G.R. No.

170432

March 24, 2008

FRANCIA vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN

CORONA, J.:
On February 6, 2003, respondent Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan filed a
complaint for expropriation against petitioners Amos, Cecilia and Benjamin,
all surnamed Francia, in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Respondent needed
petitioners' 16,256 sq. m. idle property to establish a common public
terminal for all types of public utility vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy
trucks.
In their answer, petitioners denied that the property sought to be
expropriated was raw land. It was in fact developed and there were plans for
further development. For this reason, respondents offer price of P2,333,500
(or P111.99 per square meter) was too low.
After trial, the RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a public purpose. The
construction of a common terminal for all public utility conveyances (serving
as a two-way loading and unloading point for commuters and goods) would
improve the flow of vehicular traffic during rush hours. Moreover, the
property was the best site for the proposed terminal because of its
accessibility. Thus, the RTC ordered the respondent to deposit with the Court
15% of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated, afterwhich, it may take
immediate possession of the property upon issuance of writ of possession.
Petitioners filed an MR which was denied. Aggrieved, they filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA contending that the RTC issued the orders without
conducting a hearing to determine the existence of a public purpose.
The CA held that petitioners were deprived of an opportunity to controvert
respondent's allegations, and nullified the order of expropriation except with
regard to the writ of possession. According to the CA, a hearing was not
necessary because once the expropriator deposited the required amount
(with the Court), the issuance of a writ of possession became ministerial.
ISSUE: WON prior determination of the existence of a public purpose was
necessary for the issuance of a writ of possession.

RULING: No. Section 19, of R.A. No. 7160 states:

Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That
the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and that such offer
was not accepted; Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the
proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market
value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That, the amount to be
paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court,
based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property
sought to be expropriated, it must:
(1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the
proper court and
(2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair market
value based on its current tax declaration.
The law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition
precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession.

G.R. No. L-23825

December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL,

respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
From September to October 1964, the President, acting pursuant to Sec. 68
of the Revised Administrative Code, issued several Executive Orders (93-121,
124, 126-129), creating 33 municipalities. In November 1964, Pelaez as
VPres of the Philippines and as a taxpayer, instituted the present special civil
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the
Auditor General to restrain him from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the
ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 2370
and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Under R.A. No. 2370, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas
affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues,
accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a
barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities?"
Respondent argues that a new municipality can be created without creating
new barrios, such as by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new
municipality.
ISSUE: WON the creation of the 33 municipalities was an undue delegation
of legislative power.
RULING: Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
legislative in nature. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of
the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement
or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the

principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it

must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented
by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well
settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in
the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out
or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do
not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of
Section 68, the President ...may change the seat of the government within
any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require. It is
apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the
public welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just
quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the government may be
transferred.
ISSUE: WON the President has the authority to create a municipality.
RULING: No. The statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a
new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities,
each of which consists of several barrios.
Furthermore, under Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Constitution, the
President is only given the authority to exercise general supervision over
LGUs. Hence he is limited to checking whether the LGU or its officers perform
their duties as provided by statutory enactment. He cannot interfere with
LGUs so long as they act within the scope of their authority. He may not
enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass,
even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law. He may not
vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope
of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even
suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary
action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding
provincial board.
BUT if the President is given the authority to create a municipality, he could,
in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and
including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his

office would thereby become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power
to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he
could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect,
exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
The power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus
or offices includes only the power to assume directly the functions thereof or
to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. It does not include the
authority to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new
one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create
municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an
authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices.
In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, instead of
giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in
him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the
process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power
over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive
departments, bureaus or offices.

G.R. No. L-28113

March 28, 1969

MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG vs. BENITO

CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, while the
respondents are the mayor (Benito) and councilors of the municipality of
Balabagan of the same province. Balabagan was formerly a part of
Malabang, having been created in 1960 E.O. 386 of the then President Carlos
P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios of the latter municipality.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify E.O. 386 and to
restrain the respondents from performing the functions of their respective
office relying on the rulings of Pelaez v. Auditor General and Municipality of
San Joaquin v. Siva.

In Pelaez, this Court ruled: (1) that section 23 of Republic Act 2370 [Barrio
Charter Act, approved January 1, 1960], by vesting the power to create
barrios in the provincial board, is a "statutory denial of the presidential
authority to create a new barrio and implies a negation of the bigger power
to create municipalities," and (2) that Section 68 of the Administrative Code,
insofar as it gives the President the power to create municipalities, is
unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power and (b) because it offends against section 10 (1) of Article VII of the
Constitution, which limits the President's power over local governments to
mere supervision.
Respondents argued that the rule in Pelaez does not apply in this case
because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, Balabagan is at least a
de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before
this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or
appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate
functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. As a
de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, but it may
be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the
State and not of an individual like Balindong.
ISSUE: WON the existence of Balabagan may be questioned by an individual
like Balindong.
RULING: As a general rule, an inquiry into the legal existence of a
municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or
other direct proceeding, and only in a few exceptions may a private person
exercise this function of government. But the rule disallowing collateral
attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de facto
corporation. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a
nullity, the rule is that its existence may be, questioned collaterally or
directly in any action or proceeding by anyone whose rights or interests are
affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless
they are estopped by their conduct from doing so.
ISSUE: WON Balabagan is at least a de facto municipal corporation.
RULING: No.
Respondents argue that Balabagan is a de facto corporation, having been
organized before the Courts decision in Pelaez. Hence, the question is

whether a statute can lend a color of validity to an attempted organization of

a municipality despite the fact that such statute is subsequently declared
unconstitutional.
Two views: (1) A de facto corporation cannot exist where the statute or
charter creating it is unconstitutional because there can be no de facto
corporation where there can be no de jure one; (2) a statute is binding until it
is condemned as unconstitutional.
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such
despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the
decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was
some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in
the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when
the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto
corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in
question, there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its
creation.
ISSUE: WON the invalidation of E.O. 386 would have the effect of unsettling
many acts done in reliance upon the validity of its creation.
RULING: No. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never
been passed. Executive Order 386, being unconstitutional, created no office.
This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the municipality of
Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the
executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed." For the existence of Executive, Order 386 is "an
operative fact which cannot justly be ignored."
The actual existence of a statute, prior to its determination as
unconstitutional, is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to
be considered in various aspects with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public

policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination.

G.R. No. 105746 December 2, 1996

MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ vs. HON. VICENTE T. BAZ
MENDOZA, J.:p
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by E.O. No. 258 of then Pres.
Quirino, pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
Under the said E.O., Sinacaban shall consist of the southern portion of the
municipality of Jimenez. Hence, the municipality of Jimenez shall have its
present territory minus the portion thereof included in Sinacaban.
In 1988, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrios Macabayao, Adorable,
Sinara Baja and Sinara Alto ased on the technical description in E.O. 258.
Jimenez conceded that under E.O. 258, the disputed area is indeed part of
Sinacaban, but asserted jurisdiction over the same, on the basis of an
agreement it had with Sinacaban which had been approved by the Provincial
Board of Misamis Occidental in 1950, fixing the common boundary as
follows: xxx such that the barrio of Macabayao, Sitio Adorable and site will
be a part of Jimenez down and the sitios of San Vicente, Donan, Estrella,
Mapula will be a part of Sinacaban.
In 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of
Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement
between the municipalities was void because the Board had no power to
alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No. 258, that power being
vested in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the Local Government
Code of 1983.
Hence, in 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in the RTC Oroquieta City against Sinacaban, the Province of
Misamis Occidental and its Provincial Board, etc. Jimenez alleged that, in
accordance with the decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the power to
create municipalities is essentially legislative and consequently Sinacaban,

which was created by an executive order, had no legal personality and no

right to assert a territorial claim vis-a-vis Jimenez, of which it remains part.
The RTC declared that the municipality of Sinacaban shall continue to exist
and operate as a regular municipality. It further held that the 1989 decision
by the Provincial Board fixing the boundaries between Sinacaban and
Jimenez as null and void, for not being in accordance with the boundaries
provided for in E.O. 258 creating the municipality of Sinacaban.
ISSUE: WON Sinacaban legally exists, hence it has legal personality to file a
claim (of Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja and Sinara Alto).
RULING: Yes. In Pelaez vs. Auditor General, the Court ruled that the creation
of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter. Based on such a
ruling, the President was without power to create by executive order the
Municipality of Sinacaban.
BUT, where a municipality created by executive order is later impliedly
recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer
be questioned. The following factors are sufficient as to confer on Sinacaban
the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation: (1) Sinacaban had
been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was
decided in 1965, yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been
questioned; (2) created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence
was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently
is desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under the
Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its
charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act
complained of was done or committed; (3) the State has recognized
Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33, as
reiterated by 31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129),
Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the
establishment of MCTCs in the country; (4) Jimenez had also earlier
recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it
regarding their common boundary, as embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.
Furthermore, Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative
districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the
Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, 442(d) of the Local

Government Code of 1991 cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban.

This provision states:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
ISSUE: WON R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 442(d) is invalid, since it does not conform
to the constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites
in the creation of new municipalities.
RULING: No. Since, as previously explained, Sinacaban had attained de
facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2,
1987, it is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. This requirement applies
only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. It
cannot, therefore, be applied to municipal corporations created before, such
as the Municipality of Sinacaban in the case at bar.
ISSUE: WON the Provincial Board through Resolution No. 77 had the
authority to approve the agreement made between Jimenez and Sinabacan
with respect to the questioned territory (or WON it had the power to declare
certain barrios as part of one or the other municipality).
RULING: No, if the effect would be to amend the area as described in E.O.
No. 258 creating Sinabacan. As held in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the power
of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is "of an administrative
nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities." It is a power "to fix common
boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities." It is thus limited to implementing the law creating a
municipality. It is obvious that any alteration of boundaries that is not in
accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect
of that law but its amendment. If, therefore, Resolution No. 77 of the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical
description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as
basis for opposing the claim of Sinacaban.

G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. MENDEZ
VITUG, J.:
In 1959, Pres. Garcia issued E.O. No. 353 creating the municipal district of
San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of
the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy,
Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios. Executive Order No. 353
was issued upon the request of the municipal council of San Narciso in its
Resolution No. 8, May 1959.
By virtue of E.O. 174, October 1965, issued by Pres. Macapagal, San Andres
was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class
municipality beginning July 1963 by operation of R.A. No. 1515. The E.O.
added that "the conversion of this municipal district into a municipality as
proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of
Representatives."
In 1989, San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC against
the officials of San Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of
E.O. No. 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of San Andres be
permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of
their respective offices. Petitioners invoked the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor
General.
Respondents countered that since it was at the instance of San Narciso that
San Andres was given life with the issuance of E.O. No. 353, San Narciso
should be deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new
municipality; that because San Andres had been in existence since 1959, its
corporate personality could no longer be assailed; and that, considering the
petition to be one for quo warranto, San Narciso was not the proper party to
bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting through
the Solicitor General.
In the meantime, the Local Government Code of 1991 took effect. San
Andres moved to dismiss, citing Sec. 442(d) of the law, which states:
Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. . . .

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code

shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
ISSUE: WON San Andres is legally existing.
RULING: Yes. Executive Order No. 353 creating San Andres was in 1959 but
it was only after almost 30 years, or in 1989, that San Narciso finally decided
to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the
Municipal District, and later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and
continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created LGU. Public
interest demands that a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful
authority of a political subdivision be timely raised.
Granting the E.O. No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances
in this case show that San Andres has at least attained the status of a de
facto municipal corporation.
Created in 1959, San Andres had been in existence for more than 6 years
when Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling in Pelaez would
have given rise to a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of E.O. No.
353 but certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of
the continued existence of San Andres. Thus, after more than 5 years as a
municipal district, E.O. No. 174 classified San Andres as a fifth class
municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in R.A.
No. 1515. Section 31 of B.P. 129, aka the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of MCTCs in the
country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits
organized under A.O. No. 33, June 1978. Under this administrative order, San
Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San
Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality
must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance apportioning the seats of the HOR,
appended to the 1987 Constitution, San Andres has been considered to be
one of the 12 municipalities composing the Third District of the province of
Quezon.

Lastly, the power to create political subdivisions is a function of the

legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in
the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at
giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing
laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in
this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of
vested rights. Hence, the de jure status of San Andres in the province of
Quezon must now be conceded.

G.R. No. 129093

August 30, 2001

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR. vs. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONY
CALVENTO
QUISUMBING, J.:
Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the PCSO to install Terminal OM 20 for
the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna,
for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied on the ground
that an ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna
(Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995) prohibiting the operation of lotto in Laguna.
Thereafter, Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction and TRO. He prayed for (1) a preliminary injunction or
TRO, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Cataquiz to issue
a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order
annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
The RTC enjoined the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution
or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid.
RULING: Yes. The Ordinance merely states the objection of the council to the
operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. It is but a mere policy statement
on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve
as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province
of Laguna. Petitioners admit so when they stated in their petition that: xxx
the resolution is a policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna
of its vehement opposition and/or objection to the operation of and/or all
forms of gambling including the Lotto operation in the Province of Laguna.
As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the
lotto, such resolution is valid.
ISSUE: WON an LGU may validly prohibit the operation of lotto and all forms
of gambling in the exercise of its local police power embodied in the General
Welfare Clause of the LGC.

RULING: No. While the Ordinance is upheld as a valid as part of the LGUs
autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national
government, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that
local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly
enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case
could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance
prohibiting the operation of lotto.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national
government through an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended, is
the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the
lotteries.
This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the
national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue
a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated
otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as
lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
The power of LGUs to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is
merely a delegated power coming from Congress. Municipal governments
are only agents of the national government. The delegate cannot be superior
to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of
Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and
negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any
form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited
and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization". It does not make local governments sovereign within the
state or an "imperium in imperio."