Tive For Survival, Regulative of Life Prospects, or Simply Life-Enhancing. Claims For More
Tive For Survival, Regulative of Life Prospects, or Simply Life-Enhancing. Claims For More
Tive For Survival, Regulative of Life Prospects, or Simply Life-Enhancing. Claims For More
Though far removed from actual application, in principle, goods and services may
be categorized and distributed according to their functionality: Goods can be constitutive for survival, regulative of life prospects, or simply life-enhancing. Claims for more
equal participation in sharing of the goods and services are stronger for constitutive
goods than life-enhancing goods. These distinctions are helpful in the abstract, though
little is said about how to implement these guidelines.
In Part 5 (the final part) Barrera presents a framework for understanding modern
Catholic social principles. It is here that one finds a well-organized discussion of important foundational principles such as the creation in the image of God, redemption,
human flourishing, integral human development, subsidiarity, the primacy of labor,
solidarity, the common good in its various aspects, and others. These chapters will
prove invaluable to any student of Catholic Social Thought, looking for an organizing
hermenutic for the tradition. On the other hand, Barrera himself might have been more
in touch with empirical issues and with the signs of the times. This would apply to
contemporary issues outside of the Church such as NAFTA, the meltdown of the dot
coms, the ethical role of a CFO (I am thinking of Enron), tax cuts, and other concrete
issues. The application of the teaching within the Church is also important for issues of
accountability, checks and balances, and so forth. Can anyone talk about Catholic
Social Thought in these times without addressing its behavior in the largest and most
jarring crisis in centuries? I predict that application of the social teachings of the
tradition to the Church itself will and should occupy much more space in future works
that want serious credibility.
Overall, Barrera has written a very helpful book, especially on a theoretical level,
as it provides an organizing hermenutic of the many social ethical principles contained
within the tradition.
Richard C. Bayer
The Five OClock Club, New York
468
Perhaps the two most prominent contributors to this natural-law revival have been
the moral theologian, Germain Grisez, and the legal philosopher, John Finnis. It was
no coincidence that Grisez and Finnis were the first two laymen appointed to the popes
International Theological Commission. In many respects, they have (almost singlehandedly) forced Christians and non-Christians alike to reassess the case for natural
law, just when many liberal Protestants and heterodox Catholics thought they had managed to relegate it to the dust-bin of history.
The first generation of students of what is often called the new natural law school
are now beginning to exert their influence in a range of areas. Perhaps the most wellknown is Princeton Universitys McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Robert P.
George. Nowhere in his many writings does George claim to have modified new
natural-law theory. His particular contribution has been to apply new natural-law
thought to a range of public policy questions in ways that directly challenge the
assumptions of what George calls the secular orthodoxy that dominates the public
square. These are the questions addressed by George in the collection of essays contained in his latest book, The Clash of Orthodoxies.
Written in language accessible to nonspecialists in jurisprudence, natural law, and
theology, the common thread of The Clash of Orthodoxies is Georges conviction that
the Judeo-Christian understanding of the world is more reasonable than its secular
alternatives. By secular, George does not have in mind the ecclesiastical-temporal
distinction. Rather, he means secularist philosophical commitments, as personified by
John Rawls and Robert Nozick and, at the outer extremity of unreason, Georges
Princeton colleague, Peter Singer. Though these scholars differ among themselves
about questions such as the limits of private property, George maintains that all secularists (whether they realize it or not) share the same concept of man. It is this anthropology, especially its concept of the precise relationship between human reason, free
will, and the passions that George finds so wanting.
The essence of Georges position may be found in his first essay, which carefully
compares the respective claims that Judeo-Christianity and orthodox secularists make
about the nature of man. Here George raises, among other things, grave questions
about whether secularists can believe, on the basis of their own Humean-utilitarian
anthropology, that free choice is real.
Many of the other essays reflect Georges rigorous application of this analysis to
debates within the public square, the law, and the church. In each instance, George
demonstrates that secular liberals like Rawls, as well as homosexual polemicists such
as Andrew Sullivan, are essentially seeking to rationalize positions that can only ultimately be justified on the basis of emotivist (i.e., unreasonable) understandings of
man.
Particularly important is Georges elucidation of the sheer narrowness of Rawls
portrait of public reason. Believing Jews and Christians, George maintains, should be
willing to debate public policy questions on the basis of reason. But, as George illustrates, Rawls concept of public reason effectively skews the discussion in favor of
469
Reviews
Though far removed from actual application, in principle, goods and services may
be categorized and distributed according to their functionality: Goods can be constitutive for survival, regulative of life prospects, or simply life-enhancing. Claims for more
equal participation in sharing of the goods and services are stronger for constitutive
goods than life-enhancing goods. These distinctions are helpful in the abstract, though
little is said about how to implement these guidelines.
In Part 5 (the final part) Barrera presents a framework for understanding modern
Catholic social principles. It is here that one finds a well-organized discussion of important foundational principles such as the creation in the image of God, redemption,
human flourishing, integral human development, subsidiarity, the primacy of labor,
solidarity, the common good in its various aspects, and others. These chapters will
prove invaluable to any student of Catholic Social Thought, looking for an organizing
hermenutic for the tradition. On the other hand, Barrera himself might have been more
in touch with empirical issues and with the signs of the times. This would apply to
contemporary issues outside of the Church such as NAFTA, the meltdown of the dot
coms, the ethical role of a CFO (I am thinking of Enron), tax cuts, and other concrete
issues. The application of the teaching within the Church is also important for issues of
accountability, checks and balances, and so forth. Can anyone talk about Catholic
Social Thought in these times without addressing its behavior in the largest and most
jarring crisis in centuries? I predict that application of the social teachings of the
tradition to the Church itself will and should occupy much more space in future works
that want serious credibility.
Overall, Barrera has written a very helpful book, especially on a theoretical level,
as it provides an organizing hermenutic of the many social ethical principles contained
within the tradition.
Richard C. Bayer
The Five OClock Club, New York
468
Perhaps the two most prominent contributors to this natural-law revival have been
the moral theologian, Germain Grisez, and the legal philosopher, John Finnis. It was
no coincidence that Grisez and Finnis were the first two laymen appointed to the popes
International Theological Commission. In many respects, they have (almost singlehandedly) forced Christians and non-Christians alike to reassess the case for natural
law, just when many liberal Protestants and heterodox Catholics thought they had managed to relegate it to the dust-bin of history.
The first generation of students of what is often called the new natural law school
are now beginning to exert their influence in a range of areas. Perhaps the most wellknown is Princeton Universitys McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Robert P.
George. Nowhere in his many writings does George claim to have modified new
natural-law theory. His particular contribution has been to apply new natural-law
thought to a range of public policy questions in ways that directly challenge the
assumptions of what George calls the secular orthodoxy that dominates the public
square. These are the questions addressed by George in the collection of essays contained in his latest book, The Clash of Orthodoxies.
Written in language accessible to nonspecialists in jurisprudence, natural law, and
theology, the common thread of The Clash of Orthodoxies is Georges conviction that
the Judeo-Christian understanding of the world is more reasonable than its secular
alternatives. By secular, George does not have in mind the ecclesiastical-temporal
distinction. Rather, he means secularist philosophical commitments, as personified by
John Rawls and Robert Nozick and, at the outer extremity of unreason, Georges
Princeton colleague, Peter Singer. Though these scholars differ among themselves
about questions such as the limits of private property, George maintains that all secularists (whether they realize it or not) share the same concept of man. It is this anthropology, especially its concept of the precise relationship between human reason, free
will, and the passions that George finds so wanting.
The essence of Georges position may be found in his first essay, which carefully
compares the respective claims that Judeo-Christianity and orthodox secularists make
about the nature of man. Here George raises, among other things, grave questions
about whether secularists can believe, on the basis of their own Humean-utilitarian
anthropology, that free choice is real.
Many of the other essays reflect Georges rigorous application of this analysis to
debates within the public square, the law, and the church. In each instance, George
demonstrates that secular liberals like Rawls, as well as homosexual polemicists such
as Andrew Sullivan, are essentially seeking to rationalize positions that can only ultimately be justified on the basis of emotivist (i.e., unreasonable) understandings of
man.
Particularly important is Georges elucidation of the sheer narrowness of Rawls
portrait of public reason. Believing Jews and Christians, George maintains, should be
willing to debate public policy questions on the basis of reason. But, as George illustrates, Rawls concept of public reason effectively skews the discussion in favor of
469
Reviews
unreasonable secularist assumptions. Highlighting this problem is important, not least
because of the hegemony exerted by Rawlsian thought throughout much of the academy. This ascendancy includes a number of Christian scholars (some of whom were
once regularly consulted by Protestant and Catholic leaders on public policy questions)
who are, more or less, in thrall to the Rawlsian concept of justice.
Given the fixation of many secularists with lifestyle liberationist issues, the
reader will not be surprised that several of Georges essays focus on questions such as
abortion, homosexual marriage, and euthanasia, but these essays also raise important
questions about the coherence and effectiveness of approaches to public policy by
Christian leaders over the past twenty years. In this respect, many will be struck by the
strength of Georges critique of the American Catholic Bishops Conference and some
of their staff bureaucrats during the period in which Cardinal Joseph Bernardin wielded
great influence within the Conference. One suspects that this essay may encourage
scholars to engage in a longerand, some might say, long overduecritique of what
various commentators have labeled the Bernardin project.
Yet, for all his criticisms of secular orthodoxy and those Christians who (as Cardinal
Francis George once famously remarked) apparently regard the New York Times as
their primary source of Revelation, George is not a Christian who wants to reside in a
ghetto and pretend that modernity never happened. He is very comfortable with many
modern institutions that many liberals claim as their own. Nor is George opposed to
pluralism. Much of this book is directed to showing how Christians may speak coherently of a reasonable pluralism in ways that Rawls (who, ironically enough, coined
the term) and other secularists cannot.
But given the tendency of some to label George as a conservative, many will be
surprised to learn that there is, in fact, a type of liberalism that George believes can
be integrated into orthodox Christian belief. It is, in fact, a liberalism that rebuffs the
culture of death and embraces a liberal range of practices and institutions in the
name of a freedom directed to truth. In Georges words:
This is not the liberalism of abortion, euthanasia, and the sexual revolution. It is the
liberalism, rather, of the rule of law, democratic self-governance, subsidiarity, social
solidarity, private property, limited government, equal protection, and basic human
freedoms, such as those of speech, press, assembly, and, above all, religion. It is
the liberalism of Lincoln and the American founders, of Newman and Chesterton, of
the Second Vatican Council and John Paul II: A liberalism of life (56).
Much work is, however, needed to deepen understanding of the full implications of
this liberalism. The Clash of Orthodoxies only sketches an outline. One especially
important question requiring reflection is the extent to which institutions such as democratic self-government and private property depend upon secularist premises for their
coherence in the modern world. The answer to this question will effectively determine
whether the liberalism of which George speaks is possible.
470
471
Reviews
unreasonable secularist assumptions. Highlighting this problem is important, not least
because of the hegemony exerted by Rawlsian thought throughout much of the academy. This ascendancy includes a number of Christian scholars (some of whom were
once regularly consulted by Protestant and Catholic leaders on public policy questions)
who are, more or less, in thrall to the Rawlsian concept of justice.
Given the fixation of many secularists with lifestyle liberationist issues, the
reader will not be surprised that several of Georges essays focus on questions such as
abortion, homosexual marriage, and euthanasia, but these essays also raise important
questions about the coherence and effectiveness of approaches to public policy by
Christian leaders over the past twenty years. In this respect, many will be struck by the
strength of Georges critique of the American Catholic Bishops Conference and some
of their staff bureaucrats during the period in which Cardinal Joseph Bernardin wielded
great influence within the Conference. One suspects that this essay may encourage
scholars to engage in a longerand, some might say, long overduecritique of what
various commentators have labeled the Bernardin project.
Yet, for all his criticisms of secular orthodoxy and those Christians who (as Cardinal
Francis George once famously remarked) apparently regard the New York Times as
their primary source of Revelation, George is not a Christian who wants to reside in a
ghetto and pretend that modernity never happened. He is very comfortable with many
modern institutions that many liberals claim as their own. Nor is George opposed to
pluralism. Much of this book is directed to showing how Christians may speak coherently of a reasonable pluralism in ways that Rawls (who, ironically enough, coined
the term) and other secularists cannot.
But given the tendency of some to label George as a conservative, many will be
surprised to learn that there is, in fact, a type of liberalism that George believes can
be integrated into orthodox Christian belief. It is, in fact, a liberalism that rebuffs the
culture of death and embraces a liberal range of practices and institutions in the
name of a freedom directed to truth. In Georges words:
This is not the liberalism of abortion, euthanasia, and the sexual revolution. It is the
liberalism, rather, of the rule of law, democratic self-governance, subsidiarity, social
solidarity, private property, limited government, equal protection, and basic human
freedoms, such as those of speech, press, assembly, and, above all, religion. It is
the liberalism of Lincoln and the American founders, of Newman and Chesterton, of
the Second Vatican Council and John Paul II: A liberalism of life (56).
Much work is, however, needed to deepen understanding of the full implications of
this liberalism. The Clash of Orthodoxies only sketches an outline. One especially
important question requiring reflection is the extent to which institutions such as democratic self-government and private property depend upon secularist premises for their
coherence in the modern world. The answer to this question will effectively determine
whether the liberalism of which George speaks is possible.
470
471