Amy Sla t o n

Style/Type/Standard: The Production o f Technological Resemblance

IN T R O D U C T IO N
This essay reconsiders a famous stylistic absence: the departure of ornamentation, tra ditional design motifs, and idiosyncratic profile from a broad swath of American archi tecture after 1900. That these features of earlier architectural styling are missing from many commercial, civic, and large-scale residential buildings erected over the course of the twentieth century is evident to the casual observer. It is the notion of absence itself that I want to examine. It has served as the primary analytic instrument for his torians who examine the roots of modernist architecture in America. The initial embrace of austerity and uniformity by many American builders between 1900 and 1930, when it is considered at all, is treated by historians as a renunciation of stylis tic self-consciousness. Perhaps because utilitarian buildings of this period were fre quently designed by engineers rather than architects, this early functionalism (a term I will examine) has come to represent a sort of default mode for architecture engaged when building designers choose to serve commerce rather than the more traditional master of high culture. Historians grant later manifestations of functional ism (the mid-century buildings designed by architects) greater aesthetic sophistication but attribute this development to American receptivity to International Style design precepts imported from Europe rather than to any indigenous appreciation of simpli fied form.1 The origins of the twentieth-century American commitment to the stan dardized undecorated building remain wholly negative phenomena rooted in the

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conservation of effort and money, the rejection of expressive possibility, the paring away of intention. This paper recasts these absences as presence: of designing engineers intentionality and authority, and thus of cultural meaning and social consequence for utilitarian buildings. By looking at the first expressions of this building mode in the U nited States after 1900 the thousands of undecorated, virtually identical concrete-frame factories that swelled industrial neighborhoods between 1900 and 1930 I will identify a com plex of positive forces behind the American embrace of utilitarian building design. Far from being the products of technical personnel answering the demands of industry with some pre-ordained set of design solutions (pre-ordained by what or whom, we would have to ask), the factories were created with tremendous awareness of cultural and market forces. Their appearance not only prefigures that of much later American architecture, but reflects the potential of a cultural enterprise here, architecture to be mutually determinative with technology and commerce, and thereby very directly a cause of social change. It is this relationship that makes the idea of an absence so unsatisfactory as an explanation for American modernism: it elides what can only be called the political genesis of these artifacts. To retrieve the historical meaning of functionalist industrial architecture, we must first see these buildings as ambitious examples of industrial production. In many respects the factory buildings were like the goods made within: undifferentiated in form and produced with modern, streamlined procedures. Catalogs put out by factory builders between 1900 and 1930 show a remarkably homogenous collection of offerings, the buildings varying in size but in few other ways (see Figures 1 and 2). The typical reinforced-concrete factory building erected between 1900 and 1930 was rectangular, usually from 50 to 75 feet wide and from 100 to 900 feet long. Most were from four to eight stories high, without brick cladding or ornamentation to disguise their reinforced-concrete skeleton frames. Where ornamentation was used it was usually in the form of a simple comice, or very occasionally, a tower that housed stairways and bath rooms. So great is their uniformity that factory buildings of virtually identical appear ance held industries ranging from shoe manufacturing to hose weaving, from the production of rubber gloves to the processing of breakfast cereals. The factories display an ingenious application of contemporary tenets of industrial standardization. But while the economic imperatives of mass production may have contributed to the popularity of this building style for its builders and buyers, they are not sufficient to explain the proliferation of these structures. As Reyner Banham points out, builders of hotels and hospitals of this period also sought economies but those buildings look very different from the factories, and, we might add, from one another.2 Functionalism, which I take here to mean an expressive emphasis on the characteristics of mecha nized production (simplicity and repetition of form) is similarly unhelpful as an explanatory term. A more foundational question must be asked: How did uniformity

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T HE

A M E R JC AN

T H R E A D

C O M P A N Y

at Fall River, Massachusetts

MOHAW K CARPET MILLS

Figure 1. Illustration of factories from Built by A berthaw, Catalog of the Aberthaw Construction Company, Boston, Massachusetts, 1926.

81

THE

STANLEY

WORKS

at New Britain , Connecticut

Figure 2. More factories, from Built by Aberthavu, Catalog of the Aberthaw Construction Company, Boston, Massachusetts, 1926.

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become an acceptable idiom in building design? The embrace of type itself remains to be explicated. This task involves unpacking the occurrence of resemblance or commonality among manufactured artifacts approaching a disaggregation of the notion of style. This is a project that scholars such as Svetlana Alpers, Arnold Davidson, and Irene W inter have identified as a matter of establishing historical contextualization for modes of representation. For W inter especially the goal is to presume no single reason for stylistic associations among objects but rather to pinpoint the sources and effects of style by correlating patterns of expression with the experiences of producers. Those experiences can include technical aspects of design activity. Michael Baxandall, in his unparalleled linking of expressive style and experience, explicitly connects repre sentation to perceptions of technical skill and knowledge (as deployed in rendering or measurement, for example) shared by artists and patrons. He thus connects artmaking, by way of technical knowledge, also to patterns of influence and prestige in a given social setting. This multilevel analysis of expressive convention as productive process, symbolic form, and means of social organization serves as a model for my exploration of architectural change.4 We are encouraged through such an approach, as Svetlana Alpers recognized some time ago, to study artifacts without choosing in advance the parts played by the indi vidual maker, his community, certain established modes of perceiving the world, or the viewer.5 Considered in such dynamic terms, the celebration of type as embod ied in the standardized factory buildings emerges as a genre of resemblance with a particular social history. It is a history that reflects at least two fundamental social ten sions of mass production. First, the factory designers and builders were offering a product that conformed to prevailing norms of industrial management. The reinforced-concrete factories were simplified and standardized objects that exploited economies of scale, savings deriving from the repetition of forms and processes. But this economization put its suppliers at risk of obsolescence: Would not true standard ization do away with the need for experts, for the designers and planners themselves? To protect their standing with clientele, factory designers and builders cast their own work the work of crafting and implementing standards, of typology as a rare and elevated competence. A status then accrued to the standardizers, and their occupa tional authority was bolstered in the competitive world of industrial operations. The blunt functionalism of the reinforced-concrete factory buildings expressed the height ened status of new technical knowledge to a receptive industrial market. We must ask, of course, why this epistemological elevation of typology worked why the designers and builders found in industrialists a willing audience for their lofty self-identification, for their services, and for the higher fees such specialized services might command. Here we find the second, and perhaps larger, political significance of

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functionalist design. The elevated status of standardizers dovetailed with a vast redistribution of skills, credit, and opportunity in the industrial workplace after 1900, by which many rank-and-file workers found themselves laboring without intellectual reward or occupational mobility; others, like the factory designers, ascended to secure planning or managerial roles. Factory owners shared the stratified vision of productive labor embodied in the builders self-concept. The same patterns of social change undergirded the production (i.e., mass production) of a modern, utilitarian architec ture, and industrialists enthusiasm for a functionalist building style. Design, always a blend of social and cultural operations, is here specifically a prod uct of and a signifier of technical expertise, each role supporting the other in an invo lution of technical practice and reputation. The new factory buildings may appear to have been, and indeed were, simpler in form than their predecessors, but standardiza tion was as richly determined and promising a stylistic choice for its promoters as more individualized aesthetic gestures were for conventional architects. This essay considers the origins and consequences of that commitment to uniformity.6

P R O D U C T IO N O F T H E R E IN F O R C E D - C O N C R E T E FA C T O RY B U IL D IN G
To arrive at this historic contextualization of architectural uniformity we need first to map the ways in which labor conceptual and physical was organized in the cre ation of these buildings. A handful of prominent architects created notable innova tions in reinforced-concrete factory building technology and design after 1890. Ernest Ransome7 and Albert Kahn,8 in particular, have garnered the attention of historians. Other architectural firms that achieved celebrity for their industrial commissions in these years include Purcell and Elmslie, Pond and Pond, and Schmidt, Garden and Martin. However, reinforced-concrete factories were often built without the involve ment of well-known architects or any architects at all. The vast majority of these buildings were designed and erected w ithin a world of commercial transactions rather than cutting-edge engineering or name architects. Lesser-known firms learned of new technologies and designs through trade publications and professional organizations and through patents taken out by leading designers, and then disseminated the struc tures to locales around the country. In the first decades of the twentieth century, services of the factory designers reached the market in three ways. The industrialist commissioning a plant could employ his own forces for all construction work. He would in this case enlist an engi neer or architect to draw up plans, hire subcontractors for specialized work, and assume all responsibilities for erecting a plant.9 A second option involved the factory owner soliciting plans and specifications for a factory building from an engineering

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firm and then submitting them to prospective building concerns or general contractors for bids. The engineering firm would coordinate the work of the winning contractors. This approach was substantially easier on the owner than taking on supervisory tasks himself, but still entailed a fairly close involvement. A third option removed the building owner most thoroughly from the construction process and showed the greatest growth in popularity among industrialists who bought factories at this time. This was the hiring of building firms that incorporated an engi neering division equipped to design factory buildings and a construction division able to erect the buildings from start to finish. Such firms usually maintained separate departments for promotion, drafting, estimating, accounting, purchasing, expediting, and construction. W ith these facilities a building firm could select the best site for a client after having its own staff study local geographic, supply, and labor conditions, and then coordinate every aspect of construction from excavation to final painting. A number of the engineering firms that operated along these lines were very suc cessful. Perhaps best known today are the international concerns Lockwood, Greene Company and Stone & Webster (see Figure 3). Other firms of slightly smaller size per formed similar services on a regional basis, particularly in the Midwest and Northeast where the growth of manufacturing industries was substantial between 1900 and 1930. Their functional departmentalization made the engineering/building firms kin to other streamlined mass-production industries of the day and no doubt helped create their appeal for industrial clients. N ot only were the complexities of dealing with bids and subcontractors eliminated for factory owners who turned to the modem building firms, but the costs added as each contractor and subcontractor sought profit were also removed. In his 1931 report on American construction trades, W illiam Haber summa rized the advantages that the integrated engineering/building firm held for factory owners. Purchasing, planning, and expediting were each conducted by a specialized department with the latest methods and machinery. Such unification and centraliza tion allowed the multi-function construction company to exploit economies of scale and the emerging art of coordinating production tasks.1 0 Significantly, Haber concludes his discussion of the integrated engineering/building firms with a further indictment of smaller-scale methods of project management: N o study has been made of the amount of time lost by workmen through failure in material deliveries, but from the meager evidence available it seems to be tremendous. W ith the same modern scientific organization in charge of con struction, the contrast between its operations and those of the broker contrac tor becomes more striking.1 1 It is not simply the large size of the integrated firms that brings them success, but their scientific nature; in Habers use of the word broker there is an intimation of undeserved

Combined warehouse and manufacturing pace. Bail11914

Paramount Knitting Co., Kankakee, IU.

Distributing ira rehouse and branch factory. Buill 1916

Aluminum Goods Mfg. Co., Newark, N . J.

M cA vitv. T., & Sons, L td .................................................................................St. John, N . B. M cNcal Machinery C o............................................................................................ Joplin, Mo. Mechanical Rubber Co.......................................................................................... Chicago, 1 1 1 . Merchants Terminal Warehouse Co......................................................New Bedford, Mass. Montgomery W ard & Co................................................................................. St. Paul, M inn. Morgan & \Vrisht...............................................................................................Detroit, M ich. Nashua Mfg. Co................................................................................................. Nashua, N . H . Nassau Smelting & Refining Co...................................................................Tottenville, N . Y . Naumkcag Steam Cotton Co...............................................................................Salem, Mass. New Bedford Cotton Mills Corp............................................................New Bedford, Mass. New Departure Mfg. Co.....................................................................................Bristol, Conn. New England Waste Co......................................................................................Revere, Mass. N. V. Belting & Packing Co............................................................................... Passaic, N . J. Otis Co.. T h e ................................................. 1898 ..................................................Ware, Mass. Pacific Mills (Ham pton Departm ent)........................................................... Columbia. S. C. Pacific Mills (Print Works D epartm ent)..................................................... Lawrence, Mass. Pacolet Manufacturing C o .......................... 1900 ................................................Pacolet, S. C. Palmolive Co., T h e ........................................................................................Milwaukee, Wis. Paramount K nitting Co..................................................................................... Kankakee. 1 11 . Passaic Print W orks..................................... 1890 ..............................................Passaic, N . J. Pepperell Manufacturing Co............................................................................ Biddeford, Me. Pickett Cotton M ills ....................................................................................High Point, N . C. Planters &Mfrs. Warehouse Corp................................................................... Baltimore, M d. Poe, F. W M Manufacturing C o ................... 1895 .......................................... Greenville, S. C. Quinebaug Co................................................................................................. Danielson, Conn. Rice, Barton & Fales Machine & Iron Co..................................................Worcester, Mass. Saco-Lowell Shops........................................ ' . ................................................... Lowell, Mass. State Board of Control of Wisconsin...............................................................W aupun, Wis. Staten Island Shipbuilding C o............................................................Port Richm ond, N . Y . Studebaker Corporation, T h e .......................................................................South Bend. Ind. U. S. Cartridge C o...............................................................................................Maurer, N . J. Vassie & Company. L td................................................................................... St. John, N. B. Walker. W m H . , C o .........................................................................................Buffalo, N. Y .

Cotton storehouse of 40,000 bales' capacity. Built 1909

M assach u setts C o tto n M ills. Low ell, M ass

Concrete storehouse buill 1914 following Ute Salem fire

Naumkcag Steam Cotton Company, Salem. M a n .

Figure 3. Illustrations of factories and partial list of buildings erected by the Lockwood, Greene Company, from their 1925 Annual Report.

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profit. He later associates the work of small firms and independent contractors with excessive competition that puts a premium on astuteness and disloyalty rather than engineering skill.1 2 This disparagement of independent contractors and small building concerns was not unique to Haber. The makers of one brand of steel reinforcing for concrete adver tised in 1920 that they would not license contractors or materials dealers. They wished to place their products in the hands of acknowledged experts only. The prac tice of obtaining free plans for factory buildings from steel suppliers and even from insurance companies was also losing favor among factory owners. The erection of the efficient, economical factory building was coming to be associated with firms that were at once specialists in this type of product and comprehensive, integrated enterprises able to handle every aspect of factory construction.1 3

K N O W L E D G E IN T H E M A R K E T P LA C E : T H E C O N S T R U C T IO N SIT E
To understand the success of the factory-building firms, we need to see these charac teristics as parts of a consciously pursued program. The identity of the reinforcedconcrete building firm was a doubled one. It contained a promise of rationalized, streamlined operations that would bring clients efficiency and savings. Such savings were predicated on a minute and hierarchical division of labor, as might be found in the most carefully organized manufacturing enterprises of the day. But the reputation of concrete construction firms also held intimations of a rarified and subjective knowl edge about factory building a body of knowledge not subject to division. This dou bled character reflected the builders devotion to a particular social organization of labor that not only retained a place for their own expertise, but also represented a social vision shared by the industrialists who sought their services. We will first con sider the industrialized features of concrete factory construction, and then the claims that seemed to bring factory builders an immunity to the very deskilling and routinization they advocated for other forms of technical labor. In many ways the conditions of concrete construction resembled those of contem porary factory operation far more closely than they did conventional building meth ods. In the early part of the twentieth century, the most common procedures for reinforced-concrete construction involved bringing the raw materials of concrete to the construction site, mixing them there to create the pourable medium, and then filling reusable wooden or metal molds, or forms, that had metal reinforcing rods pre-positioned w ithin them. W h en the concrete in the forms had hardened, the forms were removed and relocated, and a successive floor or section of the building was erected in a virtually uninterrupted sequence. This procedure echoed emerging

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methods of factory production that sought to replace batch, or unit-based, production with continuous flow processes. Further, as had rapidly become common practice in manufacturing contexts, a divi sion of physical and conceptual labor emerged in reinforced-concrete construction. O n the majority of concrete building projects the actual handling of materials the erection of forms, the preparation and placement of reinforcing rods, and the delivery, distribution, mixing, and pouring of concrete was accomplished by a large body of relatively untrained workers, distinct (with the exception of some carpenters who built wooden forms) from the established body of experienced (and often unionized) workers commonly employed in masonry and wood construction at this time. Super vising these workers were managers employed by building firms or contractors. These managers might themselves be hierarchically divided into field supervisors who were in turn directed by office-based designers and administrators, but however organized internally this conceptual realm remained a purview distinct from the physical labor of concrete construction. Carrying forward the rationalization process, builders gradually removed many aspects of concrete construction from the building site after 1900. The construction of forms and assembly of reinforcing rods increasingly were taken over by outside suppli ers.1 4 These auxiliary businesses, located off the construction site, mass-produced materials that previously had been individually fabricated in the course of building. Some intricate types of forms and reinforcement continued to be fabricated by work men on the building site, but enough were standardized and mass-produced to effect substantial economies. These products were often called systems by their promoters, suggesting that their use also would save builders the conceptual tasks of understand ing and planning the use of reinforcement.1 A second set of managerial initiatives in reinforced-concrete construction after 1900 achieved the tightened control of work that remained on the site, and reiterates the close relationship of productive process and social vision on the part of construction firm managers. The daily supervision of construction forces was brought about through the use of elaborate administrative procedures ranging from mnemonically coded work orders to studies of workers hygiene habits.1 6Building firm operators also lavished attention on problems of quality control on the construction site. Because concrete construction was operated as a flow process, costs incurred by faulty or wasted materi als could accelerate rapidly. From its inception as a favored material for large commer cial projects, concrete was subject to testing in the field. The scope and means of testing derived from university-based materials science programs. Academics, working as members of professional associations and as paid consultants to the building and mate rials industries, developed an elaborate body of field inspection and testing procedures. In keeping with the building firms modern managerial approach, tasks of quality control remained always outside the purview of the concrete laborer. O nly consulting

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and mid-level salaried engineers performed the work of cement and concrete testing, visiting the site as needed. Building firm managers deemed quality control to be largely a conceptual, rather than physical, task.1 7 So was the majority of work defined and organized on the concrete building site of the early twentieth century. Technical knowledge was treated by building firm opera tors as a commodity. N o technical task escaped division and delegation in the firms search for fast, efficient, predictable factory construction except, that is, those tasks that firm owners and operators claimed as their own. Their work, their technical knowledge, somehow occupied a universe impervious to the economizing, reductive trends of industrial routinization. Industrialists seeking new plants accepted this description of factory-building expertise and willingly paid the costs of employing its claimants. Standardization stopped here. We can now ask why and how this protec tive encapsulation of factory-building expertise came to be.

K N O W L E D G E IN T H E M A R K E T PLA C E : T H E B U SIN E SS O F B U IL D IN G
The essence of the high status obtained by the factory-building experts was a further commodification of knowledge and technique, but one that strategically defined their work as necessarily comprehensive, or, indivisible. W hile they defined and stratified the labor needed to erect factory buildings, the firms successfully combatted the idea that standardization or mechanization of construction could effectively be applied without their oversight. This involved celebrating, in a number of ways, the subjectiv ity of standardization as an intellectual project. As we will see, in achieving their monopoly of reinforced-concrete factory construction through such means, the experts also brought about the high cultural valuation of their product: the functional ist industrial building. The concrete builders campaign for secure occupational status took the form of a vast promotional initiative. One major tactic used by the integrated factory-building firms was to distinguish the expertise of the specialized factory designer and builder from that of the buildings owner. O ne engineer reminded manufacturers in 1911 that when they selected established engineers to design and erect their plants, it would be clear that the creative work of the industrial engineer has to do with such matters as are not usually included in the routine experience and work of owner or operator.1 8 The founder of a large factory-engineering/building firm, promoting his company in 1919, cast the relationship between industrialist and industrial engineer as similar to that of client and attorney. The analogy suggests that the knowledge of the engineer was necessary to ensure effective business operation, of the highest professional cal iber, and most interestingly in this sphere of otherwise routinized production, not a matter of repetition (see Figure 4 ).1 9

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Pertinent Facts

E originated this service.

We have fifteen years experience in Industrial Structures.

We eliminate the general contractor and save you his profit. We take only one commission, and that is paid to us by our client. We do not sell plans. plans. We have no standard

We have never designed two of our plants alike, and never expect to. Our service is sold as a whole and not in part. O ur references are the firms listed on the opposite paee and many others for whom we have built plants, or prepared reports, made investigations or appraisals. Our whole story may be summarized in the statement that we give you a maximum build ing in a m inim um time and at a minimum cost.

F ran k

D. C h a se , Inc.

Industrial Engineers
645 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago - W hitehall B!dg., New York

a
Figure 4 Frank D. Chase, A Better Way to Build Your New Plant (promotional publication), 1919.

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This meant that effective factory construction required, at the very least, a certain level of expertise. Clayton Mayers, an engineer for the successful Aberthaw Construetion Company, described in detail the possible errors that could occur in beam design. He warned of excessive and inappropriate reinforcing practices, specifying that these errors are not errors in computations, but are errors of careless design and the result is dire waste of materials.2 0 In this declaration, Mayers blamed uneconomical results on selected practitioners, rather than on the existence of specialized practitioners. In so doing he made a careful distinction between the theory and the practice of reinforced-concrete construction. This distinction became a cornerstone of factory specialists defense of their expert standing. As did other engineers of the day, Mayers pointed to the need for the assistance of knowledgeable professionals in following the growing body of codes and standards for concrete. Standards, and the whole body of standardized systems of rein forcing and concrete construction, posed dangers to the factory designer and owner because, Mayers believed, each building presented new problems. O nly by careful study could the designer achieve effective and economical application of standardized products and procedures. W ith such rhetoric, concrete experts embedded a practical complexity in a theoretically simplified technology. In forwarding this type of argument, engineers were beginning to appropriate for their own knowledge and experience the commercial cache that might have attached instead to technical objects themselves. Engineers and other factory design specialists commonly declared that materials alone do not constitute a system. A . J. Widmer, a consulting engineer who specialized in reinforced concrete, wrote in 1915:

A staff of experienced engineers is a most essential feature of a true system. The furnishing of reinforcing steel of correct types cannot constitute a system unless the design of the structure is complete in the hands of engineers experienced in the application of those particular types.2 1

According to the engineers, savings were to be had from eliminating the need for skilled labor on the worksite, not from eliminating consulting engineers. Advertising text combined claims for the efficiency and speed of building systems with invocations of proved experience. As another prominent engineer put it in his 1911 prescrip tions for construction using standardized elements:

the assembling of these materials into final structures and the installation of the equipment would be under the direct control of those who know the exact rea son for the provision of every single feature; and their knowledge of future oper ating conditions enables them to exercise an intelligent discretion that should

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result in a more harmonious whole than could result solely through a literal adherence to the most elaborate specifications.2 2

A call for discretion, and a deep knowledge of the reasons for technical specifications, welded a systematized and standardized construction method to an almost inchoate set of intellectual abilities purportedly possessed by the engineers issuing that call.2 A ll such rhetoric conveys the tension technical experts perceived between the value of rationalized production methods to their industrial clientele and the poten tial loss of occupational authority that might follow from the implementation of those methods. We can see the irony of marketplace demands with which the experts con tended. Surely the combination of standardized materials and methods with cus tomized applications could have struck the industrialist buying a factory building as paradoxical. W hy did building systems and standards exist if not to do away with the necessity for (costly) specialized expertise and for the very presence of inchoate abili ties on the construction site? In the trade literature of the early 1900s, the specialized experts preempted this argument with a sophisticated and exquisitely self-serving conception of how unration alized (that is, undivided) technical knowledge could work for commerce. Consulting engineer W illard Case articulated the relationship of standardized technologies and engineering expertise. He noted

a logical and healthy tendency from several causes toward type classification, and this has embraced not only the form of design and character of construction, but the exterior architectural treatment as well.2 4

Invoking the notion of type classification was a powerful gesture. It cast standardiza tion and the work of the factory design and construction as tasks of taxonomic distinc tion. According to this formulation, while construction could involve the same organizational methods that manufacturers used, specific bodies of knowledge were not necessarily transferable between different production situations. To refer to engineer ing and construction work in this way elevated them to the status of scientific pursuits and made standardization seem not a reductive simplification of labor but a complex analytical undertaking. This definition supported the claims of factory specialists that industrial plants are now based on a logical scientific method of analysis and that the business of the engineer is the science of building.2 5 As Cases words indicate, the uniformity of the typed factories (again, their re semblance was undisguised by any distinguishing decoration) celebrated this set of skills. The outward form of the buildings asserted the qualifications of their builders, their vital competencies in a commercial context prone to the devaluation of technical

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skills. The reinforced-concrete factory buildings were both the product of the modern organization of conceptual and physical labor and public symbols of that organization. N ot only do variety, idiosyncracy, and historicizing reference lose their status in such a calculus of architectural expression, but uniformity becomes a hallmark of intellec tual achievement, occupational success, and social influence. The buildings resem blance was actually constitutive of occupational difference. Spreading this ideology was not so much an ironic as a necessary, and possibly brilliant, gesture by the ambitious professionals who designed, built, and marketed industrial architecture in the new century.

T H E A E S T H E T IC S O F T Y P E
This discussion has tried so far to demonstrate the centrality of engineering practice to the form assumed by the American industrial landscape in this century. By rooting the emergence of modernist factory design in the organization of construction and design work it has proposed a highly specific association between two spheres of cultural activity. Such specificity is recommended by Peter Galison in his discussion of archi tectural and philosophical participation in the European Aufbau movements of the first half of this century.2 6 Examining the attitudes of Bauhaus architects and of propo nents of logical positivism, he suggests that links between the two arenas of culture arise from a set of cultural meanings shared by the two factions a set of powerful, if not fixed, images and aspirations that reflect a common vision of contemporary tech nologies. In a slight variation on Galisons formulation, I attribute to one group the factory-designing engineers a pair of cultural meanings for technology. One meaning was grounded in the practical sphere, one in the expressive sphere, and in the dis course of cultural accomplishment each meaning could be used to bolster the other. Therefore, to complete our picture of the early-twentieth-century factory designers at work, we should note that as they pursued the efficacious use of concrete for affordable factory buildings and bolstered their own standing in the marketplace, these men also claimed an explicitly aesthetic significance for their products. We can first note that the building firms and consultants who designed and erected the reinforced-concrete factories were neither ignorant of contemporary architectural fashion nor dismissive of its demands. Promoting the minimal use of traditional mate rials and ornamentation in these buildings, builders of reinforced-concrete factories crafted aesthetic arguments for functionalist design against a backdrop of vigorous critical debate in the architectural press. The specific terms of ideological exchanges among critics and architects of 1900 ranged from the formalist to the moral. A dvo cates of modern, utilitarian design and promoters of eclectic, historicizing architecture accused one another of aesthetic ineptitude, antisocial behavior, and even antidemo cratic intent. The sweeping nature of their concerns grew from their conceptions of

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how industrialization would transform American life and culture. Critics, public fig ures, and professionals of all kinds assessed American prospects in the new century. They rooted the progress or the im minent demise of American culture in the growth of mass production and mass consumption and encroaching subordination of all other endeavors to these goals. Depending on the interpreter, American arts and letters including architecture and the pursuit of an orderly modern society could be expected to flounder or flourish in tandem amid these changes.2 7 Builders of reinforced-concrete factories entered the critical fray to praise the aus tere structures to critics and the larger audience of potential factory buyers. Although promotional literature produced by factory-building firms never failed to mention the efficiency and economy of concrete construction it also offered explanations, praise, and justification for the appearance of the factories in answer to prevailing critical debates. The factory builders joined those analysts who claimed a favorable prognosis for American culture in the new era of mass production. Their buildings would be part of modern culture and challenge the rear-guard assumption that only conventional academic practice could yield buildings of architectural significance. The factory builders arguments addressed all the generalities in which contemporary architectural experts trafficked, listing advantages to the modern factory that included the intrin sic value of a well-designed building and the benefits of health and contentment for factory workers.2 8 A t this point we might begin to see a link between the two sets of cultural meanings given to the new factories by their creators: a conservatism unites the builders practi cal and aesthetic agendas. Each advantage to utilitarian factory design mentioned above indicates a portion of the factory builders ideology of modernity, yet in no way did their program challenge foundational precepts of aesthetic accomplishment in the United States. First, creating the case for the visual pleasure that a well-designed factory might bring to the discerning,2 9 factory builders offered self-justifying discus sions of factory design in publications of the cement trade and factory management. The content of this literature might be described as an association of the reinforcedconcrete factorys constitutive elements the exposed concrete column, the standard ized steel-sash window, and all the other simplified, repetitive forms typically used in this type of construction with traditional architectural values of visual beauty and harmony. Similarly, factory builders and architectural critics were formulating new ideas of what constituted good design and, more broadly, what constituted contributions to American taste or culture, but as they did so they extended an old aesthetic premise that certain kinds of architectural forms were appropriate for buildings of certain functions to a contemporary situation. For architects and critics, this aspect of realism was largely a matter of taste. A commentator writing in American Architect in 1909 explained bluntly that a free use of intricate detail or expensive materials in a

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soap factory would be mere affectation.0 Factory builders, on the other hand, saw a second, and distinctly conservative, reason to express through a buildings form the purposes for which it is intended. Both groups believed that the material nature of a building can have as full an expressive meaning as any other architectural convention, but factory builders also believed in the advertising value of a handsome plant in the path of national travel. That value stemmed from the factorys identification with industrial processes it contained. If the appearance of the factory conveyed economi cal and repetitious production methods, unencumbered by superfluous detail or dis guise, anyone encountering the structure might see in it the modern attitudes of the buildings operators, and thus deduce the nature of the work conducted within. Such buildings would have a definite effect for good . . . upon customers and as an adver tisement to those who pass it.3 1

C O N C L U S IO N
In this happy blending of culture and commerce the outward form of the reinforcedconcrete factory building reiterates the organization of labor under which it was cre ated and with which it operates. We see a political compatibility to the technical, commercial, and aesthetic aspirations of the factory engineers. We also see that functionalism can comprise not only a frank architectural expression of the material nature of a building and an expression of a buildings func tion, but also the builders (hoped-for) function w ithin a market or community. To summarize: as they solved the practical problems of an expanding production sector, the technical occupations forwarded a hierarchical vision of American indus try that reduced the autonomy and opportunities of the great majority of industrial employees while establishing a secure niche for their own services. The introduction of simplified and standardized production processes and goods displaced established productive trades, created a broad stratum of low-paid positions that offered little hope of training or advancement, and at the same time brought employment to universitytrained engineers.3 2 The enthusiasm of these experts for an overt expression of new technologies and materials in the outward forms of buildings and manufactured goods was not an accidental by-product of economic expediency and technical problem solving but an expression of this new social order certainly modem in a narrow highcultural sense, but not necessarily progressive in any broader cultural sense. This originary aspect of the modernist aesthetic reflects what David Harvey refers to as modernisms real nether side, which lay, he writes, in its subterranean celebration of corporate bureaucratic power and rationality, under the guise of a return to surface worship of the efficient machine as a suffi cient myth to embody all hum an aspiration.3 3

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To give less weight to the reinforced-concrete factory buildings, and other seemingly mundane products of modern industrial enterprise, would be to shortchange drasti cally the ambitions of their creators, and deflect any possibility of understanding the social alterations wrought by that enterprise.

Notes
1. See Reyner Banham, A Concrete Atlantis (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986); and Terry Smith, Making the Modem: Industry, Art, and Design in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 57-92. Banham sees an aesthetic appreciation of utilitarian structures arising after Le Cor busiers 1927 enthusiastic appraisal of American grain elevators and factory buildings. Banham writes of the reinforced-concrete factory buildings that hard-nosed patrons and the architects who served them . . . had no ideological axes to grind, no revolutionary postures to maintain (p. 53). Revolu tionary perhaps not, but ideological without question. 2. Banham, A Concrete Atlantis, p. 6. 3. Arnold I. Davidson, Styles of Reasoning, Conceptual History, and the Emergence of Psychiatry, The Disunity o f Science, ed. Peter Galison and David Strump (1996, Stanford University Press), pp. 75-100; Irene ]. Winter, The Affective Properties of Styles: A n Inquiry into Analytic Process and the Inscription of Meaning in Art History, in this volume. 4 - Michael Baxandall, Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 1-34. 5. Svetlana Alpers, Style is What You Make it: The Visual Arts Once Again, in The Concept o f Style, ed. Berel Lang (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, [1987] 1979), p. 114. 6. Guidance for this project can also be found in recent work in the history of science and the history of technology that considers the implementation of standardized practices and the creation of standard ized forms (for instruments, tools, or finished goods). Both disciplines have found complexities within processes of industrial rationalization; see Michael Nuwer, From Batch to Flow: Production Technology and Work-Force Skills in the Steel Industry, 1880-1920, Technology and Culture 29 (1988): 808-38; Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Knowledge and Infrastructure in Interna tional Information Management, Information Acumen, ed. Lisa Bud-Frierman (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 187-213; Robert Kohler, Lords o f the Fly: Drosophila and the Experimental Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Karen Rader, Making Mice: C. C. Little, the Jackson Labora tory, and the Standardization of Mus M usculus for Research (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Indi ana, 1995). See also: Gail Cooper, Custom Design, Engineering Guarantees, and Unpatentable Data: The Air Conditioning Industry, 1902-1935, Technology and Culture 35 (July 1994): 506-36; Amy Slaton, Origins of a Modem Form: The Reinforced-Concrete Factory in America, 1900-1930 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1995). 7. Ransome (1844-1917) began his career in California in the 1870s addressing the difficulty of build ing to resist earthquakes. In 1885, he constructed a flour mill with floor slabs cast integrally with sup porting beams, each beam reinforced in its tension zone with a single rod. By 1889, he had developed a homogenous system of floor construction in which girders, beams, and slabs of a given bay were cast as a unit on concrete columns (Ernest L. Ransome, Reminiscence, Reinforced Concrete Buildings [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1912]; reprinted in Howard Newlon, Jr., ed., A Selection o f Papers on Con crete [Detroit: American Concrete Institute, 1976], pp. 291-93; Henry J. Cowan, The Master Builders, vol. 1, Science and Building: Structural and Environmental Design in the 19th and 20th Centuries [New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977], pp. 36, 79). 8. Albert Kahn (1869-1942) established his practice in Detroit. In addition to industrial commissions, he worked on residential, institutional, and civic buildings. His brother, Julius Kahn (1874-1942), founded the Kahn Trussed Concrete Steel Company in Detroit, and established affiliates of this

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9.

10. 11. 12.

13. 14.

15.

16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23.

business around the world while working closely with Albert. For information on the Kahns, see Grant Hildebrand, Designing for Industry: The Architecture o f Albert Kahn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974); Smith, Making the Modem; Peter Conn, The Divided Mind: Ideobgy and Imagination in America, 1898-1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 21417; and Federico Bucci, Albert Kahn: Architect o f Ford (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1993). Charles Day, Industrial Plants: Their Arrangement and Construction (New York: Engineering Magazine, 1911), pp. 79-80; Harold V. Coes, Better Industrial Plants for Less Money, Factory: The Magazine o f Management 17 (January 1917): 22. William Haber, Industrial Relations in the Building Industry (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930) (reprint edition: New York: Arno and the New York Times, 1971), p. 58. Haber, Industrial Relations, p. 59. Haber also claims that smaller firms were prone to getting involved in unsound competitive prac tices and that for this reason building trade unions preferred to work with the large integrated build ing firms (ibid., pp. 61, 72). Advertisement for Barton-Spider Web System, Sweets Catalog 1920, p. 220. As one engineer summarized in 1906, the essence of economy in concrete was to be found in the duplication of forms and the elimination of architectural details that complicate form construction (Ross F . Tucker, The Progress and Logical Design of Reinforced Concrete, Concrete Age 3 [Septem ber 1906], p. 333). In 1906, Cement Age published a review of ten commercial systems of reinforcement; by 1914, dozens of firms advertised systems of preassembled reinforcement in Sweets Catalog. Mass-produced steel reinforcement became so affordable by the early 1910s that even large construction firms ended pro duction of their own reinforcing rods. See The Story of Aberthaw (unpublished manuscript in the archives of Aberthaw Construction Company, North Billerica, Mass.). The costs to building firms of machine-fabricated forms or reinforcement were offset by savings in labor on the construction site and by the prevention of excessive wood or steel consumption. By 1903 builders could make use of precast concrete beams, columns, and floor slabs, as well, avoiding the exigencies of erecting forms and of pouring concrete above ground level. Elements were cast on the ground with reinforcement in place and once set, rapidly assembled by relatively low-paid, little-trained workers. See Slaton, Origins of a Modern Form, Chapter 4: The Business of Building: Technological Choices and Organization of the Concrete Construction Firm, pp. 192-261. Trade literature of the concrete industry encouraged this division of labor. Engineers wrote of the ineptitude of field workers and the trustworthiness of their own profession, and thereby placed blame for structural failures on laborers and credit for technical success on their own proficiency. See Sla ton, Origins of Modem Form, pp. 117-44. Day, Industrial Plants, p. 18. Frank D. Chase, A Better Way to Build Your New Plant (Chicago: Frank D. Chase, Inc., 1919), p. 4 Clayton Mayers, Economy in the Design o f Reinforced Concrete Buildings (Boston: Aberthaw Construc tion Company, 1918), p. 5. A. J. Widmer, Reinforced Concrete Construction (Illinois Society of Engineers and Surveyors, 1915), p. 148. Widmer advocated the Kahn System by name. This raises the question of whether engineers had a certain fidelity to a given system and whether there was any mutual commitment on the part of the fabricating company. Day, Industrial Plants, p. 96. See, for example, advertisement for the Roebling Construction Company, Sweets Catalog 1907 1908, p. 148. Ironically, the concrete engineers message was reinforced by other building trades that felt threatened by the introduction of systemized building methods. The president of the Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers International Union said in 1905: Concrete construction is a dangerous undertaking and requires the most skilled and intelligent direction. Our organization has contended that the adoption of the various concrete systems

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24. 25.

26. 27. 28.

29. 30.

31. 32.

33.

used in construction are experimental and uncertain at best, and the work requires the most skillful mechanics. (President Bowen, Bulletin, Building Trades Association, New York, September 1905, p. 228, cited in Haber, Industrial Relations, p. 39.) Willard L. Case, The Factory Buildings (New York: Industrial Extension Institute, 1919), p. 254, emphasis added. Day, Industrial Plants, p. 4; Case, Factory Buildings, p. 255. O n the role of generalized knowledge in the creation of modem professions, see Theodore Porter, Objectivity as Standardization: The Rhetoric of Impersonality in Measurement, Statistics, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, Annals o f Scholar ship 9 (1992): 30. Peter Galison, The Cultural Meaning of Aufbau," Scientific Phibsophy: Origins and Developments, ed. F . Stadler (Dordrecht, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1993), pp. 90-91. Richard Wightman Fox and T. ]. Jackson Lears, eds., The Culture o f Consumption: Critical Essays in American History 1880-1980 (New York: Pantheon, 1983); and Conn, Divided Mind. These phrases appear in Utilitarian Structures and Their Architectural Treatment, American Archi tect 96 (November 10, 1909): 183; the sentiments are echoed throughout contemporary discussions of factory design in architectural and technical journals and in books on factory operation. Utilitarian Structures, p. 185. Utilitarian Structures, p. 183. In 1921 another critic wrote more calmly that A building should indicate by its exterior treatment and design something of the purposes for which it is intended. The indiscriminate use of decoration and color should be avoided in the design of an industrial buildings (Arthur J. McEntee, Recent Development in the Architectural Treatment of Concrete Industrial Buildings, Architecture 43 [January 1921]: 18). Utilitarian Structures, p. 186; The Library o f Factory Management, vol. 1, Buildings and Upkeep (Chicago: A. W. Shaw Co., 1915), p. 87. For detailed discussions on the stratification of labor in the United States after 1900, see David Noble, America By Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise o f Corporate Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); David Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich, Segmented Work, Divided Workers: The Historical Transformation o f Labor in the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoloy Capital: The Degradation o f Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975). David Harvey, The Condition o f Postmodemity (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1989), p. 36.