European Oil Services DB 221008
European Oil Services DB 221008
European Oil Services DB 221008
FITT Research
22 October 2008
Fundamental,
Industry,
Thematic,
Thought Leading
Deutsche Bank Company Researchs
Research Committee has deemed this
work F.I.T.T for investors seeking
differentiated ideas. Here our European
oilfield service team undertakes an indepth analysis on unique data sourced
from Wood Mackenzie that seeks to
identify which oil service themes and
names should remain resilient in the face
of deteriorating macro conditions &
commodity prices.
European Oil
Services
Reality check
Christyan Malek
Jonathan Copus
Research Analyst
(44) 20 754 58249
christyan.malek@db.com
Research Analyst
(44) 20 754 73636
lucas.herrmann@db.com
Research Analyst
(44) 20 754 51202
jonathan.copus@db.com
22 October 2008
FITT Research
Top picks
Seadrill Limited (SDRL.OL),NOK77.00
Lamprell (LAM.L),GBP129.50
Saipem (SPMI.MI),EUR13.02
AMEC Plc (AMEC.L),GBP468.25
Buy
Buy
Buy
Buy
Key changes
2020
% expirin g
2021 - 2037
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
700
500
400
300
200
100
600
2010E
2009E
2008E
2007E
2006
2005
2000
drilling days
day rate
40%
Playing the trends: Lamprell, Seadrill top picks; Amec, Saipem well placed
Our preferred names are Seadrill and Lamprell given their exposure to ultradeepwater and rig construction, respectively, and the structural dynamics
supporting them. Within E&C, we seek diversified plays exposed to our highest
conviction themes (detailed overleaf), as well as NOCs. We believe those best
placed are Saipem and Amec. In contrast, Wood Group (downgraded to Sell) is
exposed to themes/regions that appear most susceptible to negative oil price risk.
We have raised our company WACCs, which in part drives our PT revisions (see
page 45). Nonetheless, we still see significant upside potential to our top picks.
Key downside risks include oil prices sinking lower than $60/bbl for a sustained
period, macro conditions deteriorating significantly and poor execution.
Deutsche Bank AG/London
% expiring
2010
Exploration
2004
2009
We perform a 360 on the oil service industry and marry our renewed outlook for
capex growth across the oil chain with each companys respective exposure. Our
forecasts equally take into account the rate of margin expansion within each subsector, National Oil Company (NOC) positioning and companys ability to execute.
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
-2%
2003
Industry: backlog should fuel impressive EPS growth and cashflow visibility
To
NOK 90
NOK 85
760p
400p
500p
EUR 22
NOK 170
NOK 100
EUR 55
EUR 47
Sell
215p
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2002
Our mid-term outlook for global capex, done in conjunction with Wood Mackenzie
(WM), suggests that growth will be robust; the long-run oil price implicit in WMs
bottom up capex forecast is $60/bbl. With the market arguably focused on the
longer-term impact of potentially lower commodity prices, our top picks centre on
themes that offer impressive structural characteristics supported by unique data
sourced from WM.
From
NOK 125
NOK 140
960p
650p
680p
EUR 30
NOK 210
NOK 125
EUR 70
EUR 53
Hold
430p
2008
Fundamental: dealing with the reality of a potentially lower oil price world
2007
2001
Research Analyst
(44) 20 754 51202
jonathan.copus@db.com
Licenses expiring
Jonathan Copus
Research Analyst
(44) 20 754 73636
lucas.herrmann@db.com
2006
Research Analyst
(44) 20 754 58249
christyan.malek@db.com
WM drilling days
Christyan Malek
Rating/TP changes
Acergy - TP
Aker Solutions - TP
Amec - TP
Lamprell - TP
Petrofac - TP
Saipem - TP
Seadrill - TP
Subsea 7 - TP
Technip - TP
Tecnicas Reunidas - TP
Wood Group - Rating
Wood Group - TP
Increase in
capex
momentum
vs. 2007 study
35%
30%
25%
20%
Deepwater
Facilities
Oil Sands
Refining &
Petrochemical
Middle East
15%
10%
Shallow water
Deepwater
subsea
Onshore
Upstream
5%
LNG
0%
Frontier
Developments
-5%
Regas
-10%
-15%
-
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
225
All prices are those current at the end of the previous trading session unless otherwise indicated. Prices are sourced from local
exchanges via Reuters, Bloomberg and other vendors. Data is sourced from Deutsche Bank and subject companies. Deutsche
Bank does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. Thus, investors should be aware that the firm
may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single
factor in making their investment decision. Independent, third-party research (IR) on certain companies covered by DBSI's research
is available to customers of DBSI in the United States at no cost. Customers can access IR at http://gm.db.com or by calling 1-877208-6300. DISCLOSURES AND ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS ARE LOCATED IN APPENDIX 1.
22 October 2008
Table of Contents
Page 2
22 October 2008
Executive summary
Global outlook
The oil price implicit in our
(bottom
up)
forecast
for
We
spend
expect
exploration
to
by
grow
an
Longer
term,
Mackenzies
Wood
(top
down)
remain
flat.
DBs
2010
places
upside
expiry
terms
were
to
fall
commerciality
and development
severely,
we
them
easing
the
We note that whilst the downside pressure on rig demand linked to macro and credit
conditions deteriorating further cannot be ignored, we believe that near to medium-term
drilling programmes, particularly those in South America and West Africa (where a large bulk
of the worlds license expiries exist), should be least impacted.
drill
Page 3
22 October 2008
2012
additional
should
strain
place
on
the
Latest ODS Petrodata figures suggest a 34% increase in global offshore rig capacity by 2012
(40% of which will be deepwater). The common market perception is that this should be
more than sufficient to quench any future surge in drilling demand. With spare newbuild
capacity (i.e. yet to be contracted) lowest in ultra-deepwater, i.e. depths >2800m (c. 26%
across 2008-12), drilling activity continuing to surge and a sharp rise in license expiries
expected near term, we believe the day rates at this end of the drilling spectrum will continue
to climb (we estimate up to $700k/day by 2010 from current leading edge of $650/day). Note
that using the same model last year, we forecasted day rates would reach $650k/day (vs. a
consensus expectation from leading industry consultants of $550k/day).
ultra-deepwater,
we
drillers
now
rig
construction
services
emerges
as
distinct winner
Within
exploration
we
or
rig
E&C
we
seek
themes;
Amec
Page 4
Beyond 2010, whilst impossible to quantify (our model only extends to the end of the
decade), we expect ultra-deepwater day rates to stabilise. We believe that there will be
modest downward pressure (i.e. no more than -10%/year) on deepwater rig rates in depths
lower than 2800m. This is the case because even though drilling activity at these depths
appears to be tailing off, this should be partly offset by the renewed pressure to drill (driven
by continued license expiries beyond 2010 not to mention the need to appraise and develop
successful exploration wells). In contrast, shallower water day rates are expected to decline
more rapidly mid term. Our bottom up contract analysis also shows that oil companies are
signing up deepwater rigs well ahead of their release and for longer periods of time (100% of
rigs this year signed on 4+ years vs. 15% in 2005). As a result the cashflow visibility for deep
water drillers now extends well into the next decade.
With the above in mind we believe that the construction for deepwater newbuild rigs will
remain strong in the medium term, albeit continuing at a lower pace than 2006-08. We
believe jack-up newbuild demand, whilst slowing will be supported by 1) increased demand
for premium jack-up rigs capable of working in harsh environments and 2) direct investment
by National Oil Companies who appear to be taking a more explicit role in exploration drilling
than ever before. Our analysis also suggests that upgrade and refurbishment spend will
continue to remain strong well beyond our forecast horizon.
Varying degrees of exposure to our preferred segments should power impressive earnings
growth medium term (we expect sector EPS of 24% CAGR 2008-10E). Within exploration,
we favour plays that have high absolute leverage to ultra-deepwater or rig construction. Most
exposed are Seadrill and Lamprell respectively. As these themes possess structural
characteristics that remain intact below $60/bbl, it makes them our top picks across our
entire coverage universe. Within the E&C complex we seek diversified plays that are well
exposed to our highest conviction themes as well as NOCs (with particular emphasis on
South America, the Middle East and West Africa). Against a backcloth of a falling oil price and
lack of certainty around timings on project awards, we believe this combination reduces the
downside risk on company backlog growth relative to a niche player (i.e. in a specific theme
or region). We believe those best placed are Saipem and Amec.
22 October 2008
We
have
raised
our
with
adjusted
valuation
targets
across
our
coverage
universe
(see
We
changed
have
not
our
earnings
absolute
valuations
outlook
Our
this
still
In a scenario where the oil price could sit significantly below $60/bbl for a sustained period of
time, we believe the earnings of E&C companies will be negatively impacted beyond 2010 as
oil company capex gets pulled back. The reason why our earnings outlook should remain
unchanged before then is that existing company backlog provides sufficient revenue cover
and that the margins associated with the majority of these projects have already been
contracted (subject to execution performance, of course). Even so, share price sentiment will
be negative (in anticipation of a slowdown in earnings post 2010 not to mention the sectors
strong correlation with oil price). Against this backdrop we believe Saipem and Amec would
outperform on a relative basis (vs. their E&C peers); Wood Group and Aker Solutions should
underperform (we have downgraded Wood Group to a Sell from Hold). On an absolute basis
we prefer Lamprell and Seadrill from our entire coverage universe.
Page 5
22 October 2008
Risks
Key
risks
backlog
execution
are
oil
cancellation
price,
and
Oil price: whilst impossible to quantify, Wood Mackenzie estimates that 2009/10 E&C capex
would be c. 20% lower if oil prices sink to $40/bbl. Russia, North America, Europe and
Canada in particular could see an even more exaggerated decline. The Middle East will be the
least impacted but nonetheless we would expect to see a slow down. Companies most at
risk in this context are Wood Group and Aker Solutions (regional and thematic exposures
detailed on pages 40 and 41). In contrast, we believe this downside risk for companies
exposed to rig construction and ultra-deepwater drilling will be mitigated by the structural
need for operators to drill (near- and medium-term) and longer contract lives that drive
earnings growth well into the next decade.
Backlog cancellation (e.g. due to lack of client/contractor funding): Our discussions with
Wood Mackenzie and Pegasus Global (leading risk consultants) suggest there is very little
probability contracted projects will be cancelled given the healthy state of IOC and NOC
balance sheets. In the unlikely event that they do, contractors have the right to file for
liquidated damages and take control of all cash pre-payments. Equally we show that the
refinancing risk on debt maturities of the companies we cover is low (detailed in Appendix K)
and as a result we do not expect them to have cashflow issues in executing their contracts.
Execution: Poor execution is another key industry risk. We believe the potential impact this
risk can have on company earnings remains impossible to quantify ahead of any material
announcement.
Page 6
22 October 2008
capex
exploration,
The exploration end of the global capex spectrum that incorporates everything from seismic
and drilling to wellhead operations until only a few years ago was dwarfed by a
predominantly engineering and construction (E&C) driven capex cycle. National oil companies
aside, the decision by the majors to invest a higher proportion of their spend in lower-risk
opportunities in order to monetise an established resource base (e.g. stranded gas, tar sands)
played a significant role in reducing the incremental dollar invested in exploration. This
structural downward shift witnessed across 2000-03 was, however, only temporary. Visible
strains on majors long-term production profiles, within the context of an industry decline in
reserve replacement, renewed the need for a sustained up-tick in exploration spend, as
Figure 1 highlights.
Figure 1: Reversing trends: relative exploration spend re-emerges from the trough of
2002 to become a key driver of global oil and gas capex into the end of the decade
800,000
44%
700,000
42%
Capex ($bn)
600,000
40%
500,000
38%
400,000
36%
300,000
34%
200,000
replacement
reignited
capex
the
cycle,
has
exploration
spurred
by
relative
to
32%
100,000
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
E& C
2006
2007
30%
2008E 2009E 2010E
historical levels
Page 7
22 October 2008
Analysis of the outlook for global exploration by research partner Wood Mackenzie shows
accelerated growth in absolute terms. Relative to the E&C capex up-tick (expanded on in later
sections of this report) we note a temporary decline across 2007/08. We believe this is a
direct function of:
final investment decisions (FIDs) undertaken on projects that saw an acceleration in E&C
investment relative to exploration and,
In partnership with Wood Mackenzie we have incorporated National Oil company exploration
spend, along with the groups regional and industry expertise in exploration to build a bottomup assessment of the various components (shown in Figure 2) that drive this part of the
spectrum. We also leverage Wood Mackenzie data available to DB in the form of drilling days
and licenses awarded both by region and differing depths (offshore and onshore) to update
our forecast of rig rates and margins (detailed in the next section).
Figure 2: Global exploration spend outlook (NOC + IOC) by theme (av. yearly growth
development
300000
250000
Seismic 10%
$mn
200000
Drilling rigs 20%
150000
Subsurface equipment & Subsurface
products 13%
servicing 14 %
100000
Surface equipment 17 %
50000
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008E
2009E
2010E
Source: Deutsche Bank, Wood Mackenzie, Spears and associates, company data
Page 8
absolute exploration spend is shifting toward the drilling segment (employment of rigs
offshore and onshore); as more rig capacity comes on-stream and current bottlenecks
around their availability loosen, we expect a greater portion of IOC and NOC spend to be
allocated here
this in turn should continue to depress seismic capex growth (a trend we have long
argued) as the incremental dollar of spend becomes redirected into exploration
techniques (i.e. drilling and wellhead operations) that serve to recognise and indeed
prove up (crucially in the eyes of the regulators) the estimated reserves originated
through initial 2D/3D/4D seismic analysis.
Deutsche Bank AG/London
22 October 2008
Figure 3: Absolute spend across the exploration complex and expected year-on-year growth rates
$m
Av. 2008E10E
2005
2006
2007
2008E
2009E
2010E
2006/2005
Servicing
22994
30357
34384
36937
43469
51155
32%
13%
7%
18%
18%
14%
Equipment
11730
16893
21483
24609
29178
34596
44%
27%
15%
19%
19%
17%
Servicing
15239
19460
23750
26248
30550
35556
28%
22%
11%
16%
16%
14%
35893
45303
49085
52481
60740
70300
26%
8%
7%
16%
16%
13%
Total
30%
15%
9%
17%
17%
14%
Drilling (employment
of rigs)
31752
45273
51897
43%
15%
3%
37%
19%
20%
7793
10908
12870
14801
17095
40%
18%
15%
10%
5%
10%
Total
34%
15%
8%
22%
17%
15%
2007E Total
30%
20%
18%
17%
na
na
Wellhead operations
Surface
Subsurface
Seismic
% change
16281
na
1.6%
4.8%
0.5%
-8.2%
-4.1%
na
25.3%
26.9%
26.8%
25.6%
28.9%
29.5%
68.5%
66.6%
66.5%
67.3%
64.6%
64.7%
6.2%
6.5%
6.7%
7.1%
6.4%
5.8%
% breakdown by subsector
Global seismic
Source: Deutsche Bank, Wood Mackenzie, Spears and associates, company data;
Page 9
22 October 2008
to
drilling
being
prevented
for
an
indefinite
period
governments
own
Page 10
22 October 2008
700
30
25
500
20
400
Years
Licenses awarded
600
300
15
200
10
100
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Exploration
Source: Wood Mackenzie, Deutsche Bank
2006
2007
Development
The gradual increase in deepwater licenses since the beginning of the decade is fuelled by
the up-tick in exploration investment depicted in the previous section and highlights the
increasing emphasis on deepwater acreage as technology to drill in these depths improves.
Figure 5 shows the contrast in license term lengths between exploration and development.
Not surprisingly exploration licenses will have a much shorter life as the IOC will be keen to
prove up reserves before making an investment decision related to the fields
commercialisation (which can take up to 20 years in some cases). We noted a similar trend in
the number of shallow water and onshore licenses awarded since 2000 and the lack of
change in exploration and development term lengths (this is depicted in full in Appendix G).
Deepwater license expiries should force accelerated demand to drill across 2009-12
In conjunction with Wood Mackenzie we have tracked all exploration licenses awarded since
2000 with a focus on when they are due to expire.
Figure 6: Expiry profile of deepwater exploration licenses awarded*
2020
2017
2016
2014
2013
2015
% expiring
2021 - 2037
Exploration
2012
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
-2%
2011
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2006
Licenses expiring
2010
% expiring
that
2009
shows
2008
analysis
2007
Our
Source: Deutsche Bank; * note that even though the above depicts licenses awarded from 2000, the scale begins as of when they are due to expire i.e. 2006 onwards
followed
by
with
far
longer
expiry terms
These licenses (shown in Figure 6) tendered by host governments will have been awarded at
a time when the appetite to explore was relatively weaker and against a backdrop of excess
rig capacity. This is in contrast to the current tight deepwater rig environment which we
expand further on in the next section. An important note here is that exploration drilling is
typically followed by development and appraisal drilling. These licenses (on successful well
discoveries) will revert into development licenses with far longer expiry terms (as shown
above). Whilst difficult to quantify the point to make is simply that the demand to drill should
continue well beyond the expiry of an exploration license as oil companies employ these rigs
(deepwater rigs are equally capable of appraisal and development drilling) to prove up their
reserves.
Page 11
22 October 2008
What is more telling, in our opinion, is which regions and depths are seeing their licenses
enter into expiry near term as this would arguably place concentrated demand on rigs in the
local vicinity and by rig type respectively.
Figure 7: Given that the majority of the worlds
deepwater rigs* operate outside of GoM
5%
3%
90
25.0%
80
39%
16%
20.0%
70
60
15.0%
50
40
10.0%
30
20
% expiring
Licenses expiring
8%
5.0%
10
2020
2017
2016
2015
2014
%
2021 - 2037
Exploration
Source: Deutsche Bank, ODS Petrodata; * refers to contracted newbuild deepwater rigs (represents 25% of
all rigs (existing + new)
2013
2012
Russia
2011
Africa
2010
Europe
2009
E Hemisphere
2008
GOM
2006
S America
0.0%
2007
29%
Between 2009 and 2012, 62% of the worlds deepwater exploration licenses (excluding
GoM) are due to expire with sharp rises expected to occur in 2009 and 2012.
Figure 9: Breakdown of deepwater licenses expiring by depth excluding GoM*
90
80
70
Licenses expiring
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
The
sharp
rise
in
ultra-
of
rigs
(5th/6th
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2020
2021 2037
Source: Deutsche Bank, Wood Mackenzie, *Given the scale of GoM licenses awards (on average 300/year vs. 40/year for everywhere else in the world) and the fact
that 90% of them are below 2800m, we have excluded this region from the chart in order to show clearly the trends occurring in ultra-deep i.e. >2800m
Figure 9 shows that licenses in the majority of depth ranges are due for expiry over the next
three years. The sharp rise in ultra-deepwater (i.e. >2800m) license relinquishments should
place additional strain on the demand for these types of rigs (fifth/sixth generation) of which
there are far fewer of to the end of the decade relative to shallow and mid-water rigs (we
discuss the supply/demand implications of this on day rates in the next section titled
exploration dynamics).
Page 12
22 October 2008
450
80
400
350
70
Licenses expiring
250
50
200
40
150
30
100
20
50
10
0
2006
300
60
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2020
-50
2021 2037
will
emerge
as
South America licenses will relinquish between 2010 and 2012. This should see a hike in
exploratory drilling activity that in turn should fuel greater demand for rigs near term.
Note that the increase in exploration activity triggered by the Tupi find late last year destabilised the global market for rigs as the existing ones gravitated towards South
America and un-contracted global construction capacity reduced even further (mainly
driven by new orders placed by Petrobras). Our analysis of all rigs operating globally
shows that 30% has been contracted to work in the region over the next five years
(detailed in Appendix J).
The majority of the licenses awards in Africa earlier this decade will expire next year
which should see operators continue to bid on un-contracted rigs to ensure that their
drilling commitments are fulfilled.
Europe (largely represented by the North Sea and Norwegian shelf) should see a similar
surge in drilling near term as expiries approach.
We show the Gulf of Mexico separately given its much larger scale of licenses awarded
vs. the rest of the world (albeit that each license is far smaller in block size). This is
perhaps not surprising given average license term lengths are typically longer relative to
elsewhere in the world. We note that the pressure to drill in this region is less given the
first peak in expiry does not occur until 2012. In addition, oil companies have arguably
more flexibility in being able to extend drilling programs here relative to other parts of the
world.
below
current
near-term
commerciality
and development
It is worth noting that the desire to drill as many exploration wells before the license expires
will also stem from the need to land grab as much as possible before it relinquishes.
Subsequent to which the oil company will (and likely at a less pressured pace) decide
whether to go ahead with FID on the field. This process can take up to five years and is
equally critical in the eyes of the regulators and investors in ensuring the companys reserve
replacement figures appear solid.
But to what extent will these drilling schedules be adhered to in light of worsening
credit and macro conditions?
What is implicit in the above is that every operator be it oil company or independent will have
no choice but to drill in order to fulfil their commitments to the host government. High
commodity prices will no doubt influence their appetite to drill more actively. However, even
if oil prices were to fall significantly below current levels the access to reserves (particularly
Deutsche Bank AG/London
Page 13
22 October 2008
those that offer high net margin barrels) should remain a priority over its near-term
commerciality and development. The risk to this assumption is that the industry environment
deteriorates severely near term. Given the current financial turmoil, we caution that if credit
availability and macro conditions were to worsen, governments themselves (committed to
social programs and other fiscal pressures) could in turn pull funding and therefore become
more accommodating to drilling programs. This would see license expiries extended easing
the pressure for oil companies to drill.
macro
deteriorate
conditions
severely,
then
from
governments
to
explore
This decision process would typically be initiated by the host government or National Oil
Company. International oil companies that have left their licenses early or exited countries
pre-maturely have in the past found it extremely difficult to return. Note it is not uncommon
to see them negotiate with their partners including the host government on the grounds that
the block acreage yielded very little in the way of discoveries and should not continue to be
drilled upon. This is clearly a sensitive discussion but nonetheless one that again removes
some of the pressure to remain overly committed to drilling schedules and in particular those
that have not been successful.
companies to drill
on
rig
demand
Overall, whilst the downside pressure to drill linked to a potentially worsening credit and
macro environment is real, we believe that near to medium-term drilling programs particularly
those in South America and West Africa should be least impacted. This is based on 1) Wood
Mackenzies view that these host governments in particular have greater strategic ambition
to increase their countrys oil production and 2) IOCs longer-term production targets are
weighted heavily to these regions leaving them with relatively less flexibility to relinquish their
licenses.
medium-term
drilling
should
be
least
impacted
Following a hike in 2008, shallow water and onshore license near-term relinquishments
appear to be reducing mid term
Figure 12: Breakdown of shallow water and onshore
licenses expiring by region
140
600
14.0%
120
500
140
12.0%
100
400
80
300
60
200
40
100
20
10.0%
100
8.0%
80
6.0%
60
2021-2037
2016-2020
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
0.0%
2009
0
2008
2.0%
2007
4.0%
20
2006
40
% expiring
120
2005
Source: Deutsche Bank, Wood Mackenzie, *note that even though the above shows licenses awarded from
2000, the scale begins as of when they are due to expire i.e. 2006
-100
2006
2007
2008
2009
16.0%
160
Licenses expiring
180
2005
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016-2020
Shallow water licenses appear to be generally more periodic in their expiry (around every 3-4
years) and having collectively reached a peak this year, the pressure to drill into the end of
the decade is reducing. Looking at the regional splits, the GoM not surprisingly represents
one of the largest constituents of shallow water drilling and is to a large degree driving the
downtick in license relinquishments to the end of the decade. In theory this should have a
negative impact on shallow water global rig demand.
Page 14
22 October 2008
compare trends across these various datasets below starting with Figure 13, which shows
the lag between global capex and levels of drilling activity globally.
Figure 13: Medium term, Wood Mackenzie expects a secular rise in drilling days
to
exploration
and
deteriorating
IOC
and
275000
100,000
90,000
225000
80,000
175000
70,000
125000
60,000
75000
50,000
25000
40,000
2000
days
2001
2002
2003
w ellhead operations
2004
drilling
2005
seism ic
2006
2007
2008E
2009E
2010E
Figure 14: Signature bonuses accelerated in 2008 YTD with an increasing emphasis on
deepwater
14000
12000
$mn
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
2000
2001
Onshore
2002
2003
2004
Offshore <400m
2005
2006
2007
2008
YTD
Page 15
22 October 2008
Figure 15: Shift in licensees awarded has historically been followed with a similar
(directional) change in drilling days (exploration and appraisal shown)
3,000,000
95,000
drilling days
75,000
2,000,000
65,000
1,500,000
55,000
45,000
1,000,000
35,000
2,500,000
85,000
500,000
25,000
15,000
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Onshore
Source: Deutsche Bank , Wood Mackenzie; *measured by drilling days; this is defined as the time drilled between spudding & completion of well. Beyond actual drilling
it will also include time spent on wellhead related operations (surface and subsurface).
Figures 16 and 17 show how these indicators of IOC and NOC exploration spend reveal
differing trends in activity depending on the drilling depth, offshore and onshore. The appetite
to drill is not homogeneous across the spectrum of depths or indeed onshore and offshore.
Later we use the conclusions derived from these trends along with our earlier observations
on license expiries to update our outlook on rig day rates offering an alternative to the
methodologies adopted by ODS Petrodata and consultancies alike.
Shallow water drilling outlook shows mixed signals
Figure 17: Drilling activity in depths 200-399m
drilling days
Page 16
licenses aw arded
20,000
licenses (acreage in km 2)
40,000
drilling days
2010E
2009E
2007
2008E
0
2006
2010E
2009E
2008E
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
60,000
2005
50,000
80,000
2004
100,000
120,000
100,000
2003
150,000
5,000
4,500
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2000
200,000
days
250,000
licenses (acreage in km 2)
300,000
2002
29,000
27,000
25,000
23,000
21,000
19,000
17,000
15,000
13,000
11,000
9,000
2000
days
Lacklustre change in
licensing expected to
pressure drilling activity
2001
licenses aw arded
22 October 2008
2000
drilling days
200
0
2000
2010E
2009E
2007
2008E
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0
2000
400
licenses aw arded
drilling days
Source: Deutsche Bank & Wood Mackenzie; *for completion we have included similar graphs of drilling days
vs. licenses awarded at various intervals between 400m and 800m; 1199m and 3200m in Appendix I
2010E
4000
1000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
600
2009E
2000
800
2007
3000
1000
2008E
8000
6000
2006
4000
1200
2005
10000
2004
12000
200000
180000
160000
140000
120000
1400
2003
5000
1600
2002
14000
2001
16000
6000
days
7000
days
licenses aw arded
Source Deutsche Bank & Wood Mackenzie; *for completion we have included similar graphs of drilling days
vs. licenses awarded at various intervals between 400m and 800m; 1199m and 3200m in Appendix I
Figure 20: Deepwater drilling activity will continue to intensify in depths >3000m
18000
16000
outlook
demand
for
points
exponential
rise
drilling
to
in
an
ultra-
14000
Our
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
2000
400-799m
2001
800-1199m
2002
2003
1200-1599m
2004
2005
1600-1999m
2006
2007
2800-3199m
2008E
2400-2799m
2009E
2800-3199m
2010E
>3200m
2,500,000
54,000
49,000
d ays
44,000
39,000
34,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
29,000
500,000
24,000
drilling days
2010E
2009E
2008E
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
19,000
licenses aw arded
Page 17
22 October 2008
are
placing
emphasis
on
however, as highlighted
earlier, we caution that in
the
face
of
Drilling spend sourced from national oil companies will form a larger portion of oil service
backlog as they become more involved around the drill bit than ever before. Greater
ownership and participation of NOCs in oil and gas developments will naturally work its way
up the oil chain as their host governments place greater emphasis on energy security and
ensure that future years domestic demand on their resources are met. This is in contrast to
IOCs and in particular the independents whose appraisal and development programs will be
more commercially oriented, aimed at maintaining their commitments to shareholders and
monetising reserves across the commodity up-cycle.
We caution that in the face of deteriorating credit and macro conditions, Norway and Russia
NOCs would be most at risk to investment cut backs given the relatively higher cost to
explore vs. elsewhere in the world; South America and West Africa exploration appetites will
be least impacted. In theory this should provide service companies exposed to NOCs in
these regions with a relatively safer harbour to fluctuating oil & gas prices.
deteriorating
Figure 22: NOCs to play a greater role in drilling (both exploratory and appraisal)
inevitable.
90,000
be
40%
80,000
70,000
least
38%
60,000
$mn
impacted
50,000
36%
40,000
34%
30,000
20,000
32%
10,000
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007E
2008E
2009E
30%
2010E
% NOC
Page 18
22 October 2008
23 shows the former which excludes upgrades, refurbishments and re-activations (due to
lack of available data).
Figure 23: Capex* invested by drillers appears to lag worldwide rig utilisations
18000
100%
16000
95%
90%
14000
85%
12000
$ mn
80%
10000
75%
8000
70%
6000
65%
4000
60%
Capex($ m n)
2010E
2009E
2007
2008E
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
50%
1992
0
1991
55%
1990
2000
Utilisations
Source: Deutsche Bank, ODS Petrodata *represents the annualised spend across the life of each rig built (typically between 1-3 years)
Across
2006/07
activity
declined,
drilling
albeit
The large up-tick in spend (based on actual rigs commissioned; i.e., ignores speculative
builds) shown above should come as no surprise given the unexpected turnaround in
exploration activity. Over time this has led to record-high rig utilisations which in turn forced a
decline in drilling activity (due to lack of rig availability) across 2006-07, albeit a temporary one
(as shown in Figure 23 above). Of note is the length of time it has taken drillers to regain the
confidence to invest in new builds despite an upward shift in utilisation since 2003.
We qualify the degree of speculative investment that could materialise by analysing the
incremental demand to drill (measured as drilling days). Whilst in theory this should continue
to support the rig construction market, as illustrated in the last section, the appetite to drill
will vary across the spectrum of depths and indeed onshore relative to offshore.
Placing this demand analysis against the current newbuild outlook to date (shown in detail in
the next section) allows us to take a view, admittedly a qualitative one on the potential rate of
incremental spend by rig class (with each depth range above broadly represented by the
various rig types).
Despite the number of deepwater floater new builds coming on-stream, the relative lack of
liquidity here (only c. 26% are accessible vs. 70% for jack-ups) against accelerated drilling
activity suggests that the demand for newbuilds will continue to remain strong albeit at a
lower pace than across 2006-08. This is in contrast to the jack-up rig market (offshore and
onshore) that appears readily accessible and in turn should witness a more exaggerated
decline in newbuild investment vs. 2006-08.
Page 19
22 October 2008
Notable exceptions here that place upside pressure particularly on the rate of incremental
jack-up spend include:
The demand for premium jack-up rigs capable of working in harsh environments as the
global incremental supply of oil continues to be sourced from more technically
challenging prospects (e.g. in the FSU).
National oil company investment in rig newbuilds. Figures 24 and 25 show actual capex
committed to new builds between 2008 and 2012 sourced by region and origin of the
operator; i.e., NOC vs. IOC.
Asia
16%
US
29%
Europe
15%
Africa
1%
NOC
47%
Middle East
1%
South America
10%
Norw ay
28%
On comparing the above to the split of new build spend that occurred between 2003 and
2006, we note that there has been a gradual shift from the traditional investors of rig new
builds, such as the US and Europe towards South America and Asia. This move has been
underpinned by greater participation of NOCs in rig construction and in turn
refurbishment/upgrades. Confirming this is our analysis done in conjunction with Wood
Mackenzie which shows direct investment by the NOCs in drilling since 2000 (Figure 22).
Page 20
Rig attrition. Figures 26 and 27 show that 38% of global rig capacity is above 25-yearsold (typical rig run life is 30 years) suggesting that over the next 10 years, these rigs will
require some degree of maintenance. This could vary from refurbishment e.g.
replacement of corroded parts (basically returning the rig to its original efficiency and
capability thus extending its life) through to enhancement of the rig in order to extract
more value from it. Unsurprisingly the latter will materialise into a larger (monetary)
contract size given it requires the oil service company to utilise what is often termed as
its value engineers in parallel with any necessary refurbishment. It is worth noting that
we expect a more pro-active maintenance approach in contrast to earlier parts of the
cycle where underinvestment i.e., the bare minimum was accepted (drillers, keen to
exploit the strong commodity environment, kept maintenance time as low as possible).
22 October 2008
40.0%
120
35.0%
100
<5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25
2009
2006
2003
2000
1997
1994
1991
1988
1985
1982
0.0%
1979
0
1958
5.0%
20
1976
10.0%
40
1973
15.0%
60
1970
20.0%
1967
25.0%
80
1964
30.0%
1961
Ri g s d e li v e re d p e r y e a r
45.0%
>25
Age (yrs)
Source: Deutsche Bank, ODS Petrodata
Longer lead times on newbuilds (yards are now quoting four years) has led to many
operators and drillers, particularly in the US, to opt for rig upgrades often in the form of
conversion or re-activation. Interestingly, of the total number of re-activated rigs coming
on-stream across 2007-11E, 65% are sourced from the US. It appears that the US drillers
have been relatively less inclined to commit to new builds, preferring to upgrade the
existing fleet, perhaps to avoid the risk of overcapacity suffered by many of them in
previous down-cycles. It also means that they are able to exploit the current commodity
environment far more quickly and leverage arbitrage opportunities; e.g., in cases when
there is a short-term lack of rigs in a particular region.
Number of new rigs coming onto the market which will require periodic maintenance
(regulators deem five years as the maximum). With a 34% increase in rigs expected
across 2008-12 (on 2007 base), we believe this will see a proportionate increase in rig
maintenance, which coupled with the requirements of the existing asset base as
highlighted above should see demand for refurbishment remain strong well beyond our
forecast horizon.
Page 21
22 October 2008
the rate of rig replacement defined as the degree with which incremental rig capacity
(confirmed new builds and upgrades) will be offset by ageing fleet due to be taken offstream
the liquidity of the rig market - operators willingness to sign up rigs at a premium or
discount to the current leading edge will, in part be based on the accessibility of
incremental supply, i.e. the proportion of rigs that are not yet locked up into long-term
contracts
IOC drilling schedule expiries as per their host government obligations, not to mention
commitment to shareholders, many of whom will have invested in these companies
based on their degree of exploration upside (e.g. the independents) or ability to grow
production (e.g. the integrated companies)
We base our short- to medium-term rig rate forecasts on our understanding of the above
supply/demand dynamics. Macro and geopolitical factors influencing rig rates include:
Page 22
oil and gas prices (higher prices will drive appetite to drill and monetise reserves quickly)
the condition of the global economy and level of GDP growth anticipated worldwide and
at the regional level
Deutsche Bank AG/London
22 October 2008
We believe our near- to mid-term day rate outlook remains intact at sub $60/bbl oil on a
sustained basis and against deteriorating macro conditions. This is given the bottom up
nature of our demand forecast (linked to the structural dynamics detailed above).
DB day rate model
Our
day
rate
demand
model
driven
is
and
more
importantly
We have modelled short- to medium-term day rates (by depth) within the offshore segment
around our outlook for drilling activity and the our analysis on license expiries highlighted in
the previous section.
But first....
Whilst we have not quantified the impact of supply on day rates we address below,
albeit qualitatively, the extent to which capacity creep could effect our forecast, if at all.
Figures 28-31 show the timing, complexity and degree of incremental rig capacity
(already commissioned) expected to come on-stream in the medium term. It is worth
noting that rigs capable of drilling in deep and ultra deep waters are also operable in
shallower waters. Therefore in periods of low utilisation, owners of fifth/sixth generation
rigs (semi-submersibles or drillships) may choose to charter them out in reduced depths.
70
40
Number of rigs
Number of rigs
35
60
50
40
30
20
30
25
20
15
10
10
5
0
0
2008
2009
2010
2011
0-2999
2012
3000-4999
5000-7499
7500-9999
>=10000
depth (ft)
Drillship
Jackup
Semisubmersible
Tenders
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
30
80
54 Semisubmersible rigs are
planned to come onstream
across 08-12E
20
70
Number of rigs
Number of rigs
25
15
10
5
0
60
50
40
30
20
10
0-2999
3000-4999
5000-7499
7500-9999
>=10000
0
0-199
depth (ft)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2008
200-300
2009
300-400
2010
2011
>=400
2012
Whilst the rig market appears well supplied into the end of the decade, we highlight two
counter dynamics that should remove (in some cases completely) the downside risk on rig
utilisations.
Page 23
22 October 2008
Rig attrition. Of the expected 34% increase in global capacity, ODS Petrodata
estimates that up to a third of that could potentially be soaked up in replacing older rigs
forced off stream over the next 5-10 years.
Rig liquidity. Figures 32 and 33 show the proportion of new builds that have yet to be
contracted.
Number of
contracted
Jackups
30%
Total number of
uncontracted
semis and
drillships
26%
Number of
uncontracted
Jackups
70%
Total number of
contracted semis
and drillships
74%
Despite the number of deepwater floater new builds coming on-stream, the relative lack
of liquidity here (only c. 26% are still accessible) suggests that the market will continue
to remain tight in the medium term all else being equal. Conversely, the jack-up rig
market (offshore and onshore) appears readily accessible. As the new builds come on
stream, we believe this will inevitably place downward pressure on utilisation, assuming
that jack-up demand does not vary significantly from current levels.
With regards to the existing rigs already under contract (that could threaten to increase
spare capacity dramatically) analysis of the worlds contracted deepwater rigs (detailed
further in the next section) shows that the average term length on rigs signed across
2007/08 (>90% of the worlds rigs were re-negotiated during this period) is four years
(jackups around 2.5 years). The point to make is that spare capacity of existing rigs, at
least those drilling in deepwater will not free up before 2011/2012. We believe this
should be more than offset by a significant expected up-tick in drilling demand across
the same period keeping supply/demand fundamentals robust into the first half of the
next decade.
With the above in mind, we have utilised the Wood Mackenzie outlook on drilling activity and
license expiries, highlighted in the previous section, to forecast rig rates at various depth
intervals in both shallow and deepwater. Note that our forecasts have been made on a yearly
basis. So, for example, a driller currently looking to re-negotiate a contract due to expire
during 2009 would, for the purpose of our rig model, lock into the rate we estimate in 2009
(at the relevant depth) for the renewed length of the contract term.
The ultra deepwater market
(depths
>
demonstrate
7500ft)
will
the
best
supply/demand
fundamentals
further.
Page 24
tighten
As Figures 34-38 show, excess offshore rig capacity (that drove utilisation <80%) between
2003 and 2005 appears to have pressured day rates across all depths despite intermittent
increases in drilling activity during broadly the same time frame. We expect deepwater day
rates to stabilise with downward pressure on depths lower than 7500ft as drilling activity
begins to tail off offset somewhat by license expiries beyond 2010. In our opinion, the ultra
deepwater market (depths >7500ft) will demonstrate the best performance as
supply/demand fundamentals tighten further. Shallower water day rates should at best
remain at current levels.
drilling days
120.0
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
140.0
20.0
drilling days
day rate
2010E
2009E
2008E
2007
2006
2005
0.0
2000
2010E
2009E
2007
2008E
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0.0
160.0
2004
50.0
180.0
2003
100.0
5,000
4,500
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2002
150.0
WM drilling days
200.0
250.0
29,000
27,000
25,000
23,000
21,000
19,000
17,000
15,000
13,000
11,000
9,000
2000
WM drilling days
2001
22 October 2008
day rate
350
100
4500
2010E
2009E
2008E
0
2007E
3500
drilling days
200
5500
2006
2010E
2009E
2007E
2008E
day rate
300
6500
2005
drilling days
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
7500
2004
50
2003
100
400
8500
2002
150
500
9500
2001
200
10500
2000
250
600
11500
WM drilling days
300
3300
3100
2900
2700
2500
2300
2100
1900
1700
1500
2000
WM drilling days
day rate
Page 25
22 October 2008
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
700
500
400
300
200
100
600
drilling days
2010E
2009E
2008E
2007E
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0
2000
WM drilling days
day rate
Increase in new ultra deepwater rigs (capable of drilling >7500ft) will likely not be enough to
quench the ramp up in drilling activity expected at these depths. We expect rig rates to rise
further as licenses expiries approach (expected to peak by 2012 ) and rig liquidity reduces.
Source: Deutsche Bank and Wood Mackenzie estimates
2005
Up to 2 years
2006
2-4 years
2007
2008 YTD
4+ years
Figure 39 shows term lengths on the rise as clients prefer to lock into longer fixtures on fixed
day rates (as opposed to accessing the spot market on shorter term leases typically <1 year).
This should come as no surprise given the lack of rig liquidity in the deepwater market which
coupled with accelerated global drilling activity (not to mention stricter drilling schedule
requirements by host governments) has forced IOCs and independents to sign up rigs well
ahead of their release (or delivery if they are newbuild) and for longer periods of time. In
parallel we have seen several NOCs (e.g. Petrobras) do the same as they take strategic
decisions to invest over 5-10 year periods that justify locking into contracts on rigs for 5+
years. The impact this dynamic has on our company model is that it gives us greater visibility
beyond our original earnings horizon to 2012.
Page 26
22 October 2008
Our
discussions
with
construction
followed
by
services,
UAE
then
A recurring theme we have experienced amongst investors and industry alike regarding the
mid- to longer-term outlook of the rig construction industry is that even against strong
demand, excess capacity (particularly from China) could see the industrys margins decline
from their current levels (c. 20% EBITDA) as pricing power diminishes. We have analysed
current and future capacity across the Middle East, Asia and Australia basically the Eastern
Hemisphere. With currently 59 yards in the region operating, two of which are undergoing
brownfield expansion and six more being built, we believe that the risk of eventual
oversupply is real (notwithstanding yards being built in China that are not public knowledge).
However, against our demand outlook and various counter-dynamics discussed below (based
on our analysis of capacity by region and industry), the risk of margins deteriorating in the
medium term appears low in our opinion.
In Figure 40 we show the current regional yard capacity for construction. Oil and gas
activities include newbuild and refurbishment of semi-submersible rigs, jack-up rigs,
drillships, tension leg platforms, FPSO, FPO, heavy lift carriers, pipelay vessels, crude oil
tankers, container vessels, gas carriers (LNG,LPG) etc. Non-oil and gas activities
comprise yards that do ship (civil and naval) building, repair and conversion, service
crafts, cargo ships, yachts, work boats, etc. We have attached a comprehensive list of
every yard and its specifications in Appendix F.
Whilst the risk of over supply in the region poses a continuing threat to the industrys mid- to
longer-term pricing power (the fear being that the structure of the rig construction industry
will weaken as more capacity comes online), we include below some of the counterdynamics that should offset the downside risk on the companys margins across the mid
term:
Page 27
22 October 2008
The type of construction activity on offer from these yards does not coincide completely
with that of rig related construction. Figure 41 shows the proportion of yards that
provide oil and gas related construction. Investor perception of construction capacity in
these regions suggests that there is plenty of it; the reality is that it is being used for a
variety of products of which non oil and gas represents approximately one-third. Of the
oil and gas portion, the economies of scale on the yards offering newbuild services
makes it difficult to switch to the (smaller sized) refurbishment projects alone. Figure 42
shows the proportion of oil and gas based capacity that caters for refurbishment. The
relative lack of pure refurbishment capacity suggests this sub-sector will continue to
remain tight and perhaps even more so in the Middle East (only 14% of rig construction
is refurbishment based) across the mid term. Longer term however, we would argue
that as incremental demand for newbuilds slows this could force contractors to change
their product offering and result in a significant up-tick in refurbishment capacity.
Number of yards: 65
31%
36%
51%
69%
13%
Page 28
Refurbishment
Companies operating specifically in the Middle East sit within three critical barriers to
entry:
Companies looking to enter the region and more specifically UAE which represents the
bulk of construction activity in the region will lack the long standing relationships that
existing contractors have established with the local government not to mention client
base, critical prerequisites in being able to open up shop and succeed.
It makes no sense for drillers and oil companies operating here to upgrade or refurbish
their rigs anywhere else; transport costs and likely risk of delay and inferior quality far
outweighs the potential benefit of cheaper options in e.g. China.
Lack of natural harbours across the Middle East, particularly within the most
construction-heavy country, UAE. Indeed, the government recently voiced their inability
to expand industrial activity further across their coastline.
Greenfield expansions in the region as shown in Figure 43 suggest that the industry has
certainly reacted to the demand surge witnessed in rig construction but perhaps not as
aggressive as one would have expected (only four oil and gas based yards are under
construction against a current 59 in operation). Equally we show that the profile of this
incremental capacity is changing. Figure 44 shows total capex committed by all the
companies listed above (Figure 40) since 2004 and a gradual re-weighting towards nonoil and gas based activities.
Middle East
New build
22 October 2008
5,000
85 hectares
Land area
8,000 m
Quay side
90
4,500
80
4,000
7,000
70
3,500
6,000
60
3,000
42 hectares
Land area
5,000
33 hecatres
Land area
4,000
50
40
2,400 m
Quay side
3,000
1,250 m
Quay side
2,000
30
20
1,000
10
Capex ($ mn)
8,000
9,000
57.0%
55.5%
2,500
2,000
53.1%
51.8%
50.0%
1,500
1,000
500
-
Changxing (China)
Pipavav (India)
Source: Deutsche Bank, Company data* all of which will be completed by 2015; note that of the six greenfield
yards under construction two are non oil and gas related
2004
2005
Oil and gas
2006
Non - Oil and gas
2007
2008E
% of Oil and gas
Finally, despite what appears above to be a large number of yards in China (and
potentially more that have not been disclosed), the oil and gas industry is split in its view
of the quality of product that is on offer there. With drillers having to pay hefty fines on
rig delays not to mention a forfeit of day rate, the appetite to change their traditional
supplier of choice to new players particularly within Asia is unsurprisingly low. We would
caution however that as the product quality of these yards improve (industry consultants
Pegasus Global suggest this could be the case within five years), we expect market
share to be re-distributed and pricing power to be under pressure particularly on
newbuild work given the relatively higher available capacity.
established
of
the
capex
growth
across
these
Given the array of functions that exists within associated well operations (see Appendix B for
further definitions), it is no surprise that each theme will have its own characteristic
competing forces. Advanced technology and specialised hardware, relevant project
management experience, local presence via assets or resource, strong financial capabilities
as well as degree a capacity creep are to list but a few of the internal dynamics that will
underpin each segments relative and absolute margins near term.
Whilst difficult to quantify, intuitively we know that a theme, for example, with high barriers
to entry, limited competition and suffering little capacity creep and cost inflation, will realise
top-quartile margins against a backdrop of strong demand for its services. With this in mind
we have analysed the competitive forces impacting some of the sub-segments within
wellhead operations, not to mention rig construction. This strategy has helped us to
determine which themes we believe are best placed to deliver relative performance over the
forecast period.
Having interacted with the companies under coverage, as well as Wood Mackenzie and
various other industry professionals, we show below the degree of margin achievement
(both relative and absolute) each theme could realise across our forecast horizon. Implicit in
our forecasts is the reversal of the negative effects that cost inflation and FX had on margins
across 2004/05. In our company sections these broad expectations are then married with
bottom-up analysis of the components that drive each companys margins to arrive at the
base case around which we model each of the companies (applicable only to Wood Group,
Seadrill and Aker Solutions across our coverage universe).
Page 29
22 October 2008
Figure 45: Absolute and relative margin achievement across well head operations sub-segments
Theme
Surface
servicing
Surface
equipment
Subsurface
servicing
Subsurface
equipment and
products
Typical EBITDA
2008-10E
Summary of strategic analysis
margins
expectation*
25-30%
20-25%
15-20%**
10-15%**
Our analysis focuses on pressure pumping and compression services (which collectively represent the bulk
of spend in this segment). The former is a structurally strong industry with top quartile margins (relative to
other well head operations). Despite medium barriers to entry, one of them being infrastructure, market
remains dominated by few players. These include Schlumberger, Halliburton, BJS and Baker Hughes. In
contrast, compression services is structurally a weak industry with only one significant player (EXH)
Near term, however, we expect mild expansion in margins as clients become more resistant to price hikes
High barriers to entry that include technology (long lead patents), brand recognition (strong client
relationships) and capital intensity. Structurally robust industry with medium quartile margins. Market
dominated by few players. These include FMC, Cooper Cameron and National Oilwell Varco.
Near term expect impressive margin expansion as service companies less leveraged to supply chain
pressures (products manufactured in-house).
High barriers to entry that include technology (e.g. seeing an increase in the use of deviate drilling i.e.
multilateral and horizontal) and brand recognition (strong client relationships). Structurally robust industry with
medium quartile margins. Market dominated by few players. These include Baker Hughes, Schlumberger,
Halliburton and Weatherford.
Near term expect impressive margin expansion as service companies less leveraged to supply chain
pressures (equipment made to order in-house).
Medium barriers to entry and levels of substitution suggest that structurally this industry is robust with
medium quartile margins. Market dominated by few players. These include Baker Hughes, Schlumberger,
Wood Group and Weatherford.
Near term expect mild margin expansion. Even though service companies are less leveraged to supply chain
pressures (products manufactured in-house) we expect pricing power to diminish.
XXX
XX
X/X
* x/xxxx = lowest/highest margin upside; **notable exceptions respectively include: directional drilling that generates margins between 25-30% and completion/work-over: 30-35%
Source: Company data, Deutsche Bank & Wood Mackenzie estimates
Page 30
22 October 2008
Exploratory,
appraisal and
developm ent
spend* ;
38%
Engineering and
construction
spend; 62%
Source: Deutsche Bank and Wood Mackenzie;* excludes rig construction service capex
Page 31
22 October 2008
The service industry like any other commodity-related business will always prove cyclical as
oil company (NOC and IOC) development spending patterns (which tend to lag the oil cycle)
remain the underlying driver of oil service revenue. Analysis of the outlook for E&C suggests
that this cycle will undergo a smoothing out into the early part of the next decade rather
than suffer a sharp decline, shown in Figure 47.
Figure 47: E&C cycle peak remains obscure forward trajectory should remain broadly
flat medium term
440,000
36%
420,000
35%
400,000
34%
380,000
33%
360,000
340,000
32%
320,000
31%
300,000
30%
280,000
29%
260,000
28%
240,000
27%
220,000
200,000
26%
2005
2006
2007
IOC + NOC
2008E
2009E
2010E
NOCs
reserves
to
replace
and
meet
remain
on
the
medium-term radar
This capex study has brought to surface some of the qualitative trends that had been recently
highlighted in our oil service monthly (Eyes wide open), one of which was the increasing
frequency of project delays cited both in the upstream and downstream segments. Wood
Mackenzie has had to revise estimated timings of final investment decision (FID) on
numerous project developments that have fallen victim to elongated client/contractor
negotiations in the face of escalating EPC costs. Consequently, several of these have now
extended beyond our 2007-09E forecast horizon. Notably however, current pressures on
IOCs and NOCs to replace reserves and meet production targets into the second half of the
decade should ensure that these projects remain on the medium-term radar. If anything it
places upside pressure on our capex trajectory that appears to have approached a plateau.
We discuss the dynamics surrounding absolute levels of profitability within the service sector
in the next section (E&C industry dynamics).
Knowing
and
which
regions
themes
boast
the
behind
relative
By region
The key differentiator of performance within our European oil service universe (aside from
margin delivery and management capabilities) will be the ability to position a firm across the
themes and regions that offer the best growth within the updraft of global capex.
In partnership with Wood Mackenzie we have adopted a rigorous approach to global E&C
spend that draws from the consultancys vast database of individual field models. We have
incorporated all upstream/downstream projects likely to be sanctioned from 2008 based on
our partners assessment of potential commercialisation of the worlds current 2P reserve
base. These capex forecasts are sense-checked with what is implicit within our own global
supply models and should not vary significantly in an oil price world of $60/bbl+ (Wood
Mackenzie long-term assumption) given the bottom-up nature of our analysis.
Page 32
22 October 2008
Figure 48: Global E&C outlook (NOC + IOC) by region (av. yearly growth rates 200810E shown alongside)
450
420
390
SE Asia 10%
360
330
S. Am erica 1%
300
Russia -4%
270
240
210
N. Am erica -1%
180
150
M iddle East 18%
120
90
Europe 2%
60
Caspian 9%
30
Africa 21%
2005
2006
2007
2008E
2009E
2010E
Downside
risk
on
our
exaggerated
Europe,
Canada,
America
latter
and
two
already
for
North
Russia
(the
countries
are
demonstrating
negative capex)
The outlook depicted in Figure 48 implies an average growth rate in spend of 6% p.a. to
2010, slightly above the circa 5% p.a. witnessed across the first half of the decade and last
years forecast of 2% (2007-09E). Key regions offering top quartile growth in spend within
our forecast horizon are expected to be Africa, the Middle East and to a lesser degree
Canada (heavy oil) followed by South East Asia and the Caspian. The hike in oil price
witnessed across the last 12 months has seen renewed interest by the majors and
independents in mature provinces such as Europe (predominantly the North Sea). Note that
capex growth in Europe as well as Canada could equally prove elastic on the downside given
the recent drop in oil price to nearer $70/bbl. We therefore caution that there is downside risk
(we estimate up to 20% less if oil prices sink to $40/bbl) to our bottom up forecast in these
regions if oil prices fall below $60/bbl for a sustained period of time. Russia and North
America are already witnessing negative growth in capex which at sub $60/bbl could see a
more exaggerated decline.
By theme
We have utilised Wood Mackenzies regional and industry expertise on both upstream and
downstream developments to build a project-by-project database of global spend by energy
segment.
Figure 49: Global E&C outlook (NOC + IOC) by theme (av. yearly growth rates 200810E shown alongside)
455
quartile growth:
420
Upstream:
385
350
Oilsands 23%
14.0%
LNG plant 5%
13.0%
12.0%
315
280
Onshore upstream 4%
245
11.0%
210
10.0%
175
140
9.0%
105
Shallow w ater 3%
70
8.0%
35
0
2005
7.0%
2006
2007
2008E
2009E
2010E
Deepw ater subsea 5%
Page 33
22 October 2008
This years review incorporates improved Wood Mackenzie coverage of Russia, Canada and
South East Asia (including China) (IOC and NOC spend) not to mention further development
of our LNG and downstream products. All these factors have helped improve the granularity
and accuracy of our capex forecasts. The variance vs. last years capex horizon (2007-09E) is,
on average 35%. One-third of this rise is due to expanded WM coverage with the remainder
attributed to projects being pushed back (and subsequent upward cost revisions) and greater
than expected cost inflation (raw materials, staff hikes, vessel rates). We break this down
further in Appendix C.
Figure 50: Absolute spend across the global energy complex and expected year-on-year growth rates
Year/year growth rates
$mn
2006
2007
2008E
2009E
2010E
2007/06
2008E/07
Deepwater Sub-sea
9,459
13,050
14,080
13,278
15,176
38%
8%
-6%
14%
5%
18,093
20,323
23,610
28,860
38,090
12%
16%
22%
32%
23%
64,958
80,965
88,596
89,940
88,356
25%
9%
2%
-2%
3%
146,612
167,543
185,318
189,725 189,829
14%
11%
2%
0%
4%
1,150
2,050
4,900
5,125
3,572
78%
139%
5%
-30%
38%
10,484
12,910
17,910
16,997
13,591
23%
39%
-5%
-20%
5%
Re-gasification terminals
6,489
6,839
7,487
7,515
5,551
5%
9%
0%
-26%
-5%
Oil Sands
11,086
14,295
16,674
21,067
26,694
29%
17%
26%
27%
23%
16,375
19,735
27,417
27,417
27,417
21%
39%
0%
0%
13%
8,099
9,078
8,767
8,104
8,387
12%
-3%
-8%
3%
-2%
292,805
346,789
394,758
408,028 416,663
18%
14%
3%
2%
6%
262,158
287,933
283,948
281,982
na
10%
-1%
-1%
na
3%**
12%
20%
39%
45%
na
Other*
Variance
Source: Company data, Deutsche Bank & Wood Mackenzie estimates;*other includes operations and maintenance capex as well as spend that cannot be categorised by one specific theme; **2007-09E
into
ultra-deepwater
increase
in
and
facilities/FPSOs)
Page 34
in
turn
Upstream are deepwater facilities and FPSOs (and to a lesser extent deepwater
subsea). Both of these have gradually risen in the ranks (of highest growth themes)
across the past two years of our E&C capex review. The pick up in deepwater FPSOs
and facilities capex comes as no surprise as multiple upstream developments initiated
several years ago enter into their production development phase (post subsea
infrastructure investment). Figure 51 suggests there is a 2-3 year lag (although in some
cases this can be up to seven years if governments delay sanctioning) between drilling
activity (with respect to those wells spudded successfully) and the start of a project
development life cycle. We expect the accelerated shift into ultra-deepwater drilling (as
noted in the previous section) to spur a proportionate increase in E&C capex (ultradeepwater subsea and in turn facilities/FPSOs).
22 October 2008
14000
12000
12000
11000
10000
10000
8000
9000
6000
8000
4000
13000
2012E
16000
2011E
18000
14000
2010E
15000
2009E
20000
2008E
16000
2007
22000
2006
24000
17000
2005
18000
2004
Figure 51: Deep- and ultra-deepwater drilling should spur accelerated investment
across the deepwater E&C complex
Page 35
22 October 2008
40%
Increase in
capex
momentum
vs. 2007 study
35%
30%
25%
20%
Deepw ater
Facilities
Oil Sands
Refining &
Petrochem ical
M iddle East
15%
10%
Shallow water
Deepwater
subsea
Onshore
Upstream
5%
LNG
0%
Frontier
Developm ents
-5%
Regas
-10%
-15%
-
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
225
Page 36
22 October 2008
Figure 53: Last years growth rates and potential for margin gain (bubble size is relative proportion of total spend)
35%
30%
25%
LNG
Oil Sands
20%
M iddle East
15%
Deepw ater
Facilities
10%
5%
Onshore
Upstream
0%
-5%
Deepw ater
subsea
Refining &
Petrochem icals
Regas
-10%
-15%
-
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
225
Wood Mackenzie assuming project FIDs (of which many were delayed across 2007-08)
will reach completion before the end of the decade;
Higher commodity prices (i.e.>$60bbl for a sustained period) has fuelled marginal
investments in maturing fields with the result being that shallow water and onshore
upstream themes are now in positive growth territory.
The themes which appear to have demonstrated the most notable shifts are:
Frontier developments (positive): Whilst FID in the FSU has historically been
bottlenecked around local and international politics we expect a renewed appetite in
investment across the medium term (albeit that majority of this will be FEED work).
LNG (negative): this theme was expected to outperform across 2007/08; however, a
delay in project sanctioning (notably from Nigeria, which represents a large portion of the
capex) has resulted in it dropping significantly in terms of superior growth themes.
Deepwater facilities/FPSOs (positive): As highlighted in the previous section, the uptick in deepwater FPSOs and facilities capex comes as no surprise as multiple upstream
developments initiated several years ago enter into their production development phase
(post subsea infrastructure investment).
Page 37
22 October 2008
Company positioning by
theme, region and NOC
Varying degrees of exposure to our preferred segments should power impressive
earnings growth medium term across the oil services (we expect sector EPS of 24%
CAGR 2008-10). Within the E&C complex we seek diversified plays that are well
exposed to our highest conviction themes as well as NOCs. In our opinion, these are
Saipem and Amec. In a falling oil price and lack of certainty around timings on project
awards, we believe that being NOC exposed and in several themes/regions (as well as
non oil and gas activities) reduces the downside risk on company backlog growth
relative to a niche player (i.e. in a specific theme or region).
Within exploration we favour specialised plays that have high absolute exposure to
ultra-deepwater or rig construction given that we believe these themes possess
structural characteristics that remain intact below $60/bbl. In our opinion, these are
Seadrill (also has sector leading NOC exposure) and Lamprell.
In a scenario where the oil price sits below $60/bbl for a sustained period, we believe
the earnings of E&C companies will be negatively impacted beyond 2010 as oil
company capex gets pulled back (existing company backlog across the sector provides
revenue cover across our forecast horizon). Against this backdrop, we believe Saipem
and Amec will outperform on a relative basis (vs. their E&C peers); Wood Group and
Aker Solutions should under-perform. On an absolute basis we prefer Lamprell and
Seadrill from our entire coverage universe.
Page 38
Acergy
Amec**
Lamprell
Petrofac***
Saipem ****
Onshore drilling
6%
1%
Seadrill****
Subsea 7
Technip
Tecnicas
Wood
Group*****
Estimated segment
capex 2008E ($ bn)
DB preferred
segments 2008E
32%
53.4
Deepwater drilling
5%
48%
Surface servicing
Exploration: associated
well head services******
10%
10%
10%
4%
26.2
6%
52.5
20%
Surface equipment
24.6
Subsurface servicing
Subsurface equipment and products
Exploration:
rig construction services
Newbuiilds
20%
13.1
Upgrades
30%
1.3
Others
5%
15%
10%
Deepwater SURF
65%
15%
18%
5%
4%
5%
4%
Frontier Developments
5%
5%
LNG
5%
Deepwater Facilities
Shallow water SURF/facilities
Engineering &
Construction services
36.9
20%
5%
30%
40%
15%
5%
10%
20%
85%
2.2
10%
8.8
25%
10%
14.1
5%
10%
5%
23.6
5%
5%
5%
88.6
10%
18.5
14%
25%
15%
17.9
Re-gas terminals
5%
5%
0%
5%
2%
7.5
5%
10%
15%
70%
8%
27.4
5%
14%
10%
10%
15%
166.8
5%
50%
5%
Gas to liquids
4.9
10%
5%
16.7
5%
(100%)
20%
55%
(100%)
(100%)
5%
(100%)
(100%)
20%
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
$ 605 bn*
Exploration:
drilling services******
Aker
Solutions
22 October 2008
Page 39
Saipem
Seadrill**
Subsea 7
Technip
Tecnicas
Reunidas
Wood Group
34%
50%
na
23%
16%
1%
4%
5%
38%
31%
na
12%
36%
7%
3%
3%
23%
7%
na
1%
15%
2%
5%
6%
na
40%
20%
45%
27%
na
7%
15%
5%
na
25%
10%
1%
na
5%
21%
5%
5%
2%
Aker
Kvaerner
Amec
42%
2%
3%
Middle East
5%
5%
Russia/FSU/Caspian
2%
Africa
Lamprell
Europe
34%
31%
30%
27%
North America
0%
10%
17%
60%
South America
18%
10%
SE Asia
6%
40%
26%
5%
16%
na
DB preferred
regions*** 2008E
43%
3%
10%
(Total)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
na
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
3.0
9.4
4.5
0.6
3.0
13.9
2.1
2.5
10.6
3.5
5.1
Source: Deutsche Bank; *excludes resources division; * * rigs deployed all over the world and are not allocated to a specific region; * * *refers only to global E&C capex i.e. does not capture exploration related services
Technip and Saipem appear to be the most diversified plays within the European E&C service space. Both boast dominant absolute exposure to the highest number
of preferred themes globally. Lamprell and Seadrill possess high absolute exposure to rig construction and ultra-deepwater drilling, respectively.
Petrofac*
Acergy
22 October 2008
Page 40
22 October 2008
governments
on
the
developments
context
of
In theory, capital spend originating from NOCs should be less sensitive to movements in oil
price, as their respective governments place increasing emphasis on securing energy
supplies into the next decade. Countries such as Angola, Nigeria, Brazil and Qatar, that are
deploying a significant portion of their resources and people into oil and gas related activities,
will not operate under IOCs commercial consideration. While the rate of spend will inevitably
slow down if the oil price drops significantly, the pace of decline may be tempered by the
need to maintain employment, etc. in the country itself.
There is of course a counter-argument that a falling oil price and deteriorating credit
conditions could discourage further investment by governments into oil- and gas-related
projects, as their priorities sit with alternative industries that require necessary funding.
Without analysing countries fiscal budgets and their oil price planning assumptions, it is
difficult to work out which countries would be most susceptible here. However, as discussed
earlier, we believe South America, West Africa and the Middle East will be least impacted as
their respective governments prioritise strategic expansion of their countrys oil production
Figure 56: Contracts signed with NOCs* by company: Seadrill, Saipem and Tecnicas stand out
Seadrill
Saipem
Tecnicas
Wood
Group
Petrofac
Technip
AMEC
Lamprell
Acergy
Subsea 7
Aker
Solutions
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
NOC
Pure IOC
2008YTD
2007
2008YTD
2007
2008YTD
2007
2008YTD
2007
2008YTD
2007
2008YTD
2007
2008YTD
2007
2008YTD
2007
2008YTD
2007
2008YTD
2007
2008YTD
2007
0%
In a falling oil price scenario, Seadrill and Saipem backlog (and subsequent top line realisation)
should in theory be least impacted. We believe that, whilst it is difficult to measure the
impact of oil price movement on service company earnings, these companies arguably offer
the safest harbour and should demonstrate the greatest share price disconnect to volatility in
commodity prices across the medium term.
Page 41
22 October 2008
35%
% growth
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
Source: Deutsche Bank and company data; * we have omitted Seadrill given its transforming asset base
makes like for like meaningless
2010 E
2009 E
1Q
2008 E
4Q
2007
3Q
2Q
1Q
4Q
2006
3Q
2Q
1Q
4Q
2005
3Q
2Q
1Q
0%
2004
2010 E
2009 E
1Q
2008 E
4Q
2007
3Q
2Q
1Q
4Q
2006
3Q
2Q
1Q
4Q
2005
3Q
2Q
1Q
5%
2004
% growth
40%
55%
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Source: Deutsche Bank and company data; * we have omitted Seadrill given its transforming asset base
makes like for like meaningless
The above equally shows that future EPS growth should be more dependent on the degree
of volume (or backlog) expansion than margin improvement. Against a backdrop of greater
potential pricing resistance from the contractors clients, this supports our top-down view
that the European Oil Services will find it increasingly difficult to extract the same increment
in margin as before. The point to make here is that the upside risk to earnings will no longer
rest on contingencies being released (and therefore margin) but rather on the rate and size of
contracts awarded. Downside risk remains execution with its potential to erode EBIT more
accentuated given the contractors reduced room for error on their projects.
Page 42
22 October 2008
trade
at
15%
to
the
historical
average
At the industry level, we believe the risk (execution)/reward (primarily revenue) trade off has
shifted more into equilibrium. However, together with the heightened lack of visibility
surrounding credit markets particularly in the emerging nations and the risk of macro
conditions deteriorating further, on balance we argue that our sector target multiple should
trade at a 15% discount (vs. previously in line) to the historical average. Strong cashflow
visibility to the end of the decade fuelled by current sector backlog (average revenue cover
sits at 18 months) coupled with healthy balance sheets (refinancing risk on debt maturities
appears limited see Appendix K) justifies why we believe this sector should not trade at a
deeper discount to historical multiples.
14.0
12.0
12.0
10.0
2009 EV/DACF
EV/DACF
10.0
8.0
6.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
4.0
valuation
as
Wood
Group
Tecnicas
Reunidas
Technip
Subsea 7
Seadrill
Saipem
Petrofac
2010E
by
2009E
Lamprell
2008E
Aker
2007
Solutions
2006
Acergy
0.0
0.0
AMEC
2.0
2.0
an
Our implied price targets are supported by our DCF valuation in which we assume peak
company earnings in 2010 with subsequent linear fade to our mid-cycle scenario in 2013. We
have raised our company discount rates to reflect the increased market risk premium as well
as the higher cost of debt driven by the lack of credit liquidity across Europe and US. We
detail changes in company WACC in Appendix A. This in part drives our price target changes
on our universe of stocks (summarised overleaf). We assume a long-term growth rate of 3%
which is the average mid-cycle rate since 1990 for the oil services.
*Comparing these companies on any one valuation metric will never yield a perfect result
given their differing asset bases/capital structures/regional tax exposures (in turn related to
where along the service chain they operate). We consider EV/DACF to be the lesser of the
evils given the broadly similar capital intensities and gearing levels across the majority of the
companies we follow. Exceptions here would be, for example, Saipem and Wood Groups
current net debt position (vs. remainder of the sector, which is net cash), Amec and
Petrofacs asset-light business relative to peers.
High exposure to one of our preferred themes; with regards the E&C oil services they
should also be well diversified (across the oil chain and/or in other sectors such as
power, process and infrastructure)
High NOC exposure: particular emphasis on South America, West Africa, Middle East
Excellent execution track record such that downside risk to earnings forecast is low on a
relative basis
Compelling valuation we would also argue for a premium relative to the sector if the
above all co-exist (equally the reverse if they do not)
Page 43
22 October 2008
NOC %
2008 YTD
EPS
Current Target +/Target Implie
CAGR
2009E
to sector
2009E
d PT DCF DB rec.
(08EV/DACF
(9.3x)
EV/DACF (local)
10E)***
Old New
PT PT**
Comment
Acergy
(NOK)
9%
12%
(18%)
1.8
-20%
7.4
115
61
125
90
140
85
Aker
Solutions
(NOK)
6%
16%
(18%)
2.5
-35%
6.0
105
65
Hold - Exposed to Russia and Europe (regions most at risk in sub$60/bbl); limited exposure to our preferred themes
Net: argue for 35% discount to sector target (previously -10%)
AMEC ()
17%
23%
(21%)
3.9
10%
10.2
784 732
Buy
960 760
Lamprell
()
10%
23%
(17%)
1.7
10%
10.2
462 314
Buy
650 400
Petrofac
()
39%
36%
(47%)
3.9
-10%
8.3
764 460
680
500*
****
30
22
Saipem
(E)
56%
28%
(22%)
6.2
15%
10.7
28
17
Seadrill
(NOK)
83%
49%
(55%)
5.4
0%
9.3
160 181
6%
15%
(13%)
1.8
-20%
7.4
140
210 170
Subsea 7
(NOK)
65
125 100
Technip
(E)
28%
17%
(13%)
1.1
-20%
7.4
68
42
Buy
70
55
53
47
Tecnicas
Reunidas
56%
(E)
28%
(23%)
1.7
0%
9.3
48
46
Wood
Group
40%
23%
(16%)
5.1
22%*
4.0
-30%
6.5
Sell - Exposed to Russia and Europe (regions most at risk in sub296 133 (fromH $60/bbl); does not take LSTK projects which represents the bulk
old) of the offshore subsea and facilities market it operates in
430 215
Average
Source: Deutsche Bank and company data; * Excluding Seadrill given back-end loaded rig schedule that skews earnings growth; including Seadrill average would be 24%; **taken as avg. of price target implied by relative
valuation target multiple and fair value; ***consensus shown in brackets; **** taken as an average of various scenarios (detailed below), ***** combines relative and absolute valuation techniques: DCF, sum-of-parts and
sector benchmarks
Page 44
22 October 2008
leading
exposure
in
NOC
addition
to
themes
(exploration
and
E&C)
and
momentum
across 2008-10
and E&C
1000
2000
EBIT D A (Euro m )
EBITDA (Euro m)
800
1500
1000
500
600
400
200
0
2007
2008E
Offshore construction
Onshore construction
2009E
Onshore Drilling
Offshore Drilling
2010E
0
2008E
2009E
Onshore
JU 150
2010E
JU 300
2011E
2012E
As Figures 62 and 63 show, Saipems excellent leverage to ultra-deepwater via its array of
fifth/sixth generation rigs (Figure 54 highlights this unique exposure amongst the E&C peers)
represents a key growth driver for group earnings from 2009 when they are due to come onstream. As these rigs have already received, on average three-year-plus contracts, it also
improves the visibility of the companys earnings vs. its European E&C peers. The key risk in
our opinion is a delay in the delivery of these rigs.
Page 45
22 October 2008
We believe Amec should trade at a 10% premium to our 2009E EV/DACF target sector
multiple based on:
Managements track record and recent success in restructuring the business. Strong
execution capabilities at a time when customers are seeking to widen the playing field
for quality contractors should see Amec gain market share and place upside pressure to
our topline forecast.
The structural characteristics of the industries Amec operates in are critical in helping it
push through higher prices not least in achieving leading edge margins. In our view this
potential will be unlocked at a faster pace than we consider the market is expecting
placing upside pressure on our EPS forecast.
A cash yield (excluding pre-payments it is 707mn) that represents 45% of its market
capitalisation. This not only provides the company with sector leading cash return
potential (within E&C) but reduces its relative valuation: if we were to strip out the cash
from its market cap (and interest income from earnings) its 2009E P/E would equate to
5.6x (currently 8.9x) making it broadly comparable with the current sector average of
5.7x.
Well diversified beyond oil and gas: on average 38% of 2008-10E revenue is sourced
from power and process primarily gas turbines and nuclear). Our DB capital goods team
expect investment in this sector to grow by an average 15% 2008-10E).
Key downside risk is a slow down in oil sands spend (albeit it represents on average 10% of
2008-10E revenue), which we believe is one of the most susceptible themes to oil price
falling below $60/bbl.
Lamprell is the only company in Europe with high absolute and relative exposure to rig
construction services. Based in the UAE (management all from the UK), the company has
cemented excellent local content and relationships with key drillers as well as the
government. We believe Lamprell should trade at a 10% premium to our 2009E EV/DACF
target sector multiple based on:
Excellent topline visibility underpinned by one of our top growth regions, the Middle
East. Demand to build and upgrade rigs is highly visible and we expect that it will grow
at an average of 100% across the next three years. Middle East has a 25% market share
and is growing. Lamprell has a 90% share of the regions refurbishment business and a
10% share of the local new build sector. The latter is where we believe they are gaining
significant ground as they continue to perform and execute.
Upside pressure to earnings forecast. Despite our forecasts being at the top end of
consensus, we believe next year offers significant upside risk to our forecast. What is
critical here is that this would not be possible unless Lamprell successfully expands its
capacity across 2009 (given current utilisations sit at 90%). With the addition of the new
Hamriyah yard early next year, we believe this could add significant upside pressure to
our topline forecast. We detail this in our note titled rig construction a hidden oasis
published 5 June 2008.
Execution and track record management are very confident in their ability to deliver.
We believe this is supported by their excellent track record to date. In our opinion this
adds upside pressure to our margin forecast assuming untapped contingencies are
released.
proven management
capabilities to deliver and
diversify
greater investor
awareness of Lamprells
story following main market
listing in November could
itself serve as a catalyst to
the shares
Page 46
22 October 2008
Equally compelling, in our view, is the companys absolute upside to the current share price.
Key risk in our opinion is the ability to recruit sufficient personnel to cater for the potential
pipeline of contracts implied by the new capacity coming on line.
Seadrill, PT NOK 170 (previously 210), sector leading ultradeepwater exposure, significant cash return potential
We value Seadrill using a combination of relative and absolute valuation techniques given the
various scenarios of day rates that we have analysed as well as differing sector benchmarks
with which to compare it to (US and European sector multiples). Our base-case DCF of
NOK 180 is modelled around our forecasts for day rates. Alternative scenarios assume a) fiveyear payback and b) leading edge day rates. Seadrill currently trades at a significant discount
(at 3.2x) to the average 2009E P/E multiple for the US Oil Services (5.2x). We believe it should
trade in line with the US peer group and our target sector 2009E EV/DACF multiple based on
its:
up-tick
high relative and absolute exposure to our preferred theme within exploration drilling
services, ultra-deepwater. Managements choice to maintain a degree of rig liquidity in
their portfolio, evident in 2 (or 25%) of its new deepwater units remain un-contracted (vs.
global average of 26%) leaves them with sufficient exposure to further capture this uptick.
$12.5bn backlog fuels sector leading earnings growth (49% 2008-10E CAGR vs. sector
average of 24%): Seadrill possesses excellent visibility in earnings (out to 2016) given the
current length of contract terms some of which run at up to six years. This together with
additional upside to earnings related to higher day rates being signed should overshadow
the risk surrounding delays in rig new-build delivery. In any case even if every rig were
delayed by a quarter, we calculate it would have an immaterial impact on mid-term
earnings growth.
Sector leading cash return potential to shareholders (albeit this assumes credit markets
improve enabling counter parties such as Ship Finance to deal once again): we calculate
Seadrill could return up to half of the companys market cap by 2012 (for more detail
please refer to our note titled Playing the next leg of the ultra-deepwater wave
published 22 May 2008). Management reviews the companys dividend every quarter
and so far this year this has resulted in a yield of 7% from zero prior to that.
the
exploration
services
in
rig
rates
expect >7500ft as 2
deepwater
we
ultra-
newbuilds
remain un-contracted
Sector-leading cash return
potential to shareholder
Our NOK 170 price target is taken as the average of our two DCF scenarios and the share
price(s) implied by our target multiples. As highlighted above the key risk in our opinion is a
significant delay in delivery of the companys newbuilds.
Page 47
22 October 2008
Appendix A: Valuation
matrices
Figure 64: European oil services valuation table
21/10/2008 15:57
Acergy
Aker Solutions
AMEC
Lamprell
Petrofac
Saipem
Seadrill
Subsea 7
Technip
RIC
ACY.OL
AKSO.OL
AMEC.L
LAM.L
PFC.L
SPMI.MI
SDRL.OL
SUB.OL
TECF.PA
Listed
Currency
NOK
NOK
NOK
NOK
Share
price
37.2
53.5
468.0
142.0
428.3
13.0
59.5
42.9
24.1
Rec
Hold
Hold
Buy
Buy
Hold
Buy
Buy
Hold
Buy
Target
share price
90.0
85.0
760.0
400.0
500.0
22.0
170.0
100.0
55.0
(Expensive)
/Cheap %
142%
59%
62%
182%
17%
69%
186%
133%
128%
Market cap
(local bn)
7.6
14.4
1.6
0.3
1.5
5.7
25.5
7.1
2.5
Market cap
($bn)
1.2
2.2
2.7
0.5
2.5
7.6
3.9
1.1
3.4
E.V.
($bn)
1.0
1.7
1.3
0.3
2.0
11.2
9.4
1.1
1.4
Tecnicas Reunidas
Wood Group
TRE.MC
WG.L
19.6
226.3
Buy
Sell
47.0
215.0
140%
-5%
1.1
1.19
1.5
2.0
0.8
2.33
Weighted average/total
91%
RIC
2006
2007
ACY.OL
AKSO.OL
AMEC.L
LAM.L
PFC.L
SPMI.MI
SDRL.OL
SUB.OL
TECF.PA
TRE.MC
WG.L
11.8
-39.4
-20.2
13.0
9.4
13.7
20.1
11.1
9.4
11.6
12.6
18.0
15.3
16.3
14.1
9.2
15.0
13.0
10.5
13.8
18.9
12.0
6.1
14.1
RIC
2006
2007
ACY.OL
AKSO.OL
AMEC.L
LAM.L
PFC.L
SPMI.MI
SDRL.OL
SUB.OL
TECF.PA
TRE.MC
WG.L
14.0
20.3
22.8
13.1
16.5
24.1
31.8
17.2
26.9
18.0
19.0
18.9
17.8
22.6
15.9
16.1
17.5
24.7
17.1
18.5
22.9
19.3
22.9
NA
14.3
13.8
12.2
12.0
13.1
19.4
10.6
15.2
10.4
9.3
6.6
9.0
Weighted average
Euro/US comparitive
Europe
Acergy
Aker Solutions
AMEC
Lamprell
Petrofac
Saipem
Seadrill
Subsea 7
Technip
Tecnicas Reunidas
Wood Group
EV/DACF (x)
2008E
2.5
3.3
5.0
2.9
6.9
6.4
8.0
2.7
1.8
4.0
5.8
5.2
-0.5
0.17
NA
24%
NA
19%
28.5
Free cash yield (x)
2008E
2009E
2009E
2010E
2006
2007
1.8
2.5
3.9
1.7
3.9
6.2
5.4
1.8
1.1
1.7
5.1
0.9
1.8
2.7
0.9
1.9
4.4
4.3
0.9
0.7
0.8
4.6
-2.8%
-0.2%
56.1%
-0.8%
13.4%
-0.5%
-97.7%
-8.4%
15.8%
12.6%
2.1%
0.3%
2.7%
18.2%
11.5%
6.1%
-1.6%
-14.4%
-2.6%
4.0%
5.7%
0.9%
10.5%
17.0%
9.8%
13.9%
5.4%
-11.3%
-51.4%
20.7%
11.1%
11.4%
1.6%
1%
-4%
4.0
2.9
-5%
2009E
2010E
2006
3.9
5.1
11.3
5.1
10.1
8.6
6.1
3.7
6.1
7.4
8.5
3.7
4.3
8.9
4.0
7.0
6.9
3.2
3.2
4.9
5.1
6.8
3.1
3.8
7.5
3.4
5.4
5.3
2.8
2.8
4.5
4.5
5.6
8.0
9.5
7.4
11.8
8.3
11.3
15.3
9.4
7.2
14.8
9.5
9.6
10.0
8.3
13.5
8.9
11.0
14.4
9.7
6.4
17.9
9.9
7.6
6.7
9.7
9.0
8.2
5.4
7.7
5.7
9.9
9.6
8.3
7.7
5.2
7.2
4.7
NA
8.9
NA
NA
NA
NA
10.4
NA
7.4
8.3
7.3
12.1
9.6
10.6
6.7
8.1
6.6
5.5
6.8
6.6
26.9%
20.5%
11.9%
24.0%
13.0%
-3.9%
6.4%
27.8%
20.7%
26.6%
1.1%
2010E
2006
2007
ROE* (%)
2008E
2009E
2010E
33.9%
23.3%
14.0%
29.8%
26.5%
20.3%
22.7%
31.7%
23.2%
24.7%
0.5%
38.0%
24.9%
13.2%
68.8%
46.3%
20.4%
8.0%
33.3%
9.0%
48.4%
16.2%
31.7%
30.4%
13.3%
69.4%
48.3%
32.2%
9.6%
31.3%
14.0%
55.8%
20.3%
35.3%
35.1%
14.9%
51.3%
43.4%
25.9%
15.6%
29.6%
18.5%
54.2%
21.9%
28.9%
33.7%
17.5%
48.3%
44.6%
26.3%
23.7%
26.2%
21.0%
54.8%
22.3%
27.1%
31.3%
19.1%
44.3%
41.8%
28.8%
21.9%
23.0%
20.8%
45.9%
22.1%
31.4%
10%
21%
29.7%
32.4%
31.6%
29.6%
2009E
2010E
2006
2007
2009E
2010E
PEG
2008
1.8
2.5
3.4
2.8
5.6
5.9
9.6
2.0
1.3
3.6
4.7
1.3
1.8
2.3
1.7
2.7
5.0
4.9
1.3
0.8
1.6
4.1
0.6
1.3
1.6
0.9
1.3
3.5
3.9
0.7
0.5
0.8
4.2
99.4
-29.3
20.0
44.8
6.4
13.1
16.1
24.7
5.5
7.4
13.6
17.7
15.3
20.8
7.7
9.0
10.2
11.6
12.5
11.9
17.0
14.9
2.8
4.2
11.9
4.5
7.6
4.6
3.5
2.9
3.7
8.3
9.1
2.6
3.7
9.5
3.5
5.0
4.2
2.5
2.5
3.1
3.7
9.2
2.2
3.3
7.8
2.9
3.7
3.3
2.1
2.3
2.9
3.9
9.4
0.7
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.3
4.8
4.1
5.7
5.8
4.7
4.2
5.1
3.2
5.5
5.6
5.4
4.3
3.9
4.8
2.3
NA
5.1
NA
NA
NA
NA
13.6
NA
8.8
9.9
9.5
7.5
9.1
12.9
NA
9.6
7.6
7.2
4.9
6.7
5.6
NA
5.9
6.5
6.1
4.2
5.7
4.5
NA
5.5
6.0
5.6
3.8
5.3
3.9
NA
5.2
NA
NA
NA
NA
0.3
EV/EBITDA (x)
2007
2008E
Page 48
22 October 2008
RIC
ACY.OL
AKSO.OL
AMEC.L
LAM.L
PFC.L
SPMI.MI
SDRL.OL
SUB.OL
TECF.PA
Reporting
Currency
$
NOK
$
$
$
$
Share
price
37
54
468
142
428p
13
60
43
24
2006
219
1,523
54
57
120
327
143
137
195
20
226
74
121
Tecnicas Reunidas
Wood Group
TRE.MC
WG.L
RIC
ACY.OL
AKSO.OL
AMEC.L
LAM.L
PFC.L
SPMI.MI
SDRL.OL
SUB.OL
TECF.PA
TRE.MC
WG.L
Reporting
Currency
$
NOK
$
$
$
$
Share
price
37
54
468
142
428p
13
60
43
24
20
226
2006
2124
50592
2125
330
1864
7517
1160
1670
6927
1247
3469
RIC
ACY.OL
AKSO.OL
AMEC.L
LAM.L
PFC.L
SPMI.MI
SDRL.OL
SUB.OL
TECF.PA
TRE.MC
WG.L
Local
Currency
NOK
NOK
NOK
NOK
Share
price
37
54 468
142
428p
13
60
43
24
20
226
2006
1.0
3.8
18.2
4.5
48.7p
1.4
5.3
4.1
8.8
3.2
17.7p
15%
CAGR
2010E (08-10)
16.6
13%
16.3
13%
59.9
24%
48.4
23%
116.9p
44%
4.0
19%
28.0
29%
18.9
12%
8.4
13%
5.0
45%
24.p
-2%
RIC
ACY.OL
AKSO.OL
AMEC.L
LAM.L
PFC.L
SPMI.MI
SDRL.OL
SUB.OL
TECF.PA
TRE.MC
WG.L
Local
Currency
NOK
NOK
NOK
NOK
Share
price
37
54
468
142
428p
13
60
43
24
20
226
2006
1.3
8.0
0.1
0.0
4.8p
0.3
1.1
1.5
2.7p
2009E
1.8
4.9
0.3
0.1
15.2p
0.6
2.7
1.9
6.6p
21%
CAGR
2010E (08-10)
2.2
12%
5.6
16%
0.3
23%
0.2
27%
19.7p
36%
0.8
13%
NA
NA
2.9
17%
2.2
28%
8.0p
23%
RIC
ACY.OL
AKSO.OL
AMEC.L
LAM.L
PFC.L
SPMI.MI
SDRL.OL
SUB.OL
TECF.PA
TRE.MC
WG.L
Local
Currency
NOK
NOK
NOK
NOK
Share
price
37
54
468
142
428p
13
60
43
24
20
226
2006
(557)
(71)
687
(3)
144
(39)
(28,540)
(1,265)
827
167
26
CAGR
2010E (08-10)
2,595
80%
3,361
17%
219
20%
85
46%
391
121%
1,168
NA
5,804
NA
2,245
24%
592
44%
270
47%
6
-44%
RIC
Local
Currency
Share
price
2006
108
180
149
239
m)
2009E
317
3,328
175
121
360
829
1,211
335
523
215
298
Growth
2010E (07-08)
374
32%
3,774
22%
208
49%
145
12%
467
29%
1,091
7%
1,404 107%
377
35%
571
31%
243
361
Average
Acergy
Aker Solutions
AMEC
Lamprell
Petrofac
Saipem
Seadrill
Subsea 7
Technip
Tecnicas Reunidas
Wood Group
Average
Acergy
Aker Solutions
AMEC
Lamprell
Petrofac
Saipem
Seadrill
Subsea 7
Technip
Tecnicas Reunidas
Wood Group
Average
Acergy
Aker Solutions
AMEC
Lamprell
Petrofac
Saipem
Seadrill
Subsea 7
Technip
Tecnicas Reunidas
Wood Group
2010E
3758
65116
3199
852
3922
12854
4048
3263
8999
3644
6044
38%
33%
36%
CAGR
(08-10)
12%
4%
11%
20%
12%
12%
40%
14%
8%
19%
8%
Weighted average
Acergy
Aker Solutions
AMEC
Lamprell
Petrofac
Saipem
Seadrill
Subsea 7
Technip
Tecnicas Reunidas
Wood Group
Weighted Average
2006
7.0
5.5
16.0
15.4
18.9
0.7
2.7
5.9
1.8
1.3
12.7
1.9
17.3
2006
16.9%
5.7%
5.6%
18.6%
10.6%
11.0%
40.2%
16.0%
7.5%
5.3%
7.7%
13.6%
2006
7.8
-2.5
-13.0
15.1
27.5p
1.5
6.6
9.7
3.7
1.5
21.3p
Backlog ($ bn)
2008E
2009E
2010E
2010E
12.0
14.0
62.3
42.1
79.0
2.5
21.6
15.1
5.4
CAGR
(08-10)
11.8%
16.0%
22.8%
22.6%
36.3%
27.9%
48.8%
14.9%
16.6%
3.8
33.2
4.4
40.2
28.0%
23.0%
2010E
18.6%
9.4%
10.3%
19.0%
23.3%
17.8%
53.0%
20.2%
12.0%
6.8%
9.5%
24%
Increase (bp)
(08-10)
-40
160
164
112
1191
390
555
-93
151
64
-17
2009E
18.0%
8.7%
9.8%
18.5%
18.7%
15.9%
54.4%
20.1%
11.6%
6.6%
10.4%
15.4%
16.7%
19.2%
Debt adjusted cash flow per share (local)
2007
2008E
2009E
7.4
13.4
14.1
9.5
12.8
14.6
24.9
41.6
50.2
21.5
30.1
38.2
41.5p
49.1p
76.5p
1.9
3.0
3.3
12.8
18.2
26.3
12.8
15.8
17.5
3.1
5.8
7.0
1.9
2.6
3.7
30.p
44.4p
51.6p
20.0%
2010E
16.5
16.4
60.5
46.0
105.1p
4.1
29.8
19.6
7.6
4.2
59.1p
330
CAGR
(08-10)
11%
13%
21%
24%
46%
18%
28%
11%
14%
27%
15%
21%
Yield (%)
2008E
4.7%
7.8%
4.4%
7.4%
2.5%
4.9%
14.0%
0.0%
8.9%
6.8%
2.3%
2006
1.3%
7.1%
3.1%
0.0%
1.5%
1.6%
0.0%
0.0%
2.2%
6.4%
1.1%
2007
0.9%
2.0%
2.2%
0.0%
1.8%
1.8%
1.3%
0.0%
2.1%
2.2%
1.1%
2.1%
1.6%
6.3%
5.2%
ROACE (clean before goodwill %)
2007
2008E
2009E
38%
40%
36%
46%
48%
53%
48%
73%
na
235%
753%
466%
na
na
na
20%
15%
15%
6%
8%
13%
25%
28%
30%
43%
54%
61%
na
na
na
17%
19%
19%
2006
61%
60%
15%
99%
na
14%
6%
28%
21%
na
14%
19%
2007
2.7
26.6
2009E
10.2
12.4
52.5
35.2
60.9
1.9
18.6
13.4
5.0
2006
27%
39%
Dividend payout (%)
2007
2008E
17%
18%
2009E
4.9%
9.3%
5.6%
9.9%
3.6%
4.8%
0.0%
0.0%
11.1%
9.8%
2.9%
2010E
5.8%
10.5%
6.7%
11.8%
4.6%
6.3%
0.0%
0.0%
12.1%
11.1%
3.6%
6.2%
2010E
42%
56%
na
616%
na
18%
13%
33%
67%
na
19%
29%
34%
2009E
2010E
Acergy
ACY.OL
NOK
37
2.6
3.2
3.8
4.3
4.4
18%
Aker Solutions
AKSO.OL
NOK
54
9.3
10.0
9.5
10.8
12.9
144%
36%
40%
40%
40%
AMEC
AMEC.L
468
6.8
NA
NA
NA
NA
70%
49%
50%
50%
18%
50%
18%
Lamprell
Petrofac
Saipem
Seadrill
Subsea 7
Technip
Tecnicas Reunidas
Wood Group
LAM.L
PFC.L
SPMI.MI
SDRL.OL
SUB.OL
TECF.PA
TRE.MC
WG.L
NOK
NOK
142
428p
13
60
43
24
20
226
0.4
4.2
16.4
3.7
12.9
NA
NA
0.6
4.4
21.1
11,896.4
4.2
12.6
NA
NA
0.7
4.9
22.7
NA
4.8
13.5
NA
NA
0.7
5.2
NA
NA
5.7
14.4
NA
NA
0.8
5.5
NA
NA
7.1
15.3
NA
NA
13%
25%
39%
0%
0%
58%
115%
21%
28%
29%
31%
32%
0%
40%
50%
20%
37%
25%
42%
85%
0%
54%
50%
20%
40%
25%
33%
0%
0%
54%
50%
20%
40%
25%
33%
0%
0%
54%
50%
20%
Page 49
Listed
Curr.
Share
price
Old Rec
New
Rec
Old PT
New PT
Currency
Old
WACC
New
WACC
Old DCF
Comments
New DCF
(Listed
curr.)
Cost of
debt
Cost of
Equity
Beta
NOK
37
Hold
Hold
125
90
NOK
9.5%
15.0%
114
61
4.7%
15.0%
Aker Solutions
NOK
54
Hold
Hold
140
85
NOK
10.9%
16.0%
100
65
3.8%
16.0%
AMEC
468
Buy
Buy
960
760
8.2%
11.5%
1,066
732
4.2%
11.5%
Lamprell
142
Buy
Buy
650
400
7.2%
12.0%
632
314
5.4%
12.0%
Petrofac
428
Hold
Hold
680
500
8.2%
11.5%
604
460
4.1%
11.5%
Saipem
13
Buy
Buy
30
22
8.0%
11.0%
32
17
4.2%
13.2%
Seadrill
NOK
60
Buy
Buy
210
170
NOK
8.3%
13.5%
435
181
4.4%
24.2%
Subsea 7
NOK
43
Hold
Hold
125
100
NOK
8.8%
15.0%
121
65
4.2%
17.5%
Technip
24
Buy
Buy
70
55
8.1%
12.5%
65
42
3.4%
12.5%
Tecnicas Reunidas
20
Buy
Buy
53
47
10.4%
11.5%
52
46
2.5%
11.5%
Wood Group
226
Hold
Sell
430
215
7.7%
13.5%
399
133
4.0%
16.6%
Average
8.7%
13.0%
Acergy
22 October 2008
Page 50
22 October 2008
Page 51
22 October 2008
Page 52
Figure 67: Backbone functions of the service sector across the oil life cycle*
Engineering &
construction capex
(above mudline) m ainly
European and Asian
based com panies (listed
and private) w ith
relatively few er US
players
Shallow w ater
ECI of fixed
platform s
Onshore
Offshore
Surface facilities* *
Deepw ater
ECI or leasing of
floating platforms:
1) Sem i-submersibles
(SPAR, tension leg
platform s)
2) Floating production
storage and offloading
ships (FPSOs)
Deepw ater
ECI of advanced
subsea
equipment /
system s
ECI of:
1) Um bilicals, risers and flow lines
(SURF)
2) Rigid & flexible pipes
3) Topsides and hulls of platform s
ECI of frontier
developm ents
(harsh
operating
environm ents)
ECI of
conventional
oil & gas
processing
facilities
ECI of oils
sands.
Extraction
includes m in
(<75m ) and i
situ steam
injection(>75
Produced Gas
Source: Deutsche Bank *ECI is engineering, construction and installation; **Installation phase completed using various heavy lifting/pipe-laying/inspection vessels (owned or leased by E&C company) also known as lift boats
Exploration*
Drilling
Services
Floater rigs
Sub/sem im ersibles
1) 2nd
generation:
benign/harsh
w eather
2) 3rd /4th
generation:
benign/harsh
3) 5th /6th
generation:
deckload up to
5000tn/w ater
depth up to
12,000ft
(equivalent to
drilling depth
of 40,000 ft)
Fixed rigs
Drillships
1) 3rd/4th
generation:
benign/harsh
environm ent
2) 5th/6th
generation:
deckload up to
5000tn/w ater
depth up to
12,000ft
(equivalent to
drilling depth
of 40,000 ft)
Tenders/
barges
Surface
Jack-ups
(onshore/offshore)
1) Anchoring
system used
over dynam ic
positioning so
depths are
only typically
up to 500ft.
Benign
environm ent
only
1) JU
200/250/300 etc
through to 400ft
(w ater depth)
equivalent to
drilling up to
30,000ft
2) Harsh or
benign
environment
3) Standard or
high
specification
Servicing
1) Pressure
pum ping* * (e.g.,
cem enting and
stim ulation) and
com pression
services
2) Production w ell
testing.
3) rental and
fishing
4) Operations and
m aintenance.
5) Solids control
and w aste
m anagem ent
Subsurface
Equipm ent
1) Surface
equipm ent (e.g.,
valves & surface
trees, pressure
and flow control)
2) Rig equipment
(e.g., pow er
tongs)
3) Unit
m anufacturing
(e.g., plug valves)
Rig Construction
Services
Newbuilds
1) Sem i-sub, drillship, jack-up (onshore and
offshore) & tender construction
Upgrades
1) Refurbishm ent of all types of drilling
rigs
2) Re-activation
3) Conversion
Servicing
1) Logging
w hile drilling
2) m ud logging
3) Wireline
logging (e.g.,
w ell
intervention,
openhole and
cased hole).
4) Directional
drilling
5) Operations
and
m aintenance
6) Inspection
and coating
7) Coiled tubing
(excludes
m anufacturing
of)
Others
1) M aintenance and repair: rigs typically taken
offline but m ay also be done w hile in operation
using rem ote operating vehicles)
2) Construction and refurbishm ent of lift boats* * *
i.e. heavy lift construction vessels
Equipm ent
and
products
1) Casing & tubing
services and
products (inc
cem entation)
2) Coiled tubing
3) Com pletion
equipment (e.g.,
TCP, tractors,
safety tools)
4) Dow nhole
drilling tools
5) Drill bits
6) drilling &
com pletion fluids
7) Specialty
chem icals
8) tubulars
9) Well servicing
(other than above)
10) Artificial lift
(e.g. electrical
subm ersible,
rod/gas lift and
progressive cavity
pum ps)
Source: Deutsche Bank; *Note we have excluded seismic operations; **we have placed this within surface activities but can arguably be placed in subsurface (servicing) also; ***lift boats are different to rigs in that they are used for E&C type operations within the offshore segment.
Underlying driver for this market will therefore not be exploration but offshore E&C; for simplicity we have included lift boats here as they are typically built by the same companies that construct rigs
22 October 2008
Figure 68: Backbone functions of the service sector within exploration based activities
Page 53
22 October 2008
In February we published a physical version of the oil service spectrum in the form of a
laminate. Below we attach a corresponding breakdown across each industry segment
Figure 69: Exploration: Drilling
Exploration: Seismic
Seismic
Jackup rigs
BELOW THE
Jackup rigs - mobile, self elevating drilling platforms
equipped with legs which are lowered to the seabed, the
hull then being 'jacked-up' until adequate clearance is
established. Jack-ups are typically used for exploration
drilling, and for drilling development wells through existing,
relatively small structures.
What is it?
Semi-submersibles rigs
Drill ships
Land rigs
'MUDLINE'
Semi-submersibles - Floating platforms which can be
self-propelled or towed, and either anchored or
dynamically positioned over the drilling location. Prior to
drilling the hull is ballasted down for stability. Semi-subs
are typically used for drilling exploration wells, plus
subsea development wells through subsea templates.
Drill ships - Designed to operate in ultra-deep waters,
with high levels of drill pipe handling capacity and heavy
duty rigs. Given operational water depths they tend to be
dynamically positioned.
Where is it?
Shallow water
Onshore
na
na
na
X / XX
X / XXXX
$14,801 mn
$53,413 mn
2%
11%
10%
20%
Denmark: AP Moller-Maersk
China: China Oilfield Services
Egypt: Egyptian Drilling company
Indonesia: Apexindo Pratama
Italy: Saipem
Norway: Seadrill, Awilco, Thule Drilling, Scorpion Offshore,
Seajacks
UK: Abbot Group
US: Atwood Oceanics, Diamond Offshore, Ensco
International, Hercules Offshore, Nabors, Noble Drilling,
Pride International, Rowan, Transocean/GlobalSantaFe
Source: Wood Mackenzie, Deutsche Bank, www.bakerhughes.com, www.rigzone.com. Pictures - Technip and Saipem, *rig day rates given in the case of drilling, **X = lowest margin upside, XXXX = highest margin upside,
*** notable exceptions respectively include: directional drilling that generates margins between 25-30% and completion/work-over: 30-35%, **** exceptions include purely engineering or construction/construction
management related activities (i.e. not LSTK) which will yield higher overall margin e.g. 9-11%, ***** we have placed this within surface activities but can arguably be placed in subsurface (servicing) also, ******
Construction vessels, pipelaying vessels and ROVs owned by key participants
Page 54
22 October 2008
Figure 70: Exploration continued: Well head services and rig construction
Exploration: Associated Well head services
Surface servicing
Surface equipment
Where is it?
Onshore
na
na
na
na
Construction yards: 58
What is it?
Sub-surface servicing
Sub-surface equipment
BELOW THE
Wireline logging involves taking measurements to
provide descriptive and quantitative evaluations of the
formations intersected by a well bore.
Logging while drilling (LWD) adopts simlair techniques
to wireline logging, but is conducted during drilling
operations. Measurement while drilling (MWD) is
used for precise location of the drillbit.
Mud logging is done for gathering data and collecting
samples during the drilling of a well to identify possible
indications of hydrocarbons. Directional drilling is
necessary when a well bore needs to be drilled at an
angle other than vertical. Coiled tubing is a specialist
service which allows fluid or gas (e.g., nitrogen) to be
'spotted' into a well at a specific point. Can also be
used for deploying heavier tools downhole than
possible with wireline.
Other services include operations & maintenance,
inspection and coating.
'MUDLINE'
Casing & tubing services and products (including
cementation)
Coiled tubing
Completion equipment (e.g., TCP, tractors, safety
tools)
Downhole drilling tools
Drill bits
Drilling & completion fluids
Specialty chemicals
Tubulars
Well servicing (other than above)
Artificial lift (e.g., electrical submersible, rod/gas
lift and progressive cavity pumps)
Upgrades (Exploration)
Others (Development)
Construction of semisubmersible, drillship, jackup (onshore & offshore benign / harsh) & tender
barges
Construction and
refurbishment of lift boats
i.e. heavy lift construction
vessels. Lift boats are
different to rigs in that they
are used for E&C type
operations within the
offshore segment (also
included in marine installation
vessel section). Underlying
driver for this market will
therefore not be exploration
but offshore E&C.
Onshore / Offshore
(Quayside)
Fixed contract/ Cost plus
(E/P/I/C)
25-30%
20-25%
15-20% ***
10-15% ***
20%
XX
XXXX
XXX
X / XX
X / XX
Onshore
Fixed contract/ Cost plus
(E/P/I/C)
$36,937 mn
$24,609 mn
$26,248 mn
$52,481 mn
$13,084 mn
$1,308 mn
$2,196 mn
7%
4%
5%
9%
3%
0.3%
0.4%
14%
17%
14%
13%
144%
144%
16%
Source: Wood Mackenzie, Deutsche Bank, www.bakerhughes.com, www.rigzone.com. Pictures - Technip and Saipem, *rig day rates given in the case of drilling, **X = lowest margin upside, XXXX = highest margin upside,
*** notable exceptions respectively include: directional drilling that generates margins between 25-30% and completion/work-over: 30-35%, **** exceptions include purely engineering or construction/construction
management related activities (i.e. not LSTK) which will yield higher overall margin e.g. 9-11%, ***** we have placed this within surface activities but can arguably be placed in subsurface (servicing) also, ******
Construction vessels, pipelaying vessels and ROVs owned by key participants
Page 55
22 October 2008
Non-floating installations
Semi-submersible platforms
are floating installations
similar to semi-sub rigs but
which include production
facilities. They tend to be
moored on location, and can
be re-deployed at some
future date.
SPAR and Extendable Draft
Platforms are cylinder type
floaters
Tension Leg platforms
(TLPs) are floating
production units cables,
which considerably restrict
its heave motion.
Where is it?
Shallow water
Deepwater
Deepwater
na
na
What is it?
E&C Development Upstream: Infrastructure between offshore facility & well head
Heavy-lift crane barges & ships (aka liftboats) capable of holding a precise position through the
use of thrusters, thereby counteracting the force
of the wind, sea, current etc. ROV (remotely
operated vehicles) - unmanned vehicle, piloted &
powered via umbilcal. Construction and/or pipelay ships - undertake a wide range of subsea field
development construction tasks which include
flexible flowline and umbilical lay, subsea
installation, flowline tie-in as well as FPSO
mooring installation & tensioning. Also includes
accommodation and support vessels.
"Conventional"
Conventional projects
comprise shallow water
activities and proven
technology relating to
platforms attached to
the seabed and their
associated pipelines.
Deepwater / Ultradeepwater
Shallow/deepwater / Ultradeepwater
Shallow/deepwater /
Ultradeepwater
Shallow/deepwater
(often in harsh
environments)
Vessels: 40 (+ 11 under
construction)
Vessels ******:
Pipelay vessels : 36 (+4 under construction)
Construction (heavylift) vessels : 32 (+ 5 under construction)
Construction and pipelay vessels : 67 (+ 18 under construction)
ROVs : 99 (+ 23 under construction) ( ~ 70% of the construction & pipelay vessels are
fitted with ROVs)
Heavy transport vessels: 29 (+ 3 under construction)
4-5%
8-9%
8-9%
15-17%
na
16-17%
XXX
XXX
XXXX
na
XXX
XX
$14,080 mn
$25,074 mn
$8,358 mn
$13,373 mn
$36,776 mn
$23,610 mn
13-15%
6%
5%
2%
4%
1%
2%
3%
23%
3%
3%
3%
3%
Australia: Worley
Parsons
Denmark: AP MollerMaersk
France: Technip
Italy: Saipem
Malaysia: SapuraCrest
Petroleum
Netherlands: SBM
Offshore
Norway: Acergy, Aker
Solutions
US: J Ray Mcdermott,
KBR, Global Industries
Source: Wood Mackenzie, Deutsche Bank, www.bakerhughes.com, www.rigzone.com. Pictures - Technip and Saipem, *rig day rates given in the case of drilling, **X = lowest margin upside, XXXX = highest margin upside,
*** notable exceptions respectively include: directional drilling that generates margins between 25-30% and completion/work-over: 30-35%, **** exceptions include purely engineering or construction/construction
management related activities (i.e. not LSTK) which will yield higher overall margin e.g. 9-11%, ***** we have placed this within surface activities but can arguably be placed in subsurface (servicing) also, ******
Construction vessels, pipelaying vessels and ROVs owned by key participants
Page 56
22 October 2008
Brownfield/greenfield developments
Oil & gas processing units (as well as other components such as hydrogen,
sulphur etc), power generation, tanks,oil & gas gathering centres,utilities and
offsite facilities (e.g., condensate and LPG storage). Analogous to SURF facilities
in the offshore, this segment also includes pipelines, pumps/turbines.
What is it?
Where is it?
Onshore
Onshore/Offshore
Liquefaction plant
Receiving terminals
6-8% ****
na
4-5%
5-6%
2-3%
XX
na
XX
XXX / XXXX
$185,318 mn
na
$5,015 mn
$17,910 mn
$7,487 m
29%
na
1%
2%
1%
4%
na
3%
5%
5%
Source: Wood Mackenzie, Deutsche Bank, www.bakerhughes.com, www.rigzone.com. Pictures - Technip and Saipem, *rig day rates given in the case of drilling, **X = lowest margin upside, XXXX = highest margin upside,
*** notable exceptions respectively include: directional drilling that generates margins between 25-30% and completion/work-over: 30-35%, **** exceptions include purely engineering or construction/construction
management related activities (i.e. not LSTK) which will yield higher overall margin e.g. 9-11%, ***** we have placed this within surface activities but can arguably be placed in subsurface (servicing) also, ******
Construction vessels, pipelaying vessels and ROVs owned by key participants
Page 57
22 October 2008
Where is it?
Onshore
Onshore
Onshore
Onshore
3-4%
5-6%
5-6%
XX
XXX
XXX / XXXX
$4,900 mn
$16,674 mn
5-6%
XXX / XXXX
$27,417 mn
1%
3%
4%
38%
23%
13%
Canada: Hunting
France: Technip, Lurgi (owned by Air Liquide)
Germany: Krupp Uhde, Linde
Italy: Saipem/Snamprogetti
Japan: JGC, Toyo, Chiyoda
Korea: Hyundai
Norway: APL
UK: Amec
US: Air Products, Chicago Bridge & Iron, Foster
Wheeler Fluor
Source: Wood Mackenzie, Deutsche Bank, www.bakerhughes.com, www.rigzone.com. Pictures - Technip and Saipem, *rig day rates given in the case of drilling, **X = lowest margin upside, XXXX = highest margin upside,
*** notable exceptions respectively include: directional drilling that generates margins between 25-30% and completion/work-over: 30-35%, **** exceptions include purely engineering or construction/construction
management related activities (i.e. not LSTK) which will yield higher overall margin e.g. 9-11%, ***** we have placed this within surface activities but can arguably be placed in subsurface (servicing) also, ******
Construction vessels, pipelaying vessels and ROVs owned by key participants
Page 58
22 October 2008
Appendix C: Explanation of
historical capex revisions
Figure 74: Analysis of revisions in Engineering & Construction capex vs. 2007 report
Region
Africa
Caspian
-11%
-10%
20%
68%
60% Azerbaijan:
2005-06: Capex downgrades as previous estimates were replaced with actual data.
2007-09: Capex upgraded due to increased cost, especially from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli field.
Kazakhstan: Significant cost increases from the Kashagan, Karachaganak and Tengiz projects
Europe
-9%
-4%
21%
44%
61% Mainly due to currency impact and increased activity in mature fields in UK and Norway.
Middle East
-20%
-29%
-23%
2%
N. America
22%
29%
33%
42%
-5%
0%
12%
35%
Russia
-1%
8%
11%
15%
S. America
9%
15%
31%
54%
21%
33%
53%
71%
73% China:
- Major update of Chinese assets and huge increase in activity
- Impact of inflation on costs and currency impact of depreciating dollar.
Australia: Added Pluto LNG field
India: Updated ONGC expenditure
7%
12%
20%
39%
45%
SE Asia
Page 59
22 October 2008
Appendix D: Strategic
analysis of the E&C themes
Having established which
markets we expect to show
the greatest growth in
spend, we identify their
degree of margin
achievement both in
absolute and relative terms
Given the array of functions that exists within the oil service industry, it is no surprise that
each theme across the oil chain described above will have its own characteristic competing
forces. Advanced technology and specialised hardware, relevant project management
experience, local presence via assets or resource, strong financial capabilities as well as the
degree of capacity creep are to list but a few of the internal dynamics that will underpin each
segments relative and absolute margins near term.
Whilst difficult to quantify, intuitively we know that a theme, for example, with high barriers
to entry, limited competition and suffering little capacity creep and cost inflation, should
realise top-quartile margins against a backcloth of strong demand for its services. With this in
mind we have analysed the effect of competitive forces (please refer to Appendix E) upon
each of the major oil service sub-segments. Our conclusions and their implications for
margins are summarised in Figure 75. This strategic analysis has helped us to determine
which themes we believe are best placed to deliver relative performance over the forecast
period.
Having liaised with the companies under our coverage, as well as Wood Mackenzie and
various other industry professionals, we show on the next page the degree of margin
achievement (both relative and absolute) we think each theme could realise across our
forecast horizon. Implicit in our forecasts is the reversal of the negative effects that cost
inflation and FX had on margins across 2004/05. We marry these broad expectations with
bottom-up analysis of the components that drive each companys margins to arrive at the
base case around which we model each of the companies.
Page 60
22 October 2008
Figure 75: Degree of absolute and relative margin achievement across the development capex spectrum
Theme
XXXX
8-9%
XXX
As above.
7-8%
XXX
Medium levels of substitution and high barriers to entry suggest that this industry is
structurally robust with top quartile margins expected relative to other service segments.
Near term, we expect a cyclical shift in pricing power to Service Cos (esp. on larger
contracts with limited competition) and subsequent margin expansion despite upside
pressure on supplier prices.
4-5%
Structurally weak industry with bottom quartile margins (relative to deepwater). Near term,
however, we expect mild expansion in margins due to a cyclical shift in pricing power.
5-6%
XXX/XXXX
Medium levels of substitution and barriers to entry suggest that structurally this
industry is robust with medium quartile margins expected relative to other service
segments onshore. Near term, we expect a cyclical shift in pricing power to Service
Cos (esp. on $1bn+ contracts with limited competition) and subsequent margin
expansion despite upside pressure on supplier prices.
4-5%
Structurally weak industry with bottom quartile margins (relative to other offshore themes).
Near term, however, we expect mild expansion in margins due to a cyclical shift in pricing
power.
4-5%
XX
As above.
6-8%*
XX
Structurally robust industry with medium quartile margins (relative to other onshore
themes). Near term, however, we expect reasonable expansion in margins due to a
cyclical shift in pricing power particularly for those services will to take on lump sum
turnkey risk.
3-4%
XX
Industry still relatively fertile but structurally robust. Expect upside from low-level margins
driven by demand placed on alternative technologies within the energy complex.
4-5%
XXX
Whilst this industry is a relatively fertile one, we believe the lack of players able to
provide contract services within oil sands should defend impressive margin
expansion; equally driven by an expected up-tick in demand on oil sand technology
from 2009
2-3%
Structurally weak industry with bottom quartile margins (relative to other offshore themes).
Near term, however, we expect mild expansion due to a cyclical shift in pricing power.
Re-gas terminals
Medium levels of substitution and high barriers to entry suggest that this industry is
structurally robust with top quartile margins expected relative to other service
segments. Near term, we expect a cyclical shift in pricing power to Service Cos and
subsequent margin expansion despite upside pressure on supplier prices.
15-17%
* x = lowest margin upside, xxxx = highest margin upside; *exceptions include purely engineering or construction related activities (i.e. not LSTK) which will yield
higher overall margin e.g. 9-11%
Source: Company data, Deutsche Bank & Wood Mackenzie estimates
Page 61
22 October 2008
Strength
Strength of
of suppliers:
suppliers: medium
medium
Suppliers
equally
Suppliers equally split
split between
between
steel
steel for
for construction
construction and
and
subcontracting
subcontracting functions
functions that
that will
will
include
procurement,
include procurement,
construction
and
installation
construction and installation
depending
depending on
on level
levelof
of in
in house
house
capacity
capacity (e.g.
(e.g. owner
owner of
of vessels)
vessels)
Expect
Expect cyclical
cyclical led
led squeeze
squeeze on
on
sub
sub--contracting
contracting and
and installation
installation
capacity
as
demand
for
their
capacity as demand for their
services
services increase.
increase. This
This will
will place
place
upside
upside pressure
pressure on
on supplier
supplier
prices
prices in
in the
the near
near term
term
Note
Note that
that subsequent
subsequent increase
increase
-in
in raw
raw material
material and
andsub
sub
contracting
contracting prices
pricespotentially
potentially
passed
passed through
through to
toBuyer
Buyer
depending
depending on
on initial
initial terms
terms &&
conditions
conditions of
of Oil
Oil Service
Service
company
company--Buyer
Buyer contract.
contract.
Barriers
Barriers to
to entry
entryhigh
high
Capital
Capital intensive
intensive business
business whose
whose participants
participants
leverage
leverage the
the necessary
necessary equipment
equipment (e.g.
(e.g. heavy
heavy
lift/pipe
laying vessels,
vessels, remote
remote operating
operating vehicles)
vehicles)
lift/pipe--laying
and
and their
their geographic
geographic flexibility
flexibilityto
to win
windeepwater
deepwater
projects.
projects.(Lead
(Leadtime
time on
onvessel
vessel new
new builds
buildsbetween
between
33--44 years
years and
and average
average vessel
vessel cost
cost c.
c. $350mn)
$350mn)
Advanced
Advanced technology
technology (often
(often with
with long
long patent
patent
expiries)
expiries) on
onsubseaequipment/systems
subseaequipment/systems and
and to
to aa
--laying
lesser
lesser degree,
degree, pipe
pipe
laying vessels/operations
vessels/operations
Technical
Technical human
human expertise
expertise in
in deepwater
deepwater (not
(not to
to
-deep)
mention
-deep) with
mention current
current advances
advances into
into ultra
ultra
with
established
established track
track records
records
--medium
Levels
Levels of
of substitute
substitute competition
competition
medium::
Players
Players look
look to
to seek
seek market
market share
share with
with expansion
expansion of
of their
their
installation
installation capacity
capacity through
through new
new builds,
builds, vessel
vessel charters
charters or
or
converted
ships
(see
Appendix
1
for
comprehensive
list
converted ships (see Appendix 1 for comprehensive list of
of
market
players)
market players)
Technip
Acergy(~15%),
Technip (~35%),
(~35%), Saipem
Saipem (~25%),
(~25%),
Acergy(~15%),
-10%
Aker
-10% each)
AkerKvaerner
Kvaerner,,Subsea7
Subsea7 (b/w
(b/w c.
c. 55
each)
Strength
Strength of
of buyers:
buyers: low
low
Medium
Medium levels
levels of
of
substitution
substitution and
and high
high barriers
barriers
to
to entry
entry suggest
suggest that
that this
this
industry
industry isis structurally
structurally robust
robust
Near
Near term,
term, expect
expect cyclical
cyclical
led
led shift
shift in
in pricing
pricing power
power to
to
Service
Servicecos
cosand
and subsequent
subsequent
margin
margin expansion
expansion despite
despite
upside
upside pressure
pressure on
onsupplier
supplier
prices
prices
Threat
Threat of
of substitutes:
substitutes: low
low
NOC
NOC and
and IOC
IOC investment
investment shifting
shifting
away
away from
from shallow
shallow water
water fields
fields as
as
economics
economics become
become more
more
attractive
in
deepwater.
attractive in deepwater.
Size
Size of
of reserves,
reserves, ultimate
ultimate
recoveries
recoveries and
and rates
rates of
of flow
flow
potentially
higher
in
potentially higher in deepwater.
deepwater.
Page 62
22 October 2008
Figure 77: Shallow water sub-sea and facilities we expect bottom quartile margin growth near term
Barriers
Barriersto
toentry
entry low
low
Capital
-layingvessels
Capitalintensity
intensity(pipe
(pipe-laying
vesselsetc)
etc)represent
represent
aalow
lowbarrier
barrierhere
heregiven
giventhe
theexisting
existingnetwork
networkof
of
vessels
vesselssupporting
supportingsuch
suchaamature
maturebusiness
businesse.g.
e.g.
leasing
leasing would
wouldbe
beaasimple
simplecost
costeffective
effectiveoption
option
Utilises
Utilisesmore
moreconventional
conventional(less
(lesstechnically
technically
challenging)
challenging)types
typesof
ofequipment
equipment
Strength
Strength of
of suppliers:
suppliers: medium
medium
Suppliers
Suppliersequally
equallysplit
split between
between
steel
steelfor
forconstruction
constructionand
and
subcontracting
subcontractingfunctions
functionsthat
thatwill
will
include
includeprocurement
procurementand/or
and/or
construction
and/or
installation
construction and/or installation
depending
dependingon
onlevel
levelof
ofin
inhouse
house
capacity
capacity(e.g.
(e.g.owner
ownerof
of vessels)
vessels)
We
Expect
expect
cyclical
cyclical
led
led
squeeze
on
Expect
cyclical
ledsqueeze
squeeze
on on
sub
sub--contracting
contractingand
and installation
installation
capacity
capacityas
asdemand
demandfor
fortheir
their
services
servicesincrease.
increase.This
This will
willplace
place
upside
pressure
on
supplier
upside pressure on supplier
prices
pricesin
inthe
thenear
nearterm
term
Note
Notethat
that subsequent
subsequentincrease
increase
in
inraw
rawmaterial
materialand
andsub
sub-contracting
contractingprices
pricespotentially
potentially
passed
passedthrough
throughto
toBuyer
Buyer
depending
on
initial
depending on initialterms
terms&&
conditions
of
Oil
Service
conditions of Oil Service
company
company--Buyer
Buyercontract.
contract.
Levels
Levels of
of substitute
substitute competition
competition -- high
high
Players
Playerslook
lookto
toseek
seekmarket
marketshare
sharewith
withexpansion
expansionof
oftheir
their
installation
installationcapacity
capacitythrough
throughnew
newbuilds,
builds,vessel
vesselcharters
chartersor
or
converted
ships
often
designed
for
dual
purpose
i.e.
deep
converted ships often designed for dual purpose i.e. deepand
and
shallow
water
(see
Appendix
for
comprehensive
list
of
market
shallow water (see Appendix for comprehensive list of market
players)
players)
Technip
Technip (~35%),
(~35%),Saipem
Saipem (~25%),
(~25%), Acergy
Acergy (~15%),
(~15%),
Aker
Aker Kvaerner
Kvaerner,, Subsea
Subsea 7,
7,SBM
SBMOffshore,
Offshore,Samsung,
Samsung,
Mcdermott
Mcdermott,, Heerema
Heerema,, Hyundai
Hyundai
Strength
Strengthof
ofbuyers:
buyers:high
high
High
Highlevels
levelsof
ofsubstitution
substitution
and
andlow
lowbarriers
barriersto
toentry
entry
suggest
that
this
suggest that this industry
industryisis
structurally
weak
structurally weak
Near
expect
expect
cyclical
cyclical
Nearterm,
term,we
expect
cyclical
led
ledsupport
supportin
inpricing
pricing
power
powerbetween
betweenService
Service
Cos
andbuyer.
buyer.Margins
Margins
Cos and
should
subsequently
should subsequently
improve
improve(albeit
(albeitslightly)
slightly)
despite
despiteupside
upsidepressure
pressureon
on
supplier
supplierprices
prices
Threat
Threat of
of substitutes:
substitutes:high
high
NOC
NOCand
andIOC
IOCinvestment
investmentshifting
shifting
towards
towardsdeepwater
deepwaterfields
fieldsas
as
economics
economicsbecome
becomemore
more
attractive.
attractive.
Size
Sizeof
of reserves,
reserves,ultimate
ultimate
recoveries
recoveriesand
andrates
ratesof
of flow
flow
potentially
higher
in
potentially higher indeepwater.
deepwater.
Figure 78: Onshore/offshore frontier developments we expect medium quartile margin growth near term
Barriers
Barriers to
to entry
entry high
high
Technical
Technicalhuman
humanexpertise
expertiseand
andlocal
localpresence
presencein
in
some
someof
of the
theharshest
harshest weather
weatherconditions
conditionsOil
Oil Service
Service
companies
will
encounter
companies will encounter
Superior
Superiortechnology
technology(often
(oftenwith
withlong
longpatent
patent
expiries)
expiries)on
onsubsea
subseaequipment
equipmentand
and advanced
advancedpipepipelay
layvessels/operations
vessels/operations able
ableto
todeal
dealwith
withharsh
harsh
operating
environments
operating environments
Strength
Strength of
of suppliers:
suppliers: medium
medium
Main
Main supply
supply isis steel
steel (up
(up to
to 50%
50%
of
of cost
cost base)
base) with
with remainder
remainder of
of
supply
chain
split
across
various
supply chain split across various
sub
sub--contracting
contracting functions
functions (e.g.
(e.g.
construction,
construction, procurement)
procurement)
We
Expect
expect
cyclical
cyclical
led
led
squeeze
on
Expect
cyclical
led squeeze
squeeze
on on
sub
sub--contracting
contracting capacity
capacity as
as
demand
demand for
for their
their services
services
increase.
increase. This
This will
will place
place upside
upside
pressure
pressure on
on supplier
supplier prices.
prices.
Note
Note that
that subsequent
subsequent increase
increase
in
in raw
raw material
material and
and sub
sub-contracting
contracting prices
prices potentially
potentially
passed
passed through
through to
to Buyer
Buyer
depending
depending on
on initial
initial terms
terms &&
conditions
of
Oil
Service
conditions of Oil Service
company
Buyer
contract.
company-Buyer contract.
Strength
Strength of
of buyers:
buyers:medium
medium
Levels
Levels of
of substitute
substitute competition
competition--medium
medium
Players
Playerslook
lookto
toseek
seekmarket
marketshare
sharewith
withexpansion
expansionof
of
resource
resource base
base in
in these
these frontier
frontier areas
areas via
via build
build of
of local
local
content
content(increased
(increasedinvolvement
involvementof
of local
localpersonnel)
personnel)and
and
construction
constructionyards
yards(greenfield
(greenfieldor
orbrownfield
brownfieldexpansion)
expansion)
Saipem,
Saipem,Aker
AkerKvaerner,
Kvaerner, Petrofac,
Petrofac, Daewoo,
Daewoo,Linde,
Linde,
Hyundai,
Hyundai,Amec
Amec
Medium
Medium levels
levels of
of substitution
substitution
and
andhigh
highbarriers
barriersto
toentry
entry
suggest
suggestthat
that this
this industry
industryisis
structurally
robust
structurally robust
Near
we
expect
cyclical
cyclical
led
Near term,
term, expect
expect
cyclical
led led
shift
shiftin
inpricing
pricingpower
powerto
toService
Service
Cos
(esp.on
onlarger
largercontracts
contracts
Cos (esp.
with
with limited
limited competition)
competition) and
and
subsequent
margin
expansion
subsequent margin expansion
despite
despiteupside
upsidepressure
pressureon
on
supplier
supplierprices
prices
Threat
Threat of
of substitutes:
substitutes:medium
medium
NOC
NOCand
andIOC
IOCinvestment
investmentshifting
shifting
away
away from
from traditional
traditional more
more
accessible
areas
as
economics
accessible areas as economics
become
become more
more attractive
attractive in
in frontier
frontier
areas
areas
Size
Sizeof
ofreserves
reservesand
andultimate
ultimate
recoveries
recoveries potentially
potentially higher
higher in
in
frontier
frontier areas
areas
Page 63
22 October 2008
Figure 79: LNG We expect medium to top quartile margin growth near term
Strength
Strength of
of suppliers:
suppliers: medium
medium
Main
Main supply
supply isis steel
steel (up
(up to
to 50%
50%
of
cost
base)
with
remainder
of cost base) with remainder of
of
supply
supply chain
chain split
split across
across various
various
sub
sub--contracting
contracting functions
functions (e.g.
(e.g.
construction,
construction, procurement)
procurement)
Expect
Expect cyclical
cyclical led
led squeeze
squeeze on
on
sub
contracting capacity
capacity as
as
sub--contracting
demand
for
their
services
demand for their services
increase.
increase. This
This will
will place
place upside
upside
pressure
pressure on
on supplier
supplier prices.
prices.
Note
Note that
that subsequent
subsequent increase
increase
-in
in raw
raw material
material and
and sub
sub
contracting
prices
potentially
contracting prices potentially
passed
passed through
through to
to Buyer
Buyer
depending
depending on
on initial
initial terms
terms &&
conditions
of
Oil
Service
conditions of Oil Service
--Buyer
company
company
Buyer contract.
contract.
Barriers
medium
Barriers to
to entry
entry
medium
Large
requiring
Large scale
scale projects
projects
requiring contractors
contractors with
with
strong
strong balance
balance sheets
sheets given
given turn
turn key
key nature
nature of
of LNG
LNG
awards
awards
Established
NOCs(from
Established relationships
relationships with
with
NOCs(from whom
whom aa
larger
larger number
number of
of LNG
LNG contracts
contracts originate)
originate)
Regional
Regional presence
presence and
and partnership
partnership with
with local
local
personnel.
personnel. Necessary
Necessary infrastructure
infrastructure (e.g.
(e.g. yards)
yards)
required
for
construction
and
installation
phases
required for construction and installation phases
Technology
Technology licensed
licensed out
out selectively
selectively
Levels
--medium
Levels of
of substitute
substitute competition
competition
medium
Only
Only largest
largest players
players able
able to
to handle
handle increasing
increasing
number
number of
of EPIC
EPIC contracts
contracts valued
valued >> $1bn.
$1bn.
Combination
Snamthreatens
Combination of
of Saipem
Saipem &
&
Snamthreatens market
market
share
share here
here (see
(see Appendix
Appendix 11 for
for comprehensive
comprehensive list
list of
of
market
players)
market players)
Technip
Technip (~20%),
(~20%), Chiyoda
Chiyoda (~20%),
(~20%), JGC
JGC (~10%),
(~10%),
KBR
KBR (~10%),
(~10%), Saipem
Saipem Snamprogretti
Snamprogretti (~5%)
(~5%)
Strength
--low
Strength of
of buyers
buyers
low
Medium
Medium levels
levels of
of
substitution
substitution and
and barriers
barriers to
to
entry
entry suggest
suggest that
that this
this
industry
industry isis structurally
structurally
robust
robust
Near
Near term,
term, expect
expect cyclical
cyclical
led
led shift
shift in
in pricing
pricing power
power to
to
Service
cos
(esp.
on
Servicecos (esp. on
$1bn+
$1bn+ contracts
contracts with
with
limited
limited competition)
competition) and
and
subsequent
subsequent margin
margin
expansion
expansion despite
despite upside
upside
pressure
pressure on
on supplier
supplier prices
prices
Threat
Threat of
of substitutes:
substitutes: low
low
Economies
Economies of
of scale
scale (bolt
(bolt on
on
liquefaction
liquefaction trains
trains around
around existing
existing
infrastructure
infrastructure &
& established
established supply
supply
chain)
chain) increases
increases attractiveness
attractiveness of
of
LNG
LNG vs.
vs. other
other advanced
advanced energy
energy
alternatives
e.g.
GTL
alternatives e.g. GTL
Monetisation
Monetisation of
of gas
gas using
using pipelines
pipelines
increasingly
increasingly difficult
difficult for
for stranded
stranded
reserves.
LNG
more
feasible
reserves. LNG more feasible option
option
Source: Deutsche Bank
Page 64
22 October 2008
Figure 80: Deepwater drilling Day rates expected to show varying results; however structurally a robust industry
Barriers
Barriers to
toentry
entryhigh
high
Capital
Capital intensive
intensive business
business whose
whose participants
participants
leverage
drillships
leverage the
the necessary
necessaryassets
assets(e.g.
(e.g.
drillships,,semi
semi-submersible
submersiblerigs)
rigs) and
and their
theirgeographic
geographicflexibility
flexibility to
to
win
win deepwater
deepwater drilling
drilling contracts.
contracts.(Lead
(Lead time
timeon
on rig
rig
new
newbuilds
builds between
between3-3-44 years
years and
and average
average rig
rigcost
cost
-300mn)
between
-300mn)
between$100
$100
Advanced
Advanceddrilling
drilling technology
technologyrequired
requiredon
onultra
ultra
deepwater
deepwaterfields
fields
Technical
Technicalhuman
human expertise
expertise with
withestablished
established track
track
records
records
Strength
Strengthof
ofsuppliers:
suppliers: low
low
Key
supply
to
drillers
will
be
Key supply to drillers will bedrill
drill
bit
bit components
components e.g.
e.g.casing,
casing,
specialised
fluids
for
well
hole
specialised fluids for well hole
etc.
etc.Expect
Expectcyclical
cyclicalled
leduptick
uptickin
in
demand
demandfor
for these
thesematerials
materials and
and
subsequent
rise
in
supplier
prices
subsequent rise in supplier prices
In
In the
thecontext
context of
ofnew
new build
build
capacity
capacitymain
mainsupply
supply isissteel
steel
--medium
Levels
Levels of
ofsubstitute
substitute competition
competition
medium
Players
look
to
seek
market
share
with
Players look to seek market share withexpansion
expansionof
of their
their
drilling
drilling capacity
capacity through
through new
new builds
builds and
and rig
rigcharters
charters
Transocean
Transocean,,Seadrill,
Seadrill, Pride
Pride (largest
(largest players),
players),
Saipem,
Saipem,Noble,
Noble,Nabors,
Nabors,Fred
Fred Olsen
Olsen
Strength
Strength of
of buyers:
buyers: low
low
Medium
levels
of
substitution
Medium levels of substitution
and
andhigh
highbarriers
barriers to
toentry
entry
suggest
suggestthat
that this
this industry
industry isis
structurally
robust
structurally robust
Near
Near term,
term,expect
expectcyclical
cyclicalled
led
shift
shift in
inpricing
pricingpower
power to
toservice
service
cos
and
subsequent
margin
cos and subsequent margin
expansion
expansiondespite
despiteupside
upside
pressure
pressureon
onsupplier
supplierprices
prices
Threat
Threatof
of substitutes:
substitutes: low
low
NOC
and
IOC
NOC and IOC investment
investment shifting
shifting
towards
towards deepwater
deepwater fields
fields as
as
economics
economics become
become more
more
attractive.
attractive.
Size
Size of
of reserves,
reserves, ultimate
ultimate
recoveries
recoveries and
and rates
rates of
of flow
flow
potentially
higher
in
potentially higher in deepwater
deepwater
Source: Deutsche Bank
Page 65
22 October 2008
Figure 81: Heavy oil sands we expect medium quartile margin growth near term
Strength
Strengthof
ofsuppliers:
suppliers:medium
medium
Suppliers
Suppliersequally
equallysplit
split between
between
steel
steelfor
forconstruction
constructionand
and
subcontracting
subcontractingfunctions
functionsthat
thatwill
will
include
includeprocurement,
procurement,
construction
construction
Expect
Expectcyclical
cyclicalled
ledsqueeze
squeezeon
on
sub
sub--contracting
contractingas
as demand
demand for
for
their
theirservices
servicesincrease.
increase.This
Thiswill
will
place
placeupside
upsidepressure
pressureon
onsupplier
supplier
prices
pricesin
inthe
thenear
nearterm
term
Note
Note that
thatsubsequent
subsequent increase
increase
-in
inraw
rawmaterial
materialand
andsub
sub
contracting
contractingprices
pricespotentially
potentially
passed
passedthrough
throughto
tobuyer
buyer
depending
dependingon
oninitial
initialterms
terms&&
conditions
conditionsof
ofOil
Oilservice
service
company
company--buyer
buyer contract.
contract.
Barriers
Barriers to
toentry
entryhigh
high
Capital
Capital intensive
intensive business
business whose
whose participants
participants
leverage
leverage the
the necessary
necessary equipment
equipment (e.g.
(e.g. heavy
heavy lifting
lifting
trucks
trucks and
and mining
mining equipment)
equipment) to
to win
win projects.
projects.
Established
Established infrastructure
infrastructure not
not to
to mention
mention
relationships
NOCs;
relationships with
with IOCs
IOCs and
and
NOCs; track
track record
record often
often
-client
results
-clientbusiness
results in
in repeat
repeat contractor
contractor
businessand
and
reluctance
reluctance from
from client
client to
to change
change
Advanced
Advanced technology
technology (often
(often with
with long
long patent
patent
expiries)
expiries) on
on types
types of
of extraction
extraction methods
methods e.g.
e.g. in
in situ
situ
bitumen
bitumen production
production or
or processes
processes e.g.
e.g. tailing
tailing
management.
management.
Technical
Technical human
human expertise
expertise and
and know
knowhow
howhard
hard to
to
reproduce
reproduce
--medium
Levels
Levels of
of substitute
substitute competition
competition
medium
Players
look
to
seek
market
share
as
they
build
Players look to seek market share as they buildtrack
track record
record
-requisite
and
-requisite for
and relationships
relationships with
with client
client base
base(a
(a pre
pre
for winning
winning
contracts)
often
through
long
standing
contacts
in
other
contracts) often through long standing contacts in other
industries
industries
Colt
Worley
Parsons
(15%),
Fluor
Colt Worley Parsons (15%), Jacobs
Jacobs (10%),
(10%),
Fluor(10%),
(10%),
Amec
Amec(10%),
(10%), Hatch
Hatch (10%)
(10%)
Technip,
22
-5%
Technip, SNC,
SNC, Equinox,
Equinox, Vista,
Vista, Gemini,
Gemini, IMV
IMV (b/w
(b/w c.
c.-5%
each)
each)
Strength
Strengthof
ofbuyers:
buyers: low
low
Medium
Medium levels
levels of
of
substitution
substitution and
and barriers
barriers to
to
entry
entry suggest
suggest that
that this
this
industry
industry isis structurally
structurally robust
robust
Near
Near term,
term,expect
expectcyclical
cyclical
led
led shift
shift in
in pricing
pricing power
power to
to
service
cos(esp.
(esp. on
on larger
larger
servicecos
contracts
contracts with
with limited
limited
competition)
competition)
Medium
Medium term,
term, expect
expectaa
slowing
slowing in
inmargin
margin expansion
expansion
due
due to
to upside
upside pressure
pressure on
on
supplier
prices
and
supplier prices and greater
greater
resistance
from
Oil
cos
resistance from Oilcos
Threat
Threat of
of substitutes:
substitutes: medium
medium
NOC
NOC and
and IOC
IOC investment
investment shifting
shifting
away
away from
from traditional
traditional more
more
accessible
accessible areas
areas as
as economics
economics
become
becomemore
more attractive
attractive in
in oil
oil
sands
sands
Size
Size of
of reserves
reserves and
and ultimate
ultimate
recoveries
recoveries potentially
potentially higher
higher in
in oil
oil
sands
sands
Source: Deutsche Bank
Page 66
22 October 2008
Figure 82: Rig construction services we expect medium quartile margin growth near term
Barriers
Barriersto
toentry
entry medium
medium
Established
Establishedrelationships
relationshipswith
withIOCs,
IOCs, NOCs
NOCs and
andoil
oil
service
servicecompanies;
companies;track
trackrecord
recordoften
oftenresults
results in
in
repeat
-clientbusiness
repeatcontractor
contractor-client
businessand
andreluctance
reluctance
from
fromclient
clientto
tochange
change
Location
Locationand
andpartnership
partnershipwith
withlocal
localgovernment
governmentand
and
personnel.
personnel.Clients
Clientswill
willoften
oftenopt
optfor
forcontractors
contractors
located
in
close
proximity
located in close proximity
Necessary
Necessaryexpertise
expertiseand
andinfrastructure
infrastructure(e.g.
(e.g.yards)
yards)
required
requiredfor
forconstruction
constructionand
andprocurement
procurementphases.
phases.
Large
Largescale
scaleprojects
projectsrequires
requirescontractors
contractorswith
with
strong
strongbalance
balancesheets
sheetsgiven
giventurn
turnkey
keynature
natureof
of
awards
awards
Strength
Strengthof
ofsuppliers:
suppliers:medium
medium
Main
Mainsupply
supplyisissteel
steel(up
(upto
to35%
35%
of
ofcost
costbase)
base)with
withremainder
remainderof
of
supply
supplychain
chainsplit
splitacross
acrossvarious
various
sub
contracting
functions
(e.g.
sub -contracting functions (e.g.
construction,
construction,procurement)
procurement)
We
expect
cyclical
squeeze
Expect
cyclical
led led
squeeze
on on
sub
sub--contracting
contractingcapacity
capacityas
as
demand
demandfor
fortheir
theirservices
services
increase.
increase.This
Thiswill
willplace
placeupside
upside
pressure
on
supplier
pressure on supplierprices.
prices.
Note
Notethat
thatsubsequent
subsequentincrease
increase
in
inraw
rawmaterial
materialand
andsub
sub-contracting
contractingprices
pricespotentially
potentially
passed
passedthrough
throughto
tobuyer
buyer
depending
dependingon
oninitial
initialterms
terms&&
conditions
of
Oil
Service
conditions of Oil Service
company
buyer
contract.
company -buyer contract.
Levels
Levelsof
ofsubstitute
substitutecompetition
competition
by
bytheme:
theme:medium
medium
Large
Largescale
scaleplayers
players (operating
(operatingEPIC
EPICcontracts
contracts>>$500mn)
$500mn)seeking
seeking to
totake
take
on
onsmaller
smallersized
sizedprojects
projectsand
andaccept
acceptlower
lowerprices
prices(advantaged
(advantagedby
by economies
economies
of
scale)
could
alter
market
share
within
each
of
the
themes
bel
ow:
of scale) could alter market share within each of the themes bel ow:
Jack
Jack--up
uprefurbishment
refurbishmentand
andnew
newbuild
buildconstruction
constructionplayers:
players:
Lamprell
Lamprell(40%),
(40%),Keppel
KeppelFELS
FELS(20%),
(20%),PPL
PPL(15%),
(15%),Maritime
MaritimeIndustria
Industria l lServices
Services
(5
-10%),Dubai
10%),QGM
QGM(5
(5-10%),
DubaiDry
Drydocks
docks(5%)
(5%)
(5--10%),
Semi
subrefurbishment
refurbishment&
&new
newbuild
buildconstruction
constructionplayers:
players:
Semi--sub
Keppel
Keppel(15%),
(15%), Sembcorop
Sembcorop Marine
Marine(10%),
(10%), Jurong
Jurong (10%),
(10%),JJRay
RayMc
McDermott
Dermott
(10%),
(10%), DubaiDryDocks
DubaiDryDocks (15%),
(15%),PPL
PPL(10%),
(10%),Samsung
Samsung(10%)
(10%)Daewoo
Daewoo(10%),
(10%),
Lamprell,
Lamprell,MIS,
MIS,QGM
QGM (all
(all<10%)
<10%)
by
byregion
region:: high
high
Strength
Strengthof
ofbuyers
buyers --medium
medium
Medium
Mediumlevels
levelsof
ofsubstitution
substitution
and
andbarriers
barriersto
toentry
entrysuggest
suggestthat
that
this
thisindustry
industryisisstructurally
structurallyrobust
robust
Medium
Mediumterm,
term,expect
expectaaslowing
slowing
in
inmargin
marginexpansion
expansionfor
forOil
Oil
Services
due
to
upside
pressure
Services due to upside pressure
on
onsupplier
supplierprices
pricesand
andgreater
greater
resistance
resistancefrom
fromOil
Oil cos
cos
Threat
Threatof
ofgeographical
geographicalsubstitution
substitutionisisreal:
real:regional
regionalmarkets
markets will
will
increasingly
increasinglycompete
competeagainst
againsteach
eachother
otherfor
forbusiness
business
Regional
Regionalplayers
players(includes
(includessemi/
semi/jackup
jackup refurb
refurband
andnew
newbuilds):
builds):
Middle
MiddleEast
East --mainly
mainlyUAE
UAE(25%),
(25%),Singapore
Singapore(40%),
(40%),S.E
S.EAsia
Asia(15%)
(15%)
USA/GoM
USA/GoM (15%),
(15%),West
WestAfrica
Africa(5%),
(5%),
Threat
Threatof
ofsubstitutes:
substitutes:low
low
Industry
Industryitself
itselfhas
hasno
noalternative
alternative
Source: Deutsche Bank
Page 67
22 October 2008
Appendix F: Detailed
specifications of yards in
Eastern Hemisphere
Figure 83: Detailed yard specifications
Location
Company
Yard name
Status
New build/
Refurbishment
Products / Services
The range of services offered are those that are typically required during a
docking, including: general fabrication and repair in steel, stainless steel and
aluminium, heavy engineering and diesel fitting, electrical marine
maintenance, blasting and painting, hydraulic repair, propulsion system
servicing and repair including CPP and azimuthing drive units.
Australia
Existing
Others
Azerbaijan
Keppel Corp.
Existing
New build +
Refurbishment
Azerbaijan
Mcdermott
International
Baku
Existing
New build
From MCCI fabrication yard and marine base at BDJF, the company offers
services including design, fabrication and installation of offshore platforms
and installation of offshore pipelines for the oil and gas industry.
China
China State
Shipbuilding
Corporation
Greenfield expansion
New build
The new capacity will be capable of building various high-tech ships, such
as LNG ships, offshore engineering facilities and cruise ships shall have
been completed before the year 2015
China
China State
Shipbuilding
Corporation
Existing
New build +
Refurbishment
China
China State
Shipbuilding
Corporation
Existing
New build
China
China State
Shipbuilding
Corporation
Existing
Others
China
China State
Shipbuilding
Corporation
It is the largest modern ships building complex in South China with a history
of 50 years. This company has long focused on developing and building
handysize tankers and has grown into a domestic winner in building tankers
for the European owners. It has scored significant achievements in the
development of new and high-tech ships such as the ro/pax vessels and
semi-submersible heavy lift vessels and so on.
China
China State
Shipbuilding
Corporation
New build +
Refurbishment
China
China State
Shipbuilding
Corporation
Hodong Zhonghua
Shipbuilding(Group)Co. Ltd
Others
Guangzhou Shipyard
International Co.,Ltd.
Existing
Existing
Others
China
China State
Shipbuilding
Corporation
New build
New build liquefied gas carriers, car carriers, crude oil tankers, Panamax
bulk carriers, Handymax bulk carriers, Lake suitable bulk carriers, multipurpose cargo ships, fast feeder container ships etc. And in particular, gas
carriers have become one of the major products of the shipyard in the past
years. Apart from new building section, Jiangnan Shipyard has specific
divisions specializing in manufacturing pressurized tanks liquefied gas
carriers, large steel structures for civil architect engineering, variety of
mechanical and electrical equipment, nonstandard equipment, pressure
containers, port machinery etc.
China
China State
Shipbuilding
Corporation
Others
Greenfield expansion
Other Details
Page 68
22 October 2008
Company
Yard name
Status
New build/
Refurbishment
Products / Services
Other Details
New build
Existing
Others
Existing
Refurbishment
Repair and conversion of large bulk carrier, container carrier and VLCC,
Semi submersibles and FPSO.
China
Existing
Others
Ship repair.
China
Existing
Others
China
Existing
New build
A newly built shipyard with one DWT 150,000 dock and four
piers in service.
Zhoushang shipyard is building a very large ship repairing,
building and conversion base composing of 3 docks ranging
from DWT 80,000 to DWT 300,000 ( dock capacity: nearly
DWT 1,110,000), three piers, 4,500m coastline and 2,000,000
m2 land area. Within the next few years, it will have the
potential to grow into a mega shipyard and capable of
servicing all marine activities, including VLCC repairs and
offshore blocks fabrication.
China
China State
Shipbuilding
Corporation
China
China State
Shipbuilding
Corporation
China
China State
Shipbuilding
Corporation
China
Shanghai-Chengxi Shipbuilding
Co.,Ltd
Existing
New build
Existing + Brownfield
expansion
Others
Existing
Others
Yantai Raffles
Existing
New build
China
China
Keppel Corp.
China
Yantai Raffles
India
SembCorp
Pipavav Shipyard
Greenfield expansion
New Build
VLCC vessels
Indonesia
Clough
Petrosea
Existing
New build
Indonesia
Labroy Marine
Batam Island
Existing
New build
Indonesia
Mcdermott
International
Batam Island
Existing
New build
Indonesia
SembCorp
Existing
Others
Page 69
22 October 2008
Company
Yard name
Status
New build/
Refurbishment
Products / Services
Other Details
Indonesia
SembCorp
SMOE Indonesia
Existing
Others
Japan
Kawasaki
Shipbuilding
Corporation
Kobe
Existing
New build +
Refurbishment
Japan
Kawasaki
Shipbuilding
Corporation
Sakaide
Existing
New build +
Refurbishment
Japan
Mitsui
Engineering &
Shipbuilding
Mitsui
Existing
New build
The company builds LNG carrier, bulk carrier, oil tanker, FPSO, ROVs Patrol
ships etc.
Kazakhstan
Keppel Corp.
Existing
New build +
Refurbishment
Korea
Daewoo
Daewoo
Existing
New build
Korea
Hyundai
Hyundai
Existing
New build
Korea
Samsung
Geoje Shipyard
Existing
New build
Kuwait
Maritime
MIS Kuwait
Industrial Services
Existing + Brownfield
expansion
Refurbishment
Philippines
Keppel Corp.
Existing
Others
Philippines
Keppel Corp.
Existing
Others
Philippines
Keppel Corp.
Others
Qatar
Keppel Corp.,
Nakilat JV
New build
Greenfield expansion
Saudi Arabia
Maritime
MIS ARABIA
Industrial Services
Existing
Refurbishment
Saudi Arabia
SembCorp
FDSCO
Greenfield expansion
Others
The yard will have a shiplift system for new building and
repair of vessels up to Handymax size and a floating dock for
repair of vessels up to Suezmax size. The shipyard is
expected to be completed in 2009.
Singapore
Clough
Asia Offshore
Existing
New build
Singapore
Keppel Corp.
Existing
New build +
Refurbishment
Singapore
Keppel Corp.
Existing
New build +
Refurbishment
Singapore
Keppel Corp.
Existing
Others
Singapore
Keppel Corp.
Existing
Others
Singapore
Keppel Corp.
Offshore Technology
Development Pte Ltd.
Existing
New Build
Page 70
22 October 2008
Company
Yard name
Status
New build/
Refurbishment
Products / Services
Other Details
Over a total land area of 68 hectares in 2 locations, Jurong
Shipyard operates four graving docks with a total capacity of
1,100,000 dwt and berthing quays stretching over a total
length of 2,728 metres with a maximum draft of 9 metres.
Singapore
SembCorp
Jurong shipyard
Existing
New build +
Refurbishment
Singapore
SembCorp
Jurong SML
Existing
Others
Singapore
SembCorp
PPL Shipyard
Existing
New build +
Refurbishment
Singapore
SembCorp
Semwabang Shipyard
Existing
New build +
Refurbishment
Singapore
SembCorp
SMOE Shipyard
Existing
New build
Thailand
Clough
Clough Thailand
Existing
New build
Thailand
Lamprell
Sattahip
Existing
Refurbishment
UAE
Consolidated
Contractors
Company
Existing
New build
UAE
Existing
New build +
Refurbishment
Jackup refurbishment, newbuild semisubmersibles, FPSO conversions etc. Also provides ship repair service
UAE
Keppel Corp.
UAE
Lamprell
Hamriyah
Existing
Others
Existing
New build +
Refurbishment
UAE
Lamprell
Hamriyah New
Greenfield expansion
New build +
Refurbishment
It will be one of the most modern in the Middle East, with a quayside
capacity to execute up to 10 jackup rig upgrade and refurbishment projects
at any one time. It will also contain large covered and open fabrication areas
that will allow Lamprell to undertake major new build projects, such as the
construction of jackup rigs and the integration of process modules onto
FPSO vessels.
UAE
Lamprell
Jebel Ali
Existing
New build +
Refurbishment
UAE
Lamprell
Sharjah
Existing
Refurbishment
UAE
Maritime
MIS Sharjah
Industrial Services
Existing
New build +
Refurbishment
UAE
Mcdermott
International
Existing
New build
UAE
QGM
Jebel Ali
QGM
Existing
Refurbishment
Page 71
22 October 2008
700
25
20
500
Years
Licenses awarded
600
400
15
300
10
200
100
2000
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2001
2002
2003
Exploration
2004
2005
2006
2007
Development
1,800
30
1,500
25
1,200
20
Years
Licenses awarded
900
15
600
10
300
5
-
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2000
2001
2002
Exploration
Source: Wood Mackenzie, Deutsche Bank
Page 72
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Development
22 October 2008
Licenses expiring
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Page 73
22 October 2008
Drilling days
Drilling days
200
Licenses aw arded
Drilling days
2010E
2000
2010E
2009E
2008E
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0
2000
800
400
2009E
5000
2008E
1000
600
2007
10000
800
2006
1200
1000
2005
15000
2004
1400
1200
2003
20000
2002
25000
1600
90000
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
1400
2001
1800
1600
Days
30000
Days
2000
Licenses aw arded
10000
Drilling days
Page 74
2010E
2009E
2008E
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0
2000
Licenses aw arded
10000
Drilling days
2010E
100
20000
100
2009E
20000
2008E
200
30000
200
2007
30000
2006
300
40000
300
2005
40000
50000
2004
50000
400
60000
400
2003
Days
60000
500
70000
500
2002
70000
600
600
2001
700
80000
2000
90000
Days
100000
800
900
Licenses aw arded
Licenses aw arded
2010E
0
2000
2010E
2009E
2008E
5000
Drilling days
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0
2000
10000
2009E
500
500
2007
1000
15000
2008E
1000
20000
2006
Days
1500
1500
25000
2005
2000
2000
30000
2004
2500
5000
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
2003
2500
2002
3000
3000
2001
3500
Days
Licenses aw arded
22 October 2008
6%
4% 2%
29%
12%
21%
26%
S America
Uncontracted
GOM
Europe
Africa
Russia
E Hemisphere
Figure 99: Contracts signed for Jackup rigs coming online 2008-12
4%
3%
1%
1%
7%
13%
71%
Uncontracted
E Hemisphere
Middle East
S America
Africa
GOM
Europe
Page 75
22 October 2008
700
4,000
600
3,500
3,000
400
NOK mn
300
200
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
100
500
LT debt maturity
800
2013
2012
2011
180
150
Euro mn
600
ST debt maturity
60
Nil
2010
2009
Cash
2010
30
2009
2008
Cash
ST
90
2008
200
120
Debt
400
debt
GBP mn
- Strong cash position and free cash flow should cater for LT
debt maturities.
- Un-drawn revolving credit facility of Euro 750mn expiring in
Oct 2012, with option of 2x1 year extension.
Source: Company data, Deutsche Bank
2010
2009
2008
Cash
2013
2012
LT debt maturity
2011
2010
2009
2008
LT debt
Cash
LT debt
USD mn
500
No debt.
Source: Company data, Deutsche Bank
Page 76
22 October 2008
750
3,500
600
2,800
450
2,100
Euro mn
300
150
1,400
700
-
> 5 years
2017
LT debt maturity
2011
2010
2009
2008
LT debt
(700)
Cash
4-5 yrs
3-4 yrs
2-3 yrs
1-2 yrs
1 yr
LT debt
ST debt
Cash
ST debt
USD mn
500
4,000
400
3,000
300
USD mn
5,000
2,000
1,000
LT debt maturity
$ 0.4 mn
2017
2011
2010
2009
2008
LT debt
Cash
ST debt
(3,000)
$ 0.4mn
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
LT debt
(2,000)
ST debt
(1,000)
200
100
Cash
USD mn
Debt maturity
Strong free cash flows should cater for future refinancing requirements.
Page 77
2,800
500
2,400
400
200
Debt maturity
Cash
2011
LT debt
ST debt
2010
2009
100
2008
400
2010
800
300
2009
1,200
2008
Euro mn
1,600
Cash
Euro mn
2,000
LT debt
ST debt
22 October 2008
Strong net cash position (even after excluding prepayments from lump sum turnkey contracts which
represent broadly 50%).
Strong free cash flows should cater for future refinancing requirements.
400
350
300
250
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
LT debt
ST debt
200
150
100
50
Cash
USD mn
Strong free cash flows should cater for future refinancing requirements.
Un-drawn borrowing facilities (floating rate) available
:$38mn expiring in one year and $436mn expiring
between 2 and 5 years.
Page 78
22 October 2008
Figure 111: Detailed break-up of debt as at year ending 2007 (last annual report)
Curr.
Acergy
Type
$mn
$mn
Maturity
Interest rate
Net
debt/
(cash)
2007
Additional info
Convertible notes
Unsecured loan provided by Sonangol
to Sonamet
Total
NOK mn Bond - ISIN NO 0010341316
500
6
2013
2010
2.3%
2.8%
506
491
1-Dec-09
6.5%
Floating interest
638
1-Dec-11
6.9%
Floating interest
295
1-Dec-13
7.2%
Floating interest
6.0%
Fixed interest
Aker
NOK mn Bond - ISIN NO 0010342587
Solutions
NOK mn Deferred acquisition costs of TH
Resources
-73
147
1-Dec-13
407
NOK mn Loan
20
2010: 18mn
2011: 2mn
Amec
Total
GBP mn Loan
1,998
1
Lamprell
$ mn
$ mn
$ mn
$ mn
$ mn
Petrofac
No debt
Current:
Revolving credit facility
Short-term loan
Bank overdrafts
Current portion of
term loan
$ mn
Non Current:
Revolving credit facility
$ mn
Term loan
Eur mn
Eur mn
Eur mn
Eur mn
Eur mn
Eur mn
Eur mn
Eur mn
Eur mn
Eur mn
Eur mn
Eur mn
Eur mn
Eur mn
-1526
-733
-159.1
6.500
3.627
15.666
Within 1 year
Within 1 year
Within 1 year
2.662
Within 1 year
8.953
72.687
110
Saipem
1,621
14
597
105
3
4
227
5
81
3
55
238
39
41
400
480
16
3,929
US LIBOR + 0.875%
KD Discount Rate + 1.5%
UK LIBOR + 0.875%,
US LIBOR + 0.875%,
KD Discount Rate
+ 1.50%
US/UK LIBOR
+ 0.875% (4.95% to 5.84%)
-471
3.821% - 3.852%
2.462%
3.853% - 5.385%
5.484% - 6.545%
4.9550%
2.462%
6.251%
6.540%
5.540%
5.970%
3.761% - 4.722%
5.222% - 6.545%
1.451%
2017
2008: E5 mn
2010: E275 mn
2011: E200 mn
2009
4.710%
4.527% - 4.542%
5.541%
1759
Page 79
22 October 2008
Seadrill
Type
$ mn
$ mn
$ mn
Maturity
1,468
98
536
$ mn
130
149
Tranche A: $750 mn,
Tranche B: $350 mn
Tranche C: up to
$200 mn (based on value of
drilling contract)
West Eminence:
- Tranche A: $150 mn
- Tranche B: $150 mn
Subsea 7
Bonds
Bonds
Bonds
Bonds
Bonds
Bonds
Convertible bond loan
Other non-current loans
$ mn
$ mn
$ mn
Eur mn
Eur mn
Technip Eur mn
Eur mn
Bond loan
Bank borrowings and credit lines
Bank overdrafts
Accrued interest payable
$ mn
Additional info
LIBOR + 1.25%
6 yrs maturity, quarterly repayments with a final LIBOR + 0.70% upto Q4'08
balloon payment of US$300 mn.
Thereafter a grid pricing apply which
ranges from 70-100 basis points p.a.
depending on the Net Debt to
EBITDA ratio.
73 months maturity
LIBOR + 1.15%
72 months maturity
LIBOR + 1.20%
544
$ mn
$ mn
$ mn
$ mn
$ mn
$ mn
$ mn
$ mn
Net
debt/
(cash)
2007
$ mn
$ mn
Interest rate
42
19
186
93
93
30
1,000
53
4,601
256
132
0.4
388
650
3
25
19
697
46
12
58
350
NIBOR+2.95%
Fixed 7.70%
NIBOR + 1.25%
NIBOR + 0.75%
NIBOR + 1.60%
LIBOR + 2.03%
3.625%
06-Jun-11
29-Jun-17
2.8%
Zero coupon
YTM 0.95% p.a.
3588
2008
220
26-May-11
Average interest
rate at group level
is 4.84% for 2007
-1704.3
-422.3
2-5 years
Wood
Group
45
395
4.625%
Interest swaps
entered into for
50% of long term
borrowings
1 year
279
Page 80
22 October 2008
It pushes risk to the lowest level in the contracting chain where the firms have the least
financial depth.
The lowest levels have to accept the risk because they do not have the clout to ward off
the allocation.
The ability of the firms who are left with the risk can do very little to alter the risk should
it emerge on the project.
Page 81
22 October 2008
The result is that accountability is not in line with the risk and oil service companies have to
fund the completion of the project, and try and recover the costs from the sub-contractors or
through extras from the projects owner/operator.
Page 82
22 October 2008
Glossary
AHTS (Anchor Handling, Tug & Supply ship): Combination vessels operating in the offshore
market, intended for use in anchor-handling, tug operations and transportation of supplies.
Conventional/shallow waters: Depth of up to 400 metres (1,300ft).
Cost plus: The client is charged a day rate or project rate across the life of the project, with
any extra work required to complete the job added to the bill
Deep waters: Depths of over 400 metres (1,300 ft).
Commissioning: Series of processes and procedures undertaken in order to start operations
of a gas pipeline, associated plants and equipment.
Decommissioning: Series of processes and procedures undertaken in order to end
operations of a gas pipeline, associated plants and equipment. It may occur at the end of the
life of the plant, following an accident, for technical or financial reasons, and/or on
environmental or safety grounds.
Development (of a gas or oil field): All operations associated with the construction of
facilities to enable the production of oil and gas.
Drillship: A maritime vessel modified to include a drilling rig and special station-keeping
equipment. The vessel is typically capable of operating in deep water. A drillship must stay
relatively stationary on location in the water for extended periods of time. This positioning
may be accomplished with multiple anchors, dynamic propulsion (thrusters) or a combination
of these. Drillships typically carry larger payloads than semi-submersible drilling vessels, but
their motion characteristics are usually inferior.
Dynamically Positioned Heavy Lift Vessel: Vessel equipped with a heavy-lift crane, capable
of holding a precise position through the use of thrusters, thereby counteracting the force of
the wind, sea, current, etc.
EPC (Engineering, Procurement, and Construction): A type of contract typical of the onshore
construction sector, comprising the provision of engineering services, procurement of
materials and construction. The term turnkey indicates that the system is delivered to the
client ready for operations, i.e. already commissioned.
EPIC (Engineering, Procurement, Installation, Construction): A type of contract typical of
offshore construction sector, which relates to the realisation of a complex project where
global or main contractor (usually a construction company or a consortium) provides
engineering services, procurement of materials, construction of the system and
infrastructure, transport to site, installation and commissioning/preparatory activities to
start-up of operations.
the
the
the
its
the
Page 83
22 October 2008
GTL (Gas-to-Liquids): Transformation of natural gas into liquid fuel (Fischer Tropsch
technology).
22 October 2008
S-laying: Method of pipe-laying that utilises the elastic properties afforded by steel, making
the pipe configuration resemble an S, with one end on the seabed and the other under
tension onboard the ship. This configuration is suited to medium to shallow-water laying.
Spar: Floating production system, anchored to the seabed through a semi-rigid mooring
system, comprising a vertical cylindrical hull supporting the platform structure.
Spool: Connection between a sub-sea pipeline and the platform riser, or between the
terminations of two pipelines.
Submersible/semi-submersible drilling rig: A particular type of floating vessel, usually
used as a mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) that is supported primarily on large pontoonlike structures submerged below the sea surface.
Sub-sea Technology: All products and services required to install and operate production
installations on the seabed.
SURF facilities: Sub-sea Umbilicals Risers Flowlines pipelines and equipment connecting
the well or sub-sea system to a floating unit.
Template: Rigid and modular sub-sea structure where the oilfield wellheads are located.
Tendons: Pulling cables used on tension leg platforms used to ensure platform stability
during operations.
Tension leg platform (TLP): Fixed-type floating platform held in position by a system of
tendons and anchored to ballast caissons located on the seabed. These platforms are used in
ultra-deep waters.
Tie-in: Connection between a production line and a sub-sea wellhead or simply a connection
between two pipeline sections.
Topside: Portion of platform above the jacket.
Trunkline: Large diameter oil pipeline connecting large storage facilities to the production
facilities, refineries and/or onshore terminals. Used in shallow waters.
Trenching: Burying of offshore or onshore pipelines.
Umbilical: Flexible connecting sheath, containing flexible pipes and cables.
Page 85
22 October 2008
Page 86
22 October 2008
The authors of this report wish to acknowledge the contribution made by Dev Deep M an
employee of Irevna, a division of CRISIL Limited, a third-party provider to Deutsche Bank of
offshore research support services.
Page 87
22 October 2008
Appendix 1
Important Disclosures
Additional information available upon request
For disclosures pertaining to recommendations or estimates made on a security mentioned in this report, please see
the most recently published company report or visit our global disclosure look-up page on our website at
http://gm.db.com.
Analyst Certification
The views expressed in this report accurately reflect the personal views of the undersigned lead analyst about the subject
issuers and the securities of those issuers. In addition, the undersigned lead analyst has not and will not receive any
compensation for providing a specific recommendation or view in this report. Christyan Malek
400
48%
42%
300
200
32%
29%
10%
100
21%
0
Buy
Hold
Companies Covered
Sell
European Universe
Page 88
22 October 2008
Regulatory Disclosures
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EU
countries:
Disclosures
relating
to
our
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under
MiFiD
can
be
found
at
http://globalmarkets.db.com/riskdisclosures.
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Registration number - Registered as a financial instruments dealer by the Head of the Kanto Local Finance Bureau (Kinsho) No.
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