FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 150413. July 1, 2003]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ALEXANDRA

LAO, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
1[1]

G.R. CV No. 56230, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
2[2]

Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case No. TG-719.

On September 4, 1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, an application for the registration of title
over a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre,
Plan Ap-04-007770, consisting of nine thousand three hundred forty nine (9,349)
square meters under Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree. Respondent alleged that she acquired the land by
purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela,
who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land
from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by
transfer.
In the alternative, respondent prayed that the land be awarded to her under
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, also known as the
Public Land Act, based on her and her predecessor’s open, public, actual,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under
bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years.
At the hearing in the lower court, respondent presented the following
witnesses: Candido Amoroso, who testified on the ownership of the land by
Edilberto Perido in 1932; Vicente Laudato, who testified on respondent’s
purchase of the property from Raymundo and Ma. Victoria; and Fina Victoria So-
Liwanag, who assisted respondent in her application for registration.
Respondent likewise presented in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3[3]

April 19, 1994 executed by Raymundo and Victoria in her favor, the survey plan
and technical description of the property, and the tax declarations in the name of
1 [1]
Rollo, pp. 27-33.
2 [2]
RTC Records, pp. 68-69.
3 [3]
Id., at 5.
respondent as well as her predecessors-in-interest.
On June 28, 1996, the trial court made the following findings, to wit:
x x x the applicant acquired the subject parcel of land by purchase from
Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela in 1994, and that applicant
and her predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open,
public, adverse and in the concept of an owner possession of the subject parcel
of land for more than thirty (30) years now; and that the same parcel was
declared for taxation purposes; that the realty taxes due thereon have been
duly paid; that the land involved in this case is not covered by any land patent.
Likewise, this Court could well-discern from the survey plan covering the same
property, as well as technical description and other documents presented, that
the land sought to be registered is agricultural and not within any forest zone or
public domain; and that tacking her predecessors-in-interest’s possession to
hers, applicant appears to be in continuous and public possession thereof for
more than thirty (30) years.4[4]
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration
and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-
04-007770 and containing an area of nine thousand three hundred forty-nine
(9,349) square meters as supported by its technical description now forming
part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name
of ALEXANDRA A. LAO, of legal age, married to NELSON O. LAO, Filipino
citizen, with residence at 1648 Yakal Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree
of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.5[5]
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 56230. On October 15, 2001, the appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review raising the following
6[6]

errors:
THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF TITLE OF SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF
RESPONDENT.7[7]
A. RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGALLY REQUIRED
PERIOD AND ACTS OF POSSESSION.8[8]

4 [4]
RTC Records, pp. 68-69.
5 [5]
Id., at 69.
6 [6]
Rollo, p. 33.
7 [7]
Id., at 14.
8 [8]
Id.
 B. THE TAX DECLARATIONS PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT DO NOT
CORROBORATE HER CLAIM OF THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD OF
POSSESSION.9[9]
C. RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRESENT A CERTIFICATION FROM THE
APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF
HER APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.10[10]
In sum, the issues presented before us are (a) whether or not respondent
was able to prove, by the quantum of evidence mandated by law, that she met
the required period of open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession, in
the concept of an owner, of the subject parcel of land; and (b) whether or not
respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was
disposable and alienable land of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant
must show that (a) he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.
Respondent submits that Section 48 (b) of CA 141 was amended by
Republic Act No. 6940, which reduced the required period of possession to thirty
years immediately prior to the filing of the application. Said law became effective
on April 15, 1990. However, petitioner maintains that the required period of
possession remained the same. RA 6940 explicitly states that its provisions

9 [9]
Id., at 21.
10 [10]
Id.
amended sections 44, 45 and 47 of CA 141. Nothing in RA 6940 amends
Section 48 (b). In other words, the requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title set forth therein remains the same, namely, (1) possession of
the subject land from June 12, 1945, and (2) the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In Public Estates Authority v.
Court of Appeals, we held that:
11[11]

Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required
possession en concepto de dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26,
1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was retained. However, on June
22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This
later enactment required adverse possession for a period of only thirty (30)
years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073, further
amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987. Under this
decree, “the provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable land of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
by the applicant himself or thru his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 12[12]

thus:
This Court has held in Republic vs. Doldol [295 SCRA 359, (1998)] that,
originally, “Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977.” As amended Section 48 (b)
now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure.
Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Petitioner argues that respondent failed to prove by incontrovertible evidence
that she had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land, in the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945
or earlier. According to petitioner, respondent’s witnesses did not state the exact

11 [11]
G.R. No. 112172, 20 November 2000, 345 SCRA 96.
12 [12]
G.R. No. 116372, 18 January 2001, 349 SCRA 451.
period when respondent’s predecessors-in-interest started occupying the subject
land. They only made sweeping statements to the effect that respondent had
been in possession of the property for more than thirty years. Hence, it can not
be conclusively determined whether respondent and her predecessors-in-interest
have truly been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Furthermore, respondent failed to show how the property was transferred from
Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. No
extrajudicial settlement of property was established. Consequently, respondent
can not tack her possession with those of Generosa Medina and her
predecessors-in-interest.
There is merit in the petition.
Candido Amoroso, respondent’s first witness, testified that he first knew of
the property in 1932 and that it was owned by a certain Edilberto Perido.
However, no evidence was presented to support his claim. Respondent
submitted the tax declarations in the name of her predecessors-in-interest,
including that of Edilberto. However, the earliest of these documents pertained
to the year 1948 only, three years short of the required period. Respondent’s
other witness, Vicente Laudato, claimed that he had known about the property
since he was ten years old, which was in 1945, and that Edilberto Perido owned
the property. On cross-examination, however, he testified that he based his
information on Edilberto’s ownership of the land on the fact that the latter used to
greet him and his family whenever he passed by their house. Vicente later on
admitted that he did not know with certainty whether Edilberto was indeed the
owner and possessor of the property. 13[13]

Finally, respondent failed to present the extrajudicial settlement or other

document evidencing the transfer of the land from Generosa Medina to
Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. She likewise did not show
the relationship between these parties. She only presented the deed of sale
between her and the latter, where it was stated that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria
inherited the property from Generosa. Hence, respondent can not tack her
possession with those of Generosa and her predecessors-in-interest. At most,
respondent’s possession can only be reckoned from the time that Raymundo and
Ma. Victoria claimed possession of the property.
Respondent having thus failed to show by incontrovertible evidence that her
possession of the land commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier, she failed to
meet the first requisite under the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and CA 141.
Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the land subject
of her application is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our Constitution, 14[14]

13 [13]
TSN, April 19, 1996, p. 10.
14
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution: All lands of the public domain, waters,
[14]

minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within
15[15]

private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is
16[16]

shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it

remains part of the inalienable public domain. To overcome this presumption,
17[17]

incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the

application is alienable or disposable. 18[18]

In De Ocampo v. Arlos, 19[19]

it was held that:
x x x a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land
Act only if it pertains to alienable lands of the public domain. Unless such
assets are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable, occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 1073
clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the
latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
In the case at bar, no certification from the appropriate government agency
or official proclamation reclassifying the land as alienable and disposable was
presented by respondent. Respondent merely submitted the survey map and
technical descriptions of the land, which contained no information regarding the
classification of the property. These documents are not sufficient to overcome
the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain.
Respondent argues that she was not required to present any certification
stating that the land is open for disposition because no opposition to her
application was ever made by the appropriate government agencies. She claims
that in the absence of any proof to the contrary, lands of the public domain are
agricultural in nature and thus susceptible to private ownership.
As an applicant for registration of a parcel of land, respondent had the initial
obligation to show that the property involved is agricultural. Being the interested
party, it was incumbent upon her to prove that the land being registered is indeed
alienable or disposable. She cannot rely on the mere presumption that it was
agricultural and, therefore, alienable part of the public domain. Thus, in 20[20]

State. xxx.
15
Seville v. National Development Company, G.R. No. 129401 , 2 February 2001, 351
[15]

SCRA 112, 120.

16 [16]
Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 156 (2000).
17 [17]
Menguito v. Republic, G.R. No. 134308, 14 December 2000, 348 SCRA 128, 139.
18 [18]
Pagkatipunan, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 129682, 21 March 2002.
19 [19]
G.R. No. 135527, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 716.
20
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50260, 29 July 1992, 211 SCRA 868,
[20]

876.
Director of Lands v. Funtilar, 21[21]
we held:
It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an applicant
files his application for registration, the burden shifts totally to the government
to prove that the land forms part of the unclassified forest zone. The ruling in
Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69) governs
applications for confirmation of imperfect title. The applicant shoulders the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain.
Moreover, the absence of opposition from the government agencies is of no
moment because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error
of its officials or agents. 22[22]

It bears stressing at this point that declassification of forest land and its
conversion into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes
requires an express and positive act from the government. It cannot be 23[23]

presumed; but must be established by convincing proof. 24[24]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The application for original registration of title over Lot No. 3951,
Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, which was docketed as Land
Registration Case No. TG-719 before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City,
Branch 18, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Supreme Court E-Library

FIRST DIVISION

[G. R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002]

EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES,

JOSE AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C.
TORRES, JOSEPH L. NUÑEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO

21 [21]
G.R. No. L-68533, 23 May 1986, 142 SCRA 57.
22 [22]
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 214 Phil. 606, 610.
23 [23]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48327, 21 August 1991, 201 SCRA 1, 9.
24 [24]
Pagkatipunan, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra.
 FABREGAS, FERNANDO T. TORRES, LUZ G.
TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T. TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES,
JR., IMELDA CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA
ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION, NORBERTO CAMILOTE,
CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS
BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T. GADON,
ARMANDO T. TORRES and FIDELITO ECO, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of Lands, respondents,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA
MENDOZA, MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ and
CALOMA MOISES, respondents/intervernors.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This Petition seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
25[1] 26[2]

dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which declared null and void the
Decision dated January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
27[3]

Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179, confirming the imperfect
title of petitioners over a parcel of land.

The Facts

On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration
court an application for registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area
of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares (“Lot” for brevity). The Lot is
situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal,
and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the application was the
technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which
stated, “[t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.” On March 24,
1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application to include

25 [1]
Filed under both Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
26
Thirteenth Division composed of J. Arturo B. Buena (Chairman and Ponente) and J.
[2]

Justo P. Torres, Jr. and J. Pacita Canizares-Nye as members.

27 [3]
Penned by Judge Patricio M. Patajo.
additional co-applicants. Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively
28[4]

referred to as “petitioners” for brevity). 29[5]

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the
Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal
of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’ application. In due course, the land
registration court issued an order of general default against the whole world with
the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial.
Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners.
The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their
predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the
Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real estate taxes.
According to them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares of
five hectares each. During the hearings, petitioners submitted evidence to prove
that there have been nine transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-
in-interest, as follows:
“1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of the
Applicants who was in actual, open, notorious and continuous possession of
the property in the concept of owner. He had the property surveyed in his
name on 22 March 1902 (Exhibit “W” and “W-1” testimonies of J. Torres on
16 December 1987 and Mariano Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the
property. He had the property resurveyed in his name on May 21-28,
1928 (Exhibit “X” and “X-1”; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado
Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva
before the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines during World War II. He
owned and possessed the property until 1958. He declared the property
for tax purposes, the latest of which was under Tax Declaration No. 7182
issued on 3 February 1957 (Exhibit “I” and testimony of Mariano Leyva,
supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique by
virtue of a Deed of Sale on 3 February 1958 (Exhibit “H”). During the
ownership of the property by Angelina Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the
grandson of Sesinando Leyva, the previous owner, attended to the farm.
(Testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the
property in her name under Tax Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958,
under Tax Declaration No. 8775 on 3 August 1965, under Tax Declaration

28
Co-petitioners Bernardina Tawas, Joseto C. Torres, Jose Amo, Sergio L. Montealegre
[4]

and Vicente C. Torres.

29
Co-petitioners Joseph L. Nunez, Gloria Serrano, Danilo Fabregas, Fernando T. Torres,
[5]

Luz G. Tubungbanua, Caridad T. Tutana, Jose C. Torres, Jr., Imelda Gaylaluad, Rosalie
Tutana, Norma Astorias, Myrna M. Lancion, Norberto Camilote, Cecilia Macaranas,
Pedro Briones, Remedios Bantigue, Dante L. Montealegre, Aida T. Godon, Armando T.
Torres and Fidelito Eco.
 No. 16945 on 15 December 1975, and under Tax Declaration No. 03-
06145 on 25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16
October 1982 through a Deed of Sale (Exhibit “G”).
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of Sale
dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit “P-1” to “P-3”).
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE
AMO, VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO MONTEALEGRE who bought
portions of the property from Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6
November 1985 (Exhibit “Q” to “Q-3”).
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS,
DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA,
CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE
TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA LANCION, CHONA MARCIANO,
CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIQUE,
DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA GADON and
AMELIA M. MALAPAD bought portions of the property in a Deed of Sale on
12 May 1986 (Exhibit “S” to “S-3”).
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA
MARCIANO and AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new
OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO
CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO through a Deed of Sale dated 18 January
1987 (Exhibit “T” to “T-9”).”30[6]
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial
prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor General. For failure of the oppositors
to present their evidence, the land registration court issued an order considering
the case submitted for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners. The
court later set aside the order and reset the hearing to January 14, 1991 for the
presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On this date, counsel for
oppositors failed to appear again despite due notice. Hence, the court again
issued an order submitting the case for decision based on the evidence of the
petitioners.

The Trial Court’s Ruling

After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land registration

court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their
registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered a decision
confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. We quote the pertinent portions of
the court’s decision, as follows:
“From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of

30 [6]
Consolidated Rejoinder, pp. 39-41; Rollo, pp. 285-287.
 the witnesses presented by the Applicants, the property applied for is in actual,
open, public and notorious possession by the applicants and their predecessor-
in-interest since time immemorial and said possession had been testified to by
witnesses Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre, Jose Amo and
one Chona who were all cross-examined by Counsel for Oppositor Republic of
the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for
taxation purposes in the names of the previous owners and the corresponding
taxes were paid by the Applicants and the previous owners and said property
was planted to fruit bearing trees; portions to palay and portions used for
grazing purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to
establish registrable title over said property applied for by them.
On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed,
the Court can only add that all Presidential Proclamations like the Proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed are subject to “private rights.”
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA
734, 1983 “private rights” is proof of acquisition through (sic) among means of
acquisition of public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by “private
rights” means that applicant should show clear and convincing evidence that
the property in question was acquired by applicants or their ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish government or by Possessory Information
title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands xxx” (underscoring
supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated,
Applicants have acquired private rights to which the Presidential Proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed should be subject to such private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants
that as per Certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development dated
March 18, 1980, the area applied for was verified to be within the area excluded
from the operation of the Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33
dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21, 1974
which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation, amended by
Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as the Lungsod Silangan
Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit “K”).”31[7]
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April 6,
1991, petitioners alleged that the decision dated January 30, 1991 confirming
their title had become final after the Solicitor General received a copy of the
decision on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the land registration court
order the Land Registration Authority to issue the necessary decree in their favor
over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial

31 [7]
Rollo, pp. 80-82.
Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration court had already rendered a
decision and if so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an
appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of
the land registration court’s decision dated January 30, 1991, and not on
February 18, 1991 as alleged by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an order
directing the Land Regulation Authority to issue the corresponding decree of
registration in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on
the ground that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been
previously classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to private
appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an
association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (“DENR” for brevity) under its Integrated
Social Forestry Program (“ISF” for brevity), filed with the Court of Appeals a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention. They
likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is situated
inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is inalienable. They claimed that
they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates of
stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the
preliminary conference held on April 6, 1992. During the preliminary conference,
all the parties as represented by their respective counsels agreed that the only
issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is part of the public domain. 32

[8]

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition
and declared null and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the land
registration court. The Court of Appeals explained thus:
“Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII,
Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all
lands of the public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private
respondents herein, for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of
the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).

32 [8]
Rollo, p. 91.
 A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes
(Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence
whatsoever that the land applied for as described in Psu-162620 has been
segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by competent
authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the technical description of
Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey
Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of private
respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed."”
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is
confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a
Report, dated March 2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case
No. 269-A. These documents readily and effectively negate the allegation in
private respondent Collado’s application that “said parcel of land known as
Psu-162620 is not covered by any form of title, nor any public land application
and are not within any government reservation (Par. 8, Application; Emphasis
supplied). The respondent court could not have missed the import of these vital
documents which are binding upon the courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department to classify public lands. They should
have forewarned the respondent judge from assuming jurisdiction over the
case.
“x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners
are part of the public domain, it is the Director of Lands who has
jurisdiction in the disposition of the same (subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment), and not the courts.
x x x Even assuming that petitioners did have the said properties
surveyed even before the same was declared to be part of the Busol
Forest Reservation, the fact remains that it was so converted into a
forest reservation, thus it is with more reason that this action must fail.
Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how
long, cannot convert the same into private property. And courts are
without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone. (Heirs of
Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals. 172 SCRA 563; Emphasis
supplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA
387, 391) and a decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may
be struck down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 339).”33[9]
Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

33 [9]
Rollo, pp. 91-92.
 The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS FOR
CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS’
PETITION FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR
LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 (“EO 33” for brevity) dated
July 26, 1904 established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (“MWR” for
34[10]

brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even concede

that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical, literal
description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners’ claim over the
Lot is that “all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting aside the
Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights.” They point out that
EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are “subject to existing
private rights, if any there be.” Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership
goes all the way back to 1902, when their known predecessor-in-interest,
Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the Lot. They claim that the
presumption of law then prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public
Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and claimed by individuals as
their own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable and disposable. They
conclude that private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva before the issuance
of EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners’ arguments find no basis in law.

34
Issued by Governor Luke E. Wright pursuant to the provisions of Act Numbered Six
[10]

Hundred and Forty-Eight (Act No. 648), Philippine Commission, an Act Authorizing the
Civil Governor to reserve portions of the public domain for public uses.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The Spaniards 35[11]

first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and
the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias which laid the foundation that “all lands
36[12]

that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain.” Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
37[13]

ownership of all “lands, territories and possessions” in the Philippines passed to

the Spanish Crown. 38[14]

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage
Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration
of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or
the “Maura Law” partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the
Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines. It required the “adjustment” or registration of all agricultural lands,
otherwise the lands would revert to the state. 39[15]

Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all
rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands
through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States
colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926,
the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows:
“Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons
to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the

35 [11]
Republic vs. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71 (1990).
36
“We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and
[12]

possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our
name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which
are held without proper and true deeds of grants be restored to us according as they
belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys,
audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and
commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their
present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing
to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what
they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain
free and unencumbered for us to dispose as we may wish.”
37
See separate opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment
[13]

and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA 128 (2000); Chavez vs. PEA and AMARI, G.R. No.
133250, July 9, 2002.
38 [14]
Ibid., Chavez case.
39 [15]
See note 13.
 “issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,” for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions
and grants in the Islands.” In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in
the government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain
and the United States. The term “public land” referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of
the government and the friar lands.”40[16]
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After
the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (“CA 141” for
brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this day
as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of
the public domain other than timber and mineral lands. 41[17]

In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which

recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the legislature
passed Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, which took effect
on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in the Philippines under
the Torrens system. The Torrens system requires the government to issue a
42[18]

certificate of title stating that the person named in the title is the owner of the
property described therein, subject to liens and encumbrances annotated on the
title or reserved by law. The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible
and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of the certificate. 43[19]

PD 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree enacted on June 11,

1978, amended and updated Act 496.
44[20]

The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions

The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine
substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and
waters of the public domain. Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion
45[21]

in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, explained 46[22]

40 [16]
Ibid., emphasis supplied.
41 [17]
Ibid.
42 [18]
Noblejas & Noblejas, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1992 Ed.
43 [19]
Supra, see note 13.
44 [20]
Supra, see note 13.
45 [21]
Ibid.
46 [22]
Ibid.
thus:
“One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of
the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in
favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the
adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was
seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state’s power to
control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. The delegates
to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State
ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards,
however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the
Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the
Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.”
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, on “Conservation and
47[23]

Utilization of Natural Resources” barred the alienation of all natural resources

except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State
could alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section
8, Article XIV on the “National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation”. The
48[24]

1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on 49[25]

47
“Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
[23]

minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development
of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant.”
48
“Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
[24]

mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources
of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration,
development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant.”
49
“Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
[25]

mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens,
or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
“National Economy and Patrimony”.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution
readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural
resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term “natural resource” includes “not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals,
lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human need and
contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to
the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and
recreational purposes.” 50[26]

In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al ., 51[27]

the Court had occasion to discourse on watershed areas. The Court resolved
the issue of whether the parcel of land which the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is exempt from the
coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (“CARL”
for brevity). The Court defined watershed as “an area drained by a river and
52[28]

its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from

adjacent watersheds.” However, the Court also recognized that:
“The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed.
The most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most
important human necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an
adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods
that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of
watersheds is an “intergenerational” responsibility that needs to be answered
now.”
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
“Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water
or overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural
Resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by

such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as
may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant. x x x.”
50 [26]
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., 1990.
51 [27]
G.R. No. 112526, October 12, 2001.
52
R.A. No. 6657 has suspended the authority of the President to reclassify forest or
[28]

mineral lands into agricultural lands. Section 4 (a) of RA No. 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform law of 1988) states, “No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking
into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have delimited by
law, the specific limits of the public domain.”
 such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or
occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the
investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such
waters.”
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect
watershed areas and took note of the report of the Ecosystems Research and
Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the
environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds
involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:
“The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the
heartland of both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the
Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with
proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital
waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental
effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit
river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-
an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged
areas of the Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people have little if no
direct interest in the protection of the Matangtubig structures they couldn’t care
less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life
support system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it.
From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource – water.
xxx
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound
watershed management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities
like road building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the
pernicious agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped,
it would not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The
impact of watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of
people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable
comprehensive watershed development policy and program be immediately
formulated and implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens.”
The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and Adjudication
Board or DARAB to re-evaluate and determine the nature of the parcels of land
involved in order to resolve the issue of its coverage by the CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse of
natural resources such as watershed reservations which are akin to forest zones.
Population growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the
environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked human activities could
wreak havoc on the lives of present and future generations. Hence, by
constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties of
the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they
vigorously argue, private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO
33 segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended.
He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the
public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration
in his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title may have been
derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession
especial or special grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or a
titulo de compra or title through purchase. Or, that he has had continuous,
53[29]

open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years preceding
the filing of his application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation
of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA
1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by
an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The same, however,
has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on
January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time petitioners’ application for
registration was filed on April 25, 1985. As amended, Section 48 (b) now
54[30]

reads:
“(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars
or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.”

53 [29]
Section 48 of CA 141 provides:
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have applied
for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain under
the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the
proceedings in connection therewith, but have, with or without default upon their part, or
for any other cause, not received title therefor, and such applicants or grantee and their
heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their
applications. See Director, Lands Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA
757 (2000).
54 [30]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 451 (2001).
 Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land
Act requires that the applicant must prove the following:
“(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued.”55[31]
Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to
register the Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or
title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession,
whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO
33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had
acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of
acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904,
Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years. Verily, petitioners
have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the number of years
required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to
the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since
then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time
petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as
a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners’ application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer
be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer
susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b)
of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public
agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are excluded.
It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands
cannot ripen into private ownership. In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs.
Court of Appeals, the Court declared that inalienable public lands -
56[32]

“x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both

acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State.
‘The possession of public land, however long the period may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the
statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required

55 [31]
Ibid.
56 [32]
120 SCRA 734 (1983).
 number of years to constitute a grant from the State.’ ”
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals is in point. In Gordula, petitioners
57[33]

did not contest the nature of the land. They admitted that the land lies in the
heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573
classified as inalienable. The petitioners in Gordula contended, however, that
Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior to the
reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to the subject
land. The Court ruled:
“We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable
that there be a showing of a title from the state. The facts show that petitioner
Gordula did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under
Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January,
1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in
June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest
Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as
public forest reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, “private rights,” in
Proclamation No. 573, should not be interpreted as requiring a title. They opine
that it suffices if the claimant “had occupied and cultivated the property for so
many number of years, declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the
corresponding real estate taxes [which are] accepted by the government, and
[his] occupancy and possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested and
recognized by the government. Prescinding from this premise, petitioners urge
that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit five
(5) years short of the 30-year possession required under Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the
“private rights” recognized and respected in Proclamation No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs.
Reyes, we held that a settler claiming the protection of “private rights” to
exclude his land from a military or forest reservation must show “x x x by clear
and convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by [any] x x
x means for the acquisition of public lands.”
In fine, one claiming “private rights” must prove that he has complied with
C.A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which
prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for
acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and possession of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The rationale for the 30-
year period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the
State, and that the occupants and/or possessors claim an interest therein only
by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious possession.”
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the
Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of the Philippines had subsequently
57 [33]
284 SCRA 617 (1998).
segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and
disposable when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974.
Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly excluded an area of
3,780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-boso
Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-162620 is a small part of
this excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend that town sites are
considered alienable and disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
“PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33,
DATED JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 14
AND 16, BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED
RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE
LAND EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE SAME, TOGETHER
WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR
TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF
THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the operation
of Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive
Orders Nos. 14 and 16, both series of 1915, which established the Watershed
Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of
Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein and reserve the same,
together with the adjacent parcel of land of the public domain, for townsite
purposes under the provisions of Chapter XI of the Public Land Act, subject to
private rights, if any there be, and to future subdivision survey in accordance
with the development plan to be prepared and approved by the Department of
Local Government and Community Development, which parcels are more
particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Man’s Baguio, being a portion of
the Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province
of Rizal, Island of Luzon, beginning at a point marked “1” on sketch plan, being
N-74’-30 E, 8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal; thence
N 33’ 28 W 1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40’ 26 W 1538.50 m. to point 3;
thence N 30’ 50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence N 75’ 02 W 704.33 m. to point
5; thence N 14’ 18 W 1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43’ 25 W 477.04 m. to
point 7; thence N 71’ 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31’ 05 W 1025.00 m.
to point 9; thence Due North 490.38 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1075.00
m. to point 11; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 12; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 13; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 14; thence Due
East 1000.00 m. to point 15; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 16; thence
Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East 1075.00 m. to point 18;
thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to
point 20; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due South 1000.00
 m. to point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South 1075.00 m. to point 25; thence Due
West 1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 27; thence
Due West 636.56 m. to point of beginning. Containing an area of three
thousand seven hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares, more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Man’s Baguio, being a portion of
alienable and disposable portion of public domain) situated in the municipality
of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a point marked “1”
on sketch plan being N 74’ 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1.
Antipolo, Rizal; thence Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m. to point 6; thence Due
North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 8; thence
Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 10;
thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North 509.62 m. to point
12; thence S. 31’ 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71’ 38 E 458.36 m. to
point 14; thence S 43’ 25 E 477.04 m. to point 15; thence S 14’ 18 E 1399.39
m. to point 16; thence S 75’ 02 E 704.33 m. to point 17; thence S. 30’ 50 E
503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40’ 26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s 33’
23 e 1575.00 m to point of beginning. Containing an area of one thousand two
hundred twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future
survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the
seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21 st day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines”
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No. 1637
issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and location
of the proposed townsite. According to then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos,
Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed by petitioners is
part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to MWR coverage. Proclamation
58[34]

No. 1637 reads:

“PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES
OF ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON
BY INCREASING THE AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL

58
Memorandum of then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos to the President of the
[34]

Philippines dated March 29, 1996, Rollo, pp. 439-440.

 DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING
PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED
PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to
the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974
which established the townsite reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo and
San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the area and
revising the technical descriptions of the land embraced therein, subject to
private rights, if any there be, which parcel of land is more particularly described
as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation
amending the area under SWO-41762 establishing the Bagong Silangan
Townsite Reservation) situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo,
and Montalban, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along
lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the
Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines 23-24-25 by the
portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-26-27-28-29-30 by the
Municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-
33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by the Angat Watershed Reservation.
Beginning at a point marked “1” on the Topographic Maps with the Scale of
1:50,000 which is the identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed
Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future
survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas
entirely within the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is hereby revoked
accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the
seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines”
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is
needed to declassify land which had been earlier classified as a watershed
reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes. Unless and until the land classified as such is released in an
59[35]

official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands

59 [35]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 1 (1991).
of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. 60[36]

The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private

character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development
dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed
(Exh. R). The Certification reads:
“Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
EL – AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal, containing an area of 1,269,766 square meters, as shown and
described on the reverse side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo
Cabading for Angelina C. Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded
from the operation of Marikina Watershed Reservation established under
Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283,
promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the Boso-Boso Townsite
Reservation, amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known
as Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under
P.D. 1396 dated June 2, 1978 under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Human Settlements, to the exclusion of any other government agencies.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as
contained in his internal memorandum dated March 18, 1986.
Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY
Chief, Forest Engineering &
Infrastructure Section”
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification had
occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the reclassification, is contradicted by
60 [36]
Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69 (1983).
several documents submitted by the Solicitor General before the land registration
court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a Report 61[37]

dated March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the then

National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, confirming that the
Lot described in Psu-162620 forms part of the MWR. He thus recommended the
dismissal of the application for registration. The Report states:
“COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Commission and to this Honorable Court respectfully reports that:
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the Barrio of San
Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, is applied for registration of
title in the case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it was found that a
portion of the SW, described as Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was previously the
subject of registration in Land Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC Record No. N-
55948 and was issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986 in the name of
Apolonia Garcia, et al., pursuant to the Decision and Order for Issuance of
the Decree dated February 8, 1984 and March 6, 1984, respectively, and the
remaining portion of plan Psu-162620 is inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed. x
xx
“WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable
Court for its information and guidance with the recommendation that the
application in the instant proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing
(Underlining supplied).”
Likewise, in a letter dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land Inspector,
62[38]

DENR, Region IV, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office,

Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. The letter
states:
“That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso),
Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO
SEVEN SIXTY SIX (126.0766) hectares, more particularly described in Psu-
162620, which is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive
Order No. 33 dated July 2, 1904 which established the Marikina Watershed
Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
“x x x
“That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the
Registration Applicant but part of the public domain, not subjected to disposition
and is covered by Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social Forestry Program
hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is recommended for rejection (Underlining supplied).”
Copy of the letter is attached herewith as Annex “3” and made an integral part
hereof.”

61 [37]
Rollo, p. 197.
62 [38]
Ibid., p. 198.
 Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T.
Collado’s [as original applicant] application is the technical description of the
63[39]

Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division of

the Bureau of Lands. This technical description categorically stated that the Lot
“is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.”
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show
clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the Marikina
Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included within a watershed
reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a
presumption arises that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until
clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Even if they
submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from the MWR upon
the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners’ possession
as of the filing of their application on April 25, 1985 would have been only eleven
years counted from the issuance of the proclamation in 1974. The result will not
change even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed
the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners’ case falters
even more because of the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977.
According to then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637
reverted Lot A or the townsite reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly
situated, back to the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated
and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners. The following ruling may be
applied to this case by analogy:
“A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered
with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest
lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification
is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as “forest”
is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation
of imperfect title do not apply.”64[40]

63 [39]
CA Rollo, p. 117.
64 [40]
Supra, see note 36.
 Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment
should have been given due course.

Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the Republic’s
petition for annulment of judgment which was filed long after the decision of the
land registration court had allegedly become final and executory. The land
registration court rendered its decision on January 30, 1991 and the Solicitor
General received a copy of the decision on April 23, 1991. Petitioners point out
65[41]

that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals the petition for
annulment of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 only on August 6, 66[42]

1991, after the decision had supposedly become final and executory. Moreover,
petitioners further point out that the Solicitor General filed the petition for
annulment after the land registration court issued its order of May 6, 1991
directing the Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree of
registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground
that the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the case, specifically, over
the Lot which was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General
maintained that the decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer
available because it is barred by the principle of res judicata. They insist that the
land registration court had jurisdiction over the case which involves private land.
They also argue that the Republic is estopped from questioning the land
registration court’s jurisdiction considering that the Republic participated in the
proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not
alienable and disposable public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not
clearly and convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased
to be a portion of the area classified as a watershed reservation of the public
domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged
procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment
are immaterial since the land registration court never acquired jurisdiction over
the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court involving the Lot are
therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 67[43]
as follows:

65
Petitioners claim that the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision as early as
[41]

February 18, 1991.

66 [42]
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
x x x.
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial
Courts; x x x.
67 [43]
56 SCRA 647 (1974).
 “The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable
properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain,
and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private applicant.
Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the
Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be
attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not
bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations.”
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns
over technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles, which involved the registration of public
68[44]

lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res judicata
and estoppel to silence the Republic’s claim over public lands. The Court said:
“It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not
apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental
rights, nor does estoppel or laches validate an act that contravenes law or
public policy, and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its application would
involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality.”
The Court further held that ”the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of
the public properties registered and which are not capable of private
appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.”
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of
certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under its Integrated Social
Forestry Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which
petitioners sought to register. Aware that the parcels of land which their
forefathers had occupied, developed and tilled belong to the Government, they
filed a petition with then President Corazon C. Aquino and then DENR Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to
take steps for the segregation of the aforementioned area from the MWR for
development under the DENR’s ISF Programs. Subsequently, then President
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430
hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the same under the DENR’s
Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26,
1904 WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA WATERSHED RESERVATION
(IN-12) AS AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS
EMBRACED THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN,

68 [44]
159 SCRA 264 (1988).
 VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY
OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C.
AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of
Executive Order No. 33, which established the Marikina Watershed
Reservation, certain parcel of land of the public domain embraced therein
situated in Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San Joseph and
Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and place the same under
the Integrated Social Forestry Program of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations,
which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
“A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation
situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, beginning at
point “1” on plan, being identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed
Reservation; thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty
(1,430) Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No.
33 as amended, not otherwise affected by this Proclamation, shall
remain in force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the
seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and ninety.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines”
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting through
the Regional Executive Director of the DENR (Region IV), issued sometime
between the years 1989 to 1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona fide
residents of the barangays mentioned in the proclamation as qualified recipients
of the ISF programs. Among those awarded were intervenors. The certificates
of stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by the DENR to actual
occupants of parcels of land under its ISF programs for a period of twenty-five
(25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years. The DENR awarded
69[45]

contracts of stewardship to ISF participants in Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-

boso) and the other barangays based on the Inventory of Forest Occupants the
DENR had conducted. 70[46]

According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the

69 [45]
CA Rollo, p. 119.
70 [46]
Ibid., p. 88.
pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Opposition in Intervention before the land registration court to assert their rights
and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that
the land registration court had already rendered a decision on January 30, 1991
confirming petitioners’ imperfect title. Intervenors’ counsel received a copy of the
decision on August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for
new trial before the land registration court. According to intervenors, the land
registration court could not act on its motions due to the restraining order issued
by the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining the land registration court
from executing its decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor General in its petition
for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus constrained to file a
petition for intervention before the Court of Appeals which allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 71[47]
provides in pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court, or an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The Court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
inertvenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at any
time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-
intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed “before rendition of judgment by the trial
court,” as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has
recognized exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago vs.
Court of Appeals reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of
72[48]

Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for intervention even when the
case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:
“It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the
movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial had already been
concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals
and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already
submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and, manifestly
late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the rules
of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated,

71 [47]
Rule 12 under the old Rules of Court.
72 [48]
303 SCRA 600 (1999).
 is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make
the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose
of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application
of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder
and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not
constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants.
It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it
is a means to an end.”
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of
intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not in issue. Neither was the validity
of the certificates of stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly possessed
inquired into considering this too was not in issue. In fact, intervenors did not
specifically seek any relief apart from a declaration that the Lot in question
remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot fault the Court of
Appeals for allowing the intervention, if only to provide the rival groups a peaceful
venue for ventilating their sides. This case has already claimed at least five lives
due to the raging dispute between the rival camps of the petitioners on one side
and those of the DENR awardees on the other. It also spawned a number of
criminal cases between the two rival groups including malicious mischief, robbery
and arson. A strict application of the rules would blur this bigger, far more
important picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the Decision dated January
30, 1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A,
LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.

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