Order Re Oracle Google Court-Appointed Expert
Order Re Oracle Google Court-Appointed Expert
Order Re Oracle Google Court-Appointed Expert
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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For the Northern District of California
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Plaintiff,
v.
GOOGLE INC.,
Defendant.
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INTRODUCTION
In this copyright-infringement action involving an operating system for mobile devices,
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the Court appointed an expert under Rule 706, who, before the trial herein, testified in a
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separate case involving different parties. Although that litigation involved the same operating
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system, he gave no opinion on the operating system and testified only on issues uninvolved in
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the instant case. Based thereon, plaintiff moves to disqualify the Rule 706 expert from
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participating in this case. For the reasons stated below, plaintiffs motion is DENIED.
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STATEMENT
Plaintiff Oracle America, Inc., acquired copyrights in the programming platform known
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as Java. Defendant Google Inc. used Java to compose its Android operating system used in
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mobile devices. Using the Java language itself violated nothing, all agree, and 95 percent or
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more of Android constituted an original work by Google. The remaining five percent has
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become the issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the
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remaining five percent infringed Oracles copyright in the structure, sequence, and organization
of the Java Application Programming Interface, reversing a decision by this Court that had held
operation within the meaning of Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act. The Federal Circuit
remanded the case for further proceedings on Googles fair use defense (and, Google contends,
its equitable defenses) as well as Oracles remedies, including injunctive relief and damages,
which could amount to multiple billions of dollars because Oracle now claims additional
Early on, the Court appointed an expert pursuant to Rule 706 to testify before the jury
at trial . . . and not [to serve] as a confidential advisor to the judge regarding the issues of
damages (for copyright and patent claims). A memorandum order detailed the need fo a Rule
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706 expert (Dkt. No. 610 at 3): [I]n light of the parties extremely divergent views on damages
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and the unusual complexity of the damages aspect of this case, an independent economic expert
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was needed to aid the jury. After considering the recommendations of the parties, the Court
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selected Dr. James Kearl of Brigham Young University as the Rule 706 expert (Dkt. No. 374).
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independent professional analysis and view to inform the jury, in the event liability is found, on
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the issue of damages on the claims asserted in this action (Dkt. No. 413 at 1). That order also
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detailed, inter alia, the procedure for Dr. Kearl to review the relevant materials in the record,
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scheduled time for Dr. Kearl to prepare a report, provided that the parties could depose Dr.
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Kearl, and addressed Dr. Kearls compensation for his work (ibid.).2
Dr. Kearl then produced an expert report (which will eventually be updated in light of
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intervening events). This case has not yet proceeded to the damages phase, so Dr. Kearl has not
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yet testified herein. Now that the case is back from the Federal Circuit, the parties intend to
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conduct a new round of damages studies, and the new schedule for the exchange of the parties
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expert reports includes time for a new Rule 706 expert report, for a deposition of the Rule 706
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The copyright appeal herein was taken to the Federal Circuit rather than the Ninth Circuit because
the appeal included subsidiary patent issues which were then abandoned after the appeal was docketed.
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A tentative order clarifying Dr. Kearls assignment in light of the remand and the abandonment of the
patent issues will follow shortly after this order issues. The parties and Dr. Kearl shall have an opportunity to
comment on that tentative order.
expert, and for party rebuttals to the Rule 706 experts report. Dr. Kearl has also recently been
The present disqualification motion pertains to Dr. Kearls role as an expert in a separate
action involving different parties, a role he took on after accepting the Rule 706 appointment in
the instant case. In 2012, Apple Inc. commenced a patent-infringement action against Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd. (and other Samsung entities). Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.,
No. 12-00630 (Judge Lucy H. Koh). Neither Apple nor any Samsung entity is a party in the
instant action, and neither Oracle nor Google was a party in Apple v. Samsung. In that action,
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Apple claimed that certain software features in Samsungs mobile devices, which implemented
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a version of Googles Android operating system, infringed Apples patents. Apple sought over
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two billion dollars in damages from Samsung. For its part, Samsung asserted counterclaims
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against Apple arising from Apples implementation of certain features in its own devices, which
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ran Apples iOS operating system. Samsung sought six million dollars in damages.
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Due to the Android connection, Google agreed to defend and indemnify Samsung as to
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certain aspects of its defense against Apples affirmative claims but never agreed to pay (and
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did not pay) for any aspect of Samsungs affirmative case against Apple (Bicks Decl., Exh. 2).
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Both Google and Samsung retained counsel from the law firm of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
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Sullivan LLP throughout Apple v. Samsung, and Google filed briefs in that case in response to
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certain third-party discovery issues. (Keker & Van Nest LLP, the law firm that represents
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Samsungs counsel retained Dr. Kearl to serve as an expert economist solely to value
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specific features of Apple products and to evaluate the royalties Apple would have paid to
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Samsung for a hypothetical license of the Samsungs asserted patents (Kearl Decl. 2). (Again,
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Apple products, at all material times, used an operating system different from Android.)
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Neither side asserted any copyright-infringement claims. Dr. Kearl did not discuss Android or
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Google in any of his work. With the exception of a brief explanation of his role in the instant
matter, Dr. Kearl did not discuss Android or Google in his testimony in Apple v. Samsung.3
In their opening statement in Apple v. Samsung, counsel for Samsung contended that
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Apples case was an attack at Android and that Googles engineers dont need to copy
Apple (Bicks Decl., Exh. 1 at 359, 370). They further stated that Apple had proposed absurd
damages calculations (id. at 377). Finally, referencing Samsungs affirmative claim, counsel
explained that they would show [the jury] how properly to calculate a royalty and referenced
the Samsung patents, Apples infringement theory, and Dr. Kearls methodology (id. at 412).
During Apples cross-examination, Dr. Kearl acknowledged (as he had in his report)
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that he used the price that Apple actually charged customers in its App Store ($0.99) for an
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accused feature (Facetime) in his calculation of the royalty Apple would have paid in a
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hypothetical license for Samsungs patent covering that feature, even though the value that
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[Apple] users placed on Facetime is likely higher, and likely many times higher than the actual
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valued counterclaims merely in an attempt to downsize Apples damages claim (Bicks Decl.,
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Exh. 4 at 3350):
You also now know that [Samsung] hired four experts, Dr.
Schonfeld, Dr. Rao, Mr. Parulski, and Dr. Kearl, who in total were
paid over $5 million again, without what the lawyers have been
paid to pursue a $6 million claim.
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The Court has reviewed the full transcript of Dr. Kearls trial testimony (Dkt. Nos. 1311-10,
1311-11). He made no mention of Android or Google with the exception of the brief reference to his role in this
matter. Additionally, to rule on this motion, the Court asked Dr. Kearl to produce an unredacted copy of his
report and testimony in Apple v. Samsung to the parties herein (Dkt. No. 1322). The parties herein, the parties
in Apple v. Samsung, and Dr. Kearl entered into a protective agreement, and counsel for Samsung produced an
unredacted copy of Dr. Kearls report and his trial and deposition testimony to Oracle and Google. Oracle has
only submitted ten pages of the report in support of its motion, and no mention of Android or Google appears in
those pages. Oracle has not submitted any of Dr. Kearls deposition testimony. The Court is confident that
Oracle would have called attention to any reference to Android or Google in Dr. Kearls report or his deposition
testimony. Accordingly, this order can safely conclude that Dr. Kearl made no reference to Android or Google
in his report or his testimony, with the exception of a brief reference to his role in this matter.
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well-supported and reasonable estimate of the reasonable royalties in light of the objective
evidence of the value of the accused features and the availability of non-infringing substitutes
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For the Northern District of California
Dr. Kearl now states, I did not intentionally lower my damages estimates. I offered a
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Why would you use why would you use an artificially low
number? Only one reason. Theyre the plaintiff. Only one reason.
To devalue, to cheapen, to convince you that the patents are not
worth much.
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further contends that a Rule 706 expert is no longer necessary. Dr. Kearl, through his counsel,
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has filed a declaration explaining his work in Apple v. Samsung, although he stated he did not
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believe it appropriate to oppose Oracles motion, inasmuch as he does not have an adversarial
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position vis-a-vis either party in this action. Google filed a response brief arguing that the
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Oracles motion should be denied, although at oral argument on this motion counsel stated,
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[o]ur position has always been that the Rule 706 expert decision is up to the Court. And were
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willing to live with what the Court decides (Dkt. No. 1382 at 19). This order follows full
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ANALYSIS
Rule 706 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Appointment Process. On a partys motion or on its own, the
court may order the parties to show cause why expert witnesses
should not be appointed and may ask the parties to submit
nominations. The court may appoint any expert that the parties
agree on and any of its own choosing. But the court may only
appoint someone who consents to act.
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(b) Experts Role. The court must inform the expert of the experts
duties. The court may do so in writing and have a copy filed with
the clerk or may do so orally at a conference in which parties have
an opportunity to participate. The expert:
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(1) must advise the parties of any findings the expert makes;
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Rule 706 itself does not address the independence or neutrality of a court-appointed
expert. Our court of appeals reviews the appointment of a Rule 706 expert for abuse of
discretion. Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th
Cir. 1999). Neither the rule nor any decision from our court of appeals offers guidance for the
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exercise of that discretion in assessing a Rule 706 experts independence, but several district
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courts in our circuit have described Rule 706 experts as neutral. See, e.g., Gorton v. Todd,
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793 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1177 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (Judge Lawrence K. Karlton) (The Rule only
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allows a court to appoint a neutral expert.). Often, the appointment of a Rule 706 expert is
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contrasted with the selection of an expert to be called by an advocate for either side. See, e.g.,
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Hollis v. Sloan, No. 08-2674, 2010 WL 4069336, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010) (Judge
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Kendall J. Newman).
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Throughout the process of selecting a Rule 706 expert in this matter, the Court sought
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candidates that could provide a neutral explanation and viewpoint, that had no conflicts,
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and that were unimpeachable to the extent that the candidate had not taken a position in a
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prior case that might compromise [his] freedom of movement here (Dkt. Nos. 236 at 2, 610
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at 4, and 350 at 23). The parties jointly vetted Dr. Kearl for conflicts (and approved) before
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submitting his name for consideration (Dkt. No. 270). The Court held a hearing further vetting
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Dr. Kearl and one other candidate (Dkt. No. 350). Considerable effort went into the selection
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of Dr. Kearl.
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At oral argument on this motion, counsel for Oracle proposed that a Rule 706 expert
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should be dismissed if his prior work presents an appearance of impropriety, but counsel did
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not cite any authority as support. Only one decision has ever mentioned appearance of
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impropriety, and that was in a dictum. The expert there, the judge found, had not indulged in
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Litigation, MDL No. 926, 1999 WL 34815588 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 1999) (Chief Judge Sam C.
Pointer).4
Oracle has not pointed to a single statement ever made by Dr. Kearl in the Apple
case (or elsewhere) relating to Android or Google, or one usable to impeach any position he
may take here. Nor could it. Dr. Kearls role was specifically limited to assessing the
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Google. In short, Dr. Kearl provided no opinion in Apple v. Samsung that compromises his
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Oracles argument reduces to the proposition that in the marketplace, Apple remains at
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war with Google and Samsung (both of whom use Android) and that by testifying at the
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request of Samsungs counsel, Dr. Kearl allied himself with Google. Googles agreement to
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defend and indemnify Samsung, Oracle posits, shows the alliance. This argument, to repeat,
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ignores the critical point that Dr. Kearl steered completely clear of Android and limited himself
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anyone in connection with the issues on which Dr. Kearl testified. Dr. Kearl only served as an
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Oracle also contends that Samsung only brought its counterclaims against Apple (and
retained Dr. Kearl) as a foil to produce a low-ball study to contrast against Apples affirmative
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There, the Rule 706 expert organized a conference sponsored in part by a defendant, participated in
a professional meeting organized by a defendant, and discussed serving as a clinical investigator for a
defendant. That decision held that those contacts did not impair [the experts] objectivity, impartiality, or
neutrality . . . [or] result in any bias, conflict of interest, or, when the facts are known, any appearance of bias or
conflict of interest. Id. at *5. That holding rested on a consideration of all of the relevant facts, not just those
selected by a party. Id. at *8.
damages claim.5 This type of speculation regarding litigation motives by counsel is too flimsy
to impugn Dr. Kearl. Whether or not Samsung intended its affirmative case to bolster its
defense (and thereby to protect Google as indemnitor), that intention did not inform Dr.
Kearls work. Again, Dr. Kearl did not opine on Apples claims against Samsung or anything
related to Android or Google. Nor did he offer any opinion on the measure of damages for any
Nevertheless, Oracle contends that Dr. Kearls involvement in the Apple v. Samsung
case will place it between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand, Oracle wishes to cross-
examine Dr. Kearl about issues of bias. On the other hand, Oracle purports to fear that the jury
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may then infer that the Court has endorsed Googles side by appointing an expert with alleged
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bias. If this problem arises, the Court will solve it with an admonition to the jury.
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After full consideration, the Court is firmly convinced that Dr. Kearl remains qualified
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to serve and will be neutral and fair in this matter and finds that Oracle has failed to supply
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Oracle also contends that a Rule 706 expert is no longer necessary in this case because
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the damages calculations have been simplified now that Oracle is not asserting any patent
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claims. It is true that the patent claims have fallen away, but the complexity of the damages
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In the joint case management statement submitted after the reversal, Oracle noted that it
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seeks damages in an amount that includes (1) Oracles actual damages resulting from
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Googles infringing activity, including harm to Java, harm to Oracles actual and potential
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business, and loss of licensing revenues; and (2) Googles profits attributable to the
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infringement, including all revenues derived directly or indirectly from the exploitation of all
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products containing the infringing material (Dkt. No. 1273). This could amount to multiple
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The jury found in Samsungs favor as to one of its two asserted patents and awarded damages in the
amount of $158,400 the amount of Dr. Kearls estimate (Apple v. Samsung, Dkt. No. 1877 at 11 (May 2,
2014).). The jury found in Apples favor on the Samsungs other claim, which Dr. Kearl estimated at just over
six million dollars.
billions of dollars. The fact that the patent claims have fallen away does not remove the need
for the jury to understand the roles and relative importance of the accused items as elements of
products, rather than entire products. The damages question remains complicated by the fact
that the parties employ elaborate, nontraditional business models for the products at issue.
Oracles claim for Googles infringement profits is especially challenging because Google, not
Oracle, bears the burden of proving the amount of its offset, if any, for deductible expenses it
incurred in generating the revenues claimed (and proven) by Oracle. See Petrella v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1962, 1973 (2014). Indeed, the Court granted
Oracles recent discovery motion compelling Google to produce numerous internal profit and
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loss reports that Oracle intends to scour in order to rebut Googles arguments over deductible
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expenses (Dkt. No. 1372). Additionally, Oracles claim for lost licensing revenues as a
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component of its actual damages may still rely on the same hypothetical license analysis
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It is worth recalling here that Oracles damages expert, Dr. Iain Cockburn, needed
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three tries before producing a viable damages study, and parts of his third faced successful
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challenges as well (Dkt. Nos. 230, 685, 785). Thus, the appointment of a Rule 706 expert
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proved prescient. Dr. Kearls continued involvement will be useful both in assisting the
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jury in comprehending the complexity of the question of damages and in assisting the Court
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in navigating any Daubert issues that will arise with the parties new damages studies.
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Accordingly, a Rule 706 expert remains appropriate in this case, subject to the remote
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possibility that after application of Daubert the surviving damage theories by both sides will be
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so uncomplicated that a Rule 706 expert will be unnecessary to assist the jury, a possibility the
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CONCLUSION
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated:
WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE