FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112630. September 5, 1997.]

CORAZON JAMER and CRISTINA AMORTIZADO, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION,
ISETANN
DEPARTMENT STORE and/or JOHN GO, respondents.

Legaspi & Associates for petitioners.

The Law Firm of Chan, Robles and Associates for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners, store cashiers, were placed on preventive suspension by respondent
corporation for dishonesty. Investigation by the Committee on Discipline disclosed
that petitioners were found to have incurred a shortage of P15,353.78,
underpayment of P450 of cash receipts for July 14, 1990, failed to turn over P1,000
borrowed by another store cashier from petitioner Jamer and P70.00 over
replenishment of petty cash expense incurred by petitioner Amortizado. The rst
two irregularities were admitted by petitioners in their sworn statements. On
August 31, 1990, both petitioners were dismissed on ground of loss of trust and
condence. Aggrieved and not satised with the decision of management, they
instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter who rendered
judgment nding that they had been illegally dismissed, ordering their
reinstatement with full backwages and without loss of seniority rights. On appeal by
private respondents, the NLRC remanded the case to the NLRC NCR Arbitration
Branch for further proceedings. After a full blown hearing, the Labor Arbiter armed
the assailed decision. Private respondents once again appealed to the NLRC which,
however, vacated the decision of the Labor Arbiter entering a new one dismissing
petitioners' complaint. Petitioners filed this present recourse.
LLjur

The Supreme Court held that there was inexcusable failure of petitioners to move
for reconsideration of the NLRC decision warranting its outright dismissal; that
certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of respondent; that abuse of
discretion does not follow just because there is a reversal by the NLRC of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter; that failure of petitioners to report the shortages and
overages to management as soon as they arose resulted in breach of duciary trust
reposed in them by respondent company thereby causing the latter to lose
condence in them; and that the employer cannot be compelled to retain
employees who are clearly guilty of malfeasance.
aSIAHC

SYLLABUS

1.
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; FAILURE TO MOVE
FOR THE RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENT'S NLRC DECISION, A FATAL
INFIRMITY. At the outset, the Court notes petitioners' inexcusable failure to move
for the reconsideration of respondent NLRC's decision. Thus, the present petition
suers from a procedural defect that warrants its outright dismissal. While in some
exceptional cases we allowed the immediate recourse to this Court, we nd nothing
herein that could warrant an exceptional treatment to this petition which will
justify the omission. This premature action of petitioners constitutes a fatal
inrmity as ruled in a long line of decisions, most recently in the case of Building
Care Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. Likewise, a motion
for reconsideration is an adequate remedy; hence certiorari proceedings, as in this
case, will not prosper. (Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended)
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; WILL LIE ONLY IF THERE IS NO APPEAL OR ANY OTHER PLAIN,
SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AVAILABLE. The unquestioned rule in this
jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of
respondent. In the case at bench, the plain and adequate remedy referred to in Rule
65, Section 1, is a motion for reconsideration of the challenged decision and the
resolution thereof, which was expected to provide an adequate and a more speedy
remedy than the present petition for certiorari.
prcd

3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ERRORS OF JUDGMENT, NOT WITHIN ITS PROVINCE. In
asserting that there was grave abuse of discretion, petitioners advert to alleged
variances in the factual ndings of the Labor Arbiter and the respondent NLRC. This
is inept and erroneous. Errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of
jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
CaSHAc

4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; NOT MANIFEST BY MERE
REVERSAL OF DECISION. A careful reading of the records of this case would
readily show that if there is any error by public respondent in its analysis of the facts
and its evaluation of the evidence, it is not of such a degree as may be stigmatized
as a grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the
judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. An
abuse of discretion does not necessarily follow just because there is a reversal by the
NLRC of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Neither does the mere variance in the
evidentiary assessment of the NLRC and that of the Labor Arbiter would, as a
matter of course, so warrant another full review of the facts. The NLRC's decision, so
long as it is not bereft of support from the records, deserves respect from the Court.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY DESIGNED FOR CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF
JURISDICTION, NOT ERRORS OF JUDGMENT; RATIONALE. We must once more
reiterate our much repeated but not well-heeded rule that the special civil action for
certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment. The rationale for this rule is simple. When a court exercises its
jurisdiction an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error

committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous

judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of
justice would not countenance such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the
original special civil action of certiorari.
6.
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; EMPLOYMENT; DISMISSAL;
TWO-FOLD REQUIREMENTS FOR VALIDITY. Under the Labor Code, as amended,
the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee by his employer are twofold: the substantive and the procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid
or authorized cause as provided by law (Articles 282, 283 and 284, of the Labor
Code, as amended), but the rudimentary requirements of due process, basic of
which are the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself, must be observed
before an employee may be dismissed.
cdasia

7.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE; FAILURE TO REPORT
SHORTAGES AND OVERAGES TO MANAGEMENT. The failure of petitioners (store
cashiers) to report the aforequoted shortages and overages to management as soon
as they arose resulted in the breach of the duciary trust reposed in them by
respondent company, thereby causing the latter to lose condence in them. This
warrants their dismissal. Moreover, it must be pointed out that herein petitioners
have in fact admitted the underpayment of P450.00 not only in their "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" but also during the hearing conducted before Labor Arbiter Pablo C.
Espiritu. And, the record shows that the petitioners in fact made a last ditch eort to
conceal the same. Were it not for its timely discovery by private respondents'
trusted employees, the incident could not have been discovered at all. Furthermore,
it is worth stressing at this juncture that the petitioners have also expressly
admitted the shortage of P15,353.78 a substantial amount in their respective
sworn statements, and they were not able to satisfactorily explain such shortage.
The Court is convinced that these particular acts or omissions provided Isetann with
enough basis to forfeit its trust and condence over herein petitioners. The NLRC,
therefore, did not act with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that petitioners
were legally dismissed from employment. The failure of petitioners to report to
management the aforementioned irregularities constitute "fraud or willful breach of
the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly authorized representative"
one of the just causes in terminating employment as provided for by paragraph (c),
Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended. In other words, petitioners' admissions
in their sworn statements, together with the other documentary evidences on
record, constituted breach of trust on their part which justifies their dismissal.
8.
ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYER CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO RETAIN EMPLOYEES
GUILTY OF MALFEASANCE. Private respondents Isetann Department Store and
Mr. John Go cannot be compelled to retain employees who are clearly guilty of
malfeasance as their continued employment will be prejudicial to the formers' best
interest. The law, in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. The cause of social justice is not
served by upholding the interest of petitioners in disregard of the right of private
respondents. Social justice ceases to be an eective instrument for the "equalization

of the social and economic forces" by the State when it is used to shield wrongdoing.
While it is true that compassion and human consideration should guide the
disposition of cases involving termination of employment since it aects one's
source or means of livelihood, it should not be overlooked that the benets accorded
to labor do not include compelling an employer to retain the services of an
employee who has been shown to be a gross liability to the employer. It should be
made clear that when the law tilts the scale of justice in favor of labor, it is but a
recognition of the inherent economic inequality between labor and management.
The intent is to balance the scale of justice; to put the two parties on relatively
equal positions. There may be cases where the circumstances warrant favoring labor
over the interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted if the
result is an injustice to the employer, Justicia remini regarda est (Justice is to be
denied to none).

9.
ID.; ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL; LENGTH OF SERVICE OF EMPLOYEE; NOT A
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IN MODERATING PENALTY. Parenthetically, the fact
that petitioners Jamer and Amortizado had worked for respondent company for
fourteen (14) and thirteen (13) years, respectively, should be taken against them.
The infractions that they committed, notwithstanding their long years of service
with the company, reects a regrettable lack of loyalty loyalty that they should
have strengthened instead of betrayed. If the petitioners' length of service is to be
regarded as a justifying circumstance in moderating the dismissal, it will actually
become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice and
undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables.
10.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LAXITY IN ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE OF THE COMPANY,
NOT AN EXCUSE FOR DISHONESTY. It must be pointed out that the petitioners'
remark that there was laxity in the accounting procedures of the company is a
matter addressed to the respondent employer. However, this does not excuse
dishonesty of employees and should not in any case hamper the right of the
employer to terminate the employment of petitioners on the ground of loss of
condence or breach of trust. Precisely, the accounting procedure which called for
improvements was based primarily on trust and confidence.
cdll

11.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYERS ARE GIVEN WIDER LATITUDE OF DISCRETION
IN TERMINATING MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES. It must be noted that the herein
petitioners were store cashiers and as such, a special and unique employment
relationship exists between them and the respondent company. More than most
key positions, that of cashier calls for the utmost trust and condence because their
primary function involves basically the handling of a highly essential property of the
respondent employer the sales and revenues of the store. Employers are
consequently given wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of
managerial employees or other personnel occupying positions of responsibility, such
as in the instant case, than in the case of ordinary rank-and-le employees, whose
termination on the basis of these same grounds requires proof of involvement in the
malfeasance in question. Mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the

employer will not suffice.

HScAEC

12.
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; DENIALS; WEAK FORMS OF
DEFENSES. We are convinced that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in evaluating the evidence. Petitioners merely denied the charges against
them. Denials are weak forms of defenses, particularly when they are not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The petitioners' failure to
satisfactorily explain the cash shortages, for which sums they are responsible, given
their respective positions in respondent company, is enough reason to warrant their
dismissal on the ground of loss of condence. They cannot place the burden on
somebody else given the factual circumstances of this case.
13.
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; EMPLOYMENT; DISMISSAL;
PROOF BEYOND DOUBT OF EMPLOYEES' MISCONDUCT NOT REQUIRED FOR
BREACH OF TRUST. We reiterate the rule that in cases of dismissal for breach of
trust and condence, proof beyond doubt of the employees' misconduct is not
required. It is sufficient that the employer had reasonable ground to believe that the
employees are responsible for the misconduct which renders him unworthy of the
trust and condence demanded by their position. In the case at hand, it cannot be
doubted that respondents succeeded in discharging its burden of proof.
14.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT; COMPLIED WITH IN CASE
AT BAR. As regards to the second requisite, the law requires that the employer
must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2) written notices before
termination may be validly eected: rst, a notice apprising the employee of the
particular acts or omission for which his dismissal is sought and, second, a
subsequent notice informing the employee of the decision to dismiss him. In
accordance with this requirement, petitioners were given the required notices, on
August 2, 1990 and then on August 23, 1990. The Court nds that petitioners were
accorded due process before they were dismissed on August 31, 1990. It is a wellestablished rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. It is evident from the records, that herein petitioners were given all the
opportunities to defend themselves and air their side before the Committee on
Discipline, having been notied by respondent Isetann's Human Resources Division
Manager, Teresita A. Villanueva, on August 2, 1990 through letters individually sent
to them. However, when the petitioners were confronted with reports of the
anomalies, they oered no explanation or theory which could account for money
lost in their possession. Hence, the company had no other alternative but to
terminate their employment.
prLL

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J :
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The decision 1 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) 2 in

NLRC NCR CA 002074-91, 3 promulgated on November 12, 1993, is herein sought
to be annulled for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, it having
reversed and set aside the decision 4 of Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. by
dismissing the petitioners' complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent
Isetann Department Store (Isetann, for brevity). The decretal part of the NLRC
decision reads:
cdll

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby set

aside and new one promulgated declaring that the dismissal from the service
of complainants Corazon Jamer and Cristina Amortizado was valid and for
cause. Consequently, the order of reinstatement with backwages and
attorney's fees are likewise vacated and set aside." 5

Although the Labor Arbiter 6 and the NLRC reached contrary conclusions, both agree
on the following facts:
"Complainant, Corazon Jamer was employed on February 10, 1976 as a
Cashier at 'Joy Mart,' a sister company of Isetann. After two (2) years, she
was later on promoted to the position of counter supervisor. She was
transferred to Isetann, Carriedo Branch, as a money changer. In 1982 she
was transferred to the Cubao Branch of Isetann, as a money changer, till
her dismissal on August 31, 1990.
Complainant Cristina Amortizado, on the other hand, was employed also at
'Joy Mart' in May, 1977 as a sales clerk. In 1980 she was promoted to the
position as counter cashier. Thereafter, she was transferred to 'Young Un
Department Store' as an assistant to the money changer. Later on, or in
1985, she was transferred to Isetann, Cubao Branch where she worked as
a Store Cashier till her dismissal on August 31, 1990.
Both complainants were receiving a salary of P4,182.00 for eight (8) hours
work at the time of their dismissal.
Respondent Isetann Department Store on the other hand, is a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines and is engaged
in retail trade and the department store business. Individual respondent,
John Go, is the President/General (Manager) of respondent Department
Store.
This complaint arose from the dismissal of the complainants by the
respondents. They were both dismissed on August 31, 1990 on the alleged
ground of dishonesty in their work as Store Cashiers.
Complainant's (sic) function as Store Cashiers is to accumulate, at the end
of daily operations, the cash sales receipts of the selling oor cash register
clerks. At the close of business hours, all the cash sales of the oor cash
register clerks are turned over by them to the Store Cashiers, complainants
herein, together with the tally sheets prepared by the cash register clerks.
Thereafter, complainants will reconcile the cash sales with the tally sheets to
determine shortages or coverages (sic) and deposit the same with the bank

depositor (sic) of respondent's company. Thereafter, the recorded

transactions are forwarded to the main branch of respondent's company at
Carriedo for counter-checking.
On July 16, 1990, complainants discovered a shortage of P15,353.78. It was
complainant Corazon Jamer who rst discovered the shortage. In fact at
rst, she thought that it was merely a P1,000.00 shortage but when she
reconciled the cash receipts, from the cash register counters, with the tally
sheets and the actual money on hand, the shortage amounted to
P15,353.78. She informed her co-store cashier, complainant Cristina
Amortizado, about the shortage. Cristina Amortizado also reconciled and recounted the sale previous to July 16, 1990 and she also confirmed that there
was a discrepancy or a shortage of P15,353.78. They did not, (sic)
immediately report the shortage to management hoping to nd the cause of
the shortage but to no avail they failed to reconcile the same. Hence, they
had no other alternative but to report the same to the management on July
17, 1990.
Complainants, together with another Store Cashier, Lutgarda Inducta, were
asked to explain and they submitted their respective written explanations for
the shortage of P15,353.78 and the P450.00 under deposit last July 14,
1990.
Respondents placed both complainants and their co-store cashier Lutgarda
Inducta under preventive suspension for the alleged shortages. Thereafter,
respondents conducted an administrative investigation. Finding the
explanation of the complainants to be unsatisfactory, respondent dismissed
the complainants from the service on August 31, 1990. Aggrieved and not
satised with the decision of management terminating their services,
complainants instituted this present action on September 26, 1990 for illegal
dismissal praying for reinstatement with payment of backwages and other
benefits. 7

In justifying complainants' dismissal from their employment, respondents

alleged:
'When the transactions for July 15, 1990 were being reconciled, a
shortage of P15,353.78 was discovered. Also uncovered was an
underdeposit of P450.00 of cash receipts for July 14, 1990.
Considering that the foregoing decits were attributable to herein
appellees and to another store cashier, Mrs. Lutgarda Inducta, who
were the ones on duty those days respondent Isetann's Human
Resources Division Manager, Teresita A. Villanueva, issued letters
(Exhs. '1' and '5') individually addressed to herein appellees and Mrs.
Inducta requiring them to submit written explanations in regard to
their above malfeasance within 48 hours from receipt thereof.
Pursuant to said letters, they were likewise placed under preventive
suspension.

Thereafter, the Committee on Discipline of appellant Isetann

conducted a series of investigations probing appellees' and Mrs.
Inducta's aforestated shortages. In addition to the shortage of
P15,738.58 (sic) and underdeposit of P450.00, said investigation also
included the following sums which appellees failed to turnover or
account for:
a)

P1,000.00 amount borrowed by Lutgarda Inducta from

Corazon Jamer;

b)

P70.00 over replenishment of petty cash expenses incurred

by Cristina Amortizado.

After the administrative investigation, the Committee on Discipline

rendered its decision (Exhs. '3,' '3-A,' to '3-D') dated August 23, 1990
duly approved by the General Manager of respondent Isetann, nding
the appellees and Mrs. Inducta responsible for said shortages and
consequently requiring them to restitute the same to respondent
Isetann. This Decision and the notices of termination were sent by
respondent Isetann to the appellees, and which the latter admittedly
received.'
On the other hand, the complainants account of the factual antecedents
that let (sic) to their dismissal is as follows:
'Aside from the foregoing persons, Alex Mejia had and was allowed by
management to have uncontrolled access to the said room, including
the vault. Ostensibly, the purpose was to assist in the bringing in or
taking out of coin bags, monies, etc.
There were therefore, at a minimum at least six (6) persons who could
have had access to the company funds. To ascribe liability to the store
cashiers alone, in the absence of a clear proof of any wrongdoing is
not only unfair and discriminatory but is likewise illegal.
Parenthetically, and within the parameters of their assigned tasks,
herein complainants could not be faulted in any way for the said
shortage as there is no showing that the loss occurred at the time
they were in control of the funds concerned.
Complainants do not dispute the fact that there appeared to be a
shortage of P15,373.78 (sic) for the July 15, 1990 (a Sunday) sales
and which were tallied and the loss discovered on the following day,
July 16, 1990. They however vehemently deny any culpability or
participation in any kind, directly or indirectly, in regard to the said loss
or shortage. Given the kind of trust reposed upon them by
respondents for fourteen and thirteen years respectively they were
not about, although they could have done so before given the
negligence and laxity of management in regard to the control and
handling of funds of the store, to break said trust.

At the time the persons who had access either to the vault the money
and/or the keys aside from herein complainants, were: 1) Lutgarda
Inducta, also a store cashier on duty at the time; 2) the SOM Mrs.
Samonte, the supervisor in charge; 3) Alex Mejia, an employee
assigned as utility man; and 4) Boy Cabatuando.
There where(sic) three (3) keys to the money changer's room, and
these keys were assigned and distributed to: a) master key is or was
with the SOM's (Mrs. Samonte) room at the 3rd oor of the building;
b) another key is or was in the possession of the keeper of the keys,
i.e. Boy Cabatuando; and c) the third and last key is any of the store
cashiers depending on who is on duty at the time.
Likewise, there were four (4) persons who were aware and knew of
the vault combination. These were the three store cashiers, i.e. herein
complainants, Lutgarda Inducta and their SOM, Mrs. Samonte." 8

On July 23, 1991, Labor Arbiter Nieves V. de Castro, to whom the instant
controversy was originally assigned, rendered a decision 9 in favor of herein
petitioners, nding that petitioners had been illegally dismissed, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby directed to reinstate complainants to
service eective August 1, 1991 with full backwages and without loss of
seniority rights.
SO ORDERED." 10

Expectedly, respondents Isetann and John Go appealed the aforesaid decision to the
NLRC. On January 31, 1992, the NLRC issued a resolution 11 remanding this case to
the NLRC National Capital Region Arbitration Branch for further proceedings in the
following manner:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged decision is hereby SET
ASIDE and VACATED.
The entire records of this case is hereby remanded to the NLRC National
Capital Regional Arbitration Branch for further proceedings.
Considering that the Labor Arbiter a quo rendered a decision in this case
and in order to dispel any suspicion of pre-judgment of this case, the
Executive Labor Arbiter is hereby directed to have this case re-raed to
another Labor Arbiter.
SO ORDERED." 12

Consequently, the present case was then re-raed to Labor Arbiter Pablo C.
Espiritu, Jr. After a full-blown trial, the said Labor Arbiter found for the petitioners
and declared that there was no justication, whether in fact or in law, for their
dismissal. The decretal part of the decision 13 dated March 31, 1993, states:

"WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgement (sic) is hereby

rendered nding the dismissal of complainants, Cristina Amortizado and
Corazon Jamer to be illegal and concomitantly, (r)espondents are hereby
ordered to pay complainants, Corazon Jamer the amount of P125,460.00
and Cristina Amortizado the amount of P125,460.00, representing full
backwages from the time of their dismissal (August 31, 1990) till actual or
payroll reinstatement at the option of the respondent (computed until
promulgation only). Respondents are also hereby further ordered to
reinstate the complainants to their former position as Store Cashiers without
loss of seniority rights, privileges and benets, failure to do so backwages
shall continue to run but in no case to exceed three (3) years.
Respondents are also ordered to pay complainants the amount of
P25,092.00 representing 10% attorney's fees based in the total judgment
(sic) award of P250,920.00.
SO ORDERED." 14

Dissatised over the decision of the Labor Arbiter which struck private respondents
as grossly contrary to the evidence presented, the herein private respondents once
again appealed to the NLRC. And, as earlier stated, the NLRC rendered the
challenged decision 15 on November 12, 1993, vacating the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and entering a new one dismissing the petitioners' complaint.
Hence, this petition wherein the main issue to be resolved is whether NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in nding that petitioners were validly
dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
At the outset, the Court notes petitioners inexcusable failure to move for the
reconsideration of respondent NLRC's decision. Thus, the present petition suers
from a procedural defect that warrants its outright dismissal. While in some
exceptional cases we allowed the immediate recourse to this Court, we nd nothing
herein that could warrant an exceptional treatment to this petition which will
justify the omission. This premature action of petitioners constitutes a fatal
inrmity as ruled in a long line of decisions, 16 most recently in the case of Building
Care Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.: 17
"The ling of such a motion is intended to aord public respondent an
opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of a
re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. Petitioner's
inaction or negligence under the circumstances is tantamount to a
deprivation of the right and opportunity of the respondent Commission to
cleanse itself of an error unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an act
unfairly imputed. . .
. . . And for failure to avail of the correct remedy expressly provided by law,
petitioner has permitted the subject Resolution to become nal and
executory after the lapse of the ten day period within which to le such
motion for reconsideration."

Likewise, a motion for reconsideration is an adequate remedy; hence certiorari

proceedings, as in this case, will not prosper. 18 Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, clearly provides that:
"When any tribunal, board or ocer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may le a veried petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, . . ."

The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law against the acts of respondent. 19 In the case at bench, the plain and adequate
remedy referred to in Rule 65, Section I, is a motion for reconsideration of the
challenged decision and the resolution thereof, which was expected to provide an
adequate and a more speedy remedy than the present petition for certiorari.

Petitioners asseverate that respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion

when it reversed the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter.
We find said submissions untenable.
In asserting that there was grave abuse of discretion, petitioners advert to alleged
variances in the factual ndings of the Labor Arbiter and the respondent NLRC. This
is inept and erroneous. Firstly, errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of
jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil action for certiorari. 20
Secondly, a careful reading of the records of this case would readily show that if
there is any error by public respondent in its analysis of the facts and its evaluation
of the evidence, it is not of such a degree as may be stigmatized as a grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the judgment is rendered in
a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. An abuse of discretion does
not necessarily follow just because there is a reversal by the NLRC of the decision of
the Labor Arbiter. Neither does the mere variance in the evidentiary assessment of
the NLRC and that of the Labor Arbiter would, as a matter of course, so warrant
another full review of the facts. The NLRC's decision, so long as it is not bereft of
support from the records, deserves respect from the Court. 21
We must once more reiterate our much repeated but not well-heeded rule that the
special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The rationale for this rule is simple. When a
court exercises its jurisdiction an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did,
every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The
administration of justice would not countenance such a rule. Consequently, an error

of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
correctible through the original special civil action of certiorari. 22
On the merits, we nd and so hold that substantial evidence exists to warrant the
nding that petitioners were validly dismissed for just cause and after observance of
due process.
Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an
employee by his employer are two-fold: the substantive and the procedural. Not
only must the dismissal be for a valid or authorized cause as provided by law
(Articles 282, 283 and 284, of the Labor Code, as amended), but the rudimentary
requirements of due process, basic of which are the opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself, must be observed before an employee may be dismissed. 23
With respect to the rst requisite, Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended,
provides:
"ART. 282.
Termination by Employer . An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
(a)
Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of
the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with
his work;
(b)

Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c)
Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d)
Commission of a crime or oense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representative; and
(e)

Other causes analogous to the foregoing." (Emphasis supplied.

In the instant case, we nd no diculty in agreeing with the ndings of the public
respondent that the herein petitioners were guilty of acts of dishonesty by incurring
several occurrences of shortages in the amounts of P15,353.78, P1,000.00, P450.00
and P70.00 which they failed to turnover and account for/and in behalf of
respondent Isetann. Fittingly, the ndings of the NLRC are worth stressing at this
point, to wit:
cda

"With regard to the several occurrences of shortages of the amounts of

P15,353.78, P1,000.00 and P70.00, the Labor Arbiter has failed to consider
the fact that complainants-appellees were accorded the chance to explain
their side as to the shortages and that they have utterly failed to do so
providing basis for their valid dismissal. This fact has been established by the
respondents-appellants in the ndings of the Committee on Discipline on
Exhibits '3,' '3-A' to '3-D', as follows:
'a)

On the Shortage of P15,353.78:

The 3 respondents, Lutgarda Inducta, Cristy Amortizado and Corazon

Jamer denied any involvement in the loss of P15,353.78. Although the
money is under their responsibility, not one of them gave any
explanation about the shortage or loss .
b)

On the amount of P1,000.00 borrowed by Inducta from Jamer:

On July 18, 1990, Lutgarda Inducta borrowed money from

respondents (sic) Jamer amounting to P1,000.00 to cover her
shortage.
Ms. Jamer said that Ms. Inducta paid the amount on that day. But Ms .
Jamer did not report the shortage.
c)

On the Underdeposit of Cash = P450.00:

The computation of Ms. Amortizado's sales collections last July 14,

1990 resulted to an overage of P350.00. Amortizado turned over the
amount of P350.00, to cover up a shortage incurred by her and Mrs.
Inducta.
Jamer used the money given to her by Amortizado (P350.00), and
borrowed (P150.00) from the change fund to cover the total shortage
amounting to P500.00 which she had then.
Jamer cannot trace how the shortage came about. Inducta and Jamer
shouldered the total shortage amounting to P500.00, P330.00 for
Jamer and P200.00 for Inducta. Jamer claims that she returned the
P350.00 in the box. However, the claim of respondent was further
veried from the payroll section which revealed that a value slip was
issued last July 1990. Jamer and Inducta were charged for P200.00
each. A value slip was issued last August 10, 1990 charging P100.00
to Amortizado.

Jamer admitted that she failed to inform the Audit Sta regarding the
P350.00 overage which she received from Amortizado. A(s) per
report of Ms. Agnes Gonzales dated 26 July 1990, there was a total
under deposit of cash amounting to P450.00.
Total cash admitted

P65,428.05

(cash in drawer)
Total cash remitted
(per tally sheet)
Overage

d)

64,978.05

P450.00

On the P70.00 Over Replenishment of Petty Cash Expenses :

During the 3rd administrative hearing, the Committee informed Mrs.

Amortizado regarding the over replenishment of petty cash expenses

as revealed by the Finance Manager last August 10, 1990.

Mrs. Amortizado readily admitted and explained that she forgot to
inform Mrs. Inducta regarding the P70.00. She admitted her failure to
correct the amount from P100.00 to P30.00 (total expenses spent for
the taxi fair).
She added the she previously incurred a shortage amounting to
P100.00. Then she used the P70.00 to cover for the shortage. The
remaining balance of P30.00 was paid by Amortizado.
Amortizado informed the Committee that she is willing to refund the
P70.00 shortage." (Emphasis supplied). 24

From the foregoing premises, it is crystal clear that the failure of petitioners to
report the aforequoted shortages and overages to management as soon as they
arose resulted in the breach of the duciary trust reposed in them by respondent
company, thereby causing the latter to lose condence in them. This warrants their
dismissal. Moreover, it must be pointed out that herein petitioners have in fact
admitted the underpayment of P450.00 not only in their "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
but also during the hearing conducted before Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu. 25 And,
the record shows that the petitioners in fact made a last ditch eort to conceal the
same. Were it not for its timely discovery by private respondents' trusted
employees, the incident could not have been discovered at all. Furthermore, it is
worth stressing at this juncture that the petitioners have also expressly admitted
the shortage of P15,353.78 a substantial amount in their respective sworn
statements, and they were not able to satisfactorily explain such shortage. 26 The
Court is convinced that these particular acts or omissions provided Isetann with
enough basis to forfeit its trust and confidence over herein petitioners.
The NLRC, therefore, did not act with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that
petitioners were legally dismissed from employment. The failure of petitioners to
report to management the aforementioned irregularities constitute "fraud or willful
breach of the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly authorized
representative" one of the just cases in terminating employment as provided for
by paragraph (c), Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended.
In other words, petitioners' admissions in their sworn statements, together with the
other documentary evidence on record, constituted breach of trust on their part
which justies their dismissal. Private respondents Isetann Department Store and
Mr. John Go cannot be compelled to retain employees who are clearly guilty of
malfeasance as their continued employment will be prejudicial to the former's best
interest. 27 The law, in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. 28
The cause of social justice is not served by upholding the interest of petitioners in
disregard of the right of private respondents. Social justice ceases to be an eective
instrument for the "equalization of the social and economic forces" by the State
when it is used to shield wrongdoing. 29 While it is true that compassion and human

consideration should guide the disposition of case involving termination of

employment since it aects one's source or means of livelihood, it should not be
overlooked that the benets accorded to labor do not include compelling an
employer to retain the services of an employee who has been shown to be a gross
liability to the employer. It should be made clear that when the law tilts the scale of
justice in favor of labor, it is but a recognition of the inherent economic inequality
between labor and management. The intent is to balance the scale of justice; to put
the two parties on relatively equal positions. There may be cases where the
circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but never
should the scale be so tilted if the results is an injustice to the employer, Justicia
remini regarda est (Justice is to be denied to none). 30

Thus, this Court has held time and again, in a number of decisions, 31 that:
"Loss of condence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee and proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct is not required to
dismiss him on this charge. It is sucient if there is 'some basis' for such
loss of condence or if the employer has reasonable ground to believe or to
entertain the moral conviction that the employee concerned is responsible
for the misconduct and that the nature of his participation therein rendered
him absolutely unworthy of the trust and condence demanded by his
position." 32

Parenthetically, the fact that petitioners Jamer and Amortizado had worked for
respondent company for fourteen (14) and thirteen (13) years, respectively, should
be taken against them. The infractions that they committed, notwithstanding their
long years of service with the company, reects a regrettable lack of loyalty
loyalty that they should have strengthened instead of betrayed. If the petitioners'
length of service is to be regarded as a justifying circumstance in moderating the
dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of
social justice and undermining the eorts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all
undesirables. 33
Petitioners also maintain that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion when
it failed to consider the fact that, other than petitioners themselves, there were four
(4) other persons who had access to the company vaults, and hence, could have
been responsible for the aforesaid cash shortages imputed to them. They aver
therefore, that there was a serious aw and laxity in the supervision and handling
of company funds by respondent Isetann. 34
We also find this contention devoid of merit.
First, it must be pointed out that the petitioners' remark that there was laxity in the
accounting procedures of the company is a matter addressed to the respondent
employer. However, this does not excuse dishonesty of employees and should not in
any case hamper the right of the employer to terminate the employment of
petitioners on the ground of loss of condence or breach of trust. Precisely, the

accounting procedure which called for improvements was based primarily on trust
and confidence. 35
Secondly, it must be noted that the herein petitioners were store cashiers and as
such, a special and unique employment relationship exists between them and the
respondent company. More than most key positions, that of cashier calls for the
utmost trust and condence because their primary function involves basically the
handling of a highly essential property of the respondent employer the sales and
revenues of the store. Employers are consequently given wider latitude of discretion
in terminating the employment of managerial employees or other personnel
occupying positions of responsibility, such as in the instant case, than in the case of
ordinary rank-and-le employees, whose termination on the basis of these same
grounds required proof of involvement in the malfeasance in question. Mere
uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not suce. 36 In
that respect, we quote with approval the observations of the NLRC:
"To expound further, for the position of a cashier, the honesty and integrity
of the persons assuming said position are the primary considerations for
the nature of her work required that her actuation's should be beyond
suspicion as they are accorded the responsibility of handling money and
whatever they would do to such property of the employer largely depend on
their trustworthiness. Hence, the right of the employer to dismiss a cashier
guilty of breach of trust and condence should be recognized. In a case
decided by the Supreme Court it has been ruled that:
'Honesty and integrity are the primary considerations in petitioner's
position. The nature of his work requires that the actuations should be
beyond suspicion. Our empathy with the cause of labor should not
blind us to the rights of management. As we have held, this Court
should help stamp out, rather than tolerate, the commission of
irregular acts whenever these are noted. Malpractices should not be
allowed to continue but should be rebuked. (Del Carmen vs. NLRC,
203 SCRA 245)'" 37

Finally, we are convinced that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
evaluating the evidence. Petitioners merely denied the charges against them.
Denials are weak forms of defenses, particularly when they are not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence. 38 The petitioners' failure to satisfactorily explain the
cash shortages, for which sums they are responsible, given their respective positions
in respondent company, is enough reason to warrant their dismissal on the ground
of loss of condence. They cannot place the burden on somebody else given the
factual circumstances of this case. As succinctly put by the NLRC:
"That there were other persons who had access to the vaults of the
appellant company implying that these other persons could have been
responsible for the loss of the P15,353.78 is of no moment inasmuch as the
appellees were the ones who took rst custody of the possession of said
collections. As store cashiers, it is expected of them to exercise ordinary
prudence to count the collection and record the same in the tally sheet
before depositing to said vault to avoid a slightest suspicion of having

pocketed part of it should a shortage arise. They did not exert eorts to
exercise such prudence demanded of their positions hence, appellants
should not be blamed when they were called for an investigation when said
shortage was discovered.
xxx xxx xxx
That the occurrence of shortages is merely an isolated one and therefore
should not be taken against the complainant-appellees as a ground for loss
of trust and condence that would cause their termination cannot be given
any credence. The shortages having been established and admitted has
provided the employer sucient basis for loss of condence and whether
such occurrence is merely an isolated one or has been repeatedly
committed is no longer material. The bone of contention here is whether
there is 'some basis' for such loss of trust and condence and if the
employer has reasonable ground to believe or to entertain the moral
conviction that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct
which in the instant case has been established." 39

We reiterate the rule that in cases of dismissal for breach of trust and condence,
proof beyond doubt of the employees' misconduct is not required. It is sucient that
the employer had reasonable ground to believe that the employees are responsible
for the misconduct which renders him unworthy of the trust and condence
demanded by their position. 40 In the case at hand, it cannot be doubted that
respondents succeeded in discharging its burden of proof.
As regards the second requisite, the law requires that the employer must furnish
the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2) written notices before termination
may be validly eected: rst, a notice apprising the employee of the particular acts
or omission for which his dismissal is sought and, second, a subsequent notice
informing the employee of the decision to dismiss him. 41
In accordance with this requirement, petitioners were given the required notices, on
August 2, 1990 and then on August 23, 1990. The Court nds that petitioners were
accorded due process before they were dismissed on August 31, 1990. It is a wellestablished rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. 42 It is evident from the records, that herein petitioners were given all the
opportunities to defend themselves and air their side before the Committee on
Discipline, having been notied by respondent Isetann's Human Resources Division
Manager, Teresita A. Villanueva, on August 2, 1990 through letters individually sent
to them. However, when the petitioners were confronted with reports of the
anomalies, they oered no explanation or theory which could account for money
lost in their possession. Hence, the company had no other alternative but to
terminate their employment. As we elucidated in the case of Philippine Savings
Bank vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 43 to wit:
". . . the requirement of due process is satised when a fair and reasonable

opportunity to explain his side of the controversy is aorded the party. A

formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all circumstances
essential, especially when the employee chooses not to speak."

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in

NLRC NCR CA 002074-91 is hereby AFFIRMED. The petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
cda

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1.

Annex "A" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 36-57.

2.

Second Division.

3.

Penned by Commissioner Domingo H. Zapanta with Commissioner Rogelio I.

Rayala concurring and Presiding Commissioner Enda Bonto-Perez dissenting.

4.

Docketed as NLRC-NCR 00-09-05-209-90; Rollo, pp. 79-89.

5.

Annex "A" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 54.

6.

Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr.

7.

Annex "D" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 79-81.

8.

Annex "A" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 38-40.

9.

Annex "B" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 59-69.

10.

Id., Rollo, p. 69.

11.

Annex "C" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 70-76.

12.

Id., Rollo, pp. 75-76.

13.

Annex "D" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 78-79.

14.

Id.; Rollo, p. 89.

15.

Annex "A" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 36-57.

16.

Pure Foods Corporation vs. NLRC, 171 SCRA 415 [1989]; Labudahon vs. NLRC,
251 SCRA 129 [1995]; Gonpu Services Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 111897,
January 27, 1997; Orient Express Placement Philippines vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
124766, January 30, 1997; Luna vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 116404, March 20, 1997.

17.

G.R. No. 94237, February 26, 1997, citing Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc.

vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 115497, September 16, 1996.

18.

Gonpu Services Corporation vs. NLRC, supra, citing P.A. Aviles Placement
Services/Surety and Insurance Company vs. NLRC and Sinsuan, G.R. No. 120990,
October 9, 1996; Antonio vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 101755, January 27, 1992.

19.

See Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court; Pure Foods Corporation vs. NLR C,
supra; Gonpu Services Corporation vs. NLRC, supra; Building Care Corporation vs.
NLRC, supra.

20.

Pure Foods Corporation vs. NLRC, supra ; Zarate, Jr. vs. Olegario, G.R. No.
90655, October 7, 1996; Building Care Corporation vs. NLRC, supra.

21.

Philippine Advertising Counselors vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 120008, October 18, 1996.

22.

Pure Foods Corporation vs. NLRC, supra.

23.

Labor vs. NLRC, 284 SCRA 183 [1995], citing Salaw vs. NLRC, 202 SCRA 7
[1991]; Ala Mode Garments, Inc., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 122165, February 17, 1997,
citing Oania vs. NLRC, 244 SCRA 688 [1995]).

24.

Annex "A" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 45-47.

25.

Annex "A" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 45-46.

26.

Id., Rollo, pp. 47-48.

27.

Flores v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 350 [1993].

28.

Del Carmen v. NLRC, 203 SCRA 245 [1991].

29.

Pampanga II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, 250 SCRA 31 [1995].

30.

Worldwide Papermills, Inc. vs. NLRC, 244 SCRA 125 [1995].

31.

Valladolid v. Inciong, 121 SCRA [1983]; Del Carmen v. NLRC, supra; Vallende v.
NLRC, 245 SCRA 662 [1995].

32.

Ibid.

33.

Flores v. NLRC, supra.

34.

Petition dated November 26, 1993, pp. 11-14; Rollo, pp. 12-15.

35.

San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, 128 SCRA 180 [1984].

36.

Metro Drug Corporation vs. NLRC, 143 SCRA 132 [1986]; Manila Midtown
Commercial Corporation vs. NUWHRAIN [Ramada Chapter], 159 SCRA 212 [1988].

37.

Annex "A" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 53.

38.

Quiones vs. NLRC, 246 SCRA 294 [1995].

39.

Annex "A" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50-51.

40.

Maranaw Hotel & Resort Corporation (Century Park Sheraton Manila) vs. NLRC,
244 SCRA 375 [1995]; Falguera vs. Linsangan, 251 SCRA 364 [1995].

41.

Pampanga II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, supra; San Antonio vs. NLRC,
250 SCRA 359 [1995]; Jones vs. NLRC, 250 SCRA 668 [1996]; Labudahon vs.
NLRC, supra; Philippine Savings Bank vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 111173, September 4,
1996. See Secs. 2-6, Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code, as amended.

42.

Stayfast Philippine Corporation vs. NLRC, 218 SCRA 596 [1995].

43.

Docketed as G.R. No. 111173, September 4, 1996.