Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law

Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law
University Press Scholarship Online
Oxford Scholarship Online
The Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law

David G. Owen
Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198265795
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.001.0001

DAVID G. OWEN
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.003.0010
Abstract and Keywords

In this chapter, the inquiry into the nature of fault in tort law involves an examination of
the philosophical foundations of choice, action, and harmful conduct. First to be explored
are the broad ideals that give moral character to a persons actions: freedom, equality,
and community or common good. Freedom (or autonomy), equality (in a weak form),
and community (in the hard form of utility) are seen collectively to shape significantly the
moral quality of human behavior. After these fundamental values are examined generally,
their relative priority is next considered, followed by a discussion of the nature and
ordering of the basic interests at stake in tort law. Finally, the chapter focuses briefly on
the more specific questions of how the underlying values help define the wrongfulness,
first, of intentionally harmful conduct; and second, of conduct that accidentally causes
harm.
Keywords: fault, tort law, choice, action, harmful conduct, freedom, equality, community, common good,
wrongfulness
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Fault is the basic cement of the law of torts. Fault permeates the structure of tort law
doctrine, providing both definition and justification for the great majority of rules
governing private responsibility for causing harm. What fault is, therefore, and how in
moral theory it may claim to dominate this area of the law, are questions of fundamental
importance to an understanding of tort law. Fault, in common parlance, is often
addressed in terms of blame or wrong: faulty conduct is blameworthy or wrongful
conduct; a wrongdoer is subject to blame or is at fault. Yet, regardless of the
nomenclature, the basic issues remain the same: why and how the law of torts should
determine whether a particular persons conduct (more precisely, a particular persons
harmful conduct) was blameworthy or wrongful, whether the person was at fault.1
In Brown v. Kendall,2 decided in 1850, a man accidentally struck another with a stick
while trying to break up two fighting dogs. Holding that negligence was necessary to
liability, Chief Judge Shaw of Massachusetts officially proclaimed the central role of fault in
accident law, opening a century of largely unchallenged dominance of fault in the law of
torts. Within three decades of Brown v. KendalU Oliver Wendell Holmes was able to
assert authoritatively that the law does, in general, determine liability by
blameworthiness.3 And as the twentieth century opened its doors, the explicitly faultbased standard of responsibility for accidents was solidly endorsed by the legal scholars
of the period. Harvard Law School dean James Barr Ames, for example, noted with
approval that [t]he ethical standard of reasonable conduct has replaced the unmoral
standard of acting at ones peril.4
(p.202) After about a century of virtually unchallenged dominance,5 a small number of
commentators in the 1950s began to question the legitimacy of fault as the basis of liability
in certain areas of American tort law.6 And by the late 1960s, the dominance of fault in
tort law was being challenged on a variety of fronts, as no-fault automobile insurance
schemes and strict products liability rapidly gained legislative, judicial, and scholarly
support. As the twentieth century draws to a close, however, fault appears to have
reasserted its dominance as the guiding principle of the law of torts in the United States.7
To understand just why the concept of fault has proved so durable, and why its converse
strict liabilityhas proved so frail, so incapable of making lasting inroads into the heart
of tort law doctrine, one must inquire into the concept of wrongdoing that underlies the
law of torts.
The inquiry here into the nature of fault in tort law involves an examination of the
philosophical foundations of choice, action, and harmful conduct. First to be explored are
the broad ideals that give moral character to a persons actions: freedom, equality, and
community or common good. Freedom (or autonomy), equality (in a weak form), and
community (in the hard form of utility) are seen collectively to shape significantly the
moral quality of human behavior. After these fundamental values are examined generally,
their relative priority is next considered, followed by a consideration of the nature and
ordering of the basic interests at stake in tort law. Finally, the essay focuses briefly on the
more specific questions of how the underlying values help define the wrongfulness, first,
of intentionally harmful conduct, and, second, of conduct that accidentally causes harm.
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I. Freedom
A. The Concept of Freedom
Freedom, one may postulate with confidence, is the most fundamental, and most
important, moral and political value.8 Among modern philosophers, the one most credited
with propounding this ideal is Immanuel Kant, who considered freedom to be the one
sole and original right that belongs to (p.203) every human being by virtue of his
humanity.9 While philosophers and governments of course must concern themselves to a
large extent with notions of group welfare, and while selfishness is widely regarded as a
vice rather than a virtue, freedom should be viewed as the first and most essential ideal
within a broad philosophy of government and justice.10
The freedom concept rests upon the notion of free will11 the capacity of persons
rationally to select personal goals and plans for life, and their possession of means to
achieve those ends. This concept, sometimes called autonomy,12 thus entails at least two
conditions: choice and power. The design of life plans and the selection of specific goals to
achieve those plans implies a range of options and opportunities, alternatives from which
to choose. As a persons choices are enhanced, so too is that persons freedom. Freedom
also requires power, for one must have the ability to bring ones chosen goals to fruition
in order to control ones destiny, in order to be free. To be autonomous, one therefore
must possess requisite mental and physical prowess and adequate physical goods and
monetary resources to achieve the objectives one selects.13
Freedom accords persons dignity, for it permits each human to design and then to follow
his own life plan, distinct from any other. The concept also forces persons to shoulder a
burden, for it places responsibility upon each person to plan and live a life that is good
for that individual. While philosophers and theologians may debate forever the notion of
what, in the abstract, constitutes the ultimate good life and its component virtues, it is
each humans moral privilegeand his or her moral responsibilityto (p.204) choose
the particular life goals that he or she deems most worthwhile,14 and to seek to achieve
them through personal choice and action.
Viewed in this way, freedom is the primary moral and political ideal. It is the first condition
to protecting or advancing other values, such as equality, altruism, and communal
welfare. Thus, whether the ultimate goal of law is thought to be the promotion of
individual well-being or the welfare of the group, the first and most important function of
the law is to protect and promote freedom or autonomy.
B. Truth
Subsumed in freedom is the ideal of truth, a concept closely related to knowledge. From
the time of Plato, knowledge classically has been defined as justified true belief.15
Knowledge, justification, truth, and belief thus are all functionally related. Among these
concepts, however, truth is the only one that is absolute, the only true ideal.16
Knowledge, for example, only describes the state of possessing the ideal of truth.17 For
help in resolving moral questions arising out of harmful human interactions, truth may be
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viewed as the correspondence of a persons beliefs with reality.18
The intelligent and effective selection and pursuit of goals implies an ability to perceive
and comprehend things in the world and how those things interrelate according to the
principles of cause and effect. No person, of course, can absolutely know the truth, which
is one important reason why no one ever can be absolutely free. Humans, hampered by
both physical and cerebral imperfection, can see the world but dimly, and so their
choices (p.205) of both ends and means are always frustrated by their lack of
knowledge. Autonomy therefore is facilitated by the promotion of truthimproving the
correspondence between peoples beliefs or expectations, on the one hand, and the true
world as it exists and changes, on the other.
Intentionally inflicted harm is generally based upon a subversion of truth. A person
causing such harm is therefore at fault, as a preliminary matter, not because he has
caused harm to the victim, but because of the truth-falsification means by which he has
converted the victim from an autonomous person unwittingly into an object of harm.
Fraud and defamation both are widely understood to be grounded in the deliberate
falsification of the world, as the actor knows it to exist, to the detriment of the victim. Yet
most other intentional harms are based on truth subversion, too. Whether the actor be a
poisoner of candy, a burglar who cloaks himself in the mantle of the night, or an assailant
who conceals a handgun in his pocket or himself behind a tree, the success of each such
intentionally harmful ventureand its (preliminary) wrongfulnessrests substantially
upon the prior theft of truth from the victim, as from others who might otherwise act to
lend protection to the victim.
Truth, or the absence of it, also plays a powerful role both in causing accidents and in
determining blame therefor. Indeed, the very word accident is defined in terms of
unexpected harm.19 Accidental harm, then, is harm attributable to the failure of at least
one person, the actor or the victim, to expect the harm, to possess the truth concerning
the things that caused the harm. As an everyday example, imagine a simple intersectional
collision between two cars: A, driving toward an intersection, sees the traffic light change
from green to yellow and mistakenly believes that he can enter and clear the intersection
before the light turns red. B, waiting on the intersecting street, enters the intersection as
soon as her light turns green, mistakenly believing that it will be clear of traffic. A and B
enter the intersection simultaneously, at right angles, and their cars collide. Here, the
collision is attributable to the failure of both A and B to possess the truth about the status
of the intersection at the time of the collision. By convention in this situation, as reflected
in pre-established rules of the road, responsibility for determining the truthand,
accordingly, fault in failing to obtain itis allocated to the person entering the intersection
as the light changes from green to yellow. Here, as in myriad other contexts involving
accidental harm, both causation and fault are rooted in the failure of one or both of the
parties to possess the truth.
A persons ability to control his life, to live effectively within the world, is highly dependent
upon the extent to which that persons vision of the (p.206) world is true. Without
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possessing the truth in substantial measure, persons become vulnerable to both
intentionally and accidentally inflicted harm. Thus, truth is a fundamentally important
component of freedom that humans need to protect themselves from harm, and fault for
harm is often rooted in how and why the truth is used or abused by the actor and the
victim.
II. Equality
A. The Concept of Equality
A threshold problem the law confronts in the promotion of individual freedom is the
multiplicity of separate persons whose freedoms frequently collide. In a crowded world,
each persons pursuit of life goals often conflicts with other persons pursuit of their own
life goals. The law therefore must draw boundaries around individuals, defining where
one persons freedoms end and where another persons freedoms begin.20 The most
elementally helpful criterion for drawing such freedom boundaries in a just and enduring
society is equality.21
How equality helps define the scope of each persons freedoms depends upon the type
and strength of ones view of equality. Assume that A and (p.207) B start off equally in
all respects to pursue their respective goals, and that they interact in some manner that
harms B. A strong version of equality-one that emphasizes the security of resources
might require A to transfer enough of his goods to B to restore the state of equality
between A and 5, based only upon the change in their respective holdings of goods from
a status of equality to one of inequality.22 A very strong version of equality, based on
equality in the holdings of goods, could require this result even if 2?, not A, were morally
responsible for the accident. A different, weaker version of equality, based on an equal
right of action, might leave the loss entirely with fi, if neither A nor B were otherwise
responsible for the loss. Thus, the version of equality selected is crucial in defining limits
to individual freedom.
B. Three Principles of Choice
For assistance in determining how strong or weak a version of equality is appropriate in
tort lawto help ascertain moral responsibility and fault for harmful conductthe role of
human choice may usefully be examined in the recurring contexts of harmful interactions.
When two people interact, the transaction often benefits them both,23 so that actors
frequently enhance the interests of other persons. Some interactions, however, are
harmful to one or both affected persons. When the interaction is a harmful one, the prior
choices of both persons give moral character to their actions and omissions that
combined to cause the harm. At least three separate principles of choice, each bound in
separate fashion to the equality ideal, may be derived from freedom principles to help
define the wrongfulness of harmful conduct.24
The first principle of choice, based upon the equal abstract right of every person to
pursue his own interests without undue interference from others, bears most
significantly on harms which are intentional. This principle holds quite simply that a person
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should not choose to harm others solely to advance interests of his own. For example,
one should not deliver an unprovoked punch in the nose, merely to show off ones
pugilistic skills, allay ones anger, or win a bet. Since one persons abstract autonomy
rights are equal to every other persons similar rights, an actor should not infringe
another persons autonomy merely to enhance his own. For the purpose of (p.208)
achieving ones own chosen ends, in other words, one generally may not fairly choose to
frustrate the vested interestsharm the vested goodsof other persons.25 Harmful
conduct may thus be viewed as unjust or wrongful, in equality terms, if the actor chose
to cause the harm, knowing it to violate the victims equal right to freedom, for the
purpose of achieving the actors ends.26 This basic concept, which may be called the
choice-end principle, underlies the law of intentionally inflicted harm.
When human interactions accidentally result in harm, rather than when harm is
purposefully caused by an actor, very different choices are involved. The second
principle of choice reflects the limitations of space in a crowded society, and the
inevitability of collisions between separate persons pursuing their respective ends and
possessing limited power, skills, and access to the truth. Moral responsibility and blame
for such accidents hinge upon the nature of the prior choices of both parties to a collision.
Helping frame the moral character of such choices, the abstract notion of equality helps
reveal the fallacy of a common intuition that blame for accidents generally should lie upon
the actor rather than the passive victim.
The world in which we live is a dynamic one, where action is necessary to achieve ones
goals, both to protect and to enhance ones property and satisfaction. One must drive (or
walk) to the store to buy ones bread. This interest might be designated a persons
action interest. Each person also has another, passive form of interest, which might be
called ones security interest. This latter form of interest is a persons interest in
maintaining his present stock of property and satisfaction against depletion.
Abstract equality suggests that action and security interests in such a world are of equal
order, that the interests of an accident victim have no inherent priority over the interests
of the actor. Despite an undeniable counter-intuition, an accident victims passive security
interest in maintaining his stock of goods logically should have no higher intrinsic value
than the actors affirmative action interest in protecting (and augmenting) his stock of
goods.27 Indeed, freedom of action is especially deserving of protection in a dynamic
world because persons regularly must readjust through (p.209) action to everchanging conditions, even if their only goal is to protect their own security.28
Autonomy entails the notion that a person mayindeed, mustmake choices and then act
upon those choices. It is a simple truism that each such action always restricts in some
measure the choices available to others. If A chooses to move from point x to point z, and
does so, he deprives 5, standing at point y, of the opportunity to move to z. This also is
true concerning decisions not to act: If A y standing at point x, decides not to move at all,
he limits the opportunity of B, standing at point y, to move to x. Thus, whether of action or
inaction, all choices of all persons diminish in some manner the available choices (and
hence the freedom) of other persons, who are harmed to that extent. The choices and
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action inherent in the very notion of individual autonomy, therefore, imply harm to other
persons. This important concept, that freedom entails harm to other persons, may be
called the choice-harm principle. In a society devoted to autonomy and equality, the
choice-harm principle suggests that no initial preference should be given to security over
action.29 And this second principle of choice undermines substantially the notion that
merely causing harm is wrong.
The third and final principle of choice outlined here, drawing from implications of the prior
two, normatively predicates fault or blame upon whether the actors choices respected
or denied the victims equal stature as a human. This last perspective on how choice and
equality fit together may be called the choice-blame principle. The dual-faceted idea
here, rooted in the abstract equal worth of every person, is that actors are at fault for
choosing without good reason to harm other persons, or choosing to expose them to a
risk of harm. As more fully explored below, one facet of this principle, the bad-harm
facet, holds that choosing to harm (or risk harm to) another persons vested interests
without good reason violates the other persons dignity as a free and equal humanand,
hence, is wrong. This principles good-harm facet is just as important: actors regularly
must as a practical necessity, choose to harm (or risk harm to) others for reasons that
are good, and such conduct accordingly is proper.
C. Weak Equality
Together, the three principles of choice sketched out here help frame a form of equality
useful in explaining fault for causing harm. Based upon the first (p.210) two principles,
the third and normative principle of choice explicitly conditions fault upon the absence of
good reason for harming (or risking harm to) other persons. Central to the choice-blame
principles good-harm facet is the powerful notion that it is sometimes proper for one
person to harm another. This conclusion suggests the propriety of some weak
formulation of equality, one which allows each person the maximum amount of freedom
(for both security and action) consistent with an equal right of others. This form of weak
equality has been aptly termed an equality of concern and respect.30 Philosophers
across the ages, from Plato31 and Aristotle32 to Kant,33 to Nozick,34 and even to Rawls
and Dworkin,35 generally have accorded some such notion of weak equality a central
position among moral values.
When equality is defined weakly, in terms of equality of concern and respect, it becomes
subject to the criticism that it is empty, devoid of analytical content36 and, so, incapable
of helping to define freedom or any other ideal.37 Yet the concept of freedom itself can be
subjected to such a charge,38 albeit less persuasively, and the charge of emptiness
misses the fundamental point of equal freedom that proclaims the intrinsic and ineffable
worth of every human.39 The value of this abstract notion of equality (p.211) lies not in
its substance, for it possesses little if any substantive content, but in its structure, which
provides a principled basis for interpersonal comparisons that offers a powerful, initial
framework for evaluating moral questionssuch as blame for harmful interactionswhen
freedoms clash.40
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D. Distributive and Corrective Justice

Aristotles conceptions of distributive and corrective justice, grounded in differing
notions of equality, provide a helpful initial framework of just this type.41 Distributive
justice concerns the manner by which goods are distributed among persons across
society, prior to individual transactions among those persons. Rather than basing such
distributions upon strict equality, Aristotle argued that distributive justice requires only
propor-tionalitya distribution of goods proportionate to a persons desert or worth.42
The content of desert or worth, in Aristotles view, varies according to the particular
political regime and social context. In technologically advanced societies, a persons worth
is measured to a large extent by his productivity which, in turn, is conveniently (if
imperfectly) measured by the market. Variations among persons in productivity,
accidents, and other factors result in variations over time between persons in their
stocks of wealth. Under Aristotles proportionality conception of equality, therefore,
variations in holdings of wealth are not only proper, but inevitable and even necessary.
Imbalances in the proportional holdings of persons thus develop over time from various
events and transactions, both voluntary and involuntary. While the development of such
imbalances is a concern of distributive (p.212) justice, the internal fairness of the
individual transactions themselves, and whether the law should rectify their
consequences, are matters involving the entirely separate notion of corrective justice.43
Aristotle believed that this form of justice required a different (one might say stronger),
mathemati-calrather than proportionalform of equality.44 Thus, a thief should be
required to disgorge his booty and return the goods (or equal value) to his victim in
order to restore the prior proportional equality of the parties. So, too, a person
wrongfully causing another to suffer accidental loss should be required to rectify the
loss, and so restore the prior proportional relationship between the parties. This weak
form of equality, which is consistent with the dominant role of freedom, thus requires
compensation for losses caused by wrongful action, but not for other losses necessarily
caused by every action.45
III. Common Good

A. The Concept of Common Good
In contrast to the freedom ethic, which idealizes the interests of the individual, the ethic
of the common good or community 46 idealizes the collective interests of the group.47
Although individuals comprise society, so that the promotion of communal welfare
advances the interests of (at least some of) its individual members, and vice versa,48 the
community ideal of common (p.213) good subordinates the separate welfare of
members individually to the broader collective welfare of the group. Autonomy has no
intrinsic value within the community ideal, but is valuable only instrumentally to advance
the communal interests of society.
Although the communal ethic has been waning around the globe in recent years in certain
formulations as a political and economic ideal,49 it inevitably must remain a central value in
any organized society where people live closely with their neighbors. Most persons
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understand that a single individual cannot be allowed to hold the entire world hostage to
the satisfaction of his personal wants, that individuals often must make personal sacrifices
for the greater good of others.50 Whether one labels this ethic altruism,51 communal
welfare, or something else,52 it has been a central moral and political value in differing
societies, religions, and philosophies throughout the history of the world. The community
ideal was important even to Aristotle, the father of corrective justice, and to Kant, the
father of modern liberal theories of philosophy based on the freedom of the indi-vidual.
Aristotle considered humans to be by nature social,53 and Kant directed individuals to
harmonize their personal ends with the ends of others within the community 54free
though persons may all be, free within community.55
The ideal of common good is examined here from the perspectives of utility and efficiency,
the harder formulations of group welfare.56 Although classical utilitarian theory on a
number of grounds is flawed, and even (p.214) arguably irrational or incoherent as a
universal moral theory,57 a general and non-rigorous notion of utility serves as a useful
model for values that seek to maximize the aggregate welfare or preferences of the
group.58 The economic notion of efficiency, which rests to a large extent upon utility, is
considered also within this context. Although incomplete as general theories of moral
responsibility, principles of utility and efficiency will be seen to provide helpful guidance in
the resolution of certain tort law problems.
B. Utility and Efficiency
Utilitarianism may be the most prominent theory of the common good in the recent
history of Western political philosophy.59 Consequential in nature, this ethic evaluates the
moral quality of actions, and sometimes rules,60 by the extent to which they maximize the
average (or aggregate) welfare of all members of society. Since every action always
produces some measure of harm as well as good, the utilitarian goal is to produce the
greatest proportion of benefits to harms, the greatest net benefit to society. The principle
of economic efficiency, which broadly seeks to maximize communal wealth, is a variant of
the utilitarian ideal,61 with philosophical roots in hypothetical consent.62
Conduct causing harm is justified, according to both these theories, if the social harm
reasonably expected to result from the conduct is exceeded by the expected social
benefit. The converse is also true: conduct is wrongful (p.215) if it reasonably may be
expected to produce more harm than good. These principles work equally as well in
justifying intentional as well as accidental harm, but only the purist utilitarian or economic
theorist would insist upon the general and exclusive application of such principles to
resolve intentional harm problems where such aggregative principles are (potentially, at
least) destructive of certain vital rights. In accident law, however, utility and efficiency are
widely and properly viewed as central considerations in ascertaining responsibility and
assessing blame.
The most renowned formulation of the utility concept in accident law is the Learned Hand
standard for determining negligence, by which an actors failure to incur a lesser burden
to prevent a greater risk of harm implies the actors negligence.63 The Hand standard
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may be viewed as defining negligence in economic terms:64 if the costs of preventing an
accident are less than the costs of permitting it, the failure to incur the prevention costs is
inefficient and, hence, improper. Guido Calabresis Cheapest cost avoider standard,
which seeks to minimize the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of accident
prevention,65 rests similarly upon the goal of maximizing communal wealth or, the mirror
image, minimizing communal waste. By placing liability upon those persons who most
efficiently can prevent accidents, the law may help achieve an efficient level of
expenditures on both accidents and precautionary measures.66 Thus, principles of both
utility and efficiency seek to deter accident-producing conduct that is on balance wasteful
for society. Conversely, both principles encourage accident-producing conduct that
produces greater benefits than harm. Yet, the important point here is the preliminary
moral wrongfulness of behavior that foreseeably causes more harm than good,67 which
wastes communal resources, and the preliminary moral propriety 68 of behavior that
appears likely to generate a net increase in the total stock of goods.69
(p.216) IV. Ordering Values and Interests

A. Ordering Values
Although the ideals of equal freedom and the common good (community) are both
powerful touchstones for ascertaining fault in tort law, one must sometimes choose
between the two values in judging the moral quality of harmful conduct. Indeed, freedom
and community may be contrasted to one another as polar opposites, as noted earlier.
Whether one views their opposition as partial or complete, their application to tort law
problems sometimes produces conflicts which must be resolved.
Suppose a starving beggar decides to take without permission and eat a loaf of bread
lying inside the open kitchen window of a wealthy and well-fed bakers house. Because the
abstract autonomy of the beggar is no greater than the autonomy of the baker who owns
the bread, the beggars choice to take (convert) the bread would violate the bakers
equal abstract right to freedom and hence be wrongful when judged according to that
standard. Yet, when judged by any standard of common good or community, whether
utility or some softer version, the starving beggars much greater need would seem to
justify his choice and act. Such variances in result arise because of the very different
underlying moral concepts: freedom celebrates the separate value of each independent
person, and depends upon a strong conception of ownership, of the exclusive right to
property, whereas all notions of community, soft or strong, are based at some level on
aggregatingnot separatinghuman goods. At bottom, therefore, the values of freedom
(and weak equality) are directly opposed to those of community, soft or strong.
Because such conflicts do arise, it should be helpful to have a general principle of
preference between the two. At least because of the logical priority of freedom to
community, mentioned earlier, but also because of the greater essential moral power of
freedom (and its counterpart, weak equality), it may be postulated that freedom should
take precedence to community as a general principle when the two values significantly
conflict.70
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Notwithstanding freedoms general claim to prior moral value, utility remains an essential
moral value to respect. Indeed, rather than being shunted to the rear as an inferior
moral principle, utility (and its economic surrogate, efficiency) should be promoted to a
controlling status in many (p.217) instancesthose in which the guidance it can provide
is strong and that of freedom weak. The guidance provided by the freedom ideal may be
weak because the values it sustains are implicated only slightly, or because this abstract
value (more frequently than efficiency) simply cannot provide a principled, determinate
solution to a particular problem. In cases such as these, where utility (or efficiency) by
contrast is able to provide guidance that is clear and strong, freedom should give way to
the community ideals. This secondary, but very important, role for utility and efficiency
in providing moral substance to tort law problems when freedom fails to provide an
answermight aptly be called a default role.71
Conflicts between freedom and common good often turn out to be minor, or
indeterminate, on both sides (and sometimes turn out upon close inspection to be
mirages). When this occurs, when neither ideal is implicated significantly or coherently,
the law justifiably may turn instead to practicality, which is based on both freedom and
utility. When the significance of moral reasoning of any type is hard to ascertain, the law
should seek two results: first, to provide persons with freedom to adjust their own affairs
as they deem best, on grounds of personal interest and practicality, without fear of
undue legal intervention; and, second, to devise simple rules that are easy for persons to
understand and apply. Moral theorizing on tort law problems, including the
ascertainment of fault for causing harm, may be ordered in this manner.
B. Ordering Interests
Whether one examines problems of fault in tort law in terms of freedom or the common
good, comparisons between various goods or interests inevitably arise. Often actors (and
the law, in judging the wrongfulness of an actors conduct) will have to choose between
life and property, or between a risk of injury to persons and the possibility of economic
gain or maybe mere convenience. In making and judging such choices, therefore, actors
(and evaluators of their conduct) frequently must compare and evaluate harms (and risks
of harms) to such different forms of goods or interests. And so the law has sometimes
ranked such interests.
It may be helpful, in beginning an inquiry into interest ranking, to scrutinize the common
assertion that the safety interests of potential victims are inherently of a higher order
than the interests of actors in mere property, money, or convenience.72 Interest
ordering along these lines, whereby the (p.218) bodily integrity interest73 is accorded
a higher abstract value than property and economic interests, has a long and deep
tradition in the law of torts.74 This ethic is rooted generally in the context of truly
intentional takings, of deliberate invasions of palpably identifiable property interests
known to belong to specific persons targeted by the actorwhere the certainty of harm
to vested property rights is clear. Within this context of intentionally inflicted harm, the
lexical ordering75 of major interest categories provides a system of useful markers that
serve at once to identify, define, order, and provide a bulwark of protection for societys
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most fundamental vested rights. And so the law declares that one may not intentionally kill
or maim a human to protect some jelly jars.76
In judging actions causing only accidental harm, however, lexical interest ordering fits
much less comfortably, for at issue here is the moral quality of choices involving mere
risks to interests, often of unknown persons, that are by nature remote, contingent, and
speculative. While potential victims in such a context no doubt have autonomy interests in
the security of their property and bodies, the actor has an equally significant autonomy
interest in being able to move about in the world, inevitably risking harm to other
persons as discussed above. A persons autonomy depends as well upon his wealth77of
holdings of money and other propertywhich generally may be acquired only by actions
risking harm to others. The importance of property (wealth) to a persons sense of
identity, and overall autonomy, has been emphasized by philosophers across the
centuries.78 (p.219) And convenience logically may not be considered trivial, for it is by
definition what facilitates the achievement of a persons chosen goals. As seen above, the
choice-harm principle itself is based on the equal freedom premise that one persons
interest in security from accidental harm (whether to property or bodily integrity) has no
greater fundamental importance than another persons freedom of action to promote his
chosen goalsgoals which often depend on convenience, require the use of property,
and which may be stored in monetary form. Of course this concept of equality applies
only to interests in the abstract, so that a persons security interests (of any type) should
be protected against the action interests of another when the action interests (in
convenience or other goods) are of lesser value by some fair measure. But the converse
is also true, and an accident victim has no inherent moral right to derogate the actors
greater interests of any type.
An actor, therefore, in moral theory must always accord equal (due) respect to the
rights of others. This general obligation entails, first, that actors must refrain from
choosing intentionally to harm, without a superior protective right, other persons rights
that are vested in any type of goodwhether human life, or property, or sometimes
merely economic interests.79 In addition to this general prohibition of intentional harms,
an actor moving about in a crowded world must show equal respect for the security
interests of others in remaining free from accidental harm. In this context, however, in
which harms to other persons interests are not desired but only risked incidentally and
abstractly as remote contingencies, substantially dependent on events beyond the
actors control, an actor has no choice but to reduce all such interests to a common
denominator and value them in a calculus that also fairly values his own interestsin
money and convenience, as well as other interestsnecessary to the achievement of his
chosen goals.
Actors must make thousands of choices every day, in which numerous potential abstract
interests of known and unknown persons too numerous to count must be identified,
valued (in terms of worth and risk), and balanced against a similarly vast set of outcomes
desired, expected and foreseen from a contemplated course of action. Often such riskbenefit decisions must be made instantly on the spot, without opportunity for significant
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reflection. There can be no safety absolutes in such a rugged, real-world context where
choices must be made and acted upon rapidly, one after another, all day long. The
greater good of all requires that persons be permitted to (p.220) make reasonable and
good faith decisions that create mere risks of harm to others without penalty if they turn
out wrong. Interest ordering, based on the absolute priority of certain interests, is out of
place in such a context of rough and tumble choices in an imperfect world, where life and
limb (as valuable as they surely are) simply must be tossed into the same decisional
scales as mere property, money, and convenience. Thus, in the case of accidental harm,
the equal abstract freedom interests of every person (in both action and security) are
usually best accommodatedand fault is usually best determinedby principles of
utility.80
V. Fault and Intentionally Inflicted Harm

Supported by the ideal of equal freedom, the choice-end principle posits that an actor is
preliminarily blameworthy if he chooses to harm another, as discussed above. The law of
intentional torts embraces this principle in the prima facie casethat conduct is faulty, as
a preliminary matter, if it reflects a choice to cause harm to another. The good-harm facet
of the choice-blame principle of choice supports the various privileges that may defeat the
prima facie case.
A. The Prima Facie Case
When an actor (for no good reason) chooses to intrude into the autonomy realms of
another person, he infringes the others rights to freedom and equality in a fundamental
way.81 If an actor takes without permission (converts) a television belonging to another
person, solely because the actor does not own but wants one, the actor is but a thief.
Stealing property denies its owner the freedom to enjoy the fruits of his prior labor (or
good fortune), which the owner had earlier chosen to transform from labor to monetary
to tangible form in the object that was stolen. Such trespasses to the property rights of
otherstheftsare paradigmatic violations of the (p.221) equal worth of others, the
type of wrong described by Aristotle in explaining the restorative purpose of corrective
justice applicable to involuntary transactions.82
In the stolen (converted) television example, the owner deserves compensation from
the thief (converter) because the latter deliberately chose to take and appropriate for
his own use something that he knew was owned by someone else. When an actor chooses
to act for the very purpose of consuming property rights in goods83 that he knows are
owned by, and hence in part define, another person, he thereby consumes and merges
in part the will (and hence personhood) of the owner with his own. In this way, the actor
joins together in a kind of joint venture with the victim, dragging the latter (in part) along
through the universe for a time and purpose defined by the will of the actor and in
violation of the victims selfhood.
This partial merger of wills, chosen only by the actor, results in a form of communion
between the actor and the victim, who are to this extent conjoined into a kind of unity or
superperson.84 Inasmuch as he has chosen to make himself part of this unified
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superperson, the actor may be seen as having inflicted the harm unto himself. Yet the
resulting superperson is an illegitimate creation, for it is born as a result of a union
against the victims will. By forcing a communal integration upon the victim without
consent, the actor has violated the separate, equal, and autonomous status of the victim,
and in justice must act to restore the victims separateness, the condition which gave him
dignity as a human being. To achieve the separation, to undo the illicit link between the
two, corrective justice and the law of torts requires the actor to return the taken
property (or its monetary equivalent) to the victim, thereby restoring the victims taken
will, and to retrieve unto himself the harm he willed upon the victim.85
B. Privileges
The choice-blame principle, it will be recalled, conditions the wrongfulness of choices and
resulting conduct on the absence of good reasons for the (p.222) harmful conduct. To
be good, reasons for intentionally inflicting harm upon another generally must be based
upon some prior protective right some prior entitlement to person or property
belonging to the actor or another, threatened by invasion from the aggressor whom the
actor harms. By perversely choosing to threaten anothers vested rights, the aggressor
loses in the process whatever protective rights of his the actor needs to sacrifice in
order to repel the threatened invasion to the actors (or third persons) rights.86 In a
sense, the aggressors loss of rights becomes the actors gain, since the actor thereby
acquires a privilege to harm the aggressor in the exercise of the protective privilege.
Such protective rights to harm anotheras in the defense of oneself, of another, or of
ones property fundamentally inhere in freedom and hence in general are morally
superior to utility in case of conflict, as postulated earlier.
The privilege of necessity involves a minor deviation from the general priority of freedom
to utility, but it basically supports the principle. Thus, where utility suggests the propriety
of consuming the lesser goods of ones neighbor to save the greater goods of ones own,
as where the starving beggar steals the bakers bread in the example discussed above,
the necessity privilege initially reflects the communitys interest in utility by permitting the
intentional invasion (and barring the usual protective rights),87 but only with respect to
lower-order property invasions. Yet the ultimate triumph is had by freedom, for the
privilege does not permit the taking of higher-order goods of life or limb, and the
privilege to take even lower-order goods is at best partial and incomplete, for the taker
must pay the owner for the loss.88 And so the law of torts provides the starving beggar
with an initial privilege to take the bakers bread, but it holds as well that the beggar
ultimately must respect the bakers rights of ownership (notwithstanding the net util-ity 89
of the theft) by paying for the bread. And with respect to other privileges to harm
intentionally, utility is accorded scant respect; even an unproductive beggar has the right
to shoot and kill a productive baker who accosts the beggar in the street and appears to
threaten him with death.
Privileges to intentional torts, therefore, in their very existence reflect the general
superiority of freedom to utility when the two values come in conflict, although principles
of utility may play a role in defining their (p.223) proper scope.90 And the basic point of
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privileges, of the right intentionally to harm another for good reason, remains
unchallenged, whether the rationale for such right-protective harm is viewed as one of
freedom or utility.
VI. Fault and Accidental Harm

Why the common-law rules of responsibility for accidental harm also are so solidly set in
fault is explainable in terms of freedom, equality, and utility, as reflected in the second
and third principles of choice. Although freedom in the accident context retains its general
priority to principles of the common good, especially when the victim and the actor are
tied together before the accident in some relationship, utility often operates as the
controlling principle (even if only by default), especially when the parties to the accident
are strangers.
Before the theory of fault in accident law is examined further, the intuitive correctness of
a liability principle holding actors responsible for causing harm only when they are at fault,
even when they are artificially much more powerful than their weak and vulnerable
human victims, may be demonstrated by an example. Suppose that a driver, D,
approaches an intersection with a green light in his favor. A blind person, B at the moment
D begins to enter the intersection, steps out into the cross walk from behind an
ambulance, parked at the curb beside the cross walk, that has hidden B from Ds view,
Ds car hits and injures B. The ambulance was parked legally for an emergency call in a
No Parking zone beside the cross walk. D was driving with all due care and had no
reason to believe that a blind person might be in the vicinity. Bs decision to traverse the
intersection was reasonable: B had a good reason to cross the road, and no one was
around for B to ask for assistance. B pressed the control button on the cross walk pole to
change the light to red, listened for and heard the usual electronic sounds from the
control box indicating that the light was changing from green to red, and had no reason to
suspect that the control mechanism could malfunction and emit changing noises without
actually changing the light, which in fact it did. There was no way that the control
mechanism malfunction could have been anticipated or prevented by the city, the
manufacturer, or anyone else.
On facts like these, where D was truly acting with reasonable respect for the rights of
others, an intuitive sense of justice would seem to shield D (p.224) from legal
responsibility for causing harm to B.91 This is so, first, because the only risks D chose to
inflict on B were reasonable and, second, because B as much as D chose to riskand
hence causedthe collision. Protecting D from legal responsibility for Bs harm seems
fair to D, and not unfair to B, who may choose to insure against the risks of such
reasonably caused accidents as he might insure against all other risks of injury not
attributable to the fault of others, such as from tripping on a curb.
Moral theory as well as intuition supports the conclusion that responsibility for accidental
harm generally should be based on fault. In searching for an elemental theory of accident
law, one might nevertheless be inclined initially toward a rule of strict liability,92 rather
than one based on wrongfulness. Under such a rule, A generally would be liable for
causing harm to B, whether intentionally or accidentally. Equality might appear to demand
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that A correct such harm in order to restore to B what A effectively appropriated to
himself by choosing to expose B to a risk of harm.93 Indeed, if the law had assigned a
prior property right94 to Bs security from harm,95 as in the context of intentional harms
discussed above, then principles of both freedom and equality would argue for
corrective justice strictly to be (p.225) applied to such a case. Yet this type of
appropriation theory is logically dependent upon such a prior assignment of a property
right to B, the victim, and upon As choice to harm that rightwhich thereby injects
wrong-fulness (under the choice-end principle) into As taking. But this begs the
underlying question of whether A is at fault and should be liable for accidentally causing
harm to B, where Bs interests in avoiding such harm have been assigned no prior
protective right, and where A has not chosen to cause the harm.
In such cases involving merely accidental harm, where neither the actor nor the victim
has a prior right superior to the other,96 the equality ideal may help resolve this moral
conundrum. The key to resolving the conflict lies in evaluating and comparing the
apparent worth of the relevant intereststhose likely to be promoted by As action and
those likely to be pro-tected by Bs security. If A should know that Bs security from risk
is more valuable than the interests (As own and those of others) that As action likely will
promote, As choice to sacrifice Bs greater interests denies Bs equal worth, and so is
wrongful in moral theory.97 If, to the contrary, A (p.226) reasonably believes that the
interests to be promoted by his action are more valuable than the interests foreseeably
risked 98 thereby, then As choice of action is proper under principles of equality.99
Correspondingly, Bs insistence in the latter case that the law require A to compensate B
for his loss, under a principle of strict liability, would be to demand that Bs interests be
accorded more than equal worth and, hence, would be improper. The moral foundation in
equality for resting responsibility for accidents upon this type of evaluative interest
comparison derives from Aristotelian principles of virtue.100 This conception of
responsibility, of course, embraces also the basic calculus of risk or Hand-formula
approach to fault, rooted in utility as well as equality, that has long defined responsibility
for accidental harm in the law of torts. Thus, the basic ethic revealed to lie behind
responsibility for accidental harm is captured in the dual-faceted choice-blame principle,
that choosing to risk harm to others without good reason is blameworthy, but that so
choosing for good reason is proper.
B might argue that a strict liability rule would not prevent A from promoting the greater
good but would only require A to pay for, and hence internalize, the (lesser) costs of
promoting the greater goodjust as the starving beggar must pay the owner for the
stolen loaf as in the intentional harm context discussed above. But the intentional taking
situation involves very different choices by the actor with respect to very different
interests of the victim whom the actor targets for particular harm. No similar forced
communal nexus between the wills of actors and victims occurs in cases of mere
accidents. In contrast to the situation where the actor intentionally consumes goods
known to belong to someone else, a person acting for a purpose unrelated to another
person is, by hypothesis, not willing a communion with that person. Instead, harm caused
by accidental encountering with other persons is by definition unwilled. Creating mere
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risks to the interests of others is an inherent and unavoidable consequence of every
action, for every action entails harm (at least contingently) to others. To the extent that
risks of harm from action may be deemed a necessary part of proper choices of action in
an uncertain world, and hence reasonable according to some fair standard, they should
be viewed as background risks of life (p.227) for victims to protect against and
bear.101 Thus, Bs taking argument, for imposing strict responsibility on A, is
unpersuasive in cases of accidental harm.
Bs compensation claim for accidental harm reasonably caused by A fails finally on
causation grounds. As explained by the choice-harm principle discussed above, every
choice to act or refrain from acting causes harm, at least theoretically and potentially, to
other persons who commensurately are deprived of related opportunities.102 Thus,
unless the wrongfulness issue has already been resolved by a preassignment of
property rights to the victim of an accident, even a passive accident victim may be
considered the responsible cause of the harm he suffered.103 This is because the
victim, even if completely motionless at the time of the accident, made a series of
deliberative choices (and resulting actions) at some time prior to the accident that were
necessary antecedents to its eventuality.104 Nothing inherent in the victims mere
passivity at the precise moment of the accident is a shield from bearing moral
responsibility for the intended or foreseeable consequences of such prior choices.105
(p.228) Consequently, if the law is to treat actors and victims106 as equals, there
appears to be no moral basisin freedom, equality, or common goodfor a general rule
of liability that holds actors strictly accountable for accidental harm.107 Instead, the ideals
of freedom, equality, and utility all support a scheme of responsibility for accidental harm,
with only small pockets of strict liability,108 that basically is built on fault.
VII. Conclusion
The law of torts by definition concerns the law of wrongs. With few exceptions, fault
defines the core and borders of responsibility throughout this entire area of the law.
While harm alone in some abstract sense may be viewed as a wrong to the person
suffering it, in most cases an actor fairly may be held accountable for making good the
harm only if he was at fault in causing it, only if his choices that resulted in the harm fairly
may be blamed. Choosing to deny another persons equal right to freedom is the most
fundamental reason for such blame. While intentional harms gener-ally are wrongful, an
actor may properly choose to harm another in the exercise of his prior protective rights.
In an imperfect and dynamic world, accidental harm is inevitably entailed in human
freedom, such that conduct resulting in accidental harm may be considered faulty only if
it results from a choice to violate another persons vested rights or the communitys
interests in utility. Based on philosophical foundations of this type, the law of torts rests
comfortably on elemental notions of right and wrong, on principles of fault.
Notes:
(1 ) Tort, from the French word for injury or wrong, derived originally from the Latin
tortus, meaning twisted or crooked: W. PAGE KEETON , DAN B. DOBBS , ROBERT E.
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KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN , PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th
edn., 1984), 1 [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; Peter Birks, The Concept of a Civil
Wrong, this volume.
(2) 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
(3) OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881), 108.
(4) James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 99 (1908)
(5) Apart from work-place injuries, statutorily cut out of tort law and placed in workers
compensation schemes in the first few decades of this century.
(6) See, e.g., ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG , NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951),
reprinted in 54 CAL. L. REV. 1422 (1966); Fleming James, Jr., General ProductsShould
Manufacturers BeLiable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923 (1957); Charles O.
Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1951).
(7) See generally David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703 (1992) [hereinafter
The Fault Pit].
(8) Much of the following is adapted from David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of
Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427 (1993)
[hereinafter Moral Foundations].
(9) IMMANUEL KANT , THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (Rechtslehre)
(John Ladd trans., 1965) (1797), *237 (hereinafter ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE] . Freedom,
autonomy, and morality in Kants view are all inseparably bound together: IMMANUEL
KANT , FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (L. Beck trans., 1959)
(1785) *452453 [hereinafter METAPHYSICS OF MORALS] . Autonomy is thus the basis
of the dignity of both human nature and every rational nature: id. at *436. Kant viewed
autonomy, freedom of the will, as the supreme principle of morality: id. at *440.
(10) See, e.g., Robert B. Thigpen & Lyle A. Downing, Liberalism and the Communatarian
Critique, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 637 (1987). Equality and community ideals logically
presuppose the priority of freedom. Liberty is crucial to political justice because a
community that does not protect the liberty of its members does notcannottreat
them with equal concern: Ronald W. Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 3: The Place of
Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1, 53 (1987) (hereinafter What is Equality?] (explaining [t]he
priority of liberty, under equality of resources).
(11 ) The will is free, so that freedom is both the substance of right and its goal: GEORGE
W.E. HEGEL , PHILOSOPHY OF RIOHT (T. M. Knox (trans.), 1965) (1821), 20, para 4.
(12) I use the two terms interchangeably, although for some purposes there may be
value indistinguishing between them. See JOSEPH RAZ , THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
(1986), ch. 15.
Page 18 of 31

(13) Id. at 371373. Conceptions of freedom vary considerably among philosophers.
Havingthe means to be ones own master has been characterized as positive freedom,
as distinguished from freedom in its negative form, consisting in the absence of
interference with onesactivities by others. For the classical formulation of this distinction,
see Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969), 121,
reprinted in LIBERTY 33 (David Miller (ed.), 1991).
(14) For a discussion of freedom as requiring good choices, see RAZ , supra, note 12, at
378385.
(15) PAUL K. MOSER & ARNOLD VANDER NAT , HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: CLASSICAL
ANDCONTEMPORARY APPROACHES (1987), 3.
(16) Aristotle apparently viewed truth as more self-evidently and fundamentally good
thanlife: J. M. Finnis, Scepticism, Self-Refutation, and the Good of Truth, in LAW,
MORALITY, AND SOCIETYESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H. L. A. HART (P. M. S. Hacker &
J. Raz (eds.), 1977), 247, 249.
(17) The notions of knowledge and truth are so closely related, however, that they may
besubstituted for one another in most contexts. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS , NATURAL
LAW ANDNATURAL RIGHTS (1980), 59 (interchanging the terms knowledge and
truth, and referring to truth as the basic good).
(18) Perhaps the most ancient and certainly in all eras the most widely accepted theory
oftruth is the correspondence theory, according to which truth is correspondence to fact:
NICHOLAS RESCHER , THE COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH (1973), 5. The
traditional correspondence theory [of truth] holds that p is true if, and only if, it
corresponds to reality: D. M.ARMSTRONG , BELIEF, TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE
(1973), 113. Because the correspondence theoryof truth provides epistemologists with
only partial help in resolving abstract questions ofknowledge, particularly in respect to the
truth of propositions, it holds little interest for manymodern philosophers. See generally
THOMAS MORAWETZ , WITTGENSTEIN & KNOWLEDGE (1978), ch. 3; RESCHER ,
supra, ch. I. For help in analyzing the empirical and moral problemsof harmful conduct,
however, which involve truths of fact rather than truths of reason, anontechnical
definition of truth in correspondence terms appears most useful here.
(19) See, e.g., WEBSTERS NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE (1964), 9 (a happening that is not expected). See generally H. L. A. HART &
TONY HONORE , CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d edn., 1985), 151.
(20) This fundamental concept is nicely captured in Nozicks border crossing metaphor:
ROBERT NOZICK , ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974), ch. 4.
(21 ) The equality ideal has been a profoundly important ethic in moral and political
philosophy throughout the ages. It was perhaps the central ethic in Aristotles theory of
corrective justice. [T]he lawtreats the parties as equal, and asks only if one is the
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author and theother the victim of injustice or if the one inflicted and the other has
sustained an injury. Injustice then in this sense is unfair or unequal, and the endeavour
of the judge is to equalizeit: ARISTOTLE , THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (J.E.C. Welldon
(trans.), 1987) (bk. 5, ch, 7), 154. Equality was central to the philosophy of Kant, who
considered it to be contained within theprinciple of freedom. KANT , ELEMENTS OF
JUSTICE, supra, note 9, at *237238; see infra, note 33. And its elemental power remains
at the heart of much contemporary jurisprudence. See generally GERALD DWORKIN ,
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988), 110 (Every moraltheory has
some conception of equality among moral agents); RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAWS
EMPIRE (1986), 295301 [hereinafter LAWS EMPIRE]; ERIC RAKOWSKI , EQUAL
JUSTICE (1991); JOHN RAWLS , A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), 11, 3240, 77;
PETER WESTEN , SPEAKING OF EQUALITY (1990) (examining the paradoxes, rhetorical
force, and various conceptions of equality); Jeremy Waldron, Particular Values and
Critical Morality, 77 CAL, L. REV. 561, 577 (1989) ([O]ne cannot go anywhere in serious
moral thought except on the basis of some assumptionabout the fundamental equality of
human worth.).
The innate link between freedom and equality, defined by Kant, ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE,
supra, note 9, at *237238, is captured succinctly by Hart: [I]f there are any moral
rights at all, it follows that there is at least one natural right, the equal right of all men to
be free: H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955),
reprinted in THEORIES OF RIGHTS (Jeremy Waldron (ed.), 1984), 77. The constitutive
link between equality of resources and freedom is explained in R. Dworkin, What is
Equality?, supra, note 10, at 54 (arguing that liberty and equality are not independent
virtues but aspects of the same ideal of political asso-ciation, which strategy uses liberty
to help define equality and, at a more abstract level, equality to help define liberty). See
also infra, note 40.
(22) To restore equality between the two, A would have to give to B an amount of
goodsequal to half of all Bs losses. Alternatively, the state or a private insurer might
transfer froma loss-pool enough communal goods to B to rectify the loss.
(23) Economic theorists refer to such transactions as Pareto maximizing. See generally
Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509,
512518 (1980).
(24) Whether active or passive.
(25) This principle is framed in general terms, and limited to vested goods, to allow for
fairbut harmful (to the loser) competition for limited economic or social goods as yet
unvestedand so available for competitive acquisition.
(26) If a person hurts another from deliberate moral purpose, he acts unjustly:
ARISTOTLE , supra, note 21, at 172.
(27) [T]he public generally profits by individual activity. As action cannot be avoided,
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andtends to the public good, there is obviously no [sound] policy in throwing the hazard
of whatis at once desirable and inevitable upon the actor: HOLMES , supra, note 3, at 95;
Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 428 (1987) (a
property holdermay not insist that his security interests are more valuable than an
actors freedom). Whenan accident victim suffers personal injury or death, the one
obvious difference between the values of the respective interests of the actor and the
victim concerns the nature of those interests. The oft-noted preference for the interest in
bodily integrity is examined in part IV B, below.
(28) See G. DWORKIN , supra, note 21, at 112 (In general, autonomy is linked to activity,
tomaking rather than being, to those higher forms of consciousness that are distinctive of
humanpotential.).
(29) The choice-harm principle, therefore, is fundamentally different from John Stuart
Millsharm principle, which accords a higher priority to security by providing that one
person maynot interfere with the freedom of another except to prevent harm to others:
see JOHN STUART MILL , ON LIBERTY (G. Himmelfarb (ed.), 1974) (1859), 6869.
(30) Although the concept derives, through Rawls, from Kant (as well as from Aquinas,
Christ, and others), its statement in this form is Dworkins. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN
, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977), 182 (noting that Rawls justice as fairness rests
on theassumption of a natural right of all men and women to [an] equality of concern and
respect[possessed] simply as human beings with the capacity to make plans and give
justice).
(31 ) See PLATO , LAWS VI.757 (Taylor trans.), at 143 quoted in WESTEN , supra, note
21, at 5253.
(32) See ARISTOTLE , supra, note 21, bk. V, especially at 150160.
(33) Hence the universal law of justice is: act externally in such a way that the free use
ofyour will is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to a universal law:
KANT , ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, supra, note 9, at *231.
(34) Nozick may find the least use for equality among major contemporary philosophers:
see NOZICK , supra, note 20, at 222224. He is not alone, of course, in this position. See,
e.g., Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). For a
valuable critique ofequality from a leading English legal philosopher, see RAZ , supra, note
12, ch. 9.
(35) It may seem odd for Rawls and Dworkin to be included among proponents of weak
equality, for they both view equality as central to their systems. See generally RAWLS ,
supra, note 21, at 222224, 453504; Ronald Dworkin, In Defense of Equality, 1 Soc.
PHIL. & POLY 24 (1983). Yet they both subscribe to the notion of equal concern and
respect, see supra, note23, which defines the concept weakly. Although Rawlss
difference principle, as expressed inhis second principle of justice, is thoroughly rooted in
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equality, his first and prior principleof justice echoes Kants dominant concern for
freedom and autonomy: each person is to havean equal right to the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others: RAWLS , supra, note 21, at 60.
(36) It is at least ambiguous: WESTEN , supra, note 21, at 7374.
(37) Westen, supra, note 34. By empty, Professor Westen meant that normative
equalityclaims are derivative, not meaningless: WESTEN , supra, note 21, at xixxx.
(38) R. DWORKIN , supra, note 30, at xiii & ch. 12.
(39) See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81
MICH.L. REV. 575 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983). See generally RAZ , supra, note 12, at 228.
(40) Consider the breadth and power of the Kantian ideal of equal freedom as
lucidlyexpressed by Roger Pilon: we proceed from a [natural law] premise of moral
equalitydefinedby rights, not valueswhich means that no one has rights superior to
those of anyone else. So far-reaching is that premise as to enable us to derive from it the
whole of the world ofrights. Call it freedom, call it live and let live,the premise contains
its own warrantand its own limitations. It implies the right to pursue whatever values we
wishprovided onlythat in doing so we respect the same right of others. And it implies
that we alone are responsible for ourselves, for making as much or as little of our lives as
we wish and can. What elsecould it mean to be free?: Roger Pilon, Freedom,
Responsibility, and the Constitution: OnRecovering Our Founding Principles, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 507, 509510 (1993) (footnotesomitted).
(41 ) ARISTOTLE , supra, note 21, at 140149. See generally FINNIS , supra, note 17, at
161184; W. VON LEYDEN , ARISTOTLE ON EQUALITY AND JUSTICE: HIS
POLITICAL ARGUMENT (1985), 13; Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and
Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515 (1992); Steven J. Heyman,
Aristotle on Political Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 851 (1992); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective
Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992); Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice,
77 IOWA L. REV. 625 (1992) [hereinafter Substantive Corrective Justice]; Richard W.
Wright, Right, Justice, and Tort Law, this volume.
(42) Aristotle appears to have borrowed the idea from Plato, who reasoned that the true
andbest equality, in the distribution of goods, such as honor, deals proportionately with
eitherparty, ever awarding a greater share to those of greater worth, and to their
oppositessuch share as is fit: PLATO , supra, note 31, at VI.757. See WESTEN , supra,
note 21, at 5257.
(43) John Finnis argues persuasively for replacing Aristotles corrective justice
phraseologywith Thomas Aquinas Commutative justice term, on grounds that the latter
term more comfortably embraces the variety of relevant considerations seemingly
excluded by the narrower, formal conception of corrective justice described by
Page 22 of 31

Aristotle: FINNIS , supra, note 17, at 178179. After 2500 years, however, a certain
presumption of correctness might be deemed to attach toa concepts name, such that it
may simply be too late, as a practical matter, to change its name.
(44) Plato referred to this form of equality as numerical, distinguishing it from the
proportional or geometric kind: WESTEN , supra, note 21, at 5253.
(45) Recall the choice-harm principle that every action harms other persons to the
extentthat such persons are deprived, at least hypothetically, of opportunities displaced
thereby.
(46) I use the term community here in a broad sense, meaning basically the same thing
ascommon good and society. This contrasts sharply with the meaning given to the word
by most communitarian theorists, who consider communities to be smaller groups
whose very purpose is to mediate between individuals and society.
(47) Freedom and community, or something like them, are perhaps the most fundamental
and often opposingideals in contemporary American jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
RONALD DWORKIN , A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985), 71 Robert A. Baruch Bush,
Between Two Worlds: The Shift From Individual to Group Responsibility in the Law of
Causation of Injury, 33 UCLAL. REV. 1473, 15191529 (1986) (contrasting liberal and
social welfare ideals). But see VALERIE KERRUISH , JURISPRUDENCE AS IDEOLOGY
(1991), 19 (challenging the individual-societydichotomy).
(48) [T]he common good is the good of individuals, living together and depending upon
one another in ways that favour the well-being of each: FINNIS , supra, note 17, at 305,
Aristotle viewed the common good as nothing more nor less than the good of each and
every citizen: Wright, supra, note 41, at 685. This is an important premise of the liberal
wing of communitarian theory: see Bush, supra, note 47, at 1553 (referring to this
phenomenon as [t]he paradox of the communitarian vision).
(49) As demonstrated by the spectacular collapse of Marxism and Communism in the
formerSoviet block nations, and with the widespread decline of socialism around the
world.
(50) See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
31 (1985).
(51 ) See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort
Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41
MD. L. REV. 563, 584 (1982).
(52) This ethic has been referred to as aggregate-social-welfare (e.g, utilitarian), as
distinguished from a freedom-type ethic which is rights-based (e.g., Kantian): Wright,
Substantive Corrective Justice, supra, note 41, at 631.
(53) See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (E. Barker (trans.), 1958), 5; ARISTOTLE , supra, note
Page 23 of 31

21, at 321 (whatever it is that people regard as constituting existence, whatever it is that
is their objectin desiring life, it is in this that they wish to live with their friends).
(54) KANT , METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra, note 9, at *433, 436; see JOHN
FINNIS , FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS (1983), 121 (referencing Kants third
categorical imperative).
(55) More recently, John Stuart Mill celebrated the ideals of both freedom and
community. JOHN STUART MILL , UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1863).
(56) Softer variations on the community ideal, sometimes viewed by communitarians in
termsof sharing, are of little help in fashioning a scheme of responsibility based on
personalaccountability and fault. For a brief discussion of the limited role of sharing
concepts in accident law, see Moral Foundations, supra, note 8, at 457.
(57) It is particularly flawed, as a universal theory, in disregarding the separateness of
persons. See, e.g., RAWLS , supra, note 21, at 29; RAZ , supra, note 12, ch. 11. See
generally FINNIS , supra, note 17, at 111118, 176177; J. J. C. SMART & BERNARD
WILLIAMS , UTILITARIANISM: FORAND AGAINST (1973). On its arguable incoherence
as a universal theory, see FINNIS , supra, note 17, at 112115, 177.
(58) Over a wide range of preferences and wants, it is reasonable for an individual or
society to seek to maximize the satisfaction of those preferences or wants: id. at 111
112.
(59) See Ronald M. Dworkin, Rights as Trump, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS (Jeremy
Waldron (ed.) 1984), 153 (postulating that some form of utilitarianism is the most
influential background[political] justificationin the Western democracies). For classical
statements of utilitarianism, see JEREMY BENTHAM , AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS ANDLEGISLATION (1789); MILL , supra, note 55. For a
modern examination of its strengths andweaknesses, see SMART & WILLIAMS , supra,
note 57. For a sensitive comparison of utilitarianand egalitarian justifications of accident
law, see R. DWORKIN , LAWS EMPIRE, supra, note 21, at 288301 (finding the
egalitarian account superior).
(60) Although the application of rules may generate disutility in particular cases, the
broaderprinciples of rule utilitarianism seek to promote the general welfare over time.
See generally John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955); J. O. Urmson,
The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill, 3 PHIL. Q. 33 (1953). Since rule
utilitarianism has littlerelevance to personal moral accountability, it is accorded only slight
consideration in thisessay.
(61 ) Explained in R. DWORKIN , LAWS EMPIRE, supra, note 21, at 288.
(62) See generally Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency
Normin Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980); Alan Schwartz,
Page 24 of 31

Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 357
360 (1988).
(63) See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand,
J.) (expressing the concept algebraically as BPL implies negligence, where B is the
burden orcost of avoiding accidental loss, P is the increase in probability of loss if B is not
undertaken, and L is the probable magnitude or cost of such loss).
(64) Hand was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic meaning of negligence:
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972). Note,
however, that the principal relevance of the Hand standard to a moral inquiry of this type
lies in itsdemonstration of respect for the equality of other persons and for communal
interests, not forany utility or efficiency that the tort law rules as so defined may
themselves produce.
(65) See GUIDO CALABRESI , THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970), 135; Guido Calabresi
& Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1084
(1972).
(66) See generally CALABRESI , supra, note 65; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER , THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987).
(67) Doing violence to principles of equality and the virtue of prudence, as discussed
below. See infra, notes 96100 and accompanying text.
(68) The moral propriety of such behavior is preliminary because it is subject to
establishedrights, as discussed in part IV A, below.
(69) Recall that the relevance of these social goals is limited in the present enterprise to
ascertaining moral accountability for a persons choices and reflected actions and, more
specifically, to determining when such choices and actions harming other persons may be
viewed as wrongful. The search here, therefore, is not for principles of tort law that
themselves promote utility and efficiency, but for principles of tort law which reflect the
moral quality of an actors choices. Thus, the kind of utility of interest here is act, not rule,
utility.
(70) See generally CALABRESI , supra, note 65, at 2426; R. DWORKIN , supra, note 30,
at xi (rights as trumps); KANT , ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, supra, note 9, at 331;
RAWLS , supra, note 21, at 243248. But see RAZ , supra, note 12.
(71 ) For an analogous use of the default notion, see Martin A. Kotler, Competing
Conceptions of Autonomy: A Reappraisal of the Basis of Tort Law, 67 TUL. L. REV. 347
(1992).
(72) See, e.g., Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword, Impossibility, Irrationality and
StrictProduct Liability, 20 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 257 (1991) (utilizing Alan Gewirths lexical
rankingof goods into three tiers, whereby a persons physical integrity is ranked as a
Page 25 of 31

first-tier basic good, whereas wealth and convenience would be ranked as third-tier
additive goods).
(73) One must cautiously bear in mind the important and often subtle distinctions
betweennotions of a persons interests in safety, bodily integrity, and security; a
persons (imperfect)property rights in his body; and differing conceptions of abstract
rights and property rights variously employed by commentators on tort law theory.
(74) See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1963), 7786; PROSSER &
KEETON , supra, note 1, at 132 (the law has always placed a higher value on human
safety than uponmere rights in property). This premise of tort law is widely shared by
the general public. Ifasked, most people would probably say that the thing of ultimate
value in the world is humanlife: PATRICK F. MCMANUS , How I GOT THIS WAY (1994),
36.
(75) This is an order which requires us to satisfy the first principle in the ordering before
wecan move on to the second, the second before we consider the third, and so on:
Rawls, supra, note 21, at 43.
(76) Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971) (spring shotgun in vacant house
injuredjelly jar thief).
(77) Together with liberty, opportunity, and self-respect, Rawls classifies wealth as a
primarygood, since it is necessary for the framing and the execution of a rational plan of
life: RAWLS , supra, note 21, at 433. Viewing property as a form of wealth, philosophers
from thetime of Aristotle have recognized its fundamental importance to the pursuit of
goals by humanbeings. See infra, note 78 and accompanying text. Some philosophers,
such as Alan Gewirth and Joseph Raz, accord property and other forms of wealth a lower
value. See supra, notes 72 and 12.
(78) The point of property isto provide an external sphere for the operation of the
freewill: Ernest J. Weinrib, Right and Advantage in Private Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
1283, 1291 (1989). The point, in justice, of private property is to give the owner first use
and enjoymentof it and its fruits (including rents and profits), [which] enhances his
reasonable autonomy andstimulates his productivity and care: FINNIS , supra, note 17,
at 173. See generally ARISTOTLE , supra, note 21 (bk. 4, chs. 16) at 106119; HEGEL ,
supra, note 11, paras. 41, 44, 44A; JEREMY WALDRON , THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1988).
(79) The role of tort law in protecting economic interests is explored in, e.g., PETER CANE
, TORT LAW AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS (1991), and Peter Benson, The Basis for
Excluding Liability for Economic Loss in Tort Law, this volume.
(80) Accidental harm in such a context, where the actor accorded due consideration to
thesecurity interests of potential victims, thus generally should be considered
necessary harmwithin the inherent limitations of knowledge, skill, and the social calculus:
Page 26 of 31

see generally Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985); Christopher H. Schroeder,
Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L.REV. 495 (1985). One must remember, however,
that freedom generally has priority to utilityeven in the accident context when such
freedom interests are vested and specific, as when deriving from a pre-existing
relationship of the parties based on trust.
(81 ) See ARISTOTLE, supra, note 21. In intending harm, one precisely makes [losses to
otherpersons] ones gain; one to that extent uses them up, treats them as material, as
aresource for a good that no longer includes their own: John Finnis, Allocating Risks
andSuffering: Some Hidden Traps, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 193, 203 (1990). To choose
harm is theparadigmatic wrong, the exemplary instance of denial of right: id. at 205. See
generally John Finnis, Intention in Tort Law, this volume.
(82) See ARISTOTLE , supra, note 21, at 150. See also supra, note 26.
(83) Goods in the general sense of interests of value.
(84) See generally Richard A. Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two
Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477 (1979); Weinrib, supra, note 27. In contrast to classical
utilitarianisms effect of conflating all persons into one, criticized by Rawls (see RAWLS ,
supra, note 21, at 27), the very purpose of the superperson concept employed here is to
protect and enforce distinctions between persons.
(85) Moreover, in theft as with many other forms of intentional wrongdoing, notions of
bothretributive and corrective justice suggest the propriety of punitive on top of
compensatorydamages in order fully to correct the wrong. See generally Bruce
Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale,
40 ALA. L. REV. 741 (1989); Bailey Kuklin, Punishment: The Civil Perspective of Punitive
Damages, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1989); David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of
Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705, 718722 (1989).
(86) This is the idea of protective justice inherent in the Kantian notion of the right to
freedom. See Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice, and Tort Law, this volume, at 164.
(87) Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908) (boat owner may trespass on anothers dock
incase of storm; dock owner may not repel trespass by casting boat adrift in Lake
Champlains high seas); Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. North Pac. Grain Growers, Inc.,
767 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1985) (dock owner could not properly cast off burning ship,
preventing firefighters access).
(88) Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). See generally
PROSSER & KEETON , supra, note 1, at 24.
(89) In terms of act utility. Rule utility might oppose the theft in order to promote the
security of private property holdings.
Page 27 of 31

(90) As possibly in justifying the principle that an actor may not choose to harm an interest
of a higher order to protect a lower onethat one may not kill or maim a poacher to
protect some jelly jars, as noted earlier. Yet this principle also may be viewed simply as
one of ranking rights, and hence of freedom rather than utility.
(91 ) Legal responsibility, that is, in tort law to pay B for his resulting damages. Such
responsibility in tort is a stronger and otherwise quite different obligation from the form
of responsibility arising from the accident, linking the actor and the victim, that may
generate otherweaker rights and duties, such as the actors duty to stop and minister to
the victims specialneeds for immediate aid. Variations on this latter form of weak
responsibility, aptly dubbed agent-regret by Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in MORAL
LUCK (1981), 20 and outcome responsibility by Tony Honore, Responsibility and Luck:
The Moral Basis of Strict Liability, 104 LAW Q. REV. 530 (1988), are examined by both
Professor Honore and Stephen Perry intheir essays in this volume. See also Arthur
Ripstein, Equality, Luck, and Responsibility, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1994).
(92) This was the approach taken by Tony Honor, supra, note 88, and by Richard
Epstein, subject to defensive pleas. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a
System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974). Among the numerous critiques
of Epsteins strict liability theory, the most philosophically illuminating is Stephen Perrys.
See Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 147 (1988).
(93) That is, the security interests of B that A chose to put at risk.
(94) Philosophical problems concerning liability for harm may ultimately reduce to a
question of the allocation of property rights. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN ,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985), 96
98 (arguing that property rights andtort liability rights are opposite sides of the same
coin); Epstein, supra, note 92; Weinrib, supra, note 27. See generally Guido Calabresi &
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). In thecontext of intentional takings, tort liability
rules and property rights may indeed be seen asopposite sides of the same coin, as in the
starving beggar example discussed above. Yet theproperty rights notion does not appear
to help explain the moral or legal quality of choicesto act for purposes unrelated to a
victims property holdings that produce a risk of harm tosuch holdings only contingently
and incidentally to the actors chosen goals. In consideringthe problem of responsibility
for such secondary risks of harm, therefore, property rights probably need to be
regarded as a separate and prior notion to the concept of liability rights.
(95) As by positing that B, standing at point y, owns yor, more precisely, that B owns
atthe time an exclusive possessory right in y.
(96) Efforts to understand the philosophical aspects of corrective justice tend to run
intoimpenetrable bedrock located at the bottom of the inquiry, framed in terms of
Page 28 of 31

fairness in theinitial distribution of property rights. The inquiry at this point thus
transforms into muchbroader questions of distributive justice, involving the most
fundamental issues of propertyand political philosophy. For an introduction to these
issues, see, e.g., DAVID MILLER , MARKET, STATE, AND COMMUNITY (1989), ch. 2.
This may well be the point at which philosophical inquiry into principles of tort law ends,
and pure ethics and political philosophybegins. I have reached bedrock and this is where
my spade is turned: LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
(1953), 217 quoted in Catherine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A
Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2363 (1990).
(97) An unremitting principle requiring actors always to accord the interests of others
equalconcern and respect to their own may be too strong for a practical, general moral
or legal theory. See generally R. DWORKIN , LAWS EMPIRE, supra, note 21, at 291
301; Finnis, supra, note 17, at 304. Yet the principle unremitted is arguably what the
classic Golden Rule conceptcontemplates in abstract terms. See, e.g., KANT ,
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra, note 9. Moreover, when the principle of equal
respect is applied to problems of accident law, it maybe interpreted consistently with a
general proposition permitting an individual ordinarily toaccord primacy to his own
interests as a matter of practical convenience. See FINNIS , supra, note 17, at 177 (as a
matter of practical reasonableness, one cannot reasonably give equal weight, or equal
concern, to the interests of every person anywhere whose interests he couldascertain
and affect); see also SAMUEL SCHEFFLER , THE REJECTION OF
CONSEQUENTALISM (1982).
In general, an actor may fairly be considered blameworthy for causing anothers
accidental harm only if the actor knew or reasonably could foresee that his conduct was
likely to cause more harm than good to the interests of a foreseeable class of persons of
which the victim was a member. To recover damages for accidental harm, an accident
victim should be required to establish that the actors harmful behavior was
unreasonably selfishthat (1) the actor chose to act in a manner that he should have
known would expose foreseeable persons to foreseeable risks that he should have known
to be more valuable than the interests of his own (and others) that he was seeking to
promote, and (2) such excessive harm in fact resulted. Thus, the notion of a violation of
the equal respect principle in the accident context is limited and circumscribed by linked
notions of evaluation, selfish choice, action, harm, causation, and the burden of proof in
law.
(98) It is important to remember that the utility calculus discussed here concerns only
thelaw of accidents and, hence, only foreseeable risks of harm to the interests of others.
At thetime of action, therefore, the possibility of such harm is by hypothesis contingent
an unlikelyfuture eventuality that probably will not occur. This fact bears materially upon
the moralquality of As decision to sacrifice Bs interests for his own. See FINNIS ,
supra, note 17, at 126127.
(99) It is also proper under related principles of utility and efficiency. See R. DWORKIN ,
LAWS EMPIRE, supra, note 21, at 282. See generally Schwartz, supra, note 62. Even if
Page 29 of 31

Aschoice proves wrong in fact, it still would be a morally proper choice if it appeared
reasonable on the facts available to A at the time A acted.
(100) In particular, the virtue of prudence, as explained in James Gordley, in Tort Law in
the Aristotelian Tradition, this volume.
(101 ) Potential victims often may self-insure against such risks most efficiently: see Moral
Foundations, supra, note 8, at 484493. On background risks, see George P. Fletcher,
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543 (1972).
(102) If B, standing at point y, chooses to remain at y, he deprives A, standing at point x,
ofthe opportunity to move to y, thereby harming A, If, notwithstanding Bs presence at
y, A decides to move to y, resulting in a collision that causes harm, the decision of B as
well as thatof A may be seen to cause the harm. Assuming that B had no prior property
interest in point y, and assuming further that there is no good reason to prefer security
(inaction) to action, then 2Ts choice to remain at y is just as much a cause of the collision
as As choice to move to y. See generally Judith Jarvis Thomson, Causality and Rights:
Some Preliminaries, 63 CHI.-KBNT L. REV. 471 (1987). Ones intuitive preference for
the passive security interest of B in this situation may reflect assumptions, often
unfounded, (1) that A intended to harm B, or (2)that B had a prior vested right in y. In
the accident situation, the first assumption is simplywrong. The second assumption is
more problematical and may derive from some rough conception of first-in-time-first-inright: see Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive
Justice, 11 IOWA L. REV. 515, 584591 (1992). Or perhaps it reflects aconfusion
between ones (imperfect) property rights to ones own body and ones mere interest in
remaining at a particular point in space. It may be, however, that A rather than B owns y,
in which case Bs poaching thereon, and his obdurate refusal to move when he sees A
com-ing, is as much or more the cause of the collision as is As assertion of a right to
occupyhis y.
(103) See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2, 1213
(1960); Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 217220
(1973).
(104) See generally Tony Honor Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law, this
volume; Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1737 (1985).
(105) Except in unusual circumstances it can be said of any plaintiff that he made a
choiceto be where he (or his property) was when the harm he suffered occurred, and,
just as thedefendant was pursuing his own purposes in choosing to act as he did, so in
making his choicethe plaintiff was presumably attempting to further ends of his own:
Perry, supra, note 92, at 156. [W]e are necessarily dealing in tort law with an intersection
of two choices to act, notwith the effects for one person of a single such choice which has
been made by another: id. at 157.
(106) might more appropriately be referred to as earlier actors when they are passive
Page 30 of 31

at the time of harm.
(107) See generally Jules L. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 WM. &
MARYL. REV. 259 (1976); The Fault Pit, supra, note 7; Perry, supra, note 92; Ernest J.
Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37 (1983). Thus,
Ames and otherearly tort law scholars were right in arguing for the general superiority of
a rule of fault (negligence) to the unmoral rule of strict liability: see, e.g., Ames, supra,
note 4.
(108) Probably for harm from commercial misrepresentations and manufacturing defects,
see Moral Foundations, supra, note 8, and possibly from wild animals and specially
dangerous activities.
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Print publication date: 1997