Nietzsche's Critique of Democracy (18701886)

Author(s): H. W. Siemens
Source: Journal of Nietzsche Studies, No. 38 (FALL 2009), pp. 20-37
Published by: Penn State University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20717973
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Nietzsche's Critique ofDemocracy (1870-1886)

H. W.

Siemens

This article reconstructsNietzsche's shiftingviews on democracy in

theperiod 1870-86 with reference tohis enduring preoccupation with tyrannical
concentrations of power and the conviction thatradical pluralism offers theonly
effective form of resistance. As long as he identifiesdemocracy with pluralism
(Human, All Too Human), he sympathizes with it as a site of resistance and
emancipation. From around 1880 on, however, Nietzsche increasingly links

Abstract:

itwith tyranny, in the form of popular sovereignty, and with the promotion of
uniformity, to the exclusion of genuine pluralism. Democracy's emancipatory
claims are reinterpretedas "misarchism," or hatred of authority, and Nietzsche
looks to the "exceptional beings" excluded by democracy for sources of resis
tance to the "autonomous herd" and "mob rule." Against elitist readings of

thismove, it is argued thatNietzsche opposes the domination of the herd type

under democracy from a standpoint in human diversity and a generic concern
with the future of humankind. Exceptional individuals are conceived in plu
ralistic, agonal terms, as a community of legislators engaged in a process of
transvaluation that serves the interestsnot of one or a few but of all of us: "the
self-overcoming

of the human."

years have seen a strong interest in the constructive potential of

Nietzsche's
thought for a radicalized concept of agonistic democratic
Recent
But
is known to be a fierce critic of democracy, and this is
Nietzsche
politics.1
either ignored,played down, or softened bymost theoristsof radical democracy.2

thought for democratic politics thereforeneeds to be

reassessed, by asking: Is there a way to interpretor appropriate Nietzsche for
democracy that confronts the problems he locates in democracy? The purpose
of this article is to lay the ground for addressing this question by examining
Nietzsche's critique of democracy.
Nietzsche's attitude to democracy ismore complex and multifaceted than
The value of Nietzsche's

is usually thought.3 In its chronological development itexhibits distinct turns

and phases, reflecting shifts inNietzsche's philosophical center of gravity,but
also reappraisals and reversals of earlier positions. It is this trajectory and the
sources of some of its twists and turns that Iwill address in this article. Itwould,
however, be misleading to suggest that there are no constants whatsoever in

Nietzsche's
JOURNAL
Copyright ?

thought on democracy. A survey of all of Nietzsche's

OF NIETZSCHE

STUDIES,

2009 The Pennsylvania

texts on

Issue 38, 2009.

State University, University Park, PA.

20

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Nietzsche's

Critique

of Democracy

21

democracy reveals one quite striking pattern: inNietzsche's usage the terms
'democracy' and 'democratic' do not usually refer to a form of government or
a set of institutions. In other words, Nietzsche's thoughton democracy is not
political inan obvious sense; rather,thepolitical isusually taken as symptomatic
of something else, somethingmuch larger,much broader, thatNietzsche comes
to call the "whole democratic movement [demokratische Gesamtbewegung]"
(KSA 11:26[352], p. 242).4 Perhaps we can speak of a pervasive cultural tendency

or a general disposition. This is also suggested by the frequentoccurrence of the

term 'taste' (Geschmack) in connection with democracy inexpressions such as
'der demokratische Geschmack' or 'der demokratische Grundgeschmack aller

Wertsch?tzung' (KSA 11:35[22], p. 518).5 'Democracy,' then, refersprimarily

to a set of values or ideals?increasingly identifiedas one of a network ofmere
"modern ideas" inNietzsche's laterwritings?but also to a disposition, attitude,
or type thatflourishes and dominates under those values.6
All of this raises the question: Inwhat sense, ifat all, does Nietzsche engage

democracy as a political thinker?Where Nietzsche does discuss the state, he

usually does so inorder to raise thequestion of political ends: What is the state
for?And thisquestion is answered in a way thatalways subordinates the state in
instrumentalfashion to culture. It is tempting to see thisas an aestheticist refusal
of politics, a retreatfrompolitics into theprivatism ofKulturphilosophie typical
of thenineteenth century.7But I thinkthat this iswrong. Culture isnot just about
great art, even for the young,Wagnerian Nietzsche. Rather, it is themedium

for enhancing and extending human possibilities, the laboratory for all those
experiments inhuman excellence thatare his real concern?a concern thatonly
becomes more urgentand pronounced with Nietzsche's increasingpreoccupation

with Nihilism in lateryears. In this regard, Iwould suggest thatNietzsche is not

an apolitical thinkerbut a thinkerwho, in the throes and agonies ofmodernity,
resuscitates ancient political philosophy, and specifically itsethical orientation
to human excellence or perfection, by retrievingwhat Dan Conway has called
the "founding question of politics": What ought humankind to become?8

The Early andMiddle Work (1870-1881)

Nietzsche's earlywritings have little to say about democracy. What he does say
is overwhelmingly critical and usually arises in connection with his critique of
Socrates/Socratism or his rejection of certain theories on the popular origins

of the chorus inGreek tragedy.9Without question, Nietzsche's early thought

is dominated by the thought of culture and the figure of genius, embodied by
the pre-Socratic philosophers, the great tragedians, and their contemporary
avatars: Schopenhauer and Wagner. Where Nietzsche does thinkpolitically,
it is in terms of Schopenhauer's thought or, rather,Wagner's appropriation

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22

H. W. Siemens

of Schopenhauer in his essay "?ber Staat und Religion" ("On State and
Religion").10 Here Wagner plays on his favorite Schopenhauerian themes of
the diremption of thewill and itsmanifestation in theprogressive, conflictual
order of phenomena inorder to thematize the centrality of genius to cultural and
political life.The genius, he argues, stands at the summit of life's pyramid and
represents the end result and pinnacle of the all-pervasive conflict of life?the

highest manifestation of thewill.11 As such, however, Wagner's genius also

holds thekey to our redemption from conflict and suffering.The artistic genius
is cast as the creator of powerful illusions (Wahngebilde, edle T?uschungen)
that translate the Schopenhauerian "gravity of life" (Ernst des Lebens) into a

"play" (Spiel), throughwhich the "nullity of world" (Nichtigkeit der Welt) is

brought into the open but made harmless, conceded with a smile, as itwere
(wie unter L?cheln zugestanden). In this account, artistic genius offers the
community of sufferers a form of life-immanent redemption (innerhalb des

Lebens ?ber diese erhebt) that enables them to live and to affirm life, or as
Nietzsche puts it: "The influence of the genius is normally that a new network
of illusions [Illusionsnetz] is cast over a mass, under which it can live. This is
themagical influence of the genius on the subordinate levels. But there is at the

same time an ascending line [aufsteigende Linie] to the genius: this tears the
existing networks apart until finally in the attained genius a higher artistic goal
is attained" (KSA 7:6[3]).12 Clearly, we are a long way from Schopenhauer's
utterly impractical, solitary genius subsisting at themargins of society. Through
a peculiar synthesis of individual genius with Schopenhauer's "genius of the
species" (Genius der Gattung), Wagner moves the figure of genius to the
very center of cultural and political life and gives that figure the eminently
practical task of making itpossible for the human community to live and to
affirm life.13Everything?the
subordinated to this figure.

state, the people, and ordinary existence?is

For Nietzsche, however, the status of the genius at the apex of culture
and society depends on the capacity of genius to limit or measure itself and
not to abuse its position of authority for its own ends, what Nietzsche calls

"creative self-restraint" (sch?pferische Selbstumschr?nkung) with reference

to Schopenhauer (SE 3,KSA 1,p. 350-51). And in the aftermath of The Birth
of Tragedy, Nietzsche's perception of genius changes. With the breakdown

of his relation toWagner in themid-1870s, Nietzsche loses confidence in the

capacity of genius to limit itself;Wagner is increasingly cast as a tyranni
cal force,14 and the question of limits becomes central forNietzsche. How to
impose limits on genius? Where are the limits on a single overwhelming force
like genius to come from?Nietzsche now embarks on a systematic deflation
ary critique of genius that comes to fruition inHuman, All Too Human and

culminates in the dissolution of genius in its active reception: "What is genius

worth if itdoes not communicate such freedom and heights of feeling to its

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'
N ietzsche s Critique of Democracy

23

contemplator [Betrachter] and venerator that he no longer has need of the

is thedistinction of thosewho are
genius!?To make oneselfsuperfluous?that

well theshiftin
great"(AOM407;cf.KSA 8:29[19]).This aphorismillustrates
standpoint away from the genius and the ideal of self-limitation to
thosewho sufferunder genius. And with this shiftcomes thequestion of eman
cipation thatwill dominate themiddle works: How to free ourselves from the

Nietzsche's

tyrannical force of genius?15 Nowhere is this shift inscribedmore clearly than

in ?7 of Richard Wagner inBayreuth (KSA 1, p. 466), where, beginning with
a sense of "smallness and frailty,"of self-alienation or nonidentity, in the face
ofWagner's overwhelming force,Nietzsche describes a form of antagonistic

reception or Betrachten throughwhich he is empowered through and against

Wagner: "In succumbing apparently toWagner's out- and over-flowing nature,
theBetrachtende has himself partaken of its energy [Kraft] and has become
powerful through and against him, so to speak; and everyone who examines
himself closely knows that a mysterious antagonism [Gegnerschaft] belongs

even to Betrachten, that of confrontation [EntgegenschauenY (RWB 7).16

If this looks like wishful thinking on Nietzsche's part, a more sustainable
thought also emerges at this time, namely, that thebest form of resistance, the
best source of limits on the single genius, lies in a plurality of more or less

equal geniuses or forces. The conjunction of emancipation with the thought

of genuine pluralism will have a long trajectory inNietzsche's thought.At this
time, in its inception, it is explored by him in two contexts: the first is theGreek
agon, conceived as a regime of reciprocal stimulation and restraint among a
plurality of forces or geniuses; the second is contemporary democracy, identi
fied inHH as the site of pluralism, of resistance and emancipation from tyran

nical forces.17 Thus, in aphorism 230 of WS, entitled "Tyrants of theSpirit"

Nietzsche writes: "In our time, anyone expressing a singlemoral characteristic,
as do the persons of Theophrast and Moliere, would be considered sick, and
one would talk of his 'fixe idee.' [...] Nowadays a democracy of concepts rules
in everyone's head,?many together are the ruler: a single concept thatwould

wish to be ruler is, as stated, now called a 'fixe idee.' This is our way of kill
ing the tyrants,?we point to the lunatic asylum."18 These lines illustrate one
of two characteristics of Nietzsche's middle phase that stand out in contrast
to his overall treatmentof democracy. They are, first,his positive evaluation
of democracy and second, his engagement with democracy as a political phe

nomenon. This can be seen in several texts, such as WS 289, where Nietzsche
describes "democratic arrangements" as "quarantine institutions against the

old pestilence of tyrannical desires," orWS 275, where the "democratization of

Europe" is seen as "a link in thechain of those enormous prophylactic measures,

which are thebrainchild ofmodernity," as one in a series ofmodern "dams and

fortifications against barbarians, against plagues, against the enslavement of
body and mindl"

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24

H. W. Siemens

However, Nietzsche's position inHHdoes not representa complete breakwith

his formerposition. Nor does itrepresent a complete, unambiguous affirmation
of democratic institutions; indeed, many of his later, deeply critical views
are already anticipated here. To begin with the firstpoint, even if there is an
engagement with democracy as a political phenomenon, thepolitical is stillwhat

itwas for the earlyNietzsche, amere means for the advancement of cultural and
human perfection. In the aphorism (WS 275) on democracy as a prophylactic
measure against enslavement, the ultimate fruit is notpolitical freedom but the
"art of gardening," a reference to the retreat from politics described at the end
of Voltaire's Candide:

Secure foundationsat last,so thatthefuturecan build upon themwithout dan

ger! It is no longerpossible that the fruit-fieldsof culturewill once again be
destroyedovernightbywild and senselessmountain waters! Dams and fortifi
cations against barbarians, against plagues, against enslavement of body and
mindl And all of this,taken literallyand crudely to startoffwith, is gradually
understood ina higherandmore spiritual
way, so thatall themeasures mentioned
here seem to be thebrilliantpreparatorygroundworkfor thehighest artistof
theartof gardening,who can only turnto his real task,when thisone has been
completed!? (WS 275)
Nor isNietzsche unambiguous inhis affirmationof democracy, even asmeans for
a futural art of gardening. Buried in this aphorism is a worry about "something
barren and uniform in the faces" of those working for democracy, as if the

"grey dust" from their dam-building labor has "penetrated into theirbrains"
(WS 275, KSA 2:671).19 Similarly, the text (WS 289) on democratic arrange
ments as quarantine institutionsagainst tyrannyends with the remark that they
are "very useful and very boring."20 Even where contemporary democracy is
considered from a purely political (not a cultural) point of view, Nietzsche's
affirmation ishighly qualified. Thus, aphorism 293 of WS begins by reiterating
the thoughtof emancipation: "Democracy wants to create and guarantee freedom
[Unabh?ngigkeit] for as many as possible, freedom of opinion, of lifestyle and

income." But the aphorism winds up by deferring this emancipatory concept of

democracy to thefuture:"?I speak of democracy as of something to come. That
which now already goes by thatname differsfrom theolder forms of government

only because it isriding with new horses; the streets are still the same old ones,
the danger with these vehicles
and thewheels are still the same old ones.?Is
of the people's welfare [V?lkerwohles] really less than itwas?" (WS 293). So
even where theconcept of democracy is focused on political freedom rather than
culture, thevalue of contemporary democracy is qualified byNietzsche: at best,
it is a mere means for the future realization (not of culture, the art of garden
ing,but) of genuine political freedom.Whence these gestures of deferral?Why
does Nietzsche deny or at least complicate the identification of democracy with
emancipation at the verymoment inwhich he firstexpresses it?

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Nietzsche's

Critique

of Democracy

25

One clue is given in the closing line of the text just cited: the conception
of democracy as a vehicle for thewell-being of the people. While this seems
more menacing aspect inanother
harmless enough, ithas an altogether different,
one
that
from
this
actually predates this one. InHH 472,
period,
aphorism
Nietzsche describes the democratic conception of government as one inwhich
"one sees in itnothing but a tool of the popular will [des Volkswillen], not an
above in comparison with a below but merely a function of the one and only

sovereign, the people" (KSA 2, p. 303). The argument in this text is that the
concept of popular sovereignty has the effect of destroying the religious aura
of the state, so that "modern democracy is the historical form of thedecay of
the state." As we shall see, this thought returns inNietzsche's
later thought
on democracy. Of immediate concern is another implication of the concept of
popular sovereignty, one that also returns inNietzsche's later thought under
the rubric of "the autonomous herd" (BGE 202): Where government becomes
"but a function of the one and only sovereign, the people," does democracy
not run the risk of replacing one kind of tyranny?the tyrannyof the despotic

genius?with another: the tyrannyof thepeople? Under democracy, Nietzsche

argues inWS 292, "all parties are now required to flatter the 'people' and to
give itall kinds of reliefs and freedoms,whereby itfinally becomes omnipotent"
(KSA 2, p. 684). So ifNietzsche denies the emancipatory value of democracy
in themoment thathe expresses it,one reason is thatdemocracy emancipates

us from the concentration of power in a single despot or genius at the cost of

establishing another kind of tyranny: thatof the "people." But that is not all.
There is another reason for the rupturebetween democracy and emancipation,

one that is implicit in the singularword "'people.'" It is thatNietzsche doubts?

while expressing?democracy's
claim to be the site of genuine pluralism; and
without genuine pluralism, there can be no genuine freedom forNietzsche, no
effective resistance to tyranny,be ita single genius or a singular "people." This

doubt was already encountered inNietzsche's remarks that the faces of demo
crats are "barren and uniform" (einf?rmig) and thatdemocratic institutionsare
"useful but boring" (langweilig).
In a Nachlass note from 1880, these remarks come to occupy center stage

inNietzsche's thought.This text is importantbecause itbrings together both

reasons Ihave given forNietzsche's lack of confidence indemocracy: the tyranny
of the people and itspromotion of uniformity,not pluralism. The text is also a
milestone inNietzsche's thought on democracy, since it inaugurates a critical
turn thatwill only abate to some extent in the late 1880s:

The more thefeelingof unitywith one's fellowhumansgains theupperhand, the

more humanbeings aremade uniform[uniformirt],
themore theywill perceive
all difference[ordiversity:Verschiedenheit]as immoral.In thisway, thesand of
humanitynecessarilycomes intobeing: all very similar,very small,very round,
most
veryaccommodating,veryboring.Christianityanddemocracyhavedone the

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26

H. W. Siemens
to drive humanityalong thepath towardsand.A small,weak, glowing feeling
of contentmentequally distributedamong all, an improvedand extremeformof
Chineseness,would thatbe the last image thathumanitycould offer?Inevitably,
ifwe remainon thepath ofmoral sensibilitiesuntilnow.A great reflectionis
must draw a lineunder itspast,perhaps itmust address
needed,perhapshumanity
a new canon to all singular individuals[Einzelnen]:be different
from all others,
from theother;thecrudestmonstershave
and takepleasure ineach beingdifferent
certainlybeen eradicatedunder theprevailingregimeofmorality thusfar?that
was itstask;butwe do notwish to liveon thoughtlessly
undera regimeof fear in
theface ofwild beasts. For so long,fartoo long,theword has been: One likeAll,
One forAll [Einerwie Alle, Einerf?r Alle], (KSA 9:3[98], 1880; cf.D 174)

earlier concerns about the tyrannyof thepeople and the

of
uniformity under democracy are combined and concentrated in
promotion
a new thought: the systematic exclusion of difference.A furthernovelty of this
text?equally programmatic forNietzsche's further thought?is itsfocus on
morality, on values: It is by being "perceived" and branded as "immoral" that
In this text,Nietzsche's

difference or diversity is excluded, towhich Nietzsche responds by announcing

a new moral "canon" of difference and the affirmation of difference, to be

addressed to singular individuals (Einzelnen). Nietzsche's actual argumentation

at the level of values is encapsulated inhis closing words, "Einer wie Alle, Einer
f?rAlle": Insofar as morality is dominated by theChristian-democratic values

of altruism (Einerf?r Alle) and equal moral worth (Einer wie Alle), it is having
the inevitable consequence of breeding actual uniformity among people (Einer
wie Alle), to the exclusion of difference. InNietzsche's subsequent thought this
concern comes tobe focused on thedemocratic value of equality and the claim
that in reality,"equality for all [Gleichheitf?r Alle]" is equivalent to a "making
equal of all [Gleichmachung Aller]" (KSA 11:27[80]; also 'Ausgleichung': BGE
242,?&4 5,p. 183,11:36[17]).
But onwhat grounds does Nietzsche obj ect to thisdevelopment? His objection,
nota bene, does not entail a wholesale rejection of our Christian-democratic

values, which are valued for eliminating the brazen immorality of the "crudest
animals" of human history.His objection concerns the cost of this achievement,
specifically the cost to thefuture of humankind, as expressed in the question:

"Would this be the last image that humanity could offer?" It is important to
see that this question does not simply reflect an elitist identificationwith the
few singular individuals (Einzelne) against the "sand of humanity." At stake
forNietzsche is not a few individuals but, rather, thefuture of humankind and

theunderlying worry that the concern for the equal distribution of happiness or
contentment, as promoted by Christian-democratic values, and a concern for
the futureof humankind pull in opposite directions.
Four features, then, stand out in this text:
1. the claim thatChristian-democratic values breed uniformity to the exclu
sion of difference;
2. Nietzsche's focus on morality or values;

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Nietzsche's

Critique

of Democracy

27

3. the general or generic orientation ofNietzsche's objection to democratic

values: toward thefuture of humankind; and
4. the claim that there is a tension between the happiness of all individu
als, promoted by Christian-democratic values, and the future of human
kind.

All four features are programmatic for the next phase inNietzsche's thought
on democracy, as we will see. But firstwe must take stock of the trajectory I
have traced through themiddle phase ofNietzsche's thoughton democracy.
We have seen how, at thebeginning of his middle phase (HH), democracy is
conceived in positive terms as a countermodel to tyrannical concentrations of

power: that is, as an alternative,pluralistic model of power thatoffers effective

resistance to, and with that a form of emancipation from, tyrannical forces.
We have also seen how, toward the end of thismiddle phase, Nietzsche's

confidence in democracy has broken down under theweight of two consid

erations: that democracy only emancipates us from the tyrannyof despotic
power by establishing a tyrannyof themob, and the underlying realization that
democracy promotes uniformity, "the sand of humanity," rather than genuine
plurality and difference.This about-turn inNietzsche's assessment of democracy
raises a number of questions:

1. WTiere does Nietzsche now come to locate genuine pluralism if not in

democracy? How can pluralism be realized and practiced?
And ifdemocracy's failure as a site of pluralism also spells itsfailure as a form
of emancipation,
2. What, then, becomes of the emancipatory claims of democracy for
Nietzsche? How does he come to interpretthese claims in the light of
theircollapse?
3. And what about Nietzsche's own emancipatory impulse: How does he
come to articulate and locate the emancipatory impulse thathe once identi
fiedwith democracy?

Nietzsche's LaterWork (1883-1886)

These questions give us the key coordinates for understanding Nietzsche's
thought on democracy inwhat is probably its richest and most important
phase, the period leading up to BGE and GM, from around 1883-84 to
1886. In considering this later phase inNietzsche's
thought on democracy,

I will restrictmyself to a few lines of development that take off from the
text we have just considered. For lack of a better word, I will call it the
pivotal text.

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28

H. W. Siemens

concerns with the tyranny of

In the pivotal textwe saw thatNietzsche's
the people and the promotion of uniformity under democracy are concen
trated in the claim thatChristian-democratic values systematically exclude
difference. InNietzsche's subsequent thought this is radicalized in the claim
that a hatred of authority is endemic to democracy, what Nietzsche calls

idiosyncrasy against everything that rules and wants to

the
modern
Misarchism
rule,
(to coin a bad word for a bad state of affairs)"
(GM II: 12,KSA 5, p. 315). This claim is often made in contexts that take up
the "democratic

and criticize the emancipatory and egalitarian claims of democracy. Time

and again, Nietzsche looks to hollow out these claims by arguing thatmis
archism is theunderlying motivation andmeaning of thedemocratic values of
equality and freedom. A good example is note 26[282] (KSA 11) from 1884.

Here Nietzsche begins with democracy's self-understanding as emancipation:

"According towhether a people feels: 'The Few have the right, the insight,
the gift of ruling etc' or 'The Many have it'?one has an oligarchic regime
or a democratic one."

If these lines identifydemocracy with its own claims

to freedom and equality in the sense of popular sovereignty or self-rule, the
next paragraph reinterprets these claims ina way thatcollapses them.The text
continues: "Monarchy represents the belief inOne wholly Supreme Being, a
leader savior demigod. Aristocracy represents the belief in an elite humanity
and higher caste. Democracy represents the unbelief m great humans and an
elite society: 'everyone is the same as everyone' 4Atbottom we are all self
interested cattle and rabble'" (KSA 11:26[282]). Here the democratic ideal is
recast in negative, nihilistic terms: It is because we are unable to believe in
any authoritative figures or classes thatwe fall back on the ideals of popular

self-rule and equality.

What Nietzsche here describes as "unbelief" soon takes on a more active,
menacing aspect. In a subsequent note from the same notebook, he writes of
the "skepsis of a democratic age that rejects the higher kind of human": "The

psychology of this century is essentially directed against higher natures: they

are supposed to pay for theirhumanity" (KSA 11:26[342]). By the time of BGE
(two years later), this rejection has become an out-and-out "hostility." In apho

rism 22, Nietzsche refers thephysicist's belief in the lawfulness of nature to the
"democratic instinctsof themodern soul" and inparticular, itsbelief inequality:
"'Everywhere equality before the law?in this respect nature does not have it
otherwise or better than us': a charming afterthought inwhich once again the
hostility of themob towards everythingprivileged and self-satisfied, as well as a
second and finer atheism, isdisguised. 'Ni dieu, nimaitre'?that's how you want
itnot so?" (BGE 22). Inother
it: and therefore 'long live the law of nature'!?is

textsfrom 1885-86 this"hostility" is thenradicalized into"hatred" inconnection

with the slave revolt thematized inGM: a hatred on thepart ofmalcontents who
are only able to affirm themselves by projecting their self-hatred onto others

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Nietzsche's

Critique

of Democracy

29

as a "hatred of those that are happy, proud, victorious" (KSA 11:35[22], pp.
517-18; cf.KSA 12:2[ 13]). In theend,misarchism isgeneralized byNietzsche, as
"a democratic baseline taste inall evaluation [demokratischerGrund-Geschmack

aller Werthsch?tzung], inwhich the belief in great things and human beings
turns intomistrust, and finally intounbelief and becomes the causal reason why
greatness dies out" (KSA 11:35[22]).
This line of development enables us to address question 2 raised earlier:

What becomes of theemancipatory claims of democracy, afterNietzsche rejects

them?How does he come to interpretthese claims in the lightof theircollapse?
What we see under the rubricofmisarchism isa sustained, increasingly radical

ized efforton Nietzsche's part to hollow out the emancipatory and egalitarian
claims of democracy. The democratic values of equality and libertyare referred
successively to unbelief, rejection, hostility, and finally a hatred of authority
and rule, as theirunderlyingmotivation and meaning. But ifNietzsche rejects
the emancipatory claims of democracy, where does he come to locate his own
emancipatory impulse? How does he come to articulate the interest in freedom
thathe once identifiedwith democracy?
ForNietzsche, as we saw, freedom isonly possible under conditions of genuine

pluralism. And insofar as democracy involves a systematic exclusion of differ

ence, pluralism becomes impossible. In thepivotal textwe saw Nietzsche's earlier
concerns with popular tyrannyand uniformity concentrated in a concern with
the exclusion of difference under democratic morality. In the laterworks these
concerns only become more pronounced. Under the sign of misarchism, the

exclusion of difference is radicalized into themotivating hatred behind demo

cratic values. Under the sign of the "autonomous herd" (BGE 202), Nietzsche
describes thedominant social typeor group: the"herd-being" (Heerden-Wesen),
whose life interestsare served by those same values. It is thereforeunsurprising
thatNietzsche turns to those excluded by the autonomous herd forhis hopes of

emancipation. Nietzsche's earlier preoccupation with tyrannyis redirected from

the figure of genius to thatof "the autonomous herd," transformingthequestion
of emancipation: His question now concerns the sources of resistance to the
masses, to the tyrannyofmob rule (P?belherrschaft). At the same time, thefigure
of genius, recast as the deviant, nonconformist, or exceptional human beings

(Ausnahme-Menschen), looks increasingly fragile and vulnerable toNietzsche.

His emancipatory impulse isdetached from the tyrannyof genius and transforms
intoa concern with protecting exceptional individuals from themob. This much
is clear from the textsonmisarchism discussed above and frommany others from
thisperiod. A typical example isnote 26[89]: "Exceptional spiritsgo wrong more
easily; the storyof theirsuffering,their illnesses, theirrage at the loud quacking

about virtue among all themoral ganders etc. Everything conspires against them,
indemocratic ages.
they are embittered at always being out of place.?Danger
Absolute contempt as securitymeasure" (KSA 11:26[89], p. 173).

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30

H. W. Siemens

At this point, it looks as ifNietzsche is regressing to his earliest position

where he took the side of individual genius, with all its dangers of tyranni
cal excess, against themany. Or alternatively, it is as ifhe takes the side of
an elite social class or caste: the Ausnahme-Menschen
against themasses.

Clearly, these are serious charges in considering the relevance and value of
Nietzsche's
critique of democracy today. They are not entirely wrong, but
theydo call for a differentiated response. In this context, Iwill restrictmyself
to four points.

First, it iswrong to see Nietzsche as investing exclusive and absolute value

in theOne or the Few against theMany, as he sometimes does in earlywritings.
To see why, we must go back to the pivotal text.Here, Nietzsche's objection

to the leveling tendency of democratic values is expressed in this question:

"Would this be the last image that humanity could offer?" This is just one of
the forms taken by the question of ends driving Nietzsche's political thought:
What ought humankind to become? As such, it does not simply reflect an

elitist identificationwith one or a few singular individuals (Einzelne) against

the "sand of humanity." At stake forNietzsche is not a few individuals but,
in fact, thefuture of humankind, a concern that has its sources in a positive
ethical impulse that fuels Nietzsche's thought from beginning to end: that is,
his perfectionist demand thatwe overcome ourselves as we are, thatwe do

everything to enhance or elevate the human species by extending the range

of human possibilities. Exceptional or singular individuals figure not as the
exclusive beneficiaries but as the great experimenters, as the key to realiz
ing a perfectionist demand that has a generic or general orientation toward

humankind (die Menschheit, der Mensch, der Typus "Mensch," die Species
"Mensch," die Pflanze "Mensch" etc.). This generic orientation is already pres
ent inmany early texts, as I have argued elsewhere,21 but it ismost clearly
expressed in the concept of responsibility (Verantwortlichkeit) used to define
the real philosopher inBGE: the philosopher as "the human of themost wide
ranging responsibility, who has the conscience for the total development of

the human being [desMenschen]"

(BGE 61, KSA 5:79).22 In the pivotal text,
is
Nietzsche's perfectionism
expressed as a tension between the equal distribu
or
contentment
advanced by democratic values, on one side,
tion of happiness
on
the other. Thereafter, inBGE, this is radi
and the future of humankind,
calized into a stark either-or disjunction between compassion with suffering
individuals, on one side, and compassion with humankind at large (derMensch
[BGE 225]) and its fate, on the other; or again, between the contraction of

humanity (Verkleinerung) under the rule of utilitarian-democratic values,

on one side, and the enhancement of humanity (Vergr??erung, Erh?hung
[BGE 44, 212, 225, 257]), on the other. This disjunction between contrac
tion and enhancement at the level of humankind is one of the key axes of
Nietzsche's critique of democracy inBGE. Itdoes not inscribe a confrontation

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Nietzsche's

Critique

of Democracy

31

between two classes: the interestsor absolute value of an elite class against
themasses. Rather, itdescribes a confrontation between thedomination of one
type or disposition (the herd-being, the "misarchistic" Grundgeschmack aller
Werthsch?tzung) under democracy and the fateof the entire species towhich we

all belong. Democracy, according toNietzsche, confrontsuswith an irresolvable

conflict between the interestsof one type or disposition, which comes to domi
nate under democratic conditions, and the interestsof the species as whole. The

practical effectof thisdisjunction, as far as I can tell, is to force a choice upon

us between the alternatives of enhancing or contracting humankind: We must
choose either for the futureof humankind?its enhancement?or for compas
sion with actual lives, at the cost of the species?its contraction. The disturbing

implication of this line of thought is that, in respecting the equal moral worth of
all individuals, we live carelessly: at the cost of the futureof our species. This
is not because there is something inherentlywrong with equal moral worth as
a value but, rather,because itallows one human type to flourish at the expense

of others,with disastrous consequences for thewhole of humankind.

Returning to the problem of regression, the charge that the laterNietzsche
reverts to his earlier position raises once again the specter of the tyrannyof

genius and the question of limits.My second response to this charge concerns
Nietzsche's pluralistic impulse. Earlier thequestion was raised:What happens to
the thoughtof pluralism?Where does Nietzsche come to locate genuine pluralism
later thought,his pluralistic impulse, likehis
toward
those excluded by the herd-beings. Or
emancipatory impulse,migrates
of
in
it
is
because
he
conceives
them
theplural, as a pluralistic community
rather,
or
of "exceptional humans," "philosophers,"
"legislators of the future," thathe
ifnot indemocracy? InNietzsche's

should say
places his hopes for freedom in them.Nietzsche is unclear?one
these figures. The scanty and dispersed sources
systematically unclear?about
give us no clear picture of an ideal community and no clear decision on the rela
tionofAusnahme-Menschen todemocracy.23What is clear is theirtask: the trans
valuation of all values; and thereare enough indications thatNietzsche conceives

this in practice as a pluralistic agon of self-legislation and -experimentation

interpares.24 The agon, if it is to be a nondestructive and productive conflict
among more or less equals, depends not just on relations of reciprocal provoca

tion and stimulation but also on relations of reciprocal limitation.25The later

Nietzsche, then,does not regress to his early standpoint in genius and the ideal
of self-limitation; rather, in conceiving the "higher" or "exceptional beings" in
pluralistic, agonal terms,he returns to his central insight: that the best source
of limitson the genius is "a second genius," that is, a plurality ofmore or less
equal geniuses or forces. Nietzsche's youthful explorations of theGreek agon,

as a pluralistic countermodel to tyrannical concentrations of power, is revived

by the laterNietzsche andmade fruitfulforwhat he now sees as the central task:
the transvaluation of all values.

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32

H. W. Siemens

Third, tounderstand thisbetter,we must recall another programmatic feature

of the pivotal text:Nietzsche's focus on morality or values. From 1883-84
on, Nietzsche's treatmentof democracy is characterized by the prevalence of
expressions like'das demokratische Zeitalter,' 'derdemokratische Geschmack,'
and 'derdemokratische Grundgeschmack allerWertsch?tzung.'As these expres
sions indicate,Nietzsche's thought on democracy at this time revolves around

a critique of modernity that has its center of gravity inmorality or values. To

be specific, Nietzsche engages democracy within the framework of a critique
of the dominant values ofmodernity. This iswell illustratedby a Nachlass text
from 1884 that takes up the democratic value of equality: "1 have encountered
nobody with whom 1could speak about morality inmy way : thus far,no-one has
been honest and bold enough forthat.Thiscould inpart beamatterof chance. [...]
In themain, however, I believe thatmendacity inmatters ofmorality belongs
to the character of this democratic age. An age like ours, which has adopted
as itsmotto the great lie 'equality among men,' is shallow, hasty and geared

towards the semblance that all is well with humankind, and that 'good' and
'evil' is no longer a problem" (KSA 11:26[364]). Here Nietzsche's complaint
against thedemocratic age concerns theunquestioning acceptance of itsvalues,
theirapparent self-evidence, and the underlying assumption thatall iswell and
morality is no longer a problem. For Nietzsche that is the problem, or at least
the firstobstacle to be overcome. For if themendacity of the democratic age,
typified by the slogan of equality, is to pretend thatmorality is not a problem,
thenNietzschean honesty (Ehrlichkeit) requires thatwe problematize thedemo

cratic values of our age. As Nietzsche's own genealogical critiques show, this
involves breaking the autonomy of our highest values and undermining their
self-evidence by referringthemback to theirorigins in thebasic life interestsof

thosewho promote them. In this vein, the ideal of Gleichheitf?rAlle

is identi
fied by him with the actual Gleichmaching Aller, a process of equalization or
leveling that serves the interestsof that form of life that thrives and comes to

dominate under the rule of democratic values: the"herd-being."26 But genealogy

is not solely negative. In itsvery radicality and comprehensiveness, Nietzsche's
critique of values issues in the call for a transvaluation of all values. And it is

as the creative sources of new values, born of the intensified atmosphere of

a pluralistic contest of legislation, that exceptional individuals are valued by
him. Once again, it is important to remember thatwhen Nietzsche opposes the

"old" Enlightenment of the "democratic herd" and the "equalization of all," he

does so from a position in a "new Enlightenment" that serves the life interests
not of a specific social class but of all of us: "the self-overcoming ofman [des

Menschen]"(KSA 11:27[80]).

My fourth and last response to the charges of regression and elitism is that
Nietzsche's rejection of democratic values does not simply lead to a rejection
of democracy in favor of aristocratic regimes. Even ifhe subjects democratic

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Nietzsche's

of Democracy

Critique

33

values to a total critique, even if he recognizes more clearly now than ever
what he already saw in ////,that democracy is the nihilistic form of decay
(Form vom Verfall) of the state (HH 472), thisdoes not lead to complete despair:
"A declining world is a pleasure notjust for thosewho contemplate it (but also
for thosewho are destroying it).Death isnot just necessary, 'ugly' isnot enough,

there isgreatness, sublimity of all kinds with declining worlds. Also moments of
sweetness, also hopes and sunsets. Europe isa declining world. Democracy is the

decayingform [Verfalls-Form] of the state" (KSA 11:26[434]).27 Inhis laterwrit

project of a "new Enlightenment" concerning our
ings,Nktzsche'sphilosophical
is
values
increasing urgency?to a pragmatic concern
coupled?with
highest

with the (optimal) conditions for transvaluation.And in these contexts he often

recurs,once again, toan insightfromHH: thatdemocracy isamajor, unstoppable
Gesamtbewegung (in contrast with the nation-state; KSA 11:26[352]).28 The
results of Nietzsche's pragmatic deliberations, for anyone who tries to recon
struct his thought on this topic, are profoundly equivocal.29 Nietzsche argues
both thatdemocracy represents theworst conditions for a caste of higher humans
capable of the transvaluation of all values (e.g., A 43) and that itoffers thebest

conditions for them (e.g., BGE 242); indeed, he argues for a whole range of
positions between these two extremes. But that is the subject foranother article.30

At this point, it suffices to say thatNietzsche's radical critique of democratic

values iscoupled with a pragmatic approach todemocracy as both theworst and
thebest condition for transvaluation.

Research

UniversityofLeiden

University of Pretoria
H. W.Siemens@Hum.
leidenuniv. nl
Associate,

Notes
1.William Connolly,
of Political Paradox
Negotiations
Identity/Difference: Democratic
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), especially x-xiii, 158-97; William Connolly, Pluralism
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), especially 121-28; Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and
theDisplacement
of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), especially chap. 3, 42-75;
Lawrence J. Hatab, A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy
(Chicago: Open Court, 1995); Alan
Schrift, "Nietzsche forDemocracy?" Nietzsche-Studien 29 (2000): 220-33. For further references,
see also H. W. Siemens, "Nietzsche's
Political Philosophy. A Review of Recent Literature,"
Nietzsche-Studien

30 (2001): 509-26.
2. Hatab, who devotes a chapter
critique of democracy, is the exception.

in A Nietzschean

Defense

of Democracy

to Nietzsche's

3. An indispensable resource formy research into the this topic was the article "Demokratie,"
inDas Nietzsche-W?rterbuch,
ed. P. J.M. Van Tongeren, G. Schank, and H. W. Siemens (Berlin:
De Gruyter, 2004), vol. 1, 568-83.
4. All

translations are mine.

5. This translates as "the democratic baseline

See also KSA
6. This

taste in all evaluation" (KSA 11:35[22], p. 518).

11:38[6], 13:14[22]; BT "Attempt" 4; GS 368; BGE 44, 210, 224, 239, 254.
iswell illustrated by two late texts. First, Nietzsche writes:

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34

H. W. Siemens
ideas as false.

The modern
"freedom"

"equal rights"
"humaneness"
"compassion"
"the genius"

democratic misunderstanding

(as a consequence

(as impoverished
pessimistic misunderstanding
the decadence-misunderstanding
(nevrose)
"the people"

of themilieu, of the spirit of the times)

life[-form], as detachment of "the will")

"the race"

"the nation"
"democracy"
"tolerance"
"the milieu"
"utilitarianism"
"civilization"
"women's

emancipation"
"popular education"
"progress"

"sociology"(KSA 13:16[82],1889)

See also the "Attempt at a Self-Criticism"

Greeks, precisely

on the democratic

age of theGreeks: "What if [...] the

and debilitation, became ever more optimistic,
ardent for logic and a logical interpretation of the world,

in the times of their dissolution

superficial, theatrical, more and more

'cheerful' and more
and so both more

it be that?in
Could
spite of all
victory of optimism, the now dominant
rationality, the practical and theoretical utilitarianism, together with democracy itself,with which
a symptom of declining force, of approaching senescence, of physiological
it coincides,?are
'scientific'? What?

'modern ideas' and the prejudices of democratic

fatigue?" (BT"Attempt" 4, 1886).

7. See, e.g., H. Ottmann, Philosophie

taste?the

und Politik bei Nietzsche

(Berlin: De Gruyter,

1987),

93, 109,onS*?.
8. Daniel W. Conway, Nietzsche and thePolitical (London: Routledge,
1997), 2-3.
9. On Socrates/rationalism and democracy, see KSA 7:23[14], 2[3]; also KSA 12:9[20], 9[25].
On the "democratic origins of the chorus," see BT 7, KSA 1:52-53; on the sources of this theory
in the Schlegel brothers and Hegel, see B. von Reibnitz, Ein Kommentar zu Friedrich Nietzsche,
failed
"Die Geburt der Trag?die" (Kap. 1-12) (Stuttgart: Metzler,
1992), 186-87. Empedocles'
in contexts that (in
program of democratic reform is also thematized in the early Nachlass,
contrast with Socrates) are rather positive about democracy: see, e.g., KSA 7:23[14],
8:6[28],
in
6[38], 6[50]. On this, see H. Caygill, "Philosophy and Cultural Reform in the Early Nietzsche,"
The Fate of theNew Nietzsche,
109-22.

ed. H. Caygill

and K. Ansell-Pearson

(Aldershot: Avebury,

1993),

10. See Richard Wagner, S?mtliche Schriften und Dichtungen.

Volksausgabe
(Leipzig:
in 1864,
Breitkopf und H?rtel, 1911), vol. 8, 3-29. Originally a letterwritten to King Ludwig
textwas published in 1873. See Nietzsche's enthusiastic references to it in his letters to
Wagner's
See also S. Barbera,
Carl von Gersdorff of April 8,1869, and February 3, 1873 (KSB 3:36,4:131).
in "Centauren-Geburten"
"Ein Sinn und unz?hlige Hieroglyphen,"
Wissenschaft, Kunst und
beim jungen Nietzsche, ed. T. Borsche, F. Gerratana, and A. Venturelli (Berlin:
Philosophie
s essay on the early Nietzsche
De Gruyter, 1994), 217-33. The impact of Wagner'
evinced in numerous texts, especially BT 18,KSA 1:115-116, 7:6[3], 7[167], 7[172].

is clearly

11.Cf.KX4 7:7[121],7[160].

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Nietzsche's

Critique

of Democracy

35

writes, "Die Einwirkung des Genius ist gew?hnlich, da? ein neues Illusionsnetz
geschlungen wird, unter dem sie leben kann. Dies ist die magische Einwirkung
des Genius auf die untergeordneten Stufen. Zugleich aber giebt es eine aufsteigende Linie zum
Genius: diese zerrei?t immer die vorhandenen Netze, bis endlich im erreichten Genius ein h?heres
12.Nietzsche

?ber eine Masse

and 'Wahngebilde'
erreicht wird" (KSA 7:6[3]). The terms 'Wahn, Wahnvorstellung,'
are also used intensively by Nietzsche
in the early 1870s in connection with Schopenhauer's Wahn
theory (see n. 13 below). This is especially so inKSA 7, notebooks 5 and 7, but see also BT 3,
KSA \:31;BT2\,KSA
1:132; and BT 15,KSA 1:99 (in connection with Socratism).
Kunstziel

13. The expression 'Genius der Gattung' is used by Schopenhauer in his metaphysics of sexual
love (The World as Will and Representation, trans. E. E Payne [New York: Dover, 1958], vol. 2,
of deception (Wahn) whereby individuals actually
chap. 44, 53Iff.) to describe a mechanism

the interests of the species (Gattung) in pursuing what appear to them as the objects of
it appears as the "spirit of the species"
InWagner's "?ber Staat und Religion"
(Geist der Gattung) in the context of his account of Schopenhauer's Wahn theory. The young
too applies it to art. As the Dionysian "oneness in the genius of the species" (Einssein
Nietzsche
advance

their own desire.

it names
individuation and measure
im Genius der Gattung), opposed to Apollonian
(Maass),
"something never felt" (etwas Nie-empfundenes), an ecstatic sense of community in need of a new,
non-Apollonian symbolic order, identified by Nietzsche with the "gesture of dance" (Tanzgeberde
[Dionysische Weltanschauung

"tone"(#&47:3[21], 3[37]).

4, KSA

14. See, e.g., KSA 7:32[32],

Nietzsche
remarks on the good

1:577; also KSA

1:574; BT 2, KSA

1:33]) but also with

In KSA 7:32[35]
pp. 764^65
(cf. HH
577), 32[34], 32[61].
fortune thatWagner was not born to a position of power and

privilege and was not given the opportunity to exercise political power.
15. See also the retrospective note:
To win formyself the immorality of the artistwith regard towardmy material (humankind):
this has been my work in recent years.
To win for myself the spiritual freedom and joy of being able to create and not to
be tyrannized by alien ideals. (At bottom itmatters littlewhat I had to liberate myself
from: my favorite form of liberation was the artistic form: that is, I cast an image of that
which had hitherto bound me: thus Schopenhauer, Wagner, theGreeks (genius, the saint,
also a tribute of gratitude.
metaphysics, all ideals until now, the highest morality)?but

(KSA 10:16[10])

writes, "Denn gerade mit diesem Gef?hle nimmt er Theil an der gewaltigsten
Lebens?usserung Wagner's, dem Mittelpuncte seiner Kraft, jener d?monischen Uebertragbarkeit
sich Anderen ebenso mittheilen kann, als sie
seiner Natur, welche
und Selbstent?usserung
andere Wesen sich selber mittheilt und im Hingeben und Annehmen ihre Gr?sse hat. Indem der
16.Nietzsche

scheinbar der aus- und ?berstr?menden Natur Wagner' s unterliegt, hat er an ihrer
Kraft selber Antheil genommen und ist so gleichsam durch ihngegen ihnm?chtig geworden; und
Jeder, der sich genau pr?ft, weiss, dass selbst zum Betrachten eine geheimnissvolle Gegnerschaft,
die des Entgegenschauens,
geh?rt" (RWB 7).
Betrachtende

is pitted against tyranny. See

17. There are also a few texts where ancient democracy
premise is that "all Greeks (fr.Gorgias in Plato) believed the
especially KSA 9:4[301 ]:Nietzsche's
possession of power as tyrant to be themost enviable happiness," and he goes on to argue: "The
equality [Gleichheit] of citizens is themeans for avoiding tyranny, their reciprocal invigilation and
constraint" (cf. KSA 8:6[28]).
writes, "Jetzt herrscht die Demokratie der Begriffe in jedem Kopfe,?viele
sind der Herr: ein einzelner Begriff, der Herr sein wollte, heisst jetzt, wie gesagt, 'fixe
winken nach dem Irrenhause hin"
ist unsere Art, die Tyrannen zu morden,?wir
Idee.' Diess
18.Nietzsche

zusammen

(WS 230).

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H. W. Siemens

36

19. Nietzsche writes, "Nun kann es Einem angesichts Derer, welche jetzt bewusst und ehrlich
f?r diese Zukunft arbeiten, in der That bange werden: es liegt etwas Oedes und Einf?rmiges in
ihren Gesichtern, und der graue Staub scheint auch bis in ihre Gehirne hineingeweht zu sein"

(WS275,KSA 2:671).

20. This worry ismost emphatic in the Vorstufe to this text,which begins with thewords: "One
gains a more patient and milder attitude toward all the tiresome and boring [things] that the rule
of democracy brings with it (and will bring with it?) when one views it as a centuries-long
and very necessary 'quarantine,' which society-in
its own sphere in order to hinder the new
'outbreak' [? die neue'Einschleppung'],

the new proliferation of thedespotic, violent and autocratic"

(KSA8:47[10]).

21. See my article "Agonal Communities

of Taste:
of Transvaluation,"
special issue, "Nietzsche

Philosophy

Studies24 (Fall2002): 85-91.

Law

in Nietzsche's
and Community
and the Agon," Journal of Nietzsche

writes: "Der Philosoph, wie wir ihn verstehen, wir freien Geister?,
als der
f?r die Gesammt-Entwicklung
der umf?nglichsten Verantwortlichkeit, der das Gewissen
des Menschen hat" (BGE 61, KSA 5:79). It is hard to imagine a more general (Gesammt), inclusive
(umf?nglichsten) formulation than this. In BGE 203 Nietzsche describes the burden or "weight"
22. Nietzsche

Mensch

of responsibility (das Gewicht einer solchen Verantwortlichkeit) borne by the philosophers of the
future and their task, the "transvaluation of values": on one side is the fear of a "total degeneration
[Gesammt-Entartung] of the human being," and on the other, the hope that "the human being is still
not exhausted for the greatest possibilities."
In BGE 212, the breadth of this generic responsibility
is then proposed as part of the notion of "greatness" (Gr?sse) required for the enhancement

(Vergr?sserung) of the human being: It is a matter of "how much and how much diversity one could
bear and take upon oneself, how far one could stretch one's responsibility" ("wie viel und vielerlei
Einer tragen und auf sich nehmen, wie weit Einer seine Verantwortlichkeit spannen k?nnte").

23. There are texts where he argues that the higher caste should be beyond politics
and not exercise political power (KSA 10:7[21 ]), others where he argues
(KSA 11:26[173])
that they should not just rule but also experiment with moral values (KSA 12:9[153]),
and
others where the new philosophers are supposed to be distinct from, but supported by, a ruling
caste (KSA 11:35[47]). There are places where he advocates a sharpening of all oppositions
(Gegens?tze) and a removal of equality (KSA 10:7[21 ]) and others where he advocates "opening
up distances [Distanzen], but not creating oppositions [Gegens?tze]" (KSA 12:10[63]).
"NB. There must be many ?bermenschen:
24. See, e.g., KSA
all goodness
11:35(72]:
[or quality: G?te] develops only among equals. One god would always be a devil] A ruling caste

[Rasse]. On the 'rulers of the earth.'" On 'Rasse' as a social category inNietzsche's

thought, see
Gerd Schank, "Rasse" und "Z?chtung" bei Nietzsche (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000).
25. In "Homer' s Contest" (KSA 1:783-792), Nietzsche describes the Greek agon as a play
of forces (Wettspiel der Kr?fte) that is "inimical to the 'exclusivity' of genius in the modern
that in a natural order of things there are always several geniuses who
sense, and presupposes
stimulate [reizen] one another to deeds, as they also hold one another within the bounds of
That is the crux of the Hellenic notion of contest: itabhors the rule of one
[desMaa?es].
[Alleinherrschaft] and fears its dangers; itdesires, as a protective measure against the genius?a
second genius" (KSA 1:789). The best available translation of this text is by Christa Acampora,
trans., "Homer's Contest," Nietzscheana
(North American Nietzsche Society) 5 (1996).
26. Nietzsche writes:

measure

The new Enlightenment?the

old one was [conducted] in the sense of the democratic herd.
Equalization of all. The new [Enlightenment] wishes to show the ruling natures theway?to
what extent everything ispermitted to them that is not open to the herd-beings:

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Nietzsche's

1. Enlightenment

2.

Enlightenment

3.

Critique

of Democracy

37

regarding "truth and lie" in living beings

regarding "good and evil"

Enlightenment regarding the form-giving transformative forces (the hidden artists)

The self-overcoming of man (education of the higher man)
5. The teaching of the eternal return as a hammer in the hands of the most powerful

4.

humans? (KSA 11:27[80])

27.Cf. BGE 203; 77"Expeditions"

39;KSA 10:9[29],11:34[146].

28. See WS 215, KSA 12:2[13]. But see also KSA 11:34[108]: "Ich nehme die demokratische
als etwas Unvermeidliches:
aber als etwas, das nicht unaufhaltsam ist, sondern sich

Bewegung

verz?gern l??t."
29. See,
e.g.,

"Der grosse
P?belund Sklavenauf stand":
Urs Marti,
Nietzsches
und Demokratie
mit Revolution
1993), chap. 7,
(Stuttgart: Metzler,
Auseinandersetzung
especially 212: "To draw a unified picture of them [the humans with a strong will] is not easy,
given the abundance of futural visions"; and 233: "For better or worse, research has to make
peace with the fact thatNietzsche did not give an unequivocal answer to the question, whether the
coming aristocracy will exercise political rule, or exercise moral authority, as an educational elite
in a political democracy."
out Nietzsche's
in a typology of responses
to
equivocations
on the Relation Between Democracy
and 'grosse
Equivocations
Politik,'" inNietzsche, Power, and Politics. Rethinking Nietzsche's Legacy for Political Thought,
ed.H. W. Siemens and V. Roodt (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 231-68.
30.1

have

democracy.

See

tried to map
"Nietzsche's

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