FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO G.

ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; DIRECTOR GENERAL HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE PNP, et al., respondents.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The
maintenance of peace and order [1] and the protection of the people against violence are
constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and
in harmony with these constitutional duties.
Before us is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of
the Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of
Residence[2] (Guidelines) issued on January 31, 2003, by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane,
Jr., Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The facts are undisputed:
In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the
members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the
rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the
issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR), thus:
THEREISALSONEEDTOFOCUSONTHEHIGHPROFILECRIMESTHATTENDTODISTURB
THEPSYCHOLOGICALPERIMETERSOFTHECOMMUNITYTHELATESTBEINGTHEKILLING
OFFORMERNPALEADERROLLYKINTANAR.IUNDERSTANDWEALREADYHAVETHE
IDENTITYOFTHECULPRIT.LETUSBRINGTHEMTOTHEBAROFJUSTICE.
THENPAWILLFINDITMOREDIFFICULTTOCARRYOUTTHEIRPLOTSIFOURLAW
ENFORCEMENTAGENCIESCANRIDTHEMSELVESOFRASCALSINUNIFORM,ANDALSOIF
WEENFORCEAGUNBANINPUBLICPLACES.
THUS,IAMDIRECTINGTHEPNPCHIEFTOSUSPENDINDEFINITELYTHEISSUANCEOF
PERMITTOCARRYFIREARMSINPUBLICPLACES.THEISSUANCEOFPERMITSWILL
NOWBELIMITEDONLYTOOWNERSHIPANDPOSSESSIONOFGUNSANDNOTTO
CARRYINGTHEMINPUBLICPLACES.FROMNOWON,ONLYTHEUNIFORMEDMENIN
THEMILITARYANDAUTHORIZEDLAWENFORCEMENTOFFICERSCANCARRY
FIREARMSINPUBLICPLACES,ANDONLYPURSUANTTOEXISTINGLAW.CIVILIAN
OWNERSMAYNOLONGERBRINGTHEIRFIREARMSOUTSIDETHEIR
RESIDENCES.THOSEWHOWANTTOUSETHEIRGUNSFORTARGETPRACTICEWILL
BEGIVENSPECIALANDTEMPORARYPERMITSFROMTIMETOTIMEONLYFORTHAT
PURPOSE.ANDTHEYMAYNOTLOADTHEIRGUNSWITHBULLETSUNTILTHEYARE
INTHEPREMISESOFTHEFIRINGRANGE.
WECANNOTDISREGARDTHEPARAMOUNTNEEDFORLAWANDORDER.JUSTASWECANNOT
BEHEEDLESSOFOURPEOPLESASPIRATIONSFORPEACE.
Acting on President Arroyos directive, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines
quoted as follows:

TO:AllConcerned
FROM:Chief,PNP
SUBJECT:GuidelinesintheImplementationoftheBanontheCarryingofFirearms
OutsideofResidence.
DATE:January31,2003
1.Reference:PD1866datedJune29,1983anditsImplementingRulesandRegulations.
2.General:
Thepossessionandcarryingoffirearmsoutsideofresidenceisaprivilegegranted
bytheStatetoitscitizensfortheirindividualprotectionagainstallthreatsof
lawlessnessandsecurity.
Asarule,personswhoarelawfulholdersoffirearms(regularlicense,special
permit,certificateofregistrationorMR)areprohibitedfromcarryingtheirfirearms
outsideofresidence.However,theChief,PhilippineNationalPolicemay,in
meritoriouscasesasdeterminedbyhimandunderconditionsashemayimpose,
authorizesuchpersonorpersonstocarryfirearmsoutsideofresidence.
3.Purposes:
ThisMemorandumprescribestheguidelinesintheimplementationofthebanon
thecarryingoffirearmsoutsideofresidenceasprovidedforintheImplementing
RulesandRegulations,PresidentialDecreeNo.1866,datedJune29,1983and
asdirectedbyPGMA.Italsoprescribestheconditions,requirementsand
proceduresunderwhichexemptionfromthebanmaybegranted.
4.SpecificInstructionsontheBanontheCarryingofFirearms:
a.AllPTCFORareherebyrevoked.Authorizedholdersoflicensedfirearms
coveredwithvalidPTCFORmayreapplyforanewPTCFORin
accordancewiththeconditionshereinafterprescribed.
b.Allholdersoflicensedorgovernmentfirearmsareherebyprohibitedfrom
carryingtheirfirearmsoutsidetheirresidenceexceptthosecoveredwith
mission/letterordersanddutydetailordersissuedbycompetent
authoritypursuanttoSection5,IRR,PD1866,provided,thatthesaid
exceptionshallpertainonlytoorganicandregularemployees.
5.Thefollowingpersonsmaybeauthorizedtocarryfirearmsoutsideofresidence.
a.AllpersonswhoseapplicationforanewPTCFORhasbeenapproved,provided,
thatthepersonsandsecurityofthosesoauthorizedareunderactualthreat,or
bythenatureoftheirposition,occupationandprofessionareunderimminent
danger.
b.AllorganicandregularemployeeswithMission/LetterOrdersgrantedbytheir
respectiveagenciessoauthorizedpursuanttoSection5,IRR,PD1866,

provided,thatsuchMission/LetterOrdersisvalidonlyforthedurationofthe
officialmissionwhichinnocaseshallbemorethanten(10)days.
c.AllguardscoveredwithDutyDetailOrdersgrantedbytheirrespectivesecurity
agenciessoauthorizedpursuanttoSection4,IRR,PD1866,provided,that
suchDDOshallinnocaseexceed24hourduration.
d.MembersofdulyrecognizedGunClubsissuedPermittoTransport(PTT)bythe
PNPforpurposesofpracticeandcompetition,provided,thatsuchfirearms
whileintransitmustnotbeloadedwithammunitionandsecuredinan
appropriateboxorcasedetachedfromtheperson.
e.AuthorizedmembersoftheDiplomaticCorps.
6.RequirementsforissuanceofnewPTCFOR:
a.WrittenrequestbytheapplicantaddressedtoChief,PNPstatinghisqualification
topossessfirearmandthereasonswhyheneedstocarryfirearmoutsideof
residence.
b.XeroxcopyofcurrentfirearmlicensedulyauthenticatedbyRecordsBranch,
FED;
c.Proofofactualthreat,thedetailsofwhichshouldbeissuedbytheChiefof
Police/ProvincialorCityDirectorsanddulyvalidatedbyC,RIID;
d.CopyofDrugTestClearance,dulyauthenticatedbytheDrugTestingCenter,if
photocopied;
e.CopyofDI/RIIDclearance,dulyauthenticatedbyODI/RIID,ifphotocopied;
f.CopyofNeuroPsychiatricClearancedulyauthenticatedbyNPTestingCenter,if
photocopied;
g.CopyofCertificateofAttendancetoaGunSafetySeminar,dulyvalidatedby
Chief,OperationsBranch,FED;
h.NBIClearance;
i.Two(2)IDpictures(2x2)takennotearlierthanone(1)yearfromdateoffiling
ofapplication;and
j.ProofofPayment
7.Procedures:
a.ApplicationsmaybefileddirectlytotheOfficeofthePTCFORSecretariatin
CampCrame.Intheprovinces,theapplicationsmayalsobesubmittedtothe
PoliceRegionalOffices(PROs)andProvincial/CityPoliceOffices(P/CPOs)
forinitialprocessingbeforetheyareforwardedtotheofficeofthePTCFOR
Secretariat.Theprocessors,afterascertainingthatthedocumentary
requirementsareinorder,shallissuetheOrderofPayment(OP)indicating

theamountoffeespayablebytheapplicant,whointurnshallpaythefeesto
theLandBank.
b.Applications,whicharedulyprocessedandpreparedinaccordancewithexisting
rulesandregulations,shallbeforwardedtotheOCPNPforapproval.
c.Uponapprovaloftheapplication,OCPNPwillissuePTCFORvalidforone(1)
yearfromdateofissue.
d.ApplicationsforrenewalofPTCFORshallbeprocessedinaccordancewiththe
provisionsofpar.6above.
e.Applicationforpossessionandcarryingoffirearmsbydiplomatsinthe
PhilippinesshallbeprocessedinaccordancewithNHQPNPMemodated
September25,2000,withSubj:PossessionandCarryingofFirearmsby
DiplomatsinthePhilippines.
8.RestrictionsintheCarryingofFirearms:
a.Thefirearmmustnotbedisplayedorexposedtopublicview,exceptthose
authorizedinuniformandintheperformanceoftheirofficialduties.
b.Thefirearmshallnotbebroughtinsidepublicdrinkingandamusementplaces,
andallothercommercialorpublicestablishments.
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been
issued, requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the
present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as
Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives
Division. He anchored his petition on the following grounds:
I
THEPRESIDENTHASNOPOWERORAUTHORITYMUCHLESSBYAMERESPEECHTO
ALTER,MODIFYORAMENDTHELAWONFIREARMSBYIMPOSINGAGUNBANAND
CANCELINGEXISTINGPERMITSFORGUNSTOBECARRIEDOUTSIDERESIDENCES.
II
OFFICIALLY,THEREISNOPRESIDENTIALISSUANCEONTHEGUNBAN;THE
PRESIDENTIALSPEECHNEVERINVOKEDPOLICEPOWERTOJUSTIFYTHEGUNBAN;THE
PRESIDENTSVERBALDECLARATIONONGUNBANVIOLATEDTHEPEOPLESRIGHTTO
PROTECTLIFEANDTHEIRPROPERTYRIGHTTOCARRYFIREARMS.
III
THEPNPCHIEFHASNOPOWERORAUTHORITYTOISSUETHEQUESTIONED
GUIDELINESBECAUSE:
1)THEREISNOLAW,STATUTEOREXECUTIVEORDERWHICHGRANTSTHEPNPCHIEF
THEAUTHORITYTOPROMULGATETHEPNPGUIDELINES.

2)THEIMPLEMENTINGRULESANDREGULATIONSOFPD1866CANNOTBETHESUBJECT
OFANOTHERSETOFIMPLEMENTINGGUIDELINES.
3)THEPRESIDENTSSPEECHCANNOTBEABASISFORTHEPROMULGATIONOF
IMPLEMENTNGGUIDELINESONTHEGUNBAN.
IV
ASSUMINGARGUENDO,THATTHEPNPGUIDELINESIMPLEMENTPD1866,ANDTHE
AMENDMENTSTHERETO,THEPNPCHIEFSTILLHASNOPOWERORAUTHORITYTOISSUE
THESAMEBECAUSE
1)PERSEC6,RA8294,WHICHAMENDSPD1866,THEIRRSHALLBE
PROMULGATEDJOINTLYBYTHEDOJANDTHEDILG.
2)SEC.8,PD1866STATESTHATTHEIRRSHALLBEPROMULGATEDBYTHECHIEFOFTHE
PHILIPPINECONSTABULARY.
V
THEPNPGUIDELINESVIOLATETHEDUEPROCESSCLAUSEOFTHECONSTITUTION
BECAUSE:
1)THERIGHTTOOWNANDCARRYAFIREARMISNECESSARILYINTERTWINEDWITHTHE
PEOPLESINHERENTRIGHTTOLIFEANDTOPROTECTLIFE.THUS,THEPNPGUIDELINES
DEPRIVEPETITIONEROFTHISRIGHTWITHOUTDUEPROCESSOFLAWFOR:
A)THEPNPGUIDELINESDEPRIVEPETITIONEROFHISMOSTPOTENT,IFNOTHISONLY,
MEANSTODEFENDHIMSELF.
B)THEQUESTIONEDGUIDELINESSTRIPPEDPETITIONEROFHISMEANSOFPROTECTION
AGAINSTCRIMEDESPITETHEFACTTHATTHESTATECOULDNOTPOSSIBLYPROTECTITS
CITIZENSDUETOTHEINADEQUACYANDINEFFICIENCYOFTHEPOLICEFORCE.
2)THEOWNESHIPANDCARRYINGOFFIREARMSARECONSTITUTIONALLYPROTECTED
PROPERTYRIGHTSWHICHCANNOTBETAKENAWAYWITHOUTDUEPROCESSOFLAW
ANDWITHOUTJUSTCAUSE.
VI
ASSUMINGARGUENDO,THATTHEPNPGUIDELINESWEREISSUEDINTHEEXERCISE
OFPOLICEPOWER,THESAMEISANINVALIDEXERCISETHEREOFSINCETHEMEANS
USEDTHEREFORAREUNREASONABLEANDUNNCESSARYFORTHEACCOMPLISHMENT
OFITSPURPOSETODETERANDPREVENTCRIMETHEREBYBECOMINGUNDULY
OPPRESSIVETOLAWABIDINGGUNOWNERS.
VII
THEPNPGUIDELINESAREUNJUST,OPPRESSIVEANDCONFISCATORYSINCEITREVOKED
ALLEXISTINGPERMITSTOCARRYWITHOUT,HOWEVER,REFUNDINGTHEPAYMENTTHE
PNPRECEIVEDFROMTHOSEWHOALREADYPAIDTHEREFOR.
VIII

THEPNPGUIDELINESVIOLATETHEEQUALPROTECTIONCLAUSEOFTHE
CONSTITUTIONBECAUSETHEYAREDIRECTEDATANDOPPRESSIVEONLYTOLAW
ABIDINGGUNOWNERSWHILELEAVINGOTHERGUNOWNERSTHELAWBREAKERS
(KIDNAPPERS,ROBBERS,HOLDUPPERS,MNLF,MILF,ABUSAYYAFCOLLECTIVELY,AND
NPA)UNTOUCHED.
IX
THEPNPGUIDELINESAREUNJUST,OPPRESSIVEANDUNFAIRBECAUSETHEYWERE
IMPLEMENTEDLONGBEFORETHEYWEREPUBLISHED.
X
THEPNPGUIDELINESAREEFFECTIVELYANEXPOSTFACTOLAWSINCETHEYAPPLY
RETROACTIVELYANDPUNISHALLTHOSEWHOWEREALREADYGRANTEDPERMITSTO
CARRYOUTSIDEOFRESIDENCELONGBEFORETHEIRPROMULGATION.
Petitioners submissions may be synthesized into five (5) major issues:
First,whetherrespondentEbdaneisauthorizedtoissuetheassailedGuidelines;
Second,whetherthecitizensrighttobeararmsisaconstitutionalright?;
Third,whethertherevocationofpetitionersPTCFORpursuanttotheassailedGuidelinesisaviolationof
hisrighttoproperty?;
Fourth,whethertheissuanceoftheassailedGuidelinesisavalidexerciseofpolicepower?;and
Fifth,whethertheassailedGuidelinesconstituteanexpostfactolaw?
The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, in refutation of petitioners arguments, he contends that: (1) the
PNP Chief is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does not have a
constitutional right to own and carry firearms; (3) the assailed Guidelines do not violate the due
process clause of the Constitution; and (4) the assailed Guidelines do not constitute an ex post
facto law.
Initially, we must resolve the procedural barrier.
On the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that the
doctrine is not an iron-clad dictum. In several instances where this Court was confronted with
cases of national interest and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and
proceed with the judicial determination of the cases. [3] The case at bar is of similar import as it
involves the citizens right to bear arms.
I
Authority of the PNP Chief

Relying on the principle of separation of powers, petitioner argues that only Congress can
withhold his right to bear arms. In revoking all existing PTCFOR, President Arroyo and
respondent Ebdane transgressed the settled principle and arrogated upon themselves a power
they do not possess the legislative power.

We are not persuaded.

It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed
among three coordinate and substantially independent departments: the legislative, the executive
and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere.[4]
Pertinently, the power to make laws the legislative power is vested in Congress.
Congress may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other
body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle
that delegata potestas non potest delegari delegated power may not be delegated.[6]
[5]

The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute
and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits
the legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain persons, municipal corporations,
towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors. [7] Such
licensing power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations. [8]
The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since the early days of our Republic, the
legislatures tendency was always towards the delegation of power. Act No. 1780, [9] delegated
upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1) to approve or disapprove
applications of any person for a license to deal in firearms or to possess the same for personal
protection, hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time. [10] Further,
it authorized him to issue regulations which he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement
of the Act. [11] With the enactment of Act No. 2711, the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, the
laws on firearms were integrated.[12] The Act retained the authority of the Governor General
provided in Act No. 1780. Subsequently, the growing complexity in the Office of the GovernorGeneral resulted in the delegation of his authority to the Chief of the Constabulary. On January
21, 1919, Acting Governor-General Charles E. Yeater issued Executive Order No. 8 [13]authorizing
and directing the Chief of Constabulary to act on his behalf in approving and disapproving
applications for personal, special and hunting licenses. This was followed by Executive
Order No. 61[14] designating the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the government custodian of all
firearms, ammunitions and explosives. Executive Order No. 215,[15] issued by President Diosdado
Macapagal on December 3, 1965, granted the Chief of the Constabulary, not only the authority to
approve or disapprove applications for personal, special and hunting license, but also the
authority to revoke the same. With the foregoing developments, it is accurate to say that the
Chief of the Constabulary had exercised the authority for a long time. In fact, subsequent
issuances such as Sections 2 and 3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Presidential
Decree No. 1866[16] perpetuate such authority of the Chief of the Constabulary. Section 2
specifically provides that any person or entity desiring to possess any firearm shall first secure
the necessary permit/license/authority from the Chief of the Constabulary. With regard to
the issuance of PTCFOR, Section 3 imparts: The Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious
cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize
lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. These provisions are issued
pursuant to the general power granted by P.D. No. 1866 empowering him to promulgate rules
and regulations for the effective implementation of the decree.[17] At this juncture, it bears
emphasis that P.D. No. 1866 is the chief law governing possession of firearms in the Philippines
and that it was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative power.
[18]

In an attempt to evade the application of the above-mentioned laws and regulations,

petitioner argues that the Chief of the PNP is not the same as the Chief of the Constabulary, the
PC being a mere unit or component of the newly established PNP. He contends further that
Republic Act No. 8294[19] amended P.D. No. 1866 such that the authority to issue rules and
regulations regarding firearms is now jointly vested in the Department of Justice and the DILG,
not the Chief of the Constabulary.[20]

Petitioners submission is bereft of merit.

By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975,[21] the Philippine National Police (PNP) absorbed the
Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the
Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latters licensing authority. Section 24 thereof
specifies, as one of PNPs powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms
and explosives in accordance with law.[22] This is in conjunction with the PNP Chiefs power to
issue detailed implementing policies and instructions on such matters as may be necessary to
effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties of the PNP.[23]
Contrary to petitioners contention, R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of the
Constabulary (now the PNP Chief) of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the
effective implementation of P.D. No. 1866. For one, R.A. No. 8294 did not repeal entirely P.D. No.
1866. It merely provides for the reduction of penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus, the
provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chief of the Constabulary the authority to issue rules
and regulations regarding firearms remains effective. Correspondingly, the Implementing Rules
and Regulations dated September 15, 1997 jointly issued by the Department of Justice and the
DILG pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 8294 deal only with the automatic review, by the Director
of the Bureau of Corrections or the Warden of a provincial or city jail, of the records of convicts for
violations of P.D. No. 1866. The Rules seek to give effect to the beneficent provisions of R.A. No.
8294, thereby ensuring the early release and reintegration of the convicts into the community.
Clearly, both P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 6975 authorize the PNP Chief to issue the
assailed guidelines.
Corollarily, petitioner disputes President Arroyos declaration of a nationwide gun ban,
arguing that she has no authority to alter, modify, or amend the law on firearms through a mere
speech.
First, it must be emphasized that President Arroyos speech was just an expression of her
policy and a directive to her subordinate. It cannot, therefore, be argued that President Arroyo
enacted a law through a mere speech.
Second, at the apex of the entire executive officialdom is the President. Section 17, Article
VII of the Constitution specifies his power as Chief Executive, thus: The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed. As Chief Executive, President Arroyo holds the steering wheel that
controls the course of her government. She lays down policies in the execution of her plans and
programs. Whatever policy she chooses, she has her subordinates to implement them. In short,
she has the power of control. Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation
to her subordinate, she may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty .
[24]
Thus, when President Arroyo directed respondent Ebdane to suspend the issuance of
PTCFOR, she was just directing a subordinate to perform an assigned duty. Such act is well
within the prerogative of her office.
II
Right to bear arms: Constitutional or Statutory?

Petitioner earnestly contends that his right to bear arms is a constitutionally-protected right.
This, he mainly anchors on various American authorities. We therefore find it imperative to
determine the nature of the right in light of American jurisprudence.
The bearing of arms is a tradition deeply rooted in the English and American society. It
antedates not only the American Constitution but also the discovery of firearms. [25]

A provision commonly invoked by the American people to justify their possession of

firearms is the Second Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, which
reads:
Awellregulatedmilitia,beingnecessaryforthesecurityoffreestate,therightofthepeopletokeepand
bearArms,shallnotbeinfringed.
An examination of the historical background of the foregoing provision shows that it
pertains to the citizens collective right to take arms in defense of the State, not to the citizens
individual right to own and possess arms. The setting under which the right was contemplated
has a profound connection with the keeping and maintenance of a militia or an armed
citizenry. That this is how the right was construed is evident in early American cases.
The first case involving the interpretation of the Second Amendment that reached the
United States Supreme Court is United States vs. Miller.[26] Here, the indictment charged the
defendants with transporting an unregistered Stevens shotgun without the required stamped
written order, contrary to the National Firearms Act. The defendants filed a demurrer challenging
the facial validity of the indictment on the ground that the National Firearms Act offends the
inhibition of the Second Amendment. The District Court sustained the demurrer and quashed the
indictment. On appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted the right to bear arms under the
Second Amendment as referring to the collective right of those comprising the Militia a
body of citizens enrolled for military discipline. It does not pertain to the individual right of
citizen to bear arm. Miller expresses its holding as follows:
Intheabsenceofanyevidencetendingtoshowthatpossessionoruseofashotgunhavingabarrelofless
thaneighteeninchesinlengthatthistimehassomereasonablerelationshiptothepreservationor
efficiencyofawellregulatedmilitia,wecannotsaythattheSecondAmendmentguaranteestheright
tokeepandbearsuchaninstrument.Certainlyitisnotwithinjudicialnoticethatthisweaponisanypart
oftheordinarymilitaryequipmentorthatitsusecouldcontributetothecommondefense.
The same doctrine was re-echoed in Cases vs. United States.[27] Here, the Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Federal Firearms Act, as applied to appellant, does not conflict with the
Second Amendment. It ruled that:
While[appellants]weaponmaybecapableofmilitaryuse,orwhileatleastfamiliaritywithitmightbe
regardedasofvalueintrainingapersontouseacomparableweaponofmilitarytypeandcaliber,still
thereisnoevidencethattheappellantwasoreverhadbeenamemberofanymilitaryorganization
orthathisuseoftheweaponunderthecircumstancesdisclosedwasinpreparationforamilitary
career.Infact,theonlyinferencepossibleisthattheappellantatthetimechargedintheindictment
wasinpossessionof,transporting,andusingthefirearmandammunitionpurelyandsimplyona
frolicofhisownandwithoutanythoughtorintentionofcontributingtotheefficiencyofthewell
regulatedmilitiawhichtheSecondamendmentwasdesignedtofosterasnecessarytothesecurityof
afreestate.
With the foregoing jurisprudence, it is erroneous to assume that the US Constitution grants
upon the American people the right to bear arms. In a more explicit language, the United States
vs. Cruikshank[28] decreed: The right of the people to keep and bear arms is not a right
granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any way dependent upon that
instrument. Likewise, in People vs. Persce,[29] the Court of Appeals said: Neither is there any
constitutional provision securing the right to bear arms which prohibits legislation with reference
to such weapons as are specifically before us for consideration. The provision in the
Constitution of the United States that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed is not designed to control legislation by the state.
With more reason, the right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the

1987 Philippine Constitution. Our Constitution contains no provision similar to the Second
Amendment, as we aptly observed in the early case of United States vs. Villareal:[30]
Theonlycontentionofcounselwhichwouldappeartonecessitatecommentistheclaimthatthestatute
penalizingthecarryingofconcealedweaponsandprohibitingthekeepingandtheuseoffirearmswithouta
license,isinviolationoftheprovisionsofsection5ofthePhilippineBillofRights.
CounseldoesnotexpresslyrelyupontheprohibitionintheUnitedStatesConstitutionagainstthe
infringementoftherightofthepeopleoftheUnitedStatestokeepandbeararms(U.S.Constitution,
amendment2),whichisnotincludedinthePhilippineBill.Butitmaybewell,inpassing,topointout
thatinnoeventcouldthisconstitutionalguarantyhaveanybearingonthecaseatbar,notonly
becauseithasnotbeenexpresslyextendedtothePhilippineIslands,butalsobecauseithasbeen
uniformlyheldthatboththisandsimilarprovisionsinStateconstitutionsapplyonlytoarmsusedin
civilizedwarfare(seecasescitedin40Cyc.,853,note18);xxx.
Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception,
not the rule. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a
mere statutory creation. What then are the laws that grant such right to the Filipinos? The
first real firearm law is Act No. 1780 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 12,
1907. It was passed to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use and transfer of
firearms. Section 9 thereof provides:
SECTION9.Anypersondesiringtopossessoneormorefirearmsforpersonalprotection,orforuse
inhuntingorotherlawfulpurposesonly,andammunitiontherefor,shallmakeapplicationfora
licensetopossesssuchfirearmorfirearmsorammunitionashereinafterprovided.Uponmakingsuch
application,andbeforereceivingthelicense,theapplicantshallmakeacashdepositinthepostalsavings
bankinthesumofonehundredpesosforeachfirearmforwhichthelicenseistobeissued,orinlieu
thereofhemaygiveabondinsuchformastheGovernorGeneralmayprescribe,payabletothe
GovernmentofthePhilippineIslands,inthesumoftwohundredpesosforeachsuch
firearm:PROVIDED,HOWEVER,Thatpersonswhoareactuallymembersofgunclubs,dulyformed
andorganizedatthetimeofthepassageofthisAct,whoatsuchtimehavealicensetopossessfirearms,
shallnotberequiredtomakethedepositorgivethebondprescribedbythissection,andthebondduly
executedbysuchpersoninaccordancewithexistinglawshallcontinuetobesecurityforthesafekeepingof
sucharms.
The foregoing provision was restated in Section 887 [31] of Act No. 2711 that integrated the
firearm laws. Thereafter, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1866.It codified the laws
on illegal possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition of firearms, ammunitions or explosives
and imposed stiffer penalties for their violation. R.A. No. 8294 amended some of the provisions of
P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the imposable penalties. Being a mere statutory creation, the right to
bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right.
III
Vested Property Right

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. Petitioner invokes this provision, asserting that the
revocation of his PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines deprived him of his vested
property right without due process of law and in violation of the equal protection of law.
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether
life, liberty or property interest exists. [32] The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a
person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director
of Forestry,[33] we ruled that a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would
be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more
emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.[34] that:
Needlesstosay,alllicensesmaythusberevokedorrescindedbyexecutiveaction.Itisnotacontract,
propertyorapropertyrightprotectedbythedueprocessclauseoftheConstitution.
Petitioner, in arguing that his PTCFOR is a constitutionally protected property right, relied
heavily on Bell vs. Burson[35] wherein the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that once a license is issued,
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of livelihood. Suspension of issued
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interest of the licensees.
Petitioners reliance on Bell is misplaced. This case involves a drivers license, not a license
to bear arms. The catena of American jurisprudence involving license to bear arms is perfectly in
accord with our ruling that a PTCFOR is neither a property nor a property right. In Erdelyi vs.
OBrien,[36] the plaintiff who was denied a license to carry a firearm brought suit against the
defendant who was the Chief of Police of the City of Manhattan Beach, on the ground that the
denial violated her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. The
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit ruled that Erdelyi did not have a property interest in
obtaining a license to carry a firearm, ratiocinating as follows:
PropertyinterestsprotectedbytheDueProcessClauseoftheFourteenthAmendmentdonotarise
wheneverapersonhasonlyanabstractneedordesirefor,orunilateralexpectationofabenefit.xxx
Rather,theyarisefromlegitimateclaimsofentitlementdefinedbyexistingrulesorunderstanding
thatstemfromanindependentsource,suchasstatelaw.xxx
ConcealedweaponsarecloselyregulatedbytheStateofCalifornia.xxxWhetherthestatutecreatesa
propertyinterestinconcealedweaponslicensesdependslargelyupontheextenttowhichthestatute
containsmandatorylanguagethatrestrictsthediscretionofthe[issuingauthority]todenylicensesto
applicantswhoclaimtomeettheminimumeligibilityrequirements.xxxWherestatelawgivesthe
issuingauthoritybroaddiscretiontograntordenylicenseapplicationinacloselyregulatedfield,
initialapplicantsdonothaveapropertyrightinsuchlicensesprotectedbytheFourteenth
Amendment.SeeJacobson,supra,627F.2dat180(gaminglicenseunderNevadalaw);
Similar doctrine was announced in Potts vs. City of Philadelphia,[37] Conway vs. King,
Nichols vs. County of Sta. Clara,[39] and Gross vs. Norton.[40] These cases enunciated that the
test whether the statute creates a property right or interest depends largely on the extent of
discretion granted to the issuing authority.
[38]

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of
PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No.
1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by
him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to
carry them outside of residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a
PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be
exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. [41] A
licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and
one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at

their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the
defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the
Declaration of Rights.[42] The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co,[43] held: The
correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main
power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.
The foregoing jurisprudence has been resonating in the Philippines as early as 1908. Thus,
in The Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Amechazurra [44] we ruled:
xxxnoprivatepersonisboundtokeeparms.Whetherhedoesornotisentirelyoptionalwithhimself,but
if,forhisownconvenienceorpleasure,hedesirestopossessarms,hemustdosouponsuchtermsasthe
Governmentseesfittoimpose,fortherighttokeepandbeararmsisnotsecuredtohimbylaw.The
Governmentcanimposeuponhimsuchtermsasitpleases.Ifheisnotsatisfiedwiththetermsimposed,he
shoulddeclinetoacceptthem,but,ifforthepurposeofsecuringpossessionofthearmshedoesagreeto
suchconditions,hemustfulfillthem.
IV
Police Power

At any rate, assuming that petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by
the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of
the States police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations,
necessary to the common good and general welfare.
In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure,
thus:
(1)Theinterestsofthepublicgenerally,asdistinguishedfromthoseofaparticularclass,requirethe
exerciseofthepolicepower;and
(2)Themeansemployedarereasonablynecessaryfortheaccomplishmentofthepurposeandnotunduly
oppressiveuponindividuals.
Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the essence of the constitutional
guarantees of substantive due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of property rights.
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for
peace and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed
by the New Peoples Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the community, President
Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban.Undeniably, the motivating factor in the
issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.
The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In
the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What
they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish
to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we
believe is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime
incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait
in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals
to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend
them.
Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld

as reasonable exercise of the police power.[45] In State vs. Reams,[46] it was held that the
legislature may regulate the right to bear arms in a manner conducive to the public peace. With
the promotion of public peace as its objective and the revocation of all PTCFOR as the means,
we are convinced that the issuance of the assailed Guidelines constitutes a reasonable exercise
of police power. The ruling in United States vs. Villareal,[47] is relevant, thus:
Wethinktherecanbenoquestionastothereasonablenessofastatutoryregulationprohibitingthecarrying
ofconcealedweaponsasapolicemeasurewellcalculatedtorestrictthetoofrequentresorttosuchweapons
inmomentsofangerandexcitement.Wedonotdoubtthatthestrictenforcementofsucharegulation
wouldtendtoincreasethesecurityoflifeandlimb,andtosuppresscrimeandlawlessness,inany
communitywhereinthepracticeofcarryingconcealedweaponsprevails,andthiswithoutbeingunduly
oppressiveupontheindividualownersoftheseweapons.Itfollowsthatitsenactmentbythelegislatureisa
properandlegitimateexerciseofthepolicepowerofthestate.
V
Ex post facto law

In Mekin vs. Wolfe,[48] an ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an
action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and
punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when
committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and
receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense in order to convict the defendant.
We see no reason to devote much discussion on the matter. Ex post facto law prohibits
retrospectivity of penal laws.[49] The assailed Guidelines cannot be considered as an ex post facto
law because it is prospective in its application. Contrary to petitioners argument, it would not
result in the punishment of acts previously committed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.