G.R. No.

187899
October 23, 2013
ROBERT DA JOSE and FRANCISCO OCAMPO y ANGELES, Petitioners, vs.
CELERINA R. ANGELES, EDWARD ANGELO R. ANGELES and CELINE ANGELI R.
ANGELES, Respondents.
Notes/Doctrine:
The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual
damages which must be duly proven by competent proof and the best
obtainable evidence thereof. Thus, as a rule, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity.
While it is true that the respondents submitted cash vouchers to prove the
deceaseds income, the officers and/or employees who prepared, checked or
approved the same were not presented on the witness stand. As such, the Court
ruled that said cash vouchers though admitted in evidence, whether objected
to or not, have no probative value for being hearsay.
Facts: On December 1, 2001, at about 9:00 p.m., a vehicular collision took place
involving a car registered under the name of, and at that time driven by the late
Eduardo Tuazon Angeles Eduardo), and another car registered under the name
of petitioner Robert Da Jose (Robert) and at that time driven by petitioner
Francisco Ocampo y Angeles (Francisco). Eduardo died on the same day due
to Hemorrhagic Shock as a result of Blunt Traumatic Injury.
A criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property was filed on December 3, 2001 against Francisco before
the MTC. In a Decision dated December 22, 2008, the MTC declared Francisco
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
During the pendency of the criminal case, respondents counsel sent
petitioners a demand-letter for the payment (within 5 days from receipt of the
letter) of the amount ofP5,000,000 representing damages and attorneys fees.
Failing to reach any settlement, respondents subsequently filed a Complaint for
Damages based on tort against Robert and Francisco before the RTC.
Celerina testified on the various damages and attorneys fees prayed for
in their complaint. She and Eduardo begot two children: Edward who was born
on August 20, 1985 and Celine who was born on June 22, 1987.Celerina testified
that she loved Eduardo so much that when he died, it was as if she also died.
She also testified that their two children, who were very close to their father,
were shocked by the tragedy that befell him. Celerina claimed, among others,
that prior to his death, Eduardo at age 51, was physically fit and even played
golf 2 to 3times a week. A businessman during his lifetime, Celerina attested that
Eduardo was earning a yearly gross income of over P1,000,000.She also testified
that at the time of his death, Eduardo was the President of Jhamec Construction
Corp., a family enterprise, from which he derived an annual salary of more or
less P300,000; Vice-President of Classic Personnel, Inc. from which he received a
regular annual allowance ofP250,000 to P300,000; and part owner of Glennis
Laundry Haus per Joint Affidavit dated December 28, 1999 executed by

Eduardo and his partner, one Glennis S. Gonzales. Celerina also claimed that
the expenses for the medical attendance extended to Eduardo by the F.M.
Cruz Orthopedic and General Hospital amounted to P4,830 per the
corresponding Statement of Account. She pegged the expenses incurred
during the 4-day wake and subsequent burial of Eduardo at P150,000. In her
assessment, Eduardos unrealized income due to his untimely demise is
aboutP98,000 a month and that the extensively damaged Mitsubishi Lancer was
valued at more or less P700,000.Lastly, Celerina averred that for the services of
counsel, she paid P100,000 as acceptance fee and P3,000 per court hearing.
On April 12, 2004, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision holding that "it
was recklessness or lack of due care on the part of defendant Ocampo while
operating the Nissan Patrol [that] was the proximate cause of the vehicular
collision which directly resulted in the death of Eduardo T. Angeles very soon
thereafter." Thus, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence on record and the laws/jurisprudence
applicable thereto, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Robert
Da Jose and Francisco Ocampo y Angeles to solidarily pay plaintiffs Celerina
Rivera-Angeles, Edward Angelo R. Angeles and Celine Angeli R. Angeles the
following amounts:
1) P50,000.00 for the fact of death of the late Eduardo T. Angeles;
2) P500,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4) P4,830.00 for the hospitalization and P50,000.00 for the burial expenses
of the aforenamed deceased; and
5) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
Upon appeal before the CA, the CA affirmed with modification the RTCs
findings and ruling and instead awarded the following amounts of damages, to
wit:
1. The P500,000.00 award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00;
2. The award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages is further reduced to
P25,000.00; and
3. P2,316,000.00 is awarded for lost earnings of the deceased Eduardo T.
Angeles.
Contention of the Accused: That the award of P2,316,000.00 for lost earnings is
not supported by competent evidence and that the CA erred in admitting the
Glennis Laundry Haus cash vouchers as evidence to prove loss of earnings as
the said vouchers are purely hearsay evidence, hence, inadmissible and of no
probative value.
Ruling: The petition is meritorious.

Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are entitled to
indemnity for loss of earning capacity. Compensation of this nature is awarded
not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money. The
indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual
damages which must be duly proven by competent proof and the best
obtainable evidence thereof. Thus, as a rule, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By
way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is selfemployed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in
which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceaseds line
of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.
Based on the foregoing and in line with respondents claim that Eduardo
during his lifetime earned more or less an annual income of P1,000,000, the case
falls under the purview of the general rule rather than the exceptions.
Now, while it is true that respondents submitted cash vouchers to prove
Eduardos income, it is lamentable as duly observed by the RTC that the officers
and/or employees who prepared, checked or approved the same were not
presented on the witness stand.
We thus agree with the RTCs ruling that said cash vouchers though
admitted in evidence, whether objected to or not, have no probative value for
being hearsay.51
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be
produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: (1)
absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence; and (3)
absence of oath.52 Basic under the rules of evidence is that a witness can only
testify on facts within his or her personal knowledge. This personal knowledge is a
substantive prerequisite in accepting testimonial evidence establishing the truth
of a disputed fact. Corollarily, a document offered as proof of its contents has to
be authenticated in the manner provided in the rules, that is, by the person with
personal knowledge of the facts stated in the document.53
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The award for the loss of earning
capacity in the amount of P2,316,000 granted by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision dated August 29, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 83309 in favor of respondents
is hereby SET ASIDE. All the other monetary awards are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that interest at the rate of 6 per annum on the amounts
awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time of finality of this Decision
until full payment thereof. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172778

November 26, 2012
SABINIANO DUMAYAG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Notes/Doctrine:
In this petition for the reversal of a judgment of conviction of the complex crime
of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and reckless imprudence
resulting in physical injuries against a bus driver, the Court ruled that the totality
of the evidence shows that the proximate cause of the collision was the reckless
negligence of the tricycle driver, who hastily overtook another vehicle while
approaching a blind curve, in violation of traffic laws. In spite of the acquittal,
the Court however held the accused was still civilly liable for his contributory
negligence.
Facts: A passenger bus of Petrus Bus Liner (passenger bus), driven by petitioner,
collided with a tricycle driven by Elsie Genayas (Genayas), resulting in the death
of four (4) persons and causing physical injuries to five (5) others, who were all
passengers of the tricycle. At the time of the mishap, the tricycle was overtaking
a Mitsubishi pick-up when it collided with the passenger bus coming from the
opposite direction.
Petitioner was charged before the MTC with reckless imprudence resulting
in multiple homicide for the deaths of three of the tricycle passengers; and with
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries sustained by five of the
tricycle passengers and damage to property.
The MTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide. On appeal, the RTC affirmed
with modification the decision of the MTC. The CA affirmed in toto the decision
of the RTC.
Contention of the Petitioner-Driver: That the proximate cause of the accident
was the negligent, reckless and imprudent act of the tricycle driver, who
suddenly overtook another vehicle while approaching a blind curve. That the
tricycle was overloaded with eight passengers, in addition to the driver; that the
driver of the tricycle was operating along the national highway, a route
specifically prohibited under the franchise; and that the tricycle driver also
violated Section 41 (a) and (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136, as amended,
otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code of the Philippines
when he tried to overtake another vehicle while approaching a blind curve of
the highway. Therefore, due to serious violations committed by the tricycle
driver, the resulting deaths and injuries arising from the vehicular accident should
be his sole responsibility.
Ruling: The Court finds merit in the petition.
Reckless imprudence, as defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily,
but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person

performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his

employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. In order to establish a
motorists liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that
there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries
or damages complained of. Thus, to constitute the offense of reckless driving,
the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a
motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is
required.
After going over the records of this case, the Court is unable to sustain the
findings of fact and conclusion reached by the courts below. The totality of the
evidence shows that the proximate cause of the collision was the reckless
negligence of the tricycle driver, who hastily overtook another vehicle while
approaching a blind curve, in violation of traffic laws.
The evidence indubitably shows that before the collision, the passenger
bus was cruising along its rightful lane when the tricycle coming from the
opposite direction suddenly swerved and encroached on its lane. The accident
would not have happened had Genayas, the tricycle driver, stayed on his lane
and did not recklessly try to overtake another vehicle while approaching a blind
curve. Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists to drive
and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway. When overtaking
another, it should be made only if the highway is clearly visible and is free from
oncoming vehicle. Overtaking while approaching a curve in the highway,
where the drivers view is obstructed, is not allowed. Corollarily, drivers of
automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are charged with a high degree
of care and diligence to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to it
that vehicles coming from the opposite direction are not taken unaware by his
presence on the side of the road upon which they have the right to pass.
Furthermore, it was undisputed that the tricycle was overloaded, with a
total of eight (8) passengers (excluding the driver), which is a clear violation of
traffic rules and regulation. It was likewise admitted by the owner of the tricycle,
Beethoven Bernabe (Bernabe), that his driver violated the conditions specified
in the tricycle franchise which prohibited all tricycles to travel along the national
highway. In fact, he admitted that Genayas was only the alternate driver of his
son and that he did not interview him anymore when he applied as a company
driver because he was a neighbor and a nephew of his wife. For said reason,
the award of damages to Bernabe by the courts below has no justifiable basis.
The immediate and proximate cause being the reckless and imprudent act of
the tricycle driver, petitioner should be acquitted.
Nevertheless, he is civilly liable. The rule is that an "acquittal of the
accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict."
Under the proven circumstances, there was contributory negligence on
the part of petitioner. It is to be noted that there were two blind curves along

the national highway. Having travelled along it for the past 20 years, he was
aware of the blind curves and should have taken precaution in operating the
passenger bus as it approached them. In the situation at hand, he did not
exercise the necessary precaution. After negotiating the first curve, he claimed
to have stepped on the accelerator pedal because his lane was clear.
According to SPO2 Patalinghug, he found skid marks produced by the
passenger bus. It could only mean that petitioner had slammed on the brake
brought about by the sudden emergence of the tricycle in front of him.
Notwithstanding, it was still short of reckless or criminal negligence as he was
driving along his rightful lane.
In this case, a reduction of 50% of the actual damages is deemed
equitable considering that the negligence of the tricycle driver was the
proximate cause of the accident and that of petitioner was merely contributory.
Moreover, under the circumstances, petitioner cannot be made liable for moral
and exemplary damages for lack of basis. The award of attorney's fees is not
warranted either.

G.R. No. 187246

July 20, 2011
EDWIN TABAO y PEREZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Notes/Doctrine:
The Court explained that inconsistency between the affidavit and testimony
during trial does not impair the credibility of a witness. Likewise, the Court
reiterated that the right of a person using public streets and highways for travel
in relation to other motorists is mutual, coordinate and reciprocal. He is bound to
anticipate the presence of other persons whose rights on the street or highway
are equal to his own. Although he is not an insurer against injury to persons or
property, it is nevertheless his duty to operate his motor vehicle with due and
reasonable care and caution under the circumstances for the safety of others
as well as for his own.
Facts: At around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, the petitioner was driving his
Toyota Corolla car along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street towards
Nagtahan when it suddenly ramped on an island divider, bumping Rochelle
Lanete who was crossing the street. As a result of the impact, Rochelle was
thrown into the middle of the road on her back. Thereafter, Leonardo Mendez
speeding blue Toyota Corona car with plate number PES-764 ran over
Rochelles body. Bystanders armed with stones and wooden clubs
followed Mendez car until it stopped near the Nagtahan Flyover. Francisco
Cielo, a newspaper delivery boy, pleaded with the bystanders not to hurt
Mendez. Cielo went inside Mendez car, sat beside him, got his drivers license,
and ordered him to move the car backwards. Mendez followed his order, but his
car hit the center island twice while backing up. Cielo went out of the car and
approached the sprawled body of Rochelle; he and the petitioner brought
Rochelles body inside Mendez car. The three of them (the petitioner, Cielo and
Mendez) brought Rochelle to the UST Hospital, where she died on February 6,
1993 due to septicemia secondary to traumatic injuries.
Thereafter, the petitioner and Mendez was charged with reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide. The trial court ruled that it was very clear
that both accused are responsible for the death of Rochelle Lanete, and
convicted the two (2) accused of the crime charged. It found that the
petitioners car first hit the victim, causing her to be thrown into the road on her
back, and that Mendez car ran over her as she was lying down. It held that the
two failed to observe the necessary precaution and due care in operating their
respective vehicles, to wit: the petitioner was not attentive to his driving such
that he failed to see the island divider and bumped Rochelle; Mendez was
driving his car too fast at nighttime such that he was unable to avoid running
over her as her body lay prone on the street. Upon appeal before the CA, the
CA affirmed its decision with the modification that the petitioner be sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four years, nine months and 10 days of prision correccional, as
maximum.

Contention of the Accused-Petitioner: That the findings of facts are highly

speculative, manifestly mistaken and unsupported by the evidence, and that
the CA erred in upholding his conviction on the basis of the incredible and
unreliable testimony of Victor Soriano.
Ruling: After due consideration, we resolve to DENY the motion.
Reckless imprudence, generally defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily,
but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Imprudence connotes
a deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or a failure to take the
necessary precaution once the danger or peril becomes foreseen. Thus, in order
for conviction to be decreed for reckless imprudence, the material damage
suffered by the victim, the failure in precaution on the part of the accused, and
the direct link between material damage and failure in precaution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt. We are morally convinced that all three
were established in this case in accordance with the required level of evidence
in criminal cases.
The petitioner was positively identified by an eyewitness
An eyewitness account established that the petitioners vehicle actually hit
Rochelle Lanete. Eyewitness identification is vital evidence, and, in most cases,
decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. One of the prosecution
witnesses, Victor Soriano, unfortunately for the petitioners cause, saw the
incident in its entirety; Victor thus provided direct evidence as eyewitness to the
very act of the commission of the crime. [24] In his September 1, 1994 testimony,
Victor positively identified the petitioner as the person who drove the car that
ramped on an island divider along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street,
and hit Rochelle.
Contention of the Accused-Petitioner: That Victor is not a credible witness due to
inconsistencies between his affidavit and court testimony: Victor declared in his
affidavit that the petitioners car first hit Rochelle before it ramped on an island
divider; while he testified in court that the petitioners vehicle ramped on the
island divider before hitting the victim.
Ruling: We find these arguments unmeritorious.
Discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness affidavit and
testimony in open court do not impair credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte
and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching
inquiries by the investigating officer. At any rate, Victor was able to sufficiently
explain the discrepancies between his affidavit and court statements. Victor

reasoned out that the secretary who typed his affidavit made a mistake; and
explained that he signed the affidavit despite the inaccuracies in paragraph 2
because the secretary told him, kasi ho magugulo ang naimakinilya na.
Accordingly, when Victor informed his lawyer during the first day of the hearing
about the inaccuracy, the latter told him to state the truth regardless of what
was written in his affidavit.
The general rule that contradictions and discrepancies between the
testimony of a witness and his statements in an affidavit do not necessarily
discredit him is not without exception, as when the omission in the affidavit
refers to a very important detail of the incident that one relating the incident as
an eyewitness would not be expected to fail to mention, or when the narration
in the sworn statement substantially contradicts the testimony in court. In the
present case, we see no substantial contradiction in Victors affidavit and in his
court statements as he declared in both that he saw the petitioners car ramp
on the island divider and bump Rochelle. As to whether the car ramped on the
center island before or after it bumped the victim does not detract from the
fundamental fact that Victor saw and identified the petitioner as the driver of
the car that ramped on the island divider and hit Rochelle. As earlier discussed,
Victor sufficiently explained this inconsistency in the trial.
The petitioner failed to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle
The right of a person using public streets and highways for travel in relation
to other motorists is mutual, coordinate and reciprocal. He is bound to
anticipate the presence of other persons whose rights on the street or highway
are equal to his own. Although he is not an insurer against injury to persons or
property, it is nevertheless his duty to operate his motor vehicle with due and
reasonable care and caution under the circumstances for the safety of others
as well as for his own. The petitioner repeatedly admitted that as he drove his
vehicle on his way home from work on January 21, 1993, he did not notice the
island divider at the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. As a result, his car ramped on
the island so that both its rear wheels became elevated from the road and he
could no longer maneuver the vehicle. The petitioner even testified that his car
had to be towed. Later, during cross-examination, he admitted that all four
wheels of his car, not just the two rear wheels mentioned in his earlier testimony,
lost contact with the ground. The entire vehicle, therefore, ended up on top of
the island divider. He puts the blame for the ramping and, essentially, his failure
to notice the island on the darkness of nighttime and the alleged newness of the
island.
To our mind, the fact that the petitioners entire vehicle ended up ramped
on the island divider strongly indicates what actually happened in the
unfortunate incident. The vehicle could not have ended up in that condition
had the petitioner been driving at a reasonable speed. We are not persuaded
by the petitioners rather simplistic account that mere darkness, coupled with
the traffic islands alleged newness, caused his car to veer off the traffic

trajectory of Governor Forbes Street and to end up jumping on top of the traffic
island intended to channel vehicular traffic going to the Nagtahan Flyover.
A motorist is expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a
reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered, to
enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put
the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. It has not
escaped our notice that the intersection of Governor Forbes Street and G.
Tuazon Street is adjacent to the vicinity of the incident. A driver approaching an
intersection is generally under duty, among others, to keep and maintain his
vehicle under control so he can, if needed, stop at the shortest possible notice.
Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle at an
intersection would naturally require more precaution than is necessary when
driving elsewhere in a street or highway.
The fact that the petitioner was driving near the Governor Forbes Street
and G. Tuazon Street intersection gives rise to the expectation that he would
drive at a speed that anticipated or would have anticipated that other
persons are on the road, whether as pedestrians or as motorists. In this case, the
petitioner was driving his car at an inappropriate speed for a vehicle crossing an
intersection. Otherwise, he should have been able to put his vehicle to a
complete stop or, at the very least, at a speed that would have prevented his
car from climbing entirely on top of the island divider. That the petitioners entire
vehicle landed on top of the traffic island body, chassis, four wheels and all
sufficiently indicates his speed at that time. The force that propels an entire car
off the street and on top of a traffic island could only have been inordinate
speed, or at least speed beyond that of a motorist coming from or going to an
intersection. In short, the ramping of his vehicle demonstrably indicates to us
that the petitioner failed to observe the duty to maintain a reasonable speed.
We therefore believe Victors testimony that the petitioner was speeding when
he bumped the victim.
We are likewise not persuaded by the petitioners claim that darkness and
the traffic islands alleged newness justify his failure to notice the island. The
petitioners admission that he did not notice the traffic island is in itself an
indication of his failure to observe the vigilance demanded by the
circumstances. Ultimately, it shows the criminal recklessness for which he has
been convicted. The record shows that pedestrians were present in the vicinity
at the time of the incident. The CA even pointed out that the vicinity is near
residential areas, while we pointed out its proximity to an intersection. The
darkness and these circumstances should have caused the petitioner to be
more alert and more vigilant, to say nothing of slowing his car down. Newly
constructed or not, the island divider should have received the petitioners due
attention. His bare allegation that the island lacked markers or reflectorized
marks is likewise not persuasive. As the trial court correctly observed, many other
vehicles passed the same road that night but only the petitioner failed to notice
the island divider. We thus find the trial court to be correct when it held that the

petitioner failed to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle on the night of

the incident.
All told, we see no reason to overturn the lower courts findings of fact
and conclusions of law finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged.

G.R. No. 170071

March 9, 2011
HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B.
OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA, Petitioners, vs. G & S TRANSPORT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 170125
G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K.
OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA,
Respondents.
Notes/Doctrine:
The Court once again held that acquittal in the criminal case does not affect
the prosecution of an independent civil action arising from a contract of
carriage. Additionally, the Court clarified on the matter of the award of lost
earnings, stating that certification from the employer (the USAID in this case)
cannot be considered as self-serving and therefore may properly be made as
sufficient basis for the deceaseds loss of earning capacity.
Facts: Jose Marcial K. Ochoa (Jose Marcial) died on the night of March 10, 1995
while on board an Avis taxicab owned and operated by G & S Transport
Corporation (G & S), a common carrier.
At about 11:00 p.m., the taxicab was cruising along Epifanio delos Santos
Avenue [EDSA], in front of Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City at high speed. While
going up the Boni Serrano (Santolan) fly-over, it overtook another cab driven by
Pablo Clave and tried to pass another vehicle, a ten-wheeler cargo truck.
Because of the narrow space between the left side railing of the fly-over and
the ten-wheeler truck, the Avis cab was unable to pass and because of its
speed, its driver (Padilla) was unable to control it. To avoid colliding with the
truck, Padilla turned the wheel to the left causing his taxicab to ram the railing
throwing itself off the fly-over and fell on the middle surface of EDSA below. The
forceful drop of the vehicle on the floor of the road broke and split it into two
parts. Both driver Padilla and passenger Jose Marcial K. Ochoa were injured and
rushed to the hospital. At the East Avenue Medical Center, Ochoa was not as
lucky as Padilla who was alive. He was declared dead on arrival from the
accident. The death certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Quezon City cited the cause of his death as vehicular accident.
The heirs, through counsel, sent G & S a letter demanding that the latter
indemnify them for Jose Marcials death, his loss of earning capacity, and
funeral expenses in the total amount of P15,000,000.00. As G & S failed to heed
the same, the heirs filed a Complaint for Damages before the RTC.
The RTC found the taxicab driver negligent and found the evidence
adduced by G & S to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employees as insufficient. Hence, the
trial court declared G & S civilly liable to the heirs. However, for lack of receipts
or any proof of funeral expenses and other actual damages, the trial court

denied the heirs claim for actual damages. It also denied them moral and
exemplary damages for lack of legal basis. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision with the following MODIFICATION: appellant is ordered to pay
appellees the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the deceased
Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, P200,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P100,000.00 for attorneys fees and the costs of litigation. The trial
courts award of P6,537,244.96 for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased
is DELETED for lack of basis.
G.R. No. 170125
Contention of the Common Carrier: G & S reiterates its arguments that the
proximate cause of the accident is a fortuitous event and/or the negligence of
the driver of the delivery van which bumped the right portion of its taxicab and,
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees.
Position of the Heirs: That fortuitous event was not the proximate cause of the
mishap. They point out that as correctly found by the trial court, Padilla was
running at an extremely high speed. This was why the impact was so strong
when the taxicab rammed the fly-over railings and was split into two when it hit
the ground. Also, G & S remains to be civilly liable to the heirs for its breach of
contract of carriage and from its negligence in the selection and supervision of
its employees.
Ruling: We cannot proceed to resolve said issues and disturb the findings and
conclusions of the CA with respect thereto.
There is a contract of carriage between G & S and Jose Marcial
What is clear from the records is that there existed a contract of carriage
between G & S, as the owner and operator of the Avis taxicab, and Jose
Marcial, as the passenger of said vehicle. As a common carrier, G & S "is bound
to carry [Jose Marcial] safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances." However, Jose Marcial was not able to reach his destination
safely as he died during the course of the travel. "In a contract of carriage, it is
presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger
dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no need for the court to make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory
presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised
extraordinary diligence." Unfortunately, G & S miserably failed to overcome this
presumption. Both the trial court and the CA found that the accident which led
to Jose Marcials death was due to the reckless driving and gross negligence of
G & S driver, Padilla, thereby holding G & S liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial for
breach of contract of carriage.

Contention of the Accused: That the CA erred when it overlooked the fact that
the MTC Decision convicting Padilla of reckless imprudence has already been
reversed on appeal by the RTC with Padilla having been accordingly acquitted
of the crime charged.
Ruling: Regardless of Padillas acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, the
same has no bearing in the resolution of the present case.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides, viz: When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such
civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
In this case, the action filed by the heirs is primarily for the recovery of
damages arising from breach of contract of carriage allegedly committed by G
& S. Clearly, it is an independent civil action arising from contract which is
separate and distinct from the criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide filed by the heirs against Padilla by reason of the same incident.
Hence, regardless of Padillas acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, same
has no bearing in the resolution of the present case. There was therefore no error
on the part of the CA when it resolved this case without regard to the fact that
Padilla has already been acquitted by the RTC in the criminal case. Moreover,
while the CA quoted some portions of the MTC Decision in said criminal case,
we however find that those quoted portions were only meant to belie G & S
claim that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the
driver of the delivery van which allegedly hit the Avis taxicab. Even without
those quoted portions, the appellate courts ultimate finding that it was Padillas
negligence which was the proximate cause of the mishap would still be the
same. This is because the CA has, in fact, already made this declaration in the
earlier part of its assailed Decision. The fact that the MTC Decision from which
the subject quoted portions were lifted has already been reversed by the RTC is
therefore immaterial.
Contention of the Heirs: That the CA erred in deleting the award of P6,537,244.96
for Jose Marcials loss of earning capacity
Ruling: The denial by the CA of the heirs claim for lost earnings is unwarranted
In this case, the testimony of Jose Marcials wife that he was earning
around P450,000.00 a year was corroborated by a Certification issued by the
USAID. The USAID Certification is not self-serving and unreliable. A research on
USAID reveals that it is the "principal [United States] agency to extend assistance
to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in
democratic reforms." It is an "independent federal government agency that
receives over-all foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of the State [of the

United States]." Given this background, it is highly improbable that such an

agency will issue a certification containing unreliable information regarding an
employees income. Besides, there exists a presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed. Absent any showing to the contrary, it is presumed
that Cruz, as Chief of Human Resources Division of USAID, has regularly
performed his duty relative to the issuance of said certification and therefore,
the correctness of its contents can be relied upon. This presumption remains
especially so where the authenticity, due execution and correctness of said
certification have not been put in issue either before the trial court or the CA.
Verily, the USAID certification cannot be said to be self-serving because it
does not refer to an act or declaration made out of court by the heirs
themselves as parties to this case.
Clearly, the CA erred in deleting the award for lost income on the ground
that the USAID Certification supporting such claim is self-serving and unreliable.
On the contrary, we find said certification sufficient basis for the court to make a
fair and reasonable estimate of Jose Marcials loss of earning capacity just like in
Tamayo v. Seora52 where we based the victims gross annual income on his
pay slip from the Philippine National Police. Hence, we uphold the trial courts
award for Jose Marcials loss of earning capacity.
While the trial court applied the formula generally used by the courts to
determine net earning capacity which is, to wit:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy* x (gross annual income - reasonable
living expenses),53
*Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 age of the deceased)
we, however, find incorrect the amount of P6,537, 244.96 arrived at. The award
should be P6,611,634.59 as borne out by the following computation:
2 (80-36)
Net earning capacity =

x 450,844.49-50%
3
88

x 225,422.25
3

29.33 x 225,422.25

P6, 611,634.59

Contention of the Heirs: That the CA erred in reducing the award of moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P200,000.00.
Ruling: The award of moral damages should be modified
While we deemed it proper to modify the amount of moral damages
awarded by the trial court as discussed below, we nevertheless agree with the

heirs that the CA should not have pegged said award in proportion to the
award of exemplary damages. Moral and exemplary damages are based on
different jural foundations. They are different in nature and require separate
determination. The amount of one cannot be made to depend on the other.
In Victory Liner Inc. v. Gammad we awarded P100,000.00 by way of moral
damages to the husband and three children of the deceased, a 39-year old
Section Chief of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, to compensate said heirs for
the grief caused by her death. This is pursuant to the provisions of Articles 1764
and 2206(3) of the Civil Code.
Here, there is no question that the heirs are likewise entitled to moral
damages pursuant to the above provisions, considering the mental anguish
suffered by them by reason of Jose Marcials untimely death. Under this
circumstance, we thus find as sufficient and "somehow proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted" an award of moral damages in an
amount similar to that awarded in Victory which is P100,000.00.