FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127060. November 19, 2002]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FLORENTINO CENIZA,
SANTIAGO CENIZA, ESTANISLAO CENIZA,
ROMEO SIMBAJON, PABLO RAMOS, ATILANO
BONGO, EDGAR ADOLFO, EMMA ADOLFO,
JERRY ADOLFO, GLENN ADOLFO, GINA
ADOLFO, LORNA ADOLFO, CHONA ADOLFO,
EVELYN ADOLFO, in her own behalf and as
guardian of the minors HUBERT and AMIEL
ADOLFO, and ELNITA ADOLFO in her own
behalf and as guardian of minors DAVID and
PRESTINE MAY ADOLFO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision[1] dated September 28, 1994, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31728,
affirming the decision[2] in LRC Case No. N-46 of
the Regional Trial Court in Mandaue City,
Branch XXVIII, which declared private
respondents as the owners entitled to the
registration of the lots in question.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Apolinar Ceniza was the declared owner in 1948
of Lot No. 1104, located at Cabancalan,
Mandaue City, under Tax Declaration No.
01686. When he died, his heirs took possession
of the property and in 1960 partitioned the
same through a deed of extrajudicial partition.
Apolinars children, namely, Santiago, Estanislao,
Florencia, Manuela, Mercedes and Florentino,
all surnamed Ceniza, each got 1/8 share of the
property. His grandchildren, namely, the
siblings Remedios Adolfo, Melecio Ceniza, and
Constancia Zanoria, each got 1/24 share, while
Apolinars other grandchildren, namely, the
siblings Concepcion Suico, Benjamin Ceniza, Lilia
Ceniza and Delfin Ceniza, each got 1/32 share.
Private respondent Florentino Ceniza purchased
the shares of his sisters Manuela and Mercedes
and the share pertaining to the siblings
Jesusa,[3] Benjamin and Delfin. Together with his
share, Florentino became the owner of Lot Nos.
1104-A&C and had them tax declared in his
name.

Florencias share, a portion of Lot No. 1104-B,

was purchased by Mercedes who in turn
bartered the same with the share acquired by
Santiago, another private respondent in this
case.
A portion of Santiagos property was bought by
his daughter, Asuncion Ceniza, married to
private respondent Atillano Bongo and who
successfully obtained a tax declaration therefor.
From the portion purchased by Asuncion
Ceniza, another private respondent, Romeo
Simbajon, purchased an area of 270 square
meters. Romeo also acquired a tax declaration
in his name. He was the husband of Felicitas
Ceniza, another daughter of Santiago.
The share acquired by Estanislao, another child
of Apolinar, was also a portion of Lot No. 1104B. He also caused the tax declaration pertaining
to the said lot transferred in his name.
The siblings Remedios Adolfo and Constancia
Zanoria, married to private respondent Pablo
Ramos, bought the share of their brother,
Melecio Ceniza. Remedios share, in turn, was
transferred to her heirs, private respondents
Edgar, Emma, Jerry, Glenn, Gina, Lorna, Chona,
Evelyn, Hubert, Amiel, all surnamed Adolfo, and
the heirs of their brother Leoncio Adolfo,
namely, his wife Elenita Adolfo, and children
David and Prestine May Adolfo.
On November 4, 1986, private respondents
applied for registration of their respective titles
over the property they inherited from Apolinar
Ceniza, with the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City, Branch 28. Petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General opposed the application on
the following grounds:
1. That neither the applicant/s nor their
precedessors-in-interest have been in open
continuous exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in question since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A.
141, as amended by P.D. 1073).
2. That the muniment/s or title and/or the tax
declaration/s and tax payment/s receipt/s of
applicant/s if any, attached to or alleged in the
application, do/es not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of a bona fide

acquisition of the lands applied for or of their

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior
thereto. Said muniment/s of title do/es not
appear to be genuine and the tax declaration/s
and/or tax payment receipts indicate pretended
possession of applicants to be of recent vintage.
3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on
the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer
be availed of by the applicants who have failed
to file an appropriate application for
registration within the period of six (6) months
from February 16, 1976 as required by
Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records,
it appears that the instant application was filed
on October 25, 1996.
4. That the parcel/s applied for is/are portions
of the public domain belonging to the Republic
of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation.
In a decision dated February 28, 1990, the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City granted
the application.[4] It held that since the
applicants possession of the land for more than
thirty (30) years was continuous, peaceful,
adverse, public and to the exclusion of
everybody, the same was in the concept of
owners. Since the land was neither encumbered
nor subject to any other application for
registration, the trial court ordered that, upon
the finality of its decision, the decrees of
registration should be issued in favor of the
applicants.
The Solicitor General interposed an appeal for
petitioner Republic of the Philippines before the
Court of Appeals.
In a decision dated September 28, 1994, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. It held that the ruling in Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals,[5] that before public
land could be registered in the name of a
private individual, it must first be established
that the land had been classified alienable and
disposable, refers to public lands and not to
those which have acquired the nature of a
private property in view of the continuous

possession thereof by its claimants. The Court

of Appeals held:
In this case, it was sufficiently established by
appellees that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the subject lots even before the year 1927, or
fifty nine (59) years before the application was
filed (TSN, April 13, 1989, pp. 3-4; February 6,
1989, p. 7-11; June 2, 1988, pp. 3, 8-9). This
period more than sufficiently satisfies the 30
years requirement of the Public Land Act for
property to be considered as private land.
Significantly, Section 4, Presidential Decree No.
1073 provides:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and
Section 4(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act
are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-ininterest, under a bonafide claim of ownership,
since June 12, 1945.
Appellant was thus no longer required to prove
that the property in question is classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Clearly, the property no longer forms
part of the public domain. The long and
continuous possession thereof by appellees
converted said property to a private one. This
finds support in the ruling in Director of Lands
vs. Bengzon, 152 SCRA 369, to wit:
x x x alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessor-ininterest, openly, continuously and exclusively
for the prescribed statutory period (30) years
under the Public Land Act, as amended is
converted to private property by the mere lapse
or completion of said period, ipso jure. The
above is a reaffirmation of the principle
established in the earlier cases of Cario v.
Insular Government, Suzi v. Razon, and Herico
v. Dar, that open exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by law creates the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period ipso jure and without the

need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be

public land and becomes private property. x x x
In interpreting the provisions of Section 48 (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, this Court said
in Herico v. Dar, x x x when the conditions as
specified in the foregoing provision are
complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant,
a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued.The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain,
and beyond the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title as would be evidenced by the patent
and the torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of the patent.
The Court of Appeals then cited Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[6] In that
case, this Court ruled that alienable public land
held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously
and exclusively for the prescribed statutory
period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by
the mere lapse or completion of said
period, ipso jure. Moreover, appellant Republics
claim that the property in question remains to
be public land under the Constitution, is refuted
by this Courts pronouncement in Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
The Court of Appeals concluded its decision
with the following observations:
Finally, we note that no opposition was filed by
the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest
the application of appellees on the ground that
the property still forms part of the public
domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots
in question are forestal land, unlike the case of
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
701, wherein the Director of Lands questioned
the petition for registration filed by the
applicant therein on the claim that the property
applied for registration in his favor was
classified and proven to be forestal land.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,

which was denied in a resolution dated October
29, 1996. Traversing petitioners argument that
under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,
all lands of the public domain are owned by the
State, the Court of Appeals stated that said
provision further states that agricultural lands
are excluded from those lands that may not be
alienated. It further ruled:
In the instant case, among the documents
presented by appellees are Real Estate tax
receipts that sufficiently show that the subject
land is mainly utilized for agricultural purposes
devoted to the planting of coconut, corn x x x
and sugar cane x x x aside from using the same
for residential purposes x x x.
It is noticeable that appellant failed to present
any proof to establish its claim that the land in
question is not alienable. Although on July 10,
1989, the court a quo issued an order directing
the Bureau of Forest Development [BFD] to
submit xx within thirty (30) days from its receipt
of [said order] a report on the status of the land
xx to determine whether said land or any
portion thereof is within the forest zone xxx
(Record, p. 63), the BFD failed to comply.
Moreover, appellant never contested appellees
application nor did it may (sic) any
manifestation that the land in question is not
alienable. Likewise, the prosecutor representing
the Republic of the Philippines during the trial
did not even contest the classification of the
land as stated in the evidence of
appellees. Their belated objection should
therefore not prejudice appellees who openly
and in good faith presented all the documents
pertinent to their claims.
Presidential Decree No. 1073 extended the
period within which a qualified person may
apply for confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title by judicial legalization to
December 31, 1987. The filing of this case in
October, 1986 was therefore seasonable. Under
the decree, this right is available to a person
who has been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation, by
himself and through his predecessors-ininterest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition

of ownership since June 12, 1945. We reiterate

that appellees have proven themselves to have
been in possession of the subject land even
prior to June 12, 1945.
Hence, this petition for review, alleging that the
Court of Appeals erred in: (1) holding that
private respondents have registerable title to
the lots in question, and (2) ordering the
registration thereof in their names.[7]
The issues raised before us are: (a) whether
there is a need for private respondents to
establish that the land subject of their
application was alienable and disposable
despite proofs showing their possession thereof
for more than 30 years; and (b) whether private
respondents were able to meet the period
required by the Public Land Act, as amended.
Petitioner contends that before a public land
can be registered in the name of a private
individual, it must be shown first that (a) the
land has been classified alienable and
disposable, and (b) the applicant, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, has been
in continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto.
Petitioner claims that private respondents failed
to meet the said requirements. They did not
cite any official proclamation or presented the
land classification map covering the subject
parcels of land to prove that they are alienable
and disposable public lands. Neither did private
respondents adduce evidence to show that they
had been in possession of the land since June
12, 1945. Although they were able to show
possession by Apolinar, their predecessor-ininterest, since 1948, and private respondents
actual possession beginning in 1960, no proof
was presented to show possession prior to
1948. Consequently, private respondents are
not entitled to have the subject parcels of land
registered in their names.
In their comment, private respondents cite
Section 48(b),[8] before it was amended by PD
No. 1073, and Section (50)[9] of the Public Land
Act as the applicable law in this case. They
maintain that the land subject of their

application is an agricultural land devoted to

corn and other root crops. Further, they have
been in possession of the land since 1927.
Estanislao Ceniza, one of the children of
Apolinar and who was already ten years old at
that time, testified that his father was the one
in possession of the land, appropriating its fruits
and paying its realty taxes. When their father
died in 1947, Apolinars chidren took possession
of the land. They also appropriated the fruits
and paid realty taxes therefor. In 1960,
Apolinars heirs partitioned the property,
declared their respective shares in their names
for tax purposes and paid the realty taxes.
Apart from this, private respondents claim that
the land in question has long been a private
one, it being a part of Hacienda de Mandaue de
Cebu, which in turn was recognized as a private
land by the Court of First Instance of Cebu in
several decisions dated February 27, 1934,
March 27, 1935, May 6, 1937 and August 6,
1937.
Indeed, before one can be granted a
confirmation of title to lands of the public
domain, the Public Land Act requires that the
applicant must prove (a) that the land is
alienable public land and (b) that his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same must either be
since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act. Only when
these conditions are met may the possessor of
the land acquire, by operation of law, a right to
a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued.[10]
Conclusively, the Court of Appeals erred when it
held that mere adverse possession in
accordance with law for a period likewise
provided for by law would automatically entitle
the possessor to the right to register public land
in his name. The applicant has to establish first
the disposable and alienable character of the
public land. Otherwise, all public lands,
regardless of their classification, can be subject
of registration of private titles, as long as the
applicant shows that he meets the required
years of possession. Worth noting is the case
of Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,[11] where the

applicant had been in possession of the

property since 1908 but it was conclusively
shown by the government that the land was
classified as alienable or disposable only on 27
March 1972. The Court said:
x x x. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same
since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by
virtue of such possession since the subject
parcels of land were not yet alienable land at
that
time
nor
capable
of
private
appropriation. The adverse possession which
may be the basis of a grant of title or
confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to
alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain.[12] (Italics supplied)
To prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order;[13] an administrative
action;[14] investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators;[15] and a legislative act or a
statute.[16]
In this case, private respondents presented a
certification dated November 25, 1994, issued
by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the
lots involved were found to be within the
alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land
Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4I555 dated December 9, 1980.[17] This is
sufficient evidence to show the real character of
the land subject of private respondents
application.[18] Further, the certification enjoys a
presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence,[19] which is true in this
case. Worth noting also was the observation of
the Court of Appeals stating that:
no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands
and Forestry to contest the application of
appellees on the ground that the property still
forms part of the public domain. Nor is there
any showing that the lots in question are
forestal land....[20]

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling

that mere possession of public land for the
period required by law would entitle its
occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it
did not err in ruling in favor of private
respondents as far as the first requirement in
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
concerned, for they were able to overcome the
burden of proving the alienability of the land
subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,
private respondents were able to prove their
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the
year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the
factual
findings
of
the
Court
of
[21]
Appeals. Although there are exceptions,
petitioner did not show that this is one of
them.[22]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED and the decision, as well as
the resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 31728 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128750. January 18, 2001]
CARQUELO
OMANDAM
and
ROSITO
[1]
ITOM, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
BLAS
TRABASAS
and
AMPARO
BONILLA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition[2] for review seeks the reversal of
the decision dated October 29, 1996, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
44442, reversing and setting aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Del
Sur, Branch 23, dated November 15, 1996, and
the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
February 21, 1997, denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands in
Pagadian City issued in favor of Camilo Lasola
Homestead Patent No. IX-6-40 covering Lot No.
8736, with an area of 23,985 sq. m. in Sagrada,
Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur. On April 28,
1978, the Register of Deeds issued Original

Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22-690 in his

name.
On April 28, 1983, respondent Blas Trabasas
bought the land from a Dolores Sayson who
claimed she was the owner of said land. In
1984, Trabasas discovered that petitioners
Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had
occupied the land. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987,
Omandam protested Lasolas homestead patent
before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for
cancellation of the OCT. Upon Saysons advice,
Trabasas repurchased the land from Lasola,
who executed a deed of sale dated September
24,1987. On August 9,1989, Trabasas acquired a
new transfer certificate of title.
On April 16,1990, spouses Blas Trabasas and
Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint against
petitioners for recovery of possession and/or
ownership of the land with the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that
they were the true and registered owners of the
land and Omandam and Itom should vacate it.
Petitioners answered that they purchased the
land from one Godofredo Sela who had been in
possession for almost twenty years.
After the parties were duly heard, the Regional
Trial Court issued its decision on November 15,
1993 declaring that neither respondents herein
nor their predecessors-in-interest were ever in
possession of the land. Citing Director of Lands
vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 71 (1966),
Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358
(1983) and Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA
446 (1992), the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding that the plaintiffs have no
equitable right to the possession of the land
under litigation, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff1) Finding the defendants to have equitable
right to the possession of the land in litigation.
2) Ordering the plaintiffs to reconvey the title of
the land under litigation in the name of the
plaintiffs to the defendants within 30 days from
the date this decision becomes final and
executory, and upon their failure to so comply,
ordering the Clerk of Court to execute in behalf
of the plaintiffs the necessary deed of

conveyance over the said land in favor of the

defendants which deed would be considered
sufficient to authorize the Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Sur, Pagadian City, to cause the
cancellation of the Torrens Certificate of Title in
the names of the plaintiffs, and in lieu thereof,
to issue another in the common names of the
defendants.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Private respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Pending the appeal, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Region IX dismissed Omandams protest
previously filed with the Bureau of Lands.[4] It
said that Omandam failed to prove that Lasola,
respondents
predecessor-in-interest,
committed fraud and misrepresentation in
acquiring the patent, hence there is no ground
for its revocation and cancellation of its
corresponding title.
On October 29,1996, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court. It decided thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the
appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, a new one is hereby issued ordering
defendants-appellees to vacate the subject land
and surrender it to plaintiff -appellant.
Cost against defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The Court of Appeals declared that petitioners
collateral attack on the homestead title, to
defeat private respondents accion publiciana,
was not sanctioned by law; that the patent and
title of Camilo Lasola, private respondents
predecessor-in-interest, had already become
indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and that
petitioners action for reconveyance in the
nature of their protest with the Bureau of Lands
and counterclaim in their answer to the
complaint for recovery of possession, already
prescribed.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied on February 21,1997. Hence,
this petition for review. Petitioners make the
following assignment of errors, alleging that the
Court of Appeals erred in:
I. ...HOLDING THAT ONE OF THE UNDISPUTED
FACTS IS THAT On April 28,1983, plaintiff

bought the subject land from Dolores Sayson

who presented herself to be the true owner of
the subject land;
II. ...HOLDING THAT ANOTHER UNDISPUTED
FACT IS THAT ...sometime in 1984 plaintiff
discovered that defendants had entered and
had occupied the subject land. Upon
instructions of Dolores Sayson, plaintiff
approached Camilo Lasola and again bought the
subject land, this time from Camilo Lasola;
III. ...IGNORING THE FINDINGS OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH THOROUGHLY
DISCUSSED THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO
ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND CAMILO LASOLA HAD NO
EQUITABLE POSSESSION ON THE SUBJECT
LAND, WHICH LACK OF EQUITABLE POSSESION
MAKES SOME OF THE RECENT DECISIONS OF
THE SUPREME COURT APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE.[6]
In the first two assigned errors, petitioners
apparently question findings of fact by the
Court of Appeals while disputing the claim of
possession by private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest.The appellate court
had stated firstly that respondent Trabasas
bought the subject land from Sayson who
presented herself as the true owner, then
secondly, that he bought the land from Lasola
also. The first two issues, in our view, raise
questions of fact. Well-entrenched is the rule
that the Courts jurisdiction in a petition for
review is limited to reviewing or revising errors
of law allegedly committed by the appellate
court. Findings of fact below are generally
conclusive on the Court. It is not for the Court
to weigh evidence all over again.[7] There are
instances where the Court departs from this
rule.[8] However, petitioners did not show that
involved here is an exceptional instance. Hence,
we need not tarry on the first two assignments.
In the third assignment of error, petitioners
aver that public respondent erred in ignoring
the trial courts finding that private respondents
had no equitable possession of the subject land.
Again, we are confronted with a question of
fact. But petitioners claim the appellate court
had disregarded or even contradicted our

holdings in the cited cases of Director of

Lands , Abanilla, and Padre.
In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 17
SCRA 71(1966), we ruled that a void title may be
cancelled. A title over a disposable public land is
void if its grantee failed to comply with the
conditions imposed by law. In Director of Lands
vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358 (1983), we held that
the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title cannot be
used as a defense in an action for cancellation
of title acquired through fraud. These two cases
refer to actions for cancellation of title initiated
by the government, through the Solicitor
General, after a finding of fraud by the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. InPadre vs. Court of Appeals, 214
SCRA 446 (1992) we said that in an action for
quieting of title, the court may determine
incidentally the right to the possession thereof,
in order to provide complete relief to the
parties. The last case refers to determination of
rightful possession in possessory actions.
Notwithstanding the formulation by the
petitioners in the third assigned error, the real
issue raised in this case involves the trial courts
jurisdiction vis--vis administrative
agencies.
What is the effect of the trial courts decision in
a possessory action on the order of Bureau of
Lands regarding a homestead application and
decision of the DENR on the protest over the
homestead patent?
Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, gives in its
sections 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands
primarily and to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources) ultimately the authority to dispose
and manage public lands.[9] In this regard,
courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the
validity of the decree of registration issued by
the Director of Lands.[10] Only the DENR
Secretary can review, on appeal, such decree.
It will be recalled that the Bureau of Lands
approved Lasolas homestead application on
May 21, 1968. No appeal was made therefrom.
Nineteen years after, or on July 9, 1987,
Omandam filed the protest with the Bureau of

Lands. Thereafter, respondents Trabasas and

Bonilla instituted the present action in the
Regional Trial Court for recovery of possession
and/or ownership. As mentioned earlier, the
trial court held that petitioners were entitled to
a declaration of equitable possession over the
area in question. Said trial court then ordered
the cancellation of respondents title and the
issuance of a new one. In effect, the courts
order reversed the award made by the Director
of Lands in favor of Lasola. This reversal was in
error, for the proper administrative agency, the
DENR under CA 141, had prior jurisdiction over
the patent on the subject matter, which is the
contested homestead area.
DENRs jurisdiction over public lands does not
negate the authority of courts of justice to
resolve questions of possession and their
decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR
has not settled the respective rights of public
land claimants.[11] But once the DENR has
decided, particularly with the grant of
homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and
then TCT later, its decision prevails.
In this case, Lasola applied for a homestead
patent over the contested area in 1967. His
application was granted on May 21, 1968. The
Order for the issuance of the patent was issued
by the Bureau of Lands on January 29, 1974 and
the corresponding Original Certificate of Title
was issued by the Register of Deeds on April 28,
1976. From the three latter dates, no appeal
was made. It was only on July 9, 1987, i.e., 13
years from the date of the Order directing the
issuance of the patent that petitioners
protested the homestead grant with the Bureau
of Lands. Despite the said lapse of time, the
Bureau of Lands gave due course to the protest
relying on our ruling in Director vs.
Abanilla[12] that the doctrine of indefeasibility of
title does not apply when the grant is tainted
with fraud and misrepresentation. From this
date, Lasolas right of possession based on his
OCT and eventually that of respondents were
put on issue. In their desire to get possession of
the property, respondents instituted an action
for recovery of possession and/or ownership on
April 16, 1990 with the Regional Trial Court.

Said court rendered its decision against

respondents on November 15, 1993.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Pending the appeal or on March 23, 1995, the
DENR-Region IX dismissed petitioners protest
on the ground of absence of fraud and
misrepresentation committed by respondents
predecessors-in-interest.[13]On October 29,
1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated the
decision subject of this petition in favor of
respondents. Petitioners then brought the
instant case to us.
We note that the parties did not manifest as to
whether an appeal was made from the decision
of the Regional Director of DENR-IX. Further, no
mention was ever made in their pleadings
regarding the matter. From the said Order of
the DENR Regional Director up to the present,
five years have lapsed. From this, we can
conclude that no appeal has been made and
that the DENR decision dismissing the
petitioners protest and upholding respondents
right on the contested area has attained finality.
By now it appears indubitable that private
respondents, spouses Trabasas and Bonilla,
have been duly confirmed in their right to
possession of Lot No. 8736 as owners
thereof. By virtue of the deed of sale executed
by OCT holder Camilo Lasola as early as
September 24, 1987, in favor of Trabasas, who
then secured a transfer certificate of title in his
name, private respondents clearly have
superior right over the land claimed by
petitioners Omandam and Itom. The appellate
court did not err in upholding the right of
private respondents, and in ordering the
petitioners to vacate and surrender the land to
said respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
29, 1996, and its resolution dated February 21,
1997, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133250
July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO
I.
CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI
COASTAL
BAY
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order. The petition seeks
to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA"
for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then
on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay
and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for
brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The
petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from
signing a new agreement with AMARI involving
such reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government,
through the Commissioner of Public Highways,
signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines
("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain
foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The
contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the
works in consideration of fifty percent of the
total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to
reclaim land, including foreshore and
submerged areas," and "to develop, improve,
acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands."1 On the same date, then President
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila
Bay"2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos
issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend
its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future
works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and
owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP
executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated
December 29, 1981, which stated:

"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation,

construction, and such other works in the
MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties,
to be paid according to progress of works on a
unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to
be agreed upon, subject to price escalation,
retention and other terms and conditions
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All
the financing required for such works shall be
provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development
rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in
favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and
participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of
land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of
December 30, 1981 which have not yet been
sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by
CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of
approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters
in the Financial Center Area covered by land
pledge No. 5 and approximately Three Million
Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight
Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters
of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above
Mean Low Water Level located outside the
Financial Center Area and the First
Neighborhood Unit."3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting
and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so
reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a
total area of one million nine hundred fifteen
thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894)
square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988,
the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA,
covering the three reclaimed islands known as
the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern
portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have a
total land area of One Million Five Hundred
Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and
Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841
hectares.

On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint

Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the
reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of
submerged areas surrounding these islands to
complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation
Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into
the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding.4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of
Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,
confirmed the JVA.5On June 8, 1995, then
President Fidel V. Ramos, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the
JVA.6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President
Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in
the Senate and denounced the JVA as the
"grandmother of all scams." As a result, the
Senate
Committee
on
Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations, conducted a joint
investigation. The Senate Committees reported
the results of their investigation in Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated September
16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their
report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to
transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of
the public domain which the government has
not classified as alienable lands and therefore
PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the
certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands
are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V.
Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order
No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a
study on the legality of the JVA in view of
Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the
Secretary of Justice,8 the Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel,9 and the Government Corporate
Counsel.10 The Legal Task Force upheld the
legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily
Inquirer and Today published reports that there

were on-going renegotiations between PEA and

AMARI under an order issued by then President
Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA
Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio
Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz
composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed
before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining
Order
and
Preliminary
Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking
to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the
petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial
hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of
the case before the proper court."12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez
("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose billions
of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed
lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA
publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation
of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and
Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on
the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the
sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a
blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of
alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he
seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in
properties of the State that are of public
dominion.
After several motions for extension of
time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on
October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998,
respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28,
1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to
require PEA to submit the terms of the
renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for
issuance of a temporary restraining order; and
(c) to set the case for hearing on oral argument.
Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for
Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which

the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22,

1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court
gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the
Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended
JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office
of the President under the administration of
then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the
Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the
Office of the President, petitioner now prays
that on "constitutional and statutory grounds
the renegotiated contract be declared null and
void."14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and
AMARI16 are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED
FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND
ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL
FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE
GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL
FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES;
IV.
WHETHER
PETITIONER
HAS LOCUS
STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
INFORMATION
INCLUDES
OFFICIAL
INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS
BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE
AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR
THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS,
RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED,
VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER
FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS
GROSSLY
DISADVANTAGEOUS
TO
THE
GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed
for in the petition are moot and academic
because of subsequent events.

The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the

"terms and conditions of the on-going
negotiations for a new agreement." The
petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA
from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or
executing any new agreement with AMARI."
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot
and academic because AMARI furnished
petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed
Amended JVA containing the terms and
conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations.
Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a
public disclosure of the renegotiations.
Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the
signing of the Amended JVA is now moot
because PEA and AMARI have already signed
the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999.
Moreover, the Office of the President has
approved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot
avoid the constitutional issue by simply fasttracking the signing and approval of the
Amended JVA before the Court could act on the
issue. Presidential approval does not resolve
the constitutional issue or remove it from the
ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by
PEA and AMARI and its approval by the
President cannot operate to moot the petition
and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and
AMARI have still to implement the Amended
JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the
Amended JVA on constitutional grounds
necessarily
includes
preventing
its
implementation if in the meantime PEA and
AMARI have signed one in violation of the
Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in
assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its
violation of Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the government
from alienating lands of the public domain to
private corporations. If the Amended JVA
indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of
the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if
already implemented, to annul the effects of
such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary
commercial contract but one which seeks

to transfer title and ownership to 367.5

hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged
areas of Manila Bay to a single private
corporation. It now becomes more compelling
for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the
government itself does not violate a provision
of the Constitution intended to safeguard the
national patrimony. Supervening events,
whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent
the Court from rendering a decision if there is a
grave violation of the Constitution. In the
instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter
to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent
the transfer of title and ownership of alienable
lands of the public domain in the name of
AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events
had made the cases moot, the Court did not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional
issues raised to formulate controlling principles
to guide the bench, bar, and the public.17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first
impression. All previous decisions of the Court
involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the
1973
Constitution,18 covered agricultural
landssold to private corporations which
acquired the lands from private parties. The
transferors of the private corporations claimed
or could claim the right to judicial confirmation
of their imperfect titles19 under Title II of
Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for
brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to
acquire from PEA, a public corporation,
reclaimed lands and submerged areas for nonagricultural purposes by purchase under PD
No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No.
141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the
Amended JVA constitute the consideration for
the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim
judicial confirmation of their titles because the
lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly
reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial
confirmation of imperfect title requires open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain for at
least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Besides, the deadline for filing applications for

judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired

on December 31, 1987.20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately
the constitutional issue raised in this petition
because of the possible transfer at any time by
PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions
of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended
JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the
latter's seventy percent proportionate share in
the reclaimed areas as the reclamation
progresses. The Amended JVA even allows
AMARI
to
mortgage
at
any
time
the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for
the reclamation project.21
Second issue: whether the petition merits
dismissal for failing to observe the principle
governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the
judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from
the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts
applies generally to cases involving factual
questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court
cannot entertain cases involving factual issues.
The instant case, however, raises constitutional
issues of transcendental importance to the
public.22 The Court can resolve this case without
determining any factual issue related to the
case. Also, the instant case is a petition for
mandamus which falls under the original
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise
primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits
dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial
intervention in compelling PEA to disclose
publicly certain information without first asking
PEA the needed information. PEA claims
petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates
the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. It also violates the rule that
mandamus may issue only if there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada
v. Tuvera23 where the Court granted the
petition for mandamus even if the petitioners

there did not initially demand from the Office of

the President the publication of the presidential
decrees. PEA points out that in Taada, the
Executive Department had an affirmative
statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil
Code24 and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
63825 to publish the presidential decrees. There
was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in
Taada to make an initial demand from the
Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA
claims it has no affirmative statutory duty to
disclose publicly information about its
renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that
the Court must apply the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies to the
instant case in view of the failure of petitioner
here to demand initially from PEA the needed
information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI
public lands held by PEA, a government
corporation. Under Section 79 of the
Government Auditing Code,26 the disposition of
government lands to private parties requires
public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal
duty to disclose to the public the terms and
conditions for the sale of its lands. The law
obligated PEA to make this public disclosure
even without demand from petitioner or from
anyone. PEA failed to make this public
disclosure because the original JVA, like the
Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated
contract, not of a public bidding. Considering
that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to
make the public disclosure, and was even in
breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the
right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of
this issue, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when
the issue involved is a purely legal or
constitutional question.27 The principal issue in
the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to
acquire lands held by PEA in view of the
constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of
lands of the public domain to private
corporations. We rule that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply in the instant case.

Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus

standi to bring this suit
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to
institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his
constitutional right to information without a
showing that PEA refused to perform an
affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the
Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has
not shown that he will suffer any concrete
injury because of the signing or implementation
of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual
controversy requiring the exercise of the power
of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this
taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to
compel PEA to comply with its constitutional
duties. There are two constitutional issues
involved here. First is the right of citizens to
information on matters of public concern.
Second is the application of a constitutional
provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of
the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose
publicly information on the sale of government
lands worth billions of pesos, information which
the Constitution and statutory law mandate
PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue
is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain
in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA
to comply with a constitutional duty to the
nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of
transcendental importance to the public.
In Chavez v. PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right
of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters
of transcendental importance to the public,
thus "Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of
recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses
is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the
public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have
a right to initiate and prosecute actions
questioning the validity of acts or orders of
government agencies or instrumentalities, if the
issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,'

and if they 'immediately affect the social,

economic and moral well being of the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen
satisfies the requirement of personal interest,
when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, such as in this case. He invokes
several decisions of this Court which have set
aside the procedural matter of locus standi,
when the subject of the case involved public
interest.
xxx
In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that
when the issue concerns a public right and the
object of mandamus is to obtain the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real parties in interest; and
because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen
and as such is interested in the execution of the
laws, he need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result of the action. In the
aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to
enforce their right to be informed on matters of
public concern, a right then recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in
connection with the rule that laws in order to
be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal
standing, the Court declared that the right they
sought to be enforced 'is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law
of the land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while
reiterating Taada, further declared that 'when
a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion
of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the
general 'public' which possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while
expenditure of public funds may not have been
involved under the questioned contract for the
development, management and operation of
the Manila International Container Terminal,
'public interest [was] definitely involved
considering the important role [of the subject
contract] . . . in the economic development of
the country and the magnitude of the financial

consideration involved.' We concluded that, as

a consequence, the disclosure provision in the
Constitution would constitute sufficient
authority for upholding the petitioner's
standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the
right of the people to information and access to
official records, documents and papers a
right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former
solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of
the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid
down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's
legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a
public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen,
we rule that the petition at bar should be
allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, brought
by a citizen, involves the enforcement of
constitutional rights - to information and to the
equitable diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public importance,
the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to
information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final
agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains
the people's right to information on matters of
public concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all
transactions involving public interest reinforces
the people's right to information on matters of
public concern. This State policy is expressed in
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of

all its transactions involving public interest."

(Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek
to promote transparency in policy-making and
in the operations of the government, as well as
provide the people sufficient information to
exercise effectively other constitutional rights.
These twin provisions are essential to the
exercise of freedom of expression. If the
government does not disclose its official acts,
transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever
citizens say, even if expressed without any
restraint, will be speculative and amount to
nothing. These twin provisions are also essential
to hold public officials "at all times x x x
accountable to the people,"29 for unless citizens
have the proper information, they cannot hold
public officials accountable for anything. Armed
with the right information, citizens can
participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their
effective implementation. An informed citizenry
is essential to the existence and proper
functioning of any democracy. As explained by
the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30
"An essential element of these freedoms is to
keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and
the people. It is in the interest of the State that
the channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government
may perceive and be responsive to the people's
will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective
only to the extent that the citizenry is informed
and thus able to formulate its will intelligently.
Only when the participants in the discussion are
aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear
fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in
cases of on-going negotiations the right to
information is limited to "definite propositions
of the government." PEA maintains the right
does not include access to "intra-agency or
inter-agency
recommendations
or
communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of

being formulated or are in the 'exploratory

stage'."
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot
invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or
before the closing of the transaction. To
support its contention, AMARI cites the
following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions'
which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the
Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer
to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I
suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover
both steps leading to a contract and already a
consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of
the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable
safeguards on the national interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you."32 (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a
consummated contract before petitioner can
invoke the right. Requiring government officials
to reveal their deliberations at the predecisional stage will degrade the quality of
decision-making in government agencies.
Government officials will hesitate to express
their real sentiments during deliberations if
there is immediate public dissemination of their
discussions, putting them under all kinds of
pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information
the law on public bidding requires PEA to
disclose publicly, and information the
constitutional right to information requires PEA
to release to the public. Before the
consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its
own and without demand from anyone,
disclose to the public matters relating to the
disposition of its property. These include the
size, location, technical description and nature
of the property being disposed of, the terms
and conditions of the disposition, the parties
qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar

information. PEA must prepare all these data

and disclose them to the public at the start of
the disposition process, long before the
consummation of the contract, because the
Government Auditing Code requires public
bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any
citizen can demand from PEA this information
at any time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation
or review of bids or proposals being undertaken
by the bidding or review committee is not
immediately accessible under the right to
information. While the evaluation or review is
still on-going, there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" on the bids or
proposals. However, once the committee makes
its official recommendation, there arises
a "definite proposition" on the part of the
government. From this moment, the public's
right to information attaches, and any citizen
can access all the non-proprietary information
leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez
v. PCGG,33 the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent
upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other
government representatives, to disclose
sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with
the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten
wealth. Such information, though, must pertain
to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during
the stage when common assertions are still in
the process of being formulated or are in the
"exploratory" stage. There is need, of course, to
observe the same restrictions on disclosure of
information in general, as discussed earlier
such as on matters involving national security,
diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and
other classified information." (Emphasis
supplied)
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the
commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission understood that the right to
information "contemplates
inclusion
of
negotiations leading to the consummation of

the transaction." Certainly, a consummated

contract is not a requirement for the exercise of
the right to information. Otherwise, the people
can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it
may be too late for the public to expose its
defects.1wphi1.nt
Requiring a consummated contract will keep
the public in the dark until the contract, which
may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes a fait
accompli. This negates the State policy of full
transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the Constitution
could not have intended. Such a requirement
will prevent the citizenry from participating in
the public discussion of any proposedcontract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in
the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an
emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a
retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest."
The right covers three categories of information
which are "matters of public concern," namely:
(1) official records; (2) documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions and
decisions; and (3) government research data
used in formulating policies. The first category
refers to any document that is part of the public
records in the custody of government agencies
or officials. The second category refers to
documents and papers recording, evidencing,
establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying
or explaining official acts, transactions or
decisions of government agencies or officials.
The third category refers to research data,
whether raw, collated or processed, owned by
the government and used in formulating
government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on
the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation
reports, recommendations, legal and expert
opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of
reference and other documents attached to
such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA.
However, the right to information does not
compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts,

summaries and the like relating to the

renegotiation of the JVA.34 The right only
affords access to records, documents and
papers, which means the opportunity to inspect
and copy them. One who exercises the right
must copy the records, documents and papers
at his expense. The exercise of the right is also
subject to reasonable regulations to protect the
integrity of the public records and to minimize
disruption to government operations, like rules
specifying when and how to conduct the
inspection and copying.35
The right to information, however, does not
extend to matters recognized as privileged
information under the separation of
powers.36 The right does not also apply to
information on military and diplomatic secrets,
information affecting national security, and
information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution
of the accused, which courts have long
recognized as confidential.37 The right may also
be subject to other limitations that Congress
may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information
demanded by petitioner is privileged
information rooted in the separation of powers.
The information does not cover Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and
other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of
either house of Congress,38 are recognized as
confidential. This kind of information cannot be
pried open by a co-equal branch of
government. A frank exchange of exploratory
ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is
essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to exercise
Presidential,
Legislative
and
Judicial
39
power. This is not the situation in the instant
case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right
to information includes official information
on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must
constitute definite propositions by the

government and should not cover recognized

exceptions like privileged information, military
and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public
order.40 Congress has also prescribed other
limitations on the right to information in several
legislations.41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the
Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of
lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the
Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from
foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the
Regalian doctrine which holds that the State
owns all lands and waters of the public domain.
Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all "lands, territories and
possessions" in the Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown.42The King, as the sovereign
ruler and representative of the people, acquired
and owned all lands and territories in the
Philippines except those he disposed of by grant
or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted
the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the
State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all
lands and waters of the public domain. The
Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the timehonored principle of land ownership that "all
lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain."43 Article 339 of
the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420
of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the
Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first
statutory law governing the ownership and
disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines.
On May 18, 1907, the Philippine Commission
enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of
the government to corporations and
individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the
Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 2874,
the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease,
but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the

government to corporations and individuals.

On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly
passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known
as the Public Land Act, which authorized the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of
the government to corporations and
individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this day as
the general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the
Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the
shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within
the maritime zone of the Spanish territory
belonged to the public domain for public
use.44 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866
allowed the reclamation of the sea under
Article 5, which provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in
consequence of works constructed by the State,
or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons,
with proper permission, shall become the
property of the party constructing such works,
unless otherwise provided by the terms of the
grant of authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land
reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party
undertaking the reclamation, provided the
government issued the necessary permit and
did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land
to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined
property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores,
roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which,
without being of general public use, is
employed in some public service, or in the
development of the national wealth, such as
walls, fortresses, and other works for the
defense of the territory, and mines, until
granted to private individuals."
Property devoted to public use referred to
property open for use by the public. In contrast,
property devoted to public service referred to

property used for some specific public service

and open only to those authorized to use the
property.
Property of public dominion referred not only
to property devoted to public use, but also to
property not so used but employed to develop
the national wealth. This class of property
constituted property of public dominion
although employed for some economic or
commercial activity to increase the national
wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed
the re-classification of property of public
dominion into private property, to wit:
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no
longer devoted to public use or to the defense
of the territory, shall become a part of the
private property of the State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing.
The legislature, or the executive department
pursuant to law, must declare the property no
longer needed for public use or territorial
defense before the government could lease or
alienate the property to private parties.45
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission
enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the lease
of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient
provisions of this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the
foreshore as defined in existing law, and
the title to all Government or public lands
made or reclaimed by the Government by
dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the
Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the
Government without prejudice to vested rights
and without prejudice to rights conceded to the
City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall
cause all Government or public lands made or
reclaimed by the Government by dredging or
filling or otherwise to be divided into lots or
blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways
located thereon, and shall cause plats and plans
of such surveys to be prepared and filed with
the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans
the Governor-General shall give notice to the

public that such parts of the lands so made or

reclaimed as are not needed for public
purposes will be leased for commercial and
business purposes, x x x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be
disposed of to the highest and best
bidder therefore, subject to such regulations
and safeguards as the Governor-General may by
executive order prescribe." (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government
should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the
government. The Act also vested in the
government control and disposition of
foreshore lands. Private parties could lease
lands reclaimed by the government only if these
lands were no longer needed for public
purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public
bidding in the lease of government reclaimed
lands. Act No. 1654 made government
reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other
public lands which the government could sell to
private parties, these reclaimed lands were
available only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5
of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act No.
1654 did not prohibit private parties from
reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5 of
the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed
from the sea by private parties with
government permission remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine
Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public
Land Act.46 The salient provisions of Act No.
2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time classify the lands of the public
domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and
disposition of alienable or disposable public
lands, the
Governor-General,
upon
recommendation by the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from

time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open
to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited or classified x x x.
xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain
which, being neither timber nor mineral land,
shall be classified as suitable for residential
purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other
productive purposes other than agricultural
purposes, and shall be open to disposition or
concession, shall be disposed of under the
provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title
shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by
dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water
bordering upon the shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing
classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b),
and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of
to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General,
upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
declare that the same are not necessary for the
public
service
and
are
open
to
disposition under this chapter. The lands
included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale
or lease under the provisions of this Act."
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the
Governor-General to "classify lands of the
public domain into x x x alienable or
disposable"47 lands. Section 7 of the Act
empowered the Governor-General to "declare
what lands are open to disposition or
concession." Section 8 of the Act limited
alienable or disposable lands only to those
lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."

Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands

"disposable under this title48 shall be classified"
as government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands, as well as other lands. All these
lands, however, must be suitable for residential,
commercial, industrial or other productive nonagricultural purposes. These provisions vested
upon the Governor-General the power to
classify inalienable lands of the public domain
into disposable lands of the public domain.
These provisions also empowered the
Governor-General to classify further such
disposable lands of the public domain into
government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy
lands of the public domain, as well as other
non-agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically
mandated that disposable lands of the public
domain classified as government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed
of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise." The Governor-General, before
allowing the lease of these lands to private
parties, must formally declare that the lands
were "not necessary for the public service." Act
No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease
and not to sell government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands of the public
domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act
No. 1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the
only alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain that the government could not sell to
private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious.
Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain
their inherent potential as areas for public
service. This is the reason the government
prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease,
of these lands to private parties. The State
always reserved these lands for some future
public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the
reclassification of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands into other nonagricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands
falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands

for non-agricultural purposes the government

could sell to private parties. Thus, under Act No.
2874, the government could not sell
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands to private parties, unless the legislature
passed a law allowing their sale.49
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties
from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties
with government permission remained private
lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took
effect upon its ratification by the Filipino
people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the
Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1, Article
XIII, that
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
and
their
disposition,
exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inauguration of
the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not
be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for another twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of
all natural resources except public agricultural
lands, which were the only natural resources
the State could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands,
considered part of the State's natural resources,

became inalienable by constitutional fiat,

available only for lease for 25 years, renewable
for another 25 years. The government could
alienate foreshore lands only after these lands
were reclaimed and classified as alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain.
Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the
public domain, being neither timber nor mineral
lands, fell under the classification of public
agricultural lands.50 However, government
reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject
to classification as disposable public agricultural
lands, could only be leased and not sold to
private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The prohibition on private parties from
acquiring ownership of government reclaimed
and marshy lands of the public domain was only
a statutory prohibition and the legislature could
therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935
Constitution did not prohibit individuals and
corporations from acquiring government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain that were classified as agricultural lands
under existing public land laws. Section 2,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provided as
follows:
"Section 2. No private corporation or
association may acquire, lease, or hold public
agricultural lands in excess of one thousand
and twenty four hectares, nor may any
individual acquire such lands by purchase in
excess of one hundred and forty hectares, or by
lease in excess of one thousand and twentyfour hectares, or by homestead in excess of
twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing,
not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be
leased to an individual, private corporation, or
association." (Emphasis supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, the legislature did not repeal
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 to open for sale to
private parties government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain. On the
contrary, the legislature continued the long
established State policy of retaining for the
government title and ownership of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain.

Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine

National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly
approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also
known as the Public Land Act, which compiled
the then existing laws on lands of the public
domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to
this day the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain other than timber and mineral
lands.51
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the
President to classify lands of the public domain
into "alienable or disposable"52 lands of the
public domain, which prior to such classification
are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the
President to "declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA No.
141 states that the government can declare
open for disposition or concession only lands
that are "officially delimited and classified."
Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as
follows:
"Sec.
6. The
President,
upon
the
recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to
time classify the lands of the public domain
into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer
such lands from one class to another,53 for the
purpose of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration
and disposition of alienable or disposable public
lands, the President, upon recommendation by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this
Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open
to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited and classified and, when
practicable, surveyed, and which have not been
reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor
appropriated by the Government, nor in any

manner become private property, nor those on

which a private right authorized and recognized
by this Act or any other valid law may be
claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x x."
Thus, before the government could alienate or
dispose of lands of the public domain, the
President must first officially classify these lands
as alienable or disposable, and then declare
them open to disposition or concession. There
must be no law reserving these lands for public
or quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands of the public domain, are as follows:
"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain
which, being neither timber nor mineral land,
is intended to be used for residential purposes
or for commercial, industrial, or other
productive purposes other than agricultural,
and is open to disposition or concession, shall
be disposed of under the provisions of this
chapter and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title
shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by
dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water
bordering upon the shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing
classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this
title may be leased or sold, as the case may be,
to any person, corporation, or association
authorized to purchase or lease public lands for
agricultural purposes. x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b),
and (c) of section fifty-nine shall be disposed of
to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise, as soon as the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not
necessary for the public service and are open to
disposition under this chapter. The lands
included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale

or lease under the provisions of this Act."

(Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section 58
of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain. All these
lands are intended for residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural purposes. As
before, Section 61 allowed only the lease of
such lands to private parties. The government
could sell to private parties only lands falling
under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those
lands for non-agricultural purposes not
classified as government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy disposable lands of the public
domain. Foreshore lands, however, became
inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which
only allowed the lease of these lands to
qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that
disposable lands of the public domain intended
for residential, commercial, industrial or other
productive purposes other than agricultural
"shall be disposed of under the provisions of
this chapter and not otherwise." Under Section
10 of CA No. 141, the term "disposition"
includes lease of the land. Any disposition of
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes
must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No.
141,54 unless a subsequent law amended or
repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case
of Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,55Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized
succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion
intended for public use. So too are lands
reclaimed by the government by dredging,
filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that
the control and disposition of the foreshore and
lands under water remained in the national
government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing'
of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919
and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and
lands reclaimed by the government were to be
"disposed of to private parties by lease only and

not otherwise." Before leasing, however, the

Governor-General, upon recommendation of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, had first to determine that the land
reclaimed was not necessary for the public
service. This requisite must have been met
before the land could be disposed of. But even
then, the foreshore and lands under water
were not to be alienated and sold to private
parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land
was only by lease. The land remained property
of the State." (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring
opinion, "Commonwealth Act No. 141 has
remained in effect at present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private
parties of government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy alienable lands of the public domain,
first implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed
in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took
effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore
lands, however, became a constitutional edict
under the 1935 Constitution. Foreshore lands
became inalienable as natural resources of the
State, unless reclaimed by the government and
classified as agricultural lands of the public
domain, in which case they would fall under the
classification of government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution,
government reclaimed and marshy disposable
lands of the public domain continued to be only
leased and not sold to private parties.56 These
lands remained sui generis, as the only
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain the government could not sell to
private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the
government can sell to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy disposable
lands of the public domain is for the legislature
to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141
does not authorize the President to reclassify
government reclaimed and marshy lands into
other non-agricultural lands under Section 59
(d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the
only alienable or disposable lands for nonagricultural purposes that the government
could sell to private parties.

Moreover,
Section
60
of
CA
No.
141 expressly requires congressional authority
before lands under Section 59 that the
government
previously
transferred
to
government units or entities could be sold to
private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141
declares that
"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be
such as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be
reasonably necessary for the purposes for
which such sale or lease is requested, and shall
not exceed one hundred and forty-four
hectares: Provided, however, That this
limitation shall not apply to grants, donations,
or transfers made to a province, municipality or
branch or subdivision of the Government for
the purposes deemed by said entities conducive
to the public interest;but the land so granted,
donated, or transferred to a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision of the
Government shall not be alienated,
encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a
manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress: x x x." (Emphasis
supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section
60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative
authority required in Section 56 of Act No.
2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is
that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted
government units and entities from the
maximum area of public lands that could be
acquired from the State. These government
units and entities should not just turn around
and sell these lands to private parties in
violation of constitutional or statutory
limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of lands for
non-agricultural purposes to government units
and entities could be used to circumvent
constitutional limitations on ownership of
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. In the same manner, such transfers
could also be used to evade the statutory
prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the
public domain to private parties. Section 60 of

CA No. 141 constitutes by operation of law a

lien on these lands.57
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of
the public domain falling under Section 59 of CA
No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public
bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141
provide as follows:
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands
covered by this chapter are not needed for
public purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
(now the Secretary of Natural Resources) for
authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt
of such authority, the Director of Lands shall
give notice by public advertisement in the same
manner as in the case of leases or sales of
agricultural public land, x x x.
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral
bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the
highest bidder. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to
put to public auction all leases or sales of
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain.58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA
No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still
reclaim portions of the sea with government
permission. However, thereclaimed land could
become private land only if classified as
alienable agricultural land of the public
domain open to disposition under CA No. 141.
The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation
of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially
the definition of property of public dominion
found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and
422 of the Civil Code of 1950 state that
"Art. 420. The following things are property of
public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for some

public service or for the development of the

national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare
that the property of public dominion is no
longer needed for public use or public service,
before the same could be classified as
patrimonial property of the State.59 In the case
of government reclaimed and marshy lands of
the public domain, the declaration of their
being disposable, as well as the manner of their
disposition, is governed by the applicable
provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of
1950 included as property of public dominion
those properties of the State which, without
being for public use, are intended for public
service or the "development of the national
wealth." Thus, government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the State, even if not employed
for public use or public service, if developed to
enhance the national wealth, are classified as
property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on
January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the Regalian
doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution stated that
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
wildlife, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State. With the
exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain, natural resources
shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration,
development, exploitation, or utilization of any
of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, except as
to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the

development of water power, in which cases,

beneficial use may be the measure and the limit
of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation
of all natural resources with the exception of
"agricultural,
industrial
or
commercial,
residential, and resettlement lands of the public
domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution
barred the alienation of all natural resources
except "public agricultural lands." However, the
term "public agricultural lands" in the 1935
Constitution
encompassed
industrial,
commercial, residential and resettlement lands
of the public domain.60 If the land of public
domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it
would fall under the classification of agricultural
land of the public domain. Both the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, therefore, prohibited the
alienation of all natural resources except
agricultural lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the
alienation of lands of the public domain to
individuals who were citizens of the Philippines.
Private corporations, even if wholly owned by
Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to
acquire alienable lands of the public domain
unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared
that
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into
account
conservation,
ecological,
and
development requirements of the natural
resources, shall determine by law the size of
land of the public domain which may be
developed, held or acquired by, or leased to,
any qualified individual, corporation, or
association, and the conditions therefor. No
private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area nor may any citizen hold such lands by
lease in excess of five hundred hectares or
acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in
excess of twenty-four hectares. No private
corporation or association may hold by lease,
concession, license or permit, timber or forest
lands and other timber or forest resources in
excess of one hundred thousand hectares.

However, such area may be increased by the

Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of
the National Economic and Development
Authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private
corporations could hold alienable lands of the
public domain only through lease. Only
individuals could now acquire alienable lands of
the public domain, and private corporations
became absolutely barred from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of
alienable lands of the public domain, while the
statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates
Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA, a wholly government owned and
controlled corporation with a special charter.
Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with
the following purposes and powers:
"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby
created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and
submerged areas, by dredging, filling or other
means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer,
deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any
and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and
other forms of real property, owned, managed,
controlled and/or operated by the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such
service as may be necessary for the efficient,
economical and beneficial utilization of the
above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority.
The Authority shall, in carrying out the purposes
for which it is created, have the following
powers and functions:
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess
of the area permitted to private corporations by
statute.

(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work

across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse,
canal, ditch, flume x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such
functions as may be necessary for the
attainment of the purposes and objectives
herein specified." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both
foreshore and submerged areas of the public
domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and
uncovered by the ebb and flow of the
tide.61 Submerged areas are those permanently
under water regardless of the ebb and flow of
the tide.62 Foreshore and submerged areas
indisputably belong to the public domain63 and
are inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as
alienable lands open to disposition, and further
declared no longer needed for public service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of
the public domain did not apply to PEA since it
was then, and until today, a fully owned
government corporation. The constitutional ban
applied then, as it still applies now, only to
"private corporations and associations." PD No.
1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold lands of
the public domain" even "in excess of the area
permitted to private corporations by
statute." Thus, PEA can hold title to private
lands, as well as title to lands of the public
domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore
and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain, there must be legislative authority
empowering PEA to sell these lands. This
legislative authority is necessary in view of
Section 60 of CA No.141, which states
"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated
or transferred to a province, municipality, or
branch or subdivision of the Government shall
not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise
disposed of in a manner affecting its
title, except when authorized by Congress; x x
x." (Emphasis supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could
not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore
and submerged alienable lands of the public

domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority

granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain would be subject to
the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain. Hence, such legislative authority could
only benefit private individuals.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions before it, has adopted the
Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution
declares that all natural resources are "owned
by the State," and except for alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain, natural
resources cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. x x
x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are
classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural
lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses which
they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens
of the Philippines may lease not more than five
hundred hectares, or acquire not more than
twelve hectares thereof by purchase,
homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of
conservation, ecology, and development, and
subject to the requirements of agrarian reform,
the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of

lands of the public domain which may be

acquired, developed, held, or leased and the
conditions therefor." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State
policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private
corporations fromacquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Like the
1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows
private corporations to hold alienable lands of
the public domain only through lease. As in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law
governing the lease to private corporations of
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable
lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on
corporations from acquiring, except through
lease, alienable lands of the public domain is
not well understood. During the deliberations
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
commissioners probed the rationale behind this
ban, thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions
have reference to page 3, line 5 which says:
`No private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under
the 1935 Constitution, but this was introduced
in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits
private corporations from acquiring alienable
public lands. But it has not been very clear in
jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In
some of the cases decided in 1982 and 1983, it
was indicated that the purpose of this is to
prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of
this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the
provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the
Iglesia ni Cristo, there were instances where the
Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a
mere 313-square meter land where a chapel
stood because the Supreme Court said it would
be in violation of this." (Emphasis supplied)

In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the

rationale behind this constitutional ban in this
way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional
prohibition against purchases of public
agricultural lands by private corporations is to
equitably diffuse land ownership or to
encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the
economic family-size farm' and to prevent a
recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge
landholdings by corporations or private persons
had spawned social unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to
prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution
could have simply limited the size of alienable
lands of the public domain that corporations
could acquire. The Constitution could have
followed the limitations on individuals, who
could acquire not more than 24 hectares of
alienable lands of the public domain under the
1973 Constitution, and not more than 12
hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage
economic family-size farms, placing the land in
the name of a corporation would be more
effective in preventing the break-up of
farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the
name of a corporation, upon the death of the
owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the
corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the
farmland. This would prevent the continuing
break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller
plots from one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban
strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the
allowed area of alienable lands of the public
domain. Without the constitutional ban,
individuals who already acquired the maximum
area of alienable lands of the public domain
could easily set up corporations to acquire more
alienable public lands. An individual could own
as many corporations as his means would allow
him. An individual could even hide his
ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as stockholders of the corporation.
The corporation is a convenient vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional limitation on

acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of

the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of
only a limited area of alienable land of the
public domain to a qualified individual. This
constitutional intent is safeguarded by the
provision prohibiting corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain,
since the vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional intent is removed. The available
alienable public lands are gradually decreasing
in the face of an ever-growing population. The
most effective way to insure faithful adherence
to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell
alienable lands of the public domain only to
individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical
benefit arising from the constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as
stated in its second Whereas clause, consists of
three properties, namely:
1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially
eroded islands along Emilio Aguinaldo
Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro
Manila, with a combined titled area of
1,578,441 square meters;"
2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters
contiguous to the three islands;" and
3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an
additional 350 hectares more or less to
regularize the configuration of the reclaimed
area."65
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves
"the development of the Freedom Islands and
further reclamation of about 250 hectares x x
x," plus an option "granted to AMARI to
subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x
x."66
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation
area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of
the 750-hectare reclamation project have been
reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares
are still submerged areas forming part of
Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse
PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's
"actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom

Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own

expense, the reclamation of the Freedom
Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the
reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling
592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI
and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70
percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total
net usable area which is defined in the
Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less
30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title
to AMARI's share in the net usable area, totaling
367.5 hectares, will be issued in the name of
AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA
provides that
"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute
without delay the necessary deed of transfer or
conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARI's
Land share based on the Land Allocation
Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by
AMARI, shall then cause the issuance and
delivery of the proper certificates of title
covering AMARI's Land Share in the name of
AMARI, x x x; provided, that if more than
seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any
given time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver
to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the
titles pertaining to AMARI, until such time when
a corresponding proportionate area of
additional land pertaining to PEA has been
titled." (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI
will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5
hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled
in its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated
to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint venture
PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges
to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas in
Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA
states that
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its
rights and privileges to perform Rawland
Reclamation and Horizontal Development as
well as own the Reclamation Area, thereby
granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive
right, authority and privilege to undertake the
Project in accordance with the Master
Development Plan."

The Amended JVA is the product of a

renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25,
1995 and its supplemental agreement dated
August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private
corporation, can acquire and own under the
Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed
foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay
in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, x x x."(Emphasis
supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and
Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from
foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay are
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. In its Memorandum,67 PEA admits that

"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as

amended), reclaimed lands are classified as
alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title
shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by
dredging, filling, or other means;
x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted
under Presidential Administrative Order No.
365
admitted
in
its
Report
and
Recommendation to then President Fidel V.
Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are classified as
alienable and disposable lands of the public

domain."69 The Legal Task Force concluded that

"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain.
However, by statutory authority, the rights of
ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands
have been transferred to PEA, by virtue of
which PEA, as owner, may validly convey the
same to any qualified person without violating
the Constitution or any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private
corporations from holding public land, except
by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,70 1987 Constitution),
does not apply to reclaimed lands whose
ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory
grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, the foreshore and submerged
areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the
public domain, waters x x x and other natural
resources" and consequently "owned by the
State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas
"shall not be alienated," unless they are
classified as "agricultural lands" of the public
domain. The mere reclamation of these areas
by PEA does not convert these inalienable
natural resources of the State into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. There
must be a law or presidential proclamation
officially classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable and open to disposition
or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands
cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if
the law has reserved them for some public or
quasi-public use.71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only
those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited and classified."72 The
President has the authority to classify
inalienable lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In
Laurel vs. Garcia,73 the Executive Department
attempted to sell the Roppongi property in
Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the
Philippine Government for use as the Chancery
of the Philippine Embassy. Although the

Chancery had transferred to another location

thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that,
under Article 42274of the Civil Code, a property
of public dominion retains such character until
formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled
that
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been
used for a long time for actual Embassy service
does not automatically convert it to patrimonial
property. Any such conversion happens only if
the property is withdrawn from public use
(Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66
SCRA 481 [1975]. A property continues to be
part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership 'until there
is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being
such'(Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335
[1960]." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977,
authorized the issuance of special land patents
for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore
or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On January
19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of
PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising the
partially
reclaimed
Freedom
Islands.
Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of
Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued
TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of
PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529
authorizing the issuance of certificates of title
corresponding to land patents. To this day,
these certificates of title are still in the name of
PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President
Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to
an official proclamation classifying the Freedom
Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. PD No. 1085 and President
Aquino's issuance of a land patent also
constitute a declaration that the Freedom
Islands are no longer needed for public
service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, open
to disposition or concession to qualified
parties.

At the time then President Aquino issued

Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already
reclaimed the Freedom Islands although
subsequently there were partial erosions on
some areas. The government had also
completed the necessary surveys on these
islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no
longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land
mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution classifies lands of the public
domain into "agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks." Being
neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands,
the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall
under the classification of agricultural lands of
the public domain. Under the 1987
Constitution, agricultural lands of the public
domain are the only natural resources that the
State may alienate to qualified private parties.
All other natural resources, such as the seas or
bays, are "waters x x x owned by the State"
forming part of the public domain, and are
inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are
private lands because CDCP, then a private
corporation, reclaimed the islands under a
contract dated November 20, 1973 with the
Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866,
argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands
may be given to the party constructing the
works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed
lands are lands of the public domain which the
State may not alienate."75 Article 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in
consequence of works constructed by the State,
or by the provinces, pueblos or private
persons, with proper permission, shall become
the property of the party constructing such
works, unless otherwise provided by the terms
of the grant of authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, private parties could reclaim from the sea
only with "proper permission" from the State.
Private parties could own the reclaimed land
only if not "otherwise provided by the terms of

the grant of authority." This clearly meant that

no one could reclaim from the sea without
permission from the State because the sea is
property of public dominion. It also meant that
the State could grant or withhold ownership of
the reclaimed land because any reclaimed land,
like the sea from which it emerged, belonged to
the State. Thus, a private person reclaiming
from the sea without permission from the State
could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed
land which would remain property of public
dominion like the sea it replaced.76 Article 5 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the
time-honored principle of land ownership that
"all lands that were not acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain."77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be
read together with laws subsequently enacted
on the disposition of public lands. In particular,
CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public
domain must first be classified as alienable or
disposable before the government can alienate
them. These lands must not be reserved for
public or quasi-public purposes.78 Moreover,
the contract between CDCP and the
government was executed after the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution which barred private
corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. This
contract could not have converted the Freedom
Islands into private lands of a private
corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January
11, 1973, revoked all laws authorizing the
reclamation of areas under water and revested
solely in the National Government the power to
reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared
that
"The provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas
under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall
be limited to the National Government or any
person authorized by it under a proper
contract. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x."
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of

areas under water could now be undertaken

only by the National Government or by a person
contracted by the National Government. Private
parties may reclaim from the sea only under a
contract with the National Government, and no
longer by grant or permission as provided in
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14,
1979, designated PEA as the National
Government's implementing arm to undertake
"all reclamation projects of the government,"
which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or
through a proper contract executed by it with
any person or entity." Under such contract, a
private party receives compensation for
reclamation services rendered to PEA. Payment
to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind
consisting of portions of the reclaimed land,
subject to the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of
the public domain. The reclaimed land can be
used as payment in kind only if the reclaimed
land is first classified as alienable or disposable
land open to disposition, and then declared no
longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom
Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares
which are still submerged and forming part of
Manila Bay. There is no legislative or
Presidential act classifying these submerged
areas as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain open to disposition. These
submerged areas are not covered by any patent
or certificate of title. There can be no dispute
that these submerged areas form part of the
public domain, and in their present state
are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these
submerged areas are, under the Constitution,
"waters x x x owned by the State," forming part
of the public domain and consequently
inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from
the sea can these submerged areas be classified
as public agricultural lands, which under the
Constitution are the only natural resources that
the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and
transformed into public agricultural lands, the
government may then officially classify these

lands as alienable or disposable lands open to

disposition. Thereafter, the government may
declare these lands no longer needed for public
service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be
considered alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain and within the commerce of
man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore
and submerged lands into alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition is
necessary because PEA is tasked under its
charter to undertake public services that
require the use of lands of the public domain.
Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions
of PEA include the following: "[T]o own or
operate railroads, tramways and other kinds of
land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct,
maintain and operate such systems of sanitary
sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct,
maintain and operate such storm drains as may
be necessary." PEA is empowered to issue
"rules and regulations as may be necessary for
the proper use by private parties of any or all of
the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or
any of its properties and to impose or collect
fees or tolls for their use." Thus, part of the
reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held
by the PEA would actually be needed for public
use or service since many of the functions
imposed on PEA by its charter constitute
essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525
provides that PEA "shall be primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on
behalf of the National Government." The same
section also states that "[A]ll reclamation
projects shall be approved by the President
upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be
undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or
entity; x x x." Thus, under EO No. 525, in
relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA
became the primary implementing agency of
the National Government to reclaim foreshore
and submerged lands of the public domain. EO
No. 525 recognized PEA as the government
entity "to undertake the reclamation of lands

and ensure their maximum utilization

in promoting
public
welfare
and
79
interests." Since large portions of these
reclaimed lands would obviously be needed for
public service, there must be a formal
declaration segregating reclaimed lands no
longer needed for public service from those still
needed for public service.1wphi1.nt
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all
lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be
owned by the PEA," could not automatically
operate to classify inalienable lands into
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and
submerged lands of the public domain would
automatically become alienable once reclaimed
by PEA, whether or not classified as alienable or
disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a
later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No.
525, vests in the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) the
following powers and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department
shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest
lands, alienable and disposable public lands,
mineral resources and, in the process of
exercising such control, impose appropriate
taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form
of levy and collect such revenues for the
exploration, development, utilization or
gathering of such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and
guidelines on the issuance of licenses, permits,
concessions, lease agreements and such other
privileges concerning the development,
exploration and utilization of the country's
marine, freshwater, and brackish water and
over all aquatic resources of the country and
shall continue to oversee, supervise and police
our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel
such privileges upon failure, non-compliance or
violations of any regulation, order, and for all
other causes which are in furtherance of the

conservation of natural resources and

supportive of the national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the
management and disposition of all lands of the
public domain and serve as the sole agency
responsible for classification, sub-classification,
surveying and titling of lands in consultation
with
appropriate
agencies."80 (Emphasis
supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the
natural resources of the State, DENR exercises
"supervision and control over alienable and
disposable public lands." DENR also exercises
"exclusive jurisdiction on the management and
disposition of all lands of the public domain."
Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water,
like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila
Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means
that PEA needs authorization from DENR before
PEA can undertake reclamation projects in
Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over
the disposition of all lands of the public domain.
Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands
of PEA should be classified as alienable under
Sections 681 and 782 of CA No. 141. Once DENR
decides that the reclaimed lands should be so
classified, it then recommends to the President
the issuance of a proclamation classifying the
lands as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain open to disposition. We note
that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in
compliance with the Revised Administrative
Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to
authorize the reclamation of areas under water,
while PEA is vested with the power to
undertake the physical reclamation of areas
under water, whether directly or through
private contractors. DENR is also empowered to
classify lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable lands subject to the
approval of the President. On the other hand,
PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by
PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not

make the reclaimed lands alienable or

disposable lands of the public domain, much
less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the
mere transfer by the National Government of
lands of the public domain to PEA does not
make the lands alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, much less patrimonial lands
of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that
these lands are alienable or disposable and
open to disposition and a declaration that these
lands are not needed for public service, lands
reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of
the public domain. Only such an official
classification and formal declaration can
convert reclaimed lands into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to
disposition under the Constitution, Title I and
Title III83of CA No. 141 and other applicable
laws.84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed
of in accordance with CA No. 141, the Public
Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141,
admits that reclaimed lands transferred to a
branch or subdivision of the government "shall
not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise
disposed of in a manner affecting its
title, except when authorized by Congress: x x
x."85 (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
which states that
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real
Property. Whenever real property of the
Government is authorized by law to be
conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be
executed in behalf of the government by the
following: x x x."
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed
to convey any real property belonging to the
Government. The Court declared that "It is not for the President to convey real
property of the government on his or her own
sole will. Any such conveyance must be
authorized and approved by a law enacted by

the Congress. It requires executive and

legislative concurrence." (Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525
constitute the legislative authority allowing PEA
to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued
on February 4, 1977, provides that
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and
offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the
contract for the reclamation and construction
of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project
between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Construction and Development Corporation of
the Philippines dated November 20, 1973
and/or any other contract or reclamation
covering the same area is hereby transferred,
conveyed and assigned to the ownership and
administration of the Public Estates
Authority established pursuant to PD No. 1084;
Provided, however, That the rights and interests
of the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the
aforesaid contract shall be recognized and
respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall
exercise the rights and assume the obligations
of the Republic of the Philippines (Department
of Public Highways) arising from, or incident to,
the aforesaid contract between the Republic of
the Philippines and the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and
assignment, the Public Estates Authority shall
issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines
the corresponding shares of stock in said entity
with an issued value of said shares of stock
(which) shall be deemed fully paid and nonassessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the
General Manager of the Public Estates Authority
shall execute such contracts or agreements,
including appropriate agreements with the
Construction and Development Corporation of
the Philippines, as may be necessary to
implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by
the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of
the Public Estates Authority without prejudice
to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or

his assignees of such portion or portions of the

land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided
for in the above-mentioned contract. On the
basis of such patents, the Land Registration
Commission shall issue the corresponding
certificate of title." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525,
issued on February 14, 1979, provides that "Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong
to or be owned by the PEA which shall be
responsible for its administration, development,
utilization or disposition in accordance with the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any
and all income that the PEA may derive from
the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be
used in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084."
There is no express authority under either PD
No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its
reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely
transferred "ownership and administration" of
lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while
EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by
PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO
No. 525 expressly states that PEA should
dispose of its reclaimed lands "in accordance
with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1084," the charter of PEA.
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to
develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in,
subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands x x x owned, managed, controlled
and/or
operated
by
the
government."87 (Emphasis supplied) There is,
therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA
to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may
sell to private parties itspatrimonial
properties in accordance with the PEA charter
free from constitutional limitations. The
constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain
does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial
lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain to private
individuals since, with the legislative authority,
there is no longer any statutory prohibition

against such sales and the constitutional ban

does not apply to individuals. PEA, however,
cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain to private
corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such
sales. The legislative authority benefits only
individuals. Private corporations remain barred
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain, including government reclaimed
lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that
portions of the reclaimed lands could be
transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his
assignees" (Emphasis supplied) would not apply
to private corporations but only to individuals
because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise,
the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate
both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of
reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are
classified as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition, and further declared no longer
needed for public service, PEA would have to
conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing
these lands. PEA must observe the provisions of
Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring
public auction, in the absence of a law
exempting PEA from holding a public
auction.88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly
states that the patent is issued by authority of
the Constitution and PD No. 1084,
"supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended." This is an acknowledgment that
the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the
disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain unless otherwise provided by
law. Executive Order No. 654,89 which
authorizes PEA "to determine the kind and
manner of payment for the transfer" of its
assets and properties, does not exempt PEA
from the requirement of public auction. EO No.
654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode
of payment, whether in kind and in installment,
but does not authorize PEA to dispense with
public auction.

Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445,

otherwise known as the Government Auditing
Code, the government is required to sell
valuable government property through public
bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates
that
"Section 79. When government property has
become unserviceable for any cause, or is no
longer needed, it shall, upon application of the
officer accountable therefor, be inspected by
the head of the agency or his duly authorized
representative in the presence of the auditor
concerned and, if found to be valueless or
unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their
presence. If found to be valuable, it may be
sold at public auction to the highest
bidder under the supervision of the proper
committee on award or similar body in the
presence of the auditor concerned or other
authorized
representative
of
the
Commission, after advertising by printed notice
in the Official Gazette, or for not less than
three consecutive days in any newspaper of
general circulation, or where the value of the
property does not warrant the expense of
publication, by notices posted for a like period
in at least three public places in the locality
where the property is to be sold. In the event
that the public auction fails, the property may
be sold at a private sale at such price as may
be fixed by the same committee or body
concerned and approved by the Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a
negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the
Commission on Audit must approve the selling
price.90 The Commission on Audit implements
Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code
through Circular No. 89-29691 dated January 27,
1989. This circular emphasizes that government
assets must be disposed of only through public
auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted
to only in case of "failure of public auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine
citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed
foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the
public domain. Private corporations are barred
from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.

PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the

Freedom Islands on December 10, 1991. PEA
imposed a condition that the winning bidder
should reclaim another 250 hectares of
submerged areas to regularize the shape of the
Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the
additional reclaimed areas in favor of the
winning bidder.92 No one, however, submitted a
bid. On December 23, 1994, the Government
Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the
Freedom Islands through negotiation, without
need of another public bidding, because of the
failure of the public bidding on December 10,
1991.93
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995
covered not only the Freedom Islands and the
additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it
also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim
another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a
negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation
area to 750 hectares.94 The failure of public
bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only
407.84 hectares,95 is not a valid justification for
a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost
double the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the
failure of public bidding happened on
December 10, 1991, more than three years
before the signing of the original JVA on April
25, 1995. The economic situation in the country
had greatly improved during the intervening
period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local
Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is absolute
and clear: "Private corporations or associations
may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, x x x." Even Republic
Act No. 6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by
PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell
reclaimed lands to private parties, recognizes
the constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957
states
"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing,
construction, operation and maintenance of any
infrastructure projects undertaken through the
build-operate-and-transfer arrangement or any
of its variations pursuant to the provisions of

this Act, the project proponent x x x may

likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the
revenue of the project or other non-monetary
payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant
of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed
land, subject to the constitutional requirements
with respect to the ownership of the land: x x
x." (Emphasis supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes
the physical reclamation of a government BOT
project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain in view of the
constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also
mentioned by PEA and AMARI, authorizes local
governments in land reclamation projects to
pay the contractor or developer in kind
consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed
land, to wit:
"Section
302.
Financing,
Construction,
Maintenance, Operation, and Management of
Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. x x
x
xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of
industrial estates, the repayment plan may
consist of the grant of a portion or percentage
of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate
constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government
Code does not contain a proviso similar to that
of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions
on land ownership automatically apply even
though not expressly mentioned in the Local
Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local
Government Code, the contractor or developer,
if a corporate entity, can only be paid with
leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If
the contractor or developer is an individual,
portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding
12 hectares96 of non-agricultural lands, may be
conveyed to him in ownership in view of the
legislative authority allowing such conveyance.
This is the only way these provisions of the BOT
Law and the Local Government Code can avoid
a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.

Registration of lands of the public domain

Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying
the ownership of the reclaimed lands to public
respondent PEA transformed such lands of the
public domain to private lands." This theory is
echoed by AMARI which maintains that the
"issuance of the special patent leading to the
eventual issuance of title takes the subject land
away from the land of public domain and
converts the property into patrimonial or
private property." In short, PEA and AMARI
contend that with the issuance of Special Patent
No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of
titles, the 157.84 hectares comprising the
Freedom Islands have become private lands of
PEA. In support of their theory, PEA and AMARI
cite the following rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where
the Court held
"Once the patent was granted and the
corresponding certificate of title was issued, the
land ceased to be part of the public domain and
became private property over which the
Director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction."
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court
declared "After the registration and issuance of the
certificate and duplicate certificate of title
based on a public land patent, the land covered
thereby automatically comes under the
operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the
safeguards provided therein."3. Heirs of
Gregorio
Tengco
v.
Heirs
of
Jose
Aliwalas,99 where the Court ruled "While the Director of Lands has the power to
review homestead patents, he may do so only
so long as the land remains part of the public
domain and continues to be under his exclusive
control; but once the patent is registered and a
certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to
be part of the public domain and becomes
private property over which the Director of
Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
4. Manalo
v.
Intermediate
Appellate
Court,100 where the Court held
"When the lots in dispute were certified as
disposable on May 19, 1971, and free patents

were issued covering the same in favor of the

private respondents, the said lots ceased to be
part of the public domain and, therefore, the
Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over the
same."
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the
Court stated
"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956,
of President Magsaysay legally effected a land
grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau
of Medical Services, Department of Health, of
the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial
registration under the Land Registration Act.
Such land grant is constitutive of a 'fee simple'
title or absolute title in favor of petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of
the Act, which governs the registration of grants
or patents involving public lands, provides that
'Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands
belonging to the Government of the United
States or to the Government of the Philippines
are alienated, granted or conveyed to persons
or to public or private corporations, the same
shall be brought forthwith under the operation
of this Act (Land Registration Act, Act 496) and
shall become registered lands.'"
The first four cases cited involve petitions to
cancel the land patents and the corresponding
certificates of titlesissued to private parties.
These four cases uniformly hold that the
Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over
private lands or that upon issuance of the
certificate of title the land automatically comes
under the Torrens System. The fifth case cited
involves the registration under the Torrens
System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by
the National Government to Mindanao Medical
Center, a government unit under the
Department of Health. The National
Government transferred the 12.8-hectare
public land to serve as the site for the hospital
buildings and other facilities of Mindanao
Medical Center, which performed a public
service. The Court affirmed the registration of
the 12.8-hectare public land in the name of
Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of
Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example of a
public land being registered under Act No. 496

without the land losing its character as a

property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and
certificates of title issued are those in the name
of PEA, a wholly government owned
corporation performing public as well as
proprietary functions. No patent or certificate
of title has been issued to any private party. No
one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel
PEA's patent or certificates of title. In fact, the
thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's
certificates of title should remain with PEA, and
the land covered by these certificates, being
alienable lands of the public domain, should not
be sold to a private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD
No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private
or public ownership of the land. Registration is
not a mode of acquiring ownership but is
merely evidence of ownership previously
conferred by any of the recognized modes of
acquiring ownership. Registration does not give
the registrant a better right than what the
registrant had prior to the registration.102 The
registration of lands of the public domain under
the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert
public lands into private lands.103
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of
the patent or issuance of the certificate of title
the alienable land of the public domain
automatically becomes private land cannot
apply to government units and entities like PEA.
The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was
made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as
expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517
issued by then President Aquino, to wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority
of the Constitution of the Philippines and in
conformity with the provisions of Presidential
Decree
No.
1084,
supplemented
by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
there are hereby granted and conveyed unto
the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts
of land containing a total area of one million
nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred
ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the
technical description of which are hereto

attached and made an integral part hereof."

(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the
Freedom Islands on matters not covered by PD
No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits,
"except when authorized by Congress," the sale
of alienable lands of the public domain that are
transferred to government units or entities.
Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under
Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien
affecting title" of the registered land even if not
annotated on the certificate of title.104 Alienable
lands of the public domain held by government
entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain
public lands because they cannot be alienated
or encumbered unless Congress passes a law
authorizing
their disposition. Congress,
however, cannot authorize the sale to private
corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain because of the constitutional
ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public
lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No.
141 does not automatically convert alienable
lands of the public domain into private or
patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the
public domain must be transferred to qualified
private parties, or to government entities not
tasked to dispose of public lands, before these
lands can become private or patrimonial lands.
Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become
illusory if Congress can declare lands of the
public domain as private or patrimonial lands in
the hands of a government agency tasked to
dispose of public lands. This will allow private
corporations to acquire directly from
government agencies limitless areas of lands
which, prior to such law, are concededly public
lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central
implementing
agency of
the
National
Government to reclaim foreshore and
submerged areas of the public domain. Thus,
EO No. 525 declares that
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the
Agency
Primarily
Responsible
for all
Reclamation Projects

Whereas, there are several reclamation projects

which are ongoing or being proposed to be
undertaken in various parts of the country
which need to be evaluated for consistency
with national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further
institutional support to the Government's
declared policy to provide for a coordinated,
economical and efficient reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires
that all reclamation of areas shall be limited to
the National Government or any person
authorized by it under proper contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act
on behalf of the National Government which
shall ensure a coordinated and integrated
approach in the reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates
the Public Estates Authority as a government
corporation to undertake reclamation of lands
and ensure their maximum utilization in
promoting public welfare and interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416
provides the President with continuing
authority
to reorganize
the
national
government including the transfer, abolition, or
merger of functions and offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution and
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, do
hereby order and direct the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA)
shall be primarily responsible for integrating,
directing, and coordinating all reclamation
projects for and on behalf of the National
Government. All reclamation projects shall be
approved
by
the
President
upon
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be
undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or
entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects of
any national government agency or entity
authorized under its charter shall be
undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon
approval of the President.
x x x ."

As the central implementing agency tasked to

undertake reclamation projects nationwide,
with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took
the place of DENR as the government agency
charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands
of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being
leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in
the same manner that DENR, when it disposes
of other alienable lands, does not dispose of
private lands but alienable lands of the public
domain. Only when qualified private parties
acquire these lands will the lands become
private lands. In the hands of the government
agency tasked and authorized to dispose of
alienable of disposable lands of the public
domain, these lands are still public, not private
lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that
PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as
well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can
hold both lands of the public domain and
private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable
lands of the public domain like the Freedom
Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land
patents or certificates of title in PEA's name
does not automatically make such lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the
public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of
the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as
PEA has now done under the Amended JVA,
and transfer several hundreds of hectares of
these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands
to a single private corporation in only one
transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify
the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which was intended to
diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable
lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now
numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain
since PEA can "acquire x x x any and all kinds of
lands." This will open the floodgates to
corporations and even individuals acquiring
hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the

public domain under the guise that in the hands

of PEA these lands are private lands. This will
result in corporations amassing huge
landholdings never before seen in this country creating the very evil that the constitutional ban
was designed to prevent. This will completely
reverse the clear direction of constitutional
development in this country. The 1935
Constitution allowed private corporations to
acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of public
lands.105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited
private corporations from acquiring any kind of
public land, and the 1987 Constitution has
unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public
lands, once registered under Act No. 496 or PD
No. 1529, automatically become private lands is
contrary to existing laws. Several laws authorize
lands of the public domain to be registered
under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now
PD No. 1529, without losing their character as
public lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496, and
Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively,
provide as follows:
Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the
Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x
Government of the Philippine Islands are
alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or
the public or private corporations, the same
shall be brought forthwith under the operation
of this Act and shall become registered lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents.
Whenever public land is by the Government
alienated, granted or conveyed to any person,
the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Decree." (Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase
"conveyed to any person" in Section 103 of PD
No. 1529 includes conveyances of public lands
to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted,
donated, or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the
Government," as provided in Section 60 of CA
No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens
System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529.

Such registration, however, is expressly subject

to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141
that the land "shall not be alienated,
encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a
manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress." This provision refers
to government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands of the public domain that have
been titled but still cannot be alienated or
encumbered unless expressly authorized by
Congress. The need for legislative authority
prevents the registered land of the public
domain from becoming private land that can be
disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also
recognizes that lands of the public domain may
be registered under the Torrens System. Section
48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real
Property. Whenever real property of the
Government is authorized by law to be
conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be
executed in behalf of the government by the
following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines, but titled in the name of any
political subdivision or of any corporate agency
or instrumentality, by the executive head of the
agency or instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the
National Government for expansion of a public
wharf may be titled in the name of a
government corporation regulating port
operations in the country. Private property
purchased by the National Government for
expansion of an airport may also be titled in the
name of the government agency tasked to
administer the airport. Private property
donated to a municipality for use as a town
plaza or public school site may likewise be titled
in the name of the municipality.106 All these
properties become properties of the public
domain, and if already registered under Act No.
496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land.
There is no requirement or provision in any
existing law for the de-registration of land from
the Torrens System.

Private lands taken by the Government for

public use under its power of eminent domain
become unquestionably part of the public
domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No.
1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue
in the name of the National Government new
certificates of title covering such expropriated
lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states
"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain.
Whenever any registered land, or interest
therein, is expropriated or taken by eminent
domain, the National Government, province,
city or municipality, or any other agency or
instrumentality exercising such right shall file
for registration in the proper Registry a certified
copy of the judgment which shall state
definitely by an adequate description, the
particular property or interest expropriated, the
number of the certificate of title, and the nature
of the public use. A memorandum of the right
or interest taken shall be made on each
certificate of title by the Register of Deeds, and
where the fee simple is taken, a new certificate
shall be issued in favor of the National
Government, province, city, municipality, or
any other agency or instrumentality exercising
such right for the land so taken. The legal
expenses incident to the memorandum of
registration or issuance of a new certificate of
title shall be for the account of the authority
taking the land or interest therein." (Emphasis
supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No.
496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private
or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public
domain may also be registered pursuant to
existing laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended
JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the Freedom
Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from
submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words of
AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a
joint venture with a stipulation for
reimbursement of the original cost incurred by
PEA for the earlier reclamation and construction
works performed by the CDCP under its 1973
contract with the Republic." Whether the
Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the

fact remains that the Amended JVA requires

PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of the
certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land
Share in the name of AMARI."107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that private corporations "shall not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease." The transfer of title and
ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI
will "hold" the reclaimed lands other than by
lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a
"disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a
transaction considered a sale or alienation
under CA No. 141,108 the Government Auditing
Code,109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our
legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas
form part of the public domain and are
inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore
and submerged areas also form part of the
public domain and are also inalienable, unless
converted pursuant to law into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain.
Historically, lands reclaimed by the government
are sui generis, not available for sale to private
parties unlike other alienable public lands.
Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential
as areas for public use or public service.
Alienable lands of the public domain,
increasingly becoming scarce natural resources,
are to be distributed equitably among our evergrowing population. To insure such equitable
distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
have barred private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable
natural resources of the State, or seek to
circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation
of lands of the public domain to private
corporations, do so at their own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as
follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA,
are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA

may lease these lands to private corporations

but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell
these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution
and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of
Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources
of the public domain until classified as alienable
or disposable lands open to disposition and
declared no longer needed for public service.
The government can make such classification
and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed
these submerged areas. Only then can these
lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural resources
the government can alienate. In their present
state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged
areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to
AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer
to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural resources
other than agricultural lands of the public
domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged
areas. Thereafter, the government can classify
the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable,
and further declare them no longer needed for
public service. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain
to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly
Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409112 of the Civil
Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is

contrary to law," or whose "object is outside

the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void
from the beginning." The Court must perform
its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution,
and therefore declares the Amended JVA null
and void ab initio.
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper
forum to raise the issue of whether the
Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to
the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and
void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on
this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of
facts, and this last issue involves a
determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY
ENJOINED from implementing the Amended
Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby
declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No. 179987
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,
BRION,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, and
Respondent. BERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:

law" which the Latin American formal legal

system does not know how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto[1]

April 29, 2009

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

One main reason why the informal sector

has not become formal is that
from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the
informal lands are not titled and registered.
This is a generalized phenomenon in the socalled Third World. And it has many
consequences.

xxx
The question is: How is it that so many
governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to
Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these
people and have not been able to do so
effectively? One reason is that none of the state
systems in Asia or Latin America can gather
proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals
have means of proving property ownership to
each other which are not the same means
developed by the Spanish legal system. The
informals have their own papers, their own
forms of agreements, and their own systems of
registration, all of which are very clearly stated
in the maps which they use for their own
informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside,
from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field
after field--in each field a different dog is going
to bark at you. Even dogs know what private
property is all about. The only one who does
not know it is the government. The issue is that
there exists a "common law" and an "informal

This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands

currently in possession of persons and entities
other than the Philippine government. The
petition, while unremarkable as to the facts,
was accepted by the Court en banc in order to
provide definitive clarity to the applicability and
scope of original registration proceedings under
Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court
confronts not only the relevant provisions of
the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also
the reality on the ground. The countrywide
phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the
problem of informal settlement it has spawned,
has unfortunately been treated with benign
neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by
their own circumscriptions in addressing the
phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is
primarily to decide cases before us in accord
with the Constitution and the legal principles
that have developed our public land law,
though our social obligations dissuade us from
casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an
application for land registration covering a
parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452D, Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square
meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-ininterest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of
the land for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly
designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf

[4]

of the State. Apart from presenting

documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and
his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the
hearing. Velazco testified that the property was
originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino
Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto,
Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being
Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his
four sons inherited the property and divided it
among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans
wife, Magdalena,
had
become
the
administrator of all the properties inherited by
the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After
the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son
Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties,
including Lot 9864-A,
which
originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo
Velazco. It was this property that was sold by
[5]
Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr.
did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He
further manifested that he also [knew] the
property and I affirm the truth of the testimony
[6]
given by Mr. Velazco. The Republic of
the Philippines likewise did not present any
evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan
during trial was a Certification dated 11 June
2001, issued by the Community Environment &
Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRODENR), which stated that the subject property
was verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.
3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 1982.[7]
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this
application for registration and thus places

under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or

P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan
Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing
an area of Seventy One Thousand Three
Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters,
as supported by its technical description now
forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name
of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age,
Filipino, widower, and with residence at
Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory,
the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court

of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed
to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding
that he had been in possession of the property
in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect
title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision[8] reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application of Malabanan. The
appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots
as alienable and disposable was inconsequential
and should be excluded from the computation
of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate
court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification had verified that the property was
declared
alienable and disposable only on 15 March 198
2, the Velazcos possession prior to that date
could not be factored in the computation of the
period of possession. This interpretation of the
Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the

Property Registration Decree was based on the

Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]

under a bona fide claim of ownership since June

12, 1945 or earlier?

Malabanan died while the case was pending

with the Court of Appeals;[10] hence, it was his
heirs who appealed the decision of the
appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court,
rely
on
our
ruling
in Republic
v.
[11]
Naguit, which was handed down just four
months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest
that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the
Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since
the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had
directed the registration of the property had no
jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite
notice of hearing was published only after the
hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners
argue, remains the controlling doctrine,
especially when the property in question is
agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to
agricultural lands, any possession prior to the
declaration of the alienable property as
disposable may be counted in reckoning the
period of possession to perfect title under the
Public Land Act and the Property Registration
Decree.

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property

Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be
deemed private land and therefore susceptible
to acquisition by prescription in accordance
with the Civil Code?

The petition was referred to the Court en

[12]
banc, and on 11 November 2008, the case
was heard on oral arguments. The Court
formulated the principal issues for the oral
arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain may be registered under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or
is it sufficient that such classification occur at
any time prior to the filing of the applicant for
registration provided that it is established that
the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land

3. May a parcel of land established as

agricultural in character either because of its
use or because its slope is below that of forest
lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of
the subject land in their names under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both?[13]
Based on these issues, the parties formulated
their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners
reiterate that the analysis of the Court
in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the
provision.
The
seemingly
contradictory
pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted,
should be considered obiter dictum, since the
land registration proceedings therein was
void ab initio due to lack of publication of the
notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further
point
out
that
in Republic
v.
Bibonia,[14] promulgated in June of 2007, the
Court applied Naguit and adopted the same
observation that the preferred interpretation by
the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd.
For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for
Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have
been classified as alienable and disposable as
of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG
also
cites
the
subsequent
rulings
in Buenaventura
v.
Republic,[15] Fieldman

[16]

Agricultural Trading v. Republic and Republic

v. Imperial Credit Corporation,[17] as well as the
earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals.[18]
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners
submit that open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of an alienable land of the
public domain for more than 30 yearsipso
jure converts the land into private property,
thus placing it under the coverage of Section
14(2). According to them, it would not matter
whether the land sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the
public domain so long as, at the time of the
application, the property had already been
converted into private property through
prescription. To bolster their argument,
petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling
[19]
in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.

The arguments submitted by the OSG with

respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive.
The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the
Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of
properties of the State refers to patrimonial
property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private
lands. It observes that the Court has yet to
decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a
ground for application for registration, and that
the 30-year possession period refers to the
period of possession under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, and not the concept of
prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG
further submits that, assuming that the 30-year
prescriptive period can run against public lands,
said period should be reckoned from the time
the public land was declared alienable and
disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with
respect to the particular factual circumstances
surrounding the subject property and the
ownership thereof.
II.

First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property

Registration Decree. For a full understanding of
the provision, reference has to be made to the
Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the
Public Land Act, has, since its enactment,
governed the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain. The President is
authorized, from time to time, to classify the
lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable,
timber,
or
mineral
[20]
lands. Alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain are further classified according to
their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other
similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town
sites and for public and quasi-public uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the
registration in his/her name of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain? Section
11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that
public lands suitable for agricultural purposes
may be disposed of by confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial
[22]
legalization. Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the
details and unmistakably grants that right,
subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.

Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No.

1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June
12, 1945. xxx

Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its

present wording in 1977 when the law was
amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant
amendments were introduced by P.D. No.
1073. First, the term agricultural lands was
changed to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. The OSG submits that this
amendment restricted the scope of the lands
that may be registered.[23] This is not actually
the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land
Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of
lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain are a larger class
than only agricultural lands.

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following

persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:

Second, the length of the requisite possession

was changed from possession for thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the
application to possession since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated
in 1936, the period of possession deemed
necessary to vest the right to register their title
to agricultural lands of the public domain
commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this
period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which
provided that the bona fide claim of ownership
must have been for at least thirty (30) years.
Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land

It bears further observation that Section 48(b)

of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws
relative to the registration of property,
including lands of the public domain. It is
Section 14(1) that operationalizes the
registration of such lands of the public domain.
The provision reads:

(1) those who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property

Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section
14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained
in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons
or their predecessors-in-interest who have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier. That circumstance may have
led to the impression that one or the other is a
redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act has somehow been repealed or
mooted. That is not the case.

The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public

Land Act and Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following
described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such land or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree].
Who may apply. The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act
is more descriptive of the nature of the right
enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, which seems to
presume the pre-existence of the right, rather
than establishing the right itself for the first
time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public
Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073
effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily
established the right of a Filipino citizen who
has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or
complete his title by applying with the proper
court for the confirmation of his ownership
claim and the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title.

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with

the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land
Act, which provides that public lands suitable
for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles,
and given the notion that both provisions
declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that
primarily establishes the substantive ownership
of the possessor who has been in possession of
the property since 12 June 1945. In turn,
Section 14(a) of the Property Registration
Decree recognizes the substantive right granted
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
well provides the corresponding original
registration procedure for the judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title.
There is another limitation to the right granted
under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public
Land Act limits the period within which one may
exercise the right to seek registration under
Section 48. The provision has been amended
several times, most recently by Rep. Act No.
9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next
following section are hereby granted time, not
to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within
which to avail of the benefits of this
Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply
only where the area applied for does not
exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further,
That the several periods of time designated by
the President in accordance with Section FortyFive of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but
this Section shall not be construed as
prohibiting any said persons from acting under
this Chapter at any time prior to the period
fixed by the President.[24]
Accordingly under the current state of the law,
the substantive right granted under Section
48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December
2020.

B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a)
of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG
has adopted the position that for one to acquire
the right to seek registration of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, it is not
enough that the applicant and his/her
predecessors-in-interest be in possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June
1945; the alienable and disposable character of
the property must have been declared also as of
12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all
lands certified as alienable and disposable
after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
as amended. The absurdity of such an
implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the
alienable and disposable character of the land
should have already been established
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne
out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision,
qualifies its antecedent phrase under a
bonafide claim of ownership. Generally
speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify
only
the
words
or
phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely
[25]
located. Ad
proximum
antecedents fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that
would result if we adopt petitioners position.
Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would
be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the
public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12,
1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section
14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the

government from giving it effect even as it

decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness
of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945,
the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section
14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the
time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is
that the government is still reserving the right
to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective
of the length of adverse possession even if in
good faith. However, if the property has already
been classified as alienable and disposable, as it
is in this case, then there is already an intention
on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.

The Court declares that the correct

interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was
adopted
in Naguit.
The
contrary
pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out
in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the
provision to the point of virtual inutility since it
would only cover lands actually declared
alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945,
even if the current possessor is able to establish
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows
more possessors under a bona fide claim of
ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of
their imperfect titles than what would be
feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is

significant,
especially
considering
our
forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach
of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that
the
contradictory
passages
from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land
registration proceedings therein is void ab
initio in the first place due to lack of the
requisite publication of the notice of initial
hearing. There is no need to explicitly
overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts
acknowledgment that the particular line of
argument used therein concerning Section 14(1)
is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case
of Buenaventura,[26] the Court, citing Herbieto,
again stated that [a]ny period of possession
prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property
was] classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession
That statement, in the context of Section 14(1),
is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage
as cited in Buenaventura should again be
considered as obiter. The application therein
was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The
evidence submitted by petitioners therein did
not establish any mode of possession on their
part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the
application of Section 14(1). It is not even
apparent from the decision whether petitioners
therein had claimed entitlement to original
registration following Section 14(1), their
position being that they had been in exclusive
possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not
before 12 June 1945.
Thus,
neither Herbieto nor
its
principal
discipular
ruling Buenaventura has
any
precedental value with respect to Section 14(1).
On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is
embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely
involved situation wherein the applicant had
been in exclusive possession under a bona

fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945.

The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1)
therein was decisive to the resolution of the
case.
Any
doubt
as
to
which
between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final
word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now
settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be
distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals[27] since in the latter, the application
for registration had been filed before the land
was declared alienable or disposable. The
dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the
better rule between the two. Yet two years
after Bracewell,
its ponente,
the
esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
penned
the
ruling
in Republic
v.
Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim of possession
that extended back to 1927 over a public
domain land that was declared alienable and
disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell,
quoted extensively from it, and following the
mindset of the dissent, the attempt at
registration in Cenizashould have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a
certification dated November 25, 1994, issued
by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the
lots involved were "found to be within the
alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land
Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient
evidence to show the real character of the land
subject of private respondents application.

Further, the certification enjoys a presumption

of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence, which is true in this case. Worth
noting also was the observation of the Court of
Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of
Lands and Forestry to contest the application of
appellees on the ground that the property still
forms part of the public domain. Nor is there
any showing that the lots in question are
forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that mere possession of public land for the
period required by law would entitle its
occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it
did not err in ruling in favor of private
respondents as far as the first requirement in
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
concerned, for they were able to overcome the
burden of proving the alienability of the land
subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,
private respondents were able to prove their
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the
year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Although there are exceptions, petitioner did
[29]
not show that this is one of them.
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same
eminent member who authored Bracewell,
sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of
public domain lands declared alienable or
disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days
after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is
that in Ceniza, the application for registration
was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had
been declared alienable or disposable, while
in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9)
years before the land was declared alienable
or disposable. That crucial difference was also
stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it

from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent

seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of
analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The
provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following

persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.

The Court in Naguit offered the following

discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we
did even then recognize, and still do, to
be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer
to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration
Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073
preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession
over which commenced only after June 12,
1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree, which
governs and authorizes the application of those
who have acquired ownership of private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring
[30]
ownership under the Civil Code.[ ] There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of

open, continuous and exclusive possession of at

least thirty (30) years.[[31]] With such
conversion, such property may now fall within
the contemplation of private lands under
Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to
registration by those who have acquired
ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land
commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945,
and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor
may have the right to register the land by virtue
of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section
14(2), unlike in this case where petitioners have
based their registration bid primarily on that
provision, and where the evidence definitively
establishes their claim of possession only as far
back as 1948. It is in this case that we can
properly appreciate the nuances of the
provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code
provisions on prescription as the possible basis
for application for original registration under
Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113
which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of
men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Property of the State or
any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.

It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands

of the public domain are patrimonial in
character, they are susceptible to acquisitive
prescription. On the other hand, among the
public domain lands that are not susceptible to
acquisitive prescription are timber lands and

mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes

private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil
Code concerning the acquisition of real
property through prescription. Ownership of
real property may be acquired by ordinary
[32]
prescription of ten (10) years, or through
extraordinary prescription of thirty (30)
[33]
years. Ordinary
acquisitive
prescription
[34]
requires possession in good faith, as well as
just title.[35]
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree explicitly provides that persons who
have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing
laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as
a valid basis for the registration of lands. The
Civil Code is the only existing law that
specifically allows the acquisition by
prescription of private lands, including
patrimonial property belonging to the State.
Thus, the critical question that needs
affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does
encompass original registration proceedings
over patrimonial property of the State, which a
private person has acquired through
prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently
reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties
classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years.[36] Yet if we ascertain the
source of the thirty-year period, additional
complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to
how exactly it operates would emerge.
For there are in fact two distinct origins of the
thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in
1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act by granting the right to seek
original registration of alienable public lands

through possession in the concept of an owner

for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx

xxx

1137, is completed through uninterrupted

adverse possession for thirty years, without
need of title or of good faith.
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year
period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became
unavailable after 1977. At present, the only
legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the
law on prescription under the Civil Code, as
mandated under Section 14(2). However, there
is a material difference between how the thirty
(30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No.
1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.

xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]

This provision was repealed in 1977 with the

enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the
date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the
first time. Nonetheless, applications for
registration filed prior to 1977 could have
invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act
No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529
itself, at least by implication, as it applies the
rules on prescription under the Civil Code,
particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article
1137. Note that there are two kinds of
prescription under the Civil Codeordinary
acquisitive prescription and extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, which, under Article

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as

amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to
or call into application the Civil Code provisions
on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite
thirty-year possession period immediately
preceding the application for confirmation of
title, without any qualification as to whether
the property should be declared alienable at
the beginning of, and continue as such,
throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is
neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to
assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a
requirement,[38] similar to our earlier finding
with respect to the present language of Section
48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point
of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the
thirty-year possession period as basis for
original registration became Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree, which
entitled those who have acquired ownership
over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws to apply for original
registration. Again, the thirty-year period is
derived from the rule on extraordinary
prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil
Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into
operation the entire regime of prescription
under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold
true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.

Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly

refers to the principles on prescription under
existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to
apply the civil law concept of prescription, as
set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation
of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on
our part in the case of Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of
the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of the State or
any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.
The identification what consists of patrimonial
property is provided by Articles 420 and 421,
which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of
public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which
is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion,
which generally includes property belonging to
the State, cannot be the object of prescription
or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of
man.[39] Lands of the public domain, whether
declared alienable and disposable or not, are
property of public dominion and thus
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil
Code of a declaration by the President or any
duly authorized government officer of
alienability and disposability of lands of the
public domain. Would such lands so declared

alienable and disposable be converted, under

the Civil Code, from property of the public
dominion into patrimonial property? After all,
by connotative definition, alienable and
disposable lands may be the object of the
commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all
things within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription; and the same
provision further provides that patrimonial
property of the State may be acquired by
prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states
that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no

longer intended for public use or for public

service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State. It is this provision
that controls how public dominion property
may be converted into patrimonial property
susceptible to acquisition by prescription.
After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that
those property which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth are public dominion
property. For as long as the property belongs to
the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of
the public dominion if when it is intended for
some public service or for the development of
the national wealth.
Accordingly, there must be an express
declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when
such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the

period of acquisitive prescription can begin to

run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading
of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree limits its scope and reach and thus
affects the registrability even of lands already
declared alienable and disposable to the
detriment of the bona fide possessors or
occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this
interpretation is in accord with the Regalian
doctrine and its concomitant assumption that
all lands owned by the State, although declared
alienable or disposable, remain as such and
ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the
matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the
Constitution and the laws in accordance with
their language and intent. The remedy is to
change the law, which is the province of the
legislative branch. Congress can very well be
entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation
can be illustrated by an actual example.
Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act
Accelerating The Conversion Of Military
Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc., is
more commonly known as the BCDA
law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of
certain military reservations and portions of
military
camps
in
Metro
Manila,
including Fort Bonifacio and
Villamor
Air
Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the
military camps, the law mandates the President
to transfer such military lands to the Bases
Conversion
Development
Authority
[40]
(BCDA) which in turn is authorized to own,
hold and/or administer them.[41] The President

is authorized to sell portions of the military

camps, in whole or in part.[42] Accordingly, the
BCDA law itself declares that the military lands
subject thereof are alienable and disposable
pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and
regulations governing sales of government
properties.[43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted
the subject military lands have become
alienable and disposable. However, said lands
did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law
itself expressly makes the reservation that
these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds
for the conversion of the former American
[44]
bases at Clark and Subic. Such purpose can
be tied to either public service or the
development of national wealth under Article
420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained
property of the public dominion under Article
420(2), notwithstanding their status as
alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as
authorized under the BCDA law to a private
person or entity that such lands become private
property and cease to be property of the public
dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial
because they are declared as such in a duly
enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation
that they are no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national
wealth, would the period of possession prior to
the conversion of such public dominion into
patrimonial be reckoned in counting the
prescriptive period in favor of the possessors?
We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113
dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land
becomes patrimonial may be counted for the
purpose of completing the prescriptive period.
Possession of public dominion property before
it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of

prescription according to the Civil Code. As the

application for registration under Section 14(2)
falls wholly within the framework of
prescription under the Civil Code, there is no
way that possession during the time that the
land was still classified as public dominion
property can be counted to meet the requisites
of acquisitive prescription and justify
registration.

neither superior nor inferior to other statutes

such as the Property Registration Decree. The
legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the
framework set forth by the Civil Code when it
enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2)
manifests a clear intent to interrelate the
registration allowed under that provision with
the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with
respect to Section 14(1).

Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent

rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There
is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates
registration on the basis ofpossession, while
Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section
14(1) is extended under the aegis of
the Property Registration Decree and the
Public Land Act while registration under
Section 14(2) is made available both by
the Property Registration Decree and the Civil
Code.

IV.

In the same manner, we can distinguish

between the thirty-year period under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period
available through Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137
of the Civil Code. The period under the former
speaks
of
a thirty-year
period
of
possession, while the period under the latter
concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary
prescription. Registration under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act
No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession
alone without regard to the Civil Code, while
the registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree is founded on
extraordinary prescription under the Civil
Code.
It may be asked why the principles of
prescription under the Civil Code should not
apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding
the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it
ultimately is just one of numerous statutes,

One of the keys to understanding the

framework we set forth today is seeing how our
land registration procedures correlate with our
law on prescription, which, under the Civil
Code, is one of the modes for acquiring
ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial
property of the State may be acquired by
private persons through prescription. This is
brought about by Article 1113, which states
that [a]ll things which are within the commerce
of man are susceptible to prescription, and that
[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions
not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.
There are two modes of prescription through
which immovables may be acquired under the
Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1117,
requires possession in good faith and with just
title; and, under Article 1134, is completed
through possession of ten (10) years. There is
nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person
from acquiring patrimonial property of the
State through ordinary acquisitive prescription,
nor is there any apparent reason to impose
such a rule. At the same time, there are
indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title.
The ascertainment of good faith involves the
application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well
as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,[45] provisions
that more or less speak for themselves.

On the other hand, the concept of just title

requires some clarification. Under Article 1129,
there is just title for the purposes of
prescription when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of
the modes recognized by law for the acquisition
of ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the
transmission of ownership, and which would
have actually transferred ownership if the
grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect
is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale
with delivery, exchange, donation, succession,
and dacion in payment.[46]
The OSG submits that the requirement of just
title necessarily precludes the applicability of
ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial
property. The major premise for the argument
is that the State, as the owner and grantor,
could not transmit ownership to the possessor
before the completion of the required period of
possession.[47] It is evident that the OSG erred
when it assumed that the grantor referred to in
Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one
from whom the person invoking ordinary
acquisitive prescription derived the title,
whether by sale, exchange, donation,
succession or any other mode of the acquisition
of ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under
ordinary
prescription
or
extraordinary
prescription, the period of possession preceding
the classification of public dominion lands as
patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose
of computing prescription. But after the
property has been become patrimonial, the
period of prescription begins to run in favor of
the possessor. Once the requisite period has
been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the
patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into
private land; and (2) the person in possession
for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code

acquires ownership of the

operation of the Civil Code.

property

by

It is evident that once the possessor

automatically becomes the owner of the
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next
step is the registration of the property under
theTorrens system. It should be remembered
that registration of property is not a mode of
acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of
confirmation of ownership.[48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to
the adoption of the Property Registration
Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the
registration system then did not fully
accommodate the acquisition of ownership of
patrimonial property under the Civil Code.
What the system accommodated was the
confirmation of imperfect title brought about
by the completion of a period of possession
ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30
years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12
June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
[49]

The Land Registration Act was noticeably

silent on the requisites for alienable public
lands acquired through ordinary prescription
under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not
[50]
preclude such registration. Still, the gap was
lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by
itself, establishes ownership over the
patrimonial property of persons who have
completed the prescriptive periods ordained
therein. The gap was finally closed with the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in
1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly
authorizing original registration in favor of
persons who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code
as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this
case, as follows:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the

Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms
that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945 have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled
to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed
[51]
by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed
by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized
as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable
or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national
wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And
only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of

the
government. The
person
acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which
patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under
ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property
through possession for at least ten (10) years, in
good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons
uninterrupted
adverse
possession
of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title,
ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to
the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is
insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish
that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest
have
been
in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945
or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own
evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in
particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot
avail themselves of registration under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section

14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the

national evidence, conformably with Article 422

of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under
Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the
correctness of the legal doctrines established in
this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over
the implications of todays ruling cannot be
discounted. For, every untitled property that is
occupied in the country will be affected by this
ruling. The social implications cannot be
dismissed lightly, and the Court would be
abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino
people if we simply levied the law without
comment.
The informal settlement of public lands,
whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and
cultural acquiescence, and is common among
the so-called Third World countries. This
paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect
between a legal system and the reality on the
ground. The law so far has been unable to
bridge that gap. Alternative means of
acquisition
of
these
public domain lands, such as through homestea
d or free patent, have

proven unattractive due to limitations imposed

on the grantee in the encumbrance or
alienation of said properties.[52] Judicial
confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as
the most viable, if not the most attractive
means to regularize the informal settlement of
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, yet even that system, as revealed in
this decision, has considerable limits.

2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to

costs.
SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who
Associate Justice
have individually or exclusively held residential
lands on which they have lived and raised their
families. Many more have tilled and made
WE CONCUR:
productive idle lands of the State with their
hands. They have been regarded for generation
by their families and their communities as
common law owners. There is much to be said
about the virtues of according them legitimate
states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to
translate into positive law, as the law itself
REYNATO S. PUNO
considered such lands as property of the public
Chief Justice
dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set
forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly
regularize and formalize the settlement of such
A. QUISUMBING
lands which in legal theory are lands LEONARDO
of the
Associate
Justice
public domain before the problem becomes
insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite
two examples, by liberalizing the standards for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or
amending the Civil Code itself to ease the
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
requisites for the conversion of public dominion
Associate Justice
property into patrimonial.

CONSUELO YNAR
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUST

Associate Justice

Ones sense of security over land rights infuses

into every aspect of well-being not only of that
individual, but also to the persons family. Once
RENATO
that sense of security is deprived, life
and C. CORONA
Associate Justice
livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political
branches to bring welcome closure to the long
pestering problem.

CONCHITA CARPI
Associate Justice

WHEREFORE, the
Petition
is DENIED. The
MINITA
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
23 V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October

PRESBITERO J. VE
Associate Justice

[5]

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

The trial court decision identified Eduardo

TERESITAVelazco
J. LEONARDO
DE CASTO
as the
vendor of the property,
Associatenotwithstanding
Justice
the original allegation in the
application that Malabanan purchased the
same from Virgilio Velazco. See note 3. In his
subsequent pleadings, including those before
this Court, Malabanan or his heirs stated that
DIOSDADO
PERALTA was purchased from Eduardo
theM.property
AssociateVelazco,
Justice and not Virgilio. On this point, the
appellate court made this observation:

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the

Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]

Hernando de Soto Interview by Reason

Magazine
dated 30
November
1999,
at http://www.reason.com/news/show/322
13.html (Last visited, 21 April 2009).
[2]

More particularly described and delineated in

Plan CSD-04-017123. Records, p. 161.
[3]

But see note 5.

More importantly, Malabanan failed to prove

his
ownership
over Lot 9864-A. In
his
application for land registration, Malabanan
alleged that he purchased the subject lot from
Virgilio Velazco. During the trial of the case,
however, Malabanan testified that he
purchased the subject lot from Eduardo
Velazco, which was corroborated by his witness,
Aristedes Velazco, a son of Virgilio Velazco, who
stated that Eduardo was a brother of his
grandfather. As aptly observed by the Republic,
no copy of the deed of sale covering Lot 9864A, executed either by Virgilio or Eduardo
Velazco, in favor of Malabanan was marked and
offered in evidence. In the appealed Decision,
the court a quo mentioned of a deed of sale
executed in 1995 by Eduardo Velazco in favor of
Malabanan which was allegedly marked as
Exhibit I. It appears, however, that what was
provisionally marked as Exhibit I was a
photocopy of the deed of sale executed by
Virgilio Velazco in favor of Leila Benitez and
Benjamin Reyes. Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court provides that the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The offer is necessary because
it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of
facts and his judgment only and strictly upon
the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.
Thus, Malabanan has not proved that Virgilio or
Eduardo Velazco was his predecessor-ininterest. Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[6]

[4]

Id.

Rollo, p. 74.

[7]

Id. at 38. Emphasis supplied.

[8]

Penned by Associate Justice Marina Buzon of

the Court of Appeals Fifth Division, and
concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo
Sundiam and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa.
[9]

G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183.

[10]

[25]

R.
AGPALO,
STATUTORY
rd
CONSTRUCTION (3 ed., 1995) at 182.
[26]

See note 3.

[27]

380 Phil. 156 (2000).

[28]

Also known as Republic v. Court of Appeals,

440 Phil. 697 (2002).

See rollo, p. 11.

[29]

[11]

Id. at 710-712.

G.R. No. 144507, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA

442.

[30]

[12]

[31]

Through a Resolution dated 5 December

2007. See rollo, p. 141.

See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1113.

G.R. No. 157466, 21 June 2007, 525 SCRA

268.

See e.g., Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No.

65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604,
611; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567,
576; Group Commander, Intelligence and
Security Group v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275
(2002).

[15]

[32]

[13]

Id. at 186-187.

[14]

G.R. No. 166865, 2 March 2007, 459 SCRA

271.

See Article 1134, CIVIL CODE.

[33]
[16]

G.R. No. 147359, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA

92.

See Article 1137, CIVIL CODE.

[34]

[17]

G.R. No. 173088, 25 June 2008, 555 SCRA

314.

See Article 1117 in relation to Article 1128,

Civil Code. See also Articles 526, 527, 528 &
529, Civil Code on the conditions of good faith
required.

[18]

[35]

G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 178 SCRA 708.

[19]

See Article 1117, in relation to Article 1129,

Civil Code.

G.R. No. 154953, 16 June 2008.

[36]

[20]

Section 6, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.

[21]

Section 9, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.

[22]

Section 11, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.

Citing Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No.

65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604,
611; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567,
576; Group Commander, Intelligence and
Security Group v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275
(2002).

[23]

OSG Memorandum, p. 13.

[24]

Section 47, Public Land Act, as amended by

Rep. Act No. 9176.

[37]

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,

immediately before its amendment by Rep. Act
No. 1942, reads as follows:

Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, except as against the
Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter.
[38]

Again, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,

as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, was
superseded by P.D. No. 1073, which imposed
the 12 June 1945 reckoning point, and which
was then incorporated in Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
[39]

See Vllarico v. Sarmiento, G.R. No.

136438, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 110.
[40]

Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec.7.

[50]

See Section 19, Land Registration Act, which

allowed application for registration of title by
person or persons claiming, singly or
collectively, to own the legal estate in fee
simple.
[51]

See note 24.

[52]

See Section 118, Com. Act No. 141, as

amended.

Except in favor of the Government or any of

its branches, units, or institutions, lands
acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation from the date of
the approval of the application and for a
term of five years from and after the date
of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall
they become liable to the satisfaction of
any debt contracted prior to the expiration
of said period, but the improvements or
crops on the land may be mortgaged or
pledged to qualified persons, associations,
or corporations.

[41]

Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 4(a).

[42]

Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7.

[43]

Id.

[44]

Section 2, Rep. Act No. 7227.

[45]

See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1128.

[46]

A. TOLENTINO, IV CIVIL CODE OF

THE PHILIPPINES (1991 ed.) at 26; citing 2
Castan 175.
[47]

No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of

any homestead after five years and before
twenty-five years after issuance of title shall
be valid without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
which approval shall not be denied except
on constitutional and legal grounds.
EDRO GONZALES, ELY GONZALES, BENITO
CASIDSID, TANDOY MINDORO, and BADBAD
PIANA, in their respective personal capacities
and in behalf of other prior forest land
occupants similarly affected by AFFLA No. 82,
Petitioners,

Memorandum of the OSG, p. 21.

- versus -

[48]

See Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. 44 (1938).

[49]

Act No. 496.

MADAME PILAR FARM DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, Regional Director BERNARDO

AGALOOS, Director EDMUND CORTEZ, Bureau

of Forest Development, and Honorable
RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, Minister of Natural
Resources,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
PEDRO GONZALES and ELY GONZALES,
Petitioners,
- versus Honorable INOCENCIO JAURIGUE, Presiding
Judge, MTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
MADAME PILAR FARM DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, District Forester ALFREDO
SANCHEZ, Regional Director BERNARDO
AGALOOS, and Director EDMUND CORTEZ,
Bureau of Forest Development,
Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before us is this petition* for review on
certiorari
to
annul
and
set
aside
the Decision[1] dated March
24,
1994 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
31159, affirming an earlier Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, in its Civil Case
Nos. 525 and 542 which directed the Municipal
Trial
Court
(MTC)
of
San
Jose,
Occidental Mindoro to proceed with the trial of
Criminal Case No. 7852, a prosecution for Illegal
Pasturing thereat filed against the herein
petitioners Pedro Gonzales and Ely Gonzales.
The facts:
The case revolves around the lease of public
lands for agro-forestry farm purposes, pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines, as amended.
The standard documentation then for this

public
land
award
was
a pro
forma Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement
(AFFLA) prepared and processed by the Ministry
of Natural Resources (MNR), now the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), thru the then Bureau of
Forest Development (BFD).
On
or
around
October
8,
1982, Pilar Alarcon Paja, for and in behalf of
Madame Pilar Farm Development Corporation,
applied for an agro-forest farm lease covering
parcels
of
land
situated
in Sitio Tugtugin Caguray River, Barangay Murth
a,
Municipality
of
San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro for the purpose of
raising plant crops for the Alcogas program of
the
government. At
that
time, Madame Pilar Farm
Development
Corporation (hereinafter Pilar Farm) was still
unregistered, its Articles of Incorporation and
By-Laws having been filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) only on March
1, 1983, and the corresponding registration
certificate - Registration No. 111139 being
issued over two weeks later on March 18, 1983.
Out of the total 2,400 hectares applied for,
which included an abandoned pasture area of
one Fidel del Rosario, the MNR approved only a
slightly smaller area. On June 16, 1983, then
Natural
Resources
Minister Teodoro O. Pea issued
in
favor
of Pilar Farm AFFLA
No.
82 for 1,800
hectares. Shortly thereafter, it would appear
that herein petitioners Pedro Gonzales and his
son, Ely Gonzales (collectively, the Gonzaleses),
who were then into livestock raising, entered
into and occupied a portion of the awarded
area. This encroachment and the refusal of the
alleged intruders to vacate impelled
then District Forester Alfredo Sanchez to file in
the MTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro a
criminal
complaint,
thereat
docketed
as Criminal
Case
No.
7852, against
the Gonzaleses for Illegal Pasturing under the
provisions of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended, allegedlycommitted as follows:

That sometime in June, 1983 up to the present,

at Sitio Panagsangan, [Brgy] Murtha, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, both the accused
without any permit or authority from the [BFD]
director did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously occupy portion of forest zone
for their livestock pasturing and is
within [Pilar Farms AFFLA No. 82] [to] its
damage . (Words in bracket added)

To the aforesaid complaint, the Gonzaleses filed

a Motion and Petition[2] therein praying the
MTC to dismiss the complaint, or, in the
alternative, to suspend the criminal action on
grounds of erroneous venue, violation of the
equal protection guarantee and prejudicial
question, among others.

On January 21, 1985, the Gonzaleses, joined by

several others also claiming to be prior
occupants of certain parcels covered by AFFLA
No. 82, filed with the RTC of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro a petition for prohibition
and mandamus against the then MNR Minister,
certain BFD officials and Pilar Farm. The
petition, basically to challenge the agro-forest
lease award, was docketed as Civil Case No.
525.
Meanwhile, on April 25, 1985, in Criminal Case
No. 7852, the MTC issued an Order denying
the Motion and Petition therein interposed by
the Gonzaleses for the dismissal of said case or
for the suspension of said criminal proceedings.
In view of the above denial order,
the Gonzaleses filed a second petition before
the RTC, this time a special civil action for
certiorari
and
prohibition
against MTC
JudgeInocencio M. Jaurigue who issued the said
order of denial and against the BFD officials
earlier impleaded as respondents in Civil Case
No. 525. The RTC docketed the second petition
as Civil Case No. 542.

On October 31, 1985, the public respondents in

Civil Case No. 525 filed a motion to dismiss said
case. On December 6, 1985, the petitioners
filed a motion for the consolidation of Civil Case
Nos. 525 and 542.
On August 20, 1986, the RTC, on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies,
issued a Resolution dismissing the petition
in Civil Case No. 525, rationalizing as follows:
The Court has not lost sight of the fact that
petitioners quoted a declaration of the B.F.D.
District Officer that the award to respondent
[Pilar Farm] by the B.F.D. Central Office was
made despite the B.F.D. District Certification
that ----the applied area falls within
Southern Mindoro Lumber Corporation and
District Forest Occupancy Management Project
wherein forest occupants were permanently
settled.
Towards the close of hearing on June 4, 1986,
public respondents signified that verification of
that matter would have to be conducted. This
situation adds support for the stand that the
entire dispute is still within the sphere of the
executive department.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the

above resolution.
On February 11, 1987, the RTC ordered the
consolidation of Civil Case Nos. 525 and 542.
On June 4, 1987, the RTC resolved to reconsider
its dismissal of Civil Case No. 525 in the light of
an alleged supervening execution of an affidavit
by San Jose District Forester Alfredo Sanchez
who allegedly instructed petitioner Pedro
Gonzales to transfer his herd to the cancelled
pasture area of Fidel del Rosario, a portion of
which had been included in AFFLA No. 82. The
pertinent
part
of
the
[3]
reinstating resolution reads:

It must be mentioned the petitioners Motion

For Reconsideration of the dismissal of Case No.
525 had been pending as of the date the Order
for consolidation was issued; xxx.
The result of the succession of pleadings is that
in the first case (No. 525), the Court has to act
on the Motion For Reconsideration without any
pleading nor comment from any of [the]
respondents. In specifically giving a margin for
the officials to interpose the Bureau's comment,
the Court gave way for that Office to manifest
whether any action had been taken by the
Bureau on petitioners claim after the Resolution
of dismissal had been issued that the
government was still locating an area to be
awarded to petitioners, and that the situation
depicted in the District Forester's statement
would be verified.
On the other hand, petitioners now harp on the
abuse-of-discretion-angle, which shifts the
jurisdiction to the judiciary.
Definitely the Court should not seek to
substitute its judgment, its assessment, for that
of the administration body, the [BFD]. All that is
believed now open to be inquired into is the
subject of abuse of discretion, the conduct of
proceedings which led to that award.
xxx xxx xxx
It is understood that the decision on Case No.
525 will be decisive of Case No. 542; hence, no
pleading need be filed in Case No. 542
meanwhile. (Underscoring in the original; words
in bracket added.)

On April 19, 1988, however, the RTC issued

in Civil Case No. 525 a Resolution again
dismissing the said case, predicating its action
basically on the same reason set forth in its
earlier August 20, 1986 ruling. Wrote the court:
The fundamental issue encountered in the
beginning was want of jurisdiction for non-

exhaustion
of
administrative
remedies. Dismissal
therefore
was
reconsidered, because petitioners cited a basis
for alleging abuse of discretion. In essence, the
abuse was the circumstance that the area to
which petitioners had been previously
instructed by the District Forester to transfer
his herd became a part of the area leased to
[Pilar Farm]. The impression given was that the
[BFD] Central Office, which granted [AFFLA No.
82] , disregarded the word of the District
Forester, which would have favored
petitioners. Giving way to the possibility that
the procedure observed constituted an abuse of
discretion, the Court set the case for trial solely
on that question.
Public respondents, moving for reconsideration
, state that the sworn statement of the District
Forester (April 3, 1986) to the effect that
sometime in 1981, he instructed Pedro
Gonzales to transfer his herd to the cancelled
pasture area of Fidel del Rosario, was a
reversed stand of that official . It was deemed a
reversal of his letter of September 1, 1982,
stating that a suitable place for Pedro Gonzales
herd had not been found. This apparently runs
counter to the sworn statement aforecited.
The actuation of the District Forester was
regarded by public respondents as an
encroachment into the power and authority of
the Bureau Director.
The Supplemental Opposition to that Motion
reiterated petitioner's reliance on the District
Forester's alleged instruction and cited the
disregard thereof as abusive.
Replying to that Supplemental Opposition, the
public respondents dwelt on the factual,
physical justification for the award to private
respondent, that is, the finding that during the
investigation or inspection in July 1981, [the
Gonzaleses] were not occupants of subject
area. Moreover, public respondents state that
to petitioners [pasture] lease agreement had
expired and a Certification by the Regional

Director (February 19, 1985) states that the

processing of the application for renewal was
held in abeyance pending the location of
replacement site.
The determination of whether petitioners
application for lease of an area was accorded
the requisite attention or given the proper
action by the [BFD] falls initially on the
executive department .It may be gleaned from
the papers now on file (quite voluminous) that
the internal organization, the delineation of
functions according to the set-up, the detailed
instructions and regulations issued, all come
into play in the present dispute, and, at this
stage, these are not for the Court to dwell
upon. The questions of confirming whether the
District Forester instructed or authorized Pedro
Gonzales to transfer his herd as claimed, and, in
the affirmative, whether that was within his
power or functions, so as to confer a right on
Pedro Gonzales, are all embraced within the
administrative aspect - in which, judicial
intervention is not authorized.
xxx xxx xxx
In resume, since it now appears that the sworn
statement relied upon by petitioners is, after
all, for the Bureau to consider, the Court is
constrained to revise its ruling embodied in the
Resolution of June 4, 1987 and declare, as it
hereby declares, that the dismissal was
warranted. xxx..
Therefrom, the petitioners went on appeal to
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 15341. On October 18,
1989, the appellate court, on the premise that
the RTC erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 525
without giving the petitioners the chance to
prove that the findings of forestry officials were
not supported by the evidence on
record, ordered the remand of the case for trial
and decision.
Following the remand of Civil Case No. 525 and
the
subsequent trial of the consolidated cases, the

RTC, via an Order[4] dated December 21, 1992,

dismissed Civil Case Nos. 525 and 542, with an
express directive for the MTC of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro to proceed to try and
decide Criminal Case No. 7852 against Pedro
Gonzales for illegal pasturing.
Again, the petitioners went on appeal to the CA
whereat their appellate recourse was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 31159.
For
its
part,
respondent Pilar Farm also interposed an
appeal which the CA dismissed for having been
filed out of time.
In the herein assailed Decision[5] dated March
24, 1994, the CA dismissed the petitioners
appeal on the strength of, inter alia, the
following considerations:
1. The nature of the petition filed before the
RTC basically required the petitioners to
establish grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondent MNR and BFD officials, but
petitioners failed to discharge the burden;
2. But assuming that the cases before the RTC
partake of an appeal from the MNR, the
recourse would still fail owing to submitted
evidence showing that:
a. AFFLA No. 82 was regularly issued;
b. all portions of the leased area applied for
under bona fide occupation or claims were
excluded from the coverage of AFFLA No. 82;
c. that the priority right of Mrs. Pilar Alarcon
Paja over the leased area was acquired ahead of
other applicants; and
d. that during the investigation and inspections
on July 1987, the Gonzaleses were not the
occupants of the subject area.

Thereafter, the petitioners filed a pleading

styled Motion asking the CA to render a ruling
on whether or not the RTC violated procedural
due process in not resolving their offer of

rebuttal evidence which forced them to make a

proffer of proof. In a Resolution[6] dated June
15, 1994, the CA denied the motion.
Hence, petitioners present recourse submitting
for our consideration the following issues:[7]
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT DECLINED TO RULE ON WHETHER
THE LOWER COURTVIOLATED PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
PETITIONERS REBUTTAL EVIDENCES, DESPITE A
MOTION BY PETITIONERS PRAYING FOR A
RULING ON THE MATTER.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT BY THE NATURE
OF THIS PETITION, PETITIONERS TOTALLY
FAILED TO ESTABLISH LACK OF JURISDICTION,
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND/OR THE
UNLAWFUL NON-PERFORMANCE OF DUTY
IMPOSED BY LAW ON PUBLIC RESPONDENTS,
DESPITE ADMISSIONS OR PROOF TO THE
CONTRARY.

administration of justice, it is essential that

litigation
must
end
sometime
and
[9]
somewhere. A contrary policy could result to
an absurd situation where, after admission of
rebuttal evidence, the trial court, to be fair,
must allow: sur-rebuttal of the rebuttal
evidence; refutation of the sur-rebuttal of the
rebuttal evidence; thereafter, a sur-refutation
of the refutation of the sur-rebuttal of the
rebuttal evidence; and so on ad infinitum.
Anent the first issue, petitioners claim that
during the hearings for the presentation of their
rebuttal evidence, the RTC was unusually
lenient whenever respondents counsels were
absent, but did not exhibit the same behavior
when petitioners counsel was absent, as
exemplified when the RTC viewed the latters
absence as waiver of the right to present
rebuttal evidence. Scoring the CA for not
correcting a wrong allegedly dealt them below
by the RTC, petitioners now lament:

The petition lacks merit.

And now comes the decision of respondent

[appellate] court which refused to review the
most crucial assigned error raised by
petitioners. From pages one to twelve thereof,
the decision never discussed the issue on
whether the trial court committed obvious
errors in its ruling during the trial, showed
unusual leniency to respondents and practically
ignored the offer of rebuttal evidences, which
constrained appellants to submit the pending
incidents for resolution without further
arguments and to make proffer of proof. Then
on page [13] thereof, respondent court finally
concluded that [w]ith the foregoing disquisition,
the Court sees little or no reason to go into
minute detail in discussing the appellants
remaining assignments to error. Hence, the
decision of respondent court also ignored the
rebuttal
exhibits
of
herein
petitioners.[10] (Bracketed words added)

To begin with, the rules of evidence accords

trial courts considerable discretion on the
matter of admission of rebuttal evidence,[8] the
rule being that, for an effective and efficient

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the

part of the CA for not striking down the RTCs
refusal to admit petitioners rebuttal evidence.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS

ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE NO
LONGER EXIST ANY HINDRANCE TO THE
PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 7852
NOR ANY BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF DAMAGES
IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANTS, DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION BY THE MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT AND BASIS FOR THE AWARD OF
DAMAGES.

As we see it, all the above three (3) issues or

grounds emanate from a single core argument
involving the disinclination of the RTC to
consider the petitioners offer of rebuttal
evidence.

For one, the most appropriate time and forum

for the petitioners to present their evidence, be
they evidence-in-chief or rebuttal, is during the
trial of Criminal Case No. 7852 before the
MTC. Petitioners have only themselves to blame
for disrupting the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 7852. They cannot plausibly deny having
commenced Civil Case Nos. 525 and 542 hoping
that the outcome in either case would thwart
efforts towards continuing with Criminal Case
No. 7852 in the MTC. Else, why attack as sham
the steps and proceedings taken by the
BFD leading to the issuance of AFFLA No. 82,
question the regularity of the final lease award
and seek its nullification before the courts
when, as correctly held by the CA and the RTC,
these are matters immediately cognizable and
better addressed by the MNR?
For another, even at the RTC level, we can
readily observe not only the voluminous
evidence coming from both the petitioners and
the respondents, but also the painstaking
evaluation of evidentiary details in the RTCs
single space 20-paged Order[11] of December 21,
1992. There is, therefore, no compelling reason
for us to disturb the CAs findings, in its
challenged decision, affirmatory of that of the
RTC, that
Over and above the foregoing considerations,
the record is replete with documentary
evidence showing the regularity of the award of
AFFLA No. 82 in favor of [ Pilar Farm]. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
Absent such stronger countervailing proof as
would disprove the evident showing of the
foregoing documents, the [CA] is not inclined to
disturb the lower courts affirmance of the
Ministry of Natural Resources award of AFFLA
No. 82 as well as the findings made in relation
thereto.

Among the pieces of rebuttal evidence which

the petitioners are raising all the way up to this
Court concern alterations and/or intercalation
allegedly committed by the respondents, acts
which petitioners insist as being punishable
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, according to the petitioners:
Respondent court failed to consider that AFFLA
No.
82
was
purportedly
executed
on October 8, 1982 between the government
and respondent corporation at Quezon City but
notarized by a notary public commissioned at
the City of Manila. Yet, respondent corporation
was
incorporated
only
on March 18, 1983! It appears what was notariz
ed on October
8,
1982 was anotherdocument, entered as Doc. N
o. 258, Page 19, Book No. 53, Series of 1982, in
the notarial registry of Atty. Armando
Cortez. The lease agreement appears to be
falsified. Unwittingly,
public
respondents admitted under paragraph 3, page
19 of its (sic) Comment to an alteration or
intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning and punishable under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Underscoring in the original.)

For reference we quote paragraph 3, page 19 of

the public respondents Comment[12] to this
petition:
3. The records of this case also show that AFFLA
No. 82 was originally applied for under the
name of Mrs. Pilar Alarcon Paja, and that the
same was changed and put under the name of
private respondent corporation after the latter
was organized in 1983. Evidently, this explains
the discrepancy between the dates of the
Contract of Lease of AFFLA No. 82, and the
incorporation
of
private
respondent
corporation in March 1983.

Analyzing the text of the AFFLA, we find no

provision therein requiring that the lessee must

first be a corporation before it may plant and

raise crops necessary for the Alcogasprogram of
the government. Regardless of whether the
lessee is a single proprietor, a partnership, a
corporation or a cooperative, what matters
here is the lessees accomplishment of the
undertaking to plant and raise said crops.
This brings us to the matter of notarial
jurisdiction. It must be stressed right off
that Pilar Alarcon Paja signed the necessary
lease contract documents. When she affixed
her signature on and acknowledged executing
the AFFLA before a Notary Public for the City
of Manila on October 8, 1982, her act did not
necessarily amount to an alteration or
intercalation of a genuine document because
the address of her principal, Pilar Farm, at that
time
was 1160
Tayuman,
Tondo,
Metro Manila.[13] While the issuing office of the
ready-made AFFLA is in Quezon City, the Court
perceives no compelling legal reason why the
same cannot be signed and acknowledged by
the proposed lessees agent somewhere else. It
would of course be different if the integrity of
the accomplished application is otherwise
compromised, which does not appear so in this
case.
It cannot be over emphasized that when Mrs.
Paja signed the AFFLA ready-made form
on October 8, 1982, her act was nothing more
than an offer to lease, the kind of offer
contemplated under the first paragraph of
Article 1319 of the Civil Code as a prelude to
contract perfection. Until accepted with the
issuance of a final lease award, following a BFD
investigation of the applicants qualification,
among other tedious processing tasks, the offer
confers no enforceable contractual right. To be
precise, the first paragraph of Article 1319 of
the Civil Code reads:
Article 1319. Consent is manifested by the
meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon
the thing and the cause which are to constitute
the contract. The offer must be certain and the

acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance

constitutes a counter-offer.

It may be that Pilar Farm was issued its SEC

registration certificate only on March 18, 1983.
It should be stressed, however, that what
Mrs. Paja submitted shortly before that date in
behalf of what, for the nonce, may rightly be
regarded as an unregistered association in the
process of incorporation, was still an offer. The
meeting
of
the
offer
and
acceptanceoccured only on June 16, 1983 when
then Minister Teodoro O. Pea signed AFFLA No.
82. At that defining time, Pilar Farm had already
been duly registered and had acquired a judicial
personality.
In any event, the MNR, following its rules and
exercising its administrative discretion, did not
find the situation thus depicted sufficient
ground to reject the application altogether. To
borrow
from National
Power Corporation
v. Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc.,[14] the exercise
of discretion is usually a policy decision that
necessitates inquiry and deliberation on the
wisdom and practicalities of a given course of
action, in this case approving or denying the
lease application. The role of courts is to
ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality
of
government
has
transgressed
its
constitutional boundaries. Courts will not
interfere with executive or legislative discretion
exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise,
they stray into the forbidden realm of policy
decision-making.[15]
And until the MNR or the DENR cancels AFFLA
No. 82, Pilar Farm shall continue to enjoy the
rights accruing therefrom to the exclusion of
petitioners Gonzaleses, et al.
Turning now to the second issue, petitioners
bemoan the fact that the RTC, in refusing to
consider their rebuttal evidence, arrived at a
conclusion based on pure speculation, surmises
and or conjectures, which calls for the judicial

reexamination of this Court. Pressing the point,

the petitioners state:

This is where respondent court erred the

most. By refusing to consider the rebuttal
exhibits of petitioners, it relied upon
respondents documentary evidences that were
hearsay and self-serving.xxx .

We are not impressed.

Doubtless, the second issue thus raised pivots
on the factual findings of the CA respecting the
right of respondent Pilar Farm to its leased area
and the petitioners lack of right to enter and
occupy a portion thereof. Needless to stress,
such issue is beyond the province of the Court
to review, just as it is improper to raise the
same in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.[16] The Court is not a trier of
facts; it is not its function to examine, analyze,
winnow or weigh anew the evidence or
premises
supportive
of
such
factual
determination. This rule all the more assumes
an imperative dimension where, as here, the CA
affirms the findings of the lower court. Stated
differently, substantiated findings of the CA are
binding on the Court and they carry even more
weight when the said court affirms the factual
findings of the trial court.[17] As it were,
the RTCs Order [18] of December 21, 1992 directs
the MTC to exercise its jurisdiction over and to
proceed with the trial and decide Criminal Case
No. 7852. If at all, the petitioners may hope to
pursue their call for judicial reexamination in
the MTC.
The last issue in the petitioners memorandum
involves three (3) sub-issues. In the first, the
petitioners argue that the MTC may not
proceed with Criminal Case No. 7852 since the
issue, particularly in Civil Case No. 525,
respecting their entitlement to those parcels
of Pilar Farms leased area occupied by them,
constitutes a prejudicial question, such that
there would no longer be any basis for their

prosecution for illegal pasturing if they are

adjudged as so entitled. The second would
question a Forest Officers authority to conduct
a preliminary investigation for violation of the
Forestry Code, as amended. In the third,
petitioners call for a clinical analysis of the
criminal complaint in question.
The prejudicial question angle is now moot and
academic
owing
to
[19]
the RTCs Order of December
21,
1992, as affirmed in toto by
the
CA, making short shrift of petitionerschallenge a
gainst the validity and the regularity of the
issuance of AFFLA No. 82 and their outlandish
claim of having a vested right on a portion of
respondent Pilar Farms leased area. In net
effect, the issues in Civil Case Nos. 525 and 542,
without more, no longer pose as impediment to
the continuance of Criminal Case No. 7852.
The sub-issue about whether or not a Forest
Officer
has
authority
to
conduct preliminary investigation is misleading,
assuming as it does that District Forester
Alfredo Sanchez conducted a preliminary
investigation.
What is more, this sub-issue is
really a non-issue because District Forester
Alfredo Sanchez did not conduct a preliminary
investigation.With the view we take of this
matter because the record is unclear, the
investigation Mr. Sanchez conducted was not a
preliminary investigation under the rules on
criminal
procedure,
but
rather
an
administrative
investigation
authorized
under Section 89 of the Forestry Code, as
amended, which reads:
Section 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal
actions.
A
forest
officer or employee of the Bureau or
any
personnel
of
the
Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall
arrest
even
without
warrant
any person who has
committed
or
is
committing in his presence any of the offenses
defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and
confiscate, in favor of the Government, the

tools and equipment used in committing the

offense xxx. The arresting forest officer or
employee shall thereafter deliver within six (6)
hours from the time of arrest and seizure, the
offenderand the confiscated forest products, to
ols and equipment
to,
and file the proper complaint
with,
the
appropriate official designated by law to
conduct preliminary investigation and file
information in court.

Lastly, the sub-issue that calls for a clinical

analysis of the criminal complaint, or, to a
specific point, a determination of whether or
not the scene of the crime is situated in
thebarangay mentioned in the complaint, need
not detain us any longer. For, at bottom, this
sub-issue involves factual matters that should
properly be addressed by the MTC, pursuant to
the principle of hierarchy of courts.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.