Review

Author(s): Howard Gardner

Review by: Howard Gardner
Source: Curriculum Theory Network, Vol. 4, No. 2/3, Curriculum in Art (1974), pp. 205-211
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education/University of
Toronto
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Reviews

Aestheticsand Psychobiology
By D. E. Berlyne

New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,

1971. 336 pages.

Reviewed by Howard Gardner, Harvard Project Zero and Boston

Veterans Administration Hospital

If aesthetics has been the "dismal" branch of philosophy, as many have

claimed, then the scientific investigation of art bids fair for the title of
the "dismal psychology." This lamentable state of affairs cannot be blamed
on the newness of "psycho-aesthetics," nor on the quality of the psychologists involved, nor even on the amount of thought devoted to the subject.
As Daniel Berlyne points out, psychologists have long been interested in
studying art, and many gifted practitioners have at one time or another
grappled with the enigmas of artistic production and appreciation. The
lack of significant progress seems rather to reflect the dizzying complexity
of the domain, the primitiveness of the tools and theories brought to bear
on problems, and the persistent pursuit of several relatively fruitless lines
of inquiry.
For many years, and for most individuals, the psychology of art has
meant one of two things: study of the factors that motivate individuals to
produce art, or the administration of tests which measure "creativity" or
"aesthetic potential." The first line of investigation has drawn heavily on
dynamic and psychoanalytic psychology; researchers have sought to determine whether the "artistic person" is more neurotic, less neurotic, has a
different personality from, or is simply more gifted than the nonartistic
individual. Growing out of the interest in "tests and measurements," the
second avenue of inquiry has compared large numbers of people on some
Work on this review was supported in part by the National Institute of Education (Grant
No. NE-G-oo-3-ol69) and the National Institute of Neurological Disease and Stroke
(Grant No. NS 11408).

205

REVIEWS/CURRICULUM

THEORY

NETWORK

4:2/3

(1974)

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206

HOWARD GARDNER/CTN

skill thought crucial in artistic endeavor-for instance, the subject's ability

to think of many uses for a paper clip, or his agreement with certain
statements made by purportedly artistic persons. Some interesting results
emerged from these research traditions but their net effect was inconclusive: strong correlations were rare, contradictory findings abundant,
and, most important, neither line of inquiry seemed especially pertinent
to the arts. For, after all, individuals who differ greatly in personality and
motivation become involved in the arts, and neither the ability to think
divergently nor espousing artistic sentiments seems necessary or sufficient
for artistic accomplishment. Approaches that more closely model artistic
processes and products clearly were wanted.
In the past decade or two, after numerous false starts, psychologists of
art seem finally to have converged upon more promising avenues of
exploration. They have affirmed that artistic activity involves well-developed and highly intricate cognitive processes-processes clearly related to,
but not identical with, the mentation required in science, politics, business,
sport, or any other realm of human activity. The arts are regarded as a
richly differentiated set of activities, which require perceptual discrimination, capacity for deep, sustained, and varied emotional reactions, highly
articulated and supple motor skills, intimate knowledge of the world, of
other individuals, and of oneself. Owing to the work of such sensitive
as Rudolph Arnheim (1954), Irvin Child (1969), Ernst
(;ombrich (1960), and Professor Berlyne, the psychology of art has been

investigators

transformed from a dismal to a delightful branch of psychology.

Now that the psychology of art has begun to discover its mission and
its place within the psychological sciences, there is an understandable
temptation to review old studies, to evaluate theoretical formulations, to
assess the current state of the art, to synthesize new findings, and to make
projections for further inquiry. In succumbing to this temptation, Professor Daniel Berlyne has produced a provocative, scholarly, and
wide-ranging
statement that will occupy a prominent niche in psycho-aesthetics during
the coming years. In addition to its comprehensive review of earlier work,
Berlyne's book presents a distinctive and carefully developed point of
view. The entire treatise should be regarded as a brief for his vision of the
psychology of art. As one who has recently fallen prey to the same temptation and has evolved a somewhat different point of view (see Gardner
1973a; 1973b), I would like to identify the main points of Berlyne's
perspective, indicate certain areas that elude his framework, and note some
emerging commonalities in contemporary psychologies of art.
A scholar steeped in classical psychological theory,
Berlyne is intent
upon introducing artistic issues into the psychological laboratory and
translating them into the language of psychology. A well-defined stimulus,
a measurable response, a precise indication of discrimination and
learning
are part and parcel of the psychologist's armamentarium, and
Berlyne
argues persuasively that any psychology of art must be fitted out with this
equipment. He proposes the term "psychobiology" to indicate those
facets which he deems central: concentration on observable behavior,
recognition of underlying biological processes, consideration of the func-

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REVIEWS

207

tion of different psychological processes.Other allegedly psychological

concerns, such as unconscious processes,phenomenological accounts of
inspiration, and description of aesthetic experiences in their full richness,

fall outsideof psychobiology.

Berlyne's argument builds directly on his earlier psychological work.

Though sympathetic to "traditional" learning theory and behaviorism,
Berlyne has accommodated as well to more "cognitive" approaches, such
as those identified with the developmental psychologists Vygotsky and
Piaget (Berlyne 1965). This breadth of interest has also been reflected in
Berlyne's major empirical work: exploring the relation between human

cognitive capacitiesand their emotional concomitants.Berlynehas undertaken a systematicstudy of those variableswhich engenderan increasein,
or a lowering of, an individual'slevel of arousalor activation.Such collative variablesas novelty, complexity,ambiguity,uncertainty,and surprise
have successfullyaccounted for an individual's interest in and reactions
to diverse forms of stimulation (Berlyne 1960). Berlyne maintains that
artistic objects are particularlysuited to produce such effects as arousal,
pleasure, or interest; the artist, in turn, has a developed capacity to
manipulate properties like the complexity or ambiguity of a pattern.
Experimentalaestheticsmay be defined as a study of such collative variables.
This interestin the interfacebetweencognitiveand emotionalreactions
is embellished by a number of additional themes. Berlyne regards the
emergenceof information theory as a crucial contribution to aesthetics,
for this technique allows precise and unambiguousascertainmentof the
relativecomplexity,goodness,or uncertaintyof patterns.At last psychologists can measure the properties toward which the Gestalt psychologists
could only point. Another welcome development has been the discovery
by physiologistsof differentcentersin the brain which apparentlymediate
pleasurablesensations,arousal, and inhibition. These, again, provide a
material underpinning for reactions about which earlier aestheticians
could only speculate. Berlyne values studies of exploratorybehavior in
human beings and animals, for they elucidate a vital motivational factor
that underlies, and indicates the common bonds among, play, scientific
inquiry, and artistic activity. Finally, Berlyne hails such analytic techniques as factoranalysisand multidimensionalscaling;for the firsttime it
has become possible to separateout the various componentsin aesthetic
reactions, such as pleasure-valueand interest-value,and to specify the
contributionsof each.
Berlyne's book consists of a careful exposition of each factor and
techniquein the mannerof a moderatelyadvancedtextbook, followed by
a considerationof their yields for an understandingof aesthetic phenomena in the style of a scholarlymonograph.There are rich discussionsof
findings about the nature of proportion,rhythm, and aesthetic balance:
full accounts of such psychophysical variables as intensity, size, color,
novelty, and ambiguity; plus a review of those investigations in the area
of perception, learning, and motivation which are of special moment for
the psycho-aesthetician. Having read the sixteen varied chapters, anyone

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HOWARD GARDNER/CTN

208

with some background in psychology and the arts should emerge with a
clear grasp of the principles employed by Berlyne and an assessment of
what these techniques have yielded.
The book is an excellent review of work in the psychology of art, and a
persuasive brief for his view of aesthetics and psychobiology. It clearly
signals the excitement in a field that has finally discovered which questions
to ask. Disputes will center on whether the research tradition that Berlyne
himself represents has resolved key issues. One's conclusions here will
reflect (and I believe Berlyne will concur with this claim) one's own views
about art and psychology, and these in turn depend upon basic epistemological and methodological assumptions.
Two broad approaches to an area like psycho-aesthetics can be defined.
The first, which may be termed the "elementarist," holds that our understanding of artistic objects and processes presupposes a complete understanding of their components. Such an understanding can only result from
experiments employing stimulus objects over which one has complete
control. Eventually, more complex stimuli can be devised that more
faithfully model artistic objects. The alternative, or "holistic," approach
requires that one commence with an intact artistic object or experience,
regardless of its complexity. The investigation attempts to understand this
on its own terms. Only then does one decompose the experience or object
into parts so that its components can be determined and explicated.
Such orientations exert a powerful influence on an investigator's
procedures. Take, for example, the question of style perception (e.g., see

Gardner 1971b; 1972). How does an individual

learn to perceive the char-

acteristic style of Renoir-compared, say, to Monet? The elementarist

might begin by devising simple artificial stimuli out of black and white
dots. Using these stimuli, whose components can be expressed mathematically, he would seek to understand how differences between such
patterns are perceived. Gradually, then, the investigator would devise
more complex patterns that increasingly approximate "natural" styles.
The holist, for his part, would begin by assembling actual works by Renoir
and Monet, and locating individuals who can and who cannot make the
contrast. Then he would gradually eliminate cues from the paintingssay, by deleting color or texture-in an effort to determine which features
of the stimuli are essential for the discrimination. Each approach has its
perils. The elementarist may never produce patterns which even approximate "real styles" and thus the validity of the findings might be challenged;
the holist may fail to isolate completely the specific variables in
complex
paintings and thus the reliability of his conclusions might be questioned.
As an investigator whose sympathies are closer to the holist
pole, I
must record my own disappointment at the yield of Professor
Berlyne's
approach. Although the psychobiological road to aesthetics is logical and
commendable, most of its conclusions have neither illuminated perennial
questions in aesthetics, nor, and this is a more serious charge, do they seem
conclusive. As Berlyne repeatedly points out, findings about the "optimal"
level of arousal, interest, and so on, are often inconsistent with one another,
and it seems possible to devise stimuli that will support nearly any theoreti-

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REV IEWS

209

cal position on the collative variables. To be sure, some robust generalizations have emerged from the copious researches undertaken by Berlyne
and his colleagues; but these depart little from common sense and are
unlikely to convince skeptics that psychology has successfully unwrapped
the mysteries of the arts. Many of the speculations in Berlyne's latter
chapters are of considerable interest, but these lack the very data base to
which he is strongly, and rightly, committed.
To this indictment it may be responded that the field is in its early
stages: having finally gotten on the right track, the psychological approach
will go on to make more striking discoveries. Whether this prediction is
borne out remains an empirical question. I can foresee a point in the future
when Berlyne's approach will have unraveled the secrets of an interesting
or complex or pleasing display and the rules for producing (or destroying)
others. It is also possible, however, that there are other, more promising
approaches.
This review is not the place to plead an alternative case, but, by suggesting some gaps in Berlyne's approach, I can perhaps hint at another perspective on the field. For all its explicit concern with the arts, Berlyne's treatment seems to me equally valid for nonartistic endeavors. For example,
problem-solving in mathematics can involve collative variables to the
same extent as the arts. Recognizing common links between the arts and
the sciences is fine, but if there are systematic differences between the
realms these must also be acknowledged. Otherwise the call for a psychology of art sounds strangely hollow. Berlyne fails to consider that a
principal difference between the arts and the sciences may lie in the kinds
of symbols and symbol systems that they employ (see Goodman 1968;
Gardner, Howard, and Perkins 1974). Such recognition seems necessary
for a precise determination of the ways in which involvement with mathematics differs from engagement with music or poetry. This point of view
also suggests that a particular stimulus may be treated in an artistic or in
a scientific way, depending on whether and in what manner certain kinds
of symbolic reference are apprehended (see Gardner 1971a; Gardner,
Howard, and Perkins 1974).

Closely related is the question of whether Berlyne's techniques of

measurement are appropriate to the arts. The information theory approach may well be suited to analyzing certain stimuli and symbols in the
arts, but it is not suitable when the artistic object does not allow a unit by
unit analysis. Thus, while artificial punctuate patterns are
susceptible to
such analysis, richly textured art works may not be. Since "dense" and
"replete" artistic objects may be ill-suited to an elemental analysis (Gardner, in press), Berlyne's techniques may turn out to be more appropriate
for nonaesthetic objects or for art objects treated in a nonaesthetic
way.
The particular emphasis in Aesthetics and Psychobiology

may also be

questioned. Berlyne has much to say about the artistic perceiver, little
about the creator, the composer, the performer, or the critic. His psychology focuses almost exclusively on the artistic product, saying little
about the processes that bring it about. His concern is almost wholly with
the normal adult; he does not confront the question of the different

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HOWARD GARDNER/CTN

developmental levels and stages in artistic perception characteristic of

the child, the novice, and the expert. Should the normal adult prove
limited in the extent to which his perceptual abilities can be modified,
or dependent upon a particular developmental history, Berlyne's approach
risks overlooking important contributing factors. Finally, Berlyne attempts
throughout to minimize the differences between various art forms and to
generalize about the arts. This tack may neglect important distinctions
among media, as well as the possibility that certain arts (e.g., music) may
have more in common with certain sciences (e.g., mathematics) than with
other art forms.
These comments, I must emphasize, are not meant as a criticism of
Berlyne's book. Rather, I mention them to indicate that he might have
made vastly different decisions about what to include in his book, and that
these decisions would have led to a much altered table of contents, set of
examples, theoretical framework, list of conclusions, and program for the
future. At this point in the evolution of psycho-aesthetics, however, I think
it is well to have competing points of view clearly delineated and defended.
Professor Berlyne has made an excellent case for his approach and need
have no fear that it will be rejected, as its appropriateness and utility for
contemporary investigators has been amply documented.
The psychology of art has yet to find its Darwin, its Freud, or its Piaget.
Competing methods and approaches will be the rule for the coming years
and, in a young and growing field, this is as it should be. What I find most
encouraging is that, over and above the differences that may exist, there
is an emerging consensus among those who till these fields. The psychology
of art is an important and respectable branch of psychology. It has clear
relations to and distinctions from the remaining body of psychological
theory and research. Artistic activity is seen to implicate a range of cognitive skills and to invoke a set of affective-emotional responses that can be
specified and carefully studied. Neurophysiological and neuropsychological research can provide convincing evidence of the existence of pattern
detectors, pleasure and arousal centers, and discrete perceptual-and-motor
skills central to aesthetic activity. Powerful statistical and computational
techniques offer the possibility of analyzing the complex stimuli presented
by the arts. A body of skills is seen as common to scientific and artistic
activity. Investigators can approach the phenomena of aesthetic pleasure
or creativity systematically and intelligently without destroying the concepts of aesthetic pleasure and creativity.
To be sure, some would favor an approach by way of the atoms,
elements, or building blocks of artistic activity, while others prefer to use
unambiguously artistic experience as their point of departure and to coax
out essential elements afterward. At this point it is perhaps most desirable
for investigators to approach pivotal questions from "above" and from
"below"-perhaps they may even meet each other halfway! The pluralism
reflected by differing emphases on production or perception, development
or mastery, processes or prolducts, may also be healthy. For those engaged
in these exciting inquiries,
s well as for those on the sidelines, Professor
;
Berlyne's volume constitutes essential background reading.

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REVIEWS

211

REFERENCES
ARNHEIM,

RUDOLPH.

Art and visual perception.Berkeleyand Los Angeles: Uni-

versity of California Press, 1954BERLYNE,

DANIEL E.

Conflict, arousal, and curiosity. New York: McGraw-Hill,

1960.

Structure and direction in thinking. New York: Wiley, 1965"Esthetics."In The individual in a social context. The Handbook
of Social Psychology, edited by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, vol. 3, 2d
ed. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969.
GARDNER, HOWARD.
"Problem-solving in the arts and sciences." Journal of Aesthetic Education 5, no. 1 (January 1971): 93-113. (a)
". "The development of sensitivity to artistic styles." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 29, no. 4 (Summer 1971): 515-27. (b)
S"Style sensitivity in children." Human Development 15, no. 6 (1972):
325-38.
The arts and human development. New York: Wiley, 1973. (a)
"Challenges for a psychology of art." Tresselt Memorial Lecture presented at New York University, May, 1973. (b) To be published in Proceedings.
". "A psychological examination of Nelson Goodman's theory of symbols."
The Monist, in press.
GARDNER, HOWARD:
HOWARD, VERNON; AND PERKINS, DAVID.
"Symbol systems: A
philosophical, psychological, and educational investigation." In Media and
symbols: The forms of expression, communication, and education, edited by
David R. Olson. Seventy-Third Yearbook of the National Society for the Study
of Education, Part i. Chicago: National Society for the Study of Education, 1974.
ERNST
H. Art and illusion. New York: Pantheon Books, 1960.
GOMBRICH,
GOODMAN, NELSON. Languagesof art. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968.
CHILD, IRVIN L.

The Arts and HumanDevelopment

By Howard Gardner
New York: Wiley, 1973. 395 pages.

Reviewed by D. E. Berlyne, University of Toronto

This book eloquently argues some points that everyone interested in child
and everyone interested in aesthetics must think about
development
The
author contends that, if one looks for them, one can find
seriously.
artistic
abilities and sensibilities in the young child; that aestheimpressive
tic development is an extremely important facet of human growth; and
that leading developmental psychologists, notably Piaget, have neglected
it, though they might with advantage study aesthetic development in
conjunction with the facets on which they have concentrated. He presents
a dazzling array of ideas and lines of research that bear on his themes,
but most of them are touched on too briefly for the reader to grasp their
full implications and to appraise them critically.
Gardner's approach makes much of three developing "systems" concerned with making, perceiving, and feeling. He does not have the space,
however, to explain fully the sense in which these systems are differentiable,
nor in what way the differentiation helps-except
to provide convenient
His
notion
of
"modes
and
vectors" is derived from
chapter headings.
Erikson's conceptual scheme but is formulated with a view to facilitating
synthesis with the work of Piaget, the ethologists, and others. Unfortu-

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