Vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Isetann

[G.R. No. 112630.
September 5, 1997]
CORAZON
JAMER
and
CRISTINA AMORTIZADO, petitioners,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ISETANN
DEPARTMENT STORE and/or JOHN GO, respondents.
DECISION
Complainant, Corazon Jamer was employed as a Cashier at Joy Mart, a sister company
of Isetann. She was transferred to the Cubao Branch of Isetann, as a money changer, till
her dismissal on August 31, 1990.Complainant Cristina Amortizado, on the other hand,
was employed also at Joy Mart as a sales clerk.. Thereafter, she was transferred to
Young Un Department Store as an assistant to the money changer. Later on, or in 1985,
she transferred to Isetann, Cubao Branch where she worked as a Store Cashier till her
dismissal on August 31, 1990. This complaint arose from the dismissal of the
complainants by the respondents. They were both dismissed on the alleged ground of
dishonesty in their work as Store Cashiers.
Complainants discovered a shortage of P15,353.78. It was complainant Corazon Jamer
who first discovered the shortage. She informed her co-store cashier, complainant
Cristina Amortizado, about the shortage. They did not) immediately report the
shortage to management hoping to find the cause of the shortage but to no avail they
failed to reconcile the same. Respondents placed both complainants and their co-store
cashier Lutgarda Inducta under preventive suspension for the alleged shortages until
they were dismissed. Complainant instituted this present action for illegal dismissal
praying for reinstatement with payment of back wages and other benefits.
[7]
In justifying complainants dismissal from their employment, respondents alleged:

When the transactions for July 15, 1990 were being reconciled, a shortage
of P15,353.78 was discovered. Also uncovered was an under-deposit of P450.00 of
cash receipts for July 14, 1990. Aside from the foregoing persons, Alex Mejia had and
was allowed by management to have uncontrolled access to the said room including the
vault. Ostensibly, the purpose was to assist in the bringing in or taking out of coin bags,
monies, etc. There were therefore, at a minimum at least six (6) persons who could
have had access to the company funds. To ascribe liability to the store cashiers alone, in
the absence of a clear proof of any wrongdoing is not only unfair and discriminatory
but is likewise illegal.
Parenthetically, and within the parameters of their assigned tasks, herein complainants
could not be faulted in any way for the said shortage as there is no showing that the
loss occurred at the time they were in control of the funds concerned.
On July 23, 1991, Labor Arbiter Nieves V. de Castro, to whom the instant
contoversy was originally assigned, rendered a decision in favor of herein
petitioners, finding that petitioners had been illegally dismissed.
[9]
Respondents appealed the to the NLRC. On January 31, 1992, the NLRC
issued a resolution remanding this case to the NLRC National Capital Region
Arbitrattion Branch for further proceedings in the following manner:
[11]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged decision is hereby SET ASIDE

and VACATED.
The entire records of this case is hereby remanded to the NLRC National Capital
Region Arbitration Branch for further proceedings.
Consequently, the present case was then re-raffled to Labor Arbiter Pablo
C. Espiritu, Jr. After a full-blown trial, the said Labor Arbiter found for the
petitioners and declared that there was no justification, whether in fact or in
law, for their dismissal
Dissatisfied over the decision of the Labor Arbiter which struck private
respondents as grossly contrary to the evidence presented, the herein private
respondents once again appealed to the NLRC. And, as earlier stated, the
NLRC rendered the challenged decision on November 12, 1993, vacating the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and entering a new one dismissing the petitioners
complaint.
[15]
Hence, this petition wherein the main issue to be resolved is whether NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that petitioners were validly
dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
At the outset, the Court notes petitioners inexcusable failure to move for
the reconsideration of respondent NLRCs decision. Thus, the present petition
suffers from a procedural defect that warrants its outright dismissal. While in
some exceptional cases we allowed the immediate recourse to this Court, we
find nothing herein that could warrant an exceptional treatment to this petition
which will justify the omission:
[17]
Petitioners asseverate that respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of

discretion when it reversed the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter.
We find said submissions untenable.
In asserting that there was a grave abuse of discretion, petitioners advert to

alleged variances in the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the
respondent NLRC. This is inept and erroneous. Firstly, errors of judgment, as
distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special
civil action for certiorari. Secondly, a careful reading of the records of this
case would readily show that there is any error by public respondent in its
analysis of the facts and its evaluation of the evidence, it is not of such a
degree as may be stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion does not
necessarily follow just because there is a reversal by the NLRC of the decision
of the Labor Arbiter. Neither does the mere variance in the evidentiary
assessment of the NLRC and that of the Labor Arbiter would, as a matter of
course, so warrant another full review of the facts. The NLRCs decision, so
long as it is not bereft of support from the records, deserves respect from the
Court.
[20]
[21]
We must once more reiterate our much repeated but not well-heeded rule
that the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The rationale for this rule is
simple. When a court exercises its jurisdiction being exercised when the error
is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This
cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not countenance such a
rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original special civil
action of certiorari.
[22]
On the merits, we find and so hold that substantial evidence exists to

warrant the finding that petitioners were validly dismissed for just cause and
after observance of due process.
Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the lawful
dismissal of an employee by his employer are two-fold: the substantive and the
procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid or authorized cause as
provided by law (Articles 282, 283 and 284, of the Labor Code, as amended),
but the rudimentary requirements of due process, basic of which are the
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself, must be observed before an
employee may be dismissed.
[23]
With respect to the first requisite, Article 282 of the Labor Code, as
amended, provides:
ART. 282. Termination by Employer.- An employer may terminate an employment for

any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative;
and
From the foregoing premises, it is crystal clear that the failure of petitioners
to report the aforequoted shortages and overages to management as soon as
they arose resulted in the breach of the fiduciary trust reposed in them by
respondent company, thereby causing the latter to lose confidence in them.
This warrants their dismissal.
The NLRC, therefore, did not act with grave abuse of discretion in declaring
that petitioners were legally dismissed from employment. The failure of
petitioners to report to management the aforementioned irregularities constitute
fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly
authorized representative one of the just causes in terminating employment as
provided for by paragraph (c), Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Petitioners also maintain that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to consider the fact that, other than petitioners
themselves, there were four (4) other persons who had access to the company
vaults, and hence, could have been responsible for the aforesaid cash
shortages imputed to them. They aver therefore, that there was a serious flaw
and laxity in the supervision and handling of company funds by respondent
Isetann.
[34]
We also find this contention devoid of merit.

Honesty and integrity are the primary considerations in petitioners position. The nature
of his work requires that the actuations should be beyond suspicion, our empathy with
the cause of labor should not blind us to the rights of management. As we have held,
this Court should help stamp out, rather than tolerate, the commission of irregular acts
whenever these are noted. Malpractices should not be allowed to continue but should
be rebuked. (Del Carmen vs. NLRC, 203 SCRA 245)
[37]
Finally, we are convinced that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in evaluating the evidence. Petitioners merely denied the
charges against them. Denials are weak forms of defenses, particularly when
they are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The petitioners
failure to satisfactorily explain the cash shortages, for which sums they are
responsible, given their respective positions in respondent company, is enough
reason to warrant their dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence. They
cannot place the burden on somebody else given the factual circumstances of
this case
[38]
We reiterate the rule that in cases of dismissal for breach of trust and
confidence, proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employees misconduct is
not required. It is sufficient that the employer had reasonable ground to believe
that the employees are responsible for the misconduct which renders him
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by their position. In the case
at hand, it cannot be doubted that respondents succeeded in discharging its
burden of proof.
[40]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the National Labor Relations

Commission in NLRC NCR CA 002074-91 is hereby AFFIRMED. The petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Isetann

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[G.R. No. 112630.

In justifying complainants dismissal from their employment, respondents alleged:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged decision is hereby SET ASIDE

Petitioners asseverate that respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of

In asserting that there was a grave abuse of discretion, petitioners advert to

On the merits, we find and so hold that substantial evidence exists to

ART. 282. Termination by Employer.- An employer may terminate an employment for

We also find this contention devoid of merit.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the National Labor Relations

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