Republic vs. Meralco
Republic vs. Meralco
Republic vs. Meralco
MERALCO
Respondents Contention:
Petitioners Contention:
ERC: the ERC proffered a divergent view from the Office of the Solicitor
General. The ERC submits that income taxes are not operating expenses but
are reasonable costs that may be recoverable from the consuming public.
While the ERC admits that "there is still no categorical determination on
whether income tax should indeed be deducted from revenues of a public
utility," it agrees with MERALCO that to disallow public utilities from
recovering its income tax payments will effectively lower the return on rate
base enjoyed by a public utility to 8%. The ERC, however, agrees with this
Court's ruling that the use of the "net average investment method" or the
"number of months use method" is not unreasonable.
OSG: The Office of the Solicitor General, under its solemn duty to protect the
interests of the people, defended the thesis that income tax payments by a
public utility should not be recovered as costs from the consuming public
ISSUE:
WON the finding of the ERB on the rate that can be charged by MERALCO
to its consumers is proper.
HELD:
In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public
against arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and
quality of services rendered. However, the power to regulate rates does not
give the State the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the
public utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed
by the State must be one that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the
value of the property performing the service and one that is reasonable to the
public for the services rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable rates
involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.
While the power to fix rates is a legislative function, whether exercised by the
legislature itself or delegated through an administrative agency, a
determination of whether the rates so fixed are reasonable and just is a
purely judicial question and is subject to the review of the courts.
In the fixing of rates, the only standard which the legislature is required to
prescribe for the guidance of the ad-of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied. What is a just and reasonable
rate is a question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense,
and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. The requirement of
reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be
confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive. In determining whether a rate is
confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given situation, requirements
and opportunities of the utility.
Settled jurisprudence holds that factual findings of administrative bodies on
technical matters within their area of expertise should be accorded not only
respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if
not overwhelming or preponderant. In one case, we cautioned that courts
should refrain from substituting their discretion on the weight of the evidence
for the discretion of the Public Service Commission on questions of fact and
will only reverse or modify such orders of the Public Service Commission
when it really appears that the evidence is insufficient to support their
conclusions.
In the cases at bar, findings and conclusions of the ERB on the rate that
can be charged by MERALCO to the public should be respected. The
function of the court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is to
determine whether under the facts and circumstances, the final order
entered by the administrative agency is unlawful or unreasonable.
Thus, to the extent that the administrative agency has not been
arbitrary or capricious in the exercise of its power, the time-honored
principle is that courts should not interfere. The principle of separation of
powers dictates that courts should hesitate to review the acts of
administrative officers except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.
The ERB correctly ruled that income tax should not be included in the
computation of operating expenses of a public utility. Income tax paid by a
public utility is inconsistent with the nature of operating expenses. In general,
operating expenses are those which are reasonably incurred in connection
with business operations to yield revenue or income. They are items of
expenses which contribute or are attributable to the production of income or
revenue. As correctly put by the ERB, operating expenses should be a
requisite of or necessary in the operation of a utility, recurring, and that it
redounds to the service or benefit of customers.
Income tax, it should be stressed, is imposed on an individual or entity as a
form of excise tax or a tax on the privilege of earning income. In exchange for
the protection extended by the State to the taxpayer, the government collects
taxes as a source of revenue to finance its activities. Clearly, by its nature,
income tax payments of a public utility are not expenses which contribute to
or are incurred in connection with the production of profit of a public utility.
Income tax should be borne by the taxpayer alone as they are payments
made in exchange for benefits received by the taxpayer from the State.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.