Fema 453 CH 2

Structural design criteria 2
2.1 OVERVIEW
T
his chapter discusses explosive threat parameters and
measures needed to protect shelters from blast effects.
Structural systems and building envelope elements for
new and existing shelters are analyzed; shelters and FEMA model
building types are discussed; and protective design measures for
the defined building types are provided, as are design guidance
and retrofit issues. The purpose of this chapter is to offer compre-
hensive information on how to improve the resistance of shelters
when exposed to blast events.
2.2 Explosive Threat Parameters

A detonation involves supersonic combustion of an explosive ma-
terial and the formation of a shock wave. The three parameters
that primarily determine the characteristics and intensity of blast
loading are the weight of explosives, the type of the explosives,
and the distance from the point of detonation to the protected
building. These three parameters will primarily determine the
characteristics and intensity of the blast loading. The distance of
the protected building from the point of explosive detonation
is commonly referred to as the stand-off distance. The critical
locations for detonation are taken to be at the closest point that
a vehicle can approach, assuming that all security measures are
in place. Typically, this would be a vehicle parked along the curb
directly outside the facility, or at the vehicle access control gate
where inspection takes place. Similarly, a critical location may be
the closest point that a hand carried device can be deposited.
There is also no way to effectively know the size of the explosive

threat. Different types of explosive materials are classified as High
Energy and Low Energy and these different classifications greatly
influence the damage potential of the detonation. High Energy
explosives, which efficiently convert the material’s chemical
Structural design criteria 2-

energy into blast pressure, represent less than 1 percent of all ex-
plosive detonations reported by the FBI Bomb Data Center. The
vast majority of incidents involve Low Energy devices in which a
significant portion of the explosive material is consumed by def-
lagration, which is a process of subsonic combustion that usually
propagates through thermal conductivity and is typically less de-
structive than a detonation. In these cases, a large portion of the
material’s chemical energy is dissipated as thermal energy, which
may cause fires or thermal radiation damage.
For a specific type and weight of explosive material, the inten-

sity of blast loading will depend on the distance and orientation
of the blast waves relative to the protected space. A shock wave
is characterized by a nearly instantaneous rise in pressure that
decays exponentially within a matter of milliseconds, which is fol-
lowed by a longer term but lower intensity negative phase. The
initial magnitude of pressure is termed the peak pressure and the
area under a graph of pressure plotted as a function of time, also
known as the airblast pressure time history, is termed the impulse
(see Figure 2-1). Therefore, the impulse associated with the shock
wave considers both the pressure intensity and the pulse duration.
As the front of the shock-wave propagates away from the source
of the detonation at supersonic speed, it expands into increas-
ingly larger volumes of air; the peak incident pressure at the shock
front decreases and the duration of the pressure pulse increases.
The magnitude of the peak pressures and impulses are reduced
with distance from the source and the resulting patterns of blast
loads appear to be concentric rings of diminishing intensity. This
effect is analogous to the circular ripples that are created when
an object is dropped in a pool of water. The shock front first im-
pinges on the leading surfaces of a building located within its path
and is reflected and diffracted, creating focus and shadow zones
on the building envelope. These patterns of blast load intensity
are complicated as the waves engulf the entire building. The pres-
sures that load the roof, sides, and rear of the building are termed
incident pressures, while the pressures that load the building
envelope directly opposite the explosion are termed reflected
pressures. Both the intensity of peak pressure and the impulse
2- Structural design criteria

Figure 2-1
Airblast pressure time
history
affect the hazard potential of the blast loading. A detailed analysis

is required to determine the magnitude of pressure and impulse
that may load each surface relative to the origin of the detonation.
The thresholds of different types of injuries associated with

damage to wall fragments and/or glazing are depicted in Figure
2-2. This range to effects chart shows a generic interaction between
the weight of the explosive threat and its distance to an occupied
building. These generic charts, for conventional construction,
provide information to law enforcement and public safety officials
that allow them to establish safe evacuation distances should an ex-
plosive device be suspected or detected. However, these distances
are so site-specific that the generic charts provide little more than
general guidance in the absence of more reliable site-specific in-
formation. Based on the information provided in the chart, the

onset of significant glass debris hazards is associated with stand-off
distances on the order of hundreds of feet from a vehicle-borne
explosive detonation while the onset of column failure is associated
with stand-off distances on the order of tens of feet.
Figure 2-2 Range to effects chart

Source: Defense Threat Reduction Agency

2.2.1 Blast Effects in Low-rise Buildings
Many shelters can be part of low-rise buildings. Although small

weights of explosives are not likely to produce significant blast
loads on the roof, low-rise buildings may be vulnerable to blast
loadings resulting from large weights of explosives at large stand-
off distances that may sweep over the top of the building. The
blast pressures that may be applied to these roofs are likely to far
exceed the conventional design loads and, unless the roof is a con-
crete deck or concrete slab structure, it may fail. There is little that
can be done to increase the roof’s resistance to blast loading that
doesn’t require extensive renovation of the building structure.
Figure 2-3 shows the ever expanding blast wave as it radiates from
the point of detonation and causes, in sequence of events, the
building envelope to fail, the internal uplift on the floor slabs, and
eventually the engulfment of the entire building.
Figure 2-3
Blast damage
SOURCE: Naval Facilities
Engineering Service Center,
User’s Guide on Protection
Against Terrorist Vehicle
Bombs, May 1998

In addition to the blast pressures that may be directly applied to
the exterior columns and spandrel beams, the forces collected by
the building envelope will be transferred through the slabs to the
structural frame or shear walls that transfer lateral loads to the foun-
dations. The extent of damage will be greatest in close proximity to
the detonation; however, depending on the intensity of the blast,
large inelastic deformations will extend throughout the building and
cause widespread cracking to structural and nonstructural partitions.
In addition to the hazard of impact by building envelope debris

propelled into the building or roof damage that may rain down,
the occupants may also be vulnerable to much heavier debris re-
sulting from structural damage. Progressive collapse occurs when
an initiating localized failure causes adjoining members to be over-
loaded and fail, resulting in a cascading sequence of damage that
is disproportionate to the originating extent
of localized failure. The initiating localized
failure may result from a sufficiently sized
parcel bomb that is in contact with a critical
structural element or from a vehicle sized
bomb that is located a short distance from the
building (see Figure 2-4). However, a large
explosive device at a large stand-off distance is
not likely to selectively fail a single structural
member; any damage that results from this
scenario is more likely to be widespread and
the ensuing collapse cannot be considered
progressive. Although progressive collapse is
not typically an issue for buildings three stories
or shorter, transfer girders and non-ductile,
non-redundant construction may produce
structural systems that are not tolerant of
localized damage conditions. The columns
that support transfer girders and the transfer
Figure 2-4 girders themselves may be critical to the sta-
Alfred P. Murrah Federal bility of a large area of floor space.
Office Building
SOURCE: U.s. air force

As an example, panelized construction that is
sufficiently tied together can resist the localized
damage or large structural deformations that
may result from an explosive detonation.
Although the explosive detonation opposite
the Khobar Towers destroyed the exterior fa-
çade, the panelized structure was sufficiently
tied together to permit relatively large de-
formations without loss of structural stability
(see Figure 2-5). This highlights the benefits
of ductile and redundant detailing for all Figure 2-5
types of construction. Khobar Towers
SOURCE: U.s. air force
To mitigate the effects of in-structure shock that may result

from the infilling of blast pressures through damaged enclo-
sures, nonstructural overhead items should be located below the
raised floors or tied to the ceiling slabs with seismic restraints.
Nonstructural building components, such as piping, ducts,
lighting units, and conduits must be sufficiently tied back to the
building to prevent failure of the services and the hazard of falling
debris.
The contents of this manual supplement the information pro-

vided in FEMA 361, Design and Construction Guidance for Community
Shelters and FEMA 320, Taking Shelter From the Storm: Building a Safe
Room Inside Your House. Although this publication does not specifi-
cally address nuclear explosions and shelters that protect against
radiological fallout, this information may be found in FEMA
TR-87, Standards for Fallout Shelters. The contents of FEMA 452, A
How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings
will help the reader identify critical assets and functions within
buildings, determine the threats to these assets, and assess the vul-
nerabilities associated with those threats.

2.2.2 Blast Effects in High-rise Buildings:
The Urban Situation
High-rise buildings must resist significant gravity and lateral load

effects; although the choice of framing system and specific struc-
tural details will determine the overall performance, the lower
floors, which are in closest proximity to a vehicle-borne threat, are
inherently robust and more likely to be resistant to blast loading
than smaller buildings. However, tall buildings are likely to be
located in dense urban environments that tend to trap the blast
energy within the canyon like streets as the blast waves reflect off
of neighboring structures. Furthermore, tall buildings are likely
to contain underground parking and loading docks that can in-
troduce significant internal explosive threats. While these internal
threats may be prevented through rigorous access control pro-
cedures, there are few conditions in which vehicular traffic can
be restricted on city streets. Anti-ram streetscape elements are re-
quired to maintain a guaranteed stand-off distance from the face of
the building.
In addition to the hazard of structural collapse, the façade is a

much more fragile component. While the lower floor façade is
likely to fail in response to a sizable vehicle threat at a sidewalk’s
distance from the building, the peak pressures and impulses at
higher elevations diminish due to the increased stand-off distance
and the associated shallow angle of incidence (measured with re-
spect to the vertical height of the building). Although reflections
off of neighboring structures are likely to affect the intensity of
blast loads, the façade loads at the upper floors will be consider-
ably lower than the loads at the lower floors and the extent of
façade debris will reflect this. A detailed building-specific analysis
of the structure and the façade is required to identify the inherent
strengths and vulnerabilities. This study will indicate the safest
place to locate the shelter.

2.3 Hardened ConstrUCTION
2.3.1 Structural System
A shelter will only be effective if the building in which it is located

remains standing. It is unreasonable to design a shelter within a
building with the expectation that the surrounding structure may
collapse. Although the shelter must be able to resist debris impact,
it is not reasonable for it to withstand the weight of the building
crashing down upon it. Therefore, the effectiveness of the shelter
will depend on the ability of the building to sustain damage, but
remain standing. The ability of a building to withstand an explo-
sive event and remain standing depends on the characteristics of
the structure. Some of these characteristics include:
m Mass. Lightweight construction may be unsuitable for provid-

ing resistance to blast loading. Inertial resistance may be re-
quired in addition to the strength and ductility of the system.
m Shear capacity. Shear is a brittle mode of failure and primary

members and/or their connections should therefore be
designed to prevent shear failure prior to the development of
the flexural capacity.
m Capacity for resisting load reversals. In response to sizable

blast loads, structural elements may undergo multiple cycles
of large deformation. Similarly, some structural elements may
be subjected to uplift pressures, which oppose conventional
gravity load design. The effects of rebound and uplift
therefore require blast-resistant members to be designed for
significant load reversals. Depending on the cable profile,
pre-tensioned or post-tensioned construction may provide
limited capacity for abnormal loading patterns and load
reversals. Draped tendon systems designed for gravity loads
may be problematic; however, the higher quality fabrication
and material properties typical for precast construction
may provide enhanced performance of precast elements
designed and detailed to resist uplift and rebound effects
resulting from blast loading. Seated connection systems for

steel and precast concrete systems must also be designed and
detailed to accommodate uplift forces and rebound resulting
from blast loads. The use of headed studs is recommended
for affixing concrete fill over steel deck to beams for uplift
resistance.
m Redundancy. Multiple alternative load paths in the vertical-

load-carrying system allow gravity loads to redistribute in the
event of failure of structural elements.
m Ties. An integrated system of ties in perpendicular directions

along the principal lines of structural framing can serve to
redistribute loads during catastrophic events.
m Ductility. Structural members and their connections may

have to maintain their strength while undergoing large
deformations in response to blast loading. The ability of
a member to develop inelastic deformations allows it to
dissipate considerable amounts of blast energy. The ratio of
a member’s maximum inelastic deformation to a member’s
elastic limit is a measure of its ductility. Special detailing
is required to enable buildings to develop large inelastic
deformations (see Figure 2-6).
Historically, cast-in-place reinforced concrete was the preferred

material for explosion-mitigating construction. This is the mate-
rial used for military bunkers, and the military has performed
extensive research and testing of its performance. Among its ben-
efits, reinforced concrete has significant mass, which improves
its inertial resistance; it can be readily proportioned for ductile
behavior and may be detailed to achieve continuity between
members. Finally, concrete columns are less susceptible to global
buckling in the event of the loss of a floor system. However, steel
may be similarly detailed to take advantage of its inherent ductility
and connections may be designed to provide continuity between
members. Similarly, panelized precast concrete systems can be de-
tailed to permit significant deformations in response to explosive
loading, as demonstrated by the performance of Khobar Towers.
2-10 Structural design criteria

Figure 2-6
Ductile detailing of
reinforced concrete
structures
Protective design further requires the system to accept localized

failure without precipitating a collapse of a greater extent of the
structure. By allowing the building to bridge over failed compo-
nents, building robustness is greatly improved and the unintended
consequences of extreme events may be mitigated. However, it
may not be possible for existing construction to be retrofitted to
limit the extent of collapse to one floor on either side of a failed
column. If the members are retrofitted to develop catenary be-
havior, the adjoining bays must be upgraded to resist the large
lateral forces associated with this mode of response. This may
require more extensive retrofit than is either feasible or desirable.
In such a situation, it may be desirable to isolate the collapsed re-
gion rather than risk propagating the collapse to adjoining bays.
The retrofit of existing buildings to protect against a potential
Structural design criteria 2-11

progressive collapse resulting from extreme loading may therefore
best be achieved through the localized hardening of vulnerable
columns. These columns need only be upgraded to a level of
resistance that balances the capacities of all adjacent structural
elements. At greater blast intensities, the resulting damage would
be extensive and create global collapse rather than progressive
collapse. Attempts to upgrade the building to conform to the
alternate path approach would be invasive and potentially coun-
terproductive.
2.3.2 Loads and Connections
Because the shelter will likely suffer significant damage in re-

sponse to extreme loading conditions, the shelter must be able
to withstand both the direct loading associated with the natural
or manmade hazard and the debris associated with the damaged
building within which it is housed.
Structural systems that provide a continuous load path that

supports all vertical and lateral loads acting on a building are
preferred. A continuous load path ties all structural components
together and the fasteners used in the connections must be ca-
pable of developing the full capacity of the members. In order to
provide comprehensive protection, the capacity of each compo-
nent must be balanced with the capacity of all other components
and the connection details that tie them together. Because all
applied loads must eventually be transferred to the foundations,
the load path must be continuous from the uppermost structural
component to the ground.
After the appropriate loads are calculated for the shelter, they
should be applied to the exterior wall and roof surfaces of the
shelter to determine the design forces for the structural and
nonstructural elements. The continuous load path carries the
loads acting on a building’s exterior façade and roof through the
floor diaphragms to the gravity load-bearing system and lateral
load-bearing system. The individual components of the façade and
roof must be able to develop these extraordinary forces, though

deformed, and transfer them to the underlying beams, trusses,
girders, shear walls, and columns that provide the global structural
resistance. These structural systems must also be able to develop
uplift forces and load reversals that may accompany these extreme
loading conditions. Uplift forces and load reversals are typically
applied contrary to the conventional design loads and, therefore,
details must be developed that account for these contrary patterns
of deformation (see Figure 2-7). Seismic detailing that addresses
ductile behavior despite multiple cycles of load reversals are gen-
erally well suited for all of these extreme loading conditions and
building-specific details must consider each threat condition. Some
construction materials, however, are better suited to developing a
load path that can withstand loads from multiple directions and
events. Cast-in-place reinforced concrete and steel moment frame
construction is more commonly detailed to provide load paths
than in "progressive collapse" designs utilizing panelized or ma-
sonry load-bearing construction. Nevertheless, appropriate details
must be developed for nearly all structural systems.
Figure 2-7
Effects of uplift and load
reversals

Floor slabs are typically designed to resist downward gravity
loading and have limited capacity to resist uplift pressures or the
upward deformations experienced during load reversals that may
precipitate a flexural or punching shear failure (see Figure 2-8).
Therefore, floor slabs that may be subjected to significant uplift
Figure 2-8
Flat slab failure mechanisms

pressures, such that they overcome the gravity loads and subject
the slabs to reversals in curvature, require additional reinforce-
ment. If the slab does not contain this tension reinforcement, it
must be supplemented with a lightweight carbon fiber applica-
tion that may be bonded to the surface at the critical locations.
Carbon fiber reinforcing mats bonded to the top surface of slabs
would strengthen the floors for upward loading and reduce the
likelihood of slab collapse from blast infill uplift pressures as well
as internal explosions in mailrooms or other susceptible regions.
This lightweight high tensile strength material supplements the
limited capacity of the concrete to resist these unnatural loading
conditions. An alternative approach would be to notch grooves
in the top of concrete slabs and epoxy carbon fiber rods into
grooves; although this approach may offer a greater capacity, it is
much more invasive.
Similarly, adequate connections must be provided between the

roof sheathing and roof structure to prevent uplift forces from
lifting the roof off of its supports. Reinforcing steel, bolts, steel
studs, welds, screws, and nails are used to connect the roof
decking to the supporting structure. The detailing of these con-
nections depends on the magnitude of the uplift or catenary
forces that may be developed. The attachment of precast planks to
the supporting structure will require special attention to the con-
nection details. However, as with all other forms of construction,
ductile and redundant detailing will produce superior perfor-
mance in response to extreme loading.
Wall systems are typically connected to foundations using anchor

bolts, reinforcing steel and imbedded plate systems properly
welded together, and nailed mechanical fasteners for wood con-
struction. Although these connections benefit from the weight of
the structure bearing against the foundations and the lateral re-
straint provided by keyed details, the connections must be capable
of developing the design forces in both the connectors and the
materials into which the connectors are anchored.

2.3.3 Building Envelope
Façade components that must transfer the collected loads to the

structural system must be designed and detailed to absorb sig-
nificant amounts of energy associated with the extreme loading
through controlled deformation. The duration of the extreme
loading significantly influences the criteria governing the design
of the building envelope systems. Significant inelastic deforma-
tions may be permitted for extraordinary events that impart the
extreme loading over very short periods of time (e.g., explo-
sive detonations). The building envelope system need only be
designed to resist the direct shock wave, rebound, and any reflec-
tions off of neighboring buildings, all of which will occur within a
matter of milliseconds (see Figure 2-9).
Resistance to blast is often compared to

resistance to natural hazards with the
expectation that the protection against
one will provide protection against the
other. Therefore, as a first step, one
should consider any inherent resistance
derived from a building’s design to resist
environmental loading. Extreme wind
loading resulting from tornadoes may
similarly be of short enough duration to
permit a large deformation of the façade
in response to the peak loading. Cer-
tainly, the debris impact criteria will be
similar to that for blast loading. However,
hurricane winds may persist for extended
periods of time and the performance cri-
teria for façade components in response
to these sustained pressures permit
smaller deformations and less damage to
the system. Breach of the façade compo-
nents would permit pressures to fill the
Figure 2-9 building and loads to be applied to nonstructural components.
Blast damaged façade Anchorages and connections must be capable of holding the

façade materials intact and attached to the building. Brittle modes
of failure must be avoided to allow ductile deformations to occur.
2.3.4 Forced Entry and Ballistic Resistance
Ballistic-resistant design involves both the blocking of sightlines to

conceal the occupants and the use of ballistic-resistant materials
to minimize the effectiveness of the weapon. To reduce expo-
sure, the safe room should be located as far as possible into the
interior of the facility and walls should be arranged to eliminate
sightlines through doorways. In order to provide the required
level of resistance, the walls must be constructed using the appro-
priate thickness of ballistic-resistant materials, such as reinforced
concrete, masonry, mild steel plate, or composite materials. The
required thickness of these materials depends on the level of
ballistic resistance; however, resistance to a high level of ballistic
threat may be achieved using 6.5 inches of reinforced concrete,
8 inches of grouted concrete masonry unit (CMU) or brick, 1
inch mild steel plate, or ¾ inch armor steel plate. A ½-inch thick
layer of bullet-resistant fiberglass may provide resistance up to a
medium level of ballistic threat. Bullet-resistant doors are required
for a high level of protection; however, hollow steel or steel clad
doors with pressed steel frames may be used with an appropriate
concealed entryway. Ballistic-resistant window assemblies contain
multiple layers of laminated glass or polycarbonate materials and
steel frames. Because these assemblies tend to be both heavy and
expensive, their number and size should be minimized. Roof
structures should contain materials similar to the ballistic-resistant
wall assemblies. Ratings of bullet-resisting materials are presented
in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1: UL 752 Ratings of Bullet-resisting Materials
Rating Ammunition Grain Minimum Velocity (fps)
Level 1 9 mm full metal copper jacket with lead core 124 1,185
Level 2 .357 Magnum jacketed lead soft point 158 1,250
Level 3 .44 Magnum lead semi-wadcutter gas checked 240 1,350
Level 4 .30 caliber rifle lead core soft point 180 2,540
7.62 mm rifle lead core full metal copper jacket,

Level 5 150 2,750
military ball
Level 6 9 mm full metal copper jacket with lead core 124 1,400
5.56 mm rifle full metal copper jacket with lead

Level 7 55 3,080
core
7.62 mm rifle lead core full metal copper jacket,

Level 8 150 2,750
military ball
UL = Underwriters Laboratories
Forced entry resistance is measured in the time it takes for an ag-

gressor to penetrate the enclosure using a variety of hand tools
and weapons. The required delay time is based on the probability
of detecting the aggressors and the probability of a response force
arriving within a specified amount of time. The different layers
of defense create a succeeding number of security layers that are
more difficult to penetrate, provide additional warning and re-
sponse time, and allow building occupants to move into defensive
positions or designated safe haven protection (see Figure 2-10).
The rated delay time for each component comprising a defense
layer (walls, doors, windows, roofs, floors, ceilings, and utility
openings) must be known in order to determine the effective
delay time for the safe room. Conventional construction offers
little resistance to most forced entry threat severity levels and the
rating of different forced entry-resistant materials is based on stan-
dardized testing under laboratory conditions.

Figure 2-10
Layers of defense
2.4 New Construction

The design of new buildings to contain shelters provides greater
opportunities than the retrofit of existing buildings. Whether
the entire building or just the shelter is to be resistant to the
explosive terrorist threat may have a significant impact on the
architectural and structural design of the building. Furthermore,
unless the building is required to satisfy an established security
design criteria, the weight of explosive that the building is to be
designed to resist must be established by a site-specific threat and
risk assessment. Even so, given the evolving nature of the terrorist
threat, it is impossible to predict all the extreme conditions to
which the building may be exposed over its life. Therefore, even
if the building is not to be designed to resist any specific explo-
sive threat, the American Society of Civil Engineers Minimum
Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures (ASCE-7) requires
the building to be designed to sustain local damage without the
building as a whole “being damaged to an extent disproportionate
to the original local damage.” The building can therefore be de-
signed to prevent the progression of collapse in the unlikely event
a primary member loses its load carrying capacity. This minimum
design feature, achieved through the indirect prescriptive method
or direct alternate path approach, will improve the structural

integrity and provide an additional measure of safety to occu-
pants. Incorporating continuity, redundancy, and ductility into
the design will allow a damaged building to bridge over a failed
element and redistribute loads through flexure or catenary ac-
tion. This will limit the extent of debris that might otherwise rain
down upon the hardened shelter. Where specific threats are de-
fined, the vulnerable structural components may be hardened to
withstand the intensity of explosive loading. The local hardening
of vulnerable components in addition to the indirect prescriptive
detailing of the structural system to bridge over damaged compo-
nents will provide the most protection to the building.
2.4.1 Structure
Both steel frame and reinforced concrete buildings may be de-

signed and detailed to resist the effects of an exterior vehicle
explosive threat and an interior satchel explosion. Although steel
construction may be more efficient for many types of loading,
both conventional and unconventional, cast-in-place reinforced
concrete construction provide an inherent continuity and mass
that makes it desirable for blast-resistant buildings.
Reinforced concrete is a composite material in which the concrete

provides the primary resistance to compression and shear and
the steel reinforcement provides the resistance to tension and
confines the concrete core. In addition to ductile detailing, which
allows the reinforced concrete members to sustain large deforma-
tions and uncharacteristic reversals of curvature, the structural
elements are typically stockier and more massive than their steel
frame counterparts. The additional inertial resistance as well as
the continuity of cast-in-place construction facilitates designs that
are capable of sustaining the high intensity and short duration
effects of close-in explosions. Furthermore, reinforced concrete
buildings tend to crack and dissipate large amounts of energy
through internal damping. This limits the extent of rebound
forces and deformations.

Blast-resistant detailing requires continuous top and bottom re-
inforcement with tension lap splices staggered over the spans,
confinement of the plastic hinge regions by means of closely
spaced ties, and the prevention of shear failure prior to devel-
oping the flexural capacity (see Figure 2-11). One- or two-way
slabs supported on beams provide the best resistance to near con-
tact satchel threats, which may produce localized breach, but allow
the structure to redistribute the gravity loads. Concrete columns
must be confined with closely spaced spiral ties, steel jackets, or
composite wraps. This confinement increases the shear resistance,
improves the ductility, and protects against the shattering effects
resulting from a near contact explosion. Cast-in-place exterior
walls or precast panels are best able to withstand a sizable stand-off
vehicular explosive threat and may be easily detailed to interact
with the reinforced concrete frame as part of the lateral load-re-
sisting system.
Figure 2-11 Multi-span slab splice locations

Steelwork is generally better suited to resist relatively low intensity,
but long duration effects of large stand-off explosions. Steel is
an inherently ductile material that is capable of sustaining large
deformations; however, the very efficient thin-flanged sections
make the conventional frame construction vulnerable to localized
damage. Complex stress combinations and concentrations may
occur that cause localized distress and prevent the section from
developing its ultimate strength. Steel buildings may experience
significant rebound and must therefore be designed to support
significant reversals of loading. Concrete filled tube sections or
concrete encased flanged sections may be used to protect the thin-
flanged sections and supplement the inertial resistance. Concrete
encasement should extend a minimum of 4 inches beyond the
width and depth of the steel flanges and reinforcing bars may be
detailed to tie into the concrete slabs.
To allow the concrete encasement to be tied into the floor slabs,

the typical metal pan with concrete deck construction will require
special detailing. Metal deck construction provides a spall shield
to the underside of the slabs, which provides additional protection
to a near contact satchel situated on a floor. However, the internal
explosive threat will also load the ceiling slabs from beneath and
the beams must contain an ample amount of studs, which far ex-
ceeds the requirements for conventional gravity design, to transfer
the slab reactions to the steel supports without pulling out. If the
slabs are adequately connected to the steel-framing members,
these beams will be subjected to abnormal reversals of curvature.
These reversals will subject the mid-span bottom flanges to tran-
sient compressive stress and may induce a localized buckling.
Because the blast loads are transient, the dominant gravity loads
will eventually restore the mid-span bottom flange to tension;
however, unless it is adequately braced, the transient buckling will
produce localized damage.
The concrete encasement of the steel beams will provide torsional

resistance to the cross-section and minimize the need for inter-
mediate bracing. If the depth of the composite section is to be
minimized by embedding the steel section into the thickness of

the slab, the slab reinforcement must either be welded to the webs
or run through holes drilled into the webs in order to maintain
continuity. All welding of reinforcing steel must be in accordance
with seismic detailing to prevent brittle failures. Steel columns
require full moment splices and the relatively thin flange sections
require concrete encasement to prevent localized damage. To
take full advantage of the steel capacity and dissipate the greatest
amount of energy through ductile inelastic deformation, the beam
to column connections must be capable of developing the plastic
flexural capacity of the members. Connection details, similar to
those used in seismic regions, will be required to develop the
corresponding flexural and shear capacity (see Figure 2-12). Con-
necting exterior cast-in-place reinforced concrete walls to the steel
frame will require details that transfer both the direct blast loads
in bearing and the subsequent rebound effects in tension. Precast
panels are simply supported at the ends and, unless they span over
multiple floors, they lack the continuity of monolithic cast-in-place
wall construction. Cold joints in the cast-in-place construction re-
quire special detailing and the connection details for the precast
panels must be able to resist both the direct blast loads in bearing
and the subsequent rebound effects in tension.
Figure 2-12
Typical frame detail at
interior column

Regardless of the materials, framed buildings perform best when
column spacing is limited and the use of transfer girders is lim-
ited. Bearing wall systems that rely on interior cross-walls will
benefit from periodically spaced longitudinal walls that enhance
stability and control the lateral progression of damage. Bearing
wall systems that rely on exterior walls will benefit from periodi-
cally spaced perpendicular walls or substantial pilasters that limit
the extent of wall that is likely to be affected.
Free-standing columns do not have much surface area; there-

fore, air-blast loads on columns are limited by clear-time effects
in which relief waves from the free edges attenuate the reflected
intensity of the blast loads. Where the exterior façade inhibits
clear-time effects prior to façade failure, the columns will receive
the full intensity of the reflected blast pressures. Large stand-off
explosive threats may produce large inelastic flexural deforma-
tions that could initiate P- induced instabilities. Short stand-off
explosive threats may cause shear, base plate, or column splice
failures. Near contact threats may cause brisance, which is the
shattering of reinforced concrete sections. Confinement of rein-
forced concrete members by means of spiral reinforcement, steel
jackets, or carbon fiber wraps may improve their resistance. En-
casement of steel sections will inhibit local flange and web plate
deformations that could precipitate a section failure. Exterior
column splices should be located as high above grade level as
practical and match the capacity of the column section.
Load-bearing walls do not benefit from clear-time effects as col-

umns do and therefore collect the full intensity of the reflected
blast pressure pulse. Nevertheless, reinforced concrete load-
bearing walls are particularly effective if adequately reinforced.
Fully grouted masonry walls, on the other hand, are more brittle
and seismic levels of reinforcement greatly increase the ductility
and performance of masonry walls. Continuous reinforced bond
beams, with a minimum of one #4 bar or equivalent, are required
in the wall at the top and bottom of each floor and roof level. In-
terior horizontal ties are required in the floors perpendicular to
the wall. The ties are equivalent to a #4 bent bar at a maximum

spacing of 16 inches that extends into the slab and the wall the
greater of the development length of the bar or 30 inches. Vertical
ties are required from floor to floor at columns, piers, and walls.
The ties should be equivalent to a #4 bar at a maximum spacing
of 16 inches coinciding with the horizontal ties. The ties should
be continuous through the floor and extend into the wall above
and below the floor the greater of the development length of the
bar or 30 inches. Partition walls surrounding critical systems or iso-
lating areas of internal threat, such as lobbies, loading docks, and
mailrooms, require fully grouted reinforced masonry construc-
tion. It is particularly difficult to extend the reinforcement to the
full height of the partition wall and develop the reaction forces.
Reinforced bond beams are required as for load-bearing walls.
Flat roof systems are exposed to the incident blast pressures that
diffuse over the top of the building, causing complex patterns
of shadowing and focusing on the surface. Subsequent negative
phase effects may subject the pre-weakened roof systems to low
intensity, but long duration suction pressures; therefore, light-
weight roof systems may be susceptible to uplift effects. Two-way
beam slab systems are preferred for reinforced concrete construc-
tion and metal deck with reinforced concrete fill is preferred for
steel frame construction. Both of these roof systems provide the
required mass, strength, and continuity to resist all phases of blast
loading. The performance of conventional precast concrete plank
systems depends to a great extent on the connection details, and
these connections need to be detailed to provide continuity. Flat
slab and flat plate construction requires continuous bottom rein-
forcement in both directions to improve the integrity and special
details at the columns to prevent a punching shear failure. Post-
tensioned slab systems are particularly problematic because the
cable profile is typically designed to resist the predominant pat-
terns of gravity load and the system is inherently weak in response
to load reversals.

2.4.2 Façade and Internal Partitions
The building’s façade is its first real defense against the effects of a
bomb and is typically the weakest component that will be subjected
to blast pressures. Debris mitigating façade systems may be designed
to provide a reasonable level of protection to a low or moderate
intensity threat; however, façade materials may be locally over-
whelmed in response to a low intensity short stand-off detonation
or globally overwhelmed in response to a large intensity long stand-
off detonation. As a result, it is unreasonable to design a façade
to resist the actual pressures resulting from the design level threat
everywhere over the surface of the building. In fact, successful per-
formance of the blast-resistant façade may be defined as throwing
debris with less than high hazard velocities. This is particularly true
for the glazed fenestration. The peak pressures and impulses that
are used to select the laminated glazing makeup are typically estab-
lished such that no more than 10 percent of the glazed fenestration
will produce debris that is propelled with high hazard velocities
into the occupied space in response to any single detonation of the
design level threat. The definitions of high hazard velocities were
adapted from the United Kingdom hazard guides and correspond
to debris that is propelled 10 feet from the plane of the glazing and
strikes a witness panel higher than 2 feet above the floor. Similarly,
a medium level of hazard corresponds to debris that strikes the
witness panel no higher than 2 feet above the floor. A low level of
hazard corresponds to debris that strikes the floor no farther than
10 feet from the plane of the glazing and a very low level of hazard
corresponds to debris that strikes the floor no farther than 3.3 feet
from the plane of the glazing. Glass hazard response software was
developed for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the General Ser-
vices Administration, and the Department of State to determine
the performance of a wide variety of glazing systems in response to
blast loading. These simplified single-degree-of-freedom dynamic
analyses account for the strength of the glass prior to cracking
and the post-damage capacity of the laminated interlayers. While
many of these glass hazard response software remain restricted, the
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) 2248 relates
the design of glass to resist blast loading to an equivalent 3-second
equivalent wind load.

In order for the glazing to realize its theoretical capacity, it must
be retained by the mullions with an adequately sized bite, by
means of a structural silicone adhesive, or a combination of the
two. Furthermore, in order for the mechanical bite and silicone
adhesive to be effective, the mullion deformations over the length
of the lite must be limited (see Figure 2-13). Unfortunately, the
maximum extent of deformation that the mullion may sustain
prior to dislodging the glass is poorly defined. A conservative limit
of 2 degrees is often assumed for typical protective glazing systems;
however, advanced analytics may justify a significantly greater mul-
lion deformation limit. Mullions must therefore be able to accept
the reaction forces from the edges of the glazed elements and
remain intact and attached to the building. Analyses of mullion
deformations and anchorage details are required to demonstrate
the safe performance of the glazed fenestration.
Window of protected spaces Strong attachment

may be bullet-resistant to secure mullion
Insulated glazing with

laminated inner lite
Strengthened mullion system must Window adhered to the

be stronger than glass to hold frame with structural silicone
fractured window in place sealant to keep fractured
window in frame
Figure 2-13 Protective façade design

Curtainwall systems are inherently lightweight and flexible
façade systems; however, well designed curtainwall systems
demonstrated, through explosive testing, considerable
resilience in response to blast loading. Furthermore, the glazed
components are subjected to less intense loads as their flexible
supports deform in response to the blast pressures. A multi-
degree-of-freedom model of the façade will determine the
accurate interaction of the individual mullions and the phasing
of the interconnecting forces. Because all response calculations
must be dynamic and inelastic, the accurate representation of the
phasing of these forces may significantly affect the performance.
Curtainwall anchors are attached directly to the floor slabs where
the large lateral loads may be transferred directly through the
diaphragms into the lateral load-resisting systems.
Façade systems may contain combinations of glazing, metal

panels, precast concrete, or stone panels. Metal panels provide
little inertial resistance, but are capable of developing large in-
elastic deformations. The fasteners that attach these panels to the
mullions or metal studs must be designed to transfer the large
membrane forces. Stone panels provide significant inertial re-
sistance, but are relatively brittle and have little strength beyond
their modulus of rupture. Stud wall systems that restrain these
façade panels may deform within acceptable levels and develop
a membrane stiffening capacity, and strain energy methods may
be used to calculate their response. However, the anchorage of
the studs to the floor and ceiling slabs are likely to limit the forces
they can develop.
Precast panels may easily be designed to provide inelastic deforma-

tion in response to the design level threats. However, the design of
their anchorage to hold them to the building during both the di-
rect loading and subsequent rebound phase require more robust
details. Because the primary load carrying elements may buckle in
response to the large collected forces, precast panels are attached
directly to the floor slabs where the forces may be transferred
through the diaphragms to the lateral load-resisting elements.
Where mullions are attached within punched out openings in

precast panels, the spacing of the anchorages will determine the
span of the mullions and the force each anchorage is required
to resist. Embedded anchors within the precast panels will be re-
quired to accept these anchorage forces.
Fully grouted and reinforced CMU façades may be designed to

accept the large lateral loads produced by blast events; however,
it is often difficult to detail them to transfer the reaction forces to
the floor slabs. A continuous exterior CMU wall that bears against
the floor slabs may avoid many of the construction and connec-
tion difficulties, but this is not typical construction practice. Brick
or stone veneer does not appreciably increase the strength of the
CMU wall, but the added mass increases its inertial resistance.
2.5 Existing Construction: Retrofitting

Considerations
Although retrofitting existing buildings to include a shelter can
be expensive and disruptive to users, it may be the only available
option. When retrofitting existing space within a building is con-
sidered, data centers, interior conference rooms, stairwells, and
other areas that can be structurally and mechanically isolated pro-
vide the best options. Designers should be aware that an area of a
building currently used for refuge may not necessarily be the best
candidate for retrofitting when the goal is to provide comprehen-
sive protection.
An existing area that has been retrofitted to serve as a shelter is

unlikely to provide the same degree of protection as a shelter
designed as new construction. When existing space is retrofitted
for shelter use, issues have arisen that have challenged both
designers and shelter operators. For example, glass and unre-
inforced masonry façades are particularly vulnerable to blast
loading. Substantial stand-off distances are required for the unpro-
tected structure and these distances may be significantly reduced
through the use of debris mitigating retrofit systems. Further-
more, because blast loads diminish with distance and incidence
of blast wave to the loaded surface, the larger threats at larger

stand-off distances are likely to damage a larger percentage of fa-
çade elements than the more localized effects of smaller threats at
shorter stand-off distances. Safe rooms that may be located within
a building should therefore be located in windowless spaces or
spaces in which the window glazing was upgraded with a fragment
retention film (FRF).
2.5.1 Structure
The building’s lateral load-resisting system, the structural frame

or shear walls that resist wind and seismic loads, will be required
to receive the blast loads that are applied to the exterior façade
and transfer them to the building’s foundation. This load path
is typically through the floor slabs that act as diaphragms and
interconnect the different lateral load-resisting elements. The
lateral load-resisting system for a building depends to a great
extent on the type of construction and region. In many cases, low-
rise buildings do not receive substantial wind and seismic forces
and, therefore, do not require substantial lateral load-resisting
systems. Because blast loads diminish with distance, a package
sized explosive threat is likely to locally overwhelm the façade,
thereby limiting the force that may be transferred to the lateral
load-resisting system. However, the intensity of the blast loads that
may be applied to the building could exceed the design limits for
most conventional construction. As a result, the building is likely
to be subjected to large inelastic deformations that may produce
severe cracks to the structural and nonstructural partitions. There
is little that can be done to upgrade the existing structure to make
it more ductile in response to a blast loading that doesn’t require
extensive renovation of the building; therefore, safe rooms should
be located close to the interior shear walls or reinforced masonry
walls in order to provide maximum structural support in response
to these uncharacteristically large lateral loads.
Unless the structure is designed to resist an extreme loading,

such as a hurricane or an earthquake, it is not likely to sustain
extensive structural damage without precipitating a progressive
collapse. The effects of a satchel-sized explosive in close contact

to a column or a vehicle-borne explosive device at a sidewalk’s dis-
tance from the façade may initiate a failure of a primary structure
that may propagate as the supported loads attempt to redistribute
to an adjoining structure. Transfer girders that create long span
structures and support large tributary areas are particularly sus-
ceptible to localized damage conditions. As a result, safe rooms
should not be located on a structure that is either supported by or
underneath a structure that is supported by transfer girders unless
the building is evaluated by a licensed professional engineer. The
connection details for multi-story precast structures should also be
evaluated before the building is used to house a safe room.
Nonstructural building components, such as piping, ducts,

lighting units, and conduits that are located within safe rooms
must be sufficiently tied back to a solid structure to prevent failure
of the services and the hazard of falling debris. To mitigate the
effects of in-structure shock that may result from the infilling of
blast pressures through damaged windows, the nonstructural
systems should be located below the raised floors or tied to the
ceiling slabs with seismic restraints.
2.5.2 Façade and Internal Partitions
Safe rooms in existing buildings should be selected to provide

the space required to accommodate the building population and
should be centrally located to allow quick access from any location
within the building, enclosed with fragment mitigating partitions
or façade, and within robust structural systems that will resist col-
lapse. These large spaces are best located at the lower floors, away
from a lightweight roof and exterior glazing elements. If such a
space does not exist within the existing building, the available
spaces may be upgraded to achieve as many of these attributes
as possible. This will involve the treatment of the exterior façade
with fragment mitigating films, blast curtains, debris catch systems,
spray-on applications of elasto-polymers to unreinforced masonry
walls, and hardening of select columns and slabs with composite
fiber wraps, steel jackets, or concrete encasements.

2.5.2.1 Anti-shatter Façade. The conversion of existing construc-
tion to provide blast-resistant protection requires upgrades to the
most fragile or brittle elements enclosing the safe room. Failure of
the glazed portion of the façade represents the greatest hazard to
the occupants. Therefore, the exterior glazed elements of the fa-
çade and, in particular, the glazed elements of the designated safe
rooms, should be protected with an FRF, also commonly known
as anti-shatter film (ASF), “shatter-resistant window film” (SRWF),
or “security film.” These materials consist of a laminate that will
improve post-damage performance of existing windows. Applied
to the interior face of glass, ASF holds the fragments of broken
glass together in one sheet, thus reducing the projectile hazard of
flying glass fragments.
Most ASFs are made from polyester-based materials and coated

with adhesives. ASFs are available as clear, with minimal effects to
the optical characteristics of the glass, and tinted, which provides
a variety of aesthetic and optical enhancements and can increase
the effectiveness of existing heating/cooling systems. Most films
are designed with solar inhibitors to screen out ultraviolet (UV)
rays and are available treated with an abrasion-resistant coating
that can prolong the life of tempered glass.1 However, over time,
the UV absorption damages the film and degrades its effectiveness.
According to published reports, testing has shown that a 7-mil

thick film, or specially manufactured 4-mil thick film, is the min-
imum thickness that is required to provide hazard mitigation from
blast. Therefore, a 4-mil thick ASF should be utilized only if it has
demonstrated, through explosive testing, that it is capable of pro-
viding the desired hazard level response.
The application of security film must, at a minimum, cover the

clear area of the window. The clear area is defined as the portion
of the glass unobstructed by the frame. This minimum applica-
tion, termed daylight installation, is commonly used for retrofitting
windows. By this method, the film is applied to the exposed glass
1
Abrasions on the faces of tempered glass reduce the glass strength.

without any means of attachment or capture within the frame.
Application of the film to the edge of the glass panel, thereby ex-
tending the film to cover the glass within the bite, is called an edge
to edge installation and is often used in dry glazing installations.
Other methods of retrofit application may improve the film perfor-
mance, thereby reducing the hazards; however, these are typically
more expensive to install, especially in a retrofit situation.
Although a film may be effective in keeping glass fragments to-

gether, it may not be particularly effective in retaining the glass in
the frame. ASF is most effective when it is used with a blast tested
anchorage system. Such a system prevents the failed glass from ex-
iting the frame (see Figure 2-14).
The wet glazed installation, a system where the film is positively

attached to the frame, offers more protection than the daylight
installation. This system of attaching the film to the frame reduces
glass fragmentation entering the building. The wet glazing system
utilizes a high strength liquid sealant, such as silicone, to attach
the glazing system to the frame. This method is more costly than
the daylight installation.
Securing the film to the frame with a mechanically connected

anchorage system further reduces the likelihood of the glazing
system exiting the frame. Mechanical attachment includes an-
choring methods that employ screws and/or batten strips that
anchor the film to the frame along two or four sides. The mechan-
ical attachment method can be less aesthetically pleasing when
compared to wet glazing because additional framework is neces-
sary and is more expensive than the wet glazed installation.
Window framing systems and their anchorage must be capable

of transferring the blast loads to the surrounding walls. Unless
the frames and anchorages are competent, the effectiveness
of the attached films will be limited. Similarly, the walls must
be able to withstand the blast loads that are directly applied to
them and accept the blast loads that are transferred by the win-
dows. The strength of these walls may limit the effectiveness of
the glazing upgrades.

Figure 2-14
Mechanically attached
anti-shatter film
If a major rehabilitation of the façade is required to improve the

mechanical characteristics of the building envelope, a laminated
glazing replacement is recommended. Laminated glass consists
of two or more pieces of glass permanently bonded together by
a tough plastic interlayer made of polyvinyl butyral (PVB) resin.
Once sealed together, the glass “sandwich” behaves as a single
unit. Annealed, heat strengthened, tempered glass, or

polycarbonate glazing can be mixed and matched between layers
of laminated glass in order to design the most effective lite for a
given application. When fractured, fragments of laminated glass
tend to adhere to the PVB interlayer rather than falling free and
potentially causing injury.
Laminated glass can be expected to last as long as ordinary glass,

provided it is not broken or damaged in any way. It is very impor-
tant that laminated glass is correctly installed to ensure long life.
Regardless of the degree of protection required from the window,
laminated glass needs to be installed with adequate sealant to pre-
vent water from coming in contact with the edges of the glass. A
structural sealant will adhere the glazing to the frame and allow the
PVB interlayer to develop its full membrane capacity. Similar to at-
tached film upgrades, the window frames and anchorages must be
capable of transferring the blast loads to the surrounding walls.
2.5.2.2 Façade Debris Catch Systems. Blast curtains are made

from a variety of materials, including a warp knit fabric or a poly-
ethylene fiber. The fiber can be woven into a panel as thin as 0.029
inch that weighs less than 1.5 ounces per square foot. This fact
dispels the myth that blast curtains are heavy sheets of lead that
completely obstruct a window opening and eliminate all natural
light from the interior of a protected building. The blast curtains
are affixed to the interior frame of a window opening and es-
sentially catch the glass fragments produced by a blast wave. The
debris is then deposited on the floor at the base of the window.
Therefore, the use of these curtains does not eliminate the pos-
sibility of glass fragments penetrating the interior of the occupied
space, but instead limits the travel distance of the airborne debris.
Overall, the hazard level to occupants is significantly reduced by
the implementation of the blast curtains. However, a person sitting
directly adjacent to a window outfitted with a blast curtain may still
be injured by shards of glass in the event of an explosion.
The main components of any blast curtain system are the curtain
itself, the attachment mechanism by which the curtain is affixed
to the window frame, and either a trough or other retaining

mechanism at the base of the window to hold the excess curtain
material. The blast curtain with curtain rod attachment and sill
trough differ largely from one manufacturer to the next. The
curtain fabric, material properties, method of attachment, and
manner in which they operate all vary, thereby providing many
options within the overall classification of blast curtains. This fact
makes blast curtains applicable in many situations.
Blast curtains differ from standard curtains in that they do not

open and close in the typical manner. Although blast curtains are
intended to remain in a closed position at all times, they may be
pulled away from the window to allow for cleaning and blind or
shade operation. However, the curtains can be rendered ineffec-
tive if installed such that easy access would provide opportunity
for occupants to defeat their operation. The color and openness
factor of the fabric contributes to the amount of light that is trans-
mitted through the curtains and the see-through visibility of the
curtains. Although the color and weave of these curtains may be
varied to suit the aesthetics of the interior décor, the appearance
of the windows is altered by the presence of the curtains.
The curtains may either be anchored at the top and bottom of

the window frame or anchored at the top only and outfitted with
a weighted hem. The curtain needs to be extra long, with the sur-
plus either wound around a dynamic tension retainer or stored in
a reservoir housing. When an explosion occurs, the curtain feeds
out of the receptacle to absorb the force of the flying glass frag-
ments. The effectiveness of the blast curtains relies on their use
and no protection is provided when these curtains are pulled away
from the glazing (see Figure 2-15).

Figure 2-15
Blast curtain system
Rigid catch bar systems were designed and tested as a means of

increasing the effectiveness of filmed and laminated window up-
grades. Anti-shatter film and laminated glazing are designed to
hold the glass shards together as the window is damaged; however,
unless the window frames and attachments are upgraded as well to
withstand the capacity of the glazing, this retrofit will not prevent
the entire sheet from flying free of the window frames. The rigid
catch bars intercept the filmed or laminated glass and disrupt their
flight; however, they are limited in their effectiveness, tending to
break the dislodged façade materials into smaller projectiles.
Rigid catch systems collect huge forces upon impact and require
considerable anchorage into a very substantial structure to pre-
vent failure. If either the attachments or the supporting structure
are incapable of restraining the forces, the catch system will be
dislodged and become part of the debris. Alternatively, the debris

may be sliced by the rigid impact and the effectiveness of the catch
bar will be severely reduced. Finally, the effectiveness of debris
catch systems are limited where double pane, insulated glazing
units (IGUs) are used. Since anti-shatter film or laminated glass is
typically applied to only the inner surface of an IGU, debris from
the damaged outer lite could be blown past the catch bar into the
protected space.
Flexible catch bars can be designed to absorb a significant amount

of the energy upon impact, thereby keeping the debris intact
and impeding their flight. These systems may be designed to
effectively repel the debris and inhibit their flight into the occu-
pied spaces; they also may be designed to repel the debris from
the failed glazing as well as the walls in which the windows are
mounted. The design of the debris restraint system must be strong
enough to withstand the momentum transferred upon impact
and the connections must be capable of transferring the forces
to the supporting slabs and spandrel beams. However, under no
circumstances can the design of the restraint system add signifi-
cant amounts of mass to the structure that may be dislodged and
present an even greater risk to the occupants of the building.
Cables are extensively used to absorb significant amounts of

energy upon impact and their flexibility makes them easily adapt-
able to many situations. The diameter of the cable, the spacing
of the strands, and the means of attachment are all critical in
designing an effective catch system. These catch cable concepts
have been used by protective design window manufacturers as
restraints for laminated lites. The use of cable systems has long
been recognized as an effective means of stopping massive objects
moving at high velocity. An analytical simulation or a physical test
is required to confirm the adequacy of the cable catch system to
restrain the debris resulting from an explosive event.
High performance energy absorbing cable catcher systems re-

tain glass and frame fragments and limit the force transmitted
to the supporting structure. These commercially available ret-
rofit products consist of a series of ¼-inch diameter

stainless steel cables connected with a shock-absorbing device
to an aluminum box section, which is attached to the jambs,
the underside of the header, and topside of the sill. The energy
absorbing characteristics allow the catch systems to be attached
to relatively weakly constructed walls without the need for addi-
tional costly structural reinforcement. To reduce the possibility
of slicing the laminated glass, the cable may either be sheathed
in a tube or an aluminum strip may be affixed to the glass di-
rectly behind the cable.
2.5.2.3 Internal Partitions. Unreinforced masonry walls provide

limited protection against airblast due to explosions. When sub-
jected to overload from air blast, brittle unreinforced CMU walls
will fail and the debris will be propelled into the interior of the
structure, possibly causing severe injury or death to the occupants.
This wall type has been prohibited for new construction where
protection against explosive threats is required. Existing unrein-
forced CMU walls may be retrofitted with a sprayed-on polymer
coating to improve their air blast resistance. This innovative ret-
rofit technique takes advantage of the toughness and resiliency
of modern polymer materials to effectively deform and dissipate
the blast energy while containing the shattered wall fragments.
Although the sprayed walls may shatter in a blast event, the elas-
tomer material remains intact and contains the debris.
The blast mitigation retrofit for unreinforced CMU walls consists

of an interior and optional exterior layer of polyurea applied to
exterior walls and ceilings (see Figure 2-16). The polyurea pro-
vides a ductile and resilient membrane that catches and retains
secondary fragmentation from the existing concrete block as it
breaks apart in response to an air blast wave. These fragments, if
allowed to enter the occupied space, are capable of producing se-
rious injury or death to occupants of the structure.

Figure 2-16
Spray-on elastomer coating
In lieu of the elastomer, an aramid (Geotextile) debris catching

system may be attached to the structure by means of plates bolted
through the floor and ceiling slabs (see Figure 2-17). Similar to
the elastomer retrofit, the aramid layer does not strengthen the
wall; instead, it restrains the debris that would otherwise be pro-
pelled into the occupied spaces.
Figure 2-17
Geotextile debris catch
system

Alternatively, an unreinforced masonry wall may be upgraded
with an application of shotcrete sprayed onto the wall with a
welded wire fabric. This method supplements the tensile capacity
of the existing wall and limits the extent of debris that might be
propelled into the protected space. Steel sections may also be in-
stalled up against existing walls to reduce the span and provide an
alternate load transfer to the floor diaphragms. Load‑bearing ma-
sonry walls require additional redundancy to prevent the initiation
of a catastrophic progression of collapse. Therefore, the fragment
protection that may be provided by a spray‑on elasto‑polymer, a
fabric spall shield, or a metal panel must be supplemented with
structural supports that can sustain the gravity loads in the event
of excessive wall deformation. The design of stiffened steel-plate
wall systems to withstand the effects of explosive loading is one
way of achieving such redundancy and fragment protection.
These load-bearing wall retrofits require a more stringent design,
capable of resisting lateral loads and the transfer of axial forces.
Stiffened wall panels, consisting of steel plates to catch the debris
and welded tube sections spaced some 3 feet on center to supple-
ment the gravity load carrying capacity of the bearing walls, must
be connected to the existing floor and ceiling slabs by means of
base plates and anchor bolt connectors (see Figure 2-18).
A steel stud wall construction technique may also be used for

new buildings or the retrofit of existing structures requiring blast
resistance. Commercially available 18-gauge steel studs may be at-
tached web to web (back to back) and 16-gauge sheet metal may
be installed outboard of the steel studs behind the cladding (see
Figure 2-19). While the wall absorbs a considerable amount of
the blast energy through deformation, its connection to the sur-
rounding structure must develop the large tensile reaction forces.
In order to prevent a premature failure, these connections should
be able to develop the ultimate capacity of the stud in tension.
Ballistic testing of various building cladding materials requires a
nominal 4-inch thickness of stone, brick, masonry, or concrete.
Forced entry protection requires a ¼-inch thick layer of A36 steel
plate that is behind the building’s veneer and welded or screwed
to the steel stud framing in lieu of the 16-gauge sheet metal.

Figure 2-18
Stiffened wall panels

Figure 2-19 Metal stud blast wall
Internal installations require an interstitial sheathing of ½-inch

A36 steel plate. Regardless whether a ¼-inch steel plate or a 16-
gauge sheet metal is used, the interior face of the stud should be
finished with a steel-backed composite gypsum board product.

2.5.2.4 Structural Upgrades. Conventionally designed columns
may be vulnerable to the effects of explosives, particularly when
placed in contact with their surface. Stand-off elements, in the
form of partitions and enclosures, may be designed to guarantee
a minimum stand-off distance; however, this alone may not be
sufficient. Additional resistance may be provided to reinforced
concrete structures by means of a steel jacket or a carbon fiber
wrap that effectively confines the concrete core, thereby in-
creasing the confined strength and shear capacity of the column,
and holds the rubble together to permit it to continue carrying
the axial loads (see Figure 2-20). The capacity of steel flanged
columns may be increased with a reinforced concrete encasement
that adds mass to the steel section and protects the relatively thin
flange sections. The details for these retrofits must be designed to
resist the specific weight of explosives and stand-off distance.
1" Clear space Chip corners 1"

Figure 2-20 and grind
around columns
Steel jacket retrofit detail filled with 5,000 psi smooth
non-shrink grout
3/8" Steel jacket
Concrete
1" Radius
Sand blast concrete
bent plate
surfaces prior to
jacketing

2.5.3 Checklist for Retrofitting Issues
A Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist was developed for

FEMA 426 and FEMA 452 to help identify structural conditions
that may suffer in response to blast loading. Each building in
consideration needs to be evaluated by a professional engineer,
experienced in the protective design of structures, to determine
the ability to withstand blast loading.
In addition, the following questions will help address key retro-

fitting issues. Issues related to the retrofitting of existing refuge
areas (e.g., hallways/corridors, bathrooms, workrooms, laboratory
areas, kitchens, and mechanical rooms) that should be considered
include the following:
m The roof system. Is the roof system over the proposed

refuge area structurally independent of the remainder of
the building? If not, is it capable of resisting the expected
blast, wind, and debris loads? Are there openings in the roof
system for mechanical equipment or lighting that cannot be
protected during a blast or high-wind event? It may not be
reasonable to retrofit the rest of the proposed shelter area if
the roof system is part of a building that was not designed for
high-wind load requirements.
m The wall system. Can the wall systems be accessed so that

they can be retrofitted for resistance to blast and high-wind
pressures and missile impact? It may not be reasonable to
retrofit a proposed shelter area to protect openings if the
wall systems (load-bearing or non-load-bearing) cannot
withstand blast and wind pressures or cannot be retrofitted in
a reasonable manner to withstand blast or wind pressures and
missile impacts.
m Openings. Are the windows and doors vulnerable to blast and

wind pressures and debris impact? Are doors constructed of
impact-resistant materials (e.g., steel doors) and secured with
six points of connection (typically three hinges and three

latching mechanisms)? Are door frames constructed of at least
16-gauge metal and adequately secured to the walls to prevent
the complete failure of the door/frame assemblies? Does the
building rely on shutter systems for resistance to the effects of
hurricanes? There is often only minimal warning time before
a CBRE or tornado event; therefore, a shelter design that
relies on manually installed shutters is impractical. Automated
shutter systems may be considered, but they would require a
protected backup power system to ensure that the shutters are
closed before an event.
2.6 SHELTERS AND MODEL BUILDING TYPES

This section will provide basic FEMA model building types to
describe protective design and structural systems for shelters in
the most effective manner. This section is based on FEMA 310,
Handbook for the Seismic Evaluation of Buildings, which is dedicated
to instructing the design professional on how to determine if a
building is adequately designed and constructed to resist particular
types of forces. Graphics included in this section were prepared for
FEMA 454, Designing for Earthquakes: A Manual for Architects.
2.6.1 W1, W1a, and W2 Wood Light Frames

and Wood Commercial Buildings
Small wood light frame buildings (<3,000 square feet) are single
or multiple family dwellings of one or more stories in height (see
Figure 2-21). Building loads are light and the framing spans are
short. Floor and roof framing consists of closely spaced wood joists
or rafters on wood studs. The first floor framing is supported di-
rectly on the foundation, or is raised up on cripple studs and post
and beam supports. The foundation consists of spread footings
constructed of concrete, concrete masonry block, or brick ma-
sonry in older construction. Chimneys, when present, consist of
solid brick masonry, masonry veneer, or wood frame with internal
metal flues. Lateral forces are resisted by wood frame diaphragms
and shear walls. Floor and roof diaphragms consist of straight or
diagonal wood sheathing, tongue and groove planks, or plywood.

Shearwalls consist of straight or diagonal wood sheathing, plank
siding, plywood, stucco, gypsum board, particle board, or fiber-
board. Interior partitions are sheathed with plaster or gypsum
board.
Figure 2-21
W1 wood light frame
< 3,000 square feet
Large wood light frame buildings (> 3,000 square feet) are
multi-story, multi-unit residences similar in construction to W1
buildings, but with open front garages at the first story (see Figure
2-22). The first story consists of wood floor framing on wood stud
walls and steel pipe columns, or a concrete slab on concrete or
concrete masonry block walls.
Wood commercial or industrial buildings with a floor area of 5,000

square feet or more carry heavier loads than light frame construc-
tion (see Figure 2-23). In these buildings, the framing spans are
long and there are few, if any, interior walls. The floor and roof
framing consists of wood or steel trusses, glulam or steel beams,
and wood posts or steel columns. Lateral forces are resisted by
wood diaphragms and exterior stud walls sheathed with plywood,

stucco, plaster, straight or diagonal wood sheathing, or braced
with rod bracing. Large openings for storefronts and garages,
when present, are framed by post-and-beam framing. Lateral force
resistance around openings is provided by steel rigid frames or di-
agonal bracing.
Figure 2-22
W1a wood light frame
> 3,000 square feet

Figure 2-23
W2 wood commercial
buildings
Light wood frame structures do not possess significant resistance

to blast loads although larger wood commercial buildings will be
better able to accept these lateral loads than light frame wood
construction. These buildings are likely to suffer heavy damage
in response to 50 pounds of TNT at a stand-off distance of 20 to
50 feet. A shelter would best be located in a basement where the
protection to blast loading would be provided by the surrounding
soil. Large explosive detonations in close proximity to the
building will not only destroy the superstructure, but the effects of
ground shock are likely to fail the foundation walls as well; there-
fore, protected spaces should be located interior to the building.
Locating the shelter on the ground floor, for slab on grade struc-
tures, provides the maximum number of floors between occupants
and possible roof debris. Debris catch systems may be installed
beneath roof rafters of single-story buildings; however, the effec-
tiveness of the debris catch system will be limited if the zone of
roof damage is extensive.

Metal stud blast walls built within the existing building may be
used to supplement the enclosure; however, in order for these
walls to develop their resistance to lateral loads, they must be an-
chored to an existing structure. Windows enclosing the selected
shelter must either be laminated or treated with an anti-shatter
film. Either the laminated glass or the anti-shatter film should
be anchored to the surrounding wall with a system that can de-
velop but not overwhelm the capacity of the wall. A conservative
estimate of the ultimate capacity of an existing wall may be deter-
mined, in the absence of actual design information, by scaling the
code specified wind pressures with the appropriate factor of safety.
2.6.2 S1, S2, and S3 Steel Moment Frames,

Steel Braced Frames, and Steel Light
Frames
Steel moment frame and braced frame buildings with cast-in-

place concrete slabs or metal deck with concrete fill supported
on steel beams, open web joists, or steel trusses are well suited
for a hardened shelter construction. Lateral forces in steel
moment frame buildings are resisted by means of rigid or semi-
rigid beam-column connections (see Figure 2-24). When all
connections are moment-resisting connections, the entire frame
participates in lateral force resistance. When only selected
connections are moment-resisting connections, resistance is pro-
vided along discrete frame lines. Columns are oriented so that
each principal direction of the building has columns resisting
forces in strong axis bending. Diaphragms consist of concrete or
metal deck with concrete fill and are stiff relative to the frames.
Walls may consist of metal panel curtainwalls, glazing, brick
masonry, or precast concrete panels. When the interior of the
structure is finished, frames are concealed by ceilings, partition
walls, and architectural column furring. Foundations consist of
concrete spread footings or deep pile foundations.
Lateral forces in steel braced frame buildings are resisted by

tension and compression forces in diagonal steel members (see
Figure 2-25). When diagonal brace connections are concentric to

Figure 2-24
S1steel moment frames
beam column joints, all member stresses are primarily axial. When
diagonal brace connections are eccentric to the joints, members
are subjected to bending and axial stresses. Diaphragms consist of
concrete or metal deck with concrete fill and are stiff relative to
the frames. Walls may consist of metal panel curtainwalls, glazing,
brick masonry, or precast concrete panels. When the interior of
the structure is finished, frames are concealed by ceilings, par-
tition walls, and architectural furring. Foundations consist of
concrete spread footings or deep pile foundations.

Figure 2-25
S2 steel braced frames
Light frame steel structures are pre-engineered and prefabricated

with transverse rigid steel frames (see Figure 2-26). They are one-
story in height and the roof and walls consist of lightweight metal,
fiberglass, or cementitious panels. The frames are designed for
maximum efficiency and the beams and columns consist of ta-
pered, built-up sections with thin plates. The frames are built in
segments and assembled in the field with bolted or welded joints.
Lateral forces in the transverse direction are resisted by the rigid
frames. Lateral forces in the longitudinal direction are resisted by
wall panel shear elements or rod bracing. Diaphragm forces are
resisted by untopped metal deck, roof panel shear elements, or a
system of tension-only rod bracing.

Figure 2-26
S3 steel light frames
Steel moment frame structures provide excellent ductility and

redundancy in response to blast loading. Steel braced frames may
similarly be designed to resist high intensity blast loads; however,
they are less effective in resisting the progression of collapse fol-
lowing the loss of a primary load-bearing element. As a result,
first floor steel columns of existing buildings may be concrete
encased and first floor splices may be reinforced to increase their
resistance to local failure that could precipitate a progression of
collapse. The exterior façade represents the most fragile element
and is likely to be severely damaged in response to an exterior
detonation. Debris may be minimized by means of reinforced
masonry, sufficiently detailed precast panels, or laminated glass
façade. Nevertheless, a shelter within steel frame buildings would
best be located within interior space or a building core. Hardened
interior partitions may easily be constructed and anchored to ex-
isting floor slabs, and lightweight metal gauge walls may be used
to retrofit existing buildings. Metal deck roofs with rigid insula-
tion supported by bar joist structural elements possess minimal

resistance to blast pressures. The additional mass, stiffness, and
strength of metal deck roofs with concrete fill make them much
better able to resist the effects of direct blast loading and the sub-
sequent rebound. Therefore, lightweight roofs of light frame steel
structures are likely to be severely damaged in response to any
sizable blast loading and a shelter should either be located in the
basement or as interior to the building (as far from the exterior
façade) as possible.
2.6.3 S4 and S5 Steel Frames with Concrete

Shearwalls and Infill Masonry Walls
Steel frame buildings with concrete or infill masonry shear walls

with cast-in-place concrete slabs or metal deck with concrete fill
supported on steel beams, open web joists, or steel trusses are
well suited for a hardened shelter construction. When lateral
forces are resisted by cast-in-place concrete shear walls, the walls
carry their own weight. In older construction, the steel frame is
designed for vertical loads only. In modern dual systems, the steel
moment frames are designed to work together with the concrete
shear walls in proportion to their relative rigidity (see Figure
2-27). In the case of a dual system, the walls should be evaluated
under this building type and the frames should be evaluated
under S1 steel moment frames. Diaphragms consist of concrete
or metal deck with or without concrete fill. The steel frame may
provide a secondary lateral-force-resisting system, depending on
the stiffness of the frame and the moment capacity of the beam-
column connections.

Figure 2-27
S4 steel frames with
concrete shearwalls
Steel frames with infill masonry walls is an older type of building

construction (see Figure 2-28). The walls consist of infill panels
constructed of solid clay brick, concrete block, or hollow clay tile
masonry. Infill walls may completely encase the frame members,
and present a smooth masonry exterior with no indication of the
frame. The lateral resistance of this type of construction depends
on the interaction between the frame and infill panels. The com-
bined behavior is more like a shear wall structure than a frame
structure. Solidly infilled masonry panels form diagonal compres-
sion struts between the intersections of the frame members. If the
walls are offset from the frame and do not fully engage the frame

members, the diagonal compression struts will not develop. The
strength of the infill panel is limited by the shear capacity of the
masonry bed joint or the compression capacity of the strut. The
post-cracking strength is determined by an analysis of a moment
frame that is partially restrained by the cracked infill. The dia-
phragms consist of concrete floors and are stiff relative to the walls.
Figure 2-28
S5 steel frames with infill
masonry walls
Steel frame structures with either concrete shear walls or infill

masonry walls are not moment connected; therefore, the frame is
more vulnerable to collapse resulting from the loss of a column.
As a point of reference, steel moment frame buildings with lightly
reinforced CMU infill walls are likely to suffer heavy damage in

response to 500 pounds of TNT at a stand-off distance of 50 feet
or less. The first floor steel columns of existing buildings may
be concrete encased and first floor splices may be reinforced to
increase their resistance to local failure that could precipitate a
progression of collapse. The exterior façade is likely to be dam-
aged in response to an exterior detonation and debris may be
minimized by means of reinforced masonry, sufficiently detailed
precast panels, or laminated glass façade. Nevertheless, a shelter
within these buildings would best be located within interior space
or a building core, preferably enclosed on one or more sides by
the shear walls. Existing masonry infill walls may be retrofitted
to supplement existing reinforcement by either grouting cables
within holes cored within the walls or with a spray-on application
of a shotcrete and welded wire fabric or a polyurea debris catch
membrane. Alternatively, hardened interior partitions may easily
be constructed and anchored to existing floor slabs, and light-
weight metal stud walls may be used to retrofit existing buildings.
2.6.4 C1, C2, and C3 Concrete Moment

Frames, Concrete and Infill Masonry
Shearwalls – Type 1 Bearing Walls and
Type 2 Gravity Frames
These buildings consist of a frame assembly of cast-in-place

concrete beams and columns. Floor and roof framing consists
of cast-in-place concrete slabs, concrete beams, one-way joists,
two-way waffle joists, or flat slabs. Lateral forces are resisted by
concrete moment frames that develop their stiffness through
monolithic beam-column connections (see Figure 2-29). In
older construction, or in regions of low seismicity, the moment
frames may consist of the column strips of two-way flat slab sys-
tems. Modern frames in regions of high seismicity have joint
reinforcing, closely spaced ties, and special detailing to provide
ductile performance. This detailing is not present in older con-
struction. Foundations consist of concrete spread footings or
deep pile foundations.

Figure 2-29
C1 concrete moment
frames
Concrete and infill masonry shearwall building systems have

floor and roof framing that consists of cast-in-place concrete
slabs, concrete beams, one-way joists, two-way waffle joists, or flat
slabs. Floors are supported on concrete columns or bearing walls.
Lateral forces are resisted by cast-in-place concrete shear walls
or infill panels constructed of solid clay brick, concrete block,
or hollow clay tile masonry (see Figures 2-30, 2-31, and 2-32). In
older construction, cast-in-place shear walls are lightly reinforced,
but often extend throughout the building. In more recent con-
struction, shear walls occur in isolated locations and are more
heavily reinforced with boundary elements and closely spaced ties

to provide ductile performance. The diaphragms consist of con-
crete slabs and are stiff relative to the walls. Foundations consist
of concrete spread footings or deep pile foundations. The seismic
performance of infill panel construction depends on the interac-
tion between the frame and infill panels. The combined behavior
is more like a shear wall structure than a frame structure. If the
infilled masonry panels are in line with the frame, they form di-
agonal compression struts between the intersections of the frame
members; otherwise, the diagonal compression struts will not
develop. The strength of the infill panel is limited by the shear
capacity of the masonry bed joint or the compression capacity of
the strut. The post-cracking strength is determined by an analysis
of a moment frame that is partially restrained by the cracked infill.
The shear strength of the concrete columns, after cracking of the
infill, may limit the semiductile behavior of the system.
Figure 2-30
C2 concrete shearwalls
– type 1 bearing walls

Figure 2-31
C2 concrete shearwalls
– type 2 gravity frames

Figure 2-32
C3 concrete frames with
infill masonry shearwalls
Unless sited in a seismic zone, concrete frame structures are not

typically designed and detailed to develop large inelastic defor-
mations and withstand significant load reversals. As a point of
reference, a building with 8-inch thick reinforced concrete load-
bearing exterior walls and interior columns is likely to suffer heavy
damage in response to 500 pounds of TNT at a distance of 70 feet
or less. The exterior façade is likely to be damaged in response to
an exterior detonation and debris may be minimized by means of
reinforced masonry, sufficiently detailed precast panels, or lami-
nated glass façade. Nevertheless, a shelter within concrete frame
and shearwall buildings would best be located within interior
space or a building core, preferably enclosed on one or more sides

by the shear walls. Existing masonry infill walls may be retrofitted
to supplement existing reinforcement by either grouting cables
within holes cored within the walls or with a spray-on application of
a shotcrete and welded wire fabric or a polyurea debris catch mem-
brane. Alternatively, hardened interior partitions may easily be
constructed and anchored to existing floor slabs, and lightweight
metal stud walls may be used to retrofit existing buildings.
2.6.5 PC1 and PC2 Tilt-up Concrete Shearwalls

and Precast Concrete Frames and
Shearwalls
Tilt-up concrete buildings are one or more stories in height and

have precast concrete perimeter wall panels that are cast on site
and tilted into place (see Figure 2-33). Floor and roof framing
consists of wood joists, glulam beams, steel beams, open web
joists, or precast plank sections. Framing is supported on interior
steel or concrete columns and perimeter concrete bearing walls.
The floors consist of wood sheathing, concrete over form deck,
or composite concrete slabs. Roofs are typically untopped metal
deck, but may contain lightweight concrete fill. Lateral forces are
resisted by the precast concrete perimeter wall panels. Wall panels
may be solid, or have large window and door openings that cause
the panels to behave more as frames than as shear walls. In older
construction, wood framing is attached to the walls with wood led-
gers. Foundations typically consist of concrete spread footings or
deep pile foundations.

Figure 2-33
PC1 tilt-up concrete
shearwalls
Precast concrete frames and shearwalls consist of precast concrete

planks, tees, or double-tees supported on precast concrete girders
and precast columns (see Figure 2-34). Lateral forces are resisted
by precast or cast-in-place concrete shear walls. Diaphragms
consist of precast elements interconnected with welded inserts,
cast-in-place closure strips, or reinforced concrete topping slabs.

Figure 2-34
PC2 precast concrete
frames and shearwalls
Precast construction benefits from higher quality wall and frame

components than cast-in-place structures; however, it lacks the
continuity of construction present in these systems. The resis-
tance blast loading depends, to a great extent, on the mechanical
connections between the components. Designers must consider
the blast loading effects when designing and detailing these con-
nections. A shelter would best be located in a basement where
the protection to blast loading would be provided by the sur-
rounding soil. Large explosive detonations in close proximity
to the building will not only destroy the superstructure, but the
effects of ground shock are likely to fail the foundation walls as
well; therefore, protected spaces should be located interior to the

building. Locating the shelter in the basement, for slab on grade
buildings, provides the maximum number of floors between oc-
cupants and possible roof debris. Debris catch systems may be
installed beneath roof rafters of single-story buildings; however,
the effectiveness of the debris catch system will be limited if the
zone of roof damage is extensive.
Metal stud blast walls built within the existing building may be
used to supplement the enclosure; however, in order for these
walls to develop their resistance to lateral loads, they must be an-
chored to an existing structure. Windows enclosing the selected
shelter must either be laminated or treated with an anti-shatter
film. Either the laminated glass or the anti-shatter film should
be anchored to the surrounding wall with a system that can de-
velop, but not overwhelm the capacity of the wall. A conservative
estimate of the ultimate capacity of an existing wall may be deter-
mined, in the absence of actual design information, by scaling the
code specified wind pressures with the appropriate factor of safety.
2.6.6 RM1 and RM2 Reinforced Masonry

Walls with Flexible Diaphragms or Stiff
Diaphragms and Unreinforced Masonry
(URM) Load-bearing Walls
These buildings have bearing walls that consist of reinforced brick

or concrete block masonry. Wood floor and roof framing con-
sists of wood joists, glulam beams, and wood posts or small steel
columns. Steel floor and roof framing consists of steel beams or
open web joists, steel girders, and steel columns. Lateral forces are
resisted by the reinforced brick or concrete block masonry shear
walls. Diaphragms consist of straight or diagonal wood sheathing,
plywood, or untopped metal deck, and are flexible relative to the
walls (see Figure 2-35). Foundations consist of brick or concrete
spread footings.

Figure 2-35
RM1 reinforced masonry
walls with flexible
diaphragms
Buildings with reinforced masonry walls and stiff diaphragms are

similar to RM1 buildings, except the diaphragms consist of metal
deck with concrete fill, precast concrete planks, tees, or double-
tees, with or without a cast-in-place concrete topping slab, and
are stiff relative to the walls (see Figure 2-36). The floor and roof
framing is supported on interior steel or concrete frames or inte-
rior reinforced masonry walls.

Figure 2-36
RM2 reinforced masonry
walls with stiff diaphragms
Unreinforced load-bearing masonry buildings often contain

perimeter bearing walls and interior bearing walls made of clay
brick masonry (see Figure 2-37). In older construction, floor and
roof framing consists of straight or diagonal lumber sheathing
supported by wood joists, on posts and timbers. In more re-
cent construction, floors consist of structural panel or plywood
sheathing rather than lumber sheathing. The diaphragms are
flexible relative to the walls. When they exist, ties between the
walls and diaphragms consist of bent steel plates or government
anchors embedded in the mortar joints and attached to framing.
Foundations consist of brick or concrete spread footings. As a
variation, some URM buildings have stiff diaphragms relative to
the unreinforced masonry walls and interior framing. In older con-
struction or large, multi-story buildings, diaphragms may consist of

cast-in-place concrete. In regions of low seismicity, more recent
construction consists of metal deck and concrete fill supported
on steel framing.
Figure 2-37
URM load-bearing walls
Unless sited in a seismic zone, reinforced masonry structures

are not typically detailed to develop significant inelastic defor-
mations and withstand significant load reversals. Unreinforced
masonry structures are extremely brittle. As a point of reference,
a reinforced masonry building with 8-inch thick reinforced CMU
exterior walls is likely to suffer heavy damage in response to 500
pounds of TNT at a distance of 150 feet or less. An unreinforced
masonry building with reinforced CMU pilasters will suffer heavy

damage in response to 500 pounds of TNT at a distance of 250
feet or less. At these loads, the structure supported by the load-
bearing masonry wall is likely to suffer localized collapse. Grout
and additional reinforcement may be inserted within the cores of
existing masonry walls; however, a stiffened steel panel provides
the most effective way to restrain the debris and assume the gravity
loads following the loss of load carrying capacity within the wall.
A shelter within these buildings would best be located within inte-
rior space or a building core, preferably enclosed on one or more
sides by the shear walls.
2.6.7 Conclusions
Despite the various types of construction, the following protective

measures may be used to establish a hardened space that will limit
the extent of debris resulting from an explosive event. A shelter is
best located within interior space or a building core at the lowest
levels of a building or on the ground floor for a slab on grade
structure. A debris catch system should be installed beneath the
roof rafters of a single-story building. The exterior façade should
be either reinforced masonry or precast panels and windows
should either be laminated or treated with an anti-shatter film
that is anchored to the surrounding walls. First floor steel columns
may be concrete encased and first floor splices may be reinforced.
Existing masonry infill walls may be retrofitted by either grouting
cables within holes cored within the walls or with a spray-on appli-
cation of a shotcrete and welded wire fabric or a polyurea debris
catch membrane. Hardened interior partitions, such as metal
stud blast walls, may be used to enclose the shelter and these walls
should be anchored to an existing structure. A stiffened steel
panel may be constructed interior to existing load-bearing ma-
sonry walls.
2.7 CASE STUDY: BLAST-RESISTANT SAFE

ROOM
Consider the example of a safe room established in the stairwell of
a multi-story office building: it may be assumed the original

construction did not provide for reinforced masonry or rein-
forced concrete enclosures. To achieve the greatest stand-off
distance and isolate the safe room from a vehicle-borne explosive
threat, the stairwell should be interior to the structure. This will
provide the maximum level of protection from an undefined
explosive threat. Although it is common to place emergency
stairs within the building core, one can only reasonably expect a
reinforced concrete or reinforced masonry stair enclosure for a
shearwall lateral resisting structural system. Due to the large dif-
ference in weight and constructability, a stud wall with gypsum
board stair enclosure will be routinely used in lieu of reinforced
masonry or concrete for framed construction. The stair enclo-
sures may therefore be designed or upgraded to include 16-gauge
sheet metal supported by 18-gauge steel studs that are attached
web to web (back to back). These walls must be adequately an-
chored to the existing floor slabs to develop the plastic capacity of
the studs acting both in flexure and in tension. Alternatively, fully
grouted reinforced masonry stairwell enclosures, #4 bars in each
cell, may be specified. The masonry walls must be adequately an-
chored to the existing floor slabs to develop the ultimate lateral
resistance of the wall in order to transfer the reaction loads into
the lateral resisting system of the building. Doors to the stairway
enclosures are to be hollow steel or steel clad, such as 14-gauge
steel doors with 20-gauge ribs, with pressed steel frames; double
doors should utilize a center stile. Doors should open away from
the safe room and be securely anchored to the wall construction,
locally reinforced around the door.
Any windows within the stairwell enclosures are to contain

laminated glass, utilizing 0.060 PVB, that is adhered within the
mullions with a ½-inch bead of structural silicone. The mul-
lions are to be anchored into the surrounding walls to develop
the full capacity of the glazing materials. Alternatively, a 7-mil
anti-shatter film may be applied to existing windows and me-
chanically attached to the surrounding mullions to develop the
full capacity of the film. A wet glazed attachment of the film may
alternatively be applied; however, this provides a less reliable
bond to the existing mullions.

Floor slabs within an interior stairwell will be isolated from the
most direct effects of an exterior explosive event and will not be
subjected to significant uplift pressures resulting from an exterior
explosive event. Nevertheless, for new construction, floor slabs
should be designed to withstand a net upward load of magnitude
equal to the dead load plus half the live load for the floor system.
For new construction, the structural frames are to be sufficiently

tied as to provide alternate load paths to surrounding columns or
beams in the event of localized damage. These tie forces should,
at a minimum, conform to the DoD Unified Facilities Criteria
(UFC) 4-023-03, Design of Buildings to Prevent Progressive Collapse.
For reinforced concrete structures, seismic hooks and seismic
development lengths, as specified in Chapter 21 of the American
Concrete Institute (ACI) 318-05, should be used to anchor and
develop steel reinforcement. Internal tie reinforcement should
be distributed in two perpendicular directions and be continuous
from one edge of the floor or roof to the far edge of the floor or
roof, using lap splices, welds, or mechanical splices. In order to
redistribute the forces that may develop, the internal ties must
be anchored to the peripheral ties at each end (see Figure 2-38).
Steel structures must be similarly tied, and each column must
be effectively held in position by means of horizontal ties in two
orthogonal directions at each principal floor level supported by
that column.

Internal ties (dotted lines)
Horizontal tie to column
Peripheral ties
(dashed lines)
Vertical tie
Figure 2-38 Schematic of tie forces in a frame structure

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Structural design criteria 2

2.2 Explosive Threat Parameters

There is also no way to effectively know the size of the explosive

Structural design criteria 2-

For a specific type and weight of explosive material, the inten-

2- Structural design criteria

affect the hazard potential of the blast loading. A detailed analysis

The thresholds of different types of injuries associated with

Structural design criteria 2-

Figure 2-2 Range to effects chart

2- Structural design criteria

Many shelters can be part of low-rise buildings. Although small

Structural design criteria 2-

In addition to the hazard of impact by building envelope debris

2- Structural design criteria

To mitigate the effects of in-structure shock that may result

The contents of this manual supplement the information pro-

Structural design criteria 2-

High-rise buildings must resist significant gravity and lateral load

In addition to the hazard of structural collapse, the façade is a

2- Structural design criteria

A shelter will only be effective if the building in which it is located

m Mass. Lightweight construction may be unsuitable for provid-

m Shear capacity. Shear is a brittle mode of failure and primary

m Capacity for resisting load reversals. In response to sizable

Structural design criteria 2-

m Redundancy. Multiple alternative load paths in the vertical-

m Ties. An integrated system of ties in perpendicular directions

m Ductility. Structural members and their connections may

Historically, cast-in-place reinforced concrete was the preferred

2-10 Structural design criteria

Protective design further requires the system to accept localized

Structural design criteria 2-11

2.3.2 Loads and Connections

Because the shelter will likely suffer significant damage in re-

Structural systems that provide a continuous load path that

2-12 Structural design criteria

Structural design criteria 2-13

2-14 Structural design criteria

Similarly, adequate connections must be provided between the

Wall systems are typically connected to foundations using anchor

Structural design criteria 2-15

Façade components that must transfer the collected loads to the

Resistance to blast is often compared to

2-16 Structural design criteria

2.3.4 Forced Entry and Ballistic Resistance

Ballistic-resistant design involves both the blocking of sightlines to

Structural design criteria 2-17

Rating Ammunition Grain Minimum Velocity (fps)

Level 2 .357 Magnum jacketed lead soft point 158 1,250

Level 3 .44 Magnum lead semi-wadcutter gas checked 240 1,350

7.62 mm rifle lead core full metal copper jacket,

5.56 mm rifle full metal copper jacket with lead

7.62 mm rifle lead core full metal copper jacket,

Forced entry resistance is measured in the time it takes for an ag-

2-18 Structural design criteria

2.4 New Construction

Structural design criteria 2-19

Both steel frame and reinforced concrete buildings may be de-

Structural design criteria 2-

2- Structural design criteria

Structural design criteria 2-

2- Structural design criteria

Structural design criteria 2-

2- Structural design criteria

Structural design criteria 2-

2- Structural design criteria

Structural design criteria 2-