (see 1.9).
|ll4
~lB B|B4 ll4l7| B B

974 l7|B4 interpolation
Down-casting
5.4 (5.1.7) sayoga-abhve (loc. in) joining together absence gurutvt (abl.
because) heaviness patanam flying downward, falling, descending 5.5 (5.1.8)
nodana-viea-abhvt (abl. because) pushing, impulse particular absence na
not urdhvam rising upward na not tiryac crosswise gamanam motion 5.6
(5.1.9) prayatna-viet (abl. resulting from) urge particular nodana-viea
impulse particular (5.1.10-15 is commentary. See Appendix.)
5.4 In the absence of such conjoining there is falling (of the pestle) due to
its heaviness, 5.5 which motion is neither upward nor sideways, because of the
absence of a particular impulse, 5.6 which particular impulse results from a
particular endeavor (urge).
He associates upward and sideways movement in general with deliberate force,
as opposed to downward movement, i.e., the sense of intentionally displacing
something, associated with the quality of passion (rajas) vs. the sense of dropping,
without that effort, associated with the quality of lethargy (tamas).
l4
|4 l l ~ B|Bll| -
ll ll] | lll4
~lB
Going and Down-casting

5.7 (5.1.16) iau (loc. in the case of, with) arrow ayugapat non-simultaneous,
progressive sayoga-vie (pl.) conjunction(s) particular karma-anya-tve
(loc. it being the case) action different being hetu motive, reason 5.8 (5.1.17)
nodant (abl. from) impulse dyam first, primary io (gen. of) arrow karma
action tat-karma-kritt (abl. because) that action caused by ca both/and
saskrt (abl. because) mental construct uttaram later, following tath from
that uttaram uttaram ca and 5.9 (5.1.18) saskra-abhve (loc. in) construct
absence gurutvt (abl. due to) heaviness patanam falling
5.7 With an arrow, the particular conjunctions are progressive, the motive
being separate from the action. 5.8 The action of the arrow from the impulse
is primary, both because it is caused by the action of that (impulse) and
because of the construct following, (and) from that, the following following.
5.9 In the absence of such a construct, there is falling due to heaviness.
He illustrates the connection between the original impulse of the archer and the
subsequent events produced though a chain of causal reactions from the arm and
the eye to the fingers, the bowstring, the arrow, and the target. The tension created
in the drawing of the bow is primary, like lifting the pestle, and the letting go is
followed by a series of external physical events. There is a special significance to
sutra 5.9 in that the author identifies mental construct with conjoining, by
composing a sutra identical to 5.4 but replacing "conjoining" (sayoga) with
"construct" (saskra). It would require a long and convoluted explanation to
reconcile the idea of the mental "construct" presented in these works with the
corrupted technical meaning of saskra as "impressions" of past lives, a meaning
that was fashioned to support the religious doctrine of transmigration of souls.
Action (in Physicals)
B|BllBl
|l l l
l |ll4
~lB
4~lB
Contraction, Going, Down-casting

5.10 (5.2.1) nodana-pant (abl. through) impulse, pushing, nudging, or
urging, inciting compressing, squeezing sayukta-sayogt (abl. through)
conjoined with it conjoining ca and pthivym (loc. in the case of) earth karma
action 5.11 (5.2.2) tat-vieena (instrumental through) of that a particular
instance ada-kritam not commonly known caused or produced by 5.12
(5.2.3) apm (gen. pl. for) water sayoga-abhve (loc. in) conjoining absence
gurutvt (abl. due to) heaviness patanam falling (5.2.4) dravatvt (abl. due to)
fluidity syandanam (MW) moving on swiftly, running
5.10 Action, in the case of the organic (earth), is through conjoining with
what is conjoined (the individual 5.1) and through a squeezing impulse, 5.11
caused by the thing that is not commonly known, by means of a particular
instance of that (impulse). 5.12 For water, in the absence of such conjoining,
there is running due to (its) fluidity, falling due to its heaviness
Bl| 4l
|ll|
B|BllBl -
|l 4l l
Up-casting and Contraction

5.13 (5.2.5) nya tubes, tubular stalks or organs vyu-sayogt (abl. due
to) air conjoining rohaam ascending, rising 5.14 (5.2.6) nodana-pant
sayukta-sayogt ca (see 5.10) 5.15 (5.2.7) vka-abhisarpaam tree(s)
flowing towards iti "thus" ada-kritam not commonly known caused by
5.13 (but) rising upward due to its conjoining with air (breath), (as)
tubes, 5.14 through conjoining of what is conjoined (the individual 5.1) and
through a squeezing impulse 5.15 that is caused by what is not commonly
known, (and) it is thus that there is such a flowing (even) in trees.
The mention in sutra 5.10 of conjoining with what is conjoined and a certain
impulse or urge clearly refers back to sutra 5.1. In the subjective dimension of
knowledge, the living human being arises from breath or air, in conjunction with
light and heat, water, and organic substance. All life forms defy "falling due to
heaviness" by rising upward by means of internal compressive forces. (Even
lifting a pestle and pulling a bowstring involve squeezing.) The bodies of all
advanced life forms are essentially tubes, with or without appendages, and their
major systems are tubular. Rising upward is the action of up-casting, and falling
due to heaviness is the action of down-casting, action (karma) being the subject of
both parts of this chapter and even the grammatical subject of the first sutra in
each part. The phrase "caused by what is not commonly known" both here and in
5.11 and 5.18 refers to what is caused by the primary conjunction of urge and
individual self (see 5.1), known only to the subjectivist yogin.
l l| 4B |l
4 4 \
interpolation
B 4l| 4B Bl Bll l
interpolation
Contraction, Expansion, and Up-casting
5.16 (5.2.8) apm (gen. for) water saghta packing together, concretion,
coalescence, aggregation vilayanam melting, liquifying, dissolving ca and tejas-
sayogt (abl. due to) fire conjoining 5.17 (5.2.9) tatra in that case, in which
case visphrjathu rumbling like thunder ligam indicator (5.2.10-12 is
commentary. See Appendix.) 5.18 (5.2.13) agne (gen. of) fire rdhva-jvalanam
upper, upward inflammable, combustible, flaming vayo (gen. of) (bodily) air
tiryac-pavanam lateral breeze, breathing anm (gen. belonging to) atoms
manasa (gen. belonging to) mind ca and dyam primary karma activity ada-
kritam not commonly known caused (5.2.14 is commentary. See Appendix.)
5.16 For water, due to its conjoining with fire, there is coalescence and
dissolution, 5.17 in which case the indicator is rumbling. 5.18 Fire's flaming in
the upward dimension and air's breathing in the lateral dimension belong
(both) to atoms and to mind, whose activity is the primary one, caused by the
thing that is not commonly known.
Coalescence and dissolution is a lateral contracting and expanding action. Its
connection here with water provides the complement to the rising already
mentioned in 5.13, and its connection with fire is the complement to fire's rising in
5.18. Also, air's lateral action in 5.18 is the complement to its rising in 5.13. In all
three there is falling due to the influence of tamas and in all four including earth
there is the primal connection with urge or impulse, known only to subjectivist
yogin. Rumbling is known in digesting, boiling, thundering, and so on. In the body
there are many examples of condensation or collection followed by linear passage
through tubes, such as the trachea, esophagus, blood and lymph vessels, etc., and
dissolution at the other end. There are also many examples of the same things
extended into the environment, such as evaporation, rain, rivers, wells, and the
growth and decay of all the plant and animal bodies. The mention of belonging to
both atoms and mind in sutra 5.18 reinforces the dualism theme.
Chapter Six
Conjunction and Disjunction
EB| Bl
Bl
B l ]ll4 | -
l |l ll | llB
Of Experience with Happiness and Suffering
6.1 (5.2.15) tma-indriya manas-artha-sanikart (abl. coming from)
individual self powers of sense mind object drawing in together sukha-
dukham happiness suffering 6.2 (5.2.16) tat-anrambha that without
origination tma-sthe (loc. absolute where) self abiding, steady manasi (loc.
absolute where) mind arrasya (gen. of) body dukha-abhva suffering
absent sayoga conjunction 6.3 (5.2.17) apasarpaam gliding out
upasarpaam gliding in aita-pta-sayog eating drinking conjunctions
krya-antara-sayoga products other conjunction ca and iti ada-
kritni caused by that which is not common knowledge (5.2.18-5.2.26 is
commentary. See Appendix.)
6.1 There is the happiness and suffering that comes from the drawing in
together of mind and object through the individual self and his powers of
sense, 6.2 (but) there is (also) a conjunction that is absent any suffering in the
body, where the mind abides steady in the self, without the origination of that
(happiness and suffering). 6.3 The conjunctions (of mind) with eating and
drinking, and the conjunction with the other effects mentioned (in 2.1-3,
seeing forms and feeling), whether gliding out or gliding in, are (also) caused
by that which is not commonly known (the self 6.2).
(The title of this chapter is given in its eighteenth sutra, as are the titles for the
next two chapters.) Sutra 6.1 describes happiness and suffering by conjunction and
6.2 describes a disjunction from them. They both involve the senses along with
their objects, and the organs of action. In the Sankhya 20.2-6 there is another
discussion of the relationship between the powers (indriyas) and their objects with
two opposing versions of the meaning of the word "glide" (apasarpaa), possibly
referring to this text. Whether it is a creative force thought to glide into the object
from the creator of the impression that makes it manifest, or the illuminating force
Chapter Six Conjunction and Disjunction 27
(like light or sound waves) associated with the attributes of a preexisting object
thought to glide out from it to a passive receiver of impressions, either way he says
that the root cause of pleasure and displeasure is that which is not commonly
known to everyone, just that which is known to the one, the yogin.
The absence of suffering he is talking about is not a permanent state where
there is cessation of all that, but rather a conjunction with it on the part of a mind
that knows the self as separate from it.
Of Veda and Comprehension
4 4l 4l4 l l 4\
4 4 l
6.4 (6.1.1) buddhi-prv (f.) knowing (ifc) preceded by vkya-kti (f.)
speech the act of, the making or forming of vede (loc. in) Veda 6.5 (6.1.2)
brhmae (loc. for) the brhmaa saj-karma doing the names, composing or
reciting siddhi-ligam establishing (it) indicator 6.6 (6.1.3) buddhi-prva
comprehension preceded by dadti giving
6.4 In the Veda, the forming of speech is preceded by the knowing. 6.5 For
the brhmaa, doing the names is (merely) the indicator of the establishment
of it (the knowing). 6.6 The giving of it (speech) is preceded by knowing.
Veda is not just any speech, but the verbal representation of higher knowledge
that leads to liberation.
l 9 l
lBlll l~l

interpolation ll| | interpolation
6.7 (6.1.4) tath in that way, so pratigraha receiving 6.8 (6.1.5) tma-
antara-gunm (gen. pl. of) individual one/other essential constituents
tma-antare (loc. in) individual one/other akraatvt (abl. because) no
causation (6.1.6-7 is commentary. See Appendix.) 6.9 (6.1.8) tasya (gen. of) it
samabhivyhrata (tasil resulting from) "mentioning together" (MW), verbal
communication doa degradation (6.1.9-16 is commentary. See Appendix.)
6.7 Receiving (of speech) is the same (preceded by knowing) 6.8 because of
there being no causation of essential constituents (buddhi in particular 1.5) of
one individual in another individual. 6.9 That degradation of it results from
verbal communication.
In the liberating view, knowing is primary and it is not caused by verbal
communication or by any preexisting object to be known. This applies not only to
speaking but also to hearing or reading words. In Yoga philosophy, there is no such
thing as a transfer of knowledge from one self to another.
Of Motive and Karmas
l9|BlBl ll4 9|B
l B|4l-

4l4lB9lB9|4lBlll
interpolation l ~l
6.10 (6.2.1) da-ada-prayojannm (gen. of) known unknown
motives da-abhve (loc. in) (commonly) known absence prayojanam motive
abhyudayya (dat. for) rising (Prayojana here means the same as hetu in 3.2 and
3.5 where it is also associated with artha-antara.) 6.11 (6.2.2) abhiecana-
upavsa-brahmacarya-gurukulavsa-vnaprastha-yaja-dna-prokaa-di-
nakatra-mantra-kla-niyam inauguration, baptism giving up food and
pleasures (for) student life monastic (guru house) life forest life religious
ceremony giving final consecration (for cremation) quarters of the
constellations mantras time rules ca and even adya (dat. for) what is not
(commonly) known (6.2.3-7 and the first part of 6.2.8 is commentary. See
Appendix.) 6.12 (6.2.8b) artha-antaratvt (abl. because) thing different there
being yamasya (gen. on the part of) observance of rules
6.10 Of (all) motives commonly known and not commonly known, the
motive for rising (to the greatest good) is in the absence of what is commonly
known, 6.11 and even the rules as to times (of life) and mantras for: baptism,
the student's renunciation of indulgence in life, life in the house of the master,
life in the forest, sacrifice, giving, final consecration, and (after life) the
quarters of the constellations, are for the sake of that (self) which is not
commonly known (see also SD 15.9), 6.12 because of the observance of the
rules being a different thing (from the rising).
Here he continues the discussion on rites and mantras. Such karmas are a gross
conjunction of actions in the physical world, but they are disjunct from or
unrelated to realizing the highest good through understanding. A motivated person
strives to achieve a goal of ultimate happiness that he has never yet experienced
but only imagined. In the lower worlds, the various stages of life are each thought
Chapter Six Conjunction and Disjunction 29
to have their associated rules, rituals, and realms, including in the end the
"quarters" or twelve divisions of the constellations, i.e., the regions of the after-life
(also described as "months" in Chandogya Upanishad V.10). Observance of rules
in general is essential but it is not the thing that leads to rising to the ultimate good,
because that is a separate thing. The same point is made in the Sankhya (SD 4.14-
17), that observance of Vedic rites does not produce rising to ultimate happiness.
Such happiness is a contentment that is inherent in sattvic consciousness, just
waiting to be revealed by lifting the veil of darkness caused by non-distinguishing.
Of Happiness, Dharma, Desire, and Aversion
ll4l
ll ~l l
6.13 (6.2.9) asati (loc. whereas) there is no (such) ca moreover abhvt (abl.
adverbial) in the absence of it (6.2.10) sukht (abl. because) happiness rga
desire 6.14 (6.2.11) tanmayatvt (tat-mayatvt) (abl. because) that made of,
absorbed in, identical with ca and 6.15 (6.2.12) adt (abl. because) not
commonly known ca and
6.13 Moreover, whereas there is no such (rising) in the absence of that
(motive 6.10), there is the desire (for rising to the highest good) because of the
(anticipated) happiness 6.14 and because it (the desire) is identical with that
(motive) 6.15 and because it is not commonly known.
l4 l = 4 l l 94 || 4l
6.16 (6.2.13) jti-viet (abl. inferred from see 3.17, 4.16) stations in life by
birthright particular ca moreover 6.17 (6.2.14) iccha-dvea-prvik desire
aversion preceded dharma-adharma-pravtti dharma non-dharma
manifestation 6.18 (6.2.15) tat that, thus sayoga conjunction vibhga
disjunction (The context here suggests that "tat" be interpreted as indeclinable
rather than the pronoun in a compound.) (6.2.16 is commentary. See Appendix.)
6.16 Moreover, from (seeing) the particular born ranks it is inferred, 6.17
that the manifestation of dharma or non-dharma is preceded by desire and
aversion. 6.18 Thus is conjunction (and) disjunction.
Again, like the final sutras of chapters three and four, this group of three sutras
addresses the source of the worldly notions that are opposed to the liberating
contemplation, in this case the relationship of dharma with the born stations in life.
This chapter expands on conjunction vs. disjunction, which is one of the two
aspects of "discerning", which is mentioned in sutra 1.5 as part of the unnamed
essential-constituent set underlying the physical mind. The other aspect, priority
vs. posteriority, will be covered in the next chapter. The second part of that
unnamed set, the aspects of endeavoring (i.e., happiness vs. suffering, and desire
vs. aversion), have been thoroughly treated in this chapter as well.
Chapter Seven
The Prior and the Posterior
interpolation ll lB~lBl
interpolation
4ll Bl B~l
interpolationl
4 l l ll interpolation
The Essential Constituents vs. the Atomic
(7.1.1 is commentary. See Appendix.) 7.1 (7.1.2) pthiv-di-rupa-rasa-
gandha-spar earth others form taste smell feel dravya-anityatvt
(abl. because) physical non-constancy anity non-constant ca both/and (7.1.3
is commentary. See Appendix.) 7.2 (7.1.4) apsu (loc. in the case of) water tejasi
(loc. in the case of) fire vyau (loc. in the case of) air ca both/and nity constant
(The word "eternal" for "nitya" with its connotations of something profound and
mystical just isn't suitable here.) dravya-nityatvt physical constancy (7.1.5 is
commentary. See Appendix.) 7.3 (7.1.6) kraa-gua-prvak cause essential
constituent preceded by pthivym (loc. in the case of) earth pka-j ripening,
maturing, developing produced by (7.1.7-9 is commentary. See Appendix.)
7.1 The form, taste, smell, and feel in earth and the others are both non-
constant, because of the non-constancy in the physical, 7.2 and constant,
because there is also constancy in the physical, in the case of water, fire, and
air. 7.3 In the case of earth, they are produced by developing, preceded by
their essential-constituent causes (the prior).
The "physical" as a general concept is inconstant in that it always seems to be
changing, especially organic material as it grows or decays or is eaten and
converted into other bodies, but it is constantly present in the created world. The
gross elements are said to be constantly changing only because their source, in the
essential constituents, is constantly changing. (The nature of those changes can be
Chapter Seven The Prior and the Posterior 31
examined up close, by focusing on them, as described in YD 7.1). Earth is singled
out because organic things are the only ones that grow. The word used here for its
"developing" gives the same sense as the Sankhya's seed and sprout analogy.
| 4l
H l-
4l ll4l l~l
interpolation
7.4 (7.1.10) ata (abl. of comparison) this vipartam opposite au the atomic
7.5 (7.1.11) au atomic mahat great iti it is said tasmin (loc.) in that regard
viea-bhvt (abl. because) particular presence viea-abhvt (abl. because)
particular absence ca and also 7.6 (7.1.12) eka-klatvt (abl. adverbial)
simultaneous being (7.1.13-20 is commentary. See Appendix.)
7.4 The atomic (view) is the opposite of this. 7.5 It is said in that regard,
"mahat is atomic (physical)" because there is the presence of the particular
and because there is also the absence of the particular 7.6 at the same time.
4l 4l\
44llBlll
ll l4l
B interpolation
Mahat Is Not Physical
7.7 (7.1.21) avidy lack of higher knowledge, ignorance ca indeed vidy-
ligam higher knowledge mark, indication 7.8 (7.1.22) vibhavt (abl. coming
from) (see vibhu MW) worldly greatness mahn mahat, the great, comprehensive
ka the ether tath from that, in that view ca and then tm the individual 7.9
(7.1.23) tat-abhvt (abl. coming from) it absence au atomic mana mind
(7.1.24-25 is commentary. See Appendix.)
7.7 The mark of such higher knowledge is indeed the ignorance 7.8 that
mahat, who is the ether, would come from worldly greatness and then the
individual from that. 7.9 (The notion) that mind is atomic (physical) comes
from the absence of it (higher knowledge or mind).
In Sankhya too, we find the teaching that the great mahat is the creator, as
opposed to the atomic view (SD 8.16-18). Being comprehensive, mahat includes
both the universal and the particular. Greatness and priority lies in the agency of
mahat as intellect, supported by the human consciousness itself, and intellect is in
turn the support for the individual self.
ll ~

l *
interpolation
4l
Mahat Is Not Essential Constituent
7.10 (7.2.1) rpa-rasa-gandha-spara-vyatirekt (abl. because) form taste
smell touch separate, distinct artha-antaram thing separate ekatvam
oneness 7.11 (7.2.2) tath in the same way, likewise pthak-tvam individualness,
sense of being and individual (7.2.3-14 is commentary. See Appendix.) 7.12
(7.2.15) gua essential constituent api after all vibhvyate it is to be perceived
7.10 His oneness is a separate thing because it is something distinct from
form, taste, smell, and feel, 7.11 and likewise (even) individuality, 7.12 which
is, after all, an essential constituent, something to be perceived.
The essential constituents corresponding to the senses are separate from the
"oneness", and even the subject of this section, the essential constituent called
"individuality" belongs with the others, separate from the oneness. This level of
the individual is the sense of being an individual, and even though it is the source
of tman (the individual self), it is still a sense and not the one who senses. In
contrast, the notion of an "individual" person, considered to be one of many
sentient souls according to the conventional meaning, is based only on the
perception of the physical person-form. The faulty process involved goes
something like this: "I am a conscious human being. I have, and must have, a
physical human body. From that I understand that other physical human bodies I
perceive must also be possessed by conscious human beings (this is the fallacy of
affirming the consequent). I speak and hear and understand words. They speak and
I hear the words and understand. Therefore, understanding follows from words.
Furthermore, the conscious being that I am must be an eternal soul because I
cannot conceive of my own non-existence. Therefore the others must be eternal
souls. I have seen and heard that all bodies eventually die, therefore my body will
die, but my eternal soul must persist after death." And so on with regard to
motivation and action, happiness, duty, etc.
Chapter Seven The Prior and the Posterior 33
B~l
Bll 9|l
ll 4l
Mahat Is Not Action
7.13 (7.2.16) nikriyatvt (abl. known by) being without activity 7.14 (7.2.17)
asati (loc. even where) no such thing na no asti he exists iti saying (quotes) ca
moreover prayogt (abl. because) application 7.15 (7.2.18) abda-arthau word
meaning asambandhau unrelated
7.13 It is known by his being without (physical) activity. 7.14 Moreover,
there can be no saying "He (another individual) exists," because that
(assertion) can be applied even where there is no such thing, 7.15 the word
("he") and the meaning being unrelated.
Mahat is the container and the essential constituents are his, including the sense
of individuality, but the assumption that there is a sense of individuality in others
is different. Even though you can say that "he", meaning another such individual,
exists, just because you can see his activity in the gross environment, it is not the
same as self-motivated action where the urge to act is felt only in the subject. The
author said earlier that the connection between the impulse to lift a heavy pestle
and the subsequent activity on the part of the hand can only be felt by the one
person. (In the Sankhya, the opponent gives his view on this point in SD 21.13).
|B| 7l4lB| 4 l l l 9
ll lll B49ll
There Is No Mahat in Others
7.16 (7.2.19) sayogina (abl. abs. known from) having conjunction dat
(abl. abs.) staff, handle (of the pestle) samavyina (abl. abs.) inherent viet
(abl. abs.) a particular thing ca and (The terminology here is obviously taken from
sutras 5.2 and 5.5-6. Nandalal Sinha seems to treat these as a sort of ablative
absolute construction as well.) 7.17 (7.2.20) smayika based on agreement,
conventional , customary abdt (abl. derived from) the word artha-pratyaya
meaning belief 7.18 (7.2.21) eka-dikkbhym (abl. dual; both from) unique
dimension eka-klbhym (abl. dual; both from) one, unique time sanika-
viprakbhym (abl. dual; known by) drawn together drawn apart param
prior aparam posterior ca and (The dual inflections here refer to the self-
connection and the object-connection. 7.2.22-28 is commentary. See Appendix.)
7.16 It is known from the (pestle 5.2) handle conjoined (with the hand) and
from the particular thing (impulse, endeavor 5.5-6) inherent (in the
individual), 7.17 that the belief in the meaning from the word is just based on
convention. 7.18 Thus are the prior and the posterior, known by the drawn in
together, (object, sense, and individual 3.10) vs. the drawn apart, both from a
unique time, both from a unique dimension (place). (Compare with 4.13-15.)
This pestle example is also taken up in the Sankhya where the author, in
response to his opponent's assertion that individuals are known by perceiving their
various activities and circumstances in life, replies that "there is no such inference
to be made of (karmic) activity on the part of someone standing near in regard to
such a thing (inborn power) and the one whose it is, (just) from the certainty that
he is not imperceptible" (SD 19.17). That opponent then inverts the argument later
on by saying, "It is not like the case of the pestle just because of exclusion of the
evidence of the perceiver of what has the characteristics" (SD 21.13), meaning that
you can't say others don't have perception or motive just because you can't directly
experience their perception or motive. Of course we all know that the world is full
of sentient motivated people, but this author is teaching the subjectivist arm of
Yoga philosophy, the liberating contemplation where there is only one time and
one place. In that time and place there exists only the one individual, whose mind
is known by the duality of the binding effect of object, sense, and self, drawn
together, vs. the separateness. We have already learned that the absence vs. the
presence of that understanding is the indicator of mind (3.10).
Chapter Eight Inherence 35
Chapter Eight
Inherence
interpolation 4lB l
4
l l B ll llll-
ll l
4lBl | B l4l
Of the Essential Constituents in the Physical

(8.1.1-8 is commentary. See Appendix.) 8.1 (8.1.9) samavyina (gen. of) the
thing having inherence vaityt (abl. from) whiteness vaitya-buddhe (abl.
from) whiteness discerning, cognition ca and vete (loc. as to, regarding)
something white buddhi cognition te (dual) the two ete those krya-kraa-
bhte (loc. where) effect cause being, constituting 8.2 (8.1.10) dravyesu (loc.
as is the case in) physical things an-itara-itara-kra without being one
thing upon another causes 8.3 (8.1.11) kraa-ayaugapadyt (abl. of a ya
bhvrtha type, an adverbial) causes without simultaneity kraa-kramt (abl.
produced from) cause series, sequence ca and ghaa-paa-di-buddhnm (gen.
of) jar cloth etc. cognitions krama series na it is not ("na" never directly
qualifies a following term in the ablative) hetu-phala-bhvt (abl. because)
reason, basis of knowing or of acting (motive) fruit, result relation
8.1 Cognition regarding something white comes from (both) the whiteness
of the thing in which it is inherent and the cognition of whiteness (itself),
where those two constitute effect and cause (respectively), 8.2 (but) without
being the one-thing-of-the-other causes that are the case in physical things. 8.3
Such a series of cognitions regarding a pot, a cloth, and so on, without
simultaneity of the cause (with the effect), and produced from a series of
causes, it is not, because it is a relation of the basis of knowing and its result.
Something "inherent" is always present, like the heartbeat or breathing in a
living human being. In this teaching the cognition of an inherent characteristic,
like the whiteness of a white cloth for example, goes even deeper in that the
cognition of whiteness is a cause and the white cloth is an effect or result. When
experiencing a busy scene in the environment, making this connection may seem
extremely difficult, but it is possible, and getting it is the whole point of this
teaching. (The Yoga Darshana offers practical techniques to aid in developing this
ability.) The author makes it clear that the kind of cause and effect he is referring
to is not the so-called "material cause", like threads and their constituent fibers for
cloth, or clay for a pot; nor is it the instrumental cause, like the action of the
weaver or the potter, where the making is the cause, step by step (without
simultaneity). His cause for any physical object is in its essential constituents.
~l |B
l4l l4l

Of Intellect in the Three
8.4 (8.2.1) ayam this ea the very thing tvy (inst. by) you ktam made
bhojaya (imp.2.sg.) you eat enam it (in the accusative case, referring to something
previous in the sentence MW) iti saying buddhi-apekam intellect
consideration 8.5 (8.2.2) deu (loc. in) known things bhvt (abl. because)
existence adeu (loc. in) things not known abhvt (abl. because) non-
existence 8.6 (8.2.3) artha object iti called dravya-gua-karmasu (loc. in
regard to) physical essential constituents action
8.4 Saying, "This thing here made by you, eat it." is a consideration of
intellect 8.5 because of its existence in things known (by intellect) and its non-
existence in things not known. 8.6 It is (only) called the "object" in regard to
the physical, essential constituents, and action.
The "thing" here is the actual physical food, the making of it the action, and the
color, taste, smell, and texture experienced in eating it are the essential
constituents. This "object" exists only in the knowing of it through the intellect.

l~ 94
l4l 4l
lB 9 l | 4l
l 4 l
Of Comprehension in the Physical

8.7 (8.2.4) dravyeu (loc. in) physical things paca-tmakatvam the
consisting of five elements pratiiddham denied 8.8 (8.2.5) bhyastvt (abl.
because) being increasing in abundance gandhavatvt (abl. because) being
possessed of smell ca and pthiv-gandha-jne (loc. in) earth smell
comprehension prakti prime origination 8.9 (8.2.6) tath in the same way pa
water teja fire vyu air ca and rasa-rpa-spara-aviet (abl. coming from)
Chapter Eight Inherence 37
taste form feel non-particular (Again the physicals are stated separately
while the essential constituents are in a compound. See 1.4-5.)
8.7 (Thus,) the consisting of the five (gross elements) in physical things is
denied. 8.8 The prime origination is (rather) in the comprehension of (e.g.,)
smell in earth because of its being what has smell and because of the
becoming of its abundance. 8.9 In the same way, water, fire, and air come
from the (respective) non-particular taste, form and feel.
In Yoga philosophy, elements are not inherent in physical things but
comprehension is. The thesis of the priority and inherence of comprehension and
of essential constituents is unmistakable here. It could not be stated more clearly.
"Becoming" abundant is equivalent to "developing" in sutra 5.3.
l
ll4ll
interpolation 9ll-
4l
H 4 |94
ll4 l49~l interpolation

Of the Non-real in the Real
8.10 (9.1.1) kriy-gua-vyapadea-abhvt (abl.) activity essential
constituents representation (w/abl.) in the absence of prk first, prior, previous
asat non-real (9.1.2-5 is commentary. See Appendix.) 8.11 (9.1.6) asat non-real iti
called bhta-pratyaka-abhvt (abl.) substantial perception (w/abl.) from
the absence of or in the absence of bhta-smte (abl. coming from) substantial
remembering virodhi-pratyakavat (vatup having) contrary perception 8.12
(9.1.7) tath similarly abhve (loc. even when) not existing bhva-pratyaka-
tvt (abl. coming from) existence, presence perception being ca and (9.1.8-10
is commentary. See Appendix.)
8.10 It (comprehension 8.8) is non-real, previous (to the real), in the
absence of any representation of the essential constituents or activity, 8.11
(whereas) anything called "non-real" comes (either) from remembering
something substantial in the absence of perception of the substantial, having
perception to the contrary, 8.12 and similarly, from there being perception of
its existence even when it does not exist.
One may consider sensory perception to be an illusion, or non-sensory
perception to be real, or vice-versa, but by the very definition of the term, there is
nothing "non-existent", because existence is perception; "esse is percipi"
(Berkeley). The notion of non-existence is simply an existent mind construct,
perhaps a memory construct of some object, held concurrently with naive boolean
negation, the earliest and most primal function of intellect, keeping in mind that in
this context "memory" is not a re-creation of some actual thing from a real past,
but rather an original bringing to mind of an object as if it were that.
These three sutras are an introduction to the following lesson that perception is
always present, in the existent as well as in all stages of drawing away from the
existent through meditation. There is never a state of non-existence of awareness.
That is why it is called eternal. Regarding meditation or sleep, it doesn't make
sense to believe in awakening from a state of emptiness or non-existence or even
dullness of consciousness and then being able to testify to that state based on your
memory of it, because there would be nothing to remember.
lB| |4 ll9
l l
lll l
Of the Individual in All
8.13 (9.1.11) tmani (loc. within) individual tma-manaso (gen. dual; of)
individual mind sayoga-viet (abl. coming from) conjoining, conjunction
particular tma-pratyakam individual perception 8.14 (9.1.12) tath in the
same way dravya-antareu (loc. of) physical(s) other pratyakam perception
8.15 (9.1.13a) asamhita-anta-kara things not composed or collected
inner creator upasahta-samdhaya drawn in contemplations
8.13 Perception of the individual comes from a particular conjunction of
the individual and mind within the individual, 8.14 in the same way that there
is perception of other physical things, 8.15 whether they are contemplations
drawn in (or) things not collected in the inner creator.
Perception is not a conjunction of an independently existing physical object
with the physical human sense organs, but a conjunction of mind with its
container, the individual self, and they are both physical things (see 1.4). This
holds true in both the subjectivist and the materialist contemplations. (For the
duality of contemplation (samdhi) see YD 1.15 commentary.)
Chapter Nine The Basis for Knowing the Individual 39
l 4ll
4lll
Of Essential Constituents in the Individual

8.16 (9.1.13b) tem (gen. of) those ca indeed (It is common in this work for a
sutra to consist of a single term plus the word "ca", e.g., 3.18, 4.14-15, 4.18, 6.14-
15) 8.17 (9.1.14) tat-samavyt (abl. because) in them inherence karma-
gueu (loc. regarding, of) action essential constituents 8.18 (9.1.15) tma-
samavyt (abl. because) individual inherence tma-gueu (loc. regarding, of)
individual essential constituents
8.16 Indeed, it (perception) is of those (physical things) 8.17 because of the
inherence in them of action and essential constituents, 8.18 because there is
inherence in the individual of that individual's essential constituents.
The common definition of perception of an object assumes that there is an
actual object existing beforehand whether or not it is perceived by anyone, an
object to be perceived. This new alternate definition, however, admits only an
object built out of a perception that is composed of internal qualities of the
awareness itself. These are the mental attributes of sense, counting, measuring,
etc., as well as the concepts of rising and falling, expanding and contracting, and
going. Where there are no such concepts, there are no objects, inner or outer.
Chapter Nine
The Basis for Knowing the Individual
l l | 4| 4l \
interpolation
| \ 9l Bl
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Intellect
9.1 (9.2.1) asya (gen. belonging to) this idam this kryam effect kraam
cause sayogi joined together virodhi contradictory, inconsistent samavyi
inherent ca and, or iti called laigikam (ika (w/vddhi); associated with) a mark or
indicator (9.2.2-3 is commentary. See Appendix.) 9.2 (9.2.4) hetu basis for
knowing apadea semblance ligam indicator pramam means of proof
karaam doer, agent iti this thing called an-artha-antaram not thing separate
9.3 (9.2.5) asya (gen. belonging to) this idam this buddhi-apekitatvt (abl.
known by) intellect consideration
9.1 Whatever is called "this belonging to this, a cause, an effect, a
conjoined thing, an inconsistent thing, or an inherent thing," is something
that is associated with an indicator (see also 3.7-9). 9.2 This basis for knowing,
"semblance, indicator, means of proof, agent," is not the separate thing. 9.3
(Even) "this belonging to this" is known (only) through consideration by
intellect.
"This belonging to this" refers to the particular and the universal (e.g. "This
man belongs to the merchant class." or, "This plant belongs to the Nightshade
family.) That phrase is the subject here and the other words are examples of it.
(Also see sutra 1.12, which confirms that sutra 9.3 refers to the particular and the
universal.) He is saying that a tree-of-Porphyry definition of reality is a backward-
looking construct that in itself can only ever exist within the sphere of intellect.
B| |4 l ll H l l
Memory
9.4 (9.2.6) tma-manaso (gen. of) individual mind sayoga-viet (abl.
from) joining together particular saskrt (abl. from) mind construct ca and,
indeed smti memory 9.5 (9.2.7) tath in the way svapna sleep, dream 9.6
(9.2.8) svapna-antikam dream near (For another "particular conjoining of
individual and mind", the individual's perceptual power (pratyaka), see 8.13.)
(9.2.9 is commentary. See Appendix.)
9.4 Memory comes from a particular conjunction of the individual and his
mind, and from (mind) construct, 9.5 in the way that a dream 9.6 is (just) the
near dream.
The idea of a real concrete timeline, so essential for making sense of daily life
and so essential for the equations we use to describe physical reality in detail, is
undeniably true and real, but it is only real in terms of the objective view where
conscious impressions, either as theoretical constructs or data produced by
observing, recording, and remembering, are analyzed and interpreted. In the
subjective dimension of the Yoga view it is something else, where the memory of a
time past and anticipation of a time to come are to be understood only as original
present-moment mind constructs. For example, a dream is only the near dream. In
this contemplation, there was no actual real dream in an actual real past. The
manifestation of it, as an original memory construct of a dream you supposedly
had just now, exists only in the present moment of dreamy consciousness when
you find yourself awake. That is the "near dream" moment, and it is an original
creation, not a re-creation. Memories of past dreams are even further removed.
This concept can perhaps be more easily grasped at first than the concept of the
actual physical world being a mind construct, and it may be useful as an
intermediate step towards understanding the liberating subjectivist view. In other
words, in a moment of clarity you may catch yourself making up a dream memory,
developing the details as you go along like writing a story, but this relatively easy
discovery may happen long before you ever catch yourself making up the present
moment waking reality. (Of course "long before" simply means "remembered as
being long before".)
In the Yoga Darshana, memory is described as a way of thought where objects
are believed to exist even in the absence of a believer/observer and where the past
is believed to have actually happened, another true reality existing in the absence
of the witness, even independently of his remembering (YD 1.6 and 3.2). That
work treats memory as one of the three aspects of common thought that obstruct
the condition of Yoga where the witness is distinguished as a separate thing, and it
teaches that the true nature of a remembered past and an anticipated future can be
fully realized by focusing on the three transformations or "parimas" (YD 7.1).
That technique involves close awareness of the constant slipping of an elusive
"right now" present into a "just now" past.
E|l l|ll4l
lB
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9.7 (9.2.10) indriya-dot (abl. from) powers fault saskra-dot (abl.
from) (mind) construct fault ca and smti memory 9.8 (9.2.11) tat-dua-
jnam by them corrupted, degraded, worldly understanding (The pronoun
followed by the past passive participle requires an instrumental connector like
"by".) 9.9 (9.2.12) aduam not degraded vidy higher knowledge (9.2.13 is
commentary. See Appendix.)
9.7 The Smti comes from a degradation involving those powers (of mind
9.4) and from a degradation of that (mind) construct. 9.8 It is a degraded
understanding of them, 9.9 (whereas) the higher knowledge is not degraded.
Here the author seems to start again with his description of the phenomenon of
memory, oddly using the same word "smti" as the subject in a very similar
sentence, but I think in this case, calling it an "understanding", and comparing it
against "vidy", which is higher knowledge, he is cleverly referring to the body of
Sanskrit works called "Smti". These works are filled with laws, customs, crimes,
and horrible punishments, and they prescribe strict adherence to an oppressive
system of social stratification. The author of the Vedanta Darshana also expresses
disdain for this Smti, which is certainly a lower kind of knowledge.
lBl4 l|l ]|l l4 B-
lll4 lBl~ |B 9\ll
Happiness and Suffering in the One vs. Others

9.10 (10.1.1) ia-ania-kraa-viet (abl. known by) sought, wished,
desired not sought cause difference, particularity virodht (abl. (being)
known by) contradiction, mutual opposition ca and, in addition to, also mitha
reciprocal sukha-dukhayo (loc. between) happiness suffering artha-antara-
bhva thing separate relation 9.11 (10.1.2) saaya-niraya-antara-
abhva doubt certainty separate without the relation ca moreover jna-
antaratve (loc. in) understanding other being hetu basis for knowing 9.12
(10.1.3) tayo (loc. dual; where, in regard to) nipatti coming about pratyaka-
laigikbhym (inst. or abl. dual; by) direct perception having an indicator body
9.10 In addition to being known by their mutual opposition, the reciprocal
separate-thing relation between happiness and suffering is also known by a
difference of cause between what is sought vs. not sought. 9.11 The 1.) basis
for knowing that, in being the other kind of understanding (not degraded
9.18), is moreover without the 2.) separate relation of doubt vs. certainty, 9.12
where in regard to those two, their coming about is by direct perception vs.
having an indicator body (respectively).
"Sukha" means happiness or pleasure but in the sense of peace and contentment
associated with the influence of sattva, and not feelings like giddiness or rapture or
physical pleasures, which are all passions associated with the influence of rajas.
This happiness is a foundational state that is realized in the absence of suffering.
When there is suffering, relief is sought, but when there is happiness, nothing is
sought, so the"cause" here is only the suffering as the cause of the seeking.
The basis for knowing the aversion to one's own suffering is immediate and
needs no reasoning. There is no question like, "Is this something I want, or not?"
There is no doubt that can be resolved by the certainty of an answer based on
deliberation. This "other kind of comprehension", without the doubt, involves
direct perception, whereas consideration of doubt vs. certainty involves
deliberation and inference based on the evidence of indicators. The word
"indicator" (liga) here refers to the human body as the outward sign of the
individual (tman). The following material confirms that these sutras refer to a
judgment on the part of the one individual as to the happiness or suffering of
another individual based on such external signs.
The Source of the Recognizable Body
ll Bl
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H l
9.13 (10.1.4) abht he was iti the saying (quotes) api in fact sati he is ca and
(10.1.5) krya-adarant (abl. coming from) effect without direct realization
9.14 (10.1.6) eka-artha-samavayi-kraa-antareu (loc. having to do with) one
thing inherent causes other datvt (abl. because) learned knowledge
being 9.15 (10.1.7) eka-dee (loc. in terms of) a particular place, a certain part iti
(quotes) ekasmin (loc. in relation to) the one, the whole ira (iras) the head
pham the back udaram the abdominal contents (lower front) marmi the
"mortal" or vital organs (upper front) tat-viea (regarding) these: particular
tat-vieebhya (abl. pl. derived from) in those particulars, differences
9.13 In fact, saying "He was (happy or suffering).", and "He is (that)."
comes without any direct realization of that effect, 9.14 because of its being
learned (common) knowledge having to do with the inherent-in-one-thing and
the other causes ("proofs" 3.7). 9.15 From the particular differences in those
(proofs 3.7), in terms of a "part" in relation to the whole (body), is derived the
particular regarding these: the head, the back, the abdominal (digestive
organs), the vital (chest) organs.
The import of sutra 9.13 lies in the use of the third person singular form,
referring to the false notion that you can know the happiness or suffering of
another person. The only "cause" in this discussion is suffering, and the only effect
is the desire (ia 9.10) to seek relief , which effect is known exclusively by direct
comprehension in oneself, whereas in regard to others it must be inferred,
especially in relation to the law of karma, where they are thought to be sustaining
consequences of past actions. When the desire to seek takes the form of embarking
on a path to acquire self-knowledge rather than applying superficial remedies, that
constitutes the true dharma referred to in the first three sutras of this work.
A fourfold division can be seen here, corresponding to the fourfold divisions
found in 3.7 and in 3.12:
1.) conjoined = individual = back;
2.) inherent = breath = vital organs;
3.) one-thing inherent = eyes and other buddhi-indriyas = head;
4.) excluded = urge/endeavor = abdominal
The point is that the comprehension of the four principles given in sutra 3.7 is
the source and cause of the mind-construct of the gross body parts. The conjoined
is the whole body of the individual, rising upward. It is represented by the back,
which is the framework for the other three parts. The inherent things are the vital
rhythmic attributes of heartbeat and breathing, which are the prime indicators of
life that inhere in any human being, represented by the heart and lungs. The
inherent-in-one-thing are the most recognizable parts of a distinct individual
person, those organs that also sense and recognize his distinct experience, all
associated with the head. The excluded are the attributes other than those that
indicate the absence or presence of life, represented by the other organs (mainly
abdominal), involving the digestion and passage of food and water. These difficult
connections are reminiscent of certain esoteric passages in the Upaniads, such as
the abstraction of the horse sacrifice (avamedha) in the opening of the
Bihadanyaka Upaniad. The idea of this abstraction is not that religious ideas
merely symbolize physical things, but that reality begins with the raw "qualia"
perception of abstract qualities and concepts as given in sutra 1.3. Meaningful
achievement lies not in kindling sacrificial fires and chanting names, nor in their
modern equivalents of rising to power and wealth through diligence and skilful
networking, but in understanding the abstraction.
Karmas vs. Essential Understanding

4ll 4
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9||
l Blll 9ll7
(10.2.1-6 is commentary. See Appendix.) 9.16 (10.2.7) sayukta-samavyt
(abl. through) conjoined inherence agne (gen. of) a sacrificial fire vaieikam
concerning the particulars 9.17 (10.2.8) dm (gen. of) things that are learned
or taught da-prayojannm (gen. pl. of) learned knowledge the essential aim
(the essence of comprehension 1.1.4) da-abhve (loc. in the context of) learned
knowledge absence of, freedom from prayoga putting together abhyudayya
(dat. for the sake of) rising 9.18 (10.2.9) tat-vacant (abl. because) of that
exposition mnyasya (gen. of) Veda prmnyam authority iti thus it is said
9.16 Whatever concerns those particulars of the sacrificial fire is through
its inherence in what is thus conjoined (the individual), 9.17 (but) for the sake
of rising there is the putting together of the essential meanings of what is
learned of the things that have been taught (here), within the context of the
absence of what is commonly known, 9.18 this (teaching) having the authority
of Veda because it is an exposition of that. Thus it is said.
The particular agnis or fires the author refers to were the householder's ancestry
fire, the oblation fire (eastern), the fire of offering to the master (southern), etc.,
which are associated with the particular aspects of life mentioned in sutra 6.11, or
perhaps he is referring to the Avamedha, but as he has already said, these
particular formal karmas and rules and their associated agnis are not the means of
rising to the highest good, because that is accomplished through essential
comprehension of the principles taught in this work, those "having to do with
particulars" of another kind, the "Vaisheshika".
In sutra 9.17 the word "da" is used in three different ways, but they are
closely related in that what is "taught" and "learned" is the "commonly known".
The phrase, "the putting together of the essential meaning of what has been
learned" means the same as "comprehension of the essence of the words" in sutra
1.3. The notion of learning in the absence of what is learned is obviously a
contradiction but that is the whole point. The two-fold purpose, which consists of
having the higher knowledge and at the same time letting go of it, or becoming
free of it, is at the very center of the dualistic teaching of the Darshanas. The
Sankhya Darshana picks up this theme and this term "da" in its opening sutras.
End of the Vaisheshika Darshana
Appendix
Interpolations to the Vaisheshika
Appendix Interpolations to the Vaisheshika 49
Interpolations to the Vaisheshika
Chapter One
l ll
l
B 4 B l l l
l
1.1.10 dravyi physical things dravya-antaram a physical thing other
rabhante (the commentator uses verbs) they originate gua attributes ca and
gua-antaram an attribute other 1.1.11 karma action karma-sdyam action
having a beginning na not vidyate found 1.1.12 na neither dravyam the physical
kryam effect kraam cause ca (w/na) nor badhati it excludes 1.1.13
ubhayath by both gu attributes
1.1.10 Physical things originate another physical thing, and attributes
another attribute. 1.1.11 It is not found that action has its beginning in action.
1.1.12 Neither cause nor effect excludes the physical. 1.1.13 Attributes (are
excluded) by both.
The term "na vidyate", meaning "it is not found", interpreted as "he does not
find", is used only by the commentator. Here he tries to present this work as an
examination of an independent physical world not created by the self. In these
three sutras and in the next twenty-one he tries to expand on the author's clear and
simple exposition, and in so doing he reveals that he either completely misses the
point or is trying to obscure it, or perhaps he is outlining a refutation (a weak
substitute for our familiar advocate of the opposing view.) He supplies indicators
for the three main categories and examines various cause and effect relationships
among them, noting the uniqueness of action. The problem is that he sees the
physical as the underlying cause, and that is the opposite of the author's thesis. He
also distinguishes a "non-deliberate" karma from the more familiar deliberate
karma. In his commentary, "gua" means something like "attribute" instead of the
author's meaning, "essential constituent". Comparing the style and content of the
authentic material with all of this commentary, it could not be more clear that they
are composed by two different people.
50 Appendix Interpolations to the Vaisheshika
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44ll
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|4l B l
Indicators
1.1.15 kriy-guavat (vatup having) activity attribute samavyi-kraam
concomitant cause iti dravya-lakaam (of) the physical mark, indicator
1.1.16 dravya-ray the physical depending on aguavn without attributes
having sayoga-vibhgeu (loc. in, of; see MW under kraa) conjoining
disjoining akraam without cause anapeka without consideration or regard
(without intelligence or design), not deliberate iti gua-lakaam attribute
indicator 1.1.17 eka-dravyam one with, equal to the physical aguam without
attribute sayoga-vibhgeu (loc. in, of) joning together disjoining anapeka-
kraam non-deliberate cause iti karma-lakaam action indicator
1.1.15 The indicator of the physical is: It is the inherent cause, having
action and attribute. (Being a cause would never be considered an "indicator" of
anything.) 1.1.16 The indicator of an attribute is: It is non-deliberate without
cause in conjoining and disjoining, depending on the physical without having
attributes (itself). 1.1.17 The indicator of action is: It is the non-deliberate
cause of conjoining and disjoining, equal to the physical, without attribute.
He completely misunderstands what the author means by "indicator".
Collective Causes
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1.1.18 dravya-gua-karmam (gen. of) physical things attribute action

dravyam the physical kraam cause smnyam collective 1.1.19 tath in the
same way, so is gua attribute 1.1.20 sayoga-vibhga-vegnm (gen.)
conjoining disjoining impulse, drive karma action samnam alike, equally
1.1.21 na not dravym (gen. of) physical things karma action 1.1.22
vyatirekt (abl. because) difference, separateness, exclusion, inconistency
1.1.18 The physical is the collective cause of physical things, attributes, and
action. 1.1.19 So is attribute. 1.1.20 Action (is the collective cause) of
conjoining, disjoining, and drive alike, 1.1.21 (but) action is not (the collective
cause) of physical things 1.1.22 because it is different.
This abbreviating style is typical of the commentator. Sutra 1.1.18 is exactly the
opposite of the author's thesis.
Collective Effects
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1.1.23 dravym (gen. of) physical things dravyam the physical kryam
effect smnyam collective 1.1.24 gua-vaidharmyt (abl. because) attribute
having a different role na not karmam (gen. of) actions karma action 1.1.25
dvitva-prabhtaya (plural) dualness carrying forward, subsequent to, etc.
sakhy countings pthaktva-sayoga-vibhg individuation conjoining
disjoining ca and 1.1.26 asamavyt (abl. because) no inherence smnya-
kryam collective effect karma action na not vidyte found
1.1.23 The physical is (also) the collective effect of physical things. 1.1.24
Action is not (the collective effect) of actions because it has a different role
than the attributes. 1.1.25 Reckonings, and the conjoining and disjoining of
individuation are things in subsequence of the duality. 1.1.26 Because there is
no inherence, action as a collective effect is not found.
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1.1.27 sayognm (gen. of) conjoinings dravyam the physical 1.1.28

rpm (gen. of) forms, appearances rpam form,appearance 1.1.29 gurutva-
prayatna-sayognm (gen. of) heaviness effort conjunctions utkepaam
throwing upward 1.1.30 sayoga-vibhg conjoining and disjoining ca and
karmam of actions 1.1.31 kraa-smnye (loc. regarding) causes in
general dravya-karmam (gen. of) physical things (or) actions karma action
akraam non-causal uktam he has declared, is saying
1.1.27 The physical (is the collective effect) of conjoinings; 1.1.28 form, of
forms; 1.1.29 throwing upward, of conjunctions involving heaviness and
effort; 1.1.30 conjoining and disjoining, of actions. 1.1.31 Regarding causes in
general, action is non-causal of physical things or (other) actions. This is what
he is saying.
The technique of abbreviation (e.g., 1.1.28) and the use of the word "uktam"
confirms that the previous sutras were commentary, in this case all the way back to
1.1.15. These interpolations are innocent, even if obtuse, but the voluminous
commentaries on this elegant work, which were done by certain medieval scholars
(viz. The Vaieika Stras of Kada Sinha 1923) are something else. Sutra by
sutra, they bury the original message in faulty analysis and off-point rhetoric. They
are a perfect example of the clamor or jumble of beliefs in the meaning of words
mentioned in Yoga 7.2-3. Still, in an odd way, the interpolations and the
obstructive medieval commentary serve to provide that familiar background of
opposition that is actually supplied by the authors of the Sankhya and the Yoga.
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1.2.9 gua-karmasu (loc. regarding, having to do with) ca and bhvt (abl.
because) existence (abl. because) being na neither karma action na nor gua
attribute 1.2.10 smnya-viea-abhvena (instr. with) universal particular
absence of relation ca (and) but, only 1.2.11 aneka-dravya-vat-tvena (instr. by
reasson of) not one, many physical things having the condition of
dravyatvam physicalness uktam he says 1.2.12 smnya-viea-abhvena ca
1.2.13 tath gueu bhvt guatvam attributeness uktam 1.2.14 smnya-
viea-abhvena ca (see 1.2.10) 1.2.15 karmasu bhvt karmatvam actionness
uktam 1.2.16 smnya-viea-abhvena ca (see 1.2.10)
1.2.9 And it is neither attribute nor action, because its existence has to do
with attributes and actions 1.2.10 but with the absence of the relation of
particular to universal. 1.2.11 He says that physical-ness is by reason of the
condition of having many physical things 1.2.12 but with the absence of the
relation of particular to universal. 1.2.13 He says that in the same way,
attribute-ness comes from existing in attributes 1.2.14 but with the absence of
the relation of particular to universal. 1.2.15 He says that action-ness comes
from existing in actions 1.2.16 (but) with the absence of the relation of
particular to universal.
In these four pairs of sutras the commentator simply remarks on the linguistic
significance of the abstract noun forms ("-ness") used by the author in 1.14-16, in
regard to the concepts of universality and particularity (1.12). The repeated use of
the word "uktam" also marks this section as being commentary.
Chapter Two
l B 4
2.1.5 te these ke (loc. in) the ether na not vidyante found
These are not found in the ether.
Here the commentator remarks on the curious absence of a corresponding
attribute for the ether. "Na vidyate" and "na vidyante" indicate commentary.
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2.1.6 sarpis-jatu-madhucchinm agni-sayogt dravatvam adbhi

smnyam 2.1.7 trapu-ssa-loha-rajata-suvarnm agni-sayogt
dravatvam adbhi smnyam
2.1.6 For ghee, resin, and beeswax, being physical things in common with
water is through the application of fire (heat). 2.1.7 For tin, lead, iron, silver,
and gold, being physical things in common with water is through the
application of fire (heat).
In these two sutras he explains how "water" can include anything fluid or
viscous and thus conform to the idea of a liquid state as one of five states of
matter. The addition of the words drav and snigdh to sutra 2.2 in the original
material to make it seem consistent with this idea, and the lists of fusible iron age
metals and organic substances here, clearly don't belong.
In the following sutras the commentator sets out to explain why air is included
as being physical even though it is obviously not a real physical object like the
other three. He begins with an example.
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2.1.8 vi having horns kakudmn having a hump prnte-vladhi (also

written bladhi) (aluk compound) (nom. sing.) at the end tail-hair ssnvn
having a dewlap iti (quotes) gotve (loc. in) being a cow, cowhood dsam visible
ligam mark, sign, indication 2.1.9 spara feel ca indeed, now vyo (gen.
belonging to) air 2.1.10 na it is not ca but dnm of physical things spara
"feel" iti said to be ada-liga non-visible indicator vyu air 2.1.11 a-
dravya-vat-tvena (inst. by) not physical having, consisting of being
something dravyam 2.1.12 kriyvattvt guavattvt ca both 2.1.13 a-dravya-
vat-tvena (inst. by reason of) not physical consisting of its being nityatvam
something that is constant uktam what he said (is saying)
2.1.8 "It has horns. It has a hump. There is tail-hair at the end (of the tail).
It has a dewlap.": this is the visible indication that something is a cow. 2.1.9
Now feel does belong to air, 2.1.10 but it is not what is said to be the "feel" of
the visible (physical) things. Air is the indicator (only) of what is not visible
2.1.11 by reason of its being something that doesn't consist of any physical
things, (but) it is physical 2.1.12 because of its being what has action (blowing)
and because of its being what has attributes (hot, cold, etc.), both, 2.1.13 (so)
by reason of its being something that doesn't consist of physical things, (even
though it is physical) it (air) is a constant (in all four). This is what he is
saying (It clearly is not.)
Again, the word "uktam" at the end indicates that all the previous material is
commentary. The word visible is used here in two different ways, which is a bit
confusing. The visible physical things are not physical markers or indicators of
feel. The invisible physical thing "air" is a marker, but only of the invisible.
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2.1.15 vyu-sanikare (loc. in) air coming together pratyaka-abhvt
(abl. because) perception absence dam seen, visual ligam indication na not
vidyate found 2.1.16 smnyato-dt (abl. because) as a universal learned
(MW under smnyatas) ca and aviea non-particular 2.1.17 tasmt (abl.
beacause) that gamikam having doctrine, doctrinal 2.1.18 saj-karma names
making tu but asmat-viinm (gen. pl. of) us separate things ligam
indicator 2.1.19 pratyaka-pravttatvt (abl. because) by perception brought
forth being saj-karmaa (gen. of) name applied
2.1.15 A visual indication is not found in the coming together of airs
because of the absence of perception of it, 2.1.16 and it is non-particular
because it is learned as universal. 2.1.17 Because of that (learning), it is
doctrinal, 2.1.18 but applying names is an indicator of things separate from
us, 2.1.19 because there is something brought forth by perception of the
applied name.
"Na vidyate" and any mention of what is "doctrinal" belongs to the
commentator. He says if there is a name there must be a corresponding object.
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2.1.21 tat-aligam (for) it lack of indicating, being an indicator eka-
dravyatvt (abl. because) equal to physical being karmaa (gen. of) action
2.1.22 kraa-antara-anuklpti-vaidharmyt ca 2.1.23 sayogt abhva
karmaa
2.1.21 Its (the ether's) not being an indicator is because of action's being
equal to the physical, 2.1.22 and because of (its) divergence from the role of
that which follows in accordance with the other causes (other than that of
action). 2.1.23 There is no becoming of action from conjoining.
Here, noting the author's omission of the expected fifth attribute that might be
an indicator of the ether, the commentator tries to show that it is sound, even
though the author has just stated otherwise.
l
4 l
| ll l9l]l 4l 4
4ll~l Bl
| B B|
l\ll
2.1.24 kraa-gua-prvaka krya-gua da 2.1.25 krya-antara-
aprdur-bhvt (abl. known from) effect different manifestation ca and so
abda sparavatm agua 2.1.26 paratra (loc. in the case of) other, following
samavyt pratyakatvt ca also na neither atm-gua na nor mano-gua
2.1.27 pariet (because) left-over ligam kasya
2.1.24 It is well-known that the attribute of an effect is preceded by the
attribute of its cause, 2.1.25 and so, because there is no manifestation of a
different effect, it is known that sound is not an attribute of the things that
have feel (earth, water, fire, and air 2.1-4). 2.1.26 Also in the case of the
following (time and dimension), (it is not,) because of (the necessity of)
inherence and because of (sound's) being a perception. Neither is it (sound) an
attribute of individual soul or an attribute of mind (the two remaining
dravyas). 2.1.27 It is the indicator of the ether because that's all that's left.
All four element constructs listed in 2.1-4 have feel, but sound is not their
indicator. Neither is sound the indicator of time, dimension, soul, or mind, which
completes the list of dravya elements. The commentator reasons that there must be
an inherent attribute or indicator for the ether, that it must be a perception or sense
power, and that since there is only one sense that has not yet been assigned, by the
process of elimination, it must be the sense of hearing or sound.
~B~ 4l
Bl ll l4 B \l-
4 l \ll4l B
4lBl *
2.1.28 dravyatva-nityatve vyun vykhyte 2.1.29 tattvam bhvena (inst.
by the example of) existence 2.1.30 abda-liga-aviet (abl. because of)
sound('s) (as an) indicator non-particular(ity) viea-liga-abhvt ca 2.1.31
tat-anuvidhnt eka-pthaktvam equal to individuation being ca and iti
2.1.28 The physicalness (2.1.11-12) and constancy (2.1.13) (of sound) is
explained by (the text on) air, 2.1.29 (its) reality by the example of (that on)
existence, 2.1.30 because of sound's non-particularity as an indicator and
because of the non-existence of any particular indication (of it), 2.1.31 and in
its conformity with that (role) it is equal to individuation.
He refers the reader back to his commentary on air in 2.1.8-13. Then he refers
the reader back to his commentary on abstract existence in 1.2.9-16.
4| B
ll9l]l 4| 4 ll4\
4
l B|*Bl lll l
ll
2.2.1 pupa-vastrayo (loc. between) flower cloth sati there being
sanikare (loc. in) contact gua-antara-aprdur-bhva attribute some
other lack of manifestiation vastre (loc. in) cloth gandha-abhva-ligam smell
absence indicator 2.2.2 vyavasthita pthivym gandha 2.2.3 etena uat
vykhyt 2.2.4 tejasa uat 2.2.5 apsu tat
2.2.1 In the contact between a flower and a cloth, there being a lack of
manifestation of some other attribute, there is in the cloth an indicator in the
absence of any (actual) smell. 2.2.2 It is established that there is smell in earth.
2.2.3 By that, hotness is explained. 2.2.4 Hotness belongs to fire. 2.2.5 In water
it is coldness.
Hot and cold feel become form and taste, fire and water. The word vykhyta
"it is explained" inflected in any gender and number is always the commentator's.
~B~ 4l
Bl ll ~ l4 B
B l4lB
l4ll ll
2.2.7 dravyatva-nityatve vyun vykhyte 2.2.8 tattvam bhvena 2.2.9
nityeu abhvt anityeu bhvt krae kla-khy iti
2.2.7 The physicalness (2.1.11-12) and constancy (2.1.13) (of time) is
existence (1.2.17). 2.2.9 The naming of "time" as a cause is because it exists
among the non-eternals since it does not exist among the eternals.
~B~ 4l
Bl l4 B l 4 BlBl~
2.2.11 dravyatva-nityatve vyun vykhyte 2.2.12 tattvam bhvena 2.2.13

krya-vieea nntvam
2.2.11 The physicalness (2.1.11-12) and constancy (2.1.13) (of dimension) is
existence (1.2.17). 2.2.13 Its manifoldness is known through the diversity of its
effects.
l l 9ll ll B llB lllB
2.2.15 tath daki pratc udc ca 2.2.16 etena dig antar-lni middle, in-
between (la shortened from laya) dwellings, abodes vykhytni
2.2.15 In that way south, west, and north as well. 2.2.16 In that (same) way
the in-between regions are explained.
ll9l l9l H |4| |
ll l
4 l ~l
~l7
Bl
l l ~l
|4 l
2.2.17 smnya-pratyakt (abl. arising from) universal perception viea-

apratyakt (abl. arising from) particular perception viea-smte (abl. arising
from) particular memory ca and saaya doubt, uncertainty 2.2.18 dam
known ca davat (vati like) known 2.2.19 yath-dam in such a way known
a-yath-datvt (abl. adv.) without in that way known being ca 2.2.20
vidy-avidytas scholarly knowledge not scholarly knowledge ca moreover
saaya doubt, uncertainty 2.2.21 rotra-grahaa ear grasping, capturing
ya whatever artha meaning sa that thing abda word 2.2.22 tulya-jtyeu
(loc.) equal to, of the same kind or class or number or value, similar, comparable,
like artha-antara-bhteu (ifc.) kind of thing different being "which are"
vieasya (gen. of) the particular ubhayath in both cases da-tvt (abl. from)
known being 2.2.23 eka-dravyatvt na dravyam 2.2.24 na neither api indeed
karma action a-cku-tvt (abl. because) no direct sight being 2.2.25
guasya (gen. of) attribute sata (of) existence apavarga completion, end
karmabhi (inst. pl. with) actions sdharmyam
2.2.17 Uncertainty arises from perception of the universal without
perception of the particular, and from memory of the particular, 2.2.18 which
(memory) is known only like what is so known (by perception), 2.2.19 known
in that (memory) way without being known in that (perception) way. 2.2.20
Moreover, such uncertainty results whether it is from scholarly knowledge or
unscholarly knowledge, 2.2.21 (because) whatever the meaning (of the
knowledge), the thing received by the ear is just a word-sound. 2.2.22 In both
cases, that (knowledge) regarding members of the same class in respect of
those which are a different kind of thing, comes from the particulars being
known. 2.2.23 Whatever is known from being equal to the physical (a
memory) is not physical. 2.2.24 Neither indeed is action (physical), because of
there being no direct sight of it. 2.2.25 The (universal perception's 2.2.17)
commonness of role with actions is that it is where the existence of the
attribute (of the particular) leaves off.
He says that all mental considerations other than direct physical perceptions are
uncertain and that includes word knowledge whether higher or lower, because the
physical word-sound itself is only the perception, not the knowledge. Even action
is not physical because, like thought, it has no directly perceived attributes. To
him, if an object is now here and then there, it is seen to have moved, but still the
only things with attributes are the object and the background environment. This is
all true and interesting on a fairly coarse level of understanding, but again it is
simple common knowledge. Interestingly, sutra 2.2.17 is directly opposed to the
author's teaching following closely in sutras 2.2.26-30.
B4l
Bl l
2.2.27 nitya-vaidhrmyt (abl. because) eternal different dharma 2.2.28
anitya non-eternal ca and ayam this kraatas (tasil because) cause
2.2.27 Because it has a different role from the eternal. 2.2.28 Moreover this
is non-eternal because it is a cause.
\llB
2.2.32 ligt (abl. because) ca and anitya non-eternal abda sound
2.2.32 And sound is not eternal because it is an indicator.
Chapter Three
l ll 4| | 94-
4 ~l 94|B | lB Hlll
Hl Hlll Hll lBl|ll
3.1.10 kryam krya-antarasya (This recalls the most recent term in the
genitive case, "artha-antarasya" in 3.1.8, so "an-apadea" is implied.) 3.1.11
virodhi abhtam bhtasya 3.1.12 bhtam abhtasya 3.1.13 bhta bhtasya
3.1.14 prasiddhi-prvakatvt (abl. due to) common acknowledgement
previousness apadeasya (gen. of) semblance 3.1.15 aprasiddha anapadea
asat sadigdha ca anapadea 3.1.16 yasmt vi tasmt ava 3.1.17
yasmt vi tasmt gau iti ca an-aika-antikasya (gen. of) what has no single
end or point udharaam
3.1.10 It is an effect (without the semblance) of another effect. 3.1.11 The
inconsistent is non-fact, (without the semblance) of the factual, 3.1.12 fact
(without the semblance) of the non-factual, 3.1.13 (and) fact (without the
semblance) of the factual 3.1.14 due to the previousness of any common
acknowledgment of (its) semblance. 3.1.15 Whatever is without common
acknowledgment is without semblance. Whatever is without a semblance is
uncertain and unreal (no): 3.1.16 (e.g.,) because something has horns it is
therefore a horse. 3.1.17 Moreover, saying that "because of having horns it is
therefore a cow" is an example of (the error of) no single conclusion.
The commentator, using his technique of abbreviation, gives examples
illustrating the meaning of "the inconsistent". This and the following sutras recall
the word in the genitive in 3.1.8 (just as in SD 3.8-12). He sounds like an
enthusiastic student reciting beginner principles in logic.
~B~ 4l
Bl ll
3.2.2 tasya dravyatva-nityatve vyun vykhyte
3.2.2 (See 2.2.7, 2.2.11, etc.)
~B~ 4l
Bl ll B
9ll4l \ B 4 ll| ll4
Hll l7l
3.2.5 tasya dravyatva-nityatve vyun vykhyte 3.2.6 yajadatta iti

sanikare pratyaka-abhvt dam ligam na vidyate 3.2.7 smnyatas
dt ca aviea 3.2.8 tasmt gamika 3.2.9 aham iti abdasya (gen. of, in)
vyatirekt (abl. because) (not the indeclinable form "with the exception of")
separate na gamikam having doctrine
3.2.5 (See 2.2.7, 2.2.11, etc.) 3.2.6 The visible indication "it is Yajadatta" is
not found because of the absence of perception of the drawing in together.
3.2.7 It is non-particular because it is known to result from a universal. 3.2.8
Because of that it is doctrinal. 3.2.9 (But) not the doctrine of the word "I",
because that is a different thing.
4| = | =l
ll=l 9 l
3.2.12 devadatta gacchatti yajadatta gacchatti iti upacrt (abl. as ind.)
figurative speech arire pratyaya 3.2.13 sadigdha tu upacra
3.2.12 The belief "Devadatta goes", "Yajadatta goes" is figurative in
regard to the body. 3.2.13 But something figurative is obscure.
4| =l
lllBll4=9|l l
B l4 l4
4|l B 4 |ll
4 lll 4 Bl
3.2.15 devadatta gacchati iti upacrt metaphorical, figurative abhimnt
tvat to such an extent, so much as, amounting to arra-pratyaka ahakra
3.2.16 sadigdha tu upacra 3.2.17 na tu arra-viet yajadatta-
viumitrayo jnam viaya 3.2.18 aham iti mukhya-yogybhym (inst.
abl.) chief, principal fit for, able, capable abdavat as the word vyatireka-
avyabhicrt separateness, exclusion absolute viea-siddhe (abl.) difference
establishing na not gamika received, doctrinal
3.2.15 The personal identity is a perception of the body amounting to the
figurative conceit, "Devadatta goes". 3.2.16 But something figurative is
obscure. 3.2.17 But the sphere of perception (of the personal identity) is not
the knowledge of Yajadatta and Viumitra because it is not a particular
body. 3.2.18 "I am" as the word is not doctrinal since it is established as a
particular because of the absolute separation between the principal (self) and
the capable (body).
Chapter Four
B 4 9 l4 4l
4.1.4 anitya iti vieatas pratiedha-bhva 4.1.5 avidy
4.1.4 Coming up with the objection, "it is non-eternal because it is a
particular" 4.1.5 is ignorance.
lll4ll|B
=
4.1.7b rpa-saskra-abhvt (abl. because) form construct absence
vyo (gen. of) air anupalabdhi non-comprehension
There is non-comprehension of air because of the absence of a construct of
its form.
B
lB ll
4.1.9 tena through this rasa-gandha-spareu jnam (loc. regarding) taste

smell feel vykhytam explained
4.1.9 Through this, comprehension regarding taste, smell, and feel is
explained.
B
~ l4 4 E lB ll
4.1.13 etena guatve bhve ca sarva-indriyam (singular) jnam

vykhytam
4.1.13 It is explained by this that comprehension regarding attributeness
and regarding existence is the entire sense power.
He notes that the example regarding sight and form in the next three sutras
would also apply to the other three tanmatras.
9l9ll |l9~ll B 4
ll-
9l]l 4l B >l
B 4 9 l4 4l
4.2.2 pratyaka-apratyakm (gen. of) perception non-perception
sayogasya (gen. of) conjunction apratyakatvt (abl. because) lack of
perception paca-tmakam consisting of five na not vidyate found 4.2.3 gua-
antara-aprdur-bhvt (abl. because) quality other not manifest ca-na nor
tri-tmakam three consisting of
4.2.2 That consisting of five is not found because of there being a lack of
perception of any conjunction of perceptible and not perceptible, 4.2.3 nor
consisting of three because another quality is not manifest.
Chapter Five
l || ll -
|l4 |l
B 4 9 l4 4l
5.1.4 tath in this way tma-sayoga soul conjoining hasta-karmai (loc.
in) hand action 5.1.5 abhightt (abl. from) pounding musala-sayogt (abl.
through) pestle conjoining haste (loc. in) hand karma action 5.1.6 tma-
karma-hasta-sayogt (abl. through) soul action hand conjoining ca and
5.1.4 In this way there is conjoining with the self in the action of the hand.
5.1.5 There is action in the hand from pounding, through conjoining with the
pestle 5.1.6 and also through conjoining of self with the action of the hand.
He simply repeats in his own words what has already been said by the author.
B|B4 l]B4 l l ll
l 4|B 97ll4 9 8 B

4l
|l
5.1.10 nodana-viet udasana-viea 5.1.11 hasta-karma (inst. by

means of) hand action draka-karma breaking, tearing, splitting; action
vykhytam explained 5.1.12 tath in the same way dagdhasya (gen. of) the
burned or pained visphoane (loc. as to, for) the appearance of blisters or boils
5.1.13 prayatna-abhve (loc. in) effort absence prasuptasya (gen. of) someone
who is asleep calanam moving, shaking 5.1.14 te (loc. in) grass karma action
vyu-sayogt air conjoining 5.1.15 mai-gamanam magnetite gem, lodestone
moving sc-abhisarpanam needle approaching, coming toward ada-
kraam unseen, unknown cause
5.1.10 The particular upward throwing comes from a particular impulse.
5.1.11 By the action in the hand, the action of the splitting (of the husk) is
explained. 5.1.12 In the same way (it is the explanation) for the blisters of the
one who is pained (by them). (The medieval scholars' interpretation of 5.1.11-12
is astonishingly bad and flags an urgent warning as to their credibility.) 5.1.13
There is the twitching of someone who is asleep, absent any effort. 5.1.14
There is action in grass from the conjoining with air. 5.1.15 There is moving a
lodestone, the needle coming toward it, the cause unseen.
He follows the chain of cause and effect one step further. In his experience
using a mortar and pestle, the splitting of the husk from the grain is the intended
effect but an unintended effect is burning pain due to blisters (on a scholar's
uncallused hands) from lifting the pestle. He follows that observation with an
example of action not caused by motive or endeavor, and then an example of
action where the cause is known but not seen, and then an example of action where
the cause is known and seen but the connection with the cause is not seen.
4 l |lll B7|
4l l 4l
ll
5.2.10 vaidikam relating or conforming to the Veda ca and 5.2.11 apm

sayogt vibhgt ca stanayitno (abl. gen.) thunder 5.2.12 pthiv-karma
tejas-karma vyu-karma ca vykhytam
5.2.10 And it conforms with the Veda. 5.2.11 And also because conjoining
and disjoining of water is known by thunder. 5.2.12 By action in earth, action
in fire and action in air are explained.
l B ll
5.2.14 hasta-karma manasa karma-vykhytam

By action in the hand, the activity of mind is explained.
Chapter Six
l4 |ll4|9l]l 4 |
B4l l4
| l l4l ll4ll l4ll 7l B
l
l lll Bll 4l | B4 l
~4lB|
lll l B l
5.2.18 tat-abhve sayoga-abhva aprdur-bhva ca and moka
liberation 5.2.19 dravya-gua-karma-nipatti-vaidharmyt abhva absence
tama darkness 5.2.20 tejasa dravya-antarea varat ca 5.2.21 di-klu
kam ca kriyvat-vaidharmyt nikriyi 5.2.22 etena karmi gu ca
vykhyt 5.2.23 nikriym samavya karmabhya niiddha 5.2.24
kraam tu asamavyina gu 5.2.25 guai di-vykhyt (f. like di)
5.2.26 kraena kla
5.2.18 Liberation, in the absence of that, is the absence of any conjoining
and a lack of manifestation. 5.2.19 Darkness is the absence (of any conjoining)
due to the divergence from the dharma of bringing forth action, attribute,
and the physical. 5.2.20 Also that (darkness) is due to concealing of light by
another physical substance. (really!) 5.2.21 Dimension and time, (and) the
ether have no action because of their difference from what has action. 5.2.22
By that, actions and attributes are explained. 5.2.23 Inherence of whatever is
without action is excluded by action, 5.2.24 but attributes are cause without
having inherence. 5.2.25 By the attributes, dimension is explained. 5.2.26 By
cause, time (is explained).
Vykhyt, etc. He likes to say "It is not the same because it is different."
|B B 4 ] ll
6.1.6 tat-dua-bhojane na vidyate 6.1.7 duam hisym

6.1.6 This is not found when partaking in degraded (speech). 6.1.7 What is
hurtful is degraded.
] B 4 B4 94 lB 4l 94 B
lB4 llB ll
l 4lBl l
lB l l l| 4l 4 l
6.1.9 tat-adue (in) by that not degraded na not vidyate found 6.1.10 punar
again viie (loc. in) distinguished pravtti progress 6.1.11 same (loc. in) same,
equal hne (loc. in) excluded v or pravtti progress 6.1.12 etena hna-sama-
viia-dhrmikebhya excluded common distinguished dutiful parasva-
dnam another's property receiving, taking for oneself vykhytam explained
6.1.13 tath so viruddhnm (gen. pl. of) opposed, restrained, forbidden,
prohibited, improper tyga abandoning, letting go 6.1.14 hne (loc. if) excluded,
low class pare (loc. if) supreme, high class tyga rejecting 6.1.15 same (loc. if)
common, ordinary, middle tma-tyga one's own rejecting para-tyga
highest, supreme rejecting v 6.1.16 tma-tyga one's own rejecting iti
6.1.9 It (the fault) is not seen in someone who is not degraded by that
(hurtfulness). 6.1.10 Again, in the distinguished person there is progressing.
6.1.11 Or in the common person or the excluded (low class) person there is
progressing. 6.1.12 By this is explained receiving the property of the virtuous
(uncorrupted) who are excluded, common, or distinguished. 6.1.13 So (let
there be) rejecting of improper things. 6.1.14 Rejecting; if (one is) low, if high,
6.1.15 or if middle, rejecting one's own (fault) is the highest (form of)
rejecting. 6.1.16 This is (the meaning of) "rejecting one's own".
The commentator interprets "giving" 6.1.3 and "receiving" 6.1.4 in a different
way, connected with low, middle, and high births and with material gifts.
l l l B
l l4| l||B
l
6.2.3 ctur-ramyam (ya) the institute of the four stages of life for a
brahmin upadh the four tests for lack of integrity (cf. MB or Kauilya
"deceiver", machivellian) anupadh ca 6.2.4 bhva-doa character fault
upadh dishonesty adoa without fault anupadh absence of dishonesty
6.2.3 The dishonesties and the non-dishonesties are (like) the four life
stages. 6.2.4 Dishonesty (lack of purity or integrity) is a fault of character
(whereas) absence of dishonesty lacks such fault (!).
There were four tests for dishonesty or lack of integrity (upadh) known
partly from writings of the Mauryan dynasty. The tests were given to prove that a
person, perhaps a potential government minister, could resist the allures of four
temptations: sexual pleasure (kmopadh), straying from dharma (dharmopadh),
succumbing to fear (bhayopadh), and pursuing wealth (arthopadh). This
commentary seems to be inspired by the similarity between the four tests and the
four stages of life mentioned in the previous text, i.e., student, householder, forest-
dweller, and renunciant. These latter would indeed require abstinence, duty,
courage, and poverty respectively.
9|
l 9
l |Bl
| B 4 Bll4l 4l
6.2.5 yat whoever ia-rupa-rasa-gandha-sparam desirable, proper form
taste smell feel prokitam abhyukitam tat he uci pure 6.2.6 auci impure
iti (quotes) uci-pratiedha the pure challenge 6.2.7 artha-antaram thing
another ca and 6.2.8 ayatasya (gen. on the part of) unrestrained, unruled uci-
bhojant (abl. resulting from) pure enjoying, partaking abhyudaya rising (to
the greatest good) na not vidyate found niyama-abhvt (abl. resulting from)
observing rules absence vidyate found v w/na; nor
6.2.5 Whoever is proper in form, taste, smell, and feel, "pra" sprinkled (in
baptism) and "abhi" sprinkled (in final consecration), is pure. 6.2.6 (Saying)
"He is impure" challenges one who is pure, 6.2.7 and he (the accuser) is the
other thing (impure). 6.2.8 Rising resulting from partaking of what is pure is
not found on the part of one who is not ruled (by purity), nor is it found
resulting from the absence of observing rules.
Here he is responding to the mention of sprinkling water, in baptism and final
consecration, and to the mention of sacrifice. All statements as to what is "pure"
are commentary, and the use of "na vidyate" confirms it.
|| ll
6.2.16 tma-gua-karmasu (loc. in) self attributes action moka
liberation vykhyta explained
6.2.16 He has explained liberation in the self, the attributes, and action.
Chapter Seven
l
l
7.1.1 ukt gu
7.1.1 The attributes are (already) mentioned.
B B
B~
7.1.3 etena nityeu nityatvam uktam

7.1.3 By that he says that there is constancy in things that are constant.
B Bl 4lB~l
7.1.5 anityeu anity dravya-anityatvt

7.1.5 The non-constancy in the non-constant things comes from the non-
constancy in the physical.
~l
| |B
=l B ll l~l
7.1.7 eka-dravyatvt (abl. because) equal to physical (the commentator's
word; see 1.1.17) 7.1.8 ao (gen.) minute mahata (gen.) great ca and
upalabdhi-anupalabdh observation non-observation nitye (loc. in) constant
vykhyte explained 7.1.9 kraa-bahutvt (abl. from) cause multiplicity ca
7.1.7 Because of being equal to the physical, 7.1.8 in the constant,
observation and non-observation of the minute and the great is explained
7.1.9 and because of there being a multiplicity of causes.
ll
~|
~~ll4
l l l
l lll
~ll
l lll B
l ~~ ll B B
B B
B 7
7.1.13 dntt (abl. because) example, instance ca and 7.1.14 autva-

mahattvayo autva-mahattva-abhva karma-guai vykhyta 7.1.15
karmabhi karmi guai ca gu vykhyt 7.1.16 autva-
mahattvbhym karma-gu ca vykhyt 7.1.17 etena drghatva-
hrasvatve vykhyte 7.1.18 anitye anityam 7.1.19 nitye nityam 7.1.20 nityam
parimaalam
lll l l
7.1.24 guai di-vykhyt 7.1.25 krae kla
"Vykhyt", abbreviation, etc.
~ *| ~ *ll4|
~ll ll
B ~l
lBl 4 ~ B 4 Hl
~ll4l
B
4 l l| ~ *ll4l ~ * B 4
B|l l
| | B
4l| ll |4l| |4lll4|
~ll
ll l
~ll
l4ll l| |4ll B 4
~l
7.2.3 ekatva-eka-pthaktvayo ekatva-eka-pthaktva-abhva autva-

mahattvbhym (inst. by) vykhyta 7.2.4 nisakhyatvt karma-gunm
sarva-ekatvam na not vidyate found 7.2.5 bhrntam tat 7.2.6 ekatva-abhvt
(abl. because) oneness absence bhakti partition tu but still na not vidyate
found 7.2.7 krya-kraayo (loc. regarded as) ekatva-ekapthaktva-abhvt
ekatva-ekapthaktvam na not vidyate found 7.2.8 etat anityayo vykhtam
7.2.9 anyatara-karmaja ubhaya-karmaja sayogaja ca sayoga 7.2.10
etena vibhga vykhyta 7.2.11 sayoga-vibhgayo sayoga-
vibhgbhva autva-mahattvbhym vykhyta 7.2.12 karmabhi
karmi guai gu autva-mahattvbhym iti 7.2.13 yutasiddhi-abhvt
krya-kraayo sayoga-vibhgau na not vidyate found 7.2.14 guatvt
7.2.3 With regard to oneness and being a single individual, the absence of
being a single individual in oneness is explained by (the commentary on)
atomicness and greatness. 7.2.4 Universal oneness is not found because of
action and attributes' being without enumeration. 7.2.5 That is the confusion,
7.2.6 because there is absence of oneness, but still partition is not found (in
them). 7.2.7 The single individual in oneness as effect and cause is not found
because of the absence of a single individual in oneness. 7.2.8 This is explained
as two non-constants. 7.2.9 Conjoining is produced by action in one of the
two, produced by action in both, and produced by conjoining. 7.2.10 By this,
disjoining is explained. 7.2.11 With regard to conjoining and disjoining, the
absence of disjunction in conjunction is explained by (the commentary on)
atomicness and greatness. 7.2.12 Actions by actions, attributes by attributes,
by (the commentary on) atomicness and greatness. 7.2.13 Because of the
absence of the accomplishment of union (or separation), joining and
disjoining (of them) are not found as effect and (or) cause, 7.2.14 because of
being attributes.
The abundant use here of "vykhyta" and "na vidyate" immediately brand this
writing as commentary. He is trying to explain that only the physical things are
counted as individual entities, but oneness does not apply to action and attributes
even though they are not enumerated. Even in regard to the attributes named in
7.2.1 to which oneness does not apply, partition by individuation and enumeration
does not apply either. If "the oneness" refers to purua, it is well known that purua
is separate and not a cause of anything. For a similar statement by the
commentator see 8.1.8. The oneness and the individuation are both non-constant.
l~lll~l ~l~| ~l~ll4|
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7.2.22 kraa-paratvt kraa-aparatvt ca 7.2.23 paratva-aparatvayo
paratva-aparatva-abhva autva-mahattvbhym vykhyta 7.2.24
karmabhi karmi 7.2.25 guai gu 7.2.26 iha idam iti yata krya-
kraayo sa samavya 7.2.27 dravyatva-guatva-pratiedha bhavena
vykhyta 7.2.28 tattvam bhavena
7.2.22 Because of both the priority and posteriority. 7.2.23 With regard to
priority and posteriority, the absence of posteriority in priority is explained
by (the commentary on) atomicness and greatness. 7.2.24 (Also) actions by
actions 7.2.25 (and) attributes by attributes (etc., etc.).
"Vykhyta", abbreviation, etc.
Chapter Eight

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8.1.1 dravyeu in regard to jnam comprehension vykhytam explained
8.1.2 tatra there tm self mana mind ca and apratyake (loc. in) absence
belief 8.1.3 jna-nirdee (loc. in) pointing out, description comprehension
jna-nipatti-vidhi comprehension bringing forth injunction ukta it refers
to 8.1.4 gua-karmasu (loc. abs. regarding) attributes actions sanikeu
(loc. abs.) drawn in together, collectively jna-nipatte (gen. of)
comprehension coming forth dravyam the physical kraam cause 8.1.5
smnya-vieeu smnya-viea-abhvt (abl. adverbial) universal particular
(adv.) in the absence of, without tat(a) (abl. from) that eva alone jnam
comprehension 8.1.6 smnya-viea-apekam looking at, regarding, considering
dravya-gua-karmasu 8.1.7 dravye dravya-gua-karma-apekam 8.1.8 gua-
karmasu gua-karma-abhvt gua-karma-apekam na not vidyate found
8.1.1 (Here) comprehension in regard to the physical is explained, 8.1.2
where there is self and mind in the absence of belief. 8.1.3 In the description
of comprehension, he refers to the injunction for bringing forth
comprehension (see 1.2.2-4) (yes, now he's getting it). 8.1.4 Regarding
attributes and actions drawn in together, the cause of the coming forth of
comprehension is the physical. ( no, he's not.) 8.1.5 Regarding universals
and particulars, comprehension results from that (the physical) alone, without
the universal and particular. 8.1.6 Regarding the physical, attributes, and
actions, it is consideration of universal and particular (see 1.2.3). 8.1.7
Consideration of the physical, the attribute, and action is within the physical.
8.1.8 Regarding actions in attributes, consideration of action in attributes is
not found because of the absence of action in attributes.
The commentator has a different interpretation of this work. He asserts that the
physical elements are causal. Again, this is directly opposed to the author's thesis.
ll4ll
9.1.2 sat actual asat non-actual 9.1.3 asata (gen. belonging to) kriy-gua-
vyapadea-abhvt (abl. because) activity attribute representation absence
artha-antaram thing other 9.1.4 sat actual ca and, or asat non-actual 9.1.5 yat
whatever ca (disjunctive, but) anyat other asat non-actual ata (abl. from) that tat
that thing asat non-actual
9.1.2 There is the actual. There is the non-actual. 9.1.3 The separate thing
belongs to the non-actual (category), because of the absence of representation
of attribute and activity (in it), 9.1.4 whether actual or non-actual
(representation), 9.1.5 (that is,) the non-actual that is other than that non-
actual (separate thing).
In 9.1.3 he repeats the author's phrase from 9.1.1. Try reading 9.1.4-5 aloud in
Sanskrit. This indulgence in cleverness is reminiscent of 3.1.11-13 and it is
certainly not the author's writing.
Bl|l ll BllBl
Bl | | 9
9.1.8 etena by that aghaa non-jar agau non-cow adharma non-dharma ca
and vykhyta explained 9.1.9 abhtam insubstantial na does not asti exist iti
called an-artha-antaram not thing the other 9.1.10 na not asti it exists
ghaa jar gehe (loc. in) house iti saying sata (gen. abs. on the part of) actual
ghaasya (gen. abs.) jar geha-sasarga-pratiedha house association denial
9.1.8 By that non-jar, non-cow, and non-dharma are explained. 9.1. He
says that which is without substance does not exist, (yet) it is not the separate
thing. 9.1.10 Saying "The jar does not exist in the house" is (merely) a denial
of any association with the house on the part of an actual jar.
The words "etena vykhyta" are always the commentator's.
Chapter Nine
l ll44l4 B l ll
9.2.2 asya (gen. belonging to) this idam this krya-kraa-sambandha

effect cause together-binding ca and avayavt (abl.) part bhavati becomes,
exists 9.2.3 etena bdam vykhytam
9.2.2 "This belongs to this" and the binding together of effect and cause,
exist as parts of an argument. 9.2.3 By that, testimony is explained.
l
9.2.9 dharmt ca
9.2.9 And from dharma.
He takes saskra to mean impressions of past lives according to which a
person's particular dharma is determined.
4 B
9.2.13 -ram from seers; the Vedas siddha-daranam ca dharmebhya
9.2.13 What is (received) by seers and vision of the perfected come from
their (respective) dharmas.
Angels, auras, messages from God and other forms of religious mysticism are
not addressed by our revered author.
l l 4ll
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10.2.1 kraam cause iti (quotes) dravye (loc. regarding) physical krya-
samavyt 10.2.2 sayogt v 10.2.3 krae samavyt karmi 10.2.4 tath
rupe kraa-eka-artha-samavyt ca 10.2.5 kraa-samavyt sayoga
paasya cloth 10.2.6 kraa-kraa-samavyt ca
10.2.1 Regarding the physical, (he says) it is a "cause" because of its
inherence in the effect, 10.2.2 or because of its conjunction. 10.2.3 Regarding
cause, actions are through its inherence. 10.2.4 And similarly, in the case of a
(particular) form, through inherence of the one-thing cause. 10.2.5
Conjunction of a cloth (for example) is through inherence of its cause 10.2.6
and through inherence of the cause of the cause.
The conjunction of the separate threads in a certain woven pattern is in a sense
the "cause" of the cloth, but the cloth is exactly that and no more, so the cause and
the effect are essentially one and the same thing. In the same way the threads are
"caused" by the fibers and therefore so is the cloth, and so on.

The Vaisheshika Darshana

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The Vaisheshika Darshana

Translation and Commentary by John Wells

(1.1.1) atha now ata therefore dharmam dharma vykhysyma we shall

Of the Universal and the Particular

2.1 (2.1.1) rpa-rasa-gandha sparavat (fem. sing.) form-taste-smell

interpolation Bl4 4ll

14 The Vaisheshika Darshana

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The Womb-born and the Non-womb-born Individual

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Going and Down-casting

Contraction, Going, Down-casting

Up-casting and Contraction

Of the Essential Constituents in the Physical

Of Comprehension in the Physical

ll4 l49~l interpolation

Of Essential Constituents in the Individual

Happiness and Suffering in the One vs. Others

1.1.18 dravya-gua-karmam (gen. of) physical things attribute action

1.1.27 sayognm (gen. of) conjoinings dravyam the physical 1.1.28

2.1.6 sarpis-jatu-madhucchinm agni-sayogt dravatvam adbhi

2.1.8 vi having horns kakudmn having a hump prnte-vladhi (also

2.2.11 dravyatva-nityatve vyun vykhyte 2.2.12 tattvam bhvena 2.2.13

2.2.17 smnya-pratyakt (abl. arising from) universal perception viea-

3.2.5 tasya dravyatva-nityatve vyun vykhyte 3.2.6 yajadatta iti

4.1.9 tena through this rasa-gandha-spareu jnam (loc. regarding) taste

4.1.13 etena guatve bhve ca sarva-indriyam (singular) jnam

5.1.10 nodana-viet udasana-viea 5.1.11 hasta-karma (inst. by

5.2.10 vaidikam relating or conforming to the Veda ca and 5.2.11 apm

5.2.14 hasta-karma manasa karma-vykhytam

6.1.6 tat-dua-bhojane na vidyate 6.1.7 duam hisym

7.1.3 etena nityeu nityatvam uktam

7.1.5 anityeu anity dravya-anityatvt

7.1.13 dntt (abl. because) example, instance ca and 7.1.14 autva-

7.2.3 ekatva-eka-pthaktvayo ekatva-eka-pthaktva-abhva autva-

4ll Bl9 lBB lBB4-

9.2.2 asya (gen. belonging to) this idam this krya-kraa-sambandha

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