DNV Process Vs Occupational Safety
DNV Process Vs Occupational Safety
DNV Process Vs Occupational Safety
CCPS defines Process Safety Management as: The application of management principles and systems to the identification, understanding and control of process hazards in order to prevent process related injuries and incidents . In other words: Keeping the process inside the pipes and equipment
What is y ou r Definiti on?
Process vs Occupational
Consequence of Events
Process Safety is different from Occupational Safety Not as intuitive as most people lack personal experience Needs more robust analysis tools to identify hazards
Tolerable Risk
The unacceptable consequences need more reliable controls Incidents can be massive and have lasting impacts
Occ Safety
Likelihood of occurrence
4
API Bayer BP
93
95
97
99
19
19
19
20
19
20
03
01
20
05
Number
Consequence Loss of life Injury Site Evacuation Regulatory Fines Production Downtime
Number
Leading
Getting to Base Camp (Emerging) requires that you comply with the standards and have a license to operate. Getting to the Summit (Leading) requires that you perform at a much higher level and:
Practicing
Defining
Understand your operating environment Are equipped to manage your exposures Have a competent team to support you Can communicate what you have achieved Are focused on your objective
Emerging
ht g i tR i n ht g i it R ht g i it R
And we need Process Safety Management systematics along with competent people and knowledge to prevent performance slipping.
te a r e Op
PSM
ain t n i Ma
Threat 1
Hazard
Threat 2
Top Event
Threat 3 Safeguard
Complexity..
Managing Process Safety can be complex: Many drivers reputation, strategic plans, license to operate Many interfaces functions, stakeholders, systems Many resources people, knowledge, finance Many times lifecycle approach
Generally solved by gap analysis and enhancements to existing management systems. Not a standalone PSM system.
Processes
People
isrs7psm
Uns core d
red Sco
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Performance
Scoring criteria are based on the level of maturity of the issues among worksite personnel.
Missing indicates no understanding or application of issue. Poor indicates limited knowledge or implementation of the issue. Fair indicates minimum levels of understanding and implementation of the issue. Good Indicates good levels of understanding of the issue and implementation is working effectively.
7 isrs PSM
:for the health of your process business
Bypasses and isolations Control system overrides Locked Close/Locked Open/Normally Close/Normally Open Valves Pipe, Flanges and Blinds MOV/ROV/Excess Flow (Depressurising) Valve Small Bore Fittings (<2") & Conduit Control Valves & Check Valves Relief Valves and Rupture Discs
Approach focuses on the results of the application of the site PSM system and cover typical areas of poor performance such as control of:
Culverts & Drainage Field Instrumentation Tankage Fired Vessel (Furnace, Incinerator, Main Combustion Chamber, Package Boiler, Gas Turbines, etc.) Unfired Pressure Vessel (Column, Vessel, Reactor, Heat Exchangers, etc) Rotary Equipment Chemical Storage & Usage Emergency Equipment Electrical controls
System is suitable and effective System is not yet effective. System is lacking in key areas.
Process Safety Information No needs assessment. Updating limited to ut generally poorer than bsites , P&IDs. EDMS used to provide access. Old t r sta d o tter new sites. o e b G o d d l for everything - some set piece studies u Process Hazard Analysis HAZOP co done. No ongoing programme, quality control or leader development. Lack of process hazard register and understanding of risks.
No needs assessment organic growth. Inconsistent approach & style. Update process ad-hoc. Human Factors not adequately covered. PSM in Projects No clear PS approach for project. Risk still missing in design processes. Lifecycle view lacking. Standards based culture.
4/10
Operating Procedures