51 Tan Vs City of Davao

Digested by:
DULCE JASMIN A. CANONES

LLB III-A
#51 (Escheat-Rule 91)
G.R. No. L-44347 September 29, 1988
VICENTE TAN, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF DAVAO, respondent.
FACTS
Dominga Garcia is the adopted child of spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia, who were residents of
Davao City. The former married a Chinaman, Tan Seng alias Seng Yap, with whom she had 3 children one of whom is the
named petitioner herein. In 1923, they emigrated in Canton, China. Accordingly, Dominga died intestate and left a lot in
Davao City but neither her husband nor her children returned to the Philippines to claim the lot.
Years after Domingas adoptive parent, Cornelia Pizarro died, the latters nephew, Ramon Pizarro occupied a part
of Domingas property and collected the rentals from the owners of other houses occupying the land. Another nephew, in
a burst of civic spirit, informed the Solicitor General about the property, which led to the investigation of the City Fiscal and
NBI.
On September 12, 1962, the City of Davao filed a petition in the CFI of Davao to declare Dominga Garcia's land
escheated in its favor. It alleged that Dominga Garcia and her children are presumed to be dead and since Dominga
Garcia left no heir person by law entitled to inherit her estate, the same should be escheated pursuant to Rule 92 of the
Rules of Court. The court set the petition for hearing and directed the City to cause (as it did ) the publication of its petition
in the 'Mindanao Times," a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Davao, and in the Official Gazette,
once a week for six (6) consecutive weeks. Pizarro filed a motion to dismiss but to no avail. Trial Court rendered a decision
that Domingas property and its rentals shall escheat and the same are assigned to the City of Davao for the benefit of
public schools and public charitable institutions and centers in the said city. On appeal, CA affirmed the appealed decision
of the trial court. Hence, Vicenta Tan and/or her attorney-in-fact, Ramon Pizarro, appealed by petition for certiorari to the
SC, alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the city of Davao had personality to file the escheat petition and
in declaring that petitioner Vicenta Tan may be presumed dead.
ISSUE
1)
2)
WON the City of Davao had personality to file the escheat petition.
WON CA erred in declaring that petitioner Vicenta Tan be presumed dead.
DECISION
1) YES. With respect to the argument that only the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General, may file
the escheat petition under Section 1, Rule 91 of the Revised (1964) Rules of Court, the Appellate Court correctly ruled that
the case did not come under Rule 91 because the petition was filed on September 12,1962, when the applicable rule was
still Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court which provided:
Sec. 1. When and by whom,petition filed.When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property
in the Philippines, leaving no heirs or person by law entitled to the same, the municipality or city where the
deceased last resided, if he resided in the Philippines, or the municipality or city in which he had estate if he
resided out of the Philippines, may file a petition in the court of first instance of the province setting forth the
facts, and praying that the estate of the deceased be declared escheated.
Rule 91 of the Revised rules of Court, which provides that only the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, may commence escheat proceedings, did not take effect until January 1, 1964. Although the escheat
proceedings were still pending then, the Revised Rules of Court could not be applied to the petition because to do so
would work injustice to the City of Davao. Rule 144 of the 1964 Rules of Court contains this "saving" clause:
These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1964. They shall govern all cases brought after they take effect,
and also all further proceedings in cases pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court,
their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure shall
apply.
2) NO. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's ruling that Dominga Garcia and her heirs may be
presumed dead in the escheat proceedings as they are, in effect, proceedings to settle her estate. Indeed, while a petition
instituted for the sole purpose of securing a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead cannot be entertained
if that were the only question or matter involved in the case, the courts are not barred from declaring an absentee
presumptively dead as an incident of, or in connection with, an action or proceeding for the settlement of the intestate
estate of such absentee. Vicenta Tan, if she still exists, was never served with summons extra-territorially under Section 17,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. She never appeared in the trial court by herself, or counsel and never filed a pleading therein,
hence, she never submitted to the court's jurisdiction. Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest (Sec. 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court; Ferrer vs. Villamor, 60 SCRA 106; Filipinas Industrial Corp. vs. San Diego, 23
SCRA 706; 1 Moran 144). Ramon Pizarro, the alleged administrator of Dominga Garcia's property, was not a real party in
interest. He had no personality to oppose the escheat petition. ***

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