Washingtonpost.

Newsweek Interactive, LLC

Diplomacy by Other Means
Author(s): Mark Leonard
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 132 (Sep. - Oct., 2002), pp. 48-56
Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183455 .
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b y
Other Means
If
Western
governments really
wantto
persuade
reluctant alliesinthe
Muslim world thatthewar
against
terrorism isnotawar
against
Islam,
they
need to
change
their
sy le.
Forget
the
airdrops ofanti-Osamaleaflets
and
windup
radiostuned to theBBC and Voice
ofAmerica.
Ty
using
Britney Spears,
Amnest
International,
and alittle
truth,
empathy ,
and
understanding.
i
By
Mark Leonard
uring
theCold
War,
theUnited
Statescreated arob ust
array
of cul-
tural and intellectual instruments to
spread
Americanvaluesb ehind the
IronCurtainand
plead
theU.S. caseto
nonaligned
nations. Afterthefall of theBerlin
Wall,
theUnited
States
gradually
dismantled
many
of these
propagan-
daand information
tools, emasculating
theUnited
StatesInformation
Agency
and
paring
theVoiceof
America and Radio Free
Europe
downto almostresid-
ual
proportions.
Othercountries followed
suit,
such
aswhentheBritish
initially
slashed the
b udget
of the
BBC World Service and theGermans scaled b ack their
effortsatcultural
promotionb y closing
downb ranch-
esof theirGoethe-Instituts all overtheworld.
Ironically ,
theend of theCold Warhasmade
pub lic diplomacy -the
task of
communicating
withoverseas
pub lics-moreimportant
thanever.
The
spread
of
democracy
to a
majority
of coun-
tries,
increased accessto newsand
information,
and theriseof
glob al nongovernmental organiza-
tions
(NGOs)
and
protest
movementshave
put
ever
greater
constraintsonnational
governments.
The
disparatepub lic
reactionto theattacksof
Sep-
temb er
11, 2001,
and theiraftermathhasmadethat
point
all too clear. AsWestern
governments
strive
to convincereluctantalliesintheMuslim world
thatthewar
against
terrorism isnotawar
against
Islam,
the"b attleforheartsand minds" hasrisen
once
again
to the
top
of
policy makers'
inb oxes.
Thelastdecadeisrifewith
examples
of
popu-
lar
perceptions,
ratherthan
governments, setting
the
pace
forinternational
diplomacy .
In
Kosovo,
a
powerful military
coalitionrisked defeat not in
thefield b utinthemedia
b attleground
for
pub lic
support
as
governments
inGreeceand
Italy strug-
gled
to
cope
withvolatile
popular opinion.
In
Rwanda,
ethnic conflict wasmob ilized
through
inflammatory
radio b roadcaststo civiliansrather
than
b y military
command chains. Recent
antiglob -
alizationdemonstrations have revealed anew
diplomatic
environmentwherestateand nonstate
actors
compete
forthe
pub lic's
attention. Afterthe
mad cow diseasecrisisin
Britain,
theFrench
gov-
ernmentviolated
European
Unionlaw and con-
Mark Leonard is director
of
the
ForeignPolicy
Centre
(www.fpc.org.uk),
an
independent,
London-b ased think tank
launched
b y
BritishPrimeMinister
Tony
Blairin1998 to revi-
talizedeb ateon
glob al
issues.
48 FOREIGN POLICY
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42 ='~-
'I
S AS
I'm from theU.S.
government,
and I'm hereto
help:
TheUnited States now
regrets cutting
its
pub lic diplomacy b udget
when theCold War ended.
o
z
tinued to b anBritish
b eef, largely
in
response
to
pub lic
fearsab out
safety .
And the
glob al compe-
titionfor
investment, trade, tourists, entrepre-
neurs,
and
highly
skilled workers extends the
influenceof
foreignpub licsb ey ond
the
political
to theeconomic.
Thecommonthread
throughout
these
disparate
examples
is
pub lic perception:
The
way
inwhichfor-
eignpub licsinterpretBritish, U.S.,
orothercountries'
values, motivations,
and
qualities
cancreatean
enab ling
ora
disab ling
environment.
Propaganda
will not
persuadepopulations
inreluctantcoun-
triesto
supportwar,
b ut
perceptions
of Western
motivationsas
imperial
orself-interested candam-
age
thechancesof success. The
BBC
will notb lock
outcallsto armsfrom trib al radio
stations,
b utitcan
act asa
counterweight
if
people
trustits
dispas-
sionateoverview of ethnic tensions. Promotional
advertisementsforBritishb eef
might
havealimit-
ed
impact
onconsumers'
fears,
b uteffortsto show
the
quality
of Britishscienceand the
integrity
of its
veterinarianscould
help mollify
French
suspicions.
And
campaigns
to
change
the
perceptions
of coun-
trieslike
Ireland, Spain,
and New Zealand created
a
premium
for
products
and servicesand
helped
attractinvestmentand tourists.
All transactionsand
points
of contact-whether
promoting policies, selling products,
or
attracting
investment-will feed off the
general image
of acoun-
try
and reflectb ack onto
it,
inb oth
positive
and
neg-
SEPTEMBER I OCTOBER 2002 49
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Diplomacy b y
OtherMeans
ativedirections. For
example,
Nor-
way 'sreputation
forwork ininter-
national mediationwill
help per-
suadethedifferentfactionsinSri
Lankathat
Norway
isanhonest
b roker,
whichwill inturnadd to
Norway 's reputation
for
peace.
Equally ,
whentheUnited Statestries
to
exempt
its
peacekeepers
from
prosecutionb y
theInternational
Criminal
Court,
suchactionrein-
forcestheU.S.
reputation
fordoub le
standardsand unilateralism.
Joseph
S.
Ny eJr.,
deanof the
John
F.
Kennedy
School of Govern-
ment at Harvard
University ,
has
argued
thatthe
power
of influencecan
complement
moretraditional formsof
power
b ased oneconomic
or
military
clout. Such"soft
power,"
he
notes,
canrest
onthe
appeal
of "one'sideasorthe
ab ility
to setthe
agenda
in
way s
that
shape
the
preferences
of others."
But
governments
have
y et
to remold theirown
diplo-
matic structuresto
adapt
to this
changed
environ-
ment.
Instead,
most
diplomatic
institutionshavedone
littlemorethanb oltonafew new unitsorrecruita
couple
of extrastaff from
NGOs-changes
thatare
essentially
cosmetic.
Instead, diplomats
musttransform
themselvesfrom
reporters
and
lob b y ists
who reactto
issuesinto
shapers
of
pub lic
deb atesaround theworld.
TOSELL THE TRUTH
Theterm
"pub lic diplomacy "
isoftena
euphemism
for
propaganda.
Butthe
proliferation
of informa-
tionin
open
societies
(and, increasingly ,
inclosed
onesas
well)
makesit moredifficultfor
govern-
mentsto control information.
Attempts
to distort
thetruthwill
eventually
b e
exposed
and therefore
will createeven
greaterskepticism
of
governments.
Moreover,
b ecausemostideasthat
people
ab sorb
ab outa
country
are
b ey ond
thecontrol of nation-
al
governments-b ooks, CDs, films,
television
pro-
grams,
or b randsand consumer
products
with
national
connotations-governments
can
only
have
an
impact
atthe
marginsb y seeking
to clear
paths
forthemost
positivemessages
to reachmassaudi-
enceswhile
working directly
to influencethe
opin-
ionsof nicheaudiences.
Pub lic
diplomacy
should b eab out
b uilding
rela-
tionships, starting
from
understanding
othercoun-
tries'
needs, cultures,
and
peoples
and then
looking
forareasto makecommoncause. Astherelation-
I
'00
Local news
goesglob al: Images
of Western antiwar
protests
inthePakistani
press
shipsdeepen, pub lic diplomacy
canachieveahier-
archy
of
ob jectives: increasing familiarity (making
people
think ab out
y ourcountry
and
updating
their
images
of
it); increasing appreciation(creating pos-
itive
perceptions
of
y ourcountry
and
getting
oth-
ersto seeissuesfrom
y ourperspective); engaging
people(encouraging people
to see
y ourcountry
as
anattractivedestinationfortourism and
study
and
encouraging
them to
b uy
its
products
and sub scrib e
to its
values);
and
influencing people's
b ehavior
(getting companies
to
invest, encouraging pub lic
support
for
y ourcountry 'spositions,
and
convincing
politicians
to turnto itasan
ally ).
To achievethese
goals, governments
mustcraft
a
pub lic diplomacy
that
operates
inthreedimen-
sions. Thefirstiscommunicationon
day -to-day
issues-in other
words, aligning
traditional
diplo-
macy
withthenews
cy cle.
The
glob alization
of
news
coveragecomplicates
thistask.
Diplomats
haveno control overthe
way
themedia
present
their
countries,
sincethose
reports
are
ty pically
filed
b y
foreigncorrespondents.
Someof thestoriesthat
havethe
b iggestimpact
ab road arenottraditional
foreignpolicy
storiesthatemb assiesare
equipped
to deal withb utaredomestic
stories,
suchasthe
outb reak of foot-and-mouthdiseasein
Britain,
the
successof
right-wing politicianJean-Marie
LePen
intherecentFrench
presidential elections,
orthe
desecrationof
Jewishgraves
in
Italy . Diplomats
will talk to the
press
ab out
"foreign"
news
stories,
b ut
they
will refer
enquiries
ab out"domestic" sto-
riesto therelevant
governmentdepartments,
which
arenot
equipped
to understand theinternational
repercussions
of theiractions.
Moreover, during
thethroesof adomestic
crisis, foreigncorrespon-
dentswill
invariab ly get
second-classservicesince
or
0 5i
50 FOREIGN POLICY
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government
officialswill b e
primarily
concerned
ab out
presscoverage
athome.
Thesecond dimensionof
pub lic diplomacy
is
strategic comnimunication.
Governmentsare
adept
at
convey ing
theirstances on
particular
issues
(whether
tariffsonsteel or
peacemaking
inthe
Middle
East),
b utofficialsaremuchlesseffective
at
managing
overall
perceptions
of their
country .
Onereasonforthisfailureisthatdifferentinstitu-
tionshaveb een
responsib le
for
dealing
with
politics,
trade, tourism, investment,
and cultural relations.
Buton
many issues,
the
totality
of
messages
will
determinehow
people
ab road relateto anation.
Strategic
communicationislikea
political
cam-
paign: developing
asetof
comprehensivemessages
and
planning
aseriesof
sy mb olic
eventsand
photo
opportunities
to reinforcethem. Chris
Powell,
chair-
manof theBritish
advertising company
BMP
DDB,
argues
that since
people
are
exposed
to thousandsof mes-
sagesevery day ,
thethemes
mustnotb e
overly complex:
"A contrastb etween
diplo-
macy
and
advertising
isthat
in
advertising
anenormous
amount
of work
goes
into
the
preparation-b oiling
ideasdowninto
very , very
simpleconcepts,
and then
repeating
that
message
over
and over
again
until weare
all
thoroughly
b ored with
it. When
y ou
areso b ored
withit that
y ou
feel like
giving up,
thelistener
may
just
have
b egun
to
register
the
message."
Thethird dimension
of
pub lic diplomacy
isthe
most
long
term:
develop-
z
o
L-
z
CL
ing lasting relationships
with
key
individuals
through
scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars,
confer-
ences,
and accessto mediachannels. This
approach
differsfrom theusual
diplomatic practice
of nur-
turing
contacts
throughlunches,
cocktail
parties,
and
receptions.
These
relationships
arenot b uilt
b etween
diplomats
and
peopleab road-they
are
b etween
peers(politicians, special advisors,
b usi-
ness
people,
cultural
entrepreneurs,
and academ-
ics).
This
approach
differsfrom
messagesdesigned
to sell b ecauseitinvolvesa
genuineexchange
that
leadsto a"wartsand all"
picture
of the
country .
HEARING IT LIKE IT IS
Many
of thecommunicationinitiativesthatWestern
governmentsdeveloped
aftertheterroristattacks
lastautumnfall into whatcanb estb edescrib ed as
a
"convey or
b elt" model for
transmitting
informa-
tion. Recentdeb atesab out
pub lic diplomacy -par-
ticularly
intheUnited
States,
b utinothercountries
as
well-suggest
that
many policy makers
feel the
key
prob lem
isalack of
information,
asif to
say ,
"If
only
other
people
had accessto thesame
degree
of infor-
mationwe
have,
and thesame
degree
of
insight,
then
they
would
agree
with
us."
But
post-Septemb er
11
pub lic diplomacy
has
notfailed to deliverinformation.
Rather,
ithasfailed
to deliverinformation
convincingly .
Thetoneof
many messages
is
declamatory ,
without
any appar-
entintentto
engage
in
dialogue
orlisten. For
instance,
immediately
after
Septemb er11, 2001,
theU.S.
gov-
ernmentresorted to crude
psy chological operations
,/
. . . . . . . . . . . .
_
THUSEA
uRIN
mDEN
'C 0
W
it IDRER AND
OA 8UIA
NDON HAS
/Yout
N
E
I
USALA SIN ur
MIURDERER AND COWARD .
HAS ABANDONED AL
QAIA. -
HE HAS ABANDONED YOU
AND RUN AWAY. GIVE
YOURSELF UP ANDDONOT
DIE NEEDLESSLY, YOU
MEAN NOTHING TOHiM.
SAVE YOUR FAMILIES
THE GRIEF AND PQN OF
YOUR DEATH
How notto make friends and influence
people: Propaganda
leaflets
dropped
into
Afghanistan b y
theU.S.
military
such as
dropping
leafletb omb s(show-
Sing
amemb er of the
Talib an
b eating
a
group
of womenand
b earing
the
message:
"Is
thisthefuture
y ou
want
for
y our
childrenand
y ourwomen?")
or
drop-
ping fixed-frequency
windup
radiostuned to
U.S.
military
b roadcasts.
If Western
govern-
mentsareto move
b ey ond
propaganda, they
must
meet four
challenges:
understanding
the
target
audience, confronting
hos-
tility
toward Westerncul-
ture, engaging people
emo-
tionally ,
and
proving
their
ownrelevanceto the
pub lic
concerned.
Knowing y our
audienceisthe
top priority
for
any
effectivecommunication. But
diplomats
areoften
moreinterested in
winning arguments
thanin
per-
suading skeptical pub lics.
Governments
struggle
to
internalizeand
prepare
for
potential
threatsthatdo
notconform to their
underly ing strategic assump-
tions. Thismind-set
explainswhy
theIranianrevo-
lutionin1979 wassuchamassiveshock to Western
diplomats.
The
signs
were
there-rising
social
unrest,
the
growing
influenceof Islamic
political
activists-
b uttheb ureaucratic mandarinscouldn't
accept
them.
SEPTE.IBER | OcrOBER 2002 51
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Ni
Image
is
every thing: Norway
has
successfully
marketed itself asa
force forworld
peace.
Ab ove:
Norwegian
soldiers
stop
ethnic Alb anian
menwhile on
patrol
attheKosovo-Macedonian b order,
amidst
fighting
b etween ethnic Alb anian
guerillas
and Macedonian forces.
Carry ing
outsuccessful
diplomacy
isdifficultif
y ou
do nothaveearsfor
thingsy ou
do notwantto hear.
BoththeBritish
Foreign
and CommonwealthOffice
and theU.S. State
Department
fell into this
trap
when
they produced
leafletsab outtheattacksontheWorld
TradeCenterand the
Pentagon. Although
theleaflets
contained
shocking pictures
thatworked onanemo-
tional
level,
thetextwas
very forensic, explaining why
the
Septemb er
11 attackswere
undoub tedly
carried out
b y
Osamab inLaden. Thesesortsof
messages
b ecome
enmeshed ina
b attleground
of
"y our
informationver-
sus
my
information."
Astheformer
advertising
executivesAdam
Lury
(of
HHCL and
Partners)
and SimonGib son
(of
Saatchi
& Saatchi) put
it: "Theanswerisnotmoreinfor-
mation,
b utadifferentform of
engagement."
That
sentimentled U.S. Under
Secretary
of StateforPub -
lic
Diplomacy
and Pub lic AffairsCharlotteBeersto
adviseU.S.
pub lic
affairs
officers,
"Our
goal
isnot
what
y ou say ,
b utthe
response
that
y ou
desire."
Pub lic
diplomacy
isnot
simply delivering
a
message
to an
audience;
itisab out
getting
aresult. And to
get
a
result, y ou
need to
acknowledge
thatthelistener's
Iw
iV
d4
The
Norwegian People's
Aid
Organization
trains former Bosnian soldiers
and
refugees
inmine clearance.
viewsmatterasmuchasthe
message.
You must
thereforeb e
ready
to
explore
the
legitimacy
of some
b asic b eliefs-from humanand
genderrights
to
healthand
safety -in
differentsocietiesand to dis-
cusshow
they
will work in
practice,
ratherthan
repeating
them
b y
rote.
Thesecond
step
toward effectivecommunication
involves
countering
the
widespread anger
atwhatis
perceived
to b ea
one-way
flow of culturefrom the
West. Theb elief thatlocal
customs, histories,
and
identitiesare
b eing
swallowed
b y
the
unstoppab le
advanceof
Gap, Rtarb ucks,
and Tom Cruise
presents
diplomats
withan
inherently
hostileaudience.
The
rightmessage
and
positioning
ona
topic
can
prevent
weak
arguments
from
falling
ondeaf ears.
Consider,
for
example,
therecent
repositioning
of
French
pub lic diplomacy ,
whichused to b eb ased on
pushing
Frenchcultural
exceptionalism
and
promot-
ing
theFrench
language.
Withthecreationof anew
pub lic diplomacy department,
theFrench
developed
anovel
approach:
Instead of
promoting
French
excep-
tionalism,
theFrench
governmentsought
common
causewithothercountriesonthe
receiving
end of U.S.
cultural dominanceand
positioned
themselvesasthe
champion
of thosenations. Inasimilar
maneuver,
whenitb ecame
apparent
thatFrenchcould notcom-
pete
with
English
asa
glob al language,
France
sought
to
promotemultilingualism;
if Frenchwill notb ethe
first
foreignlanguage
learned around the
world,
then
atleastmorethanone
foreignlanguage
will b elearned.
Western
governments
would do well to
empha-
size
pluralism
asacentral
part
of theiridentitiesand
to illustratethe
impact
that
foreign
cultureshaveon
theircountries. Onesuccessful
example
isaBritish
program
called
Visiting
Arts.
By b ringing
artists
a_
L-J
-1-
LL.
C6
a
La_
tw
o
o
-t-
r
.a
52
FOREIGN
POLICY
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
it
7>?
9'rcii
t3
Norwegian Deputy Foreign
Minister Vidar
Helgesen
arrives to
nego-
tiatea
permanent
truce b etween Sri Lanka and theTamil reb els.
o
...J
w
z
o
U
o
C:Z
L
2:
CD
0
c
_z
o
r,.
and
performers
from otherculturesto theUnited
Kingdom,
the
government presents
a
very positive
image
of a
receptive
British
culture,
which
play s
well inthe
proud originating country
and
helps
to
dispel
concernsab outcultural
hegemony
orBritish
dominationof the
developing
world. Contrastthis
approach
withthatof theU.S. State
Department,
which
plans
to airshortvideosonArab television
channels
profiling
thelivesof
"ordinary "
Muslim-
Americans, including teachers,
b asketb all
play ers,
and
firefighters.
Theintended
message
isthatthe
United Statesisan
opensociety ,
tolerantand
accept-
ing
of all
religions,
b utthevideos
mightprove
coun-
terproductive
since
they portray
Muslimsas
b eing
assimilated into U.S. culture.
Thethird
challenge
to
pub lic diplomacy
isto
move
b ey ond
intellectual formsof communication.
Recentadvertisements forthe
MorganStanley
Dean
Wittercreditcard assertthat93
percent
of all com-
municationisnonverb al. Itisdifficultto trustthat
exact
figure,
b utitisclearthat
many
otherfactors-
experiences, emotions, images-influencepeople's
responses
to
messages.
The
challenge
isto movefrom
supply ing
informationto
capturing
the
imagination.
TheBritishamb assador to theUnited
States,
Sir
ChristopherMey er, explained
the
importance
of
sy mb olism
in
Washington, D.C.,
after
Septemb er
11: "TheBritishstock hasneverb een
higher
inthe
U.S. Itisacomb inationof wordsand
sy mb ols....
First, [Prime
Minister
Tony ]
Blair
say ing
'itisan
attack onusall.' Thenon
Septemb er
13ththe
play -
ing
of the
Star-Spangled
Banneratthe
changing
of
the
guard
at
Buckingham
Palace. And
third,
when
the
president
madehisaddressto
Congress,
there
wasBlair
up
inthe
gallery showing
his
support.
4r
South Korean President Kim Dae
Jung
addresses anaudience atthe
Nob el Peace Prize Concert inOslo.
Thecomb inationof theseevents
produced
a
surge
of affectionfortheU.K. Whatweare
really say ing
to Americansisthatwearethe
only people
inthe
entirecosmoswhom
y ou
can
really
countonwhen
the
going getstough."
Thefourth
challenge
to
transcending propagan-
dist
messages
is
proving y our
relevance. Whilethat
might
not
ty pically
b ea
prob lem
fortheUnited
States,
othercountriesoftenfall short. One
way
of
demonstrating
relevanceisto concentrate on"niche
diplomacy ." Norway
isa
good example
of acoun-
try
thathasavoiceand a
presence
ontheinterna-
tional
stage
outof
proportion
to itsmodest
position
and assets. Ithasachieved this
presencethrough
a
ruthless
prioritization
of its
target
audiencesand its
concentrationona
singlemessage: Norway
asa
forcefor
peace.
This
reputation givesNorway greater
visib ility
thanitssizewarrants and reb utsaccusations
of isolationism. Mainactivitiesinthisfield include
Norway 'slargeforeign-aid b udget(second-most
among
industrialized countriesasa
percentage
of
gross
national
product)
and itsconflictresolution
effortsintheMiddleEast
(the
Oslo
accords),
Sri
Lanka,
and Colomb ia.
Norway
also
operates
a
rapid-
reactionforce
(theNorwegian
ResourceBank for
SEPTEMBER I OCTOBER 2002 53
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Diplomacy b y
OtherMeans
Democracy
and Human
Rights)
to assistinelection
monitoring
and conflict
prevention
inab out20 coun-
tries
annually .
TheNob el Peace
Prize, originating
in
Oslo,
isa
happy
historical factthatalso raisesNor-
way 'sprofile.
SHOOT THE MESSENGER
Effective
pub lic diplomacy
reliesonmorethan
just
the
quality
of a
message. Sometimes,
the
prob lem
is
the
messenger.
Eventhemostwell-crafted
argument
will fall flatif
nob ody
truststhesource.
Just
asread-
ers
might
b e
skeptical
of anarticle
appearing
ina
newspaper
withanextreme
ideological slant,
so too
might
a
target
audienceb e
leery
of aninformation
campaignsponsored b y
aWestern
government
with
a
perceived political
motive.
Thetraditional
approach
to
pub lic diplomacy
activity overseas,
b eitcultural
festivals, seminars,
economic
promotion,
or
policy advocacy ,
isthatit
should all b econcluded with"afew wordsfrom the
amb assador." Insome
cases,
itwould b efarmore
useful to
keep
theamb assadorindoors. Sensitive
messages
to
foreignpub lics
areoftenb estdissemi-
nated
b y people
who have
something
incommon
withthe
target
audience. For
instance,
thedecision
It
will b e
impossib le
fortheUnited States to win
hearts and minds unless
people get
asensethat the
United States
really
cares ab out them as
individuals,
not
just
b ecause
they
areseenas
potential
terrorists.
to
arrange
visitsof
prominent
Muslims
living
in
Britainto Islamic countriesafter
Septemb er
11 more
convincingly
demonstrated British
respect
forIslam
thandid
any
ministerial
pronouncements.
If a
message
will
engender
distrust
simply
b ecause
itis
coming
from a
foreigngovernment,
thenthe
gov-
ernmentshould hidethatfactasmuchas
possib le.
Increasingly ,
if astateisto makeitsvoiceheard and
to influenceeventsoutsideitsdirect
control,
itmust
work
throughorganizations
and networksthatare
sep-
arate
from, independent of,
and even
suspicious
of
gov-
ernmentsthemselves. Threeof themosteffectivemedi-
umsforthis
ty pe
of
pub lic diplomacy
are
NGOs,
diasporas,
and
political parties.
Nongovernmental Organizations
Working
withnonstate
actors,
suchas
NGOs,
iscen-
tral to communicationwithcivil societiesinother
countries
(and
hencecentral to
influencing
their
gov-
ernments)
b ecause
NGOs
havethree
key
resources
not
readily
availab leto
foreigngovernments:
credi-
b ility , expertise,
and
appropriate
networks.
People
are
often
quick
to
question
themotivationsb ehind the
diplomatic pronouncements
of a
state,
b utNGOS
suchasHuman
Rights
WatchorOxfam havea
long-
standing reputation
for
independence-and
hencea
credib ility -that
itisnotfeasib lefora
government
to createforitself.
(Amnesty
International'srecent
condemnationof Palestiniansuicide
b omb ings,
for
instance,
had amuchmore
profound impact
on
political
discoursethancountlessdenunciationsfrom
theU.S. and Israeli
governments.)
TheCanadian
polling company
EnvironicsInternational
survey ed
1,000 people
ineachof the
Group
of 20 industrial-
ized and
developing
countriesand found that65
percent
of
people
trustNGOsto work intheb est
interestsof
society ,
while
only
45
percent
trustnation-
al
governments
to do thesame.
NGOs haveaccessto networks of
activists,
experts,
and
foreignpoliticians-and they
know
how to marshal thosenetworksto exert
pressure
in
a
givenpolicy
area. No
diplomatic
mission
possesses(or
would wishto
possess)
the
capab ility
to
organize
street
demonstrations,
nor are
diplomats
well
positioned
to coor-
dinate sustained
lob b y ing
cam-
paigns.
Morethan
20,000
transna-
tional NGO
networksare
already
activeontheworld
stage(of
which
90
percent
werecreated
during
the
last30
y ears),
and
many
of them
could makeeffective
partners
for
conducting pub lic diplomacy . Governments,
how-
ever,
should b e
clear-ey ed
ab outsuch
relationships,
b ecause
they b ring
theirown
peculiar
difficulties.
NGOs
haveamuchmoreinformal
way
of
doing
things
and tend to work ona
"want-to-know,"
ratherthana
"need-to-know,"
b asis.
Despite
thisclashof
cultures,
collab orations
b etweenNGOsand
governments
have
y ielded
sever-
al notab lesuccesses. For
example,
effortsto restrict
the
glob al
tradein
smuggled
"conflictdiamonds"-
whichfunded someof Africa'sb loodiestcivil warsin
Sierra
Leone, Angola,
and theDemocratic
Repub lic
of the
Congo-would
nothaveb eensuccessful with-
out sustained
government
action
alongside
NGOs
54 FOREIGN POLICY
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likeGlob al Witnessand Human
Rights
Watchand
representatives
from thediamond
industry , particu-
larly
DeBeersand theWorld Diamond Council.
Diasporas
Thanksto increased international
migration
dur-
ing
thelatterhalf of the20th
century ,
therearenow
"living links"-relations, friends,
formerb usiness
partners-within virtually every country
inthe
world. The
untapped potential
inthe
glob al diaspora
could,
withsustained
involvement, y ield
several
advantages
to
policy makers. First,
and mostob vi-
ously , diasporas
can
help
fill thedemand forlan-
guage
skillsthathasb een
highlighted b y
theevents
following Septemb er11,
when
Pashto, Farsi,
and
Arab ic
speakers
weremuchneeded.
Furthermore,
suchlinks
provide
thecultural
knowledge, political insight,
and human
intelligence
necessary
forasuccessful
foreignpolicy .
Themis-
takesand disastersthatmarked eventsliketheViet-
nam WarortheIranian
Revolution,
for
instance,
might
haveb eenavoided had thereb eenmorecom-
prehensive
and intimate
knowledge
of thosesocieties
availab leto
policy makers.
Daniel
Ellsb erg,
the
defense
analy st
who leaked the
PentagonPapers
on
U.S. decision
making
in
Vietnam,
hassaid thatno
high-ranking
U.S. official atthetimeof thewar's
escalation"could have
passed
inofficeamidterm
freshmanexam inmodernVietnamese
history ...."
An
important
and
easily
overlooked
aspect
of
diasporadiplomacy
isthe
complexity
of relations
b etweendifferent
expatriates
of thesame
country .
A
recentfocus
group
the
ForeignPolicy
Centrecon-
ducted with
y oung professionals
inNew Delhi
revealed
very
differentattitudestoward theIndian
diaspora
intheUnited Statesand theUnited
King-
dom.
Many thought
of their
compatriots
inthe
United
Kingdom
as
low-skilled, low-wage,
and
unmotivated-an
imageessentially
dominated
b y
thecorner
shop
and the
import-export
trade. In
stark contrast, theU.S. Indian
community
wasseen
inamore
positivelight,
asamb itiousand
highly
skilled-an
imageheavily
influenced
b y
the
per-
ceived
prevalence
of Indiansintheinformation-
technology industry
of Silicon
Valley . Governments,
therefore, should notjustpay
attentionto
improv-
ing
the
image
of theircountriesb ut also to the
image
of resident
diaspora
communities.
Political Parties
A third areawhere
nongovernment-to-government
diplomacy
could b e
very fruitful isin
b uilding
rela-
tionsb etween
political parties
indifferentcoun-
tries. Prob lemsb etween
governmentsmay appear
to
b e
diplomatic when,
in
fact, they
stem from diffi-
cultiesthatrevolvearound
perceived political
dif-
ferences. For
example,
one
importantcontrib uting
factorto the
frosty
relationsthathavesometimes
prevailed
b etweenBritainand France
during
the
lastfew
y ears
hasb eenthe
suspicionamong
some
memb ersof theFrenchlefttoward New Lab our's
perceived
neolib eral tilt.
Therelationsb etween
political parties
of the
sameb road
stripe
indifferentcountriescanb ea
vitally important
dimensionof thosenations' over-
all
foreign
relations. Ona
growing
listof issues--eco-
nomic
reform,
social
rights, agriculture, drugs,
ter-
rorism,
and the
environment,
not to mention
humanitarianintervention-national interestsare
neitherimmutab lenor
particular
to a
single
coun-
try . Instead,
suchissuescan
only
b eaddressed
through
adelib erative
political process.
Increased
linksb etween
political partiesrepresent
one
way
to
deal withthathistoric shift.
Somecountriesare
already fostering
suchrela-
tions. One
example
is
Germany 's
Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung-alarge, politically
oriented instituteaffil-
iated withtheChristianDemocratic
movement,
whichreceivessub stantial state
funding
to facili-
tate
policy
deb ateand
exchanges
b etweencountries
and to maintaina
phy sical presence
indozensof
nations. German
taxpay ers
fund similar
organiza-
tionswithlinksto theothermain
parties:
theSocial
Democrats, Lib erals,
and Greens. This
approach
has
many advantages. First, nurturing
relations
b etween
politicians
of differentcountriesmakes
diplomacy
easier
b y giving
b othsidesaclearideaof
the
political positioning
of theother.
Second,
such
relationshipsopen
achannel for
policy exchange
that
renewstheintellectual
capital
of
political parties.
Third, exchangeshelp develop
aninternational out-
look within
parties
thatarenot in
power,
which
canb e
advantageous
in
smoothing
thetransition
b etweenadministrations.
NOMORE "HARD SELL"
All
governments pay lip
serviceto how theriseof
glob -
al communications, the
spread
of
democracy ,
the
growth
of NGOs, and the
development
of
powerful
multilateral
organizations
haveshifted thenatureof
power
withinsocietiesand altered thecraftof
diplo-
macy .
Butfew have
adequately
reflected those
changes
inhow
they deploy theirresources, organize
their
SEPTEMBER I OCTOBER 2002 55
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Diplomacy b y
OtherMeans
activities,
or
go
ab outtheircoreb usiness. Itisa
par-
adox
that,
as
interdependence
has
increased,
theeffort
invested in
nurturing relationships
withtherestof the
world has
steadily
declined.
The
b iggestchallenge
isto thecultureand
pri-
oritiesof
diplomatic
institutionsthemselves. Pub -
lic
diplomacy
canno
longer
b eseenasanadd-on
to therest of
diplomacy -it
must b eseenasa
central
activity
that is
play ed
out across
many
dimensionsand with
many partners.
Ab ove
all,
Western
governments
need amuchb roaderand
morecreativeideaof what
pub lic diplomacy
isand
whatitcando.
Suchreformsare
already apparent
intheUnit-
ed
States,
as
pub lic diplomacy gradually
moves
away
from the
b rowb eating
associated withthe
American"hard sell." TheState
Department
has
reb randed theVoiceof America'sArab ic serviceas
"Radio Sawa"
("Radio Together").
Gonearethe
hoursof U.S.
government-monitored
talk that
attracted asmall audienceof olderdecisionmak-
ers. Inits
place
isa
fast-paced
music stationaimed
atthe
y oung,
who
sub liminally ingest
newsb ul-
letinsb etweenb lastsof
Britney Spears
and the
Backstreet
Boy s.
TheUnited Statesalso
plans
to
launcha24-hourArab ic satellitenewschannel that
will
compete
withthe
mighty
Al
Jazeera.
All these
effortsareb acked
b y
serious
money -a proposed
$750 millionfor
promotional materials,
cultural
and educational
exchanges,
and radio and televi-
sionchannelsintheMiddleEast.
Butacommunications
strategy
can'twork if it
cuts
against
the
grain
of a
country 'sforeignpolicy .
It
will b e
impossib le
fortheUnited Statesto winhearts
and mindsunlessthe
targeted peopleget
asense
thattheUnited States
really
caresab outthem as
individuals,
not
just
b ecause
they
areseenas
poten-
tial terrorists. ThecurrentU.S. administrationhas
demonstrated thatitvaluescoercionab oveall else.
As
such, pub lic diplomacy
still will b eseenasthe
pro-
jection
of
power.
Unilateralist
policies
that
alway sput
U.S. interestsfirstwill undercut
sophisticated attempts
to b uild
relationships
with
foreignpub lics.
Forall its
good intentions,
U.S.
pub lic diplomacy
could
b ecomemired
b y
thesecontradictions-a velvet
fistinaniron
glove.
I-M
Want to Know More?
Thisarticleis
adapted
from the
findings
of the
ForeignPolicy
Centre's
two-y ear
research
program,
reported
inPub lic
Diplomacy (London:
The
ForeignPolicy Centre, 2002) b y
Mark
Leonard,
with
CatherineStead and Conrad
Smewing.
This
study explores
how someof themostsuccessful indus-
trialized countries
(GreatBritain, France, Germany , Norway ,
and theUnited
States)
conduct
pub -
lic diplomacy
and b uildson
Going
Pub lic: Diplomacy for
the
InformationSociety (London:
The
ForeignPolicy Centre, 2000) b y
Mark Leonard and
Vidhy a
Alakeson.
The
starting point
for
any
discussionof
pub lic diplomacy
hasto b ean
analy sis
of the
changing
natureof
power. Joseph
S.
Ny eJr. persuasively
setouttheintellectual
argument
fortheriseof
pub -
lic
diplomacy
inhisseminal article"SoftPower"
(FOREIGN POLICY,
Fall
1990)
and in"The
Dependent
Colossus"
(FOREIGN POLICY, March/April 2002). Infihad vs. McWorld:
How Glob -
alism and
Trib alism
Are
Reshaping
theWorld
(New
York: Ballantine
Books, 1996), Benjamin
Bar-
b er
presents
themostreadab leand informative
analy sis
of cultural
stereoty ping
and
lay s
outanamb i-
tious
agenda
forinstitutions
try ing
to
manage
cultural relations.
Jessica
T. Mathews's"PowerShift"
(ForeignAffairs, January /Feb ruary 1997) highlights
theris-
ing
influenceof nonstateactorsininternational
diplomacy .
Another
pub lication
worth
examining
is"TheLandmineBan: A Case
Study
in
Humanitarian
Advocacy " (Providence:
WatsonInstitute
forInternational
Studies, 2000) b y
DonHub ert.
Finally ,
auseful and
comprehensive
collectionof
essay s
on
"Diplomacy
intheInformation
Age"
canb efound ina
special
issueof thenow-defunct
journal
iMP
(July 2001),
whichremainsavailab leonline.
)For
linksto relevantWeb
sites,
accessto theFP
Archive,
and a
comprehensive
index of related
FOREIGN
POLICY articles, go
to
www.foreignpolicy .com.
56 FOREIGN POLICY
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